Corruption and Organized Crime
in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition
LOUISE SHELLEY
American University
President Fox has made the improvement of public safety and reduction in corruption priorities of his
government. Backed by an educated urban middle-class electorate, he faces fundamental challenges to the
achievement of his goals. These include a legacy of institutionalized PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary
Party) corruption, limited respect for the rule of law, and the penetration of drug trafficking groups into the
state structure. Mexico's long border with the United States has contributed to the rapid rise in organized
crime and the use of Mexican territory by foreign crime groups. Mexico's past may preclude the transition
to a more democratic and open society despite the best of presidential intentions and the desires of much of
the Mexican population.
The election of President Vicente Fox ended 70 years of PRI (Institutionalized
Revolutionary Party) domination over Mexico. During his campaign, President Fox, a
candidate of the right-of-center PAN (National Action Party), said that he would place
public security and elimination of corruption at the top of the government agenda. In the
first months of his presidency, he has not wavered from his campaign promises to
address corruption, drug tracking, and the accompanying violence, which have deeply
penetrated the Mexican political structure and daily life in northern and coastal Mexico.
He has taken forceful and decisive actions to crack down on the drug trade, for example,
sending 700 heavily armed agents to Tijuana in January 2001 to deliver on his
commitment to eradicate crime from this violenceplagued city.
President Fox's campaign against crime and corruption is too new to have delivered
long-term results. Yet, the citizenry has faith in his ability to make a difference.
Evidence of this is the significant decline in the number of illegal border crossings
between Mexico and the United States, suggesting that the poorest of Mexican citizens
believe that there is a possibility for change. FurJournal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 3. August 2001 213-231
© 2001 Sage Publications
213
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thermore, there has been a dramatic increase in killing and retaliation among drug
traffickers. A wave of violence has been unleashed in Sinaloa. Between December 1,
2000, and January 8, 2001, 79 murders occurred, or an average of two a day since Fox
assumed the presidency. Organized crime members, as illustrated in Colombia and Italy,
often kill each other when they face increased governmental repression and fears that
members will cooperate with government law enforcers (Abadinsky, 2000).
Many Mexican analysts fear that Fox will face the same obstacles that some of his
PRI predecessors faced. Combating one or two drug organizations only strengthens the
capacity of rival groups. But to launch a simultaneous attack on the Gulf, Juarez,
Tijuana, and Sonora cartels is beyond the capacity of the Mexican state, which now
lacks reliable cadres in the federal police and investigative bodies.
Fox faces formidable challenges in combating the institutionalized corruption of the
PRI on the national, regional, and local level. In January 2001, he established a
Government Transparency Commission to address the wide range and diverse forms of
corruption that exist in Mexico. Previously, government agencies were reluctant to
provide information to the Comptroller General about potential areas of corruption risk.
Therefore, the new commission faces a challenge to convince the public and state
officials that it is more than a symbolic commission. Yet, this is a necessary step if Fox
is to deliver on his promise to improve the administrative capacity of the state.
The new president's ability to achieve reform in the future may be limited by the
legacy of institutionalized grand corruption and the political-criminal nexus of the drug
traffickers with the state apparatus. Compounding the problem is the fact that Fox's
PAN does not have a plurality of seats in the Mexican legislature. Yet, the president's
recognition that addressing crime and corruption is key to governmental and social
reform is a key step in the right direction. Also significant is his effort to engage the
United States in a new way because our border and American demand for illicit
products affect Mexico's ability to address its crime problems.
PRECONDITIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Mexico, as a Spanish colony, inherited the Spanish legal system and tradition. James
Billington (1970), the Librarian of Congress, has written that two regions of Europe
remained outside the Enlightenment, the Iberian peninsula and Russia. Therefore, these
areas failed to benefit from the Enlightenment ideal of the rule of law. The former
Spanish colonies and the countries that were under Russian rule have suffered from this
historical legacy by having less respect for the rule of law and consequently higher
levels of corruption.
Shelley / THE POST PRI TRANSITION
215
Even before the arrival of the Spaniards, there was a high level of economic disparity
in pre-Colombian society. The arrival of the Spanish reduced the social status of the
Aztecs and other Indian groups within Mexico but did not change the high level of
economic differentiation within Mexican society. A historical exhibit in the Cuernavaca
Museum vividly lays out the social hierarchies in Mexican society from the
pre-Colombian period to the present. The groups represented in the diagram change but
not their relative status within Mexican society or their overall control of the country's
resources.
Disparities in income, patron-client relationships, and the failure to observe the rule
of law exacerbate the problems of corruption. Citizens believe they cannot resolve their
problems through legal channels, and citizens at all levels of society resort to bribes and
other illegal means to achieve the desired output from the legal system.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
FACILITATING CORRUPTION
High-level and pervasive corruption rather than brute force characterized the "one
party democracy" of Mexico (Doig, 1984). The PRI has been the distributor of benefits
including jobs, contracts, educational opportunities, and social services. The process of
co-optation of opposition undermined resistance to the PRI's dominance.
The long-term rule of the PRI assured stability in Mexico, which evaded the cycles of
military and civilian rule that have characterized most Latin American governments.
Yet, the dominance of one political party did not contribute to the development of
competitive democratic institutions and the rule of law. Instead, the unique role of the
PRI in Mexican society, rather than particular features of its organization, contributed to
the high level of corruption.
In any country or city where one political group has enjoyed a dominant political role,
corruption has tended to increase overtime. Analogies can be drawn to the Christian
Democratic coalition in Italy after World War II, the Liberal party in Japan, or the
Democratic party in New York and Chicago in the United States. The unique role that
these parties have played in these governments for decades prevented a competitive
party system (Johnston, 1997).
The acme of Mexican government corruption was reached during the Salinas years
(1988 to 1994) (Pimental, 1999). The Salinas administration was highly praised by the
international community for opening up the economic system and privatizing
state-owned enterprises. Yet 'the reality was quite different from the international image.
Policies taken to modernize the Mexican economy inadvertently contributed to the rise
of organized crime and corruption (Andreas, 1999).
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During the Salinas period, drug traffickers acquired unprecedented influence at high
levels of the national government as well as at the level of regional governorships.
President Carlos Salinas's brother, Raul, received massive payments from the drug
traffickers. The indictment of Raul Salinas and the freezing of his assets by the Swiss
government after a lengthy investigation provide evidence of the serious penetration of
drug traffickers at the heights of national power (del Ponte, 1999). The arrest and
confinement in the United States of former Deputy Attorney General Mario Ruiz
Massieu, a member of Salinas's inner circle, is further evidence of the same phenomenon. Key governorships were also held by drug traffickers and their close associates. For
example, Mexican authorities investigated the governor of Quintana Roo, who was
suspected of being a central figure in a Peruvian-Colombian-Mexican drug conspiracy,
and governors of Morelos and northwestern Sonora have also been implicated in major
drug trafficking networks (Drug Enforcement Administration, 1999; Winer, 2001).
Frequent changes in the attorney general's office (the procuraduria) during the
Salinas years meant that there was no continuity of leadership within the justice system
and no important drug case could be seen to completion. Powerful drug lords were able
to influence the selection of the attorney general, and frequent changes in the top legal
official allowed different drug trafficking organizations to exercise their influence over
the government and impede all unwanted investigations. When the honest ombudsman
of Mexico, Dr. Jorge Carpizo, was made attorney general, he was not able to return
integrity to the office because he could not assert control during his short tenure.
The progressive Instituto de Ciencias Penales (Institute of Penal Sciences), under the
General Procuracy, trained researchers and students in reform of the justice system. It
was closed in the final years of the Salinas period and only recently reopened.' Many
students who served in the justice system as investigators and prosecutors had personal
experiences with high-level interference in the legal cases they were handling. Serious
impediments were placed on the investigation of high-level financial crimes committed
by politically connected offenders, even though their crimes were costly to the Mexican
state.
While the well-meaning students of the Instituto de Ciencias Penales made great
efforts to educate themselves and to promote a more just administration of justice in
Mexico, the building adjoining the institute housed the training school of the policia
judicial (the federal police force). During the Salinas period, people paid significant
bribes to enter the law enforcement body, the fees sometimes fronted by drug
traffickers, who expected services in return for the sums advanced. The expensive jeeps
and other vehicles driven by the new recruits at the academy of the policia judicial
reflected the fact that these
Shelley / THE POST PRI TRANSITION
217
individuals were not and would not be living on their governmental salaries. Many of
these law enforcers enjoyed impunity for their crimes. In 1998, police personnel were
arrested for robbery, rape, fraud, and homicide; some of the arrest warrants had not been
acted on since 1991 (Drug Enforcement Administration, 1998).
The Zedillo administration, which followed Salinas in 1994, did not have the high
level of internal corruption exemplified by Raul Salinas. Yet it could not be a real force
for change because President Zedillo was elected on the PRI ticket and could not
promote reform of his corrupted party. He proved a transitional figure between the most
corrupt of PRI administrations and the more open political system that President Fox
seeks to promote.
A painful transition process awaits Mexico, as President Fox tries to create a more
democratic society and multiparty state. Despite the new president's commitment to fight
corruption, transitional periods provide enormous opportunities for corruption because
there are now many more actors competing for power and more individuals who need to
provide consent (Weyland, 1998). Transitional periods are often characterized by
enhanced organized crime infiltration into the economic and political structure. As
research on the Russian and Sicilian mafias has shown, transitional periods in which
there is more focus on large-scale institutional change and less focus on the administration of justice prove conducive to the rise of organized crime (Gambetta, 1993).
ECONOMIC CHANGE, CORRUPTION,
AND ORGANIZED CRIME
Major economic changes of the 1980s and 1990s, which improved the
competitiveness of the Mexican economy, also had a profound impact on the capacity of
domestic crime groups to act on the North American continent and in the global
economy. With globalization and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
in particular, the Mexican economy became more fully integrated into the global
economy. Weapons, toxic waste, and smuggling of human beings and endangered
species have become part of a larger web of corruption, which originates in Mexico but
is aided by parties in America who facilitate this illicit cross-border trade (de Olloqui,
1998). Illicit trade has grown in tandem with the licit trade. The institutionalized corruption in the legal system makes it impossible to combat these trends.
In the 1980s, like many countries in Latin America, Mexico embarked on a massive
program of privatization of state resources (Manzetti & Blake, 1996). In an effort to
improve economic efficiency, the technocrats running Mexico chose to follow the
economic strategy pursued by many countries and reduce
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the state sector of the economy. Prior to Mexico's ambitious program of privatization in
the 1980s and 1990s, the state owned about 40% of the national economy.
Government technocrats, with the assistance of foreign advisers, embarked on a
major program of privatization. Many of the economic advisers to the Mexican
government were the same people who gave advice in eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. They believed that the primary focus should be on the speed of
privatization and not on the transparency of the process!
Mexico was a beneficiary of advice that was not suited to its particular economic and
political situation. Insufficient safeguards accompanied the privatization process, and
little attention was paid to the sources of capital that were used to buy state property.
Mexico lacked a sufficiently outspoken press, a mobilized civil society, and an
independent and honest law enforcement system to counteract these developments.
Therefore, many valuable state assets were sold without adequate assessment of their
value and income. As a consequence of the Mexican process of privatization, many of
Mexico's richest families became billionaires, increasing the economic disparity in
Mexico. These families acquired controlling shares of the most valuable banks, food
sectors, and telecommunications. Families with money from drugs and the gambling
sector, tainted by massive money laundering, were able to acquire formerly state-owned
businesses, allowing them to mingle criminal money with the legitimate economy and
thereby facilitating the infiltration of organized crime into the larger Mexican economy
(Oppenheimer, 1996).
THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION
FACILITATING CORRUPTION
Mexico's proximity to the United States is an important factor in its present level of
organized crime and the concomitant corruption. The United States is the greatest
consumer of drugs in the world. Mexico's lengthy border with the United States has
made the country a natural staging ground for drug operations to the United States, a
process facilitated by the long history of smuggling across our mutual border. Mexico's
major trafficking organizations are located either in the north or in coastal areas with
excellent transport routes.
Mexican crime groups are not the only ones to exploit the long, loosely reg
ulated border. The Colombians in the 1970s and 1980s began to move drugs
in large quantities across Mexico to reach the United States (Abadinsky, 2000,
pp. 252-255). More recently, Chinese organized crime groups exploited the
lax Mexican law enforcement and used the Mexican American border to traf
fic people into the United States. Many other groups from all over the world
Shelley / THE POST PRI TRANSITION
219
are now using Mexico as a haven or a transhipment point to move drugs and other
smuggled commodities into the United States.'
Crackdowns on the Medellin cartel in Colombia in the late 1980s gave Mexican drug
trafficking organizations an enormous opportunity. Increasingly, Mexicans ceased to be
middlemen and facilitators for the Colombian drug organizations and themselves
became major exporters of drugs to the United States (Andreas, 1999).
Mexican drug trafficking organizations control the production of many forms of
narcotics, including methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin. They corrupt officials on
both sides of the border to move their commodities and launder their proceeds. Mexico
is the largest source of foreign marijuana bound for the United States. It is also the
largest source of methamphetanunes, particularly those bound for the western United
States. It is a major transit point for the movement of potassium permanganate, which is
used in the purification of cocaine. Although Mexico produces only 2% of the world's
opium, nearly its entire harvested crop is converted into heroin and shipped to the United
States (Gomez-Cespedes, 1999).
Access to the large illicit markets of the United States has resulted in more diversified
crime groups in Mexico than in Colombia. Although these groups are most recognized
for their lucrative narcotics trade, many smaller groups also traffic in human beings,
waste, weapons, endangered species, and art. In 1999, according to Immigration and
Naturalization Service statistics, 1.8 million individuals were apprehended on the
U.S.-Mexican border (personal communication, Ben Bell, director of the analytical
division, 2000). Many of these crossings were facilitated by professional human
smugglers. The murder in late March 2001 of Saul Antonio Martinez Gutierrez, deputy
editor of the daily, El Imparcial, in Tamaulipas near the Texas border was possibly tied
to his investigations of immigrant smuggling and official c6rruption (Committee to
Protect Journalists, 2001). Trafficking for sexual exploitation also goes on, as evidenced
by the Cadena case, in which young girls and women from Veracruz were brought to the
southeastern United States to work in brothels (U.S. v. Roegerio Cadena et al., 1999).
The Cadena case is not an exception. The Mexican government representative on
migratory matters in Central America recognized in early 2001 that Mexico is one of the
top countries in the trafficking of children for sexual exploitation (Drug Enforcement
Administration, 2001).
The geographic advantage that Mexican drug traffickers enjoy because of their
proximity to the United States has contributed significantly to their rapid growth and the
concomitant rise in corruption of the law enforcement and legal system. Law
enforcement corruption is entrenched and is particularly acute in regions of the country
where organized crime organizations are
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Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice / August 2001
the dominant economic force (Gomez-Cespedes, 1999). The corruption of the federal
police was infamous, but many had more faith in the procuraduria and the military. This
faith was shattered by the arrest in 1997 of General Gutierrez Rebollo, Commissioner of
the Attorney General's National Institute to Combat Drugs (the equivalent of the
American drug czar) on charges of being on the payroll of the drug traffickers
(Gomez-Cespedes, 1999).
The problems have not ceased under President Fox's administration. In January 2001,
the drug kingpin Joaquin Guzman Loera escaped from Puente Grand Federal
Penitentiary. The prison warden and more than 70 other individuals were placed under
house arrest while the federal procuracy initiated an investigation. The escape was
allegedly planned a year in advance and involved $2.5 million in payoffs to prison
officials, employees as well as officials in the Interior Ministry, according to sources in
the Interior Ministry and the agency charged with federal prosecutions ("El Chapo
Paid," 2001). The release in January 2001 of the six suspects in the mob killing of
television comedian Francisco Stanley in June 1999 has given great visibility to the
problems of the Mexican investigatory process and the administration of justice (Leovy,
2001).
Long-term efforts by the Mexican government to address the criminalization of law
enforcement have been stymied by inadequate vetting, training, and salaries for law
enforcement officials. The Mexican government has established several programs to
improve the quality of policing. The National Public Safety System has established a
national police registry to prevent police who are dismissed for corruption from being
hired by another law enforcement entity. In addition, background checks and polygraphs
are being conducted on all federal prosecutors, police agents, forensic experts, and pilots
assigned to counter-drug duties. These are major-steps toward reducing corruption, but
President Fox faces serious challenges in ensuring integrity in the enforcement of
Mexican laws.
CIVIL SOCIETY PROTECTIONS
AGAINST CORRUPTION ARE MUTED
During the period of PRI domination, the forces of civil society were not strong
enough to combat the rise of organized crime and corruption. Intellectuals expressed
their concern but were not a major force to effect change. Labor unions had been
co-opted by the PRI. Few members of the church have criticized the rising power of the
drug traffickers, with the exception of the archbishop of Guadalajara, who was
subsequently assassinated. Educators did not focus on these issues in school curricula
(Godson, 1998).
The major media, although they were able to discuss openly many aspects of Mexican
society, have been muted in discussing the domestic problems of
Shelley / THE POST PRI TRANSITION
221
organized crime and corruption. The intimidation and execution of journalists and
whistleblowers have resulted in limited frank discussion because many journalists
engage in self-censorship. Moreover, publishers, fearing reprisals, often do not give
their staff members the opportunity to pursue articles on these topics.
The late 1990s was a very difficult period for journalists. Attacks on journalists
increased in 1998 over 1997, although the number of journalists killed declined. The
Comision Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (National Human Rights Commission)
recorded 32 complaints concerning attacks on journalists, whereas the Manuel Buendia
Foundation reported 57 incidents in the same period. The most serious case reported was
the killing of a reporter for the Mexican City daily, La Tarde, who had reported on
corruption in the federal prosecutorial agency, charging that its officials were
collaborating with drug traffickers. Witnesses implicated agency employees in the
reporter's killing (U.S. Department of State, 1998).
Despite the serious harassment and intimidation of members of the Mexican
journalism community, a few journalists have been brave enough to write on these
subjects. In 1997, journalists mobilized to provide greater selfdefense. The Socieded de
Periodistas began operating in 1998. According to the international watchdog body, the
Committee to Protect Journalists (1998), the society has had an impact by pressuring the
government for fuller investigations into attacks and assassination of journalists. Their
pressure is important because those who expose corruption are not provided adequate
legal protection by the Mexican state.
The situation of journalists has become even more precarious in the period since the
Fox election. The Committee to Protect Journalists has expressed its concern about the
previously mentioned killing of an investigative reporter in Tamaulipas in early 2001,
but the committee's analyst points out that this is not an isolated incident but part of a
larger system of threats and killings of journalists in border areas. Journalists are
reflecting a new sense that it is possible to address crime and corruption, but their
investigations of those who traffic in drugs and human beings have prompted heightened
intimidation and reprisals.
Mobilization of civil society has been one of the most effective forces to combat
corruption and organized crime in other countries. Palermo women organized the
"Committee of the Sheets" movement by hanging slogan-filled sheets from their
windows following Mafia killings. They proved to be an important force in restoring
civic pride and helped reclaim the city from the domination of organized crime
(Schneider, 1998). No such massive movement has arisen in Mexico to address the
serious organized crime and corruption problems. Instead, the majority of the
middle-class and educated urban
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citizens surprised the political pundits in summer 2000 and voted against the PRI
candidate in the national as well as many regional elections.
Impeding the rise of a civil society in opposition to organized crime have been the
institutionalization and glorification of the traffickers within the society. Particularly in
the northern states, such as Sinaloa, Sonora, Monterrey, and of course Tijuana,
musicians such as the corridos or La Tambora glorify drug traffickers. Movies, art, and
literature also extol the virtues of the drug traffickers without depicting the larger costs
of their activity for Mexican society (Abadinsky, 2000, p. 476).
As in Sicily, which has also given birth to major organized crime groups, the societal
focus in Mexico has been on the interests of the immediate and the extended family
rather than on the larger interests of a more impersonal societal good. The declining
power of the PRI and the rise of an educated urban population concerned with political
reform may provide the opening for a more developed civil society ready to address the
issues of organized crime and corruption.
STRENGTHS OF MEXICO
Mexico has many internal strengths to deal with the problems of corruption and the
increasingly serious problem of organized crime. The long-term commitment of Mexico
in the 20th century to the development of its citizens has meant significant investment in
education. Rapid population growth in the past century and the presence of a wealthy
elite have not precluded the development of a significant educated middle class. The
internal strife over the strike that closed UNAM (the national university in Mexico City)
in 1999-2000 is emblematic of the enormous national attention paid to education and the
possibility of social advancement through affordable higher education.
Many in Mexico speak of the passivity of the Mexican population, particularly before
the most recent elections. But Mexicans can mobilize to address problems that concern
them, and Mexico has seen increasing activism on issues that affect the individual:
education and the rights of women and indigenous groups. Women's groups have united
in large numbers to address issues of concern such as violence against women and
sexual discrimination. Moreover, many have organized to protect indigenous rights in
Chiapas.
There has been less willingness to engage on more abstract issues such as justice and
corruption. Until the 1990s, such issues were not seen as serious threats to Mexican
society and governance. For many years, internationally respected economists wrote that
corruption aids economic development by greasing the wheels of a heavily
bureaucratized society. Yet, many Mexicans learned to the contrary during successive
currency crises in the 1990s. The
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223
corruption of the banking system, the absence of transparency in financial
institutions, and the failure of the government to explain to its citizens that there was a
fiscal crisis resulted in huge losses for citizens during massive peso devaluations. Many
lost their life savings because of the government's failure to provide adequate oversight
of financial institutions and because of the cozy relationship that existed between many
leading financial figures and the ruling political party.
Many Mexicans passively observed the rise of drug trafficking organizations; they
saw the drug problem as external to Mexico. They did not understand that the rise of
the drug trade would weaken the fabric of Mexican society through increased drug use
and violence and promote the acceptance of a criminal culture. The killing of
Archbishop Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo in Guadalajara in 1993 (Catholic World News
Service, 1997), the ambush of the police chief of Tijuana, the revelations concerning
Raul Salinas's links to drug traffickers, and the highly public assassination of Jose
Francisco Massieu (Smith, 1999) were a rude awakening to many Mexicans that there
were enormous domestic costs to key institutions of Mexican society-the church and the
political system-from the activities of drug organizations.
Mexican society has yet to address in a sustained manner the grand corruption that
affects the political and economic system, but it has made much more progress in
addressing the low level corruption that affects daily life. Oversight institutions have
been established in the 1990s to promote improved administration of government and to
address some of the more glaring cases of corruption. Independent watchdog bodies
have been established to oversee World Bank projects to ensure that loan money is used
for its intended purpose.
Highly significant has been the establishment of the National Human Rights
Commission in 1990 and subsequently the establishment of such a commission at the
level of Mexico City (Americas Watch, 1991). These bodies not only listen to citizen
complaints but also perform serious investigative functions and demand changes.
Improvements in prison conditions and the reduction of corruption in penal institutions
have been achieved as a result of direct intervention by the Mexican National Human
Rights Commission (see, e.g., Galindo, 1990; Villegas, 1991).
Low level corruption has also been addressed in the area of traffic tickets. Women,
who are generally less active in corruption circles, have been hired to write parking
tickets. Initial reports indicate that this innovation is a success because revenues have
gone up and abuses associated with ticketing have gone down. Some might suggest that
this policy change is a recognition by the government that it could not combat
corruption. Anticorruption strategists, however, point out that it is important to diminish
the opportunities for
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corruption. By reserving the criminal law only for the most serious violations and using
the administrative law exclusively for more minor offenses, there are fewer possibilities
for corrupt exchanges.
THE POLITICAL COSTS
The political costs of corruption and organized crime are high for Mexico. Among
these costs is the negative impact on bilateral relations with the United States. In fact,
the drug war has become one of the major sources of tension between the two countries
(del Alizal,1991; Villegas, 1991). Increasingly, the U.S.-Mexico relationship is defined
in terms of counter-narcotics efforts, and much American reporting on Mexico in the
press and television concerns the drug trade and trafficking organizations.' The annual
drug certification process, in which Congress determines whether Mexico is paying
enough heed to drug trafficking, reduces the highly complex Mexican American
relationship to a single dimension (Gomez-Cespedes, 1999). Critics of the drug
certification process state that Mexican efforts to control drugs accelerate in the period
leading up to the congressional review, suggesting that they serve political rather than
control processes. Those that focus on the drug control process criticize certification of
Mexico as a rubber stamp because free trade under NAFTA and concerns over illegal
immigration take precedence over the drug issue.
Mexican efforts to prove compliance result in an expensive national policy (National
Drug Control Program, 1996), drug raids, and other publicitygarnering measures
designed to impress the U.S. Congress. These efforts funnel Mexican resources to
highly visible drug operations and away from social and development programs that
might have more success in combating the overall drug trade.
Drug-related corruption has also affected Mexico's image in the international arena.
The costs of this have been especially severe because many countries embraced
President Salinas as a reformer only to have their "new image" of Mexico visibly
shattered by the high level corruption of his administration. The ongoing international
money laundering investigation involving Raul Salinas and the self-exile of former
President Salinas have undermined Mexico's political standing in the world by showing
that corruption and organized crime reached the very top of the Mexican political
structure (Smith, 1999). The recent election of President Fox and the end of the PRI
monopoly on the presidency have gone a long way to reverse this negative image of
Mexico.
Americans blame Mexicans for corrupting the American system without
acknowledging that American conditions-our demand for drugs-helped give rise to the
drug trade.' Corruption of American law enforcement on our
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225
borders facilitates both the trade in drugs and human trafficking. Furthermore, American
financial institutions play a key role in the Mexican drug trade by helping to launder
money.
The financial services provided to those associated with the drug trade are not limited
to small-scale exchange operations or questionable banks. As the Senate hearings in Fall
1999 revealed, major American institutions such as Citibank allowed Raul Salinas to
launder his money. Citibank's private banking services, which remained outside the
scrutiny of its money-laundering controls, allowed Salinas to move millions through the
American banking system without due diligence investigations on the source of his
funds ("Private Banking," 1999). Without the legitimizing effect of major American
financial institutions such as Citibank, it would have been harder for Raul Salinas to
move such significant sums to Switzerland and other locales.
Despite these revelations of high-level American complicity in Mexican money
laundering, the problem is viewed as exclusively Mexican, and no responsibility is
accepted on the other side of the border. In the highly publicized American anti-money
laundering operation, Casa Blanca, American law enforcement investigated drug-related
money laundering by Mexican banks. Interviews conducted by the author with American
law enforcers close to the investigation revealed that the parameters of the investigation
were established at the outset. The focus of the investigation was money laundering by
Mexican institutions. American institutions that might be complicit in this money
laundering were outside the scope of the investigation. Yet, several American
money-laundering specialists interviewed suggested that a comprehensive investigation
of money laundering by Mexican drug traffickers could not fail to implicate financial
institutions on the American side of the Mexican-U.S. border.'
The high-level political costs of operation Casa Blanca are clear. Mexican
sovereignty was violated, and only Mexican institutions paid fines and had their
financial integrity discredited. Law enforcement issues related to crime and corruption
took precedence over the powerful value of national sovereignty.
BILATERAL STRATEGIES
The terms of engagement between the United States and Mexico may change with
new presidents in both countries. The emphasis that President Fox is putting on the need
to open borders and increase investment and economic growth in Mexico is different
from the policy of his predecessors.
The laundering of drug-related assets in the United States means that the profits of
much of Mexico's trade remain in the United States. Under the terms of the Vienna
Convention governing drug trade, the country where the drug proceeds are laundered has
the legal right to confiscate the illegal pro-
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ceeds.$ In recent years, millions in drug profits have been seized in the United States
and Switzerland. The money has gone into the government treasuries and, in the
American case, has increased the money allocated for law enforcement efforts (Shelley,
2000). Now may be the time to think of joint strategies to use some of this money for
prevention and development rather than merely crime control.
Weapons smuggling from the United States to Mexico increases violence and public
insecurity. The availability of guns in the United States and the constitutional right to
bear arms means that guns are readily available in border areas. Increased cooperation is
needed where the legal and constitutional order of Mexico and the United States is so
different (The Mexico Project, 2001).
The illegal movement of millions of Mexican citizens across the U.S.Mexico border
poses unique problems. Small-scale traffickers extract payments from Mexican citizens
to help them cross the U.S. border. In a smaller number of human smuggling cases,
there are severe violations of human rights. In recent years, American courts have heard
cases of handicapped Mexicans trafficked to the United States to peddle and, in the
previously mentioned Cadena case, Mexican minor girls were forced to serve as prostitutes for migrant workers in the United States ("Insiders Tell," 1997; "Lead Defendant,"
1999). In both these cases, the victims were awarded reparations by the court, but actual
payments to the victims did not occur because the assets of the perpetrators were located
in Mexico and cooperative measures for victim compensation had not been established
with the Mexican government. Problems of international victimization and protection
and aid for these cross-border victims need to be made priorities in the Mexico-U.S.
relationship.
The pressure that the United States places on Mexico to deal with organized crime
and corruption is primarily accomplished through a law enforcement strategy rather than
a more holistic approach. Training programs, provision of equipment, and pressure to
adopt particular legislation all raise potential human rights problems within the Mexican
context. The development of an effective antidrug strategy that is beneficial to both the
United States and Mexico needs to focus on economic development, repatriation of
seized drug assets, public education, and awareness on both sides of the border. The
funds seized in the United States linked to organized crime activity could be used to aid
victims of traffickers and to promote economic development. This process of
engagement to find development solutions and give assistance to victims would move
away from the almost exclusively repressive approach that now characterizes the
bilateral strategy.
The internationalization of Mexican business has contributed to the rise of corruption.
International companies engage in corruption to obtain desired
Shelley / THE POST PRI TRANSITION
227
contracts, obtain competitive advantage, and overcome obstacles posed by the
cumbersome Mexican bureaucracy. Many foreign-owned maquiladores (small
assembly plants) are located in the north, a region already suffering from high levels of
drug-related corruption. This corporate corruption in the north and border areas has a
direct impact on Mexican society, as bribes are often offered to evade environmental and
labor regulations. The globalization of trade has contributed to this problem as bribery
has become a central means of obtaining contracts and pursuing business objectives in
an increasingly competitive and regulated business environment. The Organization of
American States is now taking steps to address this serious problem (Zagaris & Ohri,
1999).
CONCLUSION
Mexico is at a crossroads. After 70 years under one-party rule, the citizenry
unexpectedly voted out the ruling political party and elected President Fox, who vowed
to address crime and corruption. The primacy of this issue is a testament to the severity
of the problem and the public recognition that Mexico's democracy and economy cannot
progress unless the society tackles these problems.
The situation of Mexico is different from that of Colombia to the south, where
drug-trafficking organizations have likewise acquired enormous wealth and political
power. President Fox emerged from the ranching and multinational business
community, he does not have ties to the drug traffickers, and they did not subsidize his
campaign. There is limited civil conflict in Mexico outside of Chiapas, no guerilla
movement, and a significant middle class that seeks a different future for the country.
The challenges for Mexico are severe, but President Fox seeks to address these problems
without resorting to authoritarian solutions and massive military force such as
Colombian leaders have used.
Addressing the dual problems of crime and corruption poses a formidable challenge
because these problems are deeply ingrained in Mexico. The consequences of one-party
rule, the failure to accord the rule of law primacy in society, and the institutionalized
corruption of the police and other parts of the justice system limit the state's capacity to
act against crime and corruption. The press's role has been circumscribed through
intimidation, and a strong civil society has not developed to counteract these forces.
Despite these factors, Mexico has certain important strengths. Its investment in
education since the revolution has resulted in an urban population that seriously thinks
about the problems the country faces. The strong Mexican national identity makes many
Mexicans committed to the improvement of their society. Many of those who worked
for Fox's election were young
228
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice / August 2001
Mexicans, often educated abroad, who returned to their country to make a difference.
Moreover, the PAN party, whose ticket Fox led, includes many members of the
business community, who seek an alternative future for Mexico and a more open,
competitive economy to foster growth.
Mexico cannot address its crime and corruption problems by itself. The long border
that Mexico shares with the United States is a major determinant of its economy and has
a major impact on its economy. The United States provides a large and constant market
for illicit goods from Mexico. Therefore, new means of engagement of the two
countries and new bilateral strategies must be developed if these dual problems are to be
tackled.
President Fox has focused on a development perspective, suggesting that crime and
corruption can only be attacked if the economic disparities between the United States
and Mexico are reduced. This approach contrasts sharply with the law enforcement and
control strategies that were emphasized in the past. Although the new strategy cannot be
expected to yield immediate results, it is an important step in addressing the conditions
that give rise to organized crime. Fox's emphasis on greater transparency and better
governmental administration is aimed at addressing the deep-seated corruption.
There are limits to what one man can achieve. The institutionalized corruption and
the penetration of crime groups into the state provide formidable obstacles to reform.
The new government is committed to face the future rather than de4l with the abuses of
the past. But its opportunity to forge a new future may be limited by its legacy of the
past.
NOTES
1. The author taught there on several occasions in the 1990s including as a Fulbright
scholar.
2. For example, see the interview with Rudi Dornbusch on Murder, Money, and Mexico,
the Frontline documentary coproduced in 1997 with the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation and Documentary Consortium, Lowell Bergman, producer.
3. For example, the arrest of a Polish mob boss, Ryszard Bogucki, in January in
Cancun was reported in Reforma and El Norte on January 15 and 16, 2001. Interviews with
American law enforcement officials indicate other instances in which Eastern European
and former Soviet criminals are under investigation for their activities in Mexico and
across the U.S.-Mexico border.
4. For an analysis of U.S. drug policy, see Andreas, 1996; Bagley and Walker, 1994.
5. Illustrative of this is the Mexico section of the International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report released each year by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
Shelley / THE POST PRI TRANSITION
229
6. Testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, November 9-10, 1999.
7. For a history of Mexican money laundering regulations, see Schekaiban,1999.
8. For a discussion of the dimensions and the character of the problem, see Blum,
Levi, Naylor, & Williams, 1998.
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Louise Shelley is a professor in the Department of Justice, Law, and Society and the School of
International Service atAmerican University. She is also the founder and the director of the Center
for Transnational Crime and Corruption at American University. The center conducts research. on
organized crime and maintains partnerships with research centers in the former Soviet Union.
She held a Fit [bright fellowship in Mexico in 1993 and taught at the Instituto de Ciencias Penales.