381
Islamic Studies 46:3 (2007) pp. 381–415
Muslim Ummah and its Link with Transnational
Muslim Politics
EJAZ AKRAM
Abstract
This inquiry aims firstly, to uncover the meaning of the Ummah and highlight the
various debates that exist regarding the operationalization of this concept. Secondly, it
examines how the concept of the Ummah has shaped the historical consciousness of
Muslims, and how it continues to affect the politics of Muslim states. And lastly, it
considers the notion of the Ummah vis-à-vis the Western notions of the nation state,
examining in particular how those notions aid and hinder regional cooperation
among Muslim states. The concept of the Muslim Ummah has been under much
debate by Western and non-Western scholars, especially in light of transnational
Muslim networks’ activities to operationalise the ideal of ummatic unity. For Muslims
the mere absence of war is not an equivalent of peace. If the Muslim way of life is
threatened, the environment is perceived by them to be insecure. This perceived
insecurity is not limited to the Muslim nation states. In fact Muslims have gradually
realized that the nation state system has become an impediment in realizing their way
of life and in bringing about the kind of ummatic cooperation and security they seek.
While Western regional formations (such as the EU, MERCOSUR and NAFTA) are
premised on the nation state to ensure security as well as their political and economic
objections, the Muslim world continues to use the Ummah as the major referent of
cooperation. The Islamic aspirations of the Ummah have not disappeared, and the
ability of Muslim transnational organizations, ideologies, and communication
networks to permeate national borders testifies to the existence of a more intense
feeling of Muslim community than generally recognised.
i%p
Introduction
Just as Europe’s security and unification are inter-linked, so are the concept of
ummah, the Muslim community, and Muslims’ desire to enjoy peace and
security. However, they are linked in quite opposite and divergent ways. The
literature on the European Union demonstrates that the concern for security,
in addition to economic considerations, was of central importance in leading
© Dr Muhammad Hamidullah Library, IIU, Islamabad.
http://iri.iiu.edu.pk/
382
EJAZ AKRAM
to the gradual consolidation of the European Union. Muslims have generally
viewed their peace and security in the light of their religious tradition and the
concomitant freedom to realize them in society. Amn—the conditions of
external peace and security—are not a good in and of themselves for the
Muslims; rather, good consists in having a set of conditions that are a
consequence of the fulfilment of certain other conditions, such as the unity
and integrity of their ummah through the freedom needed to put the Divine
imperatives into effect. The mere absence of war and political turbulence does
not necessarily mean peace and security in the perception of Muslims. Instead,
the Shar┘‘ah is seen as a source of integrity in the individual and a source of
cohesion in the society. It is a source of supra-‘ a╖abiyyah, to extrapolate Ibn
Khald┴n’s terminology; a bond that holds people together. If the Muslim way
of life is threatened, i.e., if the Muslims are unable to practice their way of life,
the objective conditions of security—absence of war and availability of
economic abundance—are perceived as no guarantees of true peace and
security. Peace and security are seen as a collective enterprise and are tied to
the well-being of the ummah. It is, therefore, important to examine and
analyse what ummah exactly means to Muslims.
The literature on the European Union, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and
ASEAN—demonstrates that the regional formations of economic cooperation
require security. The modern usage of security as a concept is primarily
European and implies the strategic and political safety of a state. The
Europeans and other Western states have successfully employed strategic
discourse to give protective sanctuary to their economies, at national, regional
and global levels. Most modern Muslim regional entities, however, have failed
to do so. Nonetheless, most Muslim states in the post-World War II era have
expressed the need for closer cooperation and security. This discourse on
cooperation neither arose simply from economic considerations, nor from
security concerns in the Western sense. It arose because of referents such as the
ummah, which is spiritual in nature and has an almost decisive impact on
Muslim political behaviour. Basing on the works of eminent scholars of
Islamic Studies, both Muslim and non-Muslim, this paper will analyze the
Muslims’ understanding of ummah and its relevance to matters relating to
international Muslim politics, especially to the dreams of regionalism 1 in the
Muslim world. This paper will demonstrate that the impact of the concept of
Regionalism is a high level of cooperation among states that want to overcome national
fragmentation and consolidate a bloc around common conceptions of security and economy
which then translates into a high level coordination of defence and foreign policies. Some
examples are the European Union, MERCOSUR and ASEAN.
1
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
383
ummah on Muslim consciousness 2 is overarching.
In recent decades Muslims have gradually come to feel that excessive
emphasis on the nation state has become an impediment to the wider
cooperation that they seek. By default they have come to a point where they
now realise the need for regional security. 3 At this juncture, it is important to
map the route that the Muslims are likely to take in pursuit of their political
objectives. Rather than opt for the modern Western regional formations,
whose primary referent of security and politics is the state and the economic
system that propels it, the Muslim world continues to use the notion of
ummah as the basic referent of cooperation. If one takes a look at the charter
of most Muslim international institutions such as the OIC, one finds the
‘ummatic’ undertone that suffuses such institutions. 4 Whether it is regional
formations such as the ECO or the Arab Maghrib Union (L’UMA), or
transnational resistance movements or purportedly terrorist organizations
such as al-Qaeda, all claim to work for the operative ideal of ummatic unity.
Implicitly or explicitly, the Muslim ideal of the unity of the ummah informs
the international Muslim political behaviour. Therefore, it is imperative that
this concept be analytically examined and treated as a vital category of analysis
in explaining this symbolic factor of motivation which is at the heart of all
transnational Muslim politics.
Interpretations of the Ummah
The word ummah occurs some 62 times in the Qur’┐n in the sense of a
religious community. 5 In the Qur’┐n there is chronological development of
the concept of ummah from its use as a general word for ummah as such to its
special use such as the Jewish, Christian and the Muslim ummah.6 In time, the
Qur’┐n begins to address the small community of Muslims, especially in the
Mad┘nan period of the Prophet’s life, as the ummah in a somewhat exclusive
sense.7 Fredrick Matthews Denny has argued that the chronological unfolding
By Muslim consciousness we mean here those elements that are quintessential in imparting a
distinct worldview to Muslims. The elements of this worldview are not only present in the
‘ib┐d┐t (acts of worship) but also mu‘┐mal┐t (or public dealings). These quintessential elements
are often a part of the Shar┘‘ah but not restricted to the Shar┘‘ah alone.
3
The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is a case in point, where the security
discourse seems to be increasingly dominant in the agenda.
4
See, for detailed discussion, “Le OIC en bref” <http://www.oic-oci.org/index_french.asp>.
5
See, Fredrick Matthews Denny, “Umma” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, eds. P.J.
Bearman et al (Leiden: Brill, 1979–2004), 10: 862.
6
See, ibid.
7
See, ibid.
2
384
EJAZ AKRAM
of the Qur’┐n led from a general concept of ummah to a more focused
reference to the emerging Muslim community:
…we have here a matter of umma not essentially changing its meaning as
religious community throughout the chronological development of the ur’ ┐n so
much as having its meaning progressively augmented as the prophetic message
reaches its fullest development. 8
The Qur’┐nic verse 21: 92 exhorts: “Verily, this Brotherhood [ Ummah] of
yours is a single Brotherhood [ ummatan w┐╒idatan], and I am your Lord and
Cherisher: therefore Serve Me (and no other).” 9 Since the Qur’┐n is subject to
exegesis, there is always more than one explanation. Some verses of the
Qur’┐n have more implicit meanings than others, but this verse is a fairly
direct statement, leaving no ambiguity in the mind of Muslims that the unity
of their community is paramount. One of the main features of Islam is taw╒┘d
(the unity or oneness of God). The principle of taw╒┘d, which informs all
walks of a Muslim’s life, also sets the tone for the political moorings of
Muslims. Ism┐‘┘l R┐j┘ al F┐r┴q┘, in his book Al Taw╒┘d: Its Implications for
Thought and Life claims that there is “no Islam without the ummah.”10 Al
F┐r┴q┘ says that:
God has commanded [in the Qur’┐n, 3: 104] “let there be of you an ummah to
call to the good, to enjoin virtue and forbid vice…” Clearly, the Muslims are
commanded to form themselves into an ummah.11
The Prophet (peace be on him) is known to have said: ‘“It is not permissible
for three Muslims to find themselves in a land without their assigning one of
them to their leadership’… [therefore] there is no escape from forming
themselves into an ummah.”12 The Qur’┐n 49: 9 further states:
If two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel [fighting], make ye peace
between them: but if One [party] of them transgresses beyond bound against the
other, then fight ye (all) against the One that transgresses until it complies with
the command of Allah; but if it complies then make peace between them with
justice, and be fair: For Allah loves those who are fair (and just). 13
Ibid.
See, ‘Abdullah Y┴suf ‘Al┘, The Holy Qur’┐n: Text, Translation and Commentary (Brantwood,
MD: Amana Corporation, 1409/1989), 815.
10
Ism┐‘┘l R┐j┘ al F┐r┴q┘, Al Taw╒┘d: Its Implications for Thought and Life (Herndon, VA: The
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1995), 112.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
See, ‘Abdullah Y┴suf ‘Al┘, The Holy Qur’┐n: Text, Translation and Commentary, 1341.
8
9
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
385
Furthermore, in verse 49: 10, the following commandment makes brotherhood obligatory upon all Muslims describing it as a duty to God: “The
believers are but a single Brotherhood: So make peace and reconciliation
between your two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive
mercy.”14
Finally, and most importantly, in the Qur’ ┐n God describes the Muslims
as the “middle community.” In verse 2: 143: “Thus, We have made of you an
Ummah justly balanced [ummatan wasa═an] that ye might be witnesses over
the nations [mankind].” 15 Like taw╒┘d, one of the features of Islam is that it
constitutes “the middle path” by avoiding the extremes.
God has stressed unity in several other verses of the Qur’ ┐n (such as
23: 53), emphasizing that the Ummah is one, since God is their Lord. A
community that is not unified cannot in any way claim to reflect the Divine
command that the Muslims become one ummah. Since Muslims are accountable both at the individual and collective levels, it is vital that they realize
brotherhood and unity.
Besides the Qur’┐n, the ╓ad┘th literature contains numerous injunctions
on the importance of Muslim unity. The Prophet (peace be on him) said:
“Everyone in my ummah will enter the Garden (paradise) except the one who
rejects me.”16 Another ╒ad┘th underlines the importance of ummah for
Muslims. The Prophet Mu╒ammad (peace be on him) said that his ummah will
never agree together on an error, implying that divergence from the ummah’s
religion constitutes heresy. 17 Denny has argued that:
The cultivation of Muhammad’s Sunna [life] and its enshrining in the ╒ad┘th
literature, and even more in the habits of the hearts and bodies of Muslims, is the
most powerful expression imaginable of the transfer of charisma from a religious
founder to his community of followers. In this sense, even with all the political
and other divisions and disagreements among Muslims through time, there is
utter consensus concerning the Mu╒ammadan nature, in the proper sense, of the
Muslim umma.18
Ibid.
Ibid., 58. Ummatan Wasa═an has several meanings. It suggests that the Muslims are the
‘median community’ or people who must avoid extreme paths in life, which reflects a state of
spiritual balance. It also means that the Muslim ummah is geographically located in the middle
belt of the world. ‘Abd Allah Y┴suf ‘Al┘ comments on the phrase ummatan wa╖a═an in the
following words: The essence of Islam is to avoid all extravagancs on either side. It is a sober,
practical-religion. But the Arabic Word (wasa═) also implies a touch of the literal meaning of
Intermediacy Geographically, Arabia is in an intermediate position in Old World, as was
proved in history by the rapid expansion of Islam, north, south, west and east. Ibid.
16
Cited by Denny, “Umma,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam 2, 10: 862.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid., 10: 863.
14
15
386
EJAZ AKRAM
If so, then ummah’s value for Muslims is unquestionable, as suggested by
al F┐r┴q┘.19
The ummah, in the Covenant of Mad┘nah, included the Jews and others
who lived harmoniously alongside the Muslims. Throughout history, the
authority of Muslim ummah as realized in the institution of caliphate/ imamate
has been operative. However, in the later discourse throughout Muslims
history, the understanding of ummah has evolved as a distinct Muslim ummah.
According to Denny, the consensus favoured a unified ummah that transcended all divisions:
Colonialism’s challenge instigated a great renewal of umma awareness among
Muslims, and modern Muslim thinkers since the 19th century have sustained a
variety of discourses on the political as well as other meanings of the concept of
umma for today.20
Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), the spiritual father of the Islamic state of
Pakistan,21 is known to have said that for the Muslims, all political action is
the expression of Islam’s spirituality. 22 The notion of ummah is first and
foremost a spiritual principle before being an organizing principle for society,
economy and polity. The Muslim ummah is at once an ideal as well as a
reality. It is what makes the socio-political body of Islam complete in the sense
that it confers a predicament that is more or less common between otherwise
different and disparate Muslim peoples.
The word ummah is considered to have originated either from Hebrew or
Aramaic. However, scholars disagree regarding the origin of this word in
Arabic language. 23 Al A╒san states that:
It is not that important whether a word in the Qur’an has been borrowed from
another language or not. What is important is whether or not any of the
Qur’anic terms were beyond comprehension to the people of Arabia. The
Qur’an used no word beyond their comprehension because Qur’an itself claims
that the “discourse has been revealed in the Arabic language so that they
understand it” (12: 2). Recent research on pre-Islamic poetry has also established
Al F┐r┴q┘, al Taw╒┘d, 117.
Denny, “Umma,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam 2, 10: 863.
21
John L. Esposito, “Muhammad Iqbal and the Islamic State” in John L. Esposito, ed. Voices of
Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford, 1983), 175.
22
See, Muhammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad
Ashraf & Sons, 1977), Lecture 6, 146 ff.
23
‘Abdullah al A╒san, OIC—The Organization of the Islamic Conference: An Introduction to an
Islamic Political Institution (Herndon: IIIT, 1988), 2.
19
20
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
387
that the word ummah in the sense of a confederation around a religious nucleus
had been used in the Arabic language even before the revelation of the Qur’an. 24
Muslim scholars who have written on this subject argue that the word
ummah cannot be exactly translated into other languages. Its meaning can be
explicated and conveyed but an exact definitional counterpart in English does
not exist, hence the importation of the word and the concept of ummah in
modern English usage. Ism┐‘┘l R┐j┘ al F┐r┴q┘ has written extensively on this
subject, arguing that:
The term ummah is not translatable and must be taken in its original Islamic
Arabic form. It is not synonymous with “people,” “the nation” or “the state;”
expressions that are always determined by either race, geography, language and
history, or any combination of them. 25
In the same vein Abdul Rashid Moten has argued that:
Ummah is a unique concept having no equivalent term in the Western languages.
The earlier attempts at equating Ummah with nation or nation-states has been
abandoned in favor of ‘community’ which has recently gained currency among
the Western political science circles…It is equally wrong to use community as a
synonym for Ummah. The similarities between the two terms are superficial. 26
This leads us to the quandary of how best to define ummah for the
purpose of our analysis. Both al F ┐r┴q┘ and Moten contend that ummah
cannot be defined as a community. Community itself is one of the elusive and
vague terms in social science literature, and its somewhat imprecise use has
made it bereft of any significant meaning. 27 Community in modern literature
may refer to a collection of people in a geographical area. However, the world
also has ‘communities’ that are extra-geographical, diasporic and religious.
Communities bound to geography imply a rural, pre-industrial and traditional
set up, while those that can transcend geographical boundaries with the help
of technological progress can only be conceived of as communities in a
distinctly modern set up.
Ferdinand Tonnies has drawn a distinction between gemeinschaft and
gesellschaft to illustrate the difference between a traditional community and a
modern society. According to him, gemeinschaft (community) is preIbid., 2.
Al F┐r┴q┘, al Taw╒┘d, 105.
26
Abdul Rashid Moten, Political Science: An Islamic Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1996), 63.
27
See, Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan Turner, The Penguin Dictionary of
Sociology, 2nd edition (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 44.
24
25
388
EJAZ AKRAM
dominantly rural, it is united by kinship, its sense of belonging is organically
rooted in itself, and it is self-contained. 28 By contrast, gesellschaft (society) is
predominantly urban, artificial in its association and a social arrangement
which is unsettling for the community and based upon “the conflict of egoistic
wills.”29 Tonnies’ distinction is perhaps analytically useful in understanding
the contrast between and transition from community to society in recent
European history. It is not, however, an adequate guide to understanding
either the community or society in the Muslim world. Community in the
sense of gemeinschaft is still present in different parts of the Muslim world that
have not ‘developed’ and urbanized in the modern sense. However, the
Muslim ummah is not a community in that sense. Even in the first few years
of Islamic history, the Muslim ummah (although not disrupted into what
Tonnies calls gesellschaft), was translocal. The Muslim ummah in Mad┘nah was
formed as a result of geographical dislocation of the earliest Muslims from
Makkah to Mad┘nah. Al F┐r┴q┘ says that the German concept of community
[gemeinschaft, as descrised by Tonnies] implies that membership into a
community is natural, involuntary and inevitable, except for emigration,
naturalization and systematic acculturation, whereas society membership is
the result of a decision. 30 In Tonnies’ framework, the earliest Muslims had the
organic bonds that were not disrupted by any forces akin to today’s
modernization, industrialization and urbanization. Yet they transcended their
communal, geographical, linguistic and racial boundaries by following the
commandments of the Qur’┐n.
Perhaps the best explanation of this phenomenon is offered by Seyyed
Hossein Nasr. For the lack of an exact translation into English language, Nasr
has chosen to retain the word community for Muslim ummah, albeit in a
different sense. Before we delve into Nasr’s elucidation of the concept of
ummah, we must look at the recent scholarly work on the subject.
Recent Scholarly Work on Ummah
Recent Western scholarship on Islam has viewed ummah somewhat differently
than understood by Muslims. It is worth looking at some of the recent works
on this subject because Western authors have had a substantial impact on the
way one thinks about Islam and international relations. 31 This scholarship can
be divided into different types.
Ibid., 45.
Ibid., 103.
30
Al F┐r┴q┘, al Taw╒┘d, 103.
31
See, James P. Piscatori, Islam in the World of Nation-States (New York: Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press Publisher, 1988), 42 ff.
28
29
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
389
One group, characterized by the works of Daniel Pipes and Martin
Kramer, suggests that the Islamic concept of ummah is monolithic, but they do
so from a negative perspective. Moreover, Pipes’ and Kramer’s works are
ideologically motivated and primarily suggest that Islam is a danger to
humanity.32 Given our focus, this group’s writings cannot be discussed here as
objective scholarly work, even though its influence is pervasive in some policy
circles of the English-speaking West. Other recent Western political scientists
who have written on ummah and its relevance to international relations, such
as James Piscatori, Elie Kedouri, Adda Bozeman and Peter Mandaville, suggest
that the concept of ummah is not monolithic in any of its aspects. Finally,
there are scholars, Western and non-Western, such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr,
Ism┐‘┘l al F┐r┴q┘ and John Esposito, who argue that the impact of the notion
of ummah on Muslim consciousness is quite decisive. In their opinion,
however, the concept of the ummah as a monolith is neither negative nor
constitutes a threat to the world. The latter group of scholars has demonstrated through excellent research that the Islamic movements in the Muslim
world are not monolithic. 33 While that may be true, it does not mean that the
impact of certain ideals of Islam (such as taw╒┘d, shar┘‘ah and allegiance to the
concept of ummah) is not perceived as essential and operative.
We should look at each group briefly to analyze to which extent Muslim
political behaviour and political aspirations are driven by ummah-consciousness. John L. Esposito explains the centrality of the concept of ummah
through Iqbal’s concept of an Islamic state:
The Islamic community (ummah) is a society based upon common belief.
However, it encompasses more than the notion of religious community as
understood in the Judeo-Christian tradition for it includes the notion of state as
well. There is no bifurcation of the spiritual and the temporal. 34
In the same vein, Bernard Lewis contends that the modern political
notions and institutions such as the nation-state, foreign policy or diplomacy
are alien to the world of Islam. 35 Similarly, James Piscatori has argued that this
is so because Islam emphasizes the division of the world into D┐r al-Isl┐m
(abode of peace) and D┐r al-╓arb (abode of war), with the aim of the former to
expand at the expense of the latter via holy war. 36 Elie Kedourie has argued
See for example, Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic
Books Inc., 1983), passim.
33
See, John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford, 1992), 3–6.
34
John L. Esposito, “Muhammad Iqbal and the Islamic State” in ibid., 178.
35
See, Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (New York: Harper Row, 1964), 115.
36
See, Piscatori, Islam in the World of Nation-States, 42.
32
390
EJAZ AKRAM
that the idea of “lively multiplicity of political authorities” is not endemic to a
civilization where loyalty to Islam constitutes a sole political bond; while
Adda Bozeman claims that Islam is inimical to the “core idea of the state.” 37
Drawing upon their understanding of the classical and medieval political
theory in the Islamic civilization, many Western authors have failed to grasp
what ummah really means for the Muslims. Neither are concepts such as the
state, foreign policy and diplomacy alien to the Muslims. If one casts a cursory
glance at the history of empires in Islam, it becomes evident that these notions
were known not only to the Muslim world but also to other traditional
civilizations. What may have been absent from the traditional civilizations,
including the Islamic one, are the changes that transformed the political ethics
of the modern world.
Piscatori’s contention that Islam divides the world into the abodes of
peace and war, and seeks the transformation of the whole world into the
abode of peace by holy war 38 is wrong at many levels. First, the divisions he
suggested are not as mutually opposed as he suggests. Alongside the theory of
d┐r al-╒arb versus d┐r al-Isl┐m, Muslims had notions such as d┐r al-ij┐bah and
d┐r al-da‘wah, as put forth by Fakhr al-D┘n Mu╒ammad b. ‘Umar al-R┐z┘
(d. 606/1209), a major jurist of the Sh┐fi‘┘ school of Islamic law. 39 According to
this view, there was the abode of peace and abode of potential peace, if there
was no peace. Piscatori is also wrong in pointing out that the d┐r al-Isl┐m
would take over the rest of the world by holy war ( jih┐d).40 It is important to
know that in Islam there is no such thing as the holy war; the latter is in feet a
concept that arose only among certain Christians. Jih┐d in Islam is of two
kinds, greater and lesser. The greater jih┐d means to strive for self-purification
and rooting out the evil within oneself, 41 whereas the lesser jih┐d amounts to
bearing arms to protect oneself against aggression, oppression and injustice and
to exalt the Word of God. In the same vein, Bozeman’s position that Islam is
against the idea of state is also false, because within the Islamic tradition there
is enough evidence for the requirement of law and order, and the state as the
instrument that will promulgate the order whose source is ultimately Divine
Will.42 It is true, however, as asserted by Bernard Lewis, that the “modern
nation state” has no precedence in Islamic history. 43
Quoted in ibid., 48
See n. 36 above.
39
See for details, Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Towards A Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections, tr.
Ashur A. Shamis (London-Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1423/
2003), xii, 29 and 39.
40
See, Piscatori, Islam in the World of Nation-States, 42.
41
See, Nasr, The Heart of Islam, 260.
42
Some of these aspects of what can be called a ‘state,’ according the Muslim view of history,
37
38
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
391
Piscatori in his book Islam in the World of Nation-States argues that the
Muslims have come to terms with the idea of nation state and those Muslims
who have not, are a minority. 44 He claims:
Muslims have responded more positively to the challenges of development than
by simply rejecting the idea of the state, and have worked for the creation of
Muslim nation-states. These would be hybrid institutions-nation-states without
Westernization, Islam without the Ummah45…
Muslims have largely freed themselves of a model which denigrates territorial
pluralism and demands monolithic unity. In the process, another, rather
different, consensus has emerged which says that the nation-state is, or can be, an
Islamic institution. 46
This is a rather grand conclusion. Within Piscatori’s lengthy work on this
subject, there is enough evidence that no such consensus has emerged. The
recent writers of the Muslim world who have had by far the greatest impact
on the modern Muslims’ consciousness—figures such as Ayatollah Khomeini
[└yat All┐h Khumayn┘] (d. 1409/1989), Ab┴ ’l-A‘l┐ Mawd┴d┘ (d. 1399/1979)
and Fazlur Rahman (d. 1408/1988) are analyzed by Piscatori as ‘nonconformists’ to the idea of the nation-state. 47 Given the stature of these
scholars (and often scholars and politicians at once, like Mawd ┴d┘ and
Khomeini), and their pervasive impact on the political thinking of the Muslim
world, Piscatori provides enough evidence against his own conclusion.
The hybridity notion of James Piscatori is taken one step further by Peter
Mandaville, who argues that Muslim discourses of ummah are historically
produced which he tries to prove via hybridity theory and diaspora theory. 48
Unlike Piscatori, Mandaville steers clear of the Islamic canonical texts, in
order to describe the concept of ummah.49 In his Transnational Muslim Politics:
Reimagining the Ummah Mandaville contends that studying Islam under the
rubric of “Islamic Studies” is of little help; instead, by knowing what the
were realized in the Covenant of Mad┘nah. See, for the full text of this covenant, al-Dukt┴r
Mu╒ammad ╓am┘d All┐h al-╓aydar └b┐d┘, Majm┴‘at al-Wath┐’iq al-Siyasiyyah fi’l-‘Ahd alNabaw┘ wa ’l-Kil┐fah al-Rashidah (Cairo: Lajnat al-Ta’l┘f wa’l-Tarjamah wa’l-Nashr, 1956), 1–7.
43
Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988),
40–41, passim.
44
See, Piscatori, Islam in the World of Nation-State, 146.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., 150
47
See, for Piscasori’s presentation of Khomaini, Mawd┴d┘ and Fazlur Rahman’s views, ibid.,
111–113, 101–102, and 110–111 respectively.
48
See, Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma (London:
Routledge, 2001), 83–108.
49
See, ibid., xii.
392
EJAZ AKRAM
youth groups in the Muslim world are reading and writing on the Internet can
give a better synopsis of “transnational Islam.” 50 An approach that does not
take into account the impact of the canonical texts of Islam on the
consciousness and identity of Muslims is most likely to miss the big picture.
Ever since the advent of the so-called “Islamic Fundamentalism” the Muslim
world has gradually become more and more Islamically self-conscious. Given
the level of development and literacy, the number of youths that have access
to the electronic media such as the Internet, is very small. Gary Bunt, the
author of Virtually Islamic: Computer Mediated Communication and Cyber
Islamic Environments says that the Internet has reduced the time and space
factor for Muslims, something technology does for every group of people. He
argues that the Internet is the fastest communication medium, while Islam is
the fastest growing religion and it has produced complex ways in which Islam
and the Internet combine and interact. 51 Bunt states that:
Many use the Internet to convey their own interpretation of Islam and Islamrelated issues. This has serious implications…An individual’s first experience of
Islam in cyberspace is as likely to be a so-called ‘schismatic group’ or a ‘radical’
organization…when many Internet sites are not labelled in terms of their Islamic
perspective, they may confuse readers and casual browsers. 52
Moreover, it is important to mention that there are just about as many
websites on Islam that produce propaganda against it as those that disseminate
information objectively. Thus to ground one’s conclusions on such a medium
is likely to produce skewed results, as done by Peter Mandaville. Mandaville’s
work on ummah is from a post-modern perspective, which implies a “social
construction” of the concept of Ummah. Most classical scholarship on Islam,
Western or Islamic, argues quite the opposite. Whether one reads about Islam
on a CD-ROM or the Internet versus books and journals, the only difference
is in the nature of the medium used to transmit, not the content. It is true that
the nature of the Internet has diluted the content; it is equally true of Internet
or other media, that the authorities on Islam are still the authorities on Islam. 53
Western scholarship on the unity of the ummah grossly underestimates its
impact and potential role in the near future of world politics. Work on
Ibid.
Gary Bunt, Virtually Islamic: Computer Mediated Communication and Cyber Islamic
Environments (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), 1–3.
52
Ibid., 3.
53
Most authentic Internet sites have as their patron who is usually a well-known ‘┐lim. See for
example <www.islamonline.net>, and the traditionally trained Dr Y ┴suf al-Qa╔┐w┘’s
authoritative role in this operation.
50
51
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
393
ummatic unity in Muslim politics by scholars such a Landau, Piscatori and
Eickelman, suggests that they look at the Muslim societies and their past
through the eyes of a European looking at his past. Both Eickelman and
Piscatori suggest that “the notion of a uniform central focus in Islam appears
to be questionable.” 54 They compare the notion of ummah with the
“ultramonism” of the papacy and its subordination to the French and Italian
episcopates in the nineteenth century. 55 They argue that the paramount
position of Makkah in Islam is challenged by such other centres as Karbal ┐,
Qum, Cairo, Senegal, London and Paris. 56 A Muslim audience, let alone the
Muslim scholars, would consider this a dubious claim. It is a common example
of mirror imaging of the modern way of looking at things onto things that are
verifiably traditional.
What Eickelman and Piscatori fail to take into account is the hierarchy in
which the above-mentioned centres are of importance to them. Karbal ┐, Qum
and Cairo have no competing significance compared to Makkah. Rather,
Muslims perceive the symbolic centrality of Makkah as at once the highest as
well as the epicentre of their sacred space. Karbal ┐ and Qum, on the other
hand, have a historical significance for Muslims that is at once below and
peripheral to that of Makkah. Eickelman and Piscatori’s division of the
centrality of Qum for the Sh┘‘ahs and Cairo for Sunn┘s is also not so clear-cut.
Most Sh┘‘┘s regard Najaf in Iraq as well as al-Azhar in Cairo as valid schools of
learning, just as most Sunn┘s have a high regard for the Sh ┘‘┘ shrines and
centres of learning, because of their utmost reverence for Im ┐m ‘Al┘, the
fourth Caliph (r. 36–40/656–660). As far as the Muslim orientation toward the
present ascendancy of the London and Paris is concerned, that is usually seen
by Muslims as an accident of history. Muslims continue to migrate to U.S.A,
Canada, UK and France, just as Hindus and Japanese continue to migrate to
these countries. While the Muslims are at these places for the purpose of
learning, earning or escaping from the often Western backed oppressive
regimes, they continue to regard the sanctity of Makkah as highest.
Implicit in the work of the second group of scholars is the assumption
that if the impact of ummah-consciousness on the minds of Muslims is
decisive, they must be against territorial pluralism. In other words, since the
Muslims have accommodated a system of territorial pluralism (in the form of
the nation-states) Muslims’ ummah-consciousness must not be total as Muslims
tend to claim. This assumption does not take into consideration the fact that
Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996), 149.
55
See, ibid.
56
See, ibid.
54
394
EJAZ AKRAM
the Muslim world today has not ‘chosen’ to be the way it is. 57 The historical
forces that shaped most of the world in this form have also shaped the Muslim
world. This explanation does not take into account the fact that many
Muslims are uncomfortable with this political arrangement, which arose out
of their colonial past. 58
Even though the monolithicity of ummah-consciousness has remained
imprinted on the Muslim mind throughout history, territorial pluralism has
always been accommodated. 59 With the exception of very small groups in the
Muslim world who uphold a utopian view of the political unity of Muslims in
a large but single Muslim nation-state, 60 most Muslims do not have a problem
with separate political administrative units. However, Muslims feel that these
political units (whether regional or not), must be built by the Muslims
themselves without any interference from the outside.
Now we turn to studying another contemporary but traditional point of
view on ummah, one articulated by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who brings forth
the connection between spirituality and the external world of politics.
Nasr’s Exopsition of the Muslim Doctrine of the Ummah
Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s exposition of the concept of ummah and its associated
concepts of d┐r-al-╒arb and d┐r-al-Isl┐m is most instructive. Nasr states that:
“For Islam, community implies above all a human collectivity held together
by religious bonds that are themselves the foundation for social, juridical,
political, economic and ethical links between its members.” 61 In other words,
ummah as a community has within it submerged the society as well as the
state. As opposed to al F┐r┴q┘’s conception of ummah as a society, he draws
from Tonnies’ idea of ummah as gesellschaft, Nasr’s view of ummah is not
impaired by the social changes which transform a traditional community into
a modern society. The primary reason for that is that as long as the Muslims
practice the Shar┘‘ah, the divine law, and do not part with it in favour of other
laws, they continue to remain out of the fold of modernity, even though they
spiritually and intellectually remain externally immersed in the modern world.
Ummah as a community in Nasr’s thought is not a community whose
The structure of international politics in which nation-state continues to play the role of a
basic unit of international politics, is exogenously given to the Muslim world as a result of
colonialism and Western-style nationalism which does not have an exact precedence in Muslim
history.
58
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islamic Unity—The Ideal and Obstacles in the Way of its Realization,”
Iqbal Review, 40: 1 (April 1999), 3
59
Ibid.
60
Neo-fundamentalist groups such as ╓izb al-Ta╒r┘r insist on such a mode of Islamic unity.
61
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart of Islam (San Francisco: Harper, 2002), 160–161.
57
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
395
members are linked with each other horizontally. It is a community whose
members are linked with each other vertically through the Divine Principle
and their ultimate unity can only be in God and His law. Nonetheless, they
still have horizontal communal links with each other as well, and as with all
other communities those links are at the mercy of the assault waged by
modernist ideologies. Nasr cites the verse 42: 8 from Qur’ ┐n that “Had God
willed, He could have made them one community” to demonstrate that: “It is
within the context of a world with many communities, all of which Islam sees
in religious terms, that the Islamic understanding of itself as an Ummah must
be situated and understood.” 62
Nasr also states that ever since the end of the Ummayad caliphate, the
political unity of the Muslim ummah has never been realized in the modern
sense of a nation state. However, it has since then remained a very strong ideal
throughout the Muslims’ history. Nasr states that:
Today in the Islamic world, the Ummah is politically more divided and even
culturally more fragmented, as a result of the impact of modernism, than any
time in its history. And yet it would be a great mistake to underestimate the
significance of the Quranic vision of community that most Muslims bear within
their hearts and minds. This vision is still very much alive and manifests itself in
unforeseen ways not only politically and economically, but also socially and
culturally, not to mention within the domain of religion itself. 63
Related to the concept of ummah are the classical concepts of d┐r al-Isl┐m
and d┐r al-╒arb. As contended by Piscatori and other Western political
scientists studying Islam and Muslims, d┐r al-Isl┐m, the abode of peace, 64 vies
to transform the d┐r al-╒arb, or the abode of war, usually inhabited by nonMuslims, into d┐r al-Isl┐m. It is true that as per God’s injuctions, all Muslims
are duty bound to fight and resist evil wherever they find it. 65 However, the
notion entertained by Piscatori that d┐r al-Isl┐m is the abode of Muslims
which is committed to wage jih┐d against the d┐r al-╒arb because it is the abode
of non-Muslims 66 is wrong and misleading. As Nasr has pointed out, d┐r alIbid., 161.
Ibid., 163.
64
Abode of Muslims where they can practice Islam freely without any hindrance.
65
There is a ╒ad┘th that one should try to remove evil with one’s hand; if one is unable to do
that, then with one, tongue, that is, by speaking out against that evil; and if one is unable to do
even that, then with his heart, that is by continuing to have a revulsion towards it. This,
according to the Prophet (peace be on him) is the weakest state of faith. See for the original text
of this ╒ad┘th, Ab┴ ‘├s┐ Mu╒ammad b. ‘├s┐ al-Tirmidh┘, Sunan al-Tirmidh┘, Kit┐b al-Fitan, B┐b
m┐ J┐’ f┘ Taghy┘r al-Munkar.
66
See n. 36 above.
62
63
396
EJAZ AKRAM
Isl┐m was a geographical area in which the Muslim ummah lived as a majority
and where the Shar┘‘ah was promulgated and practiced. It is important to
know, however, that within this zone, other ummahs, such as those of the
Jews and the Christians, also lived. 67 As opposed to that, d┐r al-╒arb constituted those geographical areas where Muslims were unable to practice their
religion, a modern example of which would be former Soviet Union, and the
present day Burma. 68 However, in those geographical lands which were not
Islamic, but where Muslims could still perform their rituals and live as
Muslims were called d┐r al-╖ul╒ (abode of peaceful treaty), which was added by
the later jurists as the third category. 69 Nasr further states that:
As far as living in d┐r al-╒arb is concerned, Islamic Law requires that Muslims in
such situations respect the laws of the land in which they live, but also insists
that they be able to follow their own religious practices even if to do so is
difficult. If such a way of living were to become impossible, then they are advised
to migrate to the “Abode of Islam” itself. As for following the local laws and
practices, as long as they do not contradict Islamic laws and practices, the same
injunctions hold for d┐r al-╖ul╒ as they do for d┐r al-╒arb.70
Nasr’s position on the issue of d┐r al-Isl┐m and d┐r al-╒arb elucidates that
alongside geography, this distinction is a conceptual division of people into
believers and non-believers. Corroborating Nasr’s position on this issue, Ann
K. Lambton has argued that for Islam political science is not an independent
discipline aspiring to the utmost heights of intellectual speculation; rather, it is
a branch of theology. 71 Both Nasr and Lambton maintain that the distinction
between the secular and spiritual domains has no meaning for Muslims; the
only distinction is between believers and unbelievers. Also recurrent in the
works of Nasr is an emphasis on the importance of the practice of the Shar┘‘ah
and its connection in the realization of a coherent Muslim worldview and
consciousness. Therefore, some discussion on the operativeness of this
connection deserves attention.
After the death of the Prophet (peace be on him) (11/632), the Muslim
ummah became institutionalized under the caliphate. Thirty years following
the Prophet’s death was the period usually known in Islamic history as the era
of the rightly guided Caliphs. As the Muslims grew numerically and expanded
See, Nasr, The Heart of Islam, 163.
See, ibid., 163–164.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid., 164.
71
See, Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study
of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists (New York: Oxford, 1981), 1.
67
68
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
397
geographically, the institution of caliphate gradually became weaker until in
March 1924 the Turkish Grand National Assembly declared its abolishment. 72
The abolition of the Caliphate threw the Muslim world in a state of confusion
they had not witnessed before. Throughout history, Muslims had expressed
their symbolic unity through the institution of khil┐fah, and upon its
abolition, religious scholars from all over the Muslim world were called to
discuss this issue.73 Not much headway was made in this regard, however, as
the Muslim world was either under colonial rule or was experiencing
movements of nationalism to rid themselves of the colonial rule. It is ironic
that even though the yoke of direct colonization by the Europeans was
overthrown in the course of time, the new republics and nation-states
continued to be weak actors on a global scale and entered a new era of indirect
colonial rule as peripheries to the industrial and military centres of the world.
When the Caliphate was in existence, no matter how nominal, it
performed an important symbolic function for the Muslims. After the
Caliphate’s final removal from the horizon of the Muslim world, Muslims
began to ponder over who would assume the role of the custodian of the
Shar┘‘ah in Muslim lands, which had heretofore been the duty of the Caliph.
The Caliph or Im┐m as an actual or symbolic head of the ummah, who himself
is subordinate to the Shar┘‘ah. The same is true for those who head Muslim
collectivities, whether they are sultans, kings, or elected presidents. The
allegiance of Muslims is primarily not to the person of the ruler or the state,
but to the Shar┘‘ah.74
The spiritual unity of Muslims resides in their common way of life. For
Muslims this way of life becomes universal due to the commonality of daily
rituals that a Muslim performs. What weaves the Chinese Muslim and the
Moroccan Muslim into a single ummatic fabric is a common worldview which
is brought about by the practice of Islamic rituals. These rituals are learned,
understood, and practiced through the Shar┘‘ah. Ummah is not a community
that is based just on a set of ideas although ideas, such as the idea of taw╒┘d,
play a very important role in shaping its existence. More precisely, ummah is a
community of law based upon the Qur’┐nic ideals. 75 Nasr argues that:
On a social plane Unity expresses itself in the integration of human society
which Islam has achieved to a remarkable degree. Politically it manifests itself in
Islam’s refusal to accept as the ultimate unit of the body politic anything less than
the totality of the Islamic community, or the ummah. There is only one Muslim
‘Abdullah al A╒san, OIC–The Organization of Islamic Conference, 10.
Ibid., 11.
74
See, Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, 14.
75
See, ibid., 7.
72
73
398
EJAZ AKRAM
people, no matter how scattered and far removed its members may be. Only the
complete ummah comprises that circle which is Islam and no segment of the
Muslim community has a right to claim to be the ummah any more than a
segment of a circle could claim circularity. 76
In relation to ummah’s connection with the Shar┘‘ah, it must be said that
when a Muslim enters the Islamic community by pronouncing shah┐dah
(bearing witness to the oneness of God), he also acknowledges and submits to
the Divine Law, the Shar┘‘ah. Without the Shar┘‘ah he cannot enter the
Ummah and without the Ummah, there is no realization of the Shar┘‘ah.
Etymologically, the word Shar┘‘ah means a road, a path or the way, along
which one chooses to travel to reach God. Nasr further states that:
From any point in space there can be generated a circle and an indefinite number
of radii which connect every point of the circumfrence of the circle of the
Centre. The circumference is the Shar┘‘ah whose totality comprises the whole of
the Muslim community [Ummah]. Every Muslim by virtue of accepting the
Divine Law is as a point standing on this circle…It is only by the virtue of
standing on the circumference, that is, accepting the Shar┘‘ah, that man can
discover before him a radius that leads to the Centre. Only in following the
Shar┘‘ah does the possibility of having the door of the spiritual life open and
become realized.77
It is evident from Nasr’s explanation how intricately the concept of
Shar┘‘ah and the Ummah are related to each other.
From the nineteenth century onwards, Muslim states adopted Western
inspired legal codes under the influence of colonial rule or adopted Western
ideals and institutions in the name of progress. As pointed out by Esposito, the
clash with the Western system of law soon came about due to the latter’s
conflict with the Muslim family law. 78 Muhammad Iqbal composed the
following verse in his Mysteries of Seljlessness to affirm the centrality of the
Shar┘‘ah to the unity and life of the Muslim community: 79
When a Community forsakes its Law
Its parts are severed, like the scattered dust.
The being of the Muslim rests alone
On Law, which is in truth the inner core
Of the Apostle’s faith. 80
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam (New York: Praeger, 1967), 29–30.
Ibid., 122.
78
Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 179.
79
Ibid., 179.
80
Muhammad Iqbal, The Mysteries of Selflessness tr. A.J. Arberry (London: Jay Murray
76
77
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
399
Upon the termination of the Muslim rule at the hands of the British in
India, a new system of law was brought in by the British to administer the
new colony. Until the War of Independence of 1857, (also known as the
Mutiny), the Mughal emperor continued to rule, at least symbolically, despite
the de facto rule of the British for a period of time. However, after 1857, the
British assumed direct control of India. When the Muslim authority of
administering the Shar┘‘ah was gone as a result of the abolition of Caliphate, a
debate arose in Muslim India whether India was still d┐r al-Isl┐m or d┐r al-╒arb.
A fatw┐ (religious decree) was issued by the ╓anaf┘ ‘ulam┐’ that since the
northern part of India was under the direct control of the British, it could no
longer be classified as d┐r al-Isl┐m.81 As Rudolph Peters has argued, the decisive
factor in ascertaining whether a region belongs to d┐r al-Isl┐m or d┐r al-╒arb is
the sovereign rule of the Muslims and the application of the Shar┘‘ah.82
Professor H. Siegman claims that at the heart of Islamic political doctrine
lies the concept of ummah which was tied by the bonds of faith alone. 83 Ann
K. Lambton argues that the implicit and explicit acceptance of the Shar┘‘ah
along with all its implications made the Muslims part of the Muslim ummah.
She states:
The internal organization of umma was based upon the profession of common
religion…Its organization was secured and defined by a common acceptance of,
and a common submission to, first the Shar┘‘a and secondly the temporal head of
the community, the institution of whose office, the imamate or caliphate, was
simply the symbol of the supremacy of the Shar┘‘a. The im┐m or caliph, the
representative, successor or lieutenant of the prophet was, himself, subordinate
to the Shar┘‘a, and it was to the Shar┘‘a, not to the im┐m or the caliph, that the
believer owed his allegiance. 84
She further points out that the “human beings cannot change the Divine
law, the Shar┘‘a; they can only know or not know it, obey or disobey it.” 85
Since the Shar┘‘ah precedes the state for the Muslims, the state cannot be
the lawgiver but only a subservient agent of God and His law (both of which
ontologically precede any governance). For the Muslim statesman, then, the
knowledge of the Shar┘‘ah is a prerequisite, as well as the acknowledgement of
Publishers, 1953), 37.
81
See, Rudolph Peters, “D┐r al-Isl┐m” in John L. Esposito, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Modern
Islamic World (New York: Oxford, 1995), 1: 338.
82
See, ibid., 1: 338.
83
H. Siegman, “The State and the Individual in Sunni Islam,” The Muslim World, vol. LIX
(1964), 13.
84
Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, 14.
85
Ibid., 1.
400
EJAZ AKRAM
its established sources and of the authority of God. 86 Thus for Muslims, the
state is there more for carrying out the legal and doctrinal consequences of the
Shar┘‘ah than for legislation. Thus if one breaks the law, the distinction
between moral and legal transgression is blurred, as opposed to other modern
and secular notions of law. This makes it rather difficult for the occidentals to
fully grasp the ethos of the Shar┘‘ah because of its substantial difference from
the Roman and other Western systems of law. Inasmuch as the Shar┘‘ah is the
source of the duties of Muslims, it also becomes the indispensable source of
political ideas and behaviour. The Roman law and the later occidental systems
differ from the Shar┘‘ah in its scope of legislation and judgment, as it passes on
various activities which the law takes into cognizance. 87 According to
Lambton, Muslim jurists argued that the fundamental rule of law is liberty
“but since the human nature is weak and covetous, the wisdom and loving
kindness of God necessarily lay down limits ( ╒ud┴d) for human liberty.” 88
Of the seven categories of law, one of the important categories that the
Shar┘‘ah takes into cognizance is far╔ kif┐yah or the obligation of the
community which can be translated as collective obligation. Thus ummah is
related to the Shar┘‘ah quite intimately since the sources for both are the same.
Some scholars argue that ummah constitutes a utopian element in the
political philosophy of Islam, which emerged after the Prophet’s lifetime.
Ahmad Dallal, for instance, states that it was in the period of the first four
“rightly-guided” Caliphs that important Islamic ideals such as the unity of
ummah were actually conceived. 89 Some of these elements actually
materialized in Islamic history and were thus not utopian at all; these include:
“principles of unity of ummah, the ummah as the ultimate source of political
authority, and the related principles of the unity of political leadership and the
unity of the land of Islam.” 90 Even though political fragmentation intensified
as history progressed, the ideal of Muslim unity in the form of ummah
remained very strong. On the other hand, some Muslims scholars have argued
that Islam could only be preserved by safeguarding the unity of the ummah.91
Dallal further notes that although the European encroachment of Muslim
lands dealt a severe blow to the ideas, practices and referents of unity in the
Muslim world, its ideal of ummatic unity remained strong. Islamic resistance
movements defending the solidarity of ummah emerged throughout the
See, ibid.
See, ibid., 1–2.
88
Ibid., 2.
89
Ahmad Dallal, “Ummah” in John L.Esposito, ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Modern Islamic
World, 4: 268.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
86
87
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
401
Muslim world. The Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1293–1327/1876–1909)
tried to revive the idea of ummah which became very popular in the Muslim
world, just as Jam┐l-al-D┘n Afgh┐n┘ (d. 1314/1897) rallied Muslims for the
reinvigoration of the ummah.92
Traditional Understanding Ummah and its Unity in the Shar┘‘ah
Hans Deiber argues that in the earliest Muslim ummah, the Prophet combined
the religious interests with the requirements of politics. 93 Dieber argues that if
one compares the influence of Islamic traditional philosophers on the rulers
with the influence of Latin political thought, it would be evident that Islamic
philosophers shaped the consciousness of the Muslims in a much more
profound way.94 He argues that:
… with their metaphysical worldview [Muslims] supported the traditional Islamic
nexus between religion and politics. This link is provided with a rational,
scientific basis presupposing the universality of values. They are revived in the
modern self-image of Islam.95
The reason it is of relevance to know how the Muslims viewed
themselves and their politics in the medieval times is that they have not
experienced a significant break with the past, as in the case of the modern
Western world. Their ideas and attitudes continue to be shaped almost
decisively by the Shar┘‘ah and their self-understanding of their past.
The scholars of the classical ages of Islam have commented upon the idea
of the ummah and its related concepts of the abodes of peace and war, as well
as the ummah’s relation to the Shar┘‘ah. Further, an important distinction lay
between the modern and traditional ways of conceptualizing the political. The
modern national state places, above all, an emphasis on the ideological,
political and territorial defence of the state. For Muslims throughout history,
on the other hand, the protection of their way of life according to the Shar┘‘ah,
religion and the ummah are what need defence and not only a certain
territory.
Ab┴ ╓┐mid al-Ghazz┐l┘, the famous Muslim theologian (d. 505/1111),
expounded his theory of government in which he stressed the importance of
Dallal notes how the concept of ummah had legal repercussions in the colonial period. As late
as the twentieth century, the French courts treated ummah as a legal entity with substantive
legal consequences. See, ibid., 269.
93
Hans Deiber, “Political Philosophy” in S. H. Nasr and Oliver Leaman, eds. The History of
Islamic Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1996), 841.
94
Ibid., 859.
95
Ibid.
92
402
EJAZ AKRAM
the power necessary to accomplish the maintenance of law and order.
However, this power represented or symbolized not only the collective unity
of the Muslim ummah, but also its historical continuity, and it derived its
institutional form from the legitimacy that would come from the Shar┘‘ah.96
For most Muslim thinkers within the tradition such as al-Ghazz ┐l┘, politics is
closely linked to theology, eschatology, ethics and law. 97 The caliphate or the
imamate, according to al-Ghazz┐l┘, may not have been the de facto bearer of
power and a symbol of political unity, but it must continue to exist because it
reflected cultural and religious unity. This, he thought, was necessary to
preserve the religious life of the ummah.98
One of the most important theologians in the history of Islamic
civilization was Im┐m Fakhr al-D┘n al-R┐z┘ (d. 606/1209), who is known to be
the second Ghazz┐l┘.99 In his J┐mi‘ al-‘Ul┴m he lays down a chart in which he
locates the nexus between the Shar┘‘ah and the polity:
The world is a garden, whose waterer is the dynasty, which is the authority. The
guardian of this authority is the Shar┘‘ah and Shar┘‘ah is also the policy which
preserves the kingdom; the kingdom is the city which the army brings into
existence; the army is guaranteed by wealth; wealth is acquired by the subjects
(Ummah) who are made servants via justice; justice is the axis of well being of the
world.100
Most of R┐z┘’s political thought revolves around discussion of the
qualities and requirements of the kings, but all the attributes 101 that R┐z┘ has
stipulated for the requirement of the Im┐m or Caliph are laid down in the
name of the security of the ummah.102
To the requirements stipulated by Im ┐m R┐z┘, Ibn Khald┴n adds the reign
of the Shar┘‘ah to govern the Muslim ummah. Ibn Khald┴n argues that the
See, Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, 113.
See, ibid., 128.
98
See, ibid.
99
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Fakhr al-Din Razi” in M. M. Sharif, ed. The History of Muslim
Philosophy (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963), 643.
100
Fakhr al-D┘n R┐z┘, J┐mi‘ al-‘Ul┴m, Mu╒ammad Kh┐n Malik al-Kutt┐b, ed. (Bombay,
lithograph, 1905), 206.
101
R┐z┘ argues that eight qualities are necessary for the leader of ummah: He should be clement,
generous, and have the ability to govern his thoughts, words and actions. He should be
deliberate in both, showing forgiveness and exacting punishment. He should provide security
through justice and keep the company of the ‘ulam┐,’ the learned scholars. Lastly, he should not
be so forbidding that it deters people from his office, and not so clement that people take him
for granted. See, Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, 135–136.
102
See, ibid., 135.
96
97
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
403
Caliphate is accountable to the ummah and its consensus is one of the sources
of law. Such accountability of the Caliph to the Shar┘‘ah is of necessity a legal
obligation.103 Ibn Khald┴n used a new science which led him to introduce the
concept of ‘a╖abiyyah as a foundation of temporal rule which would guarantee
the cohesion of the Muslim Ummah. He argues that the best way to safeguard
the cohesion of people and prevent them from splitting is the Shar┘‘ah which
constitutes the ultimate source of their association and mutual agreement. 104
Some scholars have made the case that the modern nation state is a
suitable form of governance for Muslims on the basis of Ni ╘┐m al-Mulk’s
theory of blending of the caliphate and the sultanate. 105 Ni╘┐m al-Mulk in his
Siy┐sat N┐mah has argued that the sultanate had become an important
institution.106 Because of this he had to propose another theory of sultanate’s
subordination to the Shar┘‘ah. Rizvi argues that:
… the establishment of sultanate could be fruitful only if it continued to uphold
the supremacy of the Shar┘‘ah…the universal nature of the Shar┘‘ah was
maintained by its content, not by its extent of jurisdiction. It was the same
Shar┘‘ah within each sultanate, but the Shar┘‘ah was not sovereign in the aggregate
of the political units. True Caliphate remained a venerable institution; it could or
could not issue letters patent in favour of the Sul ═┐n, but it had no effective
authority.107
This logic has been used by Islamic fundamentalists, most of whom also
happen to be modernists, in order to legitimize the contemporary state
system. They argue that if the Shar┘‘ah is promulgated in a certain territory,
whether administered by democrats or dictators, all else will be fine. The flaw
in this mode of reasoning is the following: nation states are not empires like
sultanates (in whom often the state and government appear to be the same
thing); the logic of nation states in the Muslim world is neither strategic, nor
regional, but a legacy of colonial rule; social changes that have led to the
transformation of the whole world into a ‘mass society’; disappearance of the
buffer zones between political entities because of the centre’s technological
capability to reach the periphery of a political unit; and the disappearance of
the Caliphate.
See, for details, Ibn Khald┴n, The Muqaddimah, tr. Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1958), 1: 367.
104
See, Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, 163.
105
S. Rizwan Ali Rizvi, “The Theory of State and Blending of the Caliphate and the Sultanate,”
Iqbal Review, vol. XXII: no. 1 (April 1981), 51.
106
Ni╘┐m al-Mulk, Siy┐sat N┐mah, ed. M. Qazv┘n┘ (Tehran: 1965), 11.
107
Rizvi, “The Theory of State and Blending of the Caliphate and the Sultanate,” 51.
103
404
EJAZ AKRAM
Upon the dissolution of the caliphate, the same requirements that were
thought necessary for the caliph were considered important for the sultans and
other comparable temporal rulers. In some form or the other, the ideal of the
ummah continued. When the Mongols destroyed the caliphate and the
political unity of the Muslim lands, jurists and Muslim political philosophers
stressed the importance of the doctrine because they found justification for it
in the Qur’┐n and the Sunnah. The interface of the Islamic world with modern
colonialism, however, cannot be compared to the Mongol invasion. This is
primarily because of the structural changes brought about by the colonial
European modernity or the voluntary modernization by the Muslims
themselves. However, there is evidence that on the one hand this encounter
with modern world has divided and locked the Muslim world in small
political and national units, and on the other, it is gradually leading to the
intensification of the discourses of ummatic unity.
Ummah and the Historical Consciousness of Muslims
It is interesting to note that the Muslim perception of the self in history has
not changed much as compared to the modern West. It is because of a certain
degree of ahistoricity that is a part of the Islamic tradition, which has enabled
concepts such as ummah to perpetuate.108 If Muslims were political realists in
the modern sense of the term, they would recognize and accept that the
caliphate, for all practical purposes, has not existed for a long time; they would
easily give up the concept of ummah as passé, as argued by Piscatori, and come
to terms with their present realities. However, the discourse of Islamic states,
governments, resistance movements all indicate that that has not happened. It
is therefore also important to analyze what the historical process means for
Muslims. For most contemporary Muslims, like their medieval ancestors, the
past is not incongruous with contemporaneous life. 109 Jacob Lassner has argued
that:
… there is a certain timelessness to the way Muslims have experienced and indeed
continue to experience history; to be sure their past as they experience it does not
resemble the “timeless Orient” of the nineteenth-century Western romantics,
that cultural invention representing changelessness, if not unchangeable form and
structures, but it is still timeless in a manner of speaking. 110
The Qur’┐n, according to the Muslims, is not a book of history but a book on human nature,
fi═rah, which is held to be of constant validity and not subject to historical relativity.
109
See, Jacob Lassner, Middle East Remembered (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2000), 14.
110
Ibid., 14.
108
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
405
Lassner argues that although the Muslim scripture is not devoid of
historical content, the Qur’┐n does have an ahistorical character which is
exhibited by its linguistic cadences and allusions. The same could be said of the
public utterances of the Prophet (peace be on him) that constitute an
important part of the Muslim tradition. 111 The Western view of history in its
modern form evinces discomfort with its past, because for many people in the
modern West, there has been a grudging realization that memories of the past
can be harmful. 112 Lassner contends that the experience of the West is not a
good guide to approach the Muslim world because for Muslims “the political
culture of the region still resonates strongly to the distant past.” 113 It is,
however, still possible for the vestigial traditional elements in the Western
world to understand the Muslim ethos better, but the only problem is that the
Christian view of the past has meaning, if not of history, at least a meaning in
history. This is because the Person as well as the Divinity of Jesus Christ
Himself became a part of the historical process. Theologically, a similar
parallel cannot be drawn with the Prophet Mu ╒ammad’s relevance to the
Muslims. The Qur’┐n, on the other hand, was revealed to the Prophet
Mu╒ammad (peace be on him) over a period of 23 years, which can be
classified as an historical era. However, all major exegetes of the Qur’ ┐n
maintain that the Qur’┐n is not only metahistorical in nature, but also that it
cannot be translated. 114 Lassner argues that it is rather problematic when either
variant of the two Western views of history — modern and traditional — is
applicable to Islamic societies and their understanding of the past. He argues
that a nuanced view of how Muslims used and continue to use their past ought
to begin with Muslim perceptions rather than Western sensibilities:
For believing Muslims, historical memory is the cement that held and continues
to hold fast the community of the faithful, especially in extraordinary moments
when it has been subjected to divisive internal stresses and /or the threat of
outside actors and influences. 115
He further argues that the resplendent civilization of classical Islam reflects the
capacity of Muslims to adapt to the best of other civilizations, while forging
their own cultural and political institutions, often with great ingenuity.
A similar case can be made for the persistence of the Hindu caste system and its relation to the
ahistoricity of the concept of the dharma, which too, like ummah, has no exact counterpart in
English language.
112
Lassner, Middle East Remembered, 120.
113
Ibid.
114
Some of these exegetes are M. M. Pickthall, A. J. Arberry and ‘Abdullah Y┴suf ‘Al┘.
115
Lassner, Middle East Remembered, 2.
111
406
EJAZ AKRAM
However, it must be mentioned that the cultural and political equilibrium that
the Shar┘‘ah demands from the Islamic world cannot accommodate changes
that are totally alien to its nature merely in the name of adaptation. Lassner
further asserts that:
To be sure, believing Muslims have also invoked history on behalf of
restructuring existing societies, but even that revolutionary summons speaks not
to a bold new world but a return to an idealized past centered about the Prophet
and his community (Ummah)…Some critics may regard this assumed linkage
between historical consciousness and behavior as over-determined…nevertheless,
in focusing only on the differences that characterize Muslim societies of the Near
East, critics will lose sight of that which gives medieval, if not modern, Islam its
unusual sense of coherence: the universalizing tendencies of a historical
consciousness first shaped in the formative period of Islamic civilization when
history was rigidly tied to idealized versions of an earlier age and when human
experience was seen as a continuous replay of events. 116
Nation States and Ummah in World Politics
In the light of our discussion above, it seems apparent that the logic of
integration and regionalism in the Muslim world can only be of necessity a
different one unless, of course, the Muslim world is so thoroughly colonized
or voluntarily adopts a historical trajectory that is radically different from its
own. James Piscatori states that at the present the Muslims are seeking to
establish Islamic states all over the Muslim world and may not be seeking to
supplant the nation state system itself. However, “pan-Islamic aspirations have
not disappeared certainly, and the ability of Muslim transnational
organizations, ideologies, and communications to permeate national borders
testifies that a greater degree of Muslim community is now apparent.” 117
Piscatori’s work is a popular perspective in the Western political science
community on this topic. However, as held by Lassner and others, “the very
notion of polity defined by geographical borders and a citizenry united by
national identity and purpose has no deep roots in the [Muslim] region and no
foundation in Islamic culture.” 118 The conception of nation state is an
invention of the nineteenth century and a product of European thought and
history. Therefore, the rapid formation of the modern nation states in the
Muslim world is fraught with problems. Lassner reproaches the Western
Ibid., 1 and 31.
James Piscatori, “International Relations and Diplomacy” in John L. Esposito, ed. The Oxford
Encyclopedia of Modern Islamic World , 2: 219.
118
Lassner, Middle East Remembered, 97.
116
117
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
407
scholars that they should not be surprised at the bizarre geography of the
Muslim domains. He states that:
… in certain instances, the developing nation-states of the region have been
plagued by the borders of self-serving colonial mapmakers…and produced
hitherto unknown boundaries and irrational political arrangements in which
tribal and other ethnic and political elements found themselves dispersed over
several newly defined nation-states. 119
Even though concepts such as qawm, wa═an, ra‘iyyah and ‘a╖abiyyah seem
to be close counterparts of nation for Muslims, there were no charters that
sought to specify rights and privileges of the inhabitants of a certain selfenclosed geographical entity, as in the case of Europe. On the other hand, as
Lassner has put it:
The cement that held Muslim societies together, other than the use of force was
the loyalty compelled by Islam itself, or, to be more precise, the obligation to
embrace Muslim ideals and practices. In that sense, one belonged to the sum of all
Muslim societies, the community, or Ummah, of Islam.120
Many Western political scientists who hold the same position as
Piscatori’s, rightfully argue from empirical evidence that most Muslim states
in the Muslim world actually want the concept of ummah to become a reality,
more so than any other regional formation such as the European Union and
the MERCOSUR. While that is true for the whole region extending from the
Middle East to South Asia to Southeast Asia, it must also be kept in mind that
in many cases, the first logical step for Muslim populations is to get rid of
what are perceived as un-representative, un-Islamic and oppressive regimes.
Such regimes are often residual by-products of Western ideological tussle of
the cold war period (Saddam’s Iraq and Gaddafi’s Libya). The incumbent
regimes in many of these countries either cooperate or are co-opted by the
West, by incentives and coercion, or both, and are not seen as legitimate in the
eyes of a vast majority of Muslims.
This also explains the demand for democracy in the Muslim world, and
the Western resistance to the idea of democratic governance in the it. 121
Further, it must not be presupposed that if or when those states become
Islamic, they will abandon the dream of a closely-knit cooperative ummah
Ibid., 102.
Ibid., 99.
121
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996), 170.
119
120
408
EJAZ AKRAM
based on strategic, ideological and symbolic goals. The latter situation may
enable them to further galvanize them more towards regional unity and
interregional cooperation. 122
The most important question to be asked is how these Muslim states
propose to get rid of the existing regimes. Such an act in the modern
international law is usually considered an act of revolution. However, most
successful modern states were built by revolutionary change. Revolution was
seen as a radical break from the socio-religious values of the past, as in the case
of the French and Bolshevik revolutions. These revolutions signify certain
socio-economic changes that eventually transformed most of Europe.
Revolution is translated as thawrah in Arabic, which has the connotation of
rebellion that threatens law and order in society and endangers the collective
security of the society. For Muslims any subversion of the socio-economic
ethos of the society is considered in negative terms and against the dictates of
the Shar┘‘ah. Therefore, if revolutionary activity is considered undesirable by
the Muslims, how will the Muslims rid themselves of the regimes they deem
corrupt, without any ‘revolutionary action’? Perhaps it is the Muslims’
habitual disdain for revolution that has prevented recourse to such actions so
far.123
If the Muslim world indeed does not want a revolution, can we claim that
the Iranian revolution was really a revolution or a change in regime? In the
light of this logic, the Iranian revolution cannot be classified as a revolution in
the European sense of the term, because it did not have a class dimension, its
goal was not to achieve a break from the past; rather, it represented a return to
the principles enshrined in the past, and it did not aim to topple the socioeconomic order. Similarly, Willard Hardman argues that the Turkish
Revolution was not a revolution but an evolution of ideas of statehood that
led from the Young Ottomans to the Kemalist state in its incipient form. 124
Even if one does concede that many of the Muslim states seek break from the
past via revolutionary action, the break sought is not from the distant but the
recent past.
Besides the fact that state of Pakistan during most of its history has been a front line ally of
the United States, the supportive and accommodating position taken by the religious parties of
Pakistan vis-à-vis any type of Islamic regime in Iran, Afghanistan or Central Asian states
demonstrates that if democracy brings the Islamists to power, interstate cooperation is most
likely to increase.
123
However, given the transition that the Muslim world is going through now, it cannot be
assumed that such fall of regimes will not continue.
124
Willard Hardman, “Kemalism: Evolution or Revolution,” doctoral dissertation, Catholic
University of America, Washington, D.C. 1996.
122
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
409
With regard to the Middle East, because of the decline of Pan-Arabism, it
is likely that some other force will take its place. Most likely, it will be
transnational Islam which will question the moral authority of the nation
state. For the ideology of transnational Islam calls for “the formation of
Islamic polities capable of carrying out an Islamic agenda in accordance with
traditional beliefs and practices.” 125
Impact of Islamic Eschatology on Ummatic Consciousness
Another reason the concept of ummah has not lost its political relevance is
related to the eschatological beliefs of the Muslims. William Chittick argues
that the final Day of Judgment is a basic article of faith in Islam which is
clearly enunciated in the Qur’ ┐n and the ╓ad┘th.126 Hence scholastic
theologians, philosophers and Sufis, all made eschatology one of the principal
concerns for Muslims. 127 The Qur’┐n talks about the Day of Judgment and
Muslim beliefs have developed in light of that and from all different sources
that indicate the second coming of Jesus (peace be on him), the Mahd ┘ and the
ultimate battle between Truth and falsehood. The deceiver ( dajj┐l) is
equivalent or the same as the Christian apocalyptic legend of the anti-Christ.
Both Sunn┘ and Sh┘‘┘ traditions affirm that the Mahd┘ (or the hidden Im┐m of
the twelver Sh┘‘┘ tradition) will be the precursor of Jesus Christ (peace be on
him), who will rule for a short period of time, uphold the integrity of the
Shar┘‘ah, and bring peace, prosperity and security. After the Mahd ┘, both
Sh┘‘ahs and Sunn┘s alike have a millenarian expectation of the coming of the
Christ (peace be on him), who will rule for a period of forty years as the
supreme judge and upon his death will be buried next to the grave of the
Prophet Mu╒ammad (peace be on him). 128 Before the advent of the Mahd┘, the
earth will be the most difficult place to live for Muslims and tyranny will
abound. The Mahd┘ and Christ (peace be on him) will both be ‘redeemers’
who will come and dispense justice and mark the end of an epoch of evil.
However, no source of eschatological doctrines of Islam indicates when the
end will be. Nonetheless, the Muslims of the modern world feel that the end is
near which they corroborate from the evidence which is related to the signs of
the S┐‘ah or the Hour mentioned especially in the ╓ad┘th. This is the most
powerful source of shaping the expectations and behaviour of Muslims. The
Lassner, Middle East Remembered, 108.
William Chittick, “Eschatology” in S.H. Nasr, ed. Encyclopedia of Islamic Spirituality (New
York : Crossroad, 1987), 378.
127
Ibid.
128
See, William J. Hamblin and Daniel C. Peterson, “Eschatology” in J. L. Esposito, ed. Oxford
Encyclopedia of Modern Islamic World , 1: 442.
125
126
410
EJAZ AKRAM
Muslims of the modern world perceive themselves as oppressed because of the
colonial and neo-colonial push of the Western world into the world of Islam.
They feel that their way of life is threatened. The feeling that the world is
about to end juxtaposed with how God has promised the end to be, instils a
keen sense of duty or role that Muslims are supposed to play. The extant
political conditions, combined with the eschatological beliefs, inform the
Muslim political behaviour not only in the present but also backward from a
forthcoming end to the present. The concept of the ummah from its inception
at the time of the origin of Muslim history to its ultimate unity and its
anticipated role in the future has a combined effect on the Muslim
consciousness. Due to this, despite a perceived state of fragmentation, the
concept has managed to survive as an important ideal.
Ummah and the Current International Relations of the Muslim
World
It is interesting to note that historically when the political form of the Muslim
ummah was more visible, “regionalism” as such was considered a threat to
Muslim unity. Of course, regionalism then meant undermining the political
potency of the supra-regional Caliphate due to greater self-autonomy of the
“regions.” Assuming that by ‘region’ we still mean the same thing, after
further political fragmentation of the Muslims into sub-regional units of the
modern age such as the destitute national states which proliferate the Muslim
world with secessionist movements, regional cooperation and unity appears as
a much better option than the state of fragmentation they currently live in.
Therefore, on the question of regionalism, the ummah has come full circle:
from ummatic unity to regionalism, to nationalism and then back to
regionalism in quest of attaining the ideal of ummah. On the political uses of
this concept, Lassner argues that even in the past regional or local rule was
usually not challenged:
… the concept of Ummah continually serves as a lightning rod with which to
attract opposition to established authority. In both the medieval chronicles and
the works of Muslim political theorists, it is clear that for traditional Muslims,
the challenge to state authority must always be justified in religious terms. For
traditionalists, the touchstone for any discussion of Islamic government has
always been the Ummah of the Prophet.129
The colonial period changed everything for the Muslim world. Once
Muslims were subjected of foreign rule, they ceased to be the masters of their
129
Lassner, Middle East Remembered, 113.
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
411
destiny. Muslims continue to feel sore about this at several levels, from
political and military to intellectual and psychological. Just like most other
things in life, this too, is often seen by Muslims in religious and apocalyptic
terms; a problem that must be taken care of to restore the historical trajectory
that seems to befit Muslims. The concept of ummah that has persisted as an
ideal throughout the periods of upheaval in Islamic history was invoked by
leading Muslim thinkers of the time. This led to a further transformation of
the concept of ummah in more political terms. Its further politicization came
about due to the Israeli occupation of Palestine and control of one of Islam’s
holy sites.
The transformation of the new political discourse, however, has not made
other meanings of ummah irrelevant for Muslims, which range from purely
spiritual to social and economic. However, the ummatic discourse has had a
decisive impact on the shaping of current international and regional
institutions. The opening statements of institutions such as ISESCO (Islamic
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) are made in terms such as
the following:
We beseech Allah to help and guide us in our tireless endeavors to secure
happiness for our people, consolidate the bonds of Islamic solidarity and cement
the cultural identity of the Muslim Ummah to make it capable of meeting
challenges.130
ISESCO, whose main purpose is to enhance cooperation and
coordination between the Islamic organizations, 131 has always aroused the
political passion of Muslims to take a firm stand toward Israel in defence of alQuds al-Shar┘f.132 Talking in the context of increasing security relations in the
southern ECO region, the former President of Iran, Mohammad Khatami
said: “Pakistan and Iran could also play a significant role to unite the Ummah.
Now that we are jointly trying to ensure peace and security in Afghanistan,
we can certainly work together for the Ummah.”133 Similarly, the Arab
Maghreb Union (whose French acronym, L’UMA, was chosen deliberately to
convey the unity of the ummah) considers history and religion as the bases of
their regional community. 134
ISESCO Newsletter, No. 40, Rajab, 1420 A.H. (Rabat: ISESCO, October 1999), 3.
See, ibid., 15.
132
See, ibid., 20.
133
Ihtisham ul Haque, “Resolution of Kashmir Issue Soon,” The Dawn (25 December 2002),
Front Page.
134
The preamble of the Arab Maghreb Union states: “Mettant à profit les travaux de la Grande
Commission maghrébine, réunie à l'automne 1988, les rédacteurs du Traité constitutif de
130
131
412
EJAZ AKRAM
‘Abdullah al A╒san implores the Muslims in his book Organization of
Islamic Conference that they need not look at ummah as an alternative for the
nation-state model, or a rival of distinct national identities; rather, they need
to change the hierarchy of their identities by giving precedence to ummah first
and then to regional and national identities. 135 As far as the reality is
concerned, al Ahsan argues that:
The primary basis of the OIC is the Quranic concept of ummah. But this
traditional religious concept has not been an obstacle for bringing modern secular
nation-states under one political platform…not forget[ting] the tensions between
religious and secular ideas in the contemporary Muslim society. 136
Cynics on the subject of Muslim unity often argue that while
international bodies such as the United Nations are “paper tigers,” their
Islamic counterparts such as OIC are “weaker paper tigers.” Given the nature
of modern international law, it is true that bodies such as the League of
Nations and UNO have been weak and ineffectual. However, it is important
to note that while UNO is an international organization which has come
about because of the danger that the nation state system wrought upon the
world, not only that it recognizes the validity of nation states, it is an agent of
national policies that seek to perpetuate this system. OIC, on the other hand,
weak as it may be, recognizes the ground reality, but does not hold dear the
boundaries within the Muslim world. Increasingly, it is addressing the security
issues of the Muslim world. OIC expressed concern on the number of Western
interventions and threats of intervention in the Muslim world and resolved
that:
… the security of each Muslim country is the concern of all Islamic countries, and
that members would seek to strengthen the security of the member states
through the cooperation and solidarity of Islamic countries. The OIC resolution
on the subject also expressed the determination of the OIC community to
preserve Islamic values and the Islamic way of life and to promote the ummah’s
common spiritual and social and economic values. 137
l'UMA du 17 février 1989 ont tenu, dans le Préambule, à mettre en exergue les liens solidaires
qui unissent les peuples du Maghreb Arabe, liens fondés sur la communauté de l'histoire, de la
religion et de la langue; ils ont certes posé comme finalité, le renforcement des relations entre les
Etats membres, mais les rédacteurs du Traité sont allés plus loin encore en prévoyant ‘la marche
progressive vers, la réalisation d'une intégration complete.’ ” See: <http://www.maghrebar
abe.org/fr/index.htm>.
135
See, ‘Abdullah al A╒san, OIC–The Organization of Islamic Conference, 123.
136
Ibid., xi.
137
Ibid., 76.
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
413
It is also important to note that one of the biggest congregations in the
world is the annual ijtim┐‘ of the Tabl┘gh┘ Jam┐‘at138 (now based in Pakistan)
and the ╓ajj. The latter is a non-political activity, but has political
ramifications. Other than those Muslims who can afford to travel to the West,
because of their Western residence, citizenship and affordability, most
Muslims who live in nation states do not possess the means to travel beyond
their national frontiers, nor do they have the legal documents to travel to their
next-door neighbours. It is the ╓ajj in Makkah which provides an occasion for
the Indian Muslims to get to know the Chinese Muslims, even though they
live as neighbours across the border from each other. Similarly, the Tabl ┘gh┘
Jam┐‘at, also apparently apolitical, flocks congregations that are sometimes
bigger than the ╓ajj.139 As the Muslim world generally becomes more and
more political, so does the international civil society of Muslims.
In the same manner, the diasporic fragments of Muslim Ummah vie to
institutionalize their support for common cause and security in the Muslim
world: “The Muslims throughout the world, be they in China or Palestine, see
themselves as a single unit, linked by a dynamics that does not allow
themselves to remain silent when people, especially those of the same faith,
have their human rights trampled upon.” 140 Muslim communities living in vast
expanses of territories ranging from South Africa to Europe to Americas are
driven by similar motivation.
Bernard Lewis is the founder of a school of thought that has produced
students141 who espouse a highly paranoid perspective on the concept of the
Muslim ummah. He argues that the Western world has become accustomed to
identities such as nation and country. Even though he maintains that the
The Tabl┘gh┘ Jam┐‘at is a movement that was initiated by the Muslims of India in the 1920s.
With non-political aims, it devoted itself to the propagation of the Islamic faith, not only for
dawah or prosletyzation of non-Muslims but to invite Muslims to become better Muslims.
Originally, it aimed to reach the illiterate or semi-literate peasants but gradually it has attracted
followers form well-educated classes of pre-dominantly South Asian, but also other places in the
Muslim world. Especially in Pakistan, there are a significant number of Tabl┘gh┘s in the military
and medical professions. See, Mumtaz Ahmad “Tablighi Jamaat” in Martin E. Marty and R.
Scott Appleby, eds. The Fundamentalism Project (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and
Sciences. University of Chicago Press, 1993). See also, Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics,
148.
139
Ibid.
140
Muhammed Haron, “The ‘Muslim News’ (1960–1986): Expression of an Islamic Identity in
South Africa” in Louis Brenner, eds. Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 224.
141
Some of the most vehemently anti-Islamic ideological scholarship is produced by this lot,
which has found its culmination in the works of Daniel Pipes.
138
414
EJAZ AKRAM
categories of nation and country are not new to the Muslim world, yet “as
definitions of political identity and loyalty they are modern and intrusive
notions.”142 Lewis further argues that:
[… the] definition of political identity and loyalty by religious belief, or to be
more precise, by religious adherence, is not limited to the revolutionaries. For
many years now there has been an active international grouping, at the United
Nations and elsewhere, consisting of more than forty Muslim governments,
which together constitute the so-called Islamic Bloc. This includes monarchies
and republics, conservatives and radicals, exponents of capitalism and socialism,
supporters of the Western Bloc, of the [formerly] Eastern Bloc, and of a whole
spectrum of shades of neutrality. They have built up an elaborate apparatus of
international consultation and, on many issues, cooperation; they hold regular
high-level conferences, and despite differences of structure, ideology, and policy,
they have achieved a significant measure of agreement and common action. In
this the Islamic peoples are in sharp contrast with those who profess other
religions.143
Conclusion
It has been argued that the concept of ummah is not directly translatable as a
single word into other languages, which has necessitated a heuristic exigency
to find its meaning in the light of the Qur’┐n and the Islamic tradition, both in
╓ad┘th literature and in its historical understanding. It has also been argued
that the historical consciousness of Muslims is different from that of the
modern Western peoples, due to which the concept of ummah has persisted
throughout the centuries. This is demonstrated by mainstream Western
political science literature on this subject, which is then juxtaposed with the
writing of Muslim scholars, such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and others. In the
light of such analysis, one can see why this concept has had such an
overarching impact on Muslims’ consciousness and their political behaviour.
Finally, when one approaches the subject of transnationalism in the
Muslim society that may take any form: OIC type of international body, or
regional bodies of economic and political cooperation (such as the ECO and
the L’UMA), economic institutions (such as the Islamic Development Bank or
the defunct BCCI, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International), Islamic
political resistance and reform movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood
and Jam┐‘at-i Isl┐m┘), or the various Western declared TCOs (such as al-Qaeda
and Islamic Jih┐d): notwithstanding the question of their having any merit or
142
143
Bernard Lewis, The Political Langauge of Islam, 4.
Ibid., 3.
MUSLIM UMMAH AND ITS LINK WITH TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM POLITICS
415
being devoid of it, all draw their inspiration from the concept of ummah and
vie for legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims, on that basis. It is important,
therefore, to apply the concept of ummah as a vital category of analysis in
International Relations literature that deals with transnational Muslims.
* * *