Books
Malcolm Salmon
Vietnam Third Force?
IT IS S U R E L Y a sign of the times, and one th a t gives ground for
the greatest satisfaction, that a m ajor Australian: political figure
should be occupying him self w ith serious and sym pathetic study
of the revolutionary history of an A sian society. O ne has only to
reckon the im probability of such a thing happening 20 o r 30
years ago to m easure som ething of th e shift in the centre of
gravity of A ustralian political life w hich has taken, place over
those years and is continuing at an accelerated rate.
A lready D r. J. F. C airn s’ latest b o ok*, has been greeted
with howls of rage by such spokesm en for the far R ight as Mr.
Geoffrey F a irb a irn and the leaders of the D .L .P. Indeed,
the
editors
of
the
DLP
journal
Foetus
thought
they
were carrying off a political m asterstroke when they published on
the front page of a recent issue a p hotograph of M r. W hitlam
and D r. C airns together at the launching of the book in M elbourne
before X m as. T he m ere fact th a t the L ab o r L ead er associated
him self with the occasion was seen by these pundits as new and
particularly telling evidence th at the L ab o r P arty is still, as for
so m any years past, going to the dogs.
F o r his part, M r. F airb airn , in a review in the Sydney Morning
Herald, took violent exxception to D r. C airn s’ closely argued point
that the V ietnam ese liberation forces only resorted to arm ed
struggle after system atic repression by the D iem regim e had
* The Eagle and the L otus — W estern Intervention in Vietnam , 1847-1968,
by J. F. Cairns. Lansdowne, M elbourne, 250 pp., $4.95.
Malcolm Salmon spent several years in Vietnam; he is foreign editor of
Tribune.
A U STR A LIA N L E F T R E V IE W — F E B .-M A R C H , 1970
71
rendered peaceful political forms of action im possible. It is essential
to the case of such m en as M r. F airb airn , who never say boo
about such things as.B -5 2 saturation raids on the South V ietnam
countryside or the m assacre at M y L ai, to hold th at the “com ­
m unists” are always and everywhere the initiators of violence.
B ut such reactions really serve only as negative confirm ation of
the significance of C airn s’ work.
The Eagle and the Lotus m oves at several levels.
It
provides first of all a b ird ’s eye view of the history of
F rench intervention in V ietnam . O ne could wish th at Dr. C airns
had found a slightly less grand form ulation than “W estern In ter­
vention ini V ietnam 1847-1968” for his sub-title, -since he devotes
only 27 pages to the entire period of F rench colonisation up to
V ietnam ’s A ugust revolution of 1945. T he section on U nited
States intervention in the post-Genieva period is, understandably
perhaps, m uch m ore substantial. Indeed, the 60-odd pages of
the chapter (The U nw innable W ar) on the course of the conflict
from 1962 to 1968 could probably have done with som e pruning.
It is here particularly that the m ass of m aterial at the au th o r’s
disposal seems to get away from him to some extent, and here that
he could lose all but the m ost determ ined of readers.
B ut the essential points are strongly m ade in these sections of
the book — the continuity of | the V ietnam ese independence
struggle from the earliest days of the F ren ch incursion into V ietnam
until the present, the indigenous ch aracter of the m ovem ent both
to V ietnam as a whole fn the past, an d to South rath er than to
N orth V ietnam in today’s circum stances.
D r. C airn s’ close study of A m erican sources is of extrem e value,
enabling him to analyse with great penetratio n the m ainsprings of
A m erican policy at the given stages — the fateful 1962 shift
from the long-standing A m erican ap praisal of the V ietnam situation
as a civil w ar situation to the “external aggression” thesis, the
overriding necessity of saving the Saigon regim e from overthrow
which lay behind the escalation of th e w ar (introduction of US
com bat troops, launching of the bom bing of N orth V ietnam ) in
1965, and th e decision taken in th e la tte r half of 1967 th at a
m ilitary victory was beyond reach. T h e author em phasises that
the T et offensive of early 1968 confirm ed rath er th an precipitated
this decision.
In m y view, D r. C airns’ study of the V ietnam w ar becom es
controversial only when it is a question of analysing the contending
ppolitical forces in South V ietnam ese society. T he “ eagle”
of his title is, of course,
W estern
interference in the
life of th e V ietnam ese nation over th e past 120 years.
His
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A U ST R A L IA N L E F T R E V IE W — F E B .-M A R C H , 1970
“lotus” m ay be described as the native civilisation of V ietnam ,
but, m ore particularly, it is th at ‘“th ird force” in V ietnam ese
political life which stands betw een those who are waging tho
arm ed liberation struggle and those who have m ade them selves
the agen|ts of foreign intervention in V ietnam ese society.
It is the “th ird force” th at Dr. C airns would like to see as
decisive in V ietnam ese affairs. It is m y view th at through
political sym pathy
and
association
(especially with
such
“third
force”
leaders
as
the
B uddhist
bonze
Thich
N hat H anh, who visited A ustralia some tim e ago and whose
ideas have influenced D r. C airns strongly) the author tends to
overdraw the significance of this force, and its possible role had
there n o t been m assive US m ilitary intervention in V ietnam .
I would be the last to deny the role th a t the “th ird force” is cer­
tain to play in the inevitable eventual political settlem ent in, South
V ietnam . Any student of the statem ents of the N ational L iberation
Front and the Provisional R evolutionary G overnm ent of South V iet­
nam knows that they share such an approach. O ne has only to m ention
the im portance attached by them to the recently form ed N ational
A lliance of D em ocratic and Peace-loving Forces, w hich probably
represents the m ost L eft elem ents of South V ietnam ’s “third force”
and which, surprisingly, is not m entioned by D r. C airns, and the
attention they give to the “third force” political exiles from South
V ietnam living in such places as Paris and B angkok, to realise this.
O n the other side, the fearful, repressive attitude adopted by
the T hieu regim e in Saigon to any m anifestation of third force
initiative reflects the sam e reality.
But the “th ird force” role will be played in a context basically
determ ined by th e course of the struggle betw een the liberation
forces and the invaders and those V ietnam ese w ho have throw n in
their lot with them . Its action will in effect m erely set the seal
Vipon a situation
which
is already basically form ed. I
suppose it can, be said w ith some degree of validity th a t
all political struggle, w hether within a political party o r in society
at large, is designed to win the support of “th ird forces” — those
who inhabit the “m iddle ground” of politics, the “uncom m itted ’,
the “centre” , the
“swinging
voters” , an d
so
on.
The
South V ietnam ese political scene is no exception to this
rule. B ut to reason from this ground th a t the third force is a
decisive force is surely to p u t th e cart before the horse.
F o r such a force can only be “decisive” post festum, as K arl M arx
was fond of saying — after the event, after the m ilitary and
political centention of the opposing forces has established the
outlines of th e new political balance.
A U STR A LIA N L E F T R E V IE W — F E B .-M A R C H , 1970
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All this is not to deny some pow er of independent initiative
to the th ird force — the exam ples of third force, m ainly Buddhist,
action iry H ue, Saigon and D a N an g cited by Dr. C airns did
precipitate change, but only in circum stances substantially prede­
term ined for it by the actions of the chief actors in the V ietnam ese
dram a. So, no doubt, it will be in th e future as well. T hird force
leaders like G eneral D uong V an M inh will never play a really deci­
sive role in a nation which has already produced its H o Chi M inh
and V o N guyen G iap.
It m ust be said th at Dr. C airns expresses extrem e doubt as to
w hether his third force will in fact prevail in South V ietnam . H e
says (p. 195): “Does such a third force (rejecting the N L F but also
opposing present Saigon policies) exist in South V ietnam ? T here
can be no doubt th at South V ietnam did possess such a third
force but A m erican policy has w eakened and reduced it. . .”
His m ain com plaint against the A m ericans, in term s of V ietnam ­
ese political life, is precisely th at th eir b ru tal intervention “ w eak­
ened and reduced” the third force. His doubt about the future of
this force is not surprising because a good p a rt of the book is
devoted to an elaboration of the depth an d b readth of the struggle of
the N L F , in which the role of the V ietnam ese com m unists is,
generally speaking highly appraised.
In a certain sense he answers m any of his own argum ents when
he says (p 209): “ It (com m unism ) was, in fact, m ore appropriate
to the needs of V ietnam th an any o th e r doctrine and in respect
to the struggle for national independence and econom ic and political
reform the com m unists in V ietnam h a d the best record” .
D r. C airns’ discussion of the V ietnam ese com m unists’ role, and
their m aintenance of an independent stance (“their own soul” )
in the disputes dividing the w orld com m unist m ovem ent, is particllarly perceptive.
But here again, his account of the flexible and creative way
in which they have behaved in this context takes m uch of the
sting out of his repeated w arnings (p. 198) of the dangers posed
by “dogm atic and relentless com m unists” in the V ietnam of the
future. B ut the book has a wider canvas th a n V ietnam . Dr. C airns is
also concerned with the problem of revolutionary w ar in general.
In this context he sees V ietnam (correctly I think) as at the same
tim e unique and in the highest degree typical.
H e firm ly underlines the prim acy of politics in revolutionary
w ar and the fact th a t for success revolutionary com batants m ust
be firm ly rooted in the social context in w hich they fight. Both
conditions he sees as fully applying in the struggle in South V ietnam .
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A U STR A LIA N L E F T R E V IE W — F E B .-M A R C H , 1970
One of the m ost valuable aspects of the book is its em phasis
on the need for structural changes in the countries of Asia, A frica
and L atin A m erica. H e writes (p. 218):
Economic developm ent is not prim arily an economic process. It is a
political and social process which leads to economic results . . . Land
reform is needed in economically under-developed countries; low er rents
are needed, and low er interest charges, and higher wages. A re land
owners likely to lead a campaign fo r land distribution and fo r the
lowering of rents? A re money lenders likely to lead a campaign for
lower interest charges? A re employers likely to lead a campaign for
higher wages? H ence, economic developm ent becomes associated with
taking from one class and giving to another . . .
The book also contains an extensive discussion of U nited States
policy up to and including the Nixon D octrine for new form s of
intervention in A sia, a critical appraisal of the developing Soviet
presence in the region, and a discussion of the future course of
A ustralian foreign policy.
In this last connection he em phasises, once again, as he did with
force in his earlier w ork, Living With Asia, the essential connection
betw een any m ovem ent tow ards an independent foreign policy
and internal change within A ustralia. Such rem arks as ‘“we can
help social progress elsew here only if we have som e of it in
A m erica and A u stralia” (p. 237), are taking on the quality of
vintage C airns. A nd again:
. . we m ust free ourselves from
conventional subm issiveness in foreign policy — we m ust cease
to be m ilitary cam p followers — if we are to have a chance of
builidng a better society in A ustralia” (Introduction, p. xi).
H e deals severely with the secretive operation by which a
succession of L iberal governm ents have integrated A ustralia, through
allowing the establishm ent of US bases on, o u r soil, in the US
nuclear system (w ith no safeguarding anti-ballistic missile), and
m akes the m ost forthright call I have yet seen from his pen for a
“Fortress A u stralia” approach to questions of national defence.
It is hardly to be expected th at one of A u stralia’s hardest-w orking
politicians should find tim e to produce a full-length study of any
given subject w ithout signs of haste and pressure creeping into
the text now and again. This certainly happens with The Eagle
and the Lotus. B u t when all is said, it rem ains a thoughtful and
hum ane contribution to the A ustralian discussion of V ietnam and
international relations in general. It is a w orthy continuation of its
author’s years-long effort to expose th e crim e com m itted in our
nam e through the V ietnam intervention, and to change the line of
A ustralian foreign policy in the direction of national independence
and peace.
A U STR A LIA N L E F T R E V IE W — F E B .-M A R C H , 1970
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