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Baltic Unity within European Unity – why Myth, not Reality?
In recent years a debate about development of the European Union (EU) has become
hugely important. There are diverse views on the direction of federalism, which the President
of the European Commission J. M. D. Barroso is passionately promoting: “Let’s not be afraid
of the words: we will need to move towards a federation of nation states. This is what we
need. This is our political horizon.”1 As a consequence of such ambitious plans, the question
of national identity and independence has become crucial. However, less attention has been
paid to the problem of regional cooperation and the effects of already existing European
integration on it, which is exactly what this report aims at.
In mass media one can often hear about an entity called ‘the Baltic States‘. This union of
three states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has cooperated quite a lot in the two last decades of
20th century, however, now the importance of cooperation seems to be in decline. The Baltic
unity in the European unity (i.e. EU) is a myth because of two reasons: passive effect of the
integration in the EU, when the European unity indirectly and unintentionally influences the
cooperation among the Baltic States, and active effect of the policies of the EU, when they
have deliberate impact on the Baltic Unity.
Baltic Unity before the EU
In order to indicate why Baltic unity is impossible in the context of integrated Europe,
it is necessary to recall the common aim of Baltic cooperation before the accession to the
European Union.
Back in the 1990, when the Baltic States still were republics of the Soviet Union, the
chairmen of Supreme Council of each state signed Declaration on Unity and Cooperation,
inter alia deciding that a Council of Baltic States has to be created “in order to assist in the
full restoration of state independence of the three Republics”. 2 Being small states, they needed
each other, first of all, for regaining independence and, secondly, for being recognized by
international community. The goal was achieved in August of 1991, when the Soviet Union
officially recognized the independence of the Baltic States, 3 and the recognition from other
1
Barroso, J. M. D. State of the Union 2012 Address. Available on: http://europa.eu/rapid/press release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm Last visited 26 April 2014.
2
Declaration on Unity and Cooperation by the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and Republic of
Lithuania, 1990.
3
Dahlburg, J. T. and Marshall, T., Los Angeles Times (1991). Independence for Baltic States. Available on:
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-07/news/mn-1530_ 1_baltic -states Last visited 26 April 2014.
2
states shortly afterwards followed. 4 Admittedly, the Baltic cooperation before these events
was quite symbolic, for instance the Baltic Way in 1989 5 and the agreement mentioned above,
even though many politicians tend to overestimate it.
6
The Baltic States with their
simultaneous demonstrations definitely attracted the attention of the world, which was
necessary, but the largest contribution to their independence was the disastrous situation of
the Soviet Union in terms of economics and politics, when, as History reports, the reforms of
Mikhail Gorbachev appeared unsuccessful.7 It allowed the Baltic cooperation to happen.
After regaining independence, the Baltic States were well aware of the fact that they
quickly need to search allies and integrate them in the West, especially after experiment with
neutrality before the Second World War. Therefore, the third goal and, according to Kirsten
Biering, the primary objective of cooperation was to get a way into international politics. 8 In
addition, “mistrust and fear towards Russia” did not disappear, 9 and was a stimulus to search
for security and economic independence. They found security in North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) and economic independence in the European Union (EU). For the
purposes of this report, the case of EU will be examined.
Already in 1992 first steps were made, in order to become members of the EU (then
European Community), namely, trade and cooperation agreements were signed with it,
gaining the Most Favoured Nation Status. 10 Attention should be paid to the fact that the Baltic
States started their way to the EU together.
On the way the main achievement was the creation of the Free Trade Agreement in
1994,11 which was extended further in 1996, including agricultural goods as well. 12 There was
also an idea about the Baltic Customs Union, and, again, as then the Prime Minister of Latvia
4
Charles, A., Baltic Review (2011). World Leaders Welcomed The Baltic States To The United Nations: Iceland
Received Special Recognition For Its Support In 1991. Available on: http://baltic-review.com/2011/03/worldleaders-welcomed-the-baltic-states-to-the-united-nations-iceland-received-special-recognition-for-its-support-in1991/ Last visited 26 April 2014.
5
UNESCO. The Baltic Way – Human Chain Linking Three States in Their Drive for Freedom. Available on:
http://www.balticway.net Last visited 26 April 2014
6
Kalniete, S. (2011). Baltijas valstu neatkarības atjaunošana. Kā tas viss notika? Available on:
http://kalniete.lv/2011/10/18/balt ijas -valstu-neatkaribas-atjaunosanas-20-gadadiena/ Last visited 26 April 2014.
7
History. Fall of the Soviet Union. Available on: http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/fall-of-soviet-union
Last visited 26 April 2014.
8
K. Biering, “The Baltic States on the International Scene: an epilogue”, in N. Petersen (ed.), The Baltic States
in International Politics, Copenhagen, DJOFPublishing, 1993, pp. 175-178.
9
M. Haab, “Potentials and Vulnerabilities of the Baltic States”, in B. Hansen and B. Heurlin (eds.), The Baltic
States in World Politics, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 4.
10
A. Elson, “Baltic State Membership in the European Union: Developing a Common Asylum and Immigration
Policy”, (1997) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 326.
11
Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of La tvia and the Republic of Lithuania,
1993.
12
OECD (2013). Baltic Free Trade Agreement. Available on: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=174
Last visited 26 April 2014.
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said, one of the goals of it was to facilitate the Baltic integration into EU. 13 It failed, and later
the transformation from Baltic cooperation to Baltic competition was observed.
What Did Go Wrong?
The breaking point was the year of 1997 when the Commission presented its opinions on
progress that the Baltic States have made, in order to get membership in the EU. It reported
that “negotiations for accession should be opened with Estonia”, 14 but in the case of Latvia
and Lithuania the Commission added “as soon as it has made sufficient progress in satisfying
the conditions of membership defined by the European Council in Copenhagen. ”15,16 Probably
it is too brave to say that this was the end of the Baltic unity and the start of the Baltic
competition, nevertheless it was true, especially on political level. “Latvia and Lithuania were
initially upset that they had been left behind,” 17 and they were forced to increase their
capabilities, i.e. to compete, which succeeded in accession to the EU in 2004 together with
Estonia.
The inner competition of the Baltic States did not disappear till this day, and instead of
cooperation, they are rivals. Before the accession, however, some experts, such as Edmunds
Apsalons 18 predicted that the integration into EU would enhance the Baltic unity. On the
contrary, others such as Mare Haab 19 were sure that the Baltic States would try not to engage
in cooperation among them, in order to advance the capabilities of each state separately.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the cooperation is needed, in order to ensure better integration
into Europe. Also now it is quite logical that it would be easier for three small states to ally
and promote their regional interests, not to compete. Then, the question is: do the Baltic States
have regional interests?
13
Šķēle, A. (1997). Report of the Prime Minister Andris Skele
at the 3rd session of the Baltic Council. Available on: http://www.am.gov.lv/en/news/speeches/1997/3659/ Last
visited 26 April 2014.
14
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Opinion on Estonia's Application for Membership of
the European Union, Brussels, 1997, p. 109.
15
Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Latvia’ s Application for Membership of the European Union,
Brussels, 1997.
16
Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Lithuania’ s Application for Membership of the European Union ,
Brussels, 1997.
17
A. Kasekamp, “Baltic States and the EU: A Rocky Road from “Outside” towards the “Core”, in The Baltic
States in the EU: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, Studies & Reports No. 98, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors
Institute, 2013, p.19.
18
E. Apsalons, “Baltic Unity – Illusion of Reality?”, in A. Lejiņš and D. Bleiere (eds.), The Baltic States: Search
for Security, Riga, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1996, pp. 216-217.
19
M. Haab, “Potentials and Vulnerabilities of the Baltic States”, in B. Hansen and B. Heirlin (eds.), The Baltic
States in World Politics, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998, pp. 9-10.
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Regional Goals Achieved
Looking at the previously mentioned aims of the Baltic unity, it is clear that they are
achieved. First, they regained independence, secondly, they were recognized by the
international community, and then they became members of both EU and NATO. Along with
their accession to the EU, the Free Trade Agreement of the Baltic States became invalid,
because it was not relevant anymore, since there was already a free trade within the EU.
Consequently, the Baltic unity in the EU is simply unnecessary and the Baltic States before
have devoted the most of their cooperation towards getting into the EU, which was the
ultimate goal.
When trying to get a membership in the EU, the Baltic States have successfully
transformed into market economies, 20 gaining some economic independence from Russia, and
that was exactly one of the reasons of economic cooperation between them before. Also from
the security perspective, the membership in the EU allows the Baltic States to feel as a part of
broader community, which secures and cares about them. Before the EU, this ‘broader
community‘ was the Baltic States themselves. Forcing others to perceive them as a unity, they
were able to gain more attention and influence: the media was referring to them as the ‘Baltic
States‘, the officials of the EU were calling them that way after common efforts towards the
European integration, and soon this term became popular among ordinary people as well, and
has survived till this day, even though the Baltics are not united at all.
After accession, there was no need to be the ‘Baltic States‘, if there is an opportunity to be
the ‘Europe‘. This association of ‘broader community‘ has created two very important
legacies on the Baltic unity: (1) Lithuania tends to perceive itself as a part of Central Europe,
and (2) Estonia moves towards Scandinavia, leaving Latvia basically alone.
Lithuania and Central Europe
Lithuania started to change its identity towards Central European one when the Baltic
States were pursuing NATO membership, and Lithuania was the most ready for that. 21
Central European identity for Lithuania actually means closer cooperation with Poland, its
largest neighbour. The EU gave opportunity for closer Lithuania - Poland relations, especially
because they were accessed the same year. Furthermore, if comparing other factors such as
religion and history, then indeed Lithuania and Poland have much more in common than
Lithuania has with the Baltics, and the membership in the EU contributes to enhancing
political and economic ties with Poland.
20
21
See supra notes 14, 15, 16.
Kasekamp, p. 20.
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One of the main unifying factors is a common religion. According to International
Religious Freedom Report for 2012, in Poland “almost 89 percent of the population is Roman
Catholic,”22 but in Lithuania 77.3 percent. 23 For comparison, the dominant religion in Latvia
and Estonia is Lutheran, and, moreover, Estonia is among the least religious countries in the
world. 24 Poland and Lithuania have a common history of Union since 14th century, and that of
state since 16th century until dissolution of country in the late 18 th century. 25 It is much more
significant than those quite recent historical ties of 20 th century among the Baltic States.
Apparently, Poland and Lithuania have a quite solid ground for cooperation.
Both Central European nations have cooperated, but admittedly more before the
accession to the EU, than after. In 1994 they signed Treaty on Friendly Relations and Good
Neighborly Cooperation, 26 inter alia regulating such significant issues as minority rights,
religious freedoms and other. Cooperation was channelled through such regional
organisations as the Council of the Baltic Sea States and Northern Dimension. However, in a
recent decade the relations between Poland and Lithuania have become very hostile. There is
a lot of problems on political level between the two countries, for instance, the Polish
politicians accuse Lithuania for unfair policies against the Polish minority, 27 even though
Lithuania’s Ambassador to Poland in 2013 asserted that relations on business and youth
cooperation level are prosperous, as well as she claimed that the membership in EU and
NATO has made their cooperation ‘perfect‘ in certain spheres due to common problems.28
Despite the fact that there exist some problems between Lithuania and Poland, there
still is cooperation, especially in the context of the EU. Regarding the identity of Lithuania, it
does not perceive itself as a Baltic State anymore, and this phenomenon is very striking in the
latest State of the Nation address by the Lithuanian President Dalia Gribuaskaite. 29 She
mentions Europe for so many times and stresses the significance of the membership of
Lithuania in it, but reference to the Baltic States is made only once in the context of recent
22
United States Department of State. Poland 2012 International Religious Freedom Report , p. 1.
United States Department of State. Lithuania 2012 International Religious Freedom Report , p. 1.
24
BBC (2011). Spirituality in Estonia - the world's 'least religious' country. Available on:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14635021 Last visited 26 April 2014.
25
Polish Academic Information Center, University at Buffalo. Poland-Lithuania
four centuries of the European Union's precursor. Available on: http://infopoland.buffalo.edu/classroom/pl.html Last visited 26 April 2014.
26
Treaty on Friendly Relations and Good Neighborly Cooperation of the Republic of Lithuania and Republic of
Poland, 1994.
27
Rohozinska, J., Central Europe Review (1999). The Conquest of Pragmatism. Available on: http://www.cereview.org/99/13/rohozinska13.ht ml Last visited 26 April 2014.
28
Warsaw Business Journal (2013). Polish-Lithuanian relations marked by cooperation, controversy. Available
on: http://www.wbj.pl/article-63442-po lish-lithuanian-relat ions-marked-by-cooperationcontroversy.html?typ=wbj Last visited 26 April 2014.
29
Grybauskaitė, D. (2014). State of the Nation Address by H.E. Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of the Republic of
Lithuania. Available on: http://www.president.lt/en/activities/state_of_the_nation_address/2014.html Last
visited 26 April 2014.
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NATO activities. Therefore, even in the rhetoric of the President the Baltic unity does not
seem to have a big importance. Neither does it play a big role in Estonian case.
Estonia and the North
Estonia quickly switched the identity to that of a Nordic country after it was the only
one from the Baltic States which was invited to further negotiations with the EU and it
realized that it has better capabilities comparing to other Baltic States, in order to become a
member of the EU. 30 In the speech by Toomas Hendrik Ilves (then the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Estonia) in 1999 “Estonia as a Nordic Country” not only he emphasized the Nordic
identity of Estonia, but also did some unpleasant remarks about Lithuania and Latvia, saying
that “the countries that chose a less dramatic reform course are the ones who did not get
invited to the first round of EU negotiations.”31 It was an explicit attempt to distance Estonia
from the Baltic region.
Likewise Lithuania, also Estonia has some common features with other Nordic
countries, the most significant being the origins of language, which also was emphasized in T.
H. Ilves’ speech, but their history is quite diverse. Even though it is still questionable, whether
Estonia is really of such a Nordic origin as it tells the world, Estonian – Nordic cooperation in
terms of economics is remarkable. According to Statistical Office of Estonia, the main trading
partners of Estonia are Finland and Sweden. The export from Estonia to these countries
constitutes more than 30% of all the trade, but import – more than 25%, pulling ahead of such
great countries as Russia and Germany.32
Although the publicists sometimes treat the Nordic identity of Estonia as a joke,
calling Estonia “a Nordic Kitten”, 33 it is obvious that Estonia and other Nordic countries has
more unity, especially in terms of economics, than the Baltic States do. Not meaningless is the
fact that the move towards the Nordic identity started exactly because of the EU and inner
Baltic competition. Additionally, the EU has left another legacy on the Baltic unity, namely it
has concentrated attention on the broader Baltic Sea region, not the Baltic States.
30
Kasekamp, pp. 19-20.
Ilves, T. H. (1999). Estonia as a Nordic Country. Available on: http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/3489 Last
visited 26 April 2014.
32
Statistical Office of Estonia. Main Trade Partners in 2012, as a % of total trade. Available on:
http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/economy-a-it/economy-in-numbers.html
33
The Economist (2010). The best Balti will be Nordic. Available on:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/theworldin2011/2010/ 12/balt ic_states_will_show_their_differences_2011 Last
visited 26 April 2014.
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The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBS R) is an initiative of
the EU approved in 2009, which aims at promoting cooperation in the region with priorities of
“saving the sea, connecting the region and increasing prosperity.” 34 EUSBSR has many
programmes, one of the main being the Baltic Sea Region Programme. It is financed by the
EU and Norway, 35 and aims at cooperation in such areas as fostering innovations, internal and
external accessibility, resources, competitive cities and regions. 36 It includes several member
states of the EU, Norway and also north-west regions of Russia and Belarus.37
Such regional projects co-financed by the EU and European countries emphasizes the
significance of the Baltic Sea Region, not the Baltic States separately. To put it mildly,
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania do not play a big role in the EU as a region, because it is small
and in comparison economically not that developed. The Baltic Sea whereas includes a lot
more countries and is geopolitically much more important. For Estonia it is especially
convenient that there are also Nordic countries, for Lithuania – Poland.
It is remarkable that EUSBSR is the first regional strategy project in the EU, which
emphasizes the potential and relevance of the Baltic Sea Region and undoubtedly is beneficial
for the Baltic States, even though does not reinforce their unity. Apart from the political
strategies and organisations influencing the inter-Baltic cooperation, there is also societal
level of the Baltic unity, which contributes to the identity of three Baltic States.
The ‘Balts’?
A person in his lifetime acquires different identities and belongs to diverse groups, one
of them being the state. Nowadays, in the time of intensive globalisation, people more easily
can associate themselves not only with cities or states, but also with larger regions. The
survey was done, 38 in order to understand which region the citizens of Latvia feel affiliated
with and to come to conclusion about the existence of Baltic identity. Latvia was chosen due
to the fact that in contrast with Estonia and Lithuania it does not have any other regional
identity (except European) and also due to practical reasons, regarding inability to reach other
states’ respondents in short time period.
34
EUSBSR. What is the EUSBSR? Available on: http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/about Last visited 26
April 2014.
35
Baltic Sea Region. Funding. Available on: http://eu.baltic.net/Funding.113.html Last visited 26 April 2014.
36
Baltic Sea Region. Priorities. Available on: http://eu.baltic.net/Priorities.21.html Last visited 26 April 2014.
37
Baltic Sea Region. Co-operation area. Available on: http://eu.baltic.net/Co-operation-area.103.html Last
visited 26 April 2014.
38
The survey was held by the author of this report on the internet platform www.aptauja.lv. 100 respondents
participated with age range from 15 to 47 years.
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Absolutely unsurprisingly the results are not very explicit, since the question asked is
associated with personal perception about oneself and can be affected by such factors as
income level, opportunities of travelling, job, etc. Half of the respondents claimed that they
feel as the citizens of Europe, but the other half – as the citizens of the Baltic States. 18–20
years old respondents were most pro-European, whereas the older generations perceived
themselves as living in the Baltic States. However, as mentioned above, there is no such clearcut trend among respondents, just indications of preferences.
The relevant aspect of the results is such a high association of oneself with Europe as a
whole, not only the Baltic region. For 18 - 20 years old people (mostly students) it could be
described as a direct result of the EU programmes. High schools apply to the European Social
Fund with different projects, 39 students in universities enjoy ERASMUS opportunities and
different others youth exchange programmes, seminars, etc., which incredibly broadens their
minds in a way that they realize themselves as a part of Europe. Moreover, they did not
experience the time of the Baltic unity in the end of 20 th century. The older people also get
affected by such European initiatives as Lifelong Learning Programme, 40 but not that much as
younger generation, therefore, they still prefer to perceive the Baltic States as their living
place, especially if they participated in such events as the Baltic Way.
One might think that the self-perception of the society is irrelevant and that it does not
affect Baltic unity, however it is not true. A young businessman from the Baltics, searching
for partners, is looking further than Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia; politicians have more
ambitions towards Europe and there is a competition between the Baltic States as to who is
the best (i.e. who is on the level of Europe); in the end just ordinary people can see the
distance between Riga and Barcelona as a small one not just for travelling, but also for living
and working, which is the effect of free flow of labour. And even though the respondents gave
equal preference to both Baltic and European region, 50% associating themselves with
Europe after only 22 years of independence and 10 years of the integration is a remarkable
result.
Conclusion
Nowadays the Baltic cooperation is not prospering, indeed. It is a myth which
continues to live in the texts of newspapers and in such organisations as the Baltic Council of
39
ES Fondi. Kas ir nauda darbībā? Available on: http://www.esfondi.lv/naudadarbiba/#483 Last visited 26
April 2014.
40
European Commission. Lifelong Learning Programme. Available on:
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/index_en.php Last visited 26 April 2014.
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Ministers. It is true that the Baltic unity declined because of the integration in Europe,
however, it is not fair to claim that the EU was directly guilty of that.
On the one hand, there were passive effects of the integration process, i.e. the EU
itself did not force the Baltic States to fragmentize, it rather gave them the opportunity to
choose the discourse. First of all, while trying to become members of the EU, the Baltic States
chose cooperation at the beginning, but in 1997 after Estonian success, all the three states
positioned themselves as rivals. The second passive effect is the achievement of regional
goals: the independence is regained and recognized; accession to the EU and NATO is done,
increasing security and economic independence from Russia. Third effect is identity change
of Estonia and Lithuania, which again was the opportunity provided by the integration in the
EU, but not simply because of the EU.
On the other hand, there is a pair of active effects of the integration when the EU
policies directly affect the Baltic unity. EUSBSR is an initiative, which stresses the relevance
of the Baltic Sea region, thus diminishing the prospects for cooperation only among the three
Baltic States. Another aspect of direct action is different projects and opportunities that are
given to the citizens of the EU, which encourage them to identify themselves with the whole
Europe, not only the Baltic States.
Weighing both passive and active factors in this situation, it shall be concluded that
the passive ones play the most important rule. It means that the Baltic cooperation in
integrated Europe is a myth not because the EU implies that, but because the Baltic States
themselves choose another discourse, which, of course, is possible because of the existence of
the EU.
Even though the previous statements seems to be negative for the Baltic States, it is
not necessarily so. Focusing on the Baltic Sea region and establishing stronger ties with other
countries is a smart option, since the Baltic States is a small region with lack of resources, and
close cooperation only among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania probably is not that beneficial.
Furthermore, competition has always been a driving force for development, and the Baltic
States shall regard it as such, not as a reason for misunderstandings, what wa s observable in
the negotiations about the Lithuanian Liquefied Natural Gas project, for instance. On the
symbolic level, the Baltic unity is a fantastic point what to bring up in the lectures of history.
Therefore, leaving the Baltic unity as a myth, the Europe shall stay reality.