ROOSEVELT AND BRITISH APPEASEMENT IN 1938
by
William V. Wallace
Early in 1938, before those steps had been taken that rendered all
but inevitable the European war of late 1939, President Roosevelt suggested
to Mr. Chamberlain a form of international conference intended to avert
the danger. Mr. Chamberlain refected it. This, wrote that greatest of
all Anglo-Americans, Sir Winston Churchill, ten years later, meant "the
loss of the last frail chance to save the world from tyranny otherwise than
by war". Indeed, that the "proffered hand" should thus have been waved
away left him "breathless with amazement".' Greater statesman than
historian though he was, Churchill's judgement must nonetheless be
respected. Yet so must that of a much lesser statesman and historian,
Sir Samuel Hoare, later Lord Tempi ewood. Writing after Churchill, this
Englishman to the core and arch-defender of Chamberlain put the blame on
Roosevelt: "It was, in fact, we who finally agreed to support the proposal,
and Roosevelt who decided that the moment was no longer suitable for it".
Not content with this, he went on to assert that "in the months that followed,
Anglo-American relations became increasingly intimate and culminated in
the parallel efforts that Washington and London made throughout the
Czechoslovak crisis".
The odd thing is that the judgements of both
men are right, or almost right.
Roosevelt's proposal was not a sudden inspiration; it had a complex
history. It was part of his attempt to dislodge the isolationism embedded
in the neutrality legislation of 1935-37, while at the same time to make
some contribution to the cause of preserving a just peace in the world at
large. He was a President in search of a policy. He had borrowed one
idea from his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and burnished it up into his
"quarantine" speech of 5 October 1937 - a speech that had upset Americans
by seeming to suggest sanctions. He had borrowed another idea from his
Under Secretary, Sumner Welles, had first dulled it down, and then
polished it up in preparation for a dramatic Armistice Day plea for peace,
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only to step back, under Hull's pressure, at the last moment.
Now, with
the turn of the year, he judged that the time had come to take up Wei I es's
Idea again and see what impact he could make on the affairs of the world.
The actual text of the message Roosevelt sent to Chamberlain on
12 January 1938 is not known. NTo American copy has been found, and
the British documents for this period have not yet been published.
But
Welles's memorandum of two days before, filled out wjth details from his
earlier memoranda, gives a fairly clear picture of it.
Roosevelt wanted
Chamberlain's "support" for a conference of small and neutral nations with
the United States to agree, among other things, on "the essential and
fundamental principles which should be observed in international relations"
and on "the methods by which international agreements may be pacifically
revised." Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia would be kept informed
and also asked for their views, in the end, it was hoped, everyone would
ratify the principles arrived at and keep the peace.
This was a far cry from sanctions; it was meant to stop a war, not
stop the aggressors. It was clearly expected to find a congenial corner of
Chamberlain's heart. Indeed, it was specifically intended to back up
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement in so far as that was known to
Roosevelt. As Welles put i t , it would "lend support and impetus to the
effort of Great Britain, supported by France, to reach the bases for a
practical understanding with Germany both on colonies and upon security,
as well as upon European adjustments. " But it did not find a welcome.
Chamberlain, of course, did "appreciate most highly the mark of
confidence", and he was "grateful" for the "vigorous initiative". But it
was his very appeasement policy that made him question Roosevelt whether
there was not a "risk of his proposal cutting across our efforts here".
Principles were very fine. But it was "probable that the Italian and German
Governments, of whom we should have to ask a contribution that they w i l l
be none too ready to give, might excuse a refusal to continue negotiations
on the ground that the subjects under discussion - which for the most part
will be specific and concrete in character - seemed all merged in the wider
problems which the President contemplates tackling as a whole". And
this was the worst of all possible moments to choose. It would be
"regrettable" if Roosevelt's plan were used"to block progress in the directions
which over recent months we have laboriously worked out and for which we
fee! the stage has at last been set in not too unfavourable a manner. "
Would Roosevelt not "consider holding his hand for a short while"?
It was not, or so Chamberlain averred in his reply of 14 January, that
he differed from Roosevelt's "objective".
Indeed, he was at great pains
to put the best possible interpretation upon his own:
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"His Majesty's Government.... have realised that if
such appeasement is to be achieved it will not be upon
the basis of bargaining in which each side seeks to weigh
up what it will get against what it will be asked to give.
Our plan (both as regards Germany and Italy) rests upon
the view that we and they are in a position each to make a
contribution towards the objective we both desire to obtain.
There would be no need to discuss whether our contribution
were greater or less than theirs. What is needed is to ensure
that the contribution of each w i l l , taken with the contribution
of the other, make up an agreement which will bring appeasement"
This sounded like pure Roosevelt.
quite different.
It was meant to.
The reality was
The first serious move in this policy of appeasement had been the visit
of Lord Halifax to Germany in November 1937. The content of his
conversation with Hitler hod been reported - at least in part - to Washington.
Halifax's private view of what might be the next step had been indirectly
hinted at. He had wondered whether a colonial settlement might not be
used "as a lever for getting some of the things both the French and British
Governments wanted, such, for example, as a contribution by Germany
toward European peace". 7
But his view had in fact been even less
Rooseveltian in tone, even more down-to-earth. It had shown none of
Chamberlain's pretence about not bargaining. "The suggestion", he had
written in his diary,
"that we should try to do a bargain on the line of getting
him (Hitler) to drop the demand for colonies as a return for
a free hand in Europe is neither very moral nor very attractive.
There might be more to be said for the more difficult but
sounder bargain of a colonial settlement at the price of being
a good European. But with what collateral security?" 8
There were bad bargains as well as good bargains.
appeasement meant bargaining.
But in Halifax's mind,
Still, Halifax was not Chamberlain. At that time he was not even
Foreign Secretary. But it mattered little. He was to become Foreign
Secretary. And in any case Chamberlain had come to much the same
conclusion. To him, Halifax's trip to Germany had been "a great success"
in "creating an atmosphere in which it is possible to discuss with Germany the
practical questions involved in a European settlement". It had been clear
that "of course, they want to dominate Eastern Europe", that "they want
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Togoland and Kameruns", that "they do not insist on Tanganyika, if they can
be given some reasonably equivalent territory on the West Coast, possibly to
be carved out of Belgian Congo and Angola", that "they would be prepared to
come back to the League, if it were shorn of its compulsory powers". All
this had appeared to Chamberlain to form a "fair basis of discussion". Or not
more? On only one aspect of the "discussion" had he elaborated in his
diary. "I don"t see why", he hod written, "we shouldn't say to Germany,
'give us satisfactory assurances that you won't use force to deal with the
Austrians and Czechoslovakians, and we will give you similar assurances that
we won't use force to prevent the changes you want, if you can get them by
peaceful means'". 9 One elaboration was sufficient. Though when he made
his first proposal to Hitler on 3 March 1938 he was still careful to emphasise
that it was not a "commercial transaction", Chamberlain had all the time had
a bargaining mentality every bit as much as Halifax. '^
Therefore what Chamberlain most feared in Jonuary 1938 was that
Roosevelt's high-flying plan would spoil his own down-to-earth bargain.
as Templewood so revealingly put i t , he "feared that his own carefully
considered plan would be sidetracked by generalities that would lead to
nothing". 11 Support was welcome - but not idealistic interference.
Or
But this was not the sum of Chamberlain's objections. Roosevelt's
proposal had a corollary. Should the new principles be rejected by Germany
and Italy, the United States "would at least have obtained the support of all
the governments of the world, other than those inseparably linked with the
Berlin-Rome axis". This "would in itself be productive of practical good
because of its inevitable repercussions on the German and Italian populations,
as well as upon those smaller countries of Europe which have been feeling
increasingly... that... they themselves, as a means of self-protection, must
align themselves with Rome and Berlin". Admittedly such an eventuality
"would seem to be the worst of possible contingencies", but it was still a
possible contingency. None could have been more unwelcome to Chamberlain.
It was never Chamberlain's desire to influence the public of another
state against its government. "We may not approve of dictatorships", he
told a Conservative rally the following April, "but there they are" - we
"cannot remove them" - we "have to live with them". 12 StilI less was it
his policy to isolate Germany and Italy by lining up the rest of the world
against them. The outcome of the Opposition's policy, he told the Commons
in the same month, "would be to do what we, at any rate, have always set
our faces against, namely, to divide Europe into two opposing blocs or
camps" - "So far from making a contribution to peace, I say that it would
inevitably plunge us into war". '3 Even just to contemplate the contingency
Roosevelt foresaw was anathema; it was so much the reverse of his whole
endeavour.
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At the time of Ms appointment to the Premiership in May 1937 he
had told a friend that he "meant to be his own Foreign Minister". 14 A
month after Roosevelt's message he virtually achieved this on the resignation
of Mr. Eden, now the Earl of Avon. In his speech on that occasion he made
it perfectly clear that his aim was not to divide but to unite:
"The peace of Europe must depend upon the attitude of the
four major powers— Germany, Italy, France and ourselves
. . . Are we to allow these two pairs of nations to go on glowering
at one another across the frontier... until at last the barriers
are broken down and the conflict begins which many think would
mark the end of civilisation?... if we can bring these four
nations into friendly discussion, into a settling of their differences,
we shall hove saved the peace of Europe for a generation". 15
Dedicated to such a mission, Chamberlain could not be expected to espouse
a cause that might thwart it. According to his biographer, he "feared the
dictators.. .would use this 'line-up of the democracies' as a pretext for a
break". 16 Or in the words of his great champion, Templewood, his plan
was such that "it was necessary to pursue it consistently and to avoid
deviations that would shift it into a contrary direction". ''
Roosevelt
might sabotage his whole policy of appeasement, or worse still, might even
transmogrify it into resistance.
There was a further difference between Chamberlain's views and those
of Roosevelt. While Roosevelt did make his first approach to Britain, it
was his intention to treat all the great powers on the same level. He would
inform and consult ail of them, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia.
What was disturbing from Chamberlain's point of view was his inclusion of
Russia. The Soviet Union lay outside of Chamberlain's reckoning. The
peace of Europe would depend on the four major powers, on Britain, France,
Germany and Italy, but not on Russia. "Surely it cannot be disputed", he
argued during the Eden debate, "that those four powers... are the most
powerful in Europe", for "after a l l , Russia is partly European but partly
Asiatic". ' 8
Of course, Roosevelt' was talking about the peace of the
world, not just of Europe. But Chamberlain had long held, not least to
Washington, that the main danger to world peace lay in Europe. ' °
And as far as he was concerned, European peace was none of Russia's
business, and he would not now have Roosevelt moke it so.
Strictly speaking, Chamberlain did not reject Roosevelt's proposal;
he merely asked if it could be postponed. In his public speeches, in his
correspondence with the United States Government and his American friends,
he had always professed to be a staunch advocate of close co-operation
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with the United States. 20 He appreciated the problems: "I fully recognise
that goodwill on the part of the U. S. Government is not wanting; the trouble
is that public opinion in a good part of the States still believes it possible for
America to stand outside Europe". 21
He appreciated the dangers; which
was why he requested a postponement in this case (just as he had prevaricated
over Roosevelt's vaguer overture in 1937 22). But he still hoped for the right
kind of co-operation at the right time - he gave no blank refusal. " i am
about", he confided to an American friend two days after replying to
Roosevelt's offer,
"to enter upon a fresh attempt to reach a reasonable understanding with both Germany and Italy, and I am by no means
unhopeful of getting results. I have an idea that when we have
done a certain amount of spade-work here we may want help
from the U.S.A.
It may well be that a point will be reached
when we shall be within sight of agreement, and yet just unable
to grasp it without a helping hand. In such an event a friendly
and sympathetic President might be able to give just the fresh
stimulus we required, and I feel sure that the American people
would feel proud if they could be brought in to share in the
final establishment of peace". 23
The President had not been rejected. He had been directed to the tactical
reserve for Chamberlain's assault on the dictators. He was to be called in,
in case of need, to clinch the deal.
In part of his judgement, then, Churchill was wrong. Chamberlain
did not reject the proposal, he just postponed it. But in the rest he was more
or less right. If Chamberlain had approved the idea, his bargaining might
have come unstuck. There might have been no sell-out at Munich, and no
need for one. Chamberlain might have found himself lined up with Roosevelt
and Stalin, forcing Hitler (and Mussolini) to behave themselves, merely by a
show of potentially devastating unify. There would, of course, have been no
American alliance. But Churchill did not expect one. He wrote only of
"involving however tentatively the mighty power of the United States". 24
He was right - a tentative involvement would have done.
It is not at all clear, however, just how far the United States would
have allowed itself to become involved, in sizing up Roosevelt's plan,
Chamberlain may have suspected that it was really designed more for the Far
East than for Europe. Japan was not to be given great power treatment,
unlike Russia, and it was hoped that "if Germany and Italy solve their
practical problems with Great Britain and France", then "their present support
of Japan will be very greatly weakened". Roosevelt was disturbed by
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Chamberlain's reply principally for its possible relevance to the Far East.
He readily agreed to defer his proposal until the British could see "what
progress they can make in beginning the direct negotiations they are
contemplating". But the de jure recognition of Italy's conquest of
Abyssinia, as envisaged by Chamberlain, was another matter:
" I take i t , of course, for granted that the Prime Minister
has given due consideration to the harmful effect which
this step would have...upon the course of Japan in the
Far East and upon the nature of the peace terms which Japan
may demand of China. At a moment when respect for treaty
obligations would seem to be of such vital importance in
international relations... and at a time when our two
Governments have been giving consideration to measures of
co-operation in support of international law and order in
the Far East... I cannot help but feel that all of the repercussions of the step., .should be most carefully considered". ^5
In short, what worried Roosevelt was not so much what happened in Europe
as the effect of events there on the Far East. The prospective legalisation
of Italian aggression was not important of itself but only by implication.
So much for American involvement in Europe.
Hull's reaction on this point was identical to Roosevelt's; the
important theatre was the Far Eastern one. In any case he had opposed
Welles's idea from the very start as "illogical", "impossible", unrealistic",
and he was obviously quite glad to see it shelved. 26 What American
involvement here? Welles, for his part, seems to have been disheartened
by the lost opportunity, for he records no further attempt to revive the plan.
How much sincerity, how much determination, how much involvement here?
Yet Welles was not against involvement; he was simply disheartened that
his idea had been given the wrong send-off and had foundered, that "by
sounding the British Government... the President was now confronted with a
positive warning that British support for his proposals would not be
forthcoming".
The blame goes back to Chamberlain. Nor was Hull
against involvement; indeed the reverse. What he thought "unrealistic"
about Welles's suggestion was that it "would have played into the hands of
the Axis" and that "furthermore, the peacefully minded nations would have
gravitated much further than they had into a policy of oppeasementprobably
under the leadership of our friend, Prime Minister Chamberlain". 29
If Roosevelt's plan had been welcomed, Hull would no doubt have done all
he could to keep it on course.
Clearly Hull had no great store of confidence in Chamberlain.
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11
Roosevelt had his own doubts.
Eastern interest:
The Italian prospect was not merely of Far
"A surrender by His Majesty's Government of the principle
of non-recognition at this time would have a serious effect
upon public opinion in this country. Public opinion in
the United States will only support this Government in
measures of pacific co-operation with the other peaceloving nations of the world, provided these measures of
co-operation are destined to re-establish and maintain
principles of international law and morality"
Despite Chamberlain's protestations of high principle, Roosevelt obviously
-suspected a bargain. The United States did not like horse-trading, and
would not participate in it.
This remained true. What were ostensibly Chamberlain's second
thoughts on the American proposal did not remove Roosevelt's suspicions.
Chamberlain had replied on 14 January in the absence of Eden. On the
latter's return he was forced to send a further reply, this time welcoming
the proposal. Its exact contents (like its date) are not yet known, but it
seems still to have raised objections, this time to procedure, and to have
elaborated on the need to recognise Italy's Abyssinian position as of right. °
It was a meagre advance on the first reply; so meagre that on the Italian
issue, for example, Roosevelt felt that there was "nothing which could be
added" from his side. 31 But in any case, it is quite clear that Roosevelt
hod every reason to question the sincerity of Chamberlain's second thoughts.
Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador in Washington, had told Welles
"with the most complete frankness, everything that had gone on between the
receipt by the President of Mr. Chamberlain's first message and the receipt
by the President of the second message" and had confided to him "the split in
the Cabinet which had occurred between Sir John Simon, on the one side, and
Mr. Eden, on the other".
The change of heart was not only trifling,
It was not even genuine.
Of course, Lindsay did insist "in the most positive manner...that the
British Government was committed to support with every means within their
power the successful realisation of the President's objectives" and would do
so "with the utmost loyalty and energy". This was on 9 February. Just a
week before, Roosevelt had promised "within the next few days" to give some
indication of his actual plans". * Now he was less sure; all that he could
say was that he still meant to go on with his plan "in the relatively near
future". The cause of the delay was fliven as "the recent acute situation
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12
the change in the supreme command of the Germany army was a bad sign.
But it was not the only reason. The split in the British Cabinet had not been
permanently repaired. Washington had good evidence of its continuance in
a telegram sent by their Charge d'Affaires in London on ^jfebruary - the very
day that Hitler took over command of the army himself.
Roosevelt was
bound to take Lindsay's assurance with a pinch of salt and to await developments.
He did not have long to wait. Within a fortnight the split had cracked
right open and Eden had been dropped. Chamberlain's first reaction stood.
As Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, wrote
in his diary, the exit of Eden led to "the inescapable conclusion that the""
decision of Chamberlain to 'play ball with Hitler and Mussolini1 has reached
a concrete stage and is no longer a mere abstraction".
The bargaining
was on. A conference was off. Shortly afterwards the British Government,
was told that "for the time being the President had determined to hold (his)
initiative in abeyance".
In a sense then, Tempiewood was right. It was Chamberlain who finally
agreed to the plan and Roosevelt who eventually demurred. But this is a
superficial view. Chamberlain's agreement was qualified and essentially
tactical. Roosevelt demurred because he knew this and because he suspected
Chamberlain's whole approach to Germany and Italy. Yet the plan was not
dead. Crucial Anglo-American exchanges continued to flow from it.
in deferring; his proposal in response to Chamberlain's first comments on
it, Roosevelt expressed the hope that he would be kept advised of "developments
with regard to some aspects of the direct negotiations with Germany and
Italy". He disliked bargaining - "with regard to the political features of
these negotiations, this Government of course has no connection" - but he
wanted market reports. His dual attitude was not wholly hypocritical. He
was concerned to know whether Chamberlain's dealings would fit into his own
plan or not, "to be apprised of these features of the negotiations which would
have a material effect upon the maintenance of those international principles
and upon the policies of world appeasement which this Government endeavours
to support". 3° Even after Eden resigned, his interest in his plan persisted.
In reply to a question put by Lindsay on 25 February, Welles wished success
to Chamberlain's "realistic and energetic efforts" in the hope that they might
lead to a "general world appeasement" and the "reestablishment of those
principles of International conduct to which this Government is so firmly
committed". ** The old formula died hard.
For his part. Chamberlain was only too anxious to keep Roosevelt
informed. He seems to have sent him some message shortly after Eden's
resignation.
And on 3 March he let him know that "he was instructing the
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13
British Ambassador in Berlin to sound out Hitler about a colonial settlement
and about appeasement in Central Europe.
His anxiety, of course,
derived from his desire to keep Roosevelt on ice, ready to bring in to force a
bargain. This role for the President and his plan Halifax now tried to
regularise.
He made two points through Lindsay on 7 March. He was "gratified"
that the United States "considered the procedure of the British Government
in its efforts to find a political appeasement 'to be right1" and "encouraged"
to have its "sympathy". Secondly, since'lt would undoubtedly be necessary
to try and obtain some scheme of general co-operation in Europe not only
political, but likewise economic", he would keep Roosevelt informed so that
he "could, should he be so disposed, determine whether at any point it might
be opportune for him to take 'independent but correlated action'". **
Halifax not only directed Roosevelt to the tactical reserve but gave him
operational instructions, too.
The best that can be said for Halifax is that he may in part have been
genuinely mistaken about the American attitude towards his and Chamberlain's
policy. Whatever the truth of i t , he was soon disabused. The United States
Government, Welles told Lindsay, had never said it considered British
procedure "to be right"; It had not "attempted to pass upon the methods of
approach determined upon.. .nor in any other way to offer advice or counsel".
Welles wished "the limits of activity beyond which this Government could
not and would not go" to be "clearly understood". As for Halifax's second
point, the suggestion of "independent but correlated action", Welles was not
clear "exactly what the British Government had in mind". But he obviously
spotted the trap, for he reminded Lindsay "that the President had made it
emphatically clear that this Government did not intend to participate in any
way in the questions of European political appeasement and that the only
initiative which the President had contemplated was that concerning which
the British Government had been fully informed" - and which, temporarily,
was being held in abeyance. Roosevelt would not take a hand in the bargaining,
now or later, by this means or the other. But in the end his actions were
to belie his words.
The desire of Washington to receive, and of London to supply information
still persisted. Halifax informed Roosevelt of his' intention to talk with
Ribbentrop on 10 March, and on 11 March he told him what had been said.
But by that date the Anschluss had intervened and Halifax was depressed.
Negotiation with Germany was "impossible"; "one of the twin efforts which
His Majesty's Government were anxious to make to prepare the way for an
appeasement, and on account of which we asked the President to postpone
his initiative, has failed".
Yet the impossibility of negotiating with
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14
Germany was qualified with a "for some time to come at all events". And it
was only one of the twins that had succumbed to the plague. It was still
possible to negotiate with Italy.
Chamberlain put It neatly in his diary two days later:
"For the moment we must abandon conversations with Germany,
we must show our determination not to be bullied by announcing
some increase or acceleration in rearmament, and we must
quietly and steadily pursue our conversations with Italy. If we
can avoid another violent coup in Czechoslovakia, which ought
to be feasible, it may be possible for Europe to settle down again,
and some day for us to start peace talks again with the Germans".
In this sense at least, Chamberlain was as good as his word. An
agreement with Italy was signed on 16 April. On 29 September a violent
coup in Czechoslovakia was avoided by the Munich Agreement, and on the
following morning Chamberlain got the peace talks going again - or so he
thought - in the Anglo-German Declaration in which he and Hitler agreed
that "the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any
other questions" and determined to continue their "efforts to remove possible
sources of difference, and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe", 45
Ail had not been lost. Oddly enough, in saving so much, independent but
correlated action by Roosevelt had been vital.
Since the Anschluss did not destroy all hope, London continued to keep
Washington informed of its progress with Rome and Berlin. Why should it
not? Welles's words of 7 March hod not been cold douche and nothing else.
After a l l , whatever his restatement of limits, he had gone so far as to say that
"the President frankly recognised that certain political appeasements in
Europe.. .were evidently an indispensable factor in the finding of bases for
world peace" and, in that spirit, trusted that they would be "completely
successful". 46 Roosevelt could not co-operate; but he condoned, and he
blessed. He could still be used, and he was. Halifax kept Hull and Welles
fully posted on the talks with Italy, ond finally asked Roosevelt for "some
public indication of his approval of the agreement itself and of the principles
which have inspired it". He did not get the letter of what he wanted:
"this Government;. .does not attempt to pass upon the political features of
accords such as that recently reached between Great Britain and Italy". But
he did get enough of the essence: "this Government has seen the conclusion
of an agreement with sympathetic interest because it is proof of the value of
peaceful negotiations". 47 | n j n j s press conference statement Roosevelf
publicly endorsed British appeasement.
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15
London went on passing information and seeking assistance: if - on
29 July - Roosevelt "could make some public statement expressing approval
of Lord Runclman's mission this would have a favourable effect on world
opinion"; if - on 24 August - Roosevelt "could find it possible to make some
further declaration directed towards the existing danger in Central Europe...
it might have a wholesome effect in restraining Hitler"; what - on
31 August - "would be the reaction in America if the Germans went into
Czechoslovakia, with the Czechs fighting them, and England did not go
along"? Halifax's cautious requests were not met, his question remained
unanswered, though Roosevelt and Hull kept maintaining in public that the
United States could not be counted out of world affairs. 48
Yet, as the tension mounted in September, the British Government could
have its hopes. At the beginning of the month Halifax was able to quote to
Lindsay the view of the American Ambassador, Joseph Kennedy, that Roosevelt
"had decided 'to go in with Chamberlain; whatever course Chamberlain
desires to adopt he would think right'". Towards the middle of the month
Lindsay was able to add that, while any compromise with German aggression
"may bring about a certain let-down of American friendliness", yet "if
.o
accommodation is really wise, we should be able to recover any ground lost".
London could also drop its hints. About the middle of the month, Hoare
caught Kennedy's ear and reminded him that "of course if they weather the
storm... Chamberlain will move quickly with Hitler to see what can be done
on a permanent basis". 50
But Washington was not so easily taken in. A request for public
approval of Chamberlain's visit to Hitler on 15 September was refused because,
in Moffat's words,
"We did not know what Mr. Chamberlain was going to do,
whether it was to sell out the Czechs or not. In any event
we should not be put in the position of writing him a blank
cheque. Ever since the beginning of the crisis the British
have been maneuvering to get us to give advice or to express
ourselves, in particular as opposed to general terms, with
the sole view of throwing responsibility on us in case their
ultimate decision is an unpopular one".
N o , the Americans were determined; they would definitely not intervene.
And then, out of the blue, came the much-desired independent but correlated
action.
The immediate impetus towards intervention seems to have come from the
United States Ambassador in Paris, William Bui lift, who suggested on
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24 September that Roosevelt should summon a conference to the Hague
"to discuss ways and means to preserve European peace and to strengthen
the foundations of peace". ^2 Despite Chamberlain's humiliating trip to
Berchtesgaden on the I5fh and the brutal Anglo-French ultimatum to
Czechoslovakia on the 21st, Hitler had raised his terms at Godesberg on the
23rd, and there was obviously a risk that the British and French would be
forced to refuse them and to go to war within a few days. It was in this
context that Bullitt made his suggestion and that Roosevelt made his intervention - to help prevent a war. They certainly succeeded; but they also
helped Chamberlain to make Munich.
There was pressure on Bullitt in Paris just as there was pressure on
Kennedy in London. The French Government had been at work in Washington,
too.
But Roosevelt had already had his own thoughts. Sometime in the
third week of September, he had told a French visitor that if the French and
British were to summon a conference and to invite the United States, he would
be prepared to accept. 54- A small circle of his advisers, including Hull,
had talked the crisis over on the 17th, and they met again on the weekend of
the 24tb-25th, along with Welles who had just come back from Europe, to
formulate policy in face of the heightening tension. In front of them on the
Saturday afternoon was the suggestion telegraphed by Bullitt, and some form of
it may have appeared to be the best of a bad bunch. None of them liked a
mere "appeal to pallid principle", and a "definite threat" to Germany was
out of the question. * "
In any case some sort of conference has been in
Roosevelt's mind from the beginning, and it was clear that the idea had just
taken on a fresh appeal for him. On the Sunday forenoon a message arrived
from President Benes asking Roosevelt to urge Britain and France not to desert
Czechoslovakia when It had agreed to their drastic proposals. **° But this
seems to have stirred no sympathies, although it may have been one of the
things that prompted Moffat, in the afternoon, to secure Hull's approval for
an offer of good offices instead of o conference. ^7 Then, late in the
evening, Roosevelt decided that the moment had arrived. He would appeal
to all parties, to Hitler and Benes, to Chamberlain and Dalodier, "urging them
to keep the negotiations going and adding as a further step, but subsidiary
thereto, an offer of good offices". But Hull now jibbed at the idea of good
offices, and despite the advocacy of Welles and Moffot, Roosevelt decided
not to make any specific mention of them. Bullitt's last-minute plea for
arbitration was also refected, and on similar grounds; it would rouse the
isolationists.
The United States did not summon a conference, it did
not suggest a conference, it did not offer to participate in any way in
maintaining peace in Europe. It merely asked the others to keep on talking:
"so long as the negotiations continue, differences may be reconciled". *9
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17
But that was not enough. Chamberlain was quick to "hail with
gratitude" Roosevelt's "weighty message", Daladier to acclaim that
Roosevelt's "moving appeal" had "special value", and both to swear that
they were doing their "very utmost to secure a peaceful solution" and making
a "supreme attempt with a view to.. .an amicable settlement". Benes was
also "deeply moved", but it was not up to him: "Czechoslovakia has already
mode (the) greatest sacrifices", yet "even today the dispute could be settled
in a spirit of equity without resort to force and the whole Czechoslovak
nation still hopes this will be the case". ° ° Still less, in his own view,
was it up to Hitler: "the possibilities of arriving at a justi settlement by
agreement a r e . . . exhausted with t h e . . . German memorandum", that is, with
Godesberg, and so "it does not rest with the German Government, but with
the Cxechaslovakk»n Government alone, to decide whether it wants peace
or war". ° '
Nothing had been achieved. More was called for.
One expedient that was hit on> on 27 September, was to ask most other
Governments to follow America's lead in appealing to Hitler and Benes to
continue talks. But it was obvious that the "cumulative effect of an
expression of world opinion" would still be insufficient - likewise a parallel
appeal to Mussolini.
Washington would have to be more specific.
Bullitt wanted it to be more committal, too, and suggested a conference at
which a United States observer would use good offices. But even Moffat
noted that "fortunately" Hull "scented the dangers" in this suggestion and
that finally ail that was left of it was "a vague suggestion that a conference
might be one solution". On the evening of 27 September, in his second
appeal to Hitler, Roosevelt was not committal, but at least he was specific:
"Present negotiations still stond open. They can be continued
if you will give the word. Should the need for supplementing
them become evident, nothing stands in the way of widening
their scope into a conference of all the nations directly interested
in'the present controversy. Such a meeting to be held immediately
- in some neutral spot in Europe - would offer the opportunity
for this and correlated questions to be solved". 63
On 29 September a conference met at Munich.
Of course, the United States did not set its seal of approval on the
resulting agreement. It shared the "universal sense of relief', but it would
not "pass upon the merits of the differences to which the Four-Power Pact
. . . related". If it continued publicly to advertise pious hopes that "the
forces which stand for the principles governing peaceful and orderly international relations.. .should not relax, but redouble their efforts", there were
official voices that were privately sceptical.
Moreover, in appealing
for the continuance of the negotiations and for a conference, the United States
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18
called for o settlement "in o spirit of justice" and "fair dealing".
Again,
the much cited "Good man" that Roosevelt flashed to Chamberlain was sent
before the Munich Conference, not after the Munich Agreement.
Washington kept its hands clean.
Yet, the "Good man" put Roosevelt's sed on a conference that he knew
would not include Czechoslovakia, the nation most directly Interested, and
would not meet in a neutral spot, but on German soil.
It also put his seal
on a conference that excluded Russia, that fitted in pat with Chamberlain's
idea of a four-power peace. Nor was it simply that, In this respect, he was
just accepting the accomplished act. His initial appeal of 26 September had
not gone out to Russia, even for its information, although it had been repeated
to Poland and Hungary. ° " Roosevelt had already endorsed the Chamberlain
view of things. And of course, after Munich, whatever the State Department
might say publicly, Roosevelt himself put his stamp of approval on the
Agreement in a message sent to Chamberlain: "I fully share your hope and
belief that there exists today the greatest opportunity in years for the
establishment of a new order based on justice and law". ° °
Yet to endorse is not necessarily to assist. Much later, Hull was unable
to say whether it was Roosevelt's actions that had forced Hitler to seek a
peaceful solution, to summon the powers to Munich. '
Just after Munich,
Roosevelt himself could not get a satisfactory answer through his Berlin Embassy,
But in fact, the impact of his intervention was not so much on Berlin as on
opinion in the rest of the world. It did not restrain the aggressors so much as
it aided the appeasers.
Benes, who was its victim, got to the heart of the matter in his memoirs.
His words are worth quoting at length in English. "What was important", he
wrote of Roosevelt's appeal of 26 September,
"and what showed me that in the given situation a just settlement
of our dispute with Germany was already ruled out, was the fact
that he placed Germany and ourselves exactly on a level, that
he turned equally to me as to Hitler with his appeal for an agreement and a settlement of the dispute without war, and did not take
into account how the conflict came about, why it came about, what
was at stake in i t , and that the threats of war and force were being
made against us; he also mode no suggestion for a fresh examination
and resolution of the bases of the affair".
Of course, Benes went on,
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19
"Roosevelt's telegram was diplomatically understandable and
formally correct; in it the neutral United States wished to be
equally objective towards both disputants... But they did not
examine the nature of the conflict, and therefore overlooked
the fact that an agreement in the given situation and under the
proposed conditions could only mean preparing the way for
the conquest of Czechoslovakia..."
That was not all.
"The fact that Roosevelt sent a similar telegram not only to
myself and Hitler, but also to Chamberlain and Daladier,
gave both Prime Ministers the opportunity to declare their
full agreement with the telegram of the President of the United
States and to cite his telegram as backing for their policy in
the whole of the crisis. It was not backing, but the greatest
part of the political public in Europe, and especially in
France and England, understood it as such at that moment".
The same was true of the organised appeals from other capitals. They were
the "final heavy blow". They were "well meant". But "at that moment they
were of decisive assistance to the policy and tactics of Chamberlain and to
the efforts of Bonnet and Daladier".
Roosevelt's incursion into European
politics put Benes in the dock with Hitler and swayed the jury round to
Chamberlain's policy of peace at any price. All Hitler had to do was to
accept judgement amply in his favour - without scuffling in court. Which
was exactly what Chamberlain had wanted all along.
Roosevelt's appeal certainly came at exactly the right time for Chamberlain.
The intricacies of the last week in September need much more careful study
than they have had, but certain features do stand out. Chamberlain was
somewhat shaken by Hitler's antics at Godesberg, but he came home with more
than half a mind to recommend acceptance of his new terms, or at least most
of them.
But he ran slap into a hardening of opinion in Britain. Most of
the Cabinet favoured rejection of the terms.
There were many signs that
the public at large was getting tougher. ' * And Chamberlain found Daladier
in an unprecedentedly resolute frame of mind when he and Bonnet came across
to London on 25-26 September. In fact, by the night of the 25th, there was
deadlock in the Anglo-French conference. ' ° At a late meeting of the
Cabinet Chamberlain produced a new idea, to send Sir Horace Wilson to see
Hitler In a "final effort". T 7 But there was. still the problem of how to get
the French to agree.
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20
Yet, by the time the conference was resumed on the morning of the 26th,
Daiodier hod given his agreement and Wilson was already on his way. There
were various pressures at work. One of them was some kind of promise that,
if the worst came to the worst, Britain would stand by France. 78 But
another was Roosevelt's plea. It left Washington at 1.15 a.m. (or 6.15 a.m.
by British clocks) on the 26th. ^9 So it was in good time to influence the
private talk Chamberloin and Daladier had in London before the full conference
met again at 11.20 a.m. The idea of sending Wilson to Hitler was in complete
accord with Roosevelt's appeal: if Roosevelt said to talk, why not send
Wilson to do just that? There is no record of what actually passed between
the two Premiers. 80 But at 1 p.m. Kennedy heard from the Foreign Office
that they were "very happy about the President's message", and shortly
afterwards, of course, they both enthusiastically welcomed it. 81 And the
"very utmost" and the "supreme effort" they referred to in so doing was in
fact the sending of Wilson to Hitler. It is obvious that Roosevelt's intervention played a key role in Chamberlain's conversion of Daladier to the idea
of yet one more appeasing step. What counted with Daladier was that, whatever the outcome of his and Chamberlain's action, Roosevelt was with them.
He had tried for some time to involve America in the Czechoslovak affair.
That he thought he hod now had some success is clear from the closing words
of his reply: "We trust thus to serve to the last the ideal of justice and
peace which has always been a link between our two nations".
Back in
Paris that evening, he was still full enough of confidence to hope that "a
moment might come soon... to call a conference to organise general peace in
Europe" and to feel that "such a call must come from President Roosevelt". 83
Roosevelt hod committed himself, however slightly, to the affairs of Europe.
He had said to carry on with the negotiations; Chamberlain could have his
way.
For the next few days Chamberlain hardly stopped thanking Roosevelt,
by one means or another, for his intervention. °" He had reason to be
thankful. The full story is too complex for this purpose, but.the Wilson
mission did lead through the British-sponsored, French-supported "Timetable"
of 27 September to the actual Munich Agreement. 85 Quite apart from
that, Roosevelt's appeal helped to create the right public atmosphere for
further talk and so for Munich. Just to quote Kennedy on 27 September:
"not only did last night's papers ploy up tremendously his message
but again this morning with very praiseworthy editorials. As a
matter of fact it helped offset a good deal of bitterness that had
arisen as a result of the terrific blast from the American newspapers on the question of the betrayal of Czechoslovakia". 86
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21
Roosevelt's appeal helped to still the British conscience - that aman of such
high moral principle should back up Chamberlain's efforts...'.
His
"Good man" went even further. "What two words", wrote Tempiewood,
"could better show his full approval of Chamberlain's efforts?". 88 What
two words, he might have added, could have been of greater assistance to
Chamberlain? He went off to the Munich Conference, in his pocket
Roosevelt's blank cheque for peace, the very thing Washington had refused
to give him a fortnight before. And of course, If Roosevelt's appeal for an
actual conference had some influence on Hitler, it was really just-more
support for Chamberlain. It impelled Hitler to accept appeasement for the
gain he could make out of it and to steer clear of the war that would have
buried appeasement. Roosevelt came in at the last to save the bargain.
As far as Chamberlain was concerned, Roosevelt's first appeal was a
bolt from the blue. His second and more specific appeal was known beforehand. Roosevelt tested his reaction (and that of Daladier) before he
telegraphed to Hitler.
Roosevelt's intervention was correlated as well as
independent - which was exactly what Chamberlain had asked for over six
months before. Chamberlain was able, too, to exploit the known as well as
to profit from the unexpected. The idea of an international conference
specifically to settle the German-Czechoslovak question was not novel; it
had been one of a number of proposals considered in London at the end of
May, and Chamberlain put it to Masaryk on 25 September as a last possibility.
But Roosevelt provided the preliminary barrage. He tested Chamberlain's
reaction about 10.30 p.m. British time, on the 27th, and then dispatched his
appeal to Hitler, repeating it to Chamberlain, about 3 a. m . , British time,
on the 28th. 9 1 At 11.30 a.m. on the 28th, Chamberlain instructed
Henderson to see Hitler:
"I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangement*
for transfer with you and representatives of Czech Government ,
together with representatives of France and Italy If you desire...
However much you distrust Prague Government's intentions, you
cannot doubt power of British and French Governments to see that
promises are carried out fairly and fully and forthwith". ° 2
It only required Hitler not to call a Czechoslovak representative for
Roosevelt's suggestion to be twisted into Munich.
Benes was right, then; Roosevelt played Chamberlain|s game. But he was
not totally right; he imagined Roosevelt to have been an unwitting player.
In many ways, of course, Roosevelt was a genuine innocent abroad. He
could not suspect that Chamberlain would so exploit his well-intentioned
plans for peace. Yet he did endorse and support Chamberlain's actions.
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22
And he did so while possessed of some pretty strong indications of the
techniques used by Chamberlain and his colleagues. He had much more to
go on now than his suspicions of earlier in the year. On 6 September, for
example, Kennedy had sent him an interesting cable. Australia had taken
up an anti-Czech attitude. "This", reported Kennedy, "will no'doubt
prove a useful lever in the hands of the British both internationally and in
due course nationally vis-a-vis the opposition", and apropos of such levering,
he went on, "it may be of interest to note how these things are worked here".
For instance, Halifax had already told the French Charge d'Affaires that
Britain could not undertake new commitments "because of public opinion in
this country and in certain of the Dominions"; but "the telegraphic report
of this conversation which was sent to the several Dominions omits the
reference to public opinion in certain of the Dominions". "
Made aware
of such tricks, Roosevelt might have been expected to be chary of himself
providing levers, but he was not. He was apparently willing to take the
risk, even anxious to play Chamberlain's game. Again, before he queried
Paris and London about his conference idea on 27 September, he had heard
from Bullitt that the Quai d'Orsay and the Foreign Office were workuv; out
a plan that virtually gave Germany what Godesberg had demanded.
This
was the first sign of the "Timetable" proposal that paved the way for the
Munich Agreement. Bullitt was sceptical, but even so, Roosevelt might have
been expected to tread warily, just in case he became linked with a sell-out.
But he pressed on with his appeal to Hitler to. come to terms, which in fact
meant to accept the sell-out. In the midst of all this, too, forgetting his
earlier altercation with Chamberlain, he turned to Mussolini, of all people,
to use his influence with Hitler in favour of peace. ' 5 How far the wheel
had turned in less than a year1.
In this Roosevelt, Benes's plea for American restraint on Britain and
France was bound to find no response. With these Rooseveltian actions,
Benes's last-minute plea for a true international conference or for American
arbitration was bound to run into the comment that "events had so changed
that a reply was no longer necessary". " ° By 30 September Czechoslovakia
was beyond help - and Roosevelt had done his bit. Tempiewood wrote a
good part of the truth; "Anglo-American relations became increasingly intimate
and culminated in the parallel efforts that Washington and London made", if
not "throughout the Czechoslovak crisis", at least on its last stretch.
In January 1938 Chamberlain and Roosevelt seemed to be completely
at cross purposes, but by September they were all but in double-harness.
The inconsistency was not on Chamberlain's side. His single-mindedness,
indeed, was almost fanatical. It was Roosevelt who changed policies. The
change was a double one. He moved from distrust of Chamberlain's peace
programme to endorsement of i t , and from leaving it up to Chamberlain to
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23
giving him some good neighbourly help. The reasons for these shifts are not
very clear, and the evidence is still insufficient. But a few suggestions
can be made.
It can probably be taken as given that Roosevelt's main concern was
quite naturally with domestic, not international questions. There was less
call for him to be consistent in the foreign field and less likelihood of his being so;
and he was inevitably less knowledgeable in it. He was therefore prone to
pressure. The pressures were many. The big ones, of course, were the
isolationist and the internationalist groups, and Roosevelt tried to tread a
path between them but nearer to the latter than the former. He was bound
to sway from time to time - as he did in late September on the question of a
conference - but he was also subject to closer pressures. Hull and Welles
were basically in agreement, but their approaches were different and it is
quite clear that they occasionally jostled Roosevelt in contrary ways. In
September, as earlier, Welles seems to have been for a more forward policy
than Hull, the one over-hopeful perhaps, the other over-cautious, the one
anxious to avert a sell-out, the other to avoid abetting it. Their later
attitudes are, in fact, not easily discerned. In their memoirs, Welles was
silent on the subject, Hull a little more forthcoming but mainly in criticism
of Welles. Moffat's diary adds some light, particularly on Hull's attitude.
But there remains a great darkness. Yet the strongest impression is one of
differing pressures. Moffat's diary also points to other, albeit minor,
differences among Roosevelt's State Department advisers. ™ The Diplomatic
Papers are not very revealing, but the rambling diary of Harold Ickes, who
was Secretary of the Interior, makes frequent allusions to the conflicting pulls
of top-rank diplomats.
And Ickes1 diary, like Hull's memoirs, leaves no
doubt that Roosevelt had some salty differences of opinion to reckon with
inside the Cabinet itself. 1 0 ° With little pushes coming from all around,
Roosevelt would have had to be very single-minded to follow a consistent
forward path.
Which of course he was not. He had a general aim - to educate
Americans to their responsibilities in the world and to contribute to the
preservation of a just peace - but he had no specific plan to which everything
and everyone else should be subservient. He took up Hull's idea and then
drew back when he scraped his knuckles on isolationism. He took up
Wei Is's idea and then drew back when he stung his fingers on appeasement.
He had no independent line; so he experimented. He succumbed to
pressures, but he was not sensible enough to succumb fully to one; he
altered both Hull's and Welles's plans and so ended up with neither. He was
left in March 1938 with neither Americans educated nor peace even
prospectively preserved - and with no obvious policy. The advice he had
half taken had not been conspicuously good, and no further advice, it seems,
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was forthcoming. Anyway, it was up to him as President. There was
nothing he could do at home; abroad,the initiative had been let slip to
Chamberlain. But the Cabinet was not at all clear how things would
ultimately work out. 1 0 1 Best just to sit it out. Make no sort of
commitment to Chamberlain, but let him have his head and see if he could
race it home. If his peace was just, then Roosevelt could add his name to it;
if not, then the shame would not be Roosevelt's. Of course, the British
recognition of the Italian Empire was a poser. Apart from its bad effects in
the Far East, it was clearly not a just settlement; yet it was a necessary
adjunct to letting Chamberlain have his head. Should he now be reined in
by same public disavowal of his half-way achievement? Was the maintenance
of a principle more important than the prospect of peace? There were
pressures round Roosevelt both for and against backing Britain.
He could
perhaps have said nothing, but he sought a compromise between the opposing
pressures and welcomed the fact of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, if not its
content. Obviously, too, he felt enough interest in how far Chamberlain
could run not to check him. But in fact he spurred him on, and for want of
a better policy, committed himself a little more to peace than principle.
Having once got in Chamberlain's wake, it was tricky to get out of it.
During the summer, of course, the commitment did not seem in the least
irrevocable. There were no more really awkward posers. Fine speeches,
full of high moral principle and implied involvement, were simple to produce.
Nor was it a poser that swung Roosevelt in the autumn. It was the
approaching reality of a war. Hitherto a war hod been hypothetical. It had
been possible to talk of a just peace without necessarily thinking of o war as
the alternative. But by Godesberg, it was either Chamberlain's peace or
Hitler's war. Roosevelt, like most of his generation on both sides of the
Atlantic, had an intense loathing for war. Most of those round him felt the
same; even Hull, who opposed Roosevelt's action, caught the sense of
impending disaster - "the world seemed to hang in the balance".
And
when Roosevelt made his first appeal, it was an impassioned plea for peace:
"Should hostilities break out the lives of millions of men, women
and children in every country involved will most certainly be lost
under circumstances of unspeakable horror. The economic system
of every country involves is certain to be shattered. The social
system of every country involved may well be completely wrecked".
It was the awful prospect of war that threw Roosevelt into Chamberlain's arms.
For what it is worth, another clue is supplied by Ickes. He recorded
Roosevelt's thoughts, so far as he knew them, in diary entries for 18 and 24
September. The difference is significant. Roosevelt thought that Chamberlain
was "for peace at any price". This meant, on the first date, that there would
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be no war: "Czechoslovakia will be l e f t . . . to paddle its own canoe". But
if there were a war, Britain, France and Russia could seal off Germany and
then reduce it from the air: "this kind of war would cost less money, would
mean comparatively few casualties, and would be more likely to succeed".
And of course, "economically the United States will fare well whether Europe
goes to war or not". There was really nothing much to worry about. But by
the second occasion, after Godesberg, the whole tone had changed. There
was a clear risk of war. And while Germany might be successfully sealed off,
"the worst thing about the situation is the overwhelming preponderance of
Germany and Italy in the air".
Not only that, if things went on the way
they were likely to, "there might follow attempts on the part of Germany,
Italy and Japan to penetrate South America" which "would mean that the
United States would have to go to defence of South America". It was "not a
cheerful prospect". 105 No, on practical as well as emotional grounds there
was everything to be said for peace, after Godesberg, however unjust. And
most of the pressures agreed.
There was a further particularly American, or particularly Presidential,
reason for intervening to preserve the peace, whatever its texture. Again
the evidence is Ickes. If what he recorded after the intervention is correct,
Roosevelt "had wanted to avoid the mistake that Wilson had made in i?]4";
he "felt that if Wilson had expressed himself vigorously then, war might have
been averted". 1 0 6 Roosevelt did not like the prospect of a war; he did
not like the prospect of this war; and he cannot have been insensible to what
the previous war had done for Wilson, his party and, perhaps, his country.
When face to face with the hard fact of war, Roosevelt, like Chamberlain,
was for peace at almost any price. In the last resort, it was up to him as
head of state, and in the final choice between principle and peace, peace
won - though to the actual steps he decided on he was again directed by
conflicting advice.
Or perhaps he was just genuinely unaware what his action might lead
to. As he put it to Hull: "It can't do any harm. It's safe to urge peace
until the last moment". 1 0 7 Or what it had led h>: "Now that you have
established personal contact with Chancellor Hitler", he told Chamberlain
through Kennedy, "I know that you will be taking up with him from time to
time many of the problems which must be resolved in order to bring about that
new and better order." '08 The world was on its way to a reasonable,
negotiated peace. As Harold Laski said to Ickes in the spring of 1938,
"the trouble with the President was that he was an English
country gentleman. As such he expects others to be country
gentlemen also". 109
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26
REFERENCES
1.
Sir Winston Churchill, The Second World Wor, I, London, 1948, p. 199.
2.
Lord Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, London, 1954, pp. 271 and 275.
3.
W. L. Longer and S. E. Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940,
London, 1952, pp. 15-24; cf. D. Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's
'Quarantine' Speech", Political Science Quarterly, September 1957,
pp. 405-33
4.
Longer and Gleason, op. c i t . , p. 26.
5.
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938, I,
Washington, D . C . , 1955 (hereafter FR), pp. 115-17; ForelgrrRelations
of the United States, Diplomatic Papers
Papers 1937, I, Washington, D. C . ,
1954 (hereafter PR 1937), pp. 665-!
£7oT
6.
FR, pp. 117-20; cf. I.Macleod, Neville Chamberlain, London, 1961,
"p7212.
7.
FR 1937, pp. 177-79, 183-185, and 195-202; FR, p. 116; cf.
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series Difiereafter GD), I,
London, 1949, no. 3 1 .
8.
Lord Halifax, Fulness of Days, London, 1957, p. 190.
9.
K. Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, London, 1946, pp. 332-33.
10.
G D , I, no. 138.
11.
Templewood, o p . c i t . , p. 262.
12.
Neville Chamberlain, The Struggle for Peace, London, 1939, p. 171.
13.
Ibid., p. 164.
14.
T. Jones, A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950, Oxford, 1954, p.350.
15.
Chamberlain, op. cit. , pp. 84-85.
16.
Feiling, op.cit. , p. 336; cf. Macleod, op. c i t . , p. 212.
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27
17.
Tempiewood, o p . c i t . , p. 269.
18.
Chamberlain, o p . c i t . , p.89.
19.
FR 1937, pp. 98-102.
20.
Cf. Chamberlain, o p . c i t . , pp.41 and 47; FR 1937, pp.98-102;
Feiling, o p . c i t . , pp.322-24.
21.
Ibid., p.322.
22.
Borg, o p . c i t . , pp.409-12.
23^
Feiling, o p . c i t . , p.324.
24.
Churchill, o p . c i t . , I, p. 198.
25.
FR, pp. 120-22.
26.
Cordell Hull, Memoirs, I, London, 1948, pp.546-49, 573, and
580-81.
27.
Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, New York, N . Y . , 1944,
pp.64-69.
28.
Ibid., p. 67.
29.
Hull, op.cit., I, pp.547-48.
30.
Macleod, op.cit., p.213; Churchill, o p . c i t . , I, pp. 197-98;
Welles, o p . c i t . , pp.67-68.
31.
FR, pp.122-23.
32.
Ibid., p. 125: cf.
33.
FR, p. 122.
34.
Ibid., p. 124.
35.
Ibid., p. 136.
36.
The Moffat Papers, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, p. 190.
37.
FR, p. 128.
38.
Ibid., p. 122.
39.
Ibid., p. 138.
40.
Ibid., p. 139.
41.
Ibid., pp.31 -32.
42.
Ibid., pp. 126-29.
43.
Ibid., pp. 130-32.
Macleod, o p . c i t . , p.213.
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44.
Felling, op.cit., pp.341-42.
45.
Documents on British Foreign Policy, Third Series, (hereafter BD)
I I , London, 1949, no. 1228.
46.
FR, p. 127.
47.
Ibid., pp. 143-48.
48.
Ibid., pp.539, 551, 565, and 568; Hull, op. c i t . , I, pp. 583-88.
49.
BD, I I , nos. 744 and 841.
50.
FR, p. 392.
51.
Moffat, op.cit., pp.202-06.
52.
FR, pp. 641-42.
53.
Hull, op.cit., I, pp. 588-93; Moffat, op.cit., pp. 195-207;
J.M. Haight, Jr., "France, the United States and the Munich Crisis",
Journal of Modern History, December 1960, pp. 340-58.
54.
Moffat, op.cit., pp.206-07.
55.
Ibjd., pp. 205-06 and 211; JFR, pp. 641 -42.
56.
Ibid., pp.649-50.
57.
Moffat, op.cit., pp. 211-12; cf. _FR, p. 661.
58.
Moffot, op. c i t . , pp. 211 -13; Hull, op.cit., I, pp.590-92.
59.
FR, pp. 657-58.
60.
Ibid., pp. 663-64.
61.
Ibid., pp.669-72.
62.
Moffat, op.cit., p.215; FR, pp.677-78.
63.
Moffat, op.cit., pp.215-16; Hull, op.cit., I, p.593;
:
FR, pp. 675 and 684-85.
64.
Ibid., pp.703-07; Moffat, op.cit., pp.218-20; Hull, op.cit.,
I, pp. 595-97.
65.
_FR, pp. 658 and 685.
66.
Ibid., p. 688; cf. Halifax, op.cit., pp. 194-95, and Templewood,
op.cit., pp.325-26.
67.
FR, p. 688.
68.
Ibid., p.657.
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29
69.
Longer and Gleoson, o p . c i t . , p. 35.
70.
Hull, op.cit., I, p.595.
71.
FR, pp.724-29.
72.
E. Benes, Mnichovske any, London, 1955, pp. 105-10.
73.
BD, I I , no. 1073; D. Cooper, Old Men Forget, London, 1953,
pp. 234-35; L.S. Amery, My Political Life, I I I , London, 1955; pp.274-75.
74.
Cooper, o p . c i t . , pp.234-38; Amery, o p . c i t . , I I I , pp.274-78;
Jones, op. clt. , pp.409-10.
75.
E.g., BD, I I , no. 1058, and G D , I I , no.589.
76.
BD^ I I , no. 1093.
77.
Cooper, op. cit., p. 237.
78.
BD, I I , no. 1096.
79.
FR, p. 657.
80.
Cf. BD, I I , no. 1096, n . l .
81.
FR, p. 659.
82.
Ibid., p.662.
83.
Ibid^, pp. 667-69.
84.
j b i d . , pp.693 and 697; _BD, I I , no. 1222.
85.
Cf. my "The Foreign Policy of President Benes in the Approach to Munich",
Slavonic and East European Review, December 1960, p. 108.
86.
FR. p. 673.
87.
Cf. Haight, op. c i t . , pp. 354-55, for the effects of the appeal on
French opinion.
88.
Tempiewood, o p . c i t . , p.326.
89.
FR, pp. 675-76 and 678-80.
90.
BD, I, nos. 349-50, and I I , no. 1112.
91.
JFR, pp. 679-80, and 684-85.
92.
BD, I I , no. 1158; cf. Haight, o p . c i t . , p.356, for Bonnet's exploitation
of Roosevelt's second plea.
93.
FR, pp. 577-78.
94.
Ibid., pp.680-81.
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30
95.
Jbio\ , pp.677, 684-85, and 689.
96.
Ibid., pp.700-01; cf. Moffat, op.cit., p.218.
97.
Welles, op.cit., pp.69-71; Hull, op.cit., I, pp.590-96;
Moffat, op.cit., pp.211-16.
98.
Ibid., pp. 195-216.
99.
The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, I I , London, 1955, pp.278-482;
cf. Hoight, op. c i t . , passim, for a good analysis of Bullitt's pressure
in particular, and G.A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats,
1919-1939, Princeton, N . J . , 1953, pp. 649-81, for some discussion
of Bullitt and Kennedy.
100. Ickes, op.cit., I I , pp.278-482; Hull, op.cit., I, pp.597-98.
101. Ickes, op.cit., 11, pp.330-33.
102. Ibid., pp.377-80; Hull, op.cit., I, pp.581-82.
103. Ibid., pp. 594-95.
104. FR, p. 658.
105. Ickes, op.cit., I I , pp.467-70, and472-74; cf. FR, pp.72-73.
106. Ickes, op.cit., I I , p.481.
107. Hull, op.cit., I, p.591.
108. Longer and Gleason, op.cit., p.35.
109. Ickes, op. c i t . , I I , p. 362.
Additional Note:
This article was written before the Earl of Avon published the second
volume of his memoirs, Facing the Dictators (London, 1962). There is therefore more detail to hand now on the British reaction to Roosevelt's offer of
12 January, particularly on the second and more favourable reaction (p.565).
At the time the Earl of Avon apparently believed that it was "almost impossible
to overestimate the effect which an indication of United States interest in
European affairs may be calculated to produce"; and, with just a touch of
unconscious irony, he still thinks that Chamberlain and most of his Cabinet
"did not look beyond the Roosevelt plan itself, which admittedly might have
failed, to the beneficial consequences which might have flowed from it, even
in failure" (pp. 554-5 and 567-8). Nonetheless he would have liked to modify
one or two of Roosevelt's phrases, notably those suggesting the removal of some
of the inequities of Versailles and emphasising that the United States could not
depart from its "traditional policy of freedom from political Involvement"
(pp. 549, 555, and 615) -which were of course basic to Roosevelt's move.
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