The Islamic State in Iraq and its Predecessor Organizations
Dr. Andreas Amborst
University of Leeds, England
Official self-designation:
Republic of Iraq
Capital:
Form of government:
Baghdad
Federal republic (rank in worldwide FFP failed state index: 13/178), with an Autonomous
Region of Kurdistan
Fuad Masum (President)
Haider al-Abadi (Prime Minister)
Arab, Kurdish
Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen
Ca. 2/3 Shiites, 1/3 Sunnites, and a ca. 3% minority of other religious groups, maybe even
less due to displacement
430,000 km2
33,417,000 (as of 2013)
82.7 inhabitants per km2
ca. 2.47% (annual growth in the period 2005-2013)
19.7; median: 21.5
56% (as of 2014)
Head of state:
Head of government:
Official languages:
Languages of inhabitants:
Religions:
Surface:
Population:
Population density:
Population growth:
Average age:
Population under 25 years:
The present contribution gives a brief overview of the
most important turning points in the 12-year history of the
group “Islamic State” (IS) in Iraq. Besides their immediate
humanitarian repercussions in civil society, the ongoing
conflicts in Syria and Iraq have an impact on the global
ideology of Jihadism, thus indirectly affecting other regional conflicts as well.
From 2003 until 2014 the IS was one among many regional groups all over the world that engaged in global jihad
under the nominal leadership of al-Qaeda. Today, the IS
enforces claims to power of its own in Syria and Iraq in
direct confrontation with the Syrian split-off (Jabhat AnNusra) of al-Qaeda. As a result of this conflict, Ayman azZawahiri publicly declared in February 2014 that alQuaida excludes the IS from its ranks. This exclusion was
one of the reasons why the IS, led by Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, felt compelled to emphatically assert its claim
to leadership in the region by proclaiming a caliphate. This
was no spontaneous decision, however, as the establishment of a caliphate had already been planned by Baghdadi’s group for many years and with the utmost effort.
Due to the discord between the IS and the AfghanPakistani al-Qaeda, the global jihadist movement is now
divided into two influential units.
The Iraq Conflict
Jihadism in Iraq is an accidental result of the U.S. war
against Iraq in 2003. Al-Qaeda did not play any major role
in Iraq at the onset of the war. It was not until Saddam
Hussein’s fall and the subsequent civil war that global
Jihadism became a political and military force to be reckoned with in Iraq. It is true that the United States eventually managed to create a comparatively high level of security
by implementing a strategy for counterinsurgency devised
by David Petraeus. However, in the wake of the complete
pull-out of the American troops and the outbreak of the
civil war in Syria the Islamic State was able to recover
from its almost total defeat.
Whether, and how strongly, the Arab Spring might have
swept over Iraq and Saddam Hussein will remain an open
question. While there are Arab revolts against the authoritarian politics of Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq as well, these are
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not under the banner of the “Arab Awakening” but rather
sparked by the enmity between Sunnite and Shiite forces.
Emergence and Development of the Jihadist Movement
in Iraq
Religious affiliation has clearly played a role during the
entire course of the Iraq conflict from 2003 until today;
however, it was not the sole cause of the conflict. The lines
of conflict run inside the religious factions as well. Neither
Sunnites nor Shiites constitute a homogenous political
force in Iraq. Nor was there any religious or ethnic regularity in the early phase of Iraqi-U.S. relations:
The development of the organization “Islamic State” can
be easily traced by its frequent changes of name, as each of
these marks an organizational and strategic turning point. 2
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the U.S. had Sunnite Arab allies (the tribes from
the Anbar Province) and Sunnite Arab adversaries
(al-Qaeda in Iraq);
they had Sunnite Kurdish allies (the Peshmerga
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and Sunnite
Kurdish adversaries (Ansar as-Sunna/Ansar alIslam);
they had Shiite allies (the Badr army and the Iraqi
security forces), and they have Shiite adversaries
(Muqtada as-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army”).
Each of these factions pursues its own political goals,
sometimes engaging in armed conflict with their own
religious community or ethnic group in that process. The
main victim of the bloody power game is the civilian
population, as becomes apparent from the large numbers
of casualties: since 2003, some 140,000 civilians and
60,000 combatants have died in Iraq due to military and
terrorist violence (Iraq Body Count Index). The death toll
of the Syrian civil war is even more dramatic: it has already claimed some 200,000 lives (UN OHCHR 2014)
within a much shorter period of time – three years – and
among a much smaller population.1 This means that there
have been a total of 400,000 casualties in this region of the
Near East alone.
Al-Qaeda was very eager to maintain that situation, as this
was the only way to ensure that no faction – neither the
occupiers nor the Iraqi security forces nor the Shiite militias – could establish a monopoly on the use of force. Behind the seemingly arbitrary terror attacks against the Iraqi
civilian population were an obvious strategy and political
considerations. At that time, al-Qaeda lacked the strength
to establish a monopoly on the use of force of its own, but
it was strong enough to prevent other groups from achieving that goal.
UN OHCHR 2014: Updated Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Republic. Commissioned
by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
August 2014.
Organization for Tawhid and Jihad
Al-Qaeda in Iraq emerged from the group Jama’at attawhid wa`l jihad which was founded by Abu Mussab azZarqawi, a native of Jordan. Prior to that, Zarqawi had
been the head of a training camp in Afghanistan that was
financed by al-Qaeda. When the Iraq war broke out in
March 2003, he came to Iraq. Initially, Tawhid wa`l Jihad
did not play any major role, being just one among many
splinter groups active in the Sunnite uprising both against
the Americans and the Iraqi security forces, the latter of
which were still in the build-up phase.
It was at that time, if ever, that the Ansar as-Sunna/Ansar
al-Islam was the most conspicuous group in the Sunnite
spectrum. Ansar as-Sunna is a Kurdish group with an
ideological affinity to global Jihadism. In contrast to
Tawhid wa`l Jihad, however, it had a much longer tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan where it fought the Peshmerga even
before the Iraq war. The Peshmerga, in turn, struggled for
an independent Kurdish nation. Ansar as-Sunna was able
to keep its organizational independence from the Islamic
State until January 2015. After that, it had to submit to the
power of Baghdadi who was the new ruler in the region.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
The first change in name was made in October 2004 when
Tawid wa`l Jihad officially joined al-Qaeda. Bin Laden
issued a public statement in which he solemnly welcomed
the new group. From then on its official name was Tanzim
Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad ar-Rafidiyn (The Central Administration of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia). Many western
governments and the media (as well as this dossier) call
that group “Al-Qaeda in Iraq” or AQI. However, foreign
members of the AQI deliberately avoid using the country
name “Iraq” in order to emphasize that they do not pursue
a nationalist agenda.
The ‘brand name’ of al-Qaeda and the supposedly sound
political-religious agenda of global Jihadism were perfect
tools for uniting the completely fragmented Sunnite groups
1
Armborst, Andreas (2014a): “Dschihadismus im Irak”. In: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 4/2014, pp. 418-425; Armborst,
Andreas (2014b): “Dschihadismus im Irak. Ein Update”. In: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 6/2014, pp. 684-691.
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under one banner. From the very beginning, however,
Sunnite partisans had reasonable doubts as to the compatibility of the global jihadists’ goals of with those of the
Sunnite nationalists in Iraq: many Iraqi resistance groups
view al-Qaeda’s ideology and its call for solidarity with
Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, and Afghanistan as abstract rhetoric of little practical use; their main concern is
tangible national interests in Iraq.
The group’s focus is well illustrated by a slogan issued by
Zarqawi: “We are fighting in Iraq but our eyes are raised
to Jerusalem.” However, most Iraqis who have joined
Zarqawi have their eyes raised to Baghdad, Mosul, and
Kirkuk rather than Jerusalem.
In line with this, the AQI launched the majority of its attacks inside Iraq but was also active in Jordan. There was
repeatedly dissent between the foreign fighters, most of
whom have a global focus, and Iraqi insurgents on the
issue of extending the battle beyond the borders of Iraq
and the purpose of such an extension.
Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (MSR)
In the end, however, the Sunnite insurgents succeeded in
agreeing on a joint agenda, with the result that al-Qaeda
formed an alliance with five groups in January 2006. Part
of the compromise was another change in name. This was
probably a concession to the nationalist wing, as the
group’s name included the official country name for the
first time: Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (Majlis Shura
al-Mujahideen fi al-Iraq), or MSR. While the MSR was
officially still under the central command of al-Qaeda, the
global ideology now ranked second behind pragmatic
national interests. This shift becomes also apparent from
the fact that an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, not to
be confused with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) was appointed
Emir instead of the controversial Abu Mussab az-Zarqawi
who was, after all, still alive at the time. Nevertheless, the
MSR continued to pursue a dual strategy: “Act locally,
think globally.” On the one hand, it focused its struggle on
its adversaries inside Iraq, that is, the Kurdish Peshmerga,
the Americans, and the latter’s new allies, the tribes from
the Anbar Province. On the other, the group has not completely abandoned its global agenda. This became obvious
when the MSR kidnapped four Russian secret agents in
June 2006 despite the fact that Russia strictly opposed the
Iraq war and did not officially participate in the military
action against al-Qaeda. In its ultimatum, the MSR instead
calls on the Russian government to pull out all its troops
from Chechnya and to release all Islamist inmates from
Russian prisons.
The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
The establishment of the MSR as an umbrella organization
of the various jihadist groups in Iraq was an important
precondition for the next step: the founding of an Islamic
state. That is why the MSR kept its name for only ten
months before changing it again, in October 2006, into
“Islamic State in Iraq” (al-Dawla Islamiyya fi Iraq). By
this change of name the ISI laid claim to legitimacy as a
sovereign Islamic state – not, of course, in accordance with
U.N. public international law but based on Islamic constitutional law.
At first glance, the solemn appointment of Abu Bakr alBaghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim in late June 2014 looked like
the spontaneous action of a megalomaniac. As a matter of
fact, however, the group already worked towards creating
the theological, military, and political preconditions for
that step as early as in January 2007. The political precondition for the establishment of a caliphate is a functioning
state with a public administration in which Islamic law is
applied exclusively. Hence, the ISI began to gradually
build an administration and judicial system of its own.
Another precondition for founding a caliphate is that it has
military control over its territory. In 2007 the ISI had military presence in a couple of provinces in northern Iraq; it
did not gain complete control until the summer of 2014.
To fulfill the theological requirements for the appointment
of a caliph, the ISI’s Sharia Commission has patched together a 100-page document on which inauguration according to Islamic law is to be based. While that document
has some weaknesses in its legal and historical reasoning,3
and while the group’s claim to a caliphate appears presumptuous in the first place, it is obvious that the ISI has
gone to great lengths to create a solid legal foundation for
its caliph’s claim to legitimacy.
What was the attitude of the Afghan-Pakistani al-Qaeda
towards that step, which basically undermined al-Qaeda’s
claim to leadership? In the beginning, Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other prominent representatives publicly hailed
the establishment of the IS as a huge success. Internal
correspondence reveals, however, that al-Qaeda was very
critical of its Iraqi spin-off, accusing it of being unable to
actually put the promising vision of an own state into practice. And sure enough, the ISI initially failed to come up to
its own ambitions in the phase from 2007 until 2011; that
is why the big offensive of the IS was not launched then
but as late as in spring 2014.
Kazimi, Nibras (2008): “The caliphate attempted”. In: Current
Trends in Islamist Ideology 7, pp. 5-49.
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The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS)
With the proclamation of the name “Islamic State of Iraq
and the Sham Region/Levant” in April 2013, the ‘hostile
takeover’ of the Jabhatu an-Nusra (JBN) group by the ISI
was sealed. The an-Nusra Front is the Syrian split-off of
al-Qaeda. Its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, is a veteran of the Iraqi al-Qaeda. Since the outbreak of the Syrian
civil war the two groups have been closely interconnected
in other personal and organizational respects as well, but
there have also been major squabbles.
The merger of the two groups was proclaimed singlehandedly by Baghdadi against the will of Julani and
Zawahiri. Many followers of the JBN deserted to the ISIS
in the weeks and months that followed, and there was
armed conflict between the two organizations. ISIS took
control of the Syrian city of Raqqa. Prior to the capture of
Mosul, which is a city with over a million inhabitants,
Raqqa was the ISIS capital.
It can be safely said that Tawhid wa`l Jihad, AQI, MSR,
ISI, and ISIL are different names for the same organization
in various stages. However, the continuity of global Jihadism in Iraq came to an end due to the disagreement
with the JBN. The proclamation of the caliphate and the
concomitant most recent change in name into “Islamic
State” are the beginning of a new development in the jihadist movement. While the goals of the latter have not
fundamentally changed, it has now two rival leaders. The
way things are at the moment, it is to be expected that
jihadist groups with a regional focus will tend to join the
IS while globally oriented groups, such as al-Qaeda on the
Arab Peninsula, will stay loyal to their mother organization.
The Islamic State (IS)
While the big offensive in spring 2014 was stunning, it did
not come as a surprise. After all, the IS had never made a
secret of its military ambitions, and had repeatedly demonstrated its potential in that respect. Over the preceding
years the IS had become much more powerful than before,
as became apparent from two interconnected developments: firstly, it initiated processes of state building; secondly, it enhanced both its military capacities and its capacity to act. By its own account, the IS currently comprises 16 contiguous provinces stretching from Aleppo to the
suburbs of Baghdad. The spheres of influence are connected by corridors along important traffic arteries all the way
to the borders of Turkey and Jordan. Territories outside
that region, such as those in Algeria, Libya, and the Sinai
are administrated by means of provincial IS governments
(on the wilayat system of the IS see Zelin 2015).4
Serious state-building processes – that is, the creation of a
civil administration – became evident by 2013 at the latest.
Particularly in the Syrian city of Raqqa the IS controls
social processes, markets, jurisdiction, public administration, and the security apparatus. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi no
longer exclusively calls upon foreign fighters in his public
messages but also on Muslim physicians, engineers, and
judges to come to the cities occupied by the IS to help in
the civil construction of the Islamic State. This is in stark
contrast to the situation in 2007 when the group called
itself Islamic State but was no state.
The other alarm signal with regard to the IS conquest campaign in spring 2014 was its military activities during the
two years preceding the offensive. The group had turned to
organizing its activities in military campaigns as early as
in 2006. These campaigns included the “Operation Clear
Conquest” (2006), “Plan of Dignity” (2007), and “God’s
Harvest” (2009).5 Initially these campaigns had very crude
strategic objectives. Over the years, however, they became
more and more professional and their results increasingly
impressive.
The ISIS campaign “Breaking the Walls” from July 2012
until 2013 was its most impressive demonstration of power
at the time. As is suggested by the name, the goal of the
campaign was to free incarcerated members from prisons.
Estimates vary, but it is probable that the ISI managed to
free 1,000 people from Iraqi state prisons – including well
secured anti-terror facilities – during that period. A total of
8 complex attacks on state prisons were documented during the campaign. The most spectacular attack was in July
2013 on the Abu Ghraib prison: 500 prisoners were freed,
including high-ranking al-Qaeda officers. In addition, the
“Breaking the Walls” campaign was characterized by the
massive use of car bombs. The group used more than 500
“vehicle borne improvised explosive devices” (VBIEDs)
in 12 months,6 thus demonstrating that it has functioning
logistic supply chains and operates with a high degree of
coordination. No other militant organization has ever used
that many car bombs in such a brief period of time.
Zelin, Aaron (2015): “The Islamic State’s model”. In: The Washington
Post, January 15, 2015.
5 Armborst, Andreas (2013): Jihadi violence. A study of al-Qaeda’s
media. Berlin.
6 Lewis, Jessica (2013): “Al-Qaeda in Iraq resurgent part I and II”.
Institute for the Study of War (ed.): Middle East Security Report 14,
September 2013. Washington DC.
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgentpart-ii.
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Conclusion
Since July 2014 at the latest, the Iraq conflict has no longer
been an asymmetrical conflict but rather resembled war
between two regular armies. While the IS still uses the
typical modus operandi of terrorist groups, 7 it has many
more branches of the military service at its command, and
is apparently capable not only of using and maintaining
some of these but also of supplying them with ammunition. This situation is made even more complicated by the
Syrian civil war. If the IS manages to establish long-term
safety for the Sunnite population in its territory and to
create lasting state structures which provide for the population in all spheres of life, then the IS will be accepted by
many as a new legitimate power in the region. In that case,
it would be impossible solve the conflict in any way that is
in the interest of the West.
Compiled in February 2015.
Lewis, Jessica (2014): “ISIS battle plan for Baghdad”. Institute for
the Study of War (ed.): Backgrounder.
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-battle-planbaghdad.
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5
Flags and Names of the Jihadist Movement in Iraq, 2001 – 2014
2001 – October 2004
Organization for Tauhid and Jihad
October 2004 – January 2006
Central Administration of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (often also
called “al-Qaeda in Iraq”, AQI)
January 2006 – October 2006
Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (MSR)
October 2006 – April 2013
The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
April 2013 – June 2014
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Sham Region
(ISIL/ISIS), jointly with Dschabhat an-Nusra
From June 2014 onward
Islamic State (IS)
Source of image files: Wikipedia
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