December 2014
A tale of two cities
The use of explosive weapons in Basra and Fallujah, Iraq, 2003-4
Report by
Jenna Corderoy and Robert Perkins
Editor
Iain Overton
With thanks to
Henry Dodd, Jane Hunter, Steve Smith
and Iraq Body Count
Copyright © Action on Armed Violence (December 2014)
Cover Illustration
A US Marine Corps M1A1 Abrams tank fires its main gun into
a building in Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr/Phantom Fury,
10 December 2004, Lance Corporal James J. Vooris (UMSC)
Infographic
Sarah Leo
Design and Printing
Matt Bellamy
Clarifications or corrections from interested parties are
welcome
Research and publications funded by the Government
of Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A tale of two cities | 1
CONTENTS
Foreword2
IRAQ: A TIMELINE
3
INTRODUCTION: IRAQ AND EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS
4
International Humanitarian Law
and Rules of Engagement
6
Basra, 2003
8
Rattling the Cage
Air strikes: Munition selection
Fallujah, 2004
Firepower for manpower
Counting the cost The aftermath and lessons learned
8
11
14
14
17
20
Conclusion22
Recommendations23
2 | Action on Armed Violence
Foreword
“
Sound military tactics employed in the pursuit of strategic objectives
tend to restrict the use of explosive force in populated areas
[... There are] ample examples from other international military
operations that indicate that the excessive use of explosive force in
populated areas can undermine both tactical and strategic objectives.”
Bård Glad Pedersen, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 17 June 20141
The language of conflict has changed enormously.
Today engagements are often fought and justified
through a public mandate to protect civilians. And yet the weapons used, and the way they are
used, far too often pose a great danger to those
civilians.
The use of explosive weapons in populated areas
puts civilians at grave risk of death and injury, as
AOAV has documented over several years.
How, then, the urgent question then must be
asked, can explosive weapons be used by
governments in a way that is consistent with a
mandate to reduce harm to civilians?
How can state and international forces regulate
the use of weapons that affect a wide area and so
minimise their collateral damage?
What are the political, military, strategic and technological factors that shape the decision to fire?
And, ultimately, how can a government achieve
peace without creating desolation?
In this series of reports, of which this is one,
Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) explores recent
and ongoing military practices in the use of
explosive weapons. We looked at three separate
contexts where explosive weapons have been
deployed by foreign forces, in a territory where
their government is not the governing authority.
Three case studies in three places most heavilyaffected by explosive violence in recent years:
Afghanistan, the Gaza Strip, and Iraq.
These reports build on research by AOAV that
shows how the use of explosive weapons with
wide-area effects in populated areas leads to a
predictable pattern of excessive civilian harm. It
considers what rules and policies already exist to
regulate the use of such force. And it asks to what
extent are civilians protected not only by international law, but also by the practices of states on
the ground, many of which go beyond existing
law? It concludes by asking, too, what measures
could still be taken to reduce the terrible harm of
explosive weapons on civilians?
TIMELINE OF THE IRAQ WAR
132,487
MINIMUM NUMBER OF TOTAL
CIVILIAN DEATHS IN IRAQ SINCE
THE FIRST STRIKE IN 2003
20 MARCH 2003
A tale of two cities | 3
> 30
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN
DEATHS PER DAY (SINCE 2003)
Missiles strike the capital city of Baghdad, signalling the launch of US-led operations against Iraq.
21 MARCH-6 APRIL 2003 UK-led operation in Basra
7 APRIL 2003
US forces enter Baghdad.
14 DECEMBER 2003
Saddam Hussein is captured in his hometown, Tikrit.
31 MARCH 2004
Gunmen in the centre of Fallujah ambush, kill and publicly exhibit the bodies of four American contractors from Blackwater Security.
5 APRIL 2004
US forces launch Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah.
7 NOVEMBER 2004
US forces launch Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah.
5 JANUARY 2006
Suicide bombers kill at least 120 people in the cities of Karbala and Ramadi.
23 NOVEMBER 2006
Five car bombs and a mortar shell strike Sadr City, Baghdad, killing at least 144 people and wounding 206.
30 DECEMBER 2006
Saddam Hussein is executed in Iraq.
10 JANUARY 2007
President George W Bush announces that an increase of more than 20,000 US troops to be deployed to Iraq. The UN announces that
34,000 civilians were killed in Iraq in 2006.
MAP OF IRAQ
TURKEY
SYRIA
30 APRIL 2009
British troops leave Basra. 179 British military
personnel had been killed during the six-year conflict.
25 OCTOBER 2009
147 civilians are killed, and 700 more wounded,
when two car bombs hit Baghdad.
31 AUGUST 2010
President Barack Obama declares an end to the
American combat mission in Iraq.
18 DECEMBER 2011
US troops leave Iraq. 4,489 US military personnel had
been killed.
TIKRIT
IRAN
RAMADI
BAGHDAD
FALLUJAH
KARBALA
BASRA
SAUDI ARABIA
1 JANUARY 2014
United Nations say at least 7,818 civilians and 1,050 members of the security forces were killed in violent attacks across Iraq in 2013.
DATA: AOAV / Iraq Body Count (as of 20/11/2014)
4 | Action on Armed Violence
INTRODUCTION: IRAQ AND
EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS
In the midst of international controversy and
condemnation, on 20 March 2003 a coalition of
allied armed forces launched a military intervention against the regime of Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein. Forty-nine countries supported ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ (see Figure 1), led by US and
UK forces.2 The intervention triggered years of
conflict. Widespread armed violence still scars the
people and the landscape of modern-day Iraq.
By the end of 2014, Iraq Body Count (IBC), which
maintains the world’s largest public database of
violent civilian deaths in the country, estimates
that as many as 150,000 civilians have died violent
deaths in Iraq since those dark March days of over
a decade before.3
Today, Iraq stands out as the country most
blighted by explosive violence. Action on Armed
Violence (AOAV) has been tracking the impacts of
explosive weapons around the world since 2011.
These weapons, which include the likes of aircraft
bombs, mortars, rockets and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), are responsible for thousands
of civilian deaths and injuries every year. Between
2011 and 2013, AOAV documented more civilian
casualties from explosive weapons in Iraq than
in any other country. AOAV recorded 28,918 total
casualties from explosive weapons in Iraq, of
whom 25,224 (87%) were civilians.4
Perhaps this is not surprising, given the historical legacy of harm that conflict has brought upon
this nation. From day one, as the infamous ‘shock
and awe’ campaign reduced the Iraqi capital
city Baghdad to rubble and ruin, using explosive
weapons even in densely-populated areas was
central to the strategies of coalition forces.5 In
part this was to avoid military casualties amid
intense public scrutiny. “The American way of war
substitutes manpower for firepower,” said retired
Army general Bob Scales during the early days of
the unfolding conflict. “We expose as few troops
as possible to close contact with the enemy. We
do that by killing as many enemy as we can with
precision weapons.”6
How precise these weapons actually are is a subject of much debate, but explosive weapons are a
tool that is all-too-often used to fulfil such rhetorical
and strategic ends. The reason for this is clear: they
can be deployed at a significant distance from the
source of threat; and dropping bombs from fighter
jets or launching shells from long-range artillery
affords a degree of security to the perpetrators.
Their distancing effect however, is one central
reason why the use of explosive weapons in
populated areas raises enormous concerns for
the protection of the civilians who are caught in
the maelstrom of violence. These are weapons
defined by their inherent capacity to affect a wide
area with blast and fragmentation effects. Any
use of explosive weapons in populated areas
puts civilians at grave risk of unintended death
and injury, as well as causing often-catastrophic
damage to civilian buildings and infrastructure.
Figure 1: Operation Iraqi Freedom (21 March—30 April 2003)
• Five national military forces operated inside Iraq (US, UK, Australia, Canada, Poland)
• 466,985 personnel deployed (9% were non-US)
• 1,801 aircraft flew 41,404 sorties
• 29,199 bombs dropped (60% were guided munitions, 32% unguided).7
A tale of two cities | 5
Unlike the wars in Afghanistan or the Balkans, the
Iraq war was waged not by a formalised alliance
(i.e. NATO), but by a coalition of national militaries.
All forces involved in the initial months of fighting
were under the ultimate direction and leadership
of US Central Command (CENTCOM). However, different armies observed differing rules of
engagement. While sharing the implicit objective
of seeking to enhance civilian protection in Iraq
they faced differing contexts and challenges, and
were guided by differing approaches and policies.
Methods and scope
In this report, AOAV looks at the military practices
and rules of engagement in place in two cities:
Basra and Fallujah. The two periods analysed here
are the ‘Battle of Basra,’ when UK forces led an
operation in the southern city of Basra between
21 March to 6 April 2003 (with military support of
US and Australian forces), and the two operations undertaken by US forces in Fallujah in 2004:
Operation Vigilant Resolve (5-28 April 2004), and
Operation Al-Fajr/Phantom Fury (7 November
2004 to 23 December 2004).
Comparing operations in Basra and Fallujah
allows for a consideration of how national military
practices can affect the ways in which explosive
weapons are used in populated areas. It also demonstrates how these approaches impacted the
civilian communities in these two cities.
While direct comparisons between these two
cities are inevitably limited by context, broad contrasts can be drawn and valuable questions raised
by examining the rules of engagement that governed the use of explosive weapons in populated
areas during the Iraq War.
What were the approaches and attitudes at
the time of these two militaries, among the
best funded, trained and most technologically
© Imperial War Museum
The protection of Iraqi civilians was repeatedly
cited as a motive both for the 2003 intervention
itself, and as a key priority throughout the later
years of fighting.8 The implicit objective of securing the protection of civilians in Iraq imposed a
heightened burden to ensure this goal was not
harmed by the means used to achieve it.
Refugees flee Basra, March 2003.
advanced in the world? How were the decisions
to deploy explosive weapons in populated areas
shaped by their respective military practices?
It is not the objective of this research to apportion
blame on individuals, or to comment on the legality of either specific actions or the operation as
a whole. Rather AOAV seeks to compare military
practices and procedures during a major recent
conflict, and to identify any military practices that
may have reduced the risk of civilian casualties.
Research for this study was carried out through
publicly-available open-source material, including
an analysis of the Iraq War Logs, previously secret
US military files released by WikiLeaks, as well
as transcripts of interviews of high-ranking British military personnel from the Chilcot Inquiry, an
inquiry into the UK’s involvement in the Iraq War.
There are limitations implicit in relying solely on
open-source material. Documents relating to the
military, such as the British rules of engagement,
are often inaccessible to the public, and there
were reports, particularly during the assaults on
Fallujah, of media access being severely limited.
The focus of this report is on explosive weapons
and their implications for civilians. Many other
weapons were used by all parties to the fighting
in Iraq, ranging from firearms, to white phosphorous.9 While these raise many other important
civilian protection questions, they fall outside
AOAV’s focus and are not addressed in this report.
6 | Action on Armed Violence
International Humanitarian
Law and Rules of Engagement
forces can enter combat. They stem from multiple
field manuals, doctrines and training publications,
not all of which are in the public domain. Even a
decade after the Iraq war began most of the rules
in place at the time for both US and UK forces are
still in force today, and, in the UK in particular, a lot
of information specific to the questions asked by
this research is restricted from public scrutiny.13
The conduct of hostilities in contemporary armed
conflicts is governed by the rules of international
humanitarian law (IHL). This body of law seeks, for
humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed
conflict, to protect those not taking a direct part in
hostilities, and to minimise suffering and destruction during wartime.10
In addition to the fundamental prohibition on any
direct attacks against civilians or civilian objects,
the central tenets of IHL include rules on precaution (measures must be taken ahead of any
attack to avoid and minimise harm to civilians),
distinction (efforts necessary to distinguish at all
times between combatants and civilians, as well
as military and civilian objects), and proportionality (that no attack can be excessive in the harm
caused to civilians in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated).11
These rules are not restricted solely to the deployment of explosive weapons, but provide insight
into principles governing all lethal use of force.
Both the UK and US publicly emphasised how the
RoE for Iraq were informed and underpinned by
the principles of IHL.14
ROE and collateral damage
The 2000 Standing Rules of Engagement for US
Forces (CJCSI 3121.01A) state, for example, that
the use of force is limited by international law, as
well as setting out additional limitations such as
US domestic law and policy.15 IHL represents only
the minimum requirements for states, and the
rules of many militaries are thought to be far more
restrictive than these general parameters.
Crucially IHL provides only limited protection
against the pattern of harm caused by the use of
explosive weapons in populated areas.12 It does,
however, represent the building blocks upon
which rules of engagements (RoE) for all militaries
are theoretically based.
Rules of War
© Imperial War Museum
RoE are military directives that describe the
circumstances under which ground, naval and air
Iraqi refugees cower as they try to flee Basra, 2003.
RoE are concerned with the balance between protecting both forces and civilians whilst still achieving
a military objective. UK soldiers serving in Iraq, for
instance, were issued with ‘Card Alpha,’ which
stated the narrow parameters in which lethal force,
including with explosive weapons, would be permitted. Card Alpha stated that “[…] in all situations you
are to use no more force than absolutely necessary.”
Troops should “only open fire against a person if he/
she is committing or about to commit an act likely
to endanger life and there is no other way to prevent
the danger.”16
Despite the limitations on publicly-available
information it is clear that both US and UK forces
explicitly prioritised the protection of civilians from
incidental harm; so-called ‘collateral damage’.
A tale of two cities | 7
“
Under British military rules of war, British troops would never be given
clearance to carry out attacks similar to those being conducted by the
US […] British rules of engagement only allow troops to open fire when
attacked, using the minimum force necessary and only at identified targets.
The American approach was markedly different. When US troops are
attacked with mortars in Baghdad, they use mortar-locating radar to find
the firing point and then attack the general area with artillery, even though
the area they are attacking may be in the middle of a densely populated
residential area.”
Senior British commander, talking to Jonathan Holmes.17
Efforts to limit civilian casualties in the course of
fighting may necessitate restrictions on the occasions in which force can be used, as well as on
the means and methods of such force. In Fallujah,
US Lt. Gen. Richard Natonski said: “There were
many times that my regiments had targets that
they wanted to engage, but because of the rules of
engagement and the amount of collateral damage,
we were precluded from hitting certain sites in the
city.”19
However, the operations carried out in Fallujah
by American troops in 2004 resulted in significant civilian casualties and civilian infrastructure
damage when compared to the British-led operation conducted in Basra in 2003. Despite a clear
awareness of the need to avoid collateral damage
and to minimise harm to civilians, over a thousand
civilians died in the two assaults on Fallujah.20
“There was never a cavalier attitude toward civilian
harm, early in both the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq,” as Neta C. Crawford, Professor of Political
© Cpl. Matthew J. Apprendi
Collateral damage essentially means causing unintended or incidental deaths and injuries
to civilians, or destroying civilian objects. The
‘US Rules of Engagement of Iraq’, a document
obtained through Wikileaks, highlights how
“Military operations will be conducted, in so far
as possible, to ensure that incidental injury to
civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects
are minimized.”18
Marines in action in Fallujah, 7 April 2004.
Science at Boston University, highlights. “[Y]et
the US military and political leadership seemed to
tolerate greater collateral damage when military
necessity was believed to demand it.”21
A more flexible, fluid definition of what constitutes
military ‘necessity’, or what is meant by ‘excessive’ collateral damage allows for considerable
interpretative variance among commanders on
the ground. The more permissive the RoE are, the
more they heighten the margin for error in the heat
of battle, and the more likely it is that civilians fall
victim to explosive weapon use.
8 | Action on Armed Violence
Basra, 2003
The southern city of Basra is one of the largest
in Iraq. Predominantly Shia, in March 2003,
Basra’s population was estimated to be between
1-1.5 million.22
Basra was heavily shelled during the Iran-Iraq war
of 1980-1988. For many years after the conflict
ended the city suffered from its effects, with
intermittent electricity and poor sanitation.23 Basra
was again bombed in 1991 after a failed uprising
against Saddam Hussein’s regime.24
Before entering Iraq in 2003, UK planning noted
that while there was an existing level of popular opposition to Saddam Hussein’s regime, any
potential support for the coalition was contingent
on avoiding civilian casualties. While UK forces
were expected to meet with relatively-limited
opposition, “We have no specific intelligence on
the instinctive reaction of Basra’s civil populace
to UK presence. Much will depend upon the
circumstances in which control is established (e.g.
destruction of civil infrastructure and civil casualties)
and how Basra is subsequently administered.”25
The Battle for Basra began on 21 March 2003, and
ended on 6 April 2003 when UK troops entered
the city centre.
Rattling the Cage
All coalition forces participating in the intervention
were led by US Central Command (CENTCOM),
with UK forces given the task of securing Basra.26
Several British regiments were involved in the
fighting for Basra, including the British 7th
Armoured Brigade (also known as the Desert
Rats), the Black Watch and 1st Battalion, the
Royal Regiment of Fusiliers.27 Other regiments
and units that pushed into Basra included the
Royal Scots Dragoon Guards and the Royal
THE BATTLE OF BASRA
20 MARCH 2003
Missiles strike Baghdad,
signalling the launch of USled operations against Iraq.
21 MARCH 6 APRIL 2003
BATTLE OF BASRA
DATA: AOAV / Iraq Body Count
TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAN
OPERATION
POPULATION AT THE TIME: 1-1.5 MILLION (EST.)
OPERATION LED BY: UK MILITARY, WITH SUPPORT
FROM COALITION AIRCRAFT
WEAPON EXAMPLES
BAGHDAD
AS90 155MM HEAVY ARTILLERY GUN
CHALLENGER II TANK
LYNX ATTACK HELICOPTERS
CIVILIAN DEATHS
IRAQ BODY COUNT RECORDED 363-480 VIOLENT
CIVILIAN DEATHS IN BASRA CAUSED BY COALITION
FORCES.
BASRA
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
A tale of two cities | 9
Marine Commandos.28 US air support was prominent in the fighting and United States Marines
tanks led the tank battles outside Basra.
“
What we did today was rattle
the cage. We went in, pushed
further, trying to create a
response to draw the enemy
towards us so we could fight
more on our own terms.”
UK soldier, speaking to British journalist
Janine di Giovanni, Basra, April 2003.29
By 23 March, after just three days of tank battles
in open areas outside the city itself, Basra was
surrounded and its outskirts secured.30 For almost
three weeks UK forces waited outside Basra,
finally taking the city on 6 April 2003.
Loose-cordons
UK forces placed a loosely-formed cordon around
Basra, allowing civilians to flee the city or to leave
in order to bring back food.31 As the UK military
ringed the city, residents of Basra began to flee,
fearing the increasingly-desperate tactics of Iraqi
militia forces, and the threat of future bombing of
civilian areas from where Iraqi tanks were based.
“All the [Iraq loyalist] artillery and tanks are near
our houses,” said retired engineer Mohammed on
escaping the city. “And they are firing from there.”32
The importance of restraint echoed throughout
the planning and conduct of the Basra operation. Limits on RoE among UK forces meant that
soldiers were “desperate to be allowed to take
on Saddam’s forces without the tight restrictions
imposed on them.”33
British commanders avoided entering the city
itself to engage Iraqi forces within populated areas
of Basra, where “the British armor [sic.] would
be nullified.”34 The choice to remain outside the
city may have saved both civilian and military
personnel lives in the long run. Explosive weapons
were used during this stand-off period, with the
Royal Artillery using a Phoenix surveillance drone
to direct artillery and air strikes against military
targets primarily removed from the populated
heartland of Basra.35
Tight controls
The UK military tightly controlled the process of
using heavy explosive weapons. Only one regiment,
the 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery, could use
155mm artillery in the battle for Basra, and each
single firing mission could only be authorised by
the regiment commander. This level of control was
higher than had been the norm in UK artillery doctrine. While UK forces fired 9,153 155mm artillery
rounds during the battle, the city itself was treated
as a “restricted fire area” by the commander in
question.36 The UK approach to the Basra operation
was “conditioned by the need to avoid large UK or
civilian casualties, and progress will be determined
by effects and events, rather than a set timetable.”37
The British were to remain outside the city, as
one British official described it at the time: “The
forces in Basra are being engaged. We’re not
Artillery
The UK in Basra deployed the AS90 heavy
artillery gun, which fires heavy 155mm shells,
still among the largest common artillery shells
in modern use. The AS90 can fire a burst of
three rounds in less than ten seconds, and a
sustained rate of two rounds a minute.38 Each
AS90 holds 48 shells, which it can fire over
39
distances of 25km.
The UK also used the L118 105mm Light
Gun, which although smaller than the AS90,
has a faster rate of fire, and so can launch
more explosive shells at a target in a shorter
space of time (twelve rounds in a minute).40
The long range and relatively wide dispersion of even the most sophisticated artillery
systems means that their use in populated
areas is likely to result in unwanted ‘collateral
damage’ as shells fall short or wide of their
target, landing among homes or businesses.
10 | Action on Armed Violence
going in. We wait for them to come to us. Where
we get targets of opportunity, we take it. It’s a
waiting game.”41
“
We are finding collateral damage
difficult. We get clearance to fire,
a computer tells us where we
are firing in relation to schools
and houses, but the decision
is taken on proportionality and
military necessity.”
Major Ian Bell, commander of Royal Horse
Artillery batteries outside Basra42
Tank battles
As the stand-off progressed, the remaining Iraqi
troops inside the city lost patience and tried to provoke UK troops by launching sorties out of the city
with tanks and armed vehicles as well as mortaring
positions.43
On 27 March 2003, Iraqi Soviet-made T-55 tanks
and armoured personnel carriers streamed out of
the city of Basra, heading towards British forces
on the Al Faw peninsula.44 From the ground, the
convoy was reportedly pounded by 155mm AS90
Tanks
The UK deployed Challenger 2 and the US
mostly used the M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams
tanks in Iraq. These tanks are equipped with a
powerful main gun that fires a range of 120mm
shells.45 These include High-Explosive Squash
Head (HESH) rounds, which squash a ‘plaster’
of explosive across a building or target on
impact. The widened surface area and the
direct contact means that when the explosive
in the shell detonates a fraction of a second
later, it projects a violent blast wave that can
cause substantial damage. The Challenger 2
can fire up to eight of these rounds a minute
and shoots at speeds of up to 25 mph.
heavy artillery and 105mm light field guns.46 The
Iraqi tanks dispersed, and became vulnerable in
the open countryside, which had turned into a
muddy quagmire after torrential rain.47
UK Challenger tanks were deployed to fire their
shells in order to destroy 14 Iraqi tanks that had
moved out into a wooded open area, away from the
population of Basra.48 The engagement on 27 March
was described as the largest tank battle involving
British forces since the Second World War.49
UK troops and tanks only entered Basra city itself
on 6 April, after spending nearly three weeks on
the outskirts of the city. By drawing Iraqi forces
out from the city, rather than taking the fight to the
opposition inside populated areas, the risk to civilians inside the city was diminished.
“
[g]iven the heavily populated
nature of Basra, and the
number of restricted and no
fire areas imposed from higher
headquarters, I treated the whole
of Basra as a restricted fire area.”
Major General Nicholas Ashmore,
commander of 3rd Regiment Royal Horse
Artillery, 2001-200450
It would, however, be an over-simplification to
imply that UK forces did not shell populated areas.
Undoubtedly, UK forces ordered the deployment
of explosive weapons in populated areas; but it is
also clear that forces were largely kept from more
intense escalations in engagements in Basra.
While there were civilian casualties in the city during
this time, the strong suggestion from soldiers and
observers alike is that the impact on civilians would
have been far greater if the military response of UK
forces had been more aggressive. Similarly while
there was damage to infrastructure through British
shelling and aerial bombing, it was not as widespread or as severe as that documented in Fallujah,
as this report will go on to describe.
A tale of two cities | 11
Crucially, the UK example of practice in Basra
illustrates that protecting one’s own troops and
protecting the lives of civilians are not incompatible goals. It is possible to achieve both through a
measure of restraint in the use of force.
Air strikes: Munition selection
Coalition air strikes in support of UK ground
troops in Iraq are also worth examining. In the
first month of the conflict 29,199 munitions were
dropped in Iraq. Of these, 19,948 were guided
munitions (68%).51 In comparison, in the Gulf
conflict in 1991, just eight per cent of all bombs
dropped were precision-guided munitions.52
The most commonly dropped bomb during the
opening month of conflict (20 March – 30 April
2003) in Iraq was the GBU-12 Paveway II (7,114
bombs, 24% of all aerial munitions deployed).53
A 2003 report by Human Rights Watch found that
both US and UK forces took significant steps to
protect civilians from their air strikes. “The United
States and United Kingdom recognized that
employment of precision-guided munitions alone
was not enough to provide civilians with adequate
protection. They employed other methods to help
minimize civilian casualties, such as bombing at
night when civilians were less likely to be on the
streets, using penetrator munitions and delayed
fuzes to ensure that most blast and fragmentation damage was kept within the impact area, and
using attack angles that took into account the
locations of civilian facilities such as schools and
hospitals.”58
© Imperial War Museum
The GBU-12 weighs 225kg/500lb, of which 89kg is
high-explosive.54 It is based on the general-purpose
Mk-82, but comes with a laser guidance system.
The Mk-82 is the classic ‘dumb’ bomb. It was the
second most-commonly dropped bomb in this
period in Iraq (5,504 bombs, 19% of the total).55
The majority of air attacks in Basra were carried
out by US fighter jets. In one strike overnight on 29
March, two US F-15E Strike Eagles, using laserguided munitions, destroyed a building where 200
suspected paramilitary members were meeting.56
Reports indicated that US aircraft had used a
delayed fuse bomb that first penetrated the building and then detonated within. This was selected
in an effort to minimise the wider blast effect.57
Iraqi civilians escorted through the ruins of Basra by soldiers from the 1st Irish Guards.
12 | Action on Armed Violence
On 5 April 2003, a US aircraft bombed a building
in Basra in an attempt to kill Lieutenant General Ali
Hassan al-Majid, otherwise known as ‘Chemical
Ali’. In the attack, 17 people living on either side of
the building were killed. All 17 were members of
two families. Both families denied any Iraqi leadership presence, and had not seen al-Majid.59
It is thought that the munition used in the attack
was a 500-pound laser-guided bomb.60 Abid
Hamudi, a 70-year-old retired oil industry worker,
who lost ten members of his family in the blast,
told The Washington Post: “Ten lives are gone.
The house was completely destroyed. You came
to save us, to protect us. That’s what you said. It’s
now the contrary. Innocent people are killed.”61
Human Rights Watch concluded: “The collateral
damage estimate done on the targets appears to
have allowed for a high level of civilian damage.
This attack may have been approved due to the
perceived military value of al-Majid. Had smaller
weapons been used, however, many civilian lives
would have been spared.”62
Wide area effects
The increase in the use of precision-guided munitions may have helped to reduce the margin for
error in one part of a weapon delivery system, but
it does not eradicate the fundamental source of
threat to civilians. When used in populated areas
these weapons still retain the capacity to cause significant civilian harm. Heavy aircraft bombs with a
large blast yield will affect a wide-area regardless of
how accurately they are delivered. Moreover, technology is only as effective as the rules that govern
their use and the information that guides it. When
used in populated areas, even the most advanced
guidance technology does not entirely remove the
potential for terrible harm to civilians.
Overall AOAV’s analysis of Iraq Body Count’s data
has shown that a minimum of 448-593 civilians
were killed in Basra between 20 March and 9 April
2003 by coalition forces. At least another thousand were injured.63 Not all of these deaths were
caused by explosive weapons, and many of these
deaths are attributed not to UK ground actions but
to aerial bombing. During the first three days of
fighting around Basra, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that hospitals
received around 100 war-wounded a day.64
Six years after the fighting in Basra, the UK paid
more than £9 million in compensation to Iraqi civilians who had been injured, lost loved ones or had
property damaged between 2003 and 2009 due to
UK military operations in Iraq.65
Cluster bombs
Both US and UK forces used cluster munitions during the early phases of the Iraq
conflict, launched from air and the ground.
Cluster munitions contain smaller explosive
submunitions which are designed to cover
a large area. Indiscriminate in nature, these
weapons were banned by the international
community in 2008.66
UK forces used cluster munitions in and
around Basra, decisions that were condemned as “poor weapons choices.”67 In one
neighbourhood, artillery targeted Iraqi tanks
hidden in a date grove in the middle of civilian homes and launched cluster munitions.
According to Human Rights Watch investigators, these munitions blanketed a much larger
area, injuring nine members of one family.68
It emerged that the Royal Artillery fired more
than 2,000 ground-launched cluster bombs
around Basra, and at least 66 BL755 bombs
were dropped from UK planes.69
The UK has since signed and ratified the
Convention on Cluster Munitions, and in April
2014 finally completed the destruction of its
entire stockpile of more than 190,000 cluster
munitions and over 38 million submunitions.70
The US, however, has not yet signed up to
the treaty at the time of publication.71
US 120mm mortar cannon fires illumination flares
over Mosul, Iraq, June 2006.
© US Army Tech. Sgt. Jeremy T. Lock, US Air Force
Yet not all strikes were as carefully planned and
engaged as better practice would recommend.
A tale of two cities | 13
14 | Action on Armed Violence
Fallujah, 2004
Fallujah is a city in the Iraqi province of al-Anbar,
forty miles west of Baghdad. US planning before
the operation began noted that most of Fallujah’s
50,000 buildings were residential, and denselypacked. The city’s layout was random, with no
distinction between residential homes, businesses
and industry, while the Jolan district in the northeast of the city was formed of “twisting alleyways
and a tangle of streets.”72
In 2003 Fallujah had been described as the “most
hostile place in Iraq,” where “grenade attacks and
drive-by shootings were a daily occurrence.”73
Fallujah became the site of rapidly-escalating tensions between the US and opposition forces. In
April 2003 US troops opened fire on Iraqi protesters during an anti-American rally, killing fifteen in
an incident that furthered widespread hostility.74
In November 2003, five months before the first
operation in Fallujah, a US Chinook helicopter was
brought down by an anti-aircraft missile outside
the city, killing 16 soldiers on-board.75 The political
set-up in Fallujah was far more hostile to foreign
troops than the conditions faced by UK forces in
Basra.
The US led two separate operations in Fallujah, the
first in April 2004 (Operation Vigilant Resolve),
and the second during November and December
2004 (Operation Al-Fajr/Phantom Fury). The two
operations are considered together in this report.
Firepower for manpower
On 31st March 2004, gunmen in the centre of
Fallujah ambushed four American contractors
working with the private-firm Blackwater Security.
The images of their burnt and mutilated bodies
were beamed across the world. The uproar that
followed placed a huge amount of public and
political pressure on the US military to respond.
Unlike in Basra, there was a fervent sense of
THE BATTLES OF FALLUJAH
20 MARCH 2003
Missiles strike Baghdad,
signalling the launch of USled operations against Iraq.
5 - 28 APRIL 2004
OPERATION
VIGILANT RESOLVE
7 NOVEMBER 2004 23 DECEMBER 2004
OPERATION
PHANTOM FURY
DATA: AOAV / Iraq Body Count
TURKEY
SYRIA
IRAN
FALLUJAH
OPERATIONS
POPULATION AT THE TIME: 285,000 (EST.)
BAGHDAD
OPERATION LED BY: US MILITARY
WEAPON EXAMPLES
M198 155MM HOWITZER
M109A6 PALADIN HOWITZER
M1A1/2 ABRAMS TANKS
F-15E STRIKE EAGLES
CIVILIAN DEATHS
DATA SUGGESTS THAT THERE WERE 1,246-1,382
VIOLENT CIVILIAN DEATHS IN FALLUJAH DURING
THE TWO OPERATIONS.
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
A tale of two cities | 15
urgency for the need to take Fallujah and to root
out those responsible for the murders of the
contractors.76
“
Everything to the west is
weapons-free […] We’re going
to let loose the dogs of war.
It will be hell.”
Staff Sgt. Sam Mortimer, Fallujah,
November 200477
The US launched ‘Operation Vigilant Resolve’
on 5 April 2004. In contrast to UK actions in Basra,
a far more restrictive cordon was set up around
the city. All roads into Fallujah were closed, with a
strict curfew imposed from 7pm to 6am. Women,
children and elderly men were not allowed to leave
the city until 9 April 2004, by which time there had
already been heavy fighting in the city, including
the bombing of a mosque compound in the city
centre on 7 April.78
The need to minimise collateral damage was
clearly indicated throughout the planning of
operations. The protection of civilians is stressed
throughout, for example, the 1st Marine Division
Rules of Engagement (RoE) carried by US forces
in Fallujah.79 Yet from its earliest stages the US
engagement in Fallujah showed a clear presumption towards the deployment of heavy explosive
weapons in what were densely-populated areas.
Two battalion task forces with about 2,000 soldiers
in total led the first assault into Fallujah on 5 April.
They were backed by ten M1A1 tanks and a battery
of powerful M198 howitzers.80 Marine regiments
attacked from the northwest and southeast.81 Supported by jet fighters and attack helicopters, US
forces engaged in intense urban street fighting for
several weeks until 28 April 2004, when the city
was given over to Iraqi forces.82
‘Operation Phantom Fury’ in November 2004
made even greater use of heavy explosive
weapons in populated areas of the city. Efforts to
restore security to Fallujah through Iraqi troops
after the first operation ended in April failed in
part because the US chain of command felt
that the connection with the local community
prevented the ‘Fallujah Brigade’ from being
aggressive enough in their use of force.83 Before
the US launched a ground offensive to retake
the city, Fallujah was “pummelled for hours” by
airstrikes targeting suspected safe houses and
strongholds.84
On 7 November 2004, an estimated 10,00015,000 US troops launched a ground assault on
the city.85 Pre-planned targets were pounded
by artillery and air strikes, where “death and
destruction rained down on the city from AC-130s
[ground-attack aircraft] to any kind of fast-moving
aircraft, 155mm howitzers, you name it – everything was getting in on the bombardment”.86 It
was thought that most of the 300,000 citizens of
Fallujah had fled before Operation Phantom Fury
(otherwise known as Operation Al-Fajr) began,
but there were no official figures on this and thus
attacking forces could not have known how many
civilians remained in the city.87 Estimates at the
time suggest that even if 70-90 percent of the
population had managed to flee, a minimum of
25,000 civilians remained caught among the falling
bombs.88 The US again placed a cordon around
the city. Unlike in Operation Vigilant Resolve, they
encouraged civilians, except for military-age men
16 to 55, to leave the city.89
The US 2004 Field Manual on Counterinsurgency
Operations states that, “The American way of war
has been to substitute firepower for manpower.
As a result, US forces have frequently resorted to
firepower in the form of artillery or air any time they
make contact.”90
Free fire
Indirect-fire weapons like artillery and mortars
can be launched without a clear line of sight to a
target, i.e. over buildings. The US deployed two
different 155mm artillery pieces during the Fallujah
operations, the M198 and the M109A6 Paladins.
The powerful Paladins can fire shells over 13 miles:
“The shells typically strike within about five yards
of their target and are likely to kill anyone within 55
yards of the point of impact.” 91 Using such potent
weaponry in a populated area puts civilians at great
risk. Its use on a significant scale in Fallujah by
© United States Marine Corps
16 | Action on Armed Violence
US M-198 155mm howitzer fires into Fallujah during Operation Phantom Fury.
US forces was heavily criticised even by its allies.
Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, a British commander
serving with American forces described how “on
one night over 40 155mm artillery rounds were fired
into a small sector of the city.”92 Brig. Aylwin-Foster
described how large sections of the city were
treated as a free-fire zone in an attempt to reduce
casualties among US troops. British officers at the
time were reportedly “appalled by the lack of concern for civilian casualties” shown in the operation
conduct, and that notably “the US commander who
ordered this devastating use of firepower did not
consider it significant enough to mention it in his
daily report to the US general in command.”93
That it was not thought necessary to report the
scale of artillery deployed in the operation reflects
an attitude that did hold dear the stated intention of mitigating civilian casualties. It was this
gung-ho approach that resulted in the destruction
and damage of half of Fallujah’s buildings over the
course of two short operations.94 Reporter Kevin
Sites, embedded with US forces in Fallujah during
the second operation, described how Marines were
allowed to operate with ‘liberal’ rules of engagement. “Nuisances”, Sites relayed, were “met with
overwhelming firepower.” 95 The relaxed RoE
described by Sites reflected the need to preclude
military casualties among US forces. They gave far
greater leeway to US commanders on the ground
to deploy explosive weapons than had been seen
earlier through the UK approach to Basra.
US forces made extensive use of heavy explosive
weapons with wide-area effects in and among
civilian homes and residential areas in Fallujah.
Between 7 November and 23 December, Fallujah
was battered by 14,000 artillery and mortar shells,
and 2,500 tank main gun rounds. At least 540 air
strikes struck targets in and around the city.96 The
vast quantity of ordnance launched into the city
resulted in a considerable risk from explosive remnants of war (ERW), which continued to threaten the
lives of civilian residents after the operations ended.
When compared with the UK approach in Basra,
the ready and widespread deployment of heavy
explosive weapons in Fallujah can be seen to be
a deeply concerning practice, not only because of
the inherent and heightened threat that it posed
to civilians and civilian objects, but also from a
strategic perspective. The heavy-handedness in
A tale of two cities | 17
counting the cost
“
My view and the view of the
British chain of command is that
the Americans’ use of violence
is not proportionate and is overresponsive to the threat they
are facing. The US will have to
abandon the sledgehammer-tocrack-a-nut approach.”
UK officer, speaking to The Telegraph
newspaper97
military practice in Fallujah arguably played a great
role in heightening hostility and grievance among
the opposition, as well as severely damaging public
perception around the world.
Fallujah was battered by 14,000 artillery
and mortar shells, and 2,500 tank main
gun rounds between 7 November and 23
December. At least 540 air strikes struck
targets in and around the city.98
Air strikes took a heavy toll on the city of Fallujah.
US jets dropped a wide variety of munitions
ranging from Hellfire missiles to massive aircraft
bombs. Approximately 150 air strikes during the
first operations completely destroyed more than
75 buildings in the city, including two mosques.99
At least 318 precision bombs, 391 rockets and
missiles, and 93,000 machine gun or cannon
rounds were fired in the second assault on Fallujah
alone.100
Journalist Tara Sutton collected testimonies from
witnesses to the bombing of Fallujah during the
first assault, claiming that air strikes often seemed
imprecise and inaccurate.
One resident of the densely populated Jolan district described what happened to his neighbours:
“We came running. He was lying here, blown
to bits. We even took pieces from the ceiling,
and we left them here. They all died except one
child.” One resident described how he was sitting
at home with his wife and four children when a
missile flew through their door at 9pm: “We were
sitting in this room. I was hit by shrapnel. My
18-month old son was hit on the head.” His young
daughter was killed.101
Thermobarics
On 9 November 2004, thousands of US troops began a ground offensive in Fallujah, moving from
residential home to residential home. This process of house clearance was characterised by the
regular use of fragmentation grenades.102 US forces also deployed “disposable one-shot rockets
called thermobarics – new explosives that drove up the overpressure in confined spaces, creating
tremendous destruction.”103 In a Marines field report from April 2003, the thermobaric round was
assessed, where “one unit disintegrated a large one-story masonry type building with one round
from 100 meters.”104
Thermobarics, also called ‘vacuum bombs’, use a small charge to generate a cloud of explosive
mixed with air, which is detonated by the explosives reacting with the air. This creates a vacuum,
which sucks up any remaining oxygen, collapsing lungs and buildings alike. “This significantly
increases the firepower that can be put in a single person’s hands,” said Reuben Brigety of
Human Rights Watch. “I’m not aware of any other conventional munitions used by a single
person that can have the same destructive power.”105 They significantly magnify a typical blast
effect and can affect a very wide area. Even in a light weapon a thermobaric munition has a massive potential for destruction. It is entirely inappropriate for use in populated areas.
© Lance Cpl. James J. Vooris
18 | Action on Armed Violence
US Marines patrol Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr, Phantom Fury.
“
Behind us there’s a market…
that’s where the bombing started.
A car was going round there, it
was shooting at the Americans
and the Americans bombed the
houses and the schools. It was
haphazard bombing.”
Fallujah resident, 2004106
Jo Wilding, a human rights activist in Fallujah
during the first assault, wrote on 17 April 2004:
“The aerial bombardment starts with the night and
we stand outside watching the explosions and
the flames. The cacophony of planes and explosions goes on through the night. I wake from my
doze certain that rockets are being fired from the
garden outside our room. Rhythmic, deep, resonating, the barrage goes on and the fear spreads
in my belly anticipating an explosion from the air
to stop the rockete[e]r.”107
In one attack, on 7 April 2004, Brigadier General
Mark Kimmitt, said that US forces dropped two
500 pound bombs at the wall of the Abd al-Aziz
al-Samarrai mosque: “My understanding is that we
went after one set of insurgents that were hiding
behind the outer wall of a mosque, not the mosque
itself.”108 Lieutenant Colonel Brennan Byrne had
ordered the attack on the mosque when his troops
were fired upon by 30 to 40 insurgents, yet it later
emerged that no bodies could be found.109 Hospital
sources reported that at least 45 Iraqis were killed
and 90 injured that day in attacks across Fallujah.
Among the casualties were a civilian family sitting
in a car parked behind the Abd al-Aziz al-Samarrai
mosque when it was bombed.110
‘Permissable limits’
Colonel Earl S. Wederbrook, 1st Marine Air Wing
staff, described how the rules of engagement for
air strikes in Fallujah “required the air force to use
munitions that would minimise collateral damage.”
He also emphasised that “certain buildings and
all mosques were strictly off limits… map drills
were held every night pointing out buildings that
were not authorized as targets” and that “pilots
A tale of two cities | 19
memorized the collateral damage estimates
and danger close distances of all their available
ordnance.”111
Despite withdrawing in April 2004, the US military
continued launching air strikes on Fallujah, particularly targeting safehouses used by Abu Musab
Zarqawi, an insurgency leader linked to al-Qaeda,
and loyalists forces. On 19 June 2004 the US
bombed a residential neighbourhood with the aim of
destroying a safe house used by Zarqawi loyalists.
Residents said, however, that around 20 people
were killed, including women and children.
A statement about the attack read: “It is standard
operating procedure to conduct a detailed collateral
damage estimate prior to approval of this type of
mission. The collateral damage estimate was within
permissible limits, and this operation was within
standing rules of engagement.”112
What exactly defines a ‘permissible limit’ in these
cases is key in evaluating the effectiveness of this
measure, potentially a vital and effective tool to
minimising civilian casualties. In Iraq, US Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld was personally required to
authorise strikes that were anticipated to cause
more than 30 civilian casualties.113
32 seconds
The short length of time taken from identifying
targets to launching an air strike was a growing
concern throughout the operations in Fallujah. A few
months after the April 2004 operation, footage shot
in the same month emerged showing a US F-16
fighter pilot requesting permission from ground control to fire upon a group of individuals.114 In the video
he is told immediately to do so, the pilot locks the
bomb guidance system, and an attack is launched.
The length of the engagement is just 32 seconds.
The military claimed that the ground commander
saw the crowd fire at the Marines. But defence
experts, when shown the footage, did not accept
that the crowd was behaving as an “offensive
military force.”115
The US Air Force in Iraq has been criticised for
adopting “an unsound targeting methodology
that relied on intercepts of satellite phones and
inadequate corroboration of intelligence. Targeting
based on geo-coordinates derived from satellite
phones in essence rendered U.S. precision weapons potentially indiscriminate.”116
Moreover if the length of time taken from identifying an emerging target to dropping a bomb on
the crowd is a mere 32 seconds, there would be
no time for a detailed assessment of the damage
likely to arise or of incidental harm to civilians.
A US government source acknowledged that in
some cases, adequate collateral damage estimates for leadership strikes could not be carried
out due to time constraints.117
The emergence of a new target in the dynamic
heat of battle does not excuse a force from its
obligation to conduct comprehensive estimates
of the potential impact of any air strike on civilians
and civilian objects. A failure to conduct such
assessments drastically increases the risk that
any eventual strike will lead to civilian casualties,
particularly if it is carried out in a populated area.
Civilian cost
The Iraqi Red Crescent Society described the situation in Fallujah as a “big disaster.”118 The Nazzal
Emergency hospital in Fallujah was razed to the
ground in an airstrike on 6 November.119 Dozens
of homes, as well as a nearby medical supplies
storeroom, were destroyed in the attack.120 Remaining hospitals and medical staff were in short supply
of blood, oxygen and antiseptics, and there were
reports of clerics turning a football field into a makeshift cemetery.121 Those who remained in the city
resorted to desperate measures to survive. One Fallujan resident, Mashadani, a car mechanic, stayed
in the city believing that the US military would not
harm his family. However, bombs struck close to his
home, and his family were forced to drink water from
a hole they had dug when water supplies ran out.122
In its analysis of the first assault on Fallujah in April
2004, Iraq Body Count concluded that between 572
and 616 of the approximately 800 recorded deaths
from armed violence in the city were civilians (as high
as 69%). Over 300 of these were women and children.123 AOAV analysis of IBC data suggests that at
least 674-766 people died in bombing and shelling
during the second operation.124
20 | Action on Armed Violence
The aftermath and
lessons learned
“
The destruction of that city
[Fallujah] in the process is
redolent of an attitude during
the Vietnam War. To paraphrase
an officer from that time, ‘we
had to destroy the city in order
to save it’.”
Dr Rod Thornton, counterinsurgency expert,
House of Commons testimony.127
It was also thought by some, including then-Prime
Minister Tony Blair, that the heavy US response in
Fallujah in 2004 had a negative impact on other
cities in Iraq, stirring hostility towards troops
based there.128 Iraq saw a surge in violence
across the whole country as the US began its first
offensive in Fallujah. April 2004 was at that point
the deadliest month since Saddam Hussein was
ousted a year earlier.129
By contrast, UK forces likely reduced the risk of
civilian casualties significantly by not attacking
populated areas of Basra with heavy explosive
weapons. UK security personnel extended this
approach to law enforcement, where they sought
to adopt a firm but friendly persona when patrolling the streets of the city (e.g. removing helmets
and replacing them with berets). This approach
drew upon experience in Northern Ireland and the
Balkans.130
US
Whether the US military accepted the criticism
from allies is difficult to assess, although operations carried out by the British forces attracted
praise from their American counterparts. According to the New York Times, a Pentagon official
acknowledged that a battle plan for Baghdad
“was informed at the last minute” when US field
commanders consulted British officers about their
success in Basra.131
Furthermore, US military manuals began to explicitly acknowledge how collateral damage could
negatively impact operations. A counterinsurgency
manual released in December 2006 indicated how
personnel “...should calculate carefully the type and
amount of force to be applied and who wields it for
any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents
is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to
the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.”132
In 2012, the US military released the 2012 Civilian
Casualty Mitigation manual.133 Perhaps the first
manual of its kind134 in directly addressing how
© Matthew J. Decker, 2003
Heavy-handed tactics employed by US forces
in Fallujah were heavily criticised during the UK
Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq war. As Sir David Richmond stated: “What the Americans were doing
in Fallujah which was being broadcast all over
the Arab media was causing serious problems all
round, certainly the Sunni part of Iraq but also I
think the Shia part of Iraq.”125 To some, the conduct of US forces reinforced the idea America was
out to win a war, while Britain was there to fight in
a counterinsurgency operation.126
Marines fire M198 howitzer at Umm Qasr, near Basra, Iraq.
© US Marine Corp/Lance Cpl. James J Vooris
A tale of two cities | 21
Air strike on suspected insurgent stronghold, Fallujah,
8 November 2004.
RoE relate to casualty mitigation, it states how
civilian casualties can cause “ill will” in the host
nation, as well as increase political pressure on
the military that “can limit freedom of action of
military forces.”135 It suggests that restrictive rules
of engagement can help reduce casualties, and
adds that even though RoE may authorise force, it
is not necessary in every case.
Battle of Basra. In 2006, a memorandum from
the Ministry of Defence submitted to parliament
stated that the RoE were “updated in June 2004
and took full account of lessons learned in all
recent operations. UK ROE doctrine is therefore
up to date and has been operationally tested
in recent war and high tempo peacekeeping
operations.”137 However it is hard to measure and
identify such changes as the relevant information
remains classified.
One clear and striking change to UK military practice since 2003-4 that the US has not followed is
the decision to sign up to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Cluster Munitions (Prohibition)
Act of 2010 makes cluster bombs the highest category of prohibited exports, and illegal under any
circumstances for UK forces to ever in the future.138
As far as drawing broader lessons goes, as stated
earlier, secrecy surrounds the UK rules of engagement, and Freedom of Information requests
submitted by AOAV have thus far yielded little
further information.
The manual also presents a six-step mitigation
cycle to reduce casualties: prepare, plan, employ,
assess, respond, and learn. In the first stage, the
manual suggests that casualty mitigation should
be incorporated into military exercises, and that
commanders should avoid “focusing exclusively
on fighting against a hostile enemy, as this could
reinforce a “shoot first” mentality.”136
© Imperial War Museum
In the planning stage, the military must have
an “accurate picture of the operational environment, including civilian concentrations,” and as
for employment, it suggests that indirect fire and
air strikes should be restricted or reserved for
a high-level approval authority. Troops should
also conduct battle damage assessments, and
respond to casualty incidents by treating the
wounded or offering compensation for losses.
The last step recommends that lessons learned
on casualty mitigation can be incorporated into
military exercises, thus completing the cycle.
UK
As for the RoE for the UK, there is an indication
that they were changed in 2004, a year after the
UK Lynx helicopter fires a rocket in to Basra, 2003.
22 | Action on Armed Violence
Conclusion
Operations in Iraq, either implicitly or explicitly, were
fought with the justification of ultimately improving
the protection of civilians. Meanwhile, and recognising that all military engagements are inevitably
politicised and subjected to public scrutiny, this
was arguably the first ‘Youtube’ conflict ever fought.
The level of public pressure, heightened by a rolling 24-hour media scrutiny, was particularly high
throughout the conflict in Iraq.
This had a significant bearing on how militaries
conducted themselves as regards the protection
of their own troops, and how they were seen to be
protecting civilians from actions of the coalition
forces.
Rules of engagement (RoE) primarily serve the
purpose of attempting to strike a balance between
the protection of troops with the protection
of civilians. The central tenets of international
humanitarian law (IHL), and its protection of civilians, were pivotal in the drafting and application of
RoE of both states considered in this report. Both
US and UK forces emphasised through their RoE
that avoiding civilian casualties or damage to civilian structures was a high priority.
used in Fallujah in November 2004, to such an
extent that it created hostility and criticism even
among its own partners in the conflict. The wider
military mindset that emphasised heavy firepower
as a first option is evidenced by the fact that a
commander was under no requirement even to
report the heavy use of explosive weapons to his
superiors.
Some measures, including undertaking extensive
collateral damage estimates before strikes, taken
by US and UK forces at the time were positive
from a humanitarian viewpoint. Ultimately, however, the most significant measure that can be taken
to protect civilians, as shown by UK ground forces
in Basra, is restraint in the decision to deploy
explosive weapons in populated areas.
How far have the UK and US moved on since the
early days of the Iraq war? More than a decade
has passed, and while much of the body of
military manuals and directives in place at the
time likely have relevance to these two respective forces, it would be galling to think that military
practice to better protect civilians has stalled
completely in the last ten years.
While involving clearly differing contexts, operations in Basra and Fallujah both presented the US
and UK with the same dilemma: whether or not to
deploy explosive weapons against an opposition
choosing to operate in a populated area, thus
greatly endangering civilians.
Both forces should take the opportunity provided
by the United Nations Secretary-General in October 2014 to share examples of their policies on
the use of explosive weapons in populated areas
to show how far they have advanced since the
operations in Basra and Fallujah.139
During the course of operations, both US and UK
forces were actively prevented from using the full
means of force at their disposal. However the UK
strategy of almost entirely avoiding firing explosive
weapons into populated areas can be seen to
have contributed significantly to reduced civilian
casualties.
When used in populated areas, explosive weapons
cause a predictable pattern of death and injury
to civilians. Stronger standards in military rules of
engagement can make a substantial difference,
but ultimately it is only be ending the use of heavy
explosive weapons in populated areas that we will
see a significant reduction in civilian suffering.
US practice appears to have offered greater room
for interpretation among individual commanders.
This is evidenced in the high level of firepower
A tale of two cities | 23
Recommendations
• State forces should immediately end the use
of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in
populated areas.
• States should work collectively with others
towards an international commitment aimed at
preventing such use.
• In line with a request from the United Nations
Secretary-General to all Member States, the
UK and US should join other governments to
share examples of good practice and policy in
the use of explosive weapons with wide-area
effects in populated areas.
• States should recognise the pattern of unacceptable harm caused by the use of explosive
weapons in populated areas, and should
publicly condemn any such use at every
opportunity, including but not limited to the
UN Security Council debates on the Protection
of Civilians.
• States, international organisations, and nongovernmental organisations should gather and
make available data on the impacts of explosive weapons. More should be done to protect
and support the organisations and individuals
that work to gather such data.
• The United States should sign up to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and outlaw the
use of these inhumane weapons.
• With Iraq continuing to see high levels of
civilian casualties from explosive weapons,
particularly IEDs, more must be done to support the Iraqi authorities and humanitarian
agencies in the country to reduce the impact
and incidents of attacks. This includes tackling
the traffic and transfer of source materials for
IEDs, better regulating stockpiles of ordnance,
clearing explosive remnants of war in the
country and ensuring that victims have properly-funded, timely and developed support.
24 | Action on Armed Violence
Endnotes
1
2
Bård Glad Pedersen, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway, “Use of explosive weapons in populated
areas,” Oslo, 17 June 2014, www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/
aktuelt/taler_artikler/taler_og_artikler_av_ovrig_politisk_lede/
bgd_taler/2014/expert-meeting-explosive.html?id=763828
(accessed 2 December 2014).
On 27 March 2003, forty-nine countries were publicly
committed to the Coalition, where contributions from
Coalition members include “direct military participation,
logistical and intelligence support, specialized chemical/
biological response teams, over-flight rights, humanitarian
and reconstruction aid, to political support”. For a list of
coalition members, see: “Operation Iraqi Freedom, Coalition
Members,” 27 March 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html
(accessed 28 November 2014).
3
As of 20 November 2014 the total documented civilian
deaths from violence recorded by Iraq Body Count was
132,487— 149,144. Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.
org (accessed on 20 November 2014).
4
AOAV’s explosive violence monitoring project uses the
reporting of English-language media to record information
on casualties. AOAV does not attempt to comprehensively
capture all incidents of explosive violence around the world
but to serve as a useful indicator of the scale and pattern
of harm. It is likely that the number of casualties in Iraq
is far higher than the total recorded by AOAV. Recording
challenges in Syria, where a civil war has raged with
increasing intensity since March 2011, has meant that
civilian casualties in that country are particularly underrepresented under AOAV’s incident-based methodology.
For more information see Henry Dodd and Robert Perkins,
“Explosive Events: Monitoring explosive violence in 2013,”
Action on Armed Violence, April 2014, http://aoav.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2014/05/AOAV-Explosive-Events-2013.
pdf (accessed 20 November 2014).
5
“A day of sirens, bombs, smoke and fires,” CNN, 21 March
2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/21/
sprj.irq.aday/ (accessed on 12 November 2014).
6
Retired US Army general Bob Scales, cited by Dennis
Cauchon, “Why U.S. casualties were low,” USA Today, 20
April 2003, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/
iraq/2003-04-20-cover-usat_x.htm (accessed 20 November
2014).
7
“Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers,”
USCENTAF, 30 April 2003, www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/
document/AFD-130613-025.pdf (accessed 1 December
2013).
8
Then-US President George W. Bush’s address at the start
of what was dubbed “Operation Iraqi Freedom” insisted,
“I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition
forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from
harm.” President G.W. Bush, cited in “President Discusses
Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” President’s Radio
Address, 22 March 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html
(accessed on 14 November 2014). UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair made repeated references to ending the brutal
repression and suffering of the Iraqi people as a mandate
for military action. “Full text: Tony Blair’s speech,” 18
March 2003, www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/18/
foreignpolicy.iraq1 (accessed 20 November 2014).
9
“US used white phosphorus in Iraq,” BBC, 16 November
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4440664.stm (accessed
on 12 November 2014).
10 Maya Brehm, “Unacceptable Risk: Use of explosive
weapons in populated areas through the lens of three cases
before the ICTY,” Pax, October 2014, available for download
from www.inew.org/news/pax-explosive-weapons-poseunacceptable-risk-to-civilians (accessed 9 December 2014).
11 Customary IHL Database,” www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/v1 (accessed 7 December 2014).
12 Maya Brehm, “Protecting Civilians from the Effects of
Explosive Weapons,” UNIDIR, New York and Geneva,
2012, www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/protectingcivilians-from-the-effects-of-explosive-weapons-en-293.pdf
(accessed 9 December 2014).
13 In October 2003 for example, Parliamentary UnderSecretary of State for the Ministry of Defence Lord Bach
said “it has been the practice of successive United
Kingdom governments not to comment on certain aspects
of operational policy, including rules of engagement,”
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldhansrd/
vo031013/text/31013-01.htm (accessed on 22 October
2014).
14 In February 2003 for example, in response to a written
question Tony Blair stated how: “As we said many times, the
Government are committed to acting in full conforming with
International Law. Our rules of engagement will reflect this.”
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/
vo030224/text/30224w64.htm (accessed on 14th November
2014).
15 “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces”, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 January 2000, http://fas.org/
man/dod-101/dod/docs/cjcs_sroe.pdf (accessed on 14
November 2014).
16 Case of Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom,
Available for download from the European Court of
Human Rights (HUDOC), www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.
aspx?p=home&c= (accessed on 22 October 2014).
17 Jonathan Holmes, “Fallujah: Eyewitness testimony from
Iraq’s besieged city” (2007) Constable p.126-128.
18 US Rules of Engagement for Iraq (2008) http://file.wikileaks.
org/file/us-iraq-rules-of-engagement.pdf (accessed on
22 October 2014). Although one should note that the
classification date for this document is 3 October 2005,
after the two assaults on the city of Fallujah. See: https://
wikileaks.org/wiki/US_Rules_of_Engagement_for_Iraq
(accessed on 14 November 2014).
19 US Lt. Gen. Richard Natonski as quoted by Dick Camp,
“Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of
Fallujah, Iraq,” (2009) Zenith Press, p.152.
20 AOAV analysis of Iraq Body Count, “IBC Anbar Apr 2004”,
and “ICB Anbar Nov-Dec 2004.”
21 Neta C. Crawford, “Accountability For Killing: Moral
Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America’s Post-9/11
Wars” (2013) Oxford University Press p.80.
22 “Basra: Post Saddam Governance,” Defence Intelligence
Analysis Staff (2003), www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/
media/52027/2003-03-11-DIS-report-Basra-post-Saddamgovernance.pdf (accessed on 22 October 2014).
A tale of two cities | 25
23 Mike Thomson, “Destination: Iraq”, BBC, 26 June 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_
correspondent/3840401.stm (accessed on 6 October 2014).
Reports of the city’s ravaged infrastructure and struggle to
restore living conditions are found in, “Basra: Post Saddam
Governance,” Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff (2003),
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/52027/2003-03-11-DISreport-Basra-post-Saddam-governance.pdf (accessed on
22 October 2014).
37 Basrah – Coalition Campaign Strategy (March 2003) www.
iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51208/JohnsontoWatkins-IraqBa
srahCoalitionCampaignStrategy-dated30 March2003.pdf
(accessed on 9 Octobr 2014).
24 “Flashback: the 1991 Iraqi revolt,” BBC, 21 August 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2888989.stm
(accessed on 6 October 2014).
40 Christopher F. Foss (ed), “Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 19992000,” Twentieth Edition, pp. 727-730.
25 “Basra: Post Saddam Governance,” Defence Intelligence
Analysis Staff (2003), www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/
media/52027/2003-03-11-DIS-report-Basra-post-Saddamgovernance.pdf (accessed on 22 October 2014).
26 CENTCOM was a US joint command consisting of land,
sea, air, and special operations forces. American and other
allied nations’ ground forces in CENTCOM served as part of
the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC),
headed by Lt. Gen. David McKiernan. The CFLCC consisted
of the US Army V Corps and the I Marine Expeditionary
Force, and the British 1st Armoured Division, served under
the 1 Marine Expeditionary Force. Stephen A. Carney,
“Allied Participation in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM” (2011)
Center of Military History, United States Army p.6, www.
history.army.mil/html/books/059/59-3-1/CMH_59-3-1.pdf
(accessed on 14 November 2014).
38 “AS90 self-propelled gun,” British Army, www.army.mod.uk/
equipment/23274.aspx (accessed on 17 November 2014).
39 “AS90 self-propelled gun,” British Army, www.army.mod.uk/
equipment/23274.aspx (accessed on 17 November 2014).
41 British official as cited in “Iraqi tanks reported to be under
attack leaving Basra,” smh.com.au, 27 March 2003, www.
smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/27/1048653774631.html
(accessed on 9 October 2014).
42 Major Ian Bell, commander of Royal Horse Artillery batteries
outside Basra as cited in “Fear of harming civilians limits
shelling of Iraqi militia in Basra,” The Scotsman, 4 April
2003, www.scotsman.com/news/world/fear-of-harmingcivilians-limits-shelling-of-iraqi-militia-in-basra-1-602443
(accessed on 28 November 2014).
43 Robert Egnell, “Complex Peace Operations and CivilMilitary Relations,” (2009) Routledge, p.128.
44 The number of Iraqi tanks reported in this encounter ranged
wildly from 120 to14 tanks. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/middle_east/2929411.stm (accessed on 9 October
2014).
27 “The battle for Basra,” The Scotsman, 22 March 2003 www.
scotsman.com/news/world/the-battle-for-basra-1-873533
(accessed on 8 October 2014).
45 “Challenger 2 main battle tank,” British Army, www.army.
mod.uk/equipment/23236.aspx (17 November 2014).
28 “UK troops storm Basra,” BBC, 6 April 2003, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2921091.stm (accessed
on 27 November 2014).
46 “Iraqi tanks reported to be under attack leaving Basra,”
Sydney Morning Herald, 27 March 2003, www.smh.com.au/
articles/2003/03/27/1048653774631.html (accessed on 9
October 2014).
29 UK soldier as quoted by Janine di Giovanni, “The Place at
the End of the World”, (2006) Bloomsbury, p.31
30 “The battle for Basra,” The Scotsman, 22 March 2003, www.
scotsman.com/news/world/the-battle-for-basra-1-873533
(accessed on 8 October 2014).
31 Michael R. Gordon, “Basra Offers a Lesson on Taking
Baghdad,” The New York Times, 7 April 2003, www.nytimes.
com/2003/04/07/international/worldspecial/07STRA.html
(accessed on 22 October 2014).
32 Retired engineer Mohammed as quoted by Sudarsan
Raghavan, “Basra refugees tell of dire plight Hussein
loyalists holed up in the city reportedly fired on fleeing
civilians,” The Inquirer, 29 March 2003,http://articles.philly.
com/2003-03-29/news/25471914_1_basra-british-troopsrefugees (accessed on 28 November 2014).
33 “Reporters witness battle for Basra,” BBC, 26 March 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2887031.stm (accessed on 9
October 2014).
34 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The Iraq War Encyclopaedia” (2013)
p.51.
35 “Cordon of steel tightens on Basra,” The Scotsman, 1 April
2003, www.scotsman.com/news/world/cordon-of-steeltightens-on-basra-1-601863 (14 November 2014).
36 Comments by Major General Nicholas Ashmore,
prosecution expert to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the case of Gotovina
et. al (IT-06-90-A), Public Annex III, 3 August 2012, http://
icr.icty.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Notice/
NotIndexable/IT-06-90-A/MOT8710R0000360087.pdf,
5590-5568.
47 “UK forces destroy breakaway tank squadron,” The
Guardian, 27 March 2003, www.theguardian.com/
world/2003/mar/27/iraq9 (accessed on 9 October 2014)
48 “UK forces destroy breakaway tank squadron,” The
Guardian, 27 March 2003, www.theguardian.com/
world/2003/mar/27/iraq9 (accessed on 9 October 2014).
UK Challenger tanks were equipped with depleted uranium
shells for tactical battles and likely fired these weapons,
which can cause long-term contamination, during this
encounter.
49 Richard Norton-Taylor and Rory McCarthy, “Scots Guards
destroy 14 Iraqi tanks in confrontation,” The Guardian, 28
March 2003 www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/28/iraq.
military (accessed on 9 October 2014)
50 The Ashmore report, cited by Maya Brehm, “Unacceptable
Risk: Use of explosive weapons in populated areas through
the lens of three cases before the iCTY,” Pax, October
2014, available for download from www.inew.org/news/paxexplosive-weapons-pose-unacceptable-risk-to-civilians.
51 T. Michael Moseley, “Operation Iraqi Freedom – By The
Numbers: Assessment and Analysis Division,” United States
Air Force, 30 April 2003 p.11 www.afhso.af.mil/shared/
media/document/AFD-130613-025.pdf (accessed on 18
November 2014) The 19,948 so-called guided munitions
include 818 CBU-103s, 88 CBU-105s and CBU-107s, all of
which are cluster bombs. Thereby while the main munition
is guided, the thousands of submunitions scattered midflight have an extremely wide-area impact.
52 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq,” Human Rights Watch (2003), p.16, www.hrw.
org/reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203.pdf (accessed on 18
November 2014).
26 | Action on Armed Violence
53 “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers,”
USCENTAF, 30 April 2003, www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/
document/AFD-130613-025.pdf (accessed 1 December
2013).
69 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Basra troops used cluster bombs,”
The Guardian, 30 May 2003, www.theguardian.com/
world/2003/may/30/iraq.richardnortontaylor (accessed on
23 October 2014).
54 Robert Hewson (ed.), “Air-launched Weapons,” IHS Jane’s,
Issue 49, 2007, pp. 463-467.
70 “United Kingdom: Country Profiles,” The Landmine
and Cluster Munition Monitor, 23 August 2014, www.
the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/
theme/3967 (accessed on 21 November 2014).
55 “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers,”
USCENTAF, 30 April 2003, www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/
document/AFD-130613-025.pdf (accessed 1 December
2013).
56 “US attacks 200 Saddam paramilitaries meeting near
Basra,” Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March 2003, www.smh.
com.au/articles/2003/03/30/1048653916537.html (accessed
on 23 October 2014).
57 “Coalition Bombs Baath Party HQ in Basra, Kills 200,” PBS,
29 March 2003, www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/middle_
east-jan-june03-baath_03-29/ (accessed on 23 October
2014).
58 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm (accessed on 23 October
2014).
59 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm (accessed on 23 October
2014).
60 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, p.32 www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203.pdf (accessed on 18
November 2014).
61 Abid Hamudi, a 70-year-old retired oil industry worker, as
quoted in “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian
Casualties in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, p.31 www.
hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203.pdf (accessed on
18 November 2014).
62 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, p.32 www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203.pdf (accessed on 23
October 2014).
63 This total is based on a dataset of nine incidents occurring
between 20 March 2003 and 9 April 2003. The official
number of Iraqi civilian deaths for the months of March
and April more broadly is 487- 638. This includes deaths
recorded in incidents that overlap beyond the end of April
2003, and are factored in on a pro-rate basis. AOAV analysis
of Iraq Body Count dataset, “IBC Basrah 20 Mar- 30 Apr
03.”
64 “ICRC activities in Iraq,” ICRC, 9 April 2003, p.6, www.icrc.
org/eng/assets/files/other/iraq-update-rex-09-04-2003.pdf
(accessed on 15 October 2014).
65 “UK pays £9m in compensation to Iraqi civilians,” BBC, 16
June 2010, www.bbc.co.uk/news/10332224 (accessed 15
October 2014).
66 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, www.
clusterconvention.org/ (accessed 2 December 2014).
67 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm (accessed on 23 October
2014).
68 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm (accessed on 23 October
2014).
71 More information on the United States Cluster Munition
Ban Policy can be found at, Landmine and Cluster Munition
Monitor, “United States Country Profile,” Last updated 27
August 2014, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/
region_profiles/theme/3974 (accessed 02 December 2014).
72 “(U) Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah I, April 2004”,
US Army National Ground Intelligence Center, http://file.
wikileaks.org/file/fallujah.pdf p.2 (accessed on 17 October
2014).
73 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “U.S. Pays For Dead, Hurt Iraqi
Civilians,” The Washington Post, 30 July 2003 via The
Orlando Sentinel, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/200307-30/news/0307300021_1_fallujah-iraq-ease-tensions
(accessed on 15th October 2014).
74 Ian Fischer, “U.S. Troops Fire on Iraqi Protesters, Leaving 15
Dead,” The New York Times, 29 April 2003, www.nytimes.
com/2003/04/29/international/worldspecial/29CND-IRAQ.
html (accessed 8 December 2014).
75 Michael Howard and Gary Younge, “16 die in attack on
US helicopter”, The Guardian, 3 November 2003 www.
theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/03/usa.iraq1 (accessed
on 15th October 2014).
76 It emerged in the Chilcot Inquiry that there was “no
strategic significance to Basra at all. Baghdad was always
the centre of gravity,” according to Major General Albert
Whitley, senior British Land Advisor to the Commander of
the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
He also indicated in the inquiry that there was no pressure
from Whitehall to influence the timing of the taking of
Basra, nor pressure from General McKiernan, commanding
general of the CFLCC, on General Brims, commander of
the British ground forces in Iraq, to take Basra early. For
more see: www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51267/statementMajGenAlbertWhitley.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2014).
77 Staff Sgt. Sam Mortimer as quoted by Kevin Sites, “Marines
let loose on streets of Fallujah,” NBC News, 10 November
2004 www.nbcnews.com/id/6450268/ns/world_newsmideast_n_africa/t/marines-let-loose-streets-fallujah/
78 “Picture emerges of Falluja siege,”BBC, 23 April 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3653223.stm
(accessed on 22 October 2014).
79 1st Marine Rules of Engagement (ROE), in Dick Camp,
“Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of
Fallujah, Iraq” (2009) Zenith Press, pp.150-1.
80 “(U) Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah I, April 2004”,
US Army National Ground Intelligence Center, http://file.
wikileaks.org/file/fallujah.pdf (accessed on 26 November
2014).
81 2nd Battalion 1st Marine Regiment and 1st Battalion 5th
Marine Regiment, while additional battalions provided as
screening force. Information taken from Bing West, “No
True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah”
(2005) Bantam Books p.65, and .S. Army, National Ground
Intelligence Center, “(U) Complex Environments: Battle
of Fallujah I, April 2004,” NGIC Assessment, http://file.
wikileaks.org/file/fallujah.pdf (accessed on 26 November
2014).
A tale of two cities | 27
82 Neta C. Crawford, “Accountability For Killing: Moral
Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America’s Post-9/11
Wars” (2013) Oxford University Press, p.285.
97 UK officer speaking to the Telegraph, as cited by Jonathan
Holmes, “Fallujah: Eyewitness testimony from Iraq’s
besieged city” (2007) Constable, p.127.
83 Raj Chandrasekaran, “Key General Criticizes April Attack
In Fallujah,” The Washington Post, 13 September 2004,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A163092004Sep12_2.html (accessed on 16 November 2014).
98 Bing West, “No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle
of Fallujah” (2005) Bantam Books, p.316.
84 “Battle for Falluja under way,” CNN, 9 November 2004,
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/08/
iraq.main/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed on 16
November 2014).
85 “Operation al-Fajr (Dawn) Operation Phantom Fury
[Fallujah],” Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/oif-phantom-fury-fallujah.htm (accessed on 27
November 2014).
86 Major Tim Karcher as quoted by Dick Camp, “Operation
Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq”
(2009) Zenith Press p.167.
87 Toby Harnden, “US seizes heart of Fallujah,” The Telegraph,
10 November 2004 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
northamerica/usa/1476309/US-seizes-heart-of-Fallujah.html
(accessed on 20 October 2014); “Falluja facing humanitarian
crisis,” Al Jazeera, 10 November 2004, www.aljazeera.com/
archive/2004/11/2008410134942589919.html (accessed on
24 October 2014).
99 “(U) Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah I, April 2004”,
US Army National Ground Intelligence Center http://file.
wikileaks.org/file/fallujah.pdf (accessed on 24 October
2014).
100 “U.S. Marine Corps operations in Iraq, 2003-2006,”
Federation of American Scientists p.66, http://fas.org/irp/
doddir/usmc/iraq03-06.pdf (accessed on 20 October 2014).
101 “Fallujah Forensics,” Tara Sutton Films, http://vimeo.
com/39464134 (accessed on 17 October 2014).
102 “(U) Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah I, April 2004”,
US Army National Ground Intelligence Center, p.1 http://
file.wikileaks.org/file/fallujah.pdf (accessed on 17 October
2014).
103 Bing West, “No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle
of Fallujah” (2005) Bantam Books p.205.
104 Field Report, Marine Corps Systems Command Liaison
Team, Central Iraq, 20 April to 25 April 2003 via Boing
Boing, http://boingboing.net/2005/11/15/new-thermobaricweap.html (accessed on 21 October 2014).
88 Anne Barnard, “Fallujah refugees describe ordeal of life in
crossfire,” The Boston Globe, 15 November 2004, www.
boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/11/15/fallujah_
refugees_describe_ordeal_of_life_in_crossfire?pg=full
105 Reuben Brigety as quoted by Noah Shachtman, “When a
Gun Is More Than a Gun,” Wired, 20 March 2003, http://
archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/2003/03/58094
(accessed on 17 November 2014).
89 Timothy S. McWillians, “The Battle for Fallujah,” U.S.
Marines in Battle, November-December 2004 p.13 www.
mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Publications/
Publication PDFs/FALLUJAH.pdf (accessed on 20 October
2014).
106 “Fallujah Forensics,” Tara Sutton Films, http://vimeo.
com/39464134 (accessed on 17 October 2014).
90 Chapter 3 Counterinsurgency Operations, Section
III Counterinsurgency Combat Operations, www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-07-22/
ch3-iii.htm (accessed on 19 November 2014).
108 Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt as cited in “US bombards
Iraq mosque complex,” BBC, 7 April 2004, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3608315.stm (accessed on 17
October 2014).
91 Jackie Spinner, “Artillerymen Clear Path for the Infantry,”
The Washington Post, 11 November 2004, www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41015-2004Nov10.
html (accessed on 17 November 2014).
109 “US bombards Iraq mosque complex,” BBC, 7 April 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3608315.stm
(accessed on 17 October 2014).
92 Brig. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, as quoted by Patrick Coburn,
“Toxic legacy of US assault on Fallujah ‘worse than
Hiroshima,’” The Independent, 24 July 2010, www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/toxic-legacy-ofus-assault-on-fallujah-worse-than-hiroshima-2034065.html
(accessed on 27 October 2014).
93 Brig. Aylwin-Foster, as quoted by Patrick Coburn, “Toxic
legacy of US assault on Fallujah ‘worse than Hiroshima,’”
The Independent, 24 July 2010, www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/middle-east/toxic-legacy-of-us-assault-onfallujah-worse-than-hiroshima-2034065.html (accessed on
27 October 2014).
94 Bing West, “No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle
of Fallujah” (2005) Bantam Books, p.316.
95 Kevin Sites, “Marines let loose on streets of Fallujah”, NBC
News, 10 November 2004, www.nbcnews.com/id/6450268/
ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/marines-let-loosestreets-fallujah/ - .VHXjSks0iO3 (accessed on 28 November
2014).
96 Bing West, “No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle
of Fallujah” (2005) Bantam Books, p.316.
107 Jonathan Holmes, “Fallujah: Eyewitness testimony from
Iraq’s besieged city” (2007) Constable p.48-49.
110 “Scores dead as Falluja resists US onslaught,”
Al Jazeera, 7 April 2004, www.aljazeera.com/
archive/2004/04/2008410115555728526.html (accessed on
17 October 2014).
111 Colonel Earl S. Wederbrook as quoted by Dick Camp,
“Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of
Fallujah, Iraq” (2009) Zenith Press, p.136.
112 Edward Cody, “U.S. Strike In Fallujah Kills 20,” The
Washington Post, 20 June 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A54342-2004Jun19.html (accessed on 17
October 2014).
113 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm (accessed on 23 October
2014).
114 Alex Thomson, “US cockpit pictures of the battle for
Fallujah,” Channel 4, 5 October 2004, www.channel4.com/
news/articles/world/middle_east/us+cockpit+pictures+of+th
e+battle+for+fallujah/257728.html (accessed on 17 October
2014).
115 “US military responds to Fallujah video”, Channel 4, 7
October 2004, www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/
middle_east/us+military+responds+to+fallujah+vid
eo/254013.html (accessed on 17 October 2014).
28 | Action on Armed Violence
116 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, p.20, www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm (accessed on 23 October
2014).
132 US Army Field Manual, “Counterinsurgency,” FM 3-24,
December 2006, p.25, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/
Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf (accessed on 26
October 2014).
117 “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties
in Iraq” (2003) Human Rights Watch, p.20, www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm (accessed on 23 October
2014).
133 “Civilian Casualty Mitigation” (July 2012) http://armypubs.
army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/attp3_37x31.pdf
(accessed on 26 October 2014).
118 Dahr Jamail, “IRAQ: The Other Face of U.S. ‘Success’ in
Fallujah”, Inter Press Service, 15 November 2004, www.
ipsnews.net/2004/11/iraq-the-other-face-of-us-success-infallujah/ (accessed on 16 November 2014).
134 Gregory S. McNeal, “Army Publishes New “Manual” on
Preventing Harm to Civilians”, Forbes, 19 July 2012,
www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2012/07/19/armypublishes-new-manual-on-preventing-harm-to-civilians/
(accessed on 28 November 2014).
119 “US strikes raze Falluja hospital”, BBC, 6 November 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3988433.stm (accessed on 22
October 2014).
135 “Civilian Casualty Mitigation” (July 2012) http://armypubs.
army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/attp3_37x31.pdf
(accessed on 26 October 2014).
120 Fadel-Al-Badrani, “US bombards Fallujah bastion,”
The Age, 7 November 2004, www.theage.com.au/
articles/2004/11/06/1099547435329.html?from=storylhs
(accessed 21 November 2014).
136 “Civilian Casualty Mitigation” (July 2012) http://armypubs.
army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/attp3_37x31.pdf
(accessed on 26 October 2014).
121 “Scale of Falluja violence emerges”, BBC, 12 April 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3619661.stm
(accessed on 24 October 2014).
122 Fallujan resident Mashadani, as quoted by Anne Barnard,
“Fallujah refugees describe ordeal of life in crossfire,” The
Boston Globe, 15 November 2004, www.boston.com/news/
world/articles/2004/11/15/fallujah_refugees_describe_
ordeal_of_life_in_crossfire?pg=full (accessed on 28
November 2014).
123 “No Longer Unknowable: Falluja’s April Civilian Toll is 600,”
Iraq Body Count, 26 October 2004, www.iraqbodycount.
org/analysis/reference/press-releases/9/ (accessed on 28
October 2014).
124 AOAV analysis of Iraq Body Count, “IBC Anbar Apr 2004”
and “ICB Anbar Nov-Dec 2004.”
125 Evidence of Sir David Richmond, 26 January 2011, p.20,
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51109/20110126-richmond.
pdf (accessed on 24 October 2014).
126 Jonathan Holmes, “Fallujah: Eyewitness testimony from
Iraq’s besieged city” (2007) Constable p.128.
127 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Iraq: An Initial
Assessment of Conflict Operations,” Sixth Report of
Session 2004-05, Volume 1, www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmdfence/65/65i.pdf (accessed
on 24 October 2014).
128 Speaking at the Iraq Inquiry for example, Tony Blair said,
“I think at the time I was worried the Americans were
going in too hard and too heavy.” www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/
media/43909/100129-blair.pdf p.209.
129 “68 dead in Basra blasts,” The Guardian, 21 April 2004,
www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/21/iraq1 (accessed
on 27 November 2014).
130 There was reported, a “sense of steadiness among British
troops, almost all of whom have done at least a tour of duty
in Ulster’s urban war zone. In contrast, the U.S. infantry had
almost no one below the rank of noncommissioned officer
with any experience under fire before the first clashes in
Iraq.” Joseph Fitchett, “WAR IN IRAQ / Acknowledging
a military asset: British tactics make impression on
U.S.”, The New York Times, 9 April 2003, www.nytimes.
com/2003/04/09/news/09iht-brits_ed3_.html (accessed on
10 October 2014).
131 Joseph Fitchett, “WAR IN IRAQ / Acknowledging a military
asset: British tactics make impression on U.S.”, The New
York Times, 9 April 2003 www.nytimes.com/2003/04/09/
news/09iht-brits_ed3_.html (accessed on 10 October 2014).
137 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Iraq: An Initial
Assessment of Conflict Operations,” Sixth Report of
Session 2004-05, Volume 1, www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmarmed/828/828we40.htm
(accessed on 26 October 2014).
138 “United Kingdom Cluster Munition Ban Policy”, The
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 23 August 2014,
www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/
theme/3967 (accessed 21 November 2014).
139 On 1 October 2014 a Note Verbale was issued to all
Member States of the United Nations requesting “Member
States to make available relevant information pertaining
to good practice and policy that either expressly governs,
or otherwise places limits on, the use by armed forces of
explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated
areas.” Such information is to be shared with the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OCHA/
NV/188/2014.
ACTION ON ARMED VIOLENCE
Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) is a London, based charity that has a central mission: to
reduce harm and to rebuild lives affected by armed violence.
We do this by carrying out field work, research and advocacy to reduce the incidence and
impact of global armed violence.
The number of fatalities from armed violence is estimated to be over half a million people
killed every year. Around two thirds of these violent deaths are estimated to occur outside
conflict situations. Poorer countries are particularly badly affected.
We seek to remove the threat of weapons, monitor the impact of explosive weapons
around the world and investigate what causes armed violence – from guns to suicide
bombings. We aim to clear land of explosive weapons and work with governments to
regulate guns.
We work with victims of armed violence, offering psychosocial assistance, providing
opportunities to help them earn a living and to try to reduce conflict at local levels.
We work to build communities affected by armed violence, working with governments and
measuring and monitoring the incidences and impacts of armed violence around the world.
To contact AOAV please go to our website: www.aoav.org.uk
CONTACT
Action on Armed Violence
5th Floor, Epworth House
25 City Road
London EC1Y 1AA
T +44 (0)20 7256 9500
F +44 (0)20 7256 9311
E [email protected]
www.aoav.org.uk