Case 2 | Bulletin 17 – General
Published August 2012
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This document is classified as NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED in accordance with the IPCC’s protective marking scheme
Ignoring a call to abandon a pursuit
Pursuit of a stolen vehicle, raising issues about:
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Taking action when a call to abort a pursuit is ignored
Early contact with the force control room during pursuits
Using dedicated Airwave channels during pursuits
Managing the incident de-brief
Overview of incident
Around lunchtime officers from the force’s specialist unit setup to tackle vehicle based crime
spotted a vehicle that had been stolen from a residential property the night before. Officers
pursued the vehicle until it drove the wrong way down a dual carriageway and the pursuit was
aborted.
Around 3pm the same day, officers were informed of a possible location for the stolen vehicle.
The officers drove to the location and began searching. The vehicle was located unattended in
a car park and additional resources were requested. One of the officers, PS A, on foot, kept the
vehicle under surveillance. After a few minutes four people got into the vehicle and drove away.
Two unmarked vehicles followed the stolen car. The occupants of the stolen vehicle were at this
time unaware that they were being pursued.
As the stolen vehicle approached a village officers attempted to “sting” the vehicle using a tyre
deflation device. This was unsuccessful as a vehicle driven by a member of the public was
directly in front of the stolen vehicle. The occupants of the stolen vehicle became aware of the
police presence. Officers activated their emergency equipment and began a pursuit.
The pursuit continued at speeds of up to 80mph.
During the pursuit officers had communicated via Airwave and mobile phone. The Airwave
channel used was not monitored or recorded by the force communications department.
The communication department had been alerted to the incident by the force helicopter which
had become airborne and was en-route to the pursuit following a call from one of the officers
involved in the pursuit. As the pursuit developed officers should have passed information to the
communications department to enable them to make the necessary risk assessments.
As the pursuit entered an A road, one of the officers began a commentary on the force-wide
traffic department channel, which the force use for all pursuits once they move to a tactical
phase. The radios of all but one of the vehicles pursuing the stolen car were affiliated to this
© Independent Police Complaints Commission. All Rights Reserved.
channel, although none of the officer’s personal radios were. This channel was monitored and
recorded by the communications department.
The pursuit reached speeds of up to 90mph, often travelling on the wrong side of the road.
After obtaining information about the suitability of the police vehicle and driver, the
communications operator recommend that the pursuit be aborted because of the way the stolen
vehicle was being driven on the wrong side of the road. The lack of background knowledge of
the incident was also a factor in the decision. This was broadcast on the same channel that the
officers were using. By this time three additional vehicles from the unit had made their way from
other locations and were in contact with pursuit, behind the other police vehicles.
One of the two unmarked vehicles pulled over to the nearside and turned off its emergency
equipment as the pursuit entered a village, however the other unmarked vehicle and the three
additional vehicles continued in pursuit of the stolen vehicle. After seeing the other police
vehicles continue, the other vehicle reactivated its emergency equipment and rejoined the
pursuit.
The communications operator again repeated the instruction to abort the pursuit on the Roads
Policing Unit (RPU) force channel but this was not acknowledged by the lead vehicle. Force
policy does not specify what action should be taken if an abort instruction is ignored.
The force helicopter arrived overhead as the pursuit continued.
The communications operator repeated the instruction to abort the pursuit but this was not
acknowledged.
The pursuit continued and the police helicopter took up the commentary. Six police vehicles
were now involved in the pursuit, with one of the original unmarked cars leading, followed by
three marked vehicles. The other two unmarked vehicles were not in visual contact with the
marked cars.
The stolen vehicle was pursued for a further nine miles. At times the recorded speed of the
police vehicle leading the pursuit reached over 100mph. The stolen vehicle and the police
vehicles completed numerous overtaking manoeuvres at times creating a third line between
oncoming vehicles and those being overtaken. Shortly after leaving a village with a 60mph limit,
the lead police vehicle overtook against oncoming traffic straddling a double white line at
speeds of 96mph. At a traffic light controlled junction the police lead vehicle passed through at
55mph as the lights were changing, and oncoming vehicles could be seen waiting to turn at the
junction. The traffic was heavy in all directions.
As the stolen vehicle left the village it attempted to overtake a vehicle but struck the hard
surround of a keep left bollard and the driver lost control. The stolen vehicle collided with four
stationary vehicles on the opposite carriageway and spun through 270 degrees before coming
to rest.
The occupants of the stolen vehicle exited the car unaided and were arrested.
The period from deployment of the stinger until conclusion of the incident was 10 minutes 52
seconds.
One member of the public, who was passed during the pursuit, was so concerned about how it
was carried out that he called police, and later made a complaint.
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Type of investigation
IPCC managed investigation
Recommendations
Local recommendations
Finding 1
1.
The abort instruction given by the communications operator was not followed by all
vehicles. At the time of the incident the force pursuit policy did not include an explanation
of what specifically was expected when a call to abort was issued.
2.
Also the force’s policy has no instructions on how a failure to comply with an abort
instruction should be dealt with at the communications centre.
Local recommendation 1
3.
The force should review its pursuit policy and include instructions regarding a failure to
comply.
Local suggestion 1
4.
The specialist unit setup to tackle vehicle based crime is a relatively small unit.
Consideration should be given to additional training for the entire unit to ensure that a
culture of non-compliance with the force pursuit policy is not endemic.
Finding 2
5.
There was a lack of contact with the communications centre at an early stage of this
incident when officers were planning to use stinger.
6.
Several of the officers involved state there was confusion over which radio channel
should be used and also an inability to hear the radio.
7.
Force policy is clear that any pursuit that has entered a tactical phase must be controlled
on channel 130. However, communications were not alerted to the pursuit at the start
and were unable to take control. Earlier communication would have helped the
communications centre to make appropriate assessments and manage the pursuit
effectively.
Local recommendation 2
8.
Force policy should instruct that any unit unable to hear instructions from the
communications department must abort from a pursuit.
Local recommendation 3
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9.
Force policy should be amended so that as soon as a fail to stop occurs,
communications should move to a designated channel. Officers should also move to a
designated channel if on a pre-planned operation and likelihood of a pursuit is high.
Local recommendation 4
10.
Driver training should be reviewed and should be amended to local recommendations 2
and 3 (above).
Finding 3
11.
There was a lack of focus and recording at the incident de-brief.
12.
The force’s de-brief form was completed by an officer from the unit. Although the form is
quite logical and gives some guidance regarding completion it contains only a brief
summary and no details of who made what comments.
13.
This form is a “hot” learning tool which allows the force to implement urgent learning
issues. It would be beneficial if a third party could therefore trace the source of the
information if required.
Local recommendation 5
14.
The de-brief form should be reviewed and clear guidance given regarding completion. It
would be beneficial if details of points raised could be attributed to an individual.
Force response
Local recommendation 1
1.
Force policy is now taken directly from the ACPO guidelines which were drafted with the
assistance of the IPCC.
2.
Force policy now states: “When a decision is made to abort a pursuit, the authorities,
including those for deployment of tactics, are automatically withdrawn. All police vehicles
involved in the pursuit will turn off all visual and audible emergency warning equipment
and stop at the side of the road when safe to do so. Officers will confirm to the
communications centre that they have done so before resuming patrol.”
3.
The force policy is now clear that any authority to use pursuit tactics is withdrawn at the
time of the abort. It is also clear that for officers to continue a pursuit following a
command to abort, that the officers would be breaching policy, conduct regulations and
also potentially road traffic legislation. The force does not feel it is necessary to explain
the consequences following a failure to comply as this would potentially apply to every
policy within the force. They accept that the instruction to abort is a lawful order and that
the delivery of an abort command needs to be given in that manner. The force will ensure
that the abort order is fully understood by all control room staff and that if it is not heeded
that the delivery of the abort order is escalated immediately through the chain of
command within the control room until complied with.
4.
The term “control room” underlines a cultural change within the constabulary, in that
there was a broader recognition that the then “communications centre” had become more
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of a facilitator of requests for police service, rather than the centre of live-time command
and control issues.
Local suggestion 1
5.
The head of the roads policing unit has been consulted about this suggestion. The
officers involved in this incident have performed to a high standard since the incident.
The force does not consider that any further training is necessary to ensure compliance
with the force pursuit policy. The officers involved have had a great amount of time to
reflect upon the incident since it happened. This will be supported by a meeting of the
unit led by the head of roads policing to emphasise the forces high standards and what is
expected.
Local recommendations 2, 3 & 4
6.
Force policy is now clear on this issue. Only two vehicles should be involved, and the
force’s policy now states: “As soon as a pursuit commences, the patrol involved must
inform the control room. If immediate radio communication cannot be made, or is lost
between the vehicle and the control room, the pursuit will be discontinued.”
7.
All pursuits, whether initial or tactical, will be conducted on the INTOP 1 channel. All
officers should ensure that their personal and vehicles radios have this channel available.
If the officer commencing the pursuit is unable to switch to INTOP 1, for whatever
reason, the appropriate communication centre will take the necessary action to ensure
that officer is patched into INTOP 1.
8.
Driver training now reflects new policy and tactics.
Local recommendation 5
9.
The recommendation was accepted, and the head of roads policing will consider how
best to implement it. Implementation will be taken forward in order to support the concept
that the de-brief is intended to pick up key learning points and safety issues.
Outcomes for officers and staff
Police constable A
1.
Police constable A, the controlling driver of the primary vehicle in the pursuit, who
repeatedly failed to abort the pursuit when instructed to do so by the communications
operator, and drove in a way that breached road traffic laws and force policy received a
written warning.
Detective constable B
2.
Detective constable B, the operator in the lead vehicle, received advice from the head of
the roads policing unit for failing to ensure that the pursuit was aborted, and for being
compliant in the manner of driving of police constable A.
Other Officers
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3.
Other officers involved in the pursuit received formal instruction from the head of the
roads policing unit on the standards expected of officers involved in similar pursuits.
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