The Role of Foreign Chambers of Commerce
and Government Agencies in Shaping Labour
Legislations in China:
A Case Study on the Shenzhen Collective Consultation
Ordinance and the Guangdong Regulations on
Democratic Management of Enterprises
Elaine Sio-ieng HUI and Chris King-chi CHAN 1
(Department of Applied Social Studies,
City University of Hong Kong)
1
This research is commissioned by the FNV Mondiaal, Netherlands to the Department of Applied
Social Studies, City University of Hong Kong. Dr. Chris King-chi CHAN ( [email protected]) is
a principal investigator and Miss Elaine Sio-ieng HUI ([email protected]) is a research
assistant of this project. Hui is also a PhD student in the Kassel University in Germany. Dr. Violaine
Delteil, Assistant Professor from Sorbonne Nouvelle University (Paris 3) in France, was involved in
the data collection of this report when she was a Visiting Scholar at the Hong Kong Baptist University
from February to June 2011. Her contribution is deeply appreciated.
1
Table of Content
Content
Page
I. Introduction
3
II. How have foreign business chambers shaped the collective bargaining legislation?
•
Methodology
5
•
Two determining factors
7
•
The U.S.
9
•
AmCham China
9
•
•
10
AmCham South China
11
Europe
•
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China
12
•
Western Europe
13
•
Scandinavian Europe
13
•
Benelux Europe
14
•
Hong Kong
14
•
Korea
20
•
Japan
20
•
Taiwan
20
III. Who else are shaping the legislations?
21
IV. The leverage to promote labour legislations: building a pro-labour alliance in China
23
Figure 1: Three types of foreign business chambers under examination in this report.
6
Table 2: lists the chambers of commerce that have been interviewed.
6
Figure 3: Types of businesses engaged by responding members of Am Cham.
10
Figure 4: Sizes of businesses of responding members of Am Cham.
10
Figure 5: The dynamics among anti-labour and pro-labour forces in China.
25
List of Abbreviations.
26
•
East Asia
2
I. Introduction
Ever since China’s economic reform in 1978, labour unrest has been growing in both the foreign
invested enterprises (FIEs) and state owned enterprises (SOEs)2. Responding to this, the
Chinese party-state has been trying to channel workers’ discontent to the legal system which
places emphasis on individual rights (such as ones’ legal entitlement to minimum wage, social
insurance, over-time premium and so forth), rather than collective rights (including the rights to
organize, to strike and to collective bargaining)3. The three new labour laws—the Labour
Contract Law in 2008, the Employment Promotion Law, the Labour Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law in 2007—were meant to be a legal response within the individual-rights based
framework in recent years to pacify the increasingly disgruntled workers. However, collective
disputes do not disappear after their promulgation and strikes continue to spread out against
the backdrop of recurring labour shortage and widening income gap in the country4. The
radicalization of workers’ actions in 2010 as exemplified by the Honda strike and other strike
cases have clearly exposed the incongruity between the individual rights based legal framework
and the collective interest based nature of industrial disputes. In these strikes, workers’
demands usually were democratic trade union reform and wages higher than the minimum
legal requirement, all of which could be barely addressed by the existing legal framework.
Feeling the pressing demands of workers, the Chinese government and the All China Federation
of Trade Unions (ACFTU) have attempted to add some elements of collective-right to the
current labour regulatory framework. Shortly after the Honda strike, 13 provinces have issued
documents in the name of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committee or local government
to promote collective wage consultation. Besides, after a few years of suspension, the
2
See, for example, Lee Ching Kwan, Gender and the South China Miracle: Two Worlds of Factory Women (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1998); Pun Ngai, Making in China: Women Factory workers in a Global Workplace
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Chris Chan King Chi, The Challenge of Labour in China: strikes and the
changing labour regime in global factories (New York/London: Routledge, 2010); Anita China, “Strikes in China’s
Export Industries in Comparative Perspective”, China Journal, Vol. 65(2011), p.27-52.
3
Chen Feng, “Individual rights and collective rights: Labor's predicament in China”, Communist and PostCommunist Studies, No. 40(2009), p.59-79.
4
In 2007 the income of the top ten percent of the wealthiest was as much as 23 times of that of the poorest 10
th
percent, while it was only 7.3 times in 1998; see China Daily, Country's wealth divide past warning level, 12 May
2010. Concerning the income gap between urban and rural wage earners, it is reported that the ratio is 3.33 to 1;
th
see BBC, Income Gap in China Continues to Grow (Fagaiwei: zhongguo shouru chaju jiju kuoda), 6 August 2010.
Although about 55 percent of the population resides in the rural regions, they only share 11.3 percent of the social
th
wealth; see China Daily, Wealth gap poses threat to stability, 9 January 2010. And the Gini coefficient of the
country has reached the level of 0.47 in 2010.
According to the newspaper report, altogether 2 million workers were needed in the Pearl River Delta in the early
2010 and some factories were compelled to halt production because of the labor shortages; see Chengdu
Commercial Daily, Labour shortage in the Pearl River Delta is getting worse, 2 million workers are needed
nd
(chusanjiao mingongfan jiaju, quekou chao 200 wan), 22 February 2010.
3
governments of the Guangdong province and the Shenzhen Municipal have put the Regulations
on the Democratic Management of Enterprises (thereafter called “Democratic Management
Regulations”) and the Shenzhen Collective Consultation Ordinance (thereafter called “Collective
Consultation Ordinance”) respectively on the discussion table again in August 2010.
However, while labour activism has created huge pressure for the party-state to improve labour
laws, the capital does not remain silent. On the contrary, the global corporations and their
agencies—the chambers of commerce, Embassies and government agencies from their home
countries— have become increasingly organized and more powerful in shaping the labour laws
in China. This is best illustrated, firstly, in the strong criticism made by the American Chamber
of Commerce in Shanghai and Beijing and the US-China Business Council over the Labour
Contract Law in 20085, and secondly in many overseas business chambers’ opposition to the
recent proposed legislations on the Democratic Management Regulations and Collective
Consultation Ordinance6.
It is against this socio-political and legal development that this report aims to investigate the
role of overseas business chambers and foreign government agencies in shaping labour
regulations in China. It examines questions, such as, through what means do they lobby the
local and central government? What are their lobbying strategies? Are there any coalitions
among business chambers from different countries? What kind of support have they obtained
from their own governments? The research findings are of vital significance to the
improvement of labour conditions in China, as well as to the transnational labour movement.
Given the pervasiveness of transnational capitalism and the interlocking of China into the global
production chain, this report seeks to shed light on the leverage and strategic position of
overseas trade unions and labour NGOs in pressurizing transnational corporations to uphold
global labour standards outside their countries of origin. It also highlights the importance of
building up a broader pro-labour alliance in China, which should include progressive scholars,
lawyers, hardcore workers, labour NGOs and international trade unions. The research findings
will inform the campaign strategies of the local and global civil society in promoting
transnational solidarity for workers’ rights.
This paper is divided into four main parts. The next section accounts for the response of
different foreign commercial chambers and government agencies towards the legislation of the
Democratic Management Regulations and Collective Consultation Ordinance in South China. It
also elaborate in detail what strategies have been deployed by them to shape the legislations.
Section three examines, apart from the chambers of commerce, how other stakeholders have
5
For details, see Globalization Monitor, Complicity, Campaigns, Collaboration, and Corruption: Strategies and
Responses to European Corporations and lobbyists in China (Hong Kong: Globalization Monitor, 2010).
6
Singtao News (a Hong Kong newspaper), 27th September 2010; Wenwei bao (a Hong Kong newspaper), 18th
September 2010.
4
tried to influence the two legislations. Section four highlights the leverage for the local civil
society and overseas trade unions in promoting pro-labour regulations in China.
II. How have foreign business chambers shaped the collective bargaining legislation?
Methodology
In order to analyze the strategies of foreign business chambers in opposing the legislation of
the Democratic Management Regulations and Collective Consultation Ordinance in South China,
the authors have interviewed 27 representatives from 25 business chambers, foreign embassies
and consulates, 1 labour experts from ILO, 9 labour and legal scholars, 2 trade unions and
government officials, as well as 1 lawyer from April to July 20117. In additions, a systematic
review of documents produced by the business chambers, trade unions and governments has
been conducted.
The foreign business chambers under examination in this report could be divided into three
main types according to their countries of origin. They include the U.S, Europe (further divided
into European Union, Western Europe, Scandinavian Europe and Benelux Europe), and East Asia
(including Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan ). See figure 1 and table 2. As will be elaborated,
this classification helps explain different business chambers’ positions towards the collective
bargaining legislation in South China.
China
Figure one: Three types of foreign business chambers under examination in this report.
7
We thank all the representatives from the business chambers, foreign Embassies and foreign governmentsupported agencies for accepting our interview and providing us with insightful information.
5
Table 2: The chambers of commerce and government agencies that have been interviewed.
Countries/regions of origin
The U.S.
Chambers of Commerce
Embassy, Consulate or government
agency
The American Chamber of Commerce, PRC [in
Beijing]
Am Cham in South China [in Guangzhou]
The American Chamber of Commerce in Hong
Kong
European Union
EU Chamber of Commerce in China, Beijing Delegation of the European Union in
Office
Beijing
EU Chamber of Commerce in China, Shenzhen Delegation of the European Union in
office
Hong Kong
EU Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong
Germany
Association of German Chambers of Industry
and Commerce in Hong Kong
(Western Europe)
German Chamber of Commerce, South China
The U.K.
British Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong
(Western Europe)
France
French Chamber of commerce , Guangdong
French Embassy in Beijing
French Chamber of commerce, Hong Kong
French Consulate in Guangdong
(Western Europe)
French Chamber of commerce, Beijing
Sweden
Swedish Embassy
(Scandinavia)
Benelux countries
Benelux Chamber of Commerce in China
Hong Kong
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
Consulate General of Belgium
Federation of Hong Kong Industries
6
Japan
Japanese External Trade Organization,
Hong Kong
Korea
Korea Trade-Investment
Agency, Guangzhou
Taiwan
Taiwan Merchant Association Dongguan
Promotion
Taiwan World Trade Center, Shanghai
Taiwan
World
Guangzhou
Trade
Center,
Two determining factors
The overseas business chambers, foreign Embassies or Consulates, foreign government
agencies we interviewed have different position towards the Democratic Management
Regulations and Collective Consultation Ordinance. Their positions can be explained by two
determining factors—their positions in the global production chains and the industrial relations
model in their home countries.
Regarding the first factor, enterprises engaging into businesses of different nature along the
global production chains will be affected by the two legislations to a different degree, thus they
have differing responses towards them. In the age of global capitalism, most western brands
have already outsourced their production to suppliers in the developing countries. As a result,
the direct businesses of many western brands in China focus on marketing and sales in the
consumption market or the service and financial industry, while most product suppliers to
these western brands are operated by the East Asian capital (and in some cases by local
Chinese domestic companies).
The East Asian capital-run supplying factories usually produce low end products and are labour
intensive. Their employees are largely unskilled or semi-skilled workers hired at conditions
simply in line with or, in some better cases, slightly above the legal requirement because they
do not possess much marketplace bargaining power, workplace bargaining power or
associational power8. Therefore, collective bargaining that aims to ‘regulating wages and other
8
Drawing upon Erik Olin Wright, Silver proposes that workers possess three types of bargaining power:
marketplace bargaining power, workplace bargaining power and associational power. See Erik Olin Wright,
“Working-Class Power, the Capitalist-class Interests, and Class Compromise”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.
105, Issue 4 (January 2000), p 957- 1002, Beveryly J. Silver, Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and
Globalization since 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
7
core conditions of employment by negotiation between unions and employers’9 will help boost
rank-and-file workers’ associational power in these low end factories and will have a positive
impact on their wage level if it can be implemented effectively. In other words, the Collective
Consultation Ordinance and the Democratic Management Regulations will have a great impact
on the East Asian suppliers.
Contrary to this, the western enterprises in China focusing on the consumption market, service
and financial industries are less affected by the two legislations. First, they are less labour
intensive; thus the upward wage pressure created by collective bargaining will be less severe to
them. This analysis coincides with the remark of the interviewee from the Japan External Trade
Organization in Hong Kong—“collective bargaining has the strongest impact on the labour
intensive enterprises”. Second, western enterprises in China hire more skilled and managerial
employees whose strong marketplace and workplace bargaining power have to a large extent
guaranteed them good salaries that are well above the legal standards. Therefore, the effect of
collective bargaining on their not-so-suppressed wage level will be less significant when
compared to that in the supplying factories.
The second determining factor that shapes different capitals’ attitude towards the two
legislations is the industrial relations in their home countries. As will be elaborated, foreign
chambers tend to not welcome labour regulations that are not based on the industrial relations
model in their home countries. Moreover, they feel the moral pressure not to openly oppose
labour regulations that are in line with their home countries’ norms. In addition, as will be
explicate, a strong labour and trade union movement in the foreign chambers’ home countries
has proven to have positive effects on the labour legislations in China.
With these two determining factors in mind, we will examine the three main types of overseas
chambers’ position towards the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic
Management Regulations in the followings.
The U.S.
Two U.S. businesses chambers in China were interviewed, namely the American Chamber of
Commerce in the People's Republic of China (AmCham China) located in Beijing and the
American Chamber of Commerce in South China (AmCham South China) located in Guangzhou.
AmCham China focuses on Beijing, Dalian, Wuhan and Tianjin while AmCham South China on
the Southern regions. They are independent from each other but are connected in terms of
9
Richard Hyman, 'The Rise and Decline of Collective Bargaining as a Mechanism of Employment Regulation in
Britain”, In Alaluf, M and Prieto, C (ed.), Collective Bargaining and the Social Construction of Employment,
(European Trade Union Institute, 2001), p.187.
8
information exchange. AmCham China has 2600 members coming from over 1200 companies
while AmCham South China has over 1800.
AmCham China
The interviewee from AmCham China noted that it does not have any official position towards
the Collective Consultation Ordinance and the Democratic Management Regulations; this is
consistent with the fact that no official statement on these proposed legislations can be found
on its website10. The reasons for its unconcerned attitude are two-fold. First, members of
AmCham China are from the Northern and Central part of China, who are not going to be
affected by the labour legislations in the South. As far as their members’ interests will not be
affected, AmCham China does not have to be very vocal on the issue. This is in a huge contrast
to its open opposition to the Labour Contract law in 2008, which is a national law and affects
firms all over China.
Second, many members of AmCham China are not engaged in the labour intensive
manufacturing industries, thus the issue of collective bargaining is of a less concern to them. A
thorough analysis of AmCham China membership is not available from any official channels, but
a rough idea could still be generated from a member survey published in its 2011 White Paper11.
It has surveyed 434 corporate members which is about one-third of the total. Only 23% of them
are from the manufacturing industries while the majorities come from the service industries
(36%), hi-tech industry (11%) and information technology sector (9%)12. See Figure 3. Also,
most of the responding companies are not labour intensive, with 70% of them have less than
500 employees and only 15 % has a workforce over 200013. See Figure 4.
10
See http://www.amchamchina.org/
Every year, AmCham China publishes its White Paper for the sake of lobbying the Chinese government. It is
basically a position paper that outlines its viewpoints and recommendations on issues ranging from trading to
industrial policies to cross-sectors and regional economic affairs. The White Paper is regarded as an important
guideline for the Chamber’s work in that year. In fact, publishing White Paper is a normal practice for many foreign
chambers in China.
12
See http://www.amchamchina.org/article/7914
13
Ibid
11
9
Figure 3: Types of businesses engaged
by responding members of Am Cham.
Figure 4: Sizes of businesses of
responding members of Am Cham.
Adding to these figures, the interviewee from AmCham China made it clear in the interview
that a large proportion of the American companies in China are concentrated in the good and
service industry, and only a small part of them are conducting export-related business as the
U.S. firms have little, if any, manufacturing capacity in China and their goods usually come from
the Taiwanese, Hong Kong and local Chinese suppliers. As explicate previously, the position of
firms represented by foreign chambers along the global production chain is a determining
factor for their attitude towards the proposed legislations. Enterprises that are labour intensive
and from the manufacturing industries are facing greater upward wage pressure imposed by
collective bargaining, thus their agencies, foreign chambers, will take greater initiative to
express their opposition. On the contrary, chambers representing interests of firms that are not
labour intensive and from the non manufacturing industries, as in the case of AmCham China,
tend to be less vocal.
AmCham South China
AmCham South China, which focuses on the Southern regions, has opposed to the legislation of
Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations; this is largely
related to the economic development of the Guangdong province. Guangdong is an exportoriented manufacturing region that mainly serves the U.S. and European consumption market
(and increasingly the local’s). It has attracted immense foreign investment and made
substantial contribution to the country’s economy14. In 2009, a total of US$355.9 billion
14
The Guangdong province has strong manufacturing industries that produce computers, computer accessories,
mechanical and electrical products, reined chemicals, toys and garments; see AmCham South China, White Paper
2011, p 142.
10
processing trade volume was recorded in Pearl River Delta (PRD) alone, which amounts to 40
percent of China’s full amount; and the province’s export and gross industrial production
reached US$358.9 billion and 6.82 trillion yuan respectively in 200915. Most of the foreign
investments in the Guangdong province come from Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and
the United States16.
As highlighted by the interviewee from AmCham South China, the region’s reliance on the
secondary industry means that many enterprises in South China are labour intensive, thus
labour issues is of great concern to them. This explains why AmCham South China, whose
members are often engaged with the manufacturing industry, is more concerned with the two
legislations than AmCham China, whose members are more attached to the service and
technology sectors. Also, since the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic
Management Regulations are legislations at the Municipal and Provincial level, only companies
situated in Shenzhen and the Guangdong province will be impacted. Therefore, AmCham South
China, which acts as an agency to promote their interests, has taken many initiatives to voice
out its opposition.
The interviewee from AmCham South China disclosed that it has submitted a position paper on
the two legislations to the governments, which, however, is not available in any official
channels. It has also held some private discussions with the government and has met the Mayor
of the Dongguan city to express its reservation. Besides, it has made its opposition via the
Dongguan City Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment17, which has weekly meeting
with the Mayor office and monthly meeting with the Mayor. The interviewee commented that
the two proposed ordinances probably will not be passed due to the feedback from various
associations, including AmCham South China and the Dongguan City Association of Enterprises
with Foreign Investment.
Europe
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China
15
AmCham South China, White Paper 2011, p. 136.
AmCham South China, White Paper 2011, p. 142.
17
The Dongguan City Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment is a local non-profit social group approved
by the State authorities and registered with the industry and commerce administration departments; and it is
under the strong guidance of the Dongguan City Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the
Dongguan City Bureau of Civil Affairs. It provides services to the Sino-foreign joint venture enterprises, Sinoforeign contractual cooperative enterprises, wholly foreign-owned enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises
involved in foreign processing and assembly (including enterprises funded by capital from Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan and overseas Chinese) in Dongguan City. For detail, see http://www.dgaefi.org/xhjj.asp. Similar
associations exist in other cities of Guangdong.
16
11
In China, European firms can be represented at two levels: their national business chambers
and the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (EUCCC). The former usually deal with
issues of individual firms (e.g. when they have economic or labour disputes) while the latter put
more emphasis on policy advocacy, lobbying and networking among businesses. According to
interviewees from various national chambers, the Chinese government has paid greater
attention to EUCCC than to individual national chambers and EUCCC is seen as a more
legitimate and important counterpart for dialogue.
EUCCC has over 1600 members. Its headquarter is situated in Beijing and branches are set up in
other eight cities, including Chengdu, Chongqing, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shanghai,
Shenyang and Tianjin. Unlike the American chambers, these eight branches are well structured
under the coordination of their Beijing headquarter.
The interviewee from EUCCC in Beijing and four representatives from EUCCC in Guangzhou and
Shenzhen noted that EUCCC has not formulated any official position towards the Collective
Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations. However, quite perplexingly,
EUCCC in Guangzhou and Shenzhen have already taken the initiative to organize seminars on
how to deal with collective bargaining for members; this somehow shows that it is an issue of
concern to EUCCC and its members18.
The ambivalent position of EUCCC towards the legislations could be explained by the two
determining factors expounded earlier. First, the interviewee from EUCCC in Beijing said 65% of
its members are big MNCs while only 30% are small and medium sized enterprises. Although no
detailed analysis of European businesses in China is available from the official channel of EUCCC,
it can be roughly deduced that many EUCCC members are concentrating on high value added
and service industry, which will not be so much impacted by the upward wage pressure created
by collective bargaining. Second, it is highly likely that EUCCC would be subjected to censure
from trade unions and labour groups if it openly opposes the two proposed legislations.
Workers’ rights to collective bargaining has long been regarded as a fundamental labour rights
and a norm for industrial relations in Europe; therefore EUCCC is under the moral pressure of
not to openly oppose the European norm, even if it does not help promote the European model
of industrial relations in China. This is attested to by the fact that throughout the interviews,
many EUCCC representatives emphasized that European firms are used to social and labour
regulations. It probably has learned a lesson from its lobbying activities against the 2008 Labour
Contract Law. During the public consultation of the Law, EUCCC representatives have openly
expressed concern over the rising labour costs that might create by the Law and implied that
18
th
For example, on 20 June 2011, EUCCC Guangzhou and Shenzhen organized a seminar called “China HR
Strategies to Gain Advantage in a Competitive Environment”. Part of the seminar addressed issues like “How best
to manage strikes”, “How to go slows” and “What the law allows in handling collective bargaining”. For detail, see
http://c.1yz.cn/s/v.php?eHp3VzNQfG9nVXBiSyg7WzhMeHNPITFFfg==
12
the European business might invest somewhere else if the Law was to be passed. Later, the
European Trade Union Confederation had imposed immense pressure on EUCCC and
subsequently it clarified that it supported the law19.
Western Europe
Interviews with the officials from the French Chamber of Commerce in Guangdong and Beijing,
the French Embassy in Beijing and the French Consulate in Guangdong show that they are not
so concerned with the legislation of Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic
Management Regulations. This could be explained by the fact that national chambers, as
mentioned before, do not receive as much attention from the Chinese government as the
EUCCC do and policy advocacy is not high on their agenda.
According to the representative from the German Chamber of Commerce Shenzhen in South
China, it has not expressed any official opposition to the two legislations. The interviewee
believed the legislations probably would not affect German firms much as “they are used to
unions and strict labour laws in their home country”. Again, it is evident that the norm of
industrial relations in the home countries of the chambers has shaped the opinion they hold, or
at least the way they try to present themselves, regarding the labour regulations in China
Scandinavian Europe
The representative from the Swedish Embassy in Beijing who concentrates on labour issues in
China was interviewed. He remarked that it is not a common practice for the Embassy of
European countries in China to delegate specific officers to work on issues related to labour
rights and labour market. This happens with the Swedish Embassy because trade unions in
Sweden are powerful enough to assert influential institutional power within the government
structure and influence its policies.
The Swedish Embassy is in support of the two legislations; the interviewee said “the labour
market in china is strange and volatile, laws do not ensure a functional labour market, and
collective bargaining is a means to stabilize the labour market.” The Embassy, working closely
with the Swedish trade unions, has tried to promote its industrial relations model in China
through dialogue and cooperation with the government and ACFTU. Together with the Ministry
of Commerce (MOFCOM), it has conducted workshops on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
for provincial government officials, which did cover the issues of collective bargaining. In future,
it plans to hold specific seminars on collective bargaining for trade union and government
officials.
19
Globalization Monitor, Complicity, Campaigns, Collaboration, and Corruption
13
The case of Swedish Embassy demonstrates that a strong labour movement in the home
countries of global capital has positive impacts on the labour regulations and industrial
relations in China. It is therefore important to explore how an organic link between the global
and local labour movement can be formed and be effectively utilized to improve workers’ rights
in China. This question will be further discussed in the last section of this report.
Benelux Europe
Representative from the Benelux Chamber of Commerce (BenCham) in Beijing was interviewed.
BenCham has three chapters in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (Pearl River Delta) and it has
over 320 members in China. According to the interviewee, most firms from Benelux Europe in
South China are involved in manufacturing production and sourcing businesses while those in
Shanghai and Beijing are focusing on the service industry; and most of its members are small
medium sized enterprises.
BenCham’s influence on the Chinese government is not as significant as that of EUCCC or other
big national chambers in China20. Its missions are to build up connection among members,
provide them with important information and assist them to do business in China while leaving
policy advocacy to the hands of EUCCC. That is why it has no official position on the Collective
Bargaining Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations, despite that fact that the
interviewee believes that it will affect their members as workers “will have more power” with
which they can use to increase wages.
Representative from the Belgium Consulate in Guangzhou was also interviewed. He said there
are 37 Belgium firms in South China, which hire altogether over 2000 workers. Most of them
are not big in size and each has a workforce of about 5 to 20. He remarked that Belgium
Consulate in Guangzhou focuses on issues of individual firms while the Embassy in Beijing has
greater emphasis on policy advocacy and sometimes has cooperation with the EUCCC. The
Consulate has no official position on the two legislations, but the personal opinion of the
interviewee is that they have a good and bad side. On the one hand, it helps avoid strikes and
maintain social peace and, on the other, it gives workers the rights to fix salaries.
East Asia
Hong Kong
Many business associations in Hong Kong are against the Collective Consultation Ordinance and
Democratic Management Regulations21; this again could be explained by their business nature
20
Interview with the official from BenCham.
See Wenhui Bao (a Hong Kong newspaper), “Joint petition of Hong Kong business associations to express
concern over deepening industrial conflict caused by the Guangdong Democratic Enterprise Management
21
14
and position in the global production chain. Most Hong Kong investment in China concentrates
in the export-oriented manufacturing industry and the labour intensive service industry.
According to the representative of Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, over 80% of
Hong Kong businesses in Guangdong are with the labour intensive manufacturing industries.
Therefore they will be most impacted by the two proposed legislations and are very vocal in
lobbying the government. In addition, as Hong Kong firms are not used to collective bargaining
or workers’ participation in corporate governance even in their home, and the industrial
relations model practised in Hong Kong is one leaving almost everything to the market;
therefore they have a strong tendency to oppose the pro-labour regulations in China.
Representatives from two of the largest four chambers in Hong Kong—the Hong Kong General
Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC) and Federation of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI)—were
interviewed. HKGCC has about 4000 corporate members, among which 90% are involved in the
service industries (and some in the finance industries)22. HKGCC has submitted two position
papers on the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations23 to
the government. In the first position paper, it opposed to the posts of workers director who will
be involved in the companies’ supervision and decision-making, as it believes this might lead to
leakage of confidential businesses information. It is also against the suggestion in Collective
Consultation Ordinance that companies should start wage bargaining with workers
representatives if one fifth of its employees request so; it worries that workers will abuse the
bargaining mechanism and they will easily resort to strikes and collective actions if no
agreement could be reached. The official from HKGCC added that wage bargaining between
workers and enterprises will create big wage pressure on companies and increase their
Regulations (Gangshanhui lianshu fandui you louzi maotun jihua, Guangdong jue huanshen “Qiye Minzhu Guanli
th
Tiaoli”
), 18 September 2010; Mingpao (a
Hong Kong newspaper), Concern over “democratic enterprise management, four biggest business chambers want
to meet Wangyang” (You “qiye minzhu guanli”, sida shanhui qijian Wangyang
th
), 15 September 2010; Hong Kong Commerical Daily, “Four biggest business chambers in Hong Kong
collect opinions on the Guangdong Democratic Enterprise Management Regulations and the Shenzhen Collective
Consultation Ordinance” (Jiu yueqiye minzhu guanli Shenzhen jiti qieshan tiaoli caoan gangsida shanhui shouji
st
yijian
), 21 September 2010; Hong Kong
Economic Journal, “Shenzhen’s new laws may increase wages by 70 percent, Hong Kong businesses might move to
other places and Japanese enterprises pronounce investment withdrawal” (Shenzhen yi xinli, gongzi huo
shenqicheng, gangshan liaobao taowangqiao, reqi yangyan chezi
th
), 6 September 2010; Hong Kong Economic Times, “Four Hong Kong business chambers want to be
exempted from the new law on wages in Guangdong” (Yuejiaoxin xinli, gang xishanhui qihoumian
th
4
), 15 September 2010; Wenhui Bao, “Hong Kong businesses worries about wage consultation in
th
Shenzhen” (Shenzhen yixing gongzi xieshan, gangqi youlv
), 8 September 2010;
Mingpao, “Against the position of workers’ director and collective consultation, 40 business associations urge the
Guangdong government to withdraw the new laws” (Fandui she zhigong dongshi jiti xieshanji, 40 shanhui yizu yue
th
che laogong xinfa
40
), 10 September 2010.
22
Interview with HKGCC officials.
23
Copies of these two position papers were given to the researchers by the representative from HKGCC.
港商會聯袂反對 憂勞資矛盾激化 廣東決緩審「企業民主管理條例」
見汪洋
憂「企業民主管理」四大商會冀
就粵企業民主管理深圳集體協商條例草案 港四大商會收集意見
企揚言撤資
商會冀豁免
深圳擬新例 工資或升七成 港商料爆逃亡潮 日
粵加薪新例 港
深圳擬行工資協商 港企憂慮
反對設職工董事集體協商制 商會擬促粵撤勞工新法
15
business costs. In the second position paper, it summarizes that these legislations “will not only
deepen labour-management conflict, but also create difficult business environment for
enterprises and obstruct their development; in the long run, it will also affect the country’s
economic development and peoples’ living standard.”
FHKI has about 3000 members in China, most of which are engaged with the manufacturing
industries24. FHKI released two position papers which claim that the two legislations will harm
industrial harmony, give rise to labour management conflict and might even lead to a return to
the situation of everybody eating from the same “big pot of rice” (dahuofan 大鑊飯) as in the
state-socialist period. It also asserted that the legislations will have negative impacts on the
business environment and dampen business motivation, or even threaten social stability and
economic growth25. FHKI is of the opinion that wages should be determined by the free market,
rather than collective bargaining26. Its representative said in the interview that “if workers join
the director board as proposed by the Democratic Management Regulations, the business cost
will increase because workers’ representatives definitely will fight for the maximum interests of
workers”.
The other two largest chambers in Hong Kong have turned down our interview, but information
from their website testifies to their strong opposition to the two legislations. As shown in its
regular publication, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (CGCC) is explicitly against the
posts of workers director, like HKGCC and FHKI. Besides, it has expressed concern that workers
may abuse the collective bargaining mechanism as the proposed Democratic Management
Regulation states that collective bargaining can be kicked off in a company if one third of its
employees request so. CGCC suggests that the legislations should limit “the frequency of
collective bargaining that employees can initiate and to raise the quorum to 50%”27. Also, it
worries that “large-scale strikes would be more likely to occur”28 because these legislations will
breed different types of labour unions, apart from the party-led ones. It therefore suggests that
workers can only be represented by the state-recognized trade unions in collective bargaining,
24
Information from the FHKI interviewee.
Federation of Hong Kong Industries, Opinions and Comments on the “Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Collective
Consultation Ordinance” (Guanyu “Shenzhen Tequ Jiti Xieshan Tiaoli” (Xiugai caoan zhengqiu yijiangao) de kanfa he
jianyi
(
)
), August 2010; FHKI, Report on
“Guangdong Province Collective Wage Consultation Regulations” and “Guangdong Province Democratic Enterprise
Management Regulations” (Guangyu “Guangdongshen Gongzi Jiti Xieshan Tiaoli” ji “Guangdongshen Qiye Minzhu
Guangli Tiaoli (caoan xiugaigao) de baogao”
(
)
) , August 2010.
26
FHKI, Opinions and Comments on the “Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Collective Consultation Ordinance”
(Guanyu “Shenzhen Tequ Jiti Xieshan Tiaoli” (Xiugai caoan zhengqiu yijiangao) de kanfa he jianyi
(
)
), August 2010
27
Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, CGCC Vision, November 2010, p5.
28
Ibid.
25
關於《深圳經濟特區集體協商條例》 修改草案徵求意見稿 的看法和建議
》 草案修改稿 的報告
關於《廣東省工資集體協商條例》及《廣東省企業民主管理條例
特區集體協商條例》 修改草案徵求意見稿 的看法和建議
關於《深圳經濟
16
which means the ACFTU and its affiliates only. The Chinese Manufacturers’ Associations of
Hong Kong (CMA) website does not show any position paper on the two legislations, but it was
very active in organizing seminars on collective bargaining among members29 and have been
involved in many joint actions with other three chambers.
The lobbying strategies of the Hong Kong business chambers targeted three levels of
government, namely Hong Kong, Guangdong and Chinese central government. At the Hong
Kong level, first, in order to strengthen the legitimacy of their opposition and solicit support
from members, the four chambers had held joint consultation to collect enterprises’ opinion on
the two legislations30. Second, the chambers released their own position paper as well as a
joint position paper, which was submitted to the Hong Kong (and Guangdong) government for
the sake of lobbying. The FHKI representative revealed that after taking their comments into
consideration, the Hong Kong government submitted its own position paper to the Ministry of
Commerce in China which largely reflects the interest of the Hong Kong businesses.
Third, the chambers have appealed to some key Hong Kong politicians who are holding
symbolic, if not important, positions in the Chinese government. They include Ms. Elsie Leung
Oi-sie who is the former Secretary for Justice of Hong Kong and currently the Deputy Director of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law Committee under the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People's Republic of China31, Ms. Rita Fan
Hsu Lai-tai who is currently a standing committee member of the National People's Congress of
the People's Republic of China32, Ms. Miriam Lau Kin Yee and Mr. Michael Tien Puk Sun who
are both members of the NPC33, Mr. Howard Young How Wah, Mr. James Tien Pei-Chun and Ms.
Selina Chow Liang Shuk-yee who are members of the National Committee of the Chinese
29
For instance, an exchange session on “Salary Collective Negotiation” of Guangdong Enterprise Democratic
th
Management Regulation was held on 7 October 2011, and a seminar on “Latest Development of Human
Resources Management in Mainland and Hong Kong” which covered collective wage bargaining was organized on
th
8
December
2010.
See
http://www.cma.org.hk/files/fckfiles/Circular_exchange_session.pdf,
http://www.cma.org.hk/files/uploads/20101109173512Microsoft%20Word%20%20circular_Flexsystem_8%20DEC%202010.pdf
30
See Mingpao, “Concern over “democratic enterprise management, four biggest business chambers want to meet
Wangyang”, The Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong, Biggest four chambers co-organized
“Guangdong Democratic Enterprise Mangement Regulations and Shenzhen Collective Consultation Ordinance”
consultation meeting to collective opinions from the industrial and commercial sectors (Sida shanhui heban
“Guangdong, Shenzhen ‘Qiye Minzhu Guangli’ ji ‘Jiti Xieshan’ Tiaoli zixunhui”, tingqu ji shouji gongshan yeji yijian
),
accessed at http://cma.org.hk/news-detail/1247/55
31
Singtao Daily (a Hong Kong newspaper), “Lau Jin Ho: Keep on reflecting Hong Kong businessmen’s concern” (Liu
th
Zhan Hao: Xue fanyin gangshan youlv
), 27 September 2010.
32
Ibid
33
See the website of Hong Kong Apparel Society Limited
http://www.hkapparel.com.hk/chi/info_activity_content.php?ID=181&year=2010
四大商會合辦「廣東、深圳“企業民主管理”及“集體協商”條例諮詢會」聽取及收集工商業界意見
劉展灝：續反映港商憂慮
17
People's Political Consultative Conference34. These Hong Kong politicians have been seen by the
chambers as important leverage to influence the Guangdong and central government.
The chambers’ strategies to lobby the Guangdong government are four-fold. First, it attempts
to highlight the economic contribution of Hong Kong businesses in the region and the negative
impacts of the two legislations on them35. The chairperson of the China Affairs Committee of
CGCC remarked that the new legislations will lead to large-scale withdrawal of investment and
enterprise closure, which in the end will weaken the competitiveness of the region36. In China,
local government has a strong motivation to maintain high economic growth due to, on the one
hand, its independent fiscal status from the central government’s and, on the other, the strong
patron-client relations between the government officials and investors in the province.
Therefore, by emphasizing their economic significance to the Guangdong province, the Hong
Kong businesses were giving signals to the Guangdong government that its interest would
possibly be harmed by the legislations too. Second, the four biggest chambers, the Hong Kong
Business Community Joint Conference (香港各界商會聯席會議) consisting of over 40 business
associations, and some of the above-mentioned Hong Kong politicians had sent their lobbying
letters to Wang Huahua, the Mayor of the Guangdong Province, Wangyang, the Secretary of
the Guangdong Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the Legality Committee of the
Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress (省人大法制委員會) 37 . Third, to give the local
government even more pressure, the Hong Kong Business Community Joint Conference
published their petition in two Hong Kong newspapers on 16th September 201038. Fourth, the
four chambers sought to lobby the provincial government face-to-face. For example, they have
met officials from the Ministry of the Human Resources and Social Security of Guangdong
Province (廣東省人力資源和社會保障廳) 39. The interviewee from HKGCC said in some cases,
34
ibid
Hong Kong Economic Journal, “Shenzhen’s new laws may increase wages by 70 percent, Hong Kong businesses
might move to other places and Japanese enterprises pronounce investment withdrawal”
36
Hong Kong Economic Times, “Four Hong Kong business chambers want to be exempted from the new law on
wages in Guangdong”
37
See the website of Hong Kong Apparel Society Limited
http://www.hkapparel.com.hk/chi/info_activity_content.php?ID=181&year=2010
38
Ibid; also see Singtao Daily, “Hong Kong businesses pulishing petition in newspapers to voice out opposition, the
laws on collective wage consultation in Guangdon is suspended” (Gangshan qianlie fanui liandeng guangao kangyi,
th
Guangdong zhenhuan xinzixieshan lifa
), 27 September
2010, accessed at http://news.singtao.ca/calgary/2010-09-27/china1285574889d2754336.htm; Mingpao,
“Business associations for small and medium sized enterprises are planning to make advertisments in newspaper
to oppose the new labour laws ” (Zhongxiaoqi shanhui yi dengbao kangyi xin laogong fa
th
), 11 September 2010.
39
Hong Kong Economic Journal, “Biggest four business chambers met Guangdong government officials to reflect
opinion, Hong Kong businesses hope to be exempted from introducing the position of worker directors” (Sida
shanhui shouwu yueshen guanyuan fanyin yijian, gangshan zhengqu houmian zhigong ru dongshihui
th
), 30 October 2010; Wenhui Bao, “The new policies of trade
35
港商強烈反對 聯登廣告抗議 廣東暫緩薪資協商立法
新勞工法
晤粵省官員反映意見 港商爭取豁免職工入董事會
中小企商會擬登報抗議
四大商會首
18
the officials from the Guangdong government came to Hong Kong to have discussion with its
members.
The Hong Kong business associations have also lobbied the central government, even though
the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations are only local
legislations. The Hong Kong General Chamber of Textile Limited met the Minster Chen Deming
from the Ministry of Commerce in November 201040 . Besides, a delegate from HKGCC was sent
to Beijing to meet the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance and the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to voice out its concern over the legislations41.
And members of the general council of HKGCC, including Victor Li Tzar-kuoi and Jeffrey Lam Kinfung who are the Hong Kong legislative councilors, had met the vice Premier of the country and
discussed the legislation42.
The lobbying activities of Hong Kong business associations seem to be quite effective and have
significant impact on the process of legislation; this is partly due to the substantial investment
of Hong Kong businessmen in China. In 2010, Hong Kong was China’s third largest trading
partner, after the U.S and Japan; and in the same year there was US$230.6 billion bilateral
trade between Hong Kong and China, which amounted to 7.8% of China’s total external trade43.
And Hong Kong is the largest source of foreign direct investment in China. By the end of 2010,
45.4% of all approved overseas-funded projects in China were from Hong Kong and the
cumulative utilized capital inflow from Hong Kong was 42.3% of the total44. The representative
from HKGCC said that over 50% of the trading export business in Dongguan comes from Hong
Kong. All these have made their opposition sounds louder. As a result, it is reported that the
proposed legislations have been put off due to the contention of Hong Kong business
associations.
Korea
工
unions are coming, Hong Kong enterprises are worried” (Gonghui xinzheng jiang chutai, gangqi shengan youlv
th
), 6 September 2010.
40
Takungpao (a Hong Kong newspaper), “the Minster Chen Deming from the Ministry of Commerce met the
delegate from the Hong Kong General Chamber of Textiles, who went to Beijing to reflect the diffculties of Hong
Kong businesses” (Gangqi jingying beishou kunyao, Xianggang fangzhi shanhui zutuan fangjing fanying, shanwubu
Chen Deming buzhang ji youguan lingdao jiejian
th
), 8 November 2010.
41
Interview with officials from HKGCC
42
Ibid
43
th
Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Market Profile on Chinese Mainland, 12 September 2011. Accessed at
http://www.hktdc.com/info/mi/a/mpcn/en/1X06BPS5/1/Profiles-Of-China-Provinces-Cities-And-IndustrialParks/Market-Profile-On-Chinese-Mainland.htm#5
44
Ibid.
會新政將出台 港企深感憂慮
部長暨有關領導接見
港企經營備受困擾 香港紡織商會組團訪京反映 商務部陳德銘
19
The representative from Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (Guangzhou office), a
Korean government supported agency, was interviewed. According to the informant, most
outbound investment from Korea go to China and there are around 1200 to 1300 Korean
companies in the Guangdong province, most of which are concentrated in the manufacturing
industry. The informant said the Agency is not aware of the legislations on Collective
Consultation Ordinance and the Democratic Management Regulations; this is consistent with
the information we obtained from labour scholars in China. Anyway, the informant speculated
that the legislations might increase labour costs for small enterprises, but will not have much
impact on the big ones.
Japan
The representative from the Japanese External Trade Organization in Hong Kong, which is
Japanese government-supported, was interviewed. The informant suggested that Japanese
businesses in China consider the legislation on the Collective Consultation Ordinance and
Democratic Management Regulations as one of their two urgent concerns (the other one is
increasing labour costs). They are worrying that the legislations will provoke labour disputes in
companies and increase labour costs. Also, they are against the idea that outsiders, for example,
hired trade union presidents and government officials, who have no knowledge of the
companies, can be involved in the bargaining process.
Its lobbying activities include meeting the Guangdong provincial government to express their
concern and submitting an opinion paper to the government. The Organization has exchanged
information with the Hong Kong business associations on the issue but has not initiated any
joint lobbying effort because their concerns over the legislations are different. While the former
is against the inclusion of workers’ representatives into the companies’ director board, the
latter’s anxiety is more about the bargaining process which, in its opinion, has not been
specified clearly enough by the legislations.
Taiwan
Representatives from the Shanghai and Guangzhou office of the Taiwan World Trade Center, a
Taiwanese government-supported agency focusing on economic affairs in China, and the
Taiwan Merchant Association Dongguan were interviewed. According to our informants, at the
national level, the Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland is concerned
with national economic and trade policies while independent merchant associations at the local
level focus on specific day-to-day issues. It should be noted that local Taiwan business
associations are more powerful than the national one, with the associations in Dongguan,
20
Guangzhou and Shenzhen as the most influential due to their significant economic contribution
in the regions45.
Taiwanese business associations have strong influence in China when compared to other
countries. Take the Taiwan Merchant Association Dongguan as an example; it has close contact
with and much influence on the local Dongguan government. It meets with the government
every month and can directly contact the Vice-Mayer for anything important. Every three
months, an expanded meeting at the city-level with the government will be held. It was in this
expanded meeting that the legislation of the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic
Management Regulation were discussed with the government and members were surveyed.
The informants suggested that the Association has not come up with any official position on the
legislations because, on the one hand, given the global economic downturn, the major concern
of Taiwanese enterprises now is their transformation from export-oriented businesses into
ones based on domestic consumption market, rather than new labour regulations. On the other,
Taiwanese firms in China have different opinions towards the legislations and they have not
come to a consensus yet; while the big firms tend to support the legislations, the small firms
tend to oppose them as the burden of increasing labour costs will be heavier for the latter.
III. Who else are shaping the legislations?
The making of labour laws is never only a concern to foreign businesses; other parties are
involved in influencing the legislations too. In what follows, the role of state-owned enterprises,
the party-state, official trade unions, labour NGOs, labour and legal scholars in the legislation of
Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations will be discussed,
so as to depict a more thorough picture on the dynamics and interaction of different social
forces in shaping labour legislations in China. Our analysis in this section is built upon the
information obtained from our interviews with 9 labour and legal scholars, 2 trade unions and
government officials, 1 ILO labour expert and 1 lawyer in China.
State-owned enterprises
The scholars we interviewed disclosed that many state owned enterprises have reservation
over the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations. However,
they have not made any open opposition and there is hardly any media report on their position.
They mainly express their opinion and articulate their interest through the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), which supervises and
manages the state owned enterprises on behalf of the state46. The labour and legal scholars
45
The informants noted that Taiwanese investment altogether contribute to over 51% and 15% of the GDP in
Dongguan and Guangzhou respectively.
46
See the website of SASAC http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html
21
revealed that SASAC is among one of the fiercest forces within the party-state that opposes the
legislations.
Trade unions
Both the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations were at
first initiated and drafted by the provincial trade unions, which is under the supervision of the
party-led ACFTU. However, when resistance from other social forces emerges, the trade unions
and ACFTU seem to have stepped back from supporting the legislations; this is in a great
contrast to ACFTU’s outspoken attitude in defending the Labour Contract Law in 200847.
Labour NGOs
Some Hong Kong labour NGOs focusing on Chinese labour issues have noticed Hong Kong
businessmen’s attempt to stop the legislations. They were quick enough to protest against
them. However, due to limited resources, neither have they identified the tight connection
among business associations, the Hong Kong government and politicians in lobbying the local
and central Chinese government, nor were they aware in time of the opposition of other
foreign business chambers. As a result, they have missed out the leverage to protest against the
anti-labour effort of the capital.
Some Chinese labour NGOs have submitted opinion paper on the legislations during the public
consultation organized by the government, but there is no way to verify how much they weigh
to the government.
Labour and Legal scholars
Scholars we interviewed noted that the local government has conducted a number of closed
door consultations on the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management
Regulations separately with scholars, lawyers, foreign enterprises, government departments,
workers’ representatives and so forth. They disclosed that most foreign enterprises showed
reservations on the legislations in these consultations while some government departments,
such as the Labour Bureau, were not supportive either as they think these legislations will
dampen investment drive and therefore harm the regions’ economic interest. Our informants
suggested that scholars and lawyers are generally more sympathetic to workers. In their
opinion, among those who are actively consulted by the government, scholars represent a
more progressive force which has a pro-labour orientation and is more or less willing to
promote workers’ interest within the limited space they are given. In fact, one scholar we
47
For more about ACFTU’s defense of the Labour Contract Law, see, for example,
Complicity, Campaigns, Collaboration, and Corruption,
Globalization Monitor,
22
interviewed tried hard to debate with his opponents in the consultation at the city level of
Guangzhou.
Part-state
The suspension of the legislations of Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic
Management Regulations is not only due to the resistance from foreign businesses, but also the
party-state’s worry on the spillover of labour activism and industrial conflict that might be
triggered by the legislations48. After the new wave of labour protests sparked by the Honda
workers strike in 2010, the party-state has become more anxious to pacify the aggrieved
workers; as a result, these two legislations were put on the discussion table again. According to
the informant from HKGCC, the Guangdong government officials disclosed that they do not
support the two legislations, but the central government has given them pressure and wants it
to be a pilot province to enforce those legislations.
However, the party-state realizes that if collective negotiation is to be implemented effectively,
it has to be backed by strong workers’ organization, which in turns might help breed
independent workers’ organizing in the country49. When the wave of strikes in 2010 starts to
fade away, the potential negative impacts of these legislations on social and political stability
have outweighed their positive effects in the eyes of both the central and local government.
Therefore, the legislations on Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management
Regulations have been halted in the face of interest convergence among the foreign and local
capital, as well as the party-state.
IV. The leverage to promote labour legislations: building a pro-labour alliance in China
Foreign and local capital has become increasingly organized through their agencies—chamber
of commerce, government supported agencies, Embassies of their own countries—to articulate
and advance their interest vis-à-vis that of labour. They have deployed different strategies to
influence the legislation of the Collective Consultation Ordinance and Democratic Management
Regulations, including submitting position paper, highlighting the legislations’ negative impacts
on investment and business environment, meeting local government officials, lobbying the
central government, mobilizing their political connection at home, petition and so forth.
Chinese labour is now facing an ever stronger and better organized capital, whose interests
sometimes converge with the party-state’s. That said, drawing upon our analysis above, it is still
possible to identify various leverages in influencing labour legislations in favor of workers in the
short term and to promote workers’ rights in the long run.
48
49
Interview with labour and legal scholars.
Information from the scholar informants
23
First, as underscored in previous section, some labour and legal scholars in China are vocal to
advocate for workers’ right. Some of them are actively consulted by the government in the
making of labour law while some others try to produce pro-labour discourse in media. In fact,
one scholar we interviewed writes many articles in newspapers to promote labour rights and he
was later invited to the consultation on collective negotiation organized by the local
government. While local trade unions seem to be stepping back from defending the legislations,
he tried hard to debate with his opponents in the consultation.
Second, given the political connection between China and Hong Kong, labour NGOs in Hong
Kong can exercise important leverage over anti-labour forces and in fact they enjoy greater
social freedom to protest against them; this explains why they were quick enough to stage
protests against the Hong Kong business chambers as underscored earlier. However, this
leverage can only be exercised effectively when the Hong Kong labour NGOs are able to grasp
the full dynamics among the foreign and local capital, the local and central government, official
trade unions and workers; otherwise, they will miss out the leverage in supporting the prolabour legislations and workers’ movement in China.
Third, labour NGOs in China can also help promote labour legislations. During the public
consultation on the legislation of 2008 Labour Contract Law, with the strong mobilization from
labour NGOs over 190,000 comments were received by the government, which had created
much pressure for the party-state50. Although their feedback on the Collective Consultation
Ordinance and Democratic Management Regulations was not in a large scale and probably does
not count much to the government, still they are important social forces to help advance labour
rights in future.
Fourth, overseas trade unions can exercise leverage over the government and the capital from
their own countries. For instance, the Swedish trade unions are strong enough to utilize the
Swedish Embassy to help educate the Chinese government officials and trade unionists about
collective bargaining. Also, as in the case of Labour Contract Law, the U.S. and European trade
unions helped pressure the chamber of commerce from their home countries to protect
workers’ basic rights
In the western context, workers are usually organized and represented by trade unions.
However, Chinese trade unions could not be understood from the western perspective and
there are huge controversies over if they can genuinely represent workers’ interest. On the one
hand, the higher level trade unions are under the supervision of the party-state and have been
well incorporated into the state bureaucracy; on the other, the plant level trade unions are
50
See Globalization Monitor, Complicity, Campaigns, Collaboration, and Corruption,
24
usually subjected to the control of enterprises’ management51. Given this specific Chinese
context, rather than placing all the hope on the party-led or management-dominated trade
unions, it is of urgent necessity to build up a broader pro-labour alliance in China, which should
include the progressive forces mentioned above, such as labour and legal scholars, labour NGOs
activists, active workers, international trade unions, or even some open minded local trade
unionists, to support workers’ struggles against the local and global capital. Figure 5 highlights
the dynamics among different anti-labour and pro-labour forces in shaping labour regulations in
China. In blue are the social forces that are now having a pro-labour orientation. In the past,
these progressive forces are working here and there, without much interaction and
coordination. It is now time to explore how they can be connected together in an organic and
interactive manner as a broader pro-labour alliance to resist capital’s exploitation in China.
International trade
unions & NGOs
Foreign
companies
Foreign
business
chambers
Foreign
embassy
Chinese private
companies
Chinese state
enterprises
SASAC
All China Federation of
Industry and Commerce
(
) and Chinese
Enterprise Directors
Association (
)
工商联
企聯
State’s labour regulations
Party-led trade
union
Labour
NGOs
Labor and legal scholars
Figure 5: The dynamics among anti-labour and pro-labour forces in China
51
See Chen Feng, “Between the state and labour: The conflict of Chinese trade unions' double identity in market
reform”, The China Quarterly, No. 176(2003), p. 1006-1028; Bill Taylor and Liqi, “Is the ACFTU a Union and Does it
Matter?”, Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 49 (2007), p. 701-715.
25
List of Abbreviation
Name
Abbreviations
Foreign invested enterprises
FIEs
State owned enterprises
SOEs
All China Federation of Trade Unions
ACFTU
Chinese Communist Party
CCP
Pearl River Delta
PRD
American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China
AmCham China
the American Chamber of Commerce in South China
AmCham South China
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China
EUCCC
Ministry of Commerce
MOFCOM
Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR
Benelux Chamber of Commerce in China
BenCham
the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
HKGCC
Federation of Hong Kong Industries
FHKI
Chinese General Chamber of Commerce
CGCC
Chinese Manufacturers’ Associations of Hong Kong
CMA
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China
NPC of PRC
National Development and Reform Commission
NDRC
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the
State Council
SASAC
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