International Phenomenological Society
Russell's Cryptic Response to Strawson
Author(s): James W. Austin
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jun., 1978), pp. 531-537
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106574 .
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DISCUSSION
RUSSELL'S CRYPTIC RESPONSE TO STRAWSON
In a widely read but cryptic article entitled "Mr. Strawson on
Referring," Bertrand Russell defends his theory of descriptions
against the attack leveled at it in P. F. Strawson's "On Referring."'
Unfortunately, Russell's article is very mysterious at points, and it is
difficult to see on first reading just what his arguments really are.
Consequently, it is often read but seldom taken seriously, at least not
as a well reasoned and successful defense against Strawson's superior
criticism of the theory. Indeed, on the surface it seems that, in places,
Russell's essay is one giant non sequitar. This is true especially in the
first part -the first eight paragraphs, to be exact -in which Russell
claims that Strawson's mistake consists in a misunderstanding of the
role of egocentric particulars in linguistic activity. Yet Russell's
discussion in this section seems to be a skeleton of an argument rather
than an actual argument. He even neglects to tell the reader what he
means by "the problem of egocentricity," much less how attending to
this problem serves to illuminate the error in Strawson's criticism. In
what follows, I hope to fill out the details of the skeletal argument
and show how Russell's comments largely succeed in answering
Strawson on this baffling issue of egocentricity. But first we must
briefly recall Strawson's criticism.
In "On Referring" Strawson offers several objections to the
theory of descriptions and more than one version of some of those objections. Russell's abstruse reference to egocentricity is designed to attack the specific argument Strawson offers in Part II of "On Referring." In that section Strawson interprets Russell as postulating the axiom of extensionalism, which is:
(SI) A sentence is significant (i.e., is meaningful) if and only if it
has a truth value.
Now one simply needs to deliver an example of a sentence which
clearly has no truth value (i.e., is neither true nor false), but is, at the
same time, significant, in order to falsify (SI) and with it Russell's entire logistic program. A good candidate for such a counterexample is
the familiar proposition:
(S2) The present king of France is wise.
When confronted with this example, Russell (still according to
Strawson) decides not to abandon the postulate (SI) as he should;
' These two papers, along with Russell's original' statement of the theory of
descriptions, "On Denoting," and Frege's "On Sense and Nominatum," are conveniently located together in Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory, I. M. Copi
andJ. A. Gould, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Part 3, pp. 73-132;
531
532
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
rather, he fabricates the elaborate theory of descriptionsjust in order
to handle counterexamples such as (S2). This ad hoc Russellian
theory denys that (S2) contradicts the general rule (SI) because of the
following consideration: the troublesome point about (S2) is that it
contains a definite description, "the present king of France," which
fails to refer to any object. And Russell's principle of definite desoriptivity is that:
(S3) All uniquely referring expressions entail a uniquely existential claim.
Thus, "the present king of France" in (S2), logically entails:
(S4) There exists one and only one x such that x is now the king
of France.
So, by asserting (S2) we also assert (S4) which is false since there is no
king of France. And since (S4) is false, by modus tollens, the original
statement (S2) is false. And since (S2) is false, (S2) has a truth value
and is not a counterexample to the extensionalist's axiom (SI) which
states that having a truth value is both necessary and sufficient for a
sentence's being significant.
Among other things Strawson wants to hold against Russell's
theory so stated, is that:
(1) (S1), the extensionalist axiom, is false;
(2) (S2), the proffered counterexample, is, when issued on the
appropriate occasion in French history, neither true nor false;
(3) the statement in (2) above proves that in (1);
(4) (S2) does not entail (though it does presuppose) the analysis
in (S4);
(5) therefore, (S3) as a logical rule is false; and since (S3) is the
principle behind Russell's views on definite descriptions,
(6) the theory of descriptions is therefore false.
Russell's allegedly crucial error, the one which initiates the chain
reaction of mistakes, is to be found in the extensionalist postulate (SI)
in which the meaning of a sentence is equated with its truth functionality. Sentences, Strawson tells us, are never true or false; it is the
uses of sentences on particular occasions and in particular contexts
which constitute true or false assertions. "The present king of France
is wise" by itself, is neither true nor false. If issued, say, during the
reign of Louis XIV, it is, ex hypothesi, true; if issued during the reign
of Louis XV, false; and if issued today, it is neither (according to
Strawson). Likewise, the grammatical subject of (S2), "the present
king of France," does not by itself mention or refer. Rather, if used
during the reign of Louis XIV it refers to Louis XIV; if used during
the reign of Louis XV, it refers to Louis XV; and if used today, it fails
to refer. Failure to distinguish between a sentence and its use, and
RUSSELL'S CRYPTIC RESPONSE TO STRAWSON
533
between a (uniquely referring) expression and its use, lead Russell to
postulate the false claim of extensionalism, (SI).
The meaning of an expression cannot be identified with the object it is
used, on a particular occasion, to refer to. The meaning of a sentence
cannot be identified with the assertion it is used, on a particular occasion,
to make . .. the meaning of an expression or sentence is not .
.
. its use
on a particular occasion .... So the question of whether a sentence or expression is significant or not has nothing whatever to do with the question
of whether the sentence, uttered on a particular occasion, is, on that occaThe source
sion, being used to refer to, or mention, anything at all....
of Russell'smistake was that he thought that referring or mentioning, if it
occurred at all, must be meaning.2
Strawson's argument characterized by this quotation is practically
airtight. The only problem lies in the conclusion. The correct conclusion would be that the axiom (SI) is false, not that Russell's theory is
wrong; for, in fact, Russell never held (SI) to be true. (Perhaps
''never" is too strong a word to use in referring to any theory imputed
to Russell, for his continual shifting of theories and repudiation of
earlier notions are well known if not notorious. However, I feel this to
be a sign of his- deep philosophical honesty and readiness to admit
mistakes rather than some uncontrolled eclecticism.) Russell, as a
logician, deals with propositions, not sentences. He does not wish to
hold, as (SI) seems to entail, that all sentences or word strings,
regardless of context, regardless of grammatical or logical form,
regardless of use or circumstances, must have truth value. Such a notion would be absurd. Strawson says "We cannot talk of the sentence
being true or false, but only of its being used to make a true or false
assertion. "9 Russell would agree-entirely,. though he would of course
prefer the term 'proposition' to 'assertion.' So let us rewrite (SI) in accordance with Russell's concept of propositions:
(Sla) A sentence is meaningful when and only when it is being
used to make a true or false assertion, i.e., a proposition (or express a
proposition).
As to any residue of trouble over the status of the meanings of
words, word strings, or sentences not in use, there is only a mild quibble. Strawson, for example, insists on using the term 'meaning' to
characterize the "general directions" for the use of words or expressions apart from actual occurrences in particular propositions of
those words or expressions. That there are such "general directions" -that is, that one could glean certain empirical rules for the
applicability of an expression -is certainly a claim Russell would not
assail. Dictionaries are full of such "directions." Whether or not he
2
3
Ibid., p. 112.
Ibid., p. I I 1.
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
534
would also agree to affix the label 'meaning' to that set of "general
directions" is, however, of negligible philosophical consequence.
The important point to notice, according to Russell, is that any
assertion (proposition) either fits the states of affairs which it claims to
picture, or it fails to fit them. If it fits we call that assertion (proposition) true; if it fails, false. There is no third possibility. There is,
however, one case in which an assertion fails to fit its state of affairs in
an assertion which contains a nondenoting
a special way-namely,
definite description. Mr. Russell does, while Mr. Strawson does not
wish to use "false" to cover this special case of an assertion's failure to
fit its circumstances. But the issue can be argued no further. The difference at this point turns on "a purely verbal question" as Russell admits, and neither side can claim conclusive support from common
usage.4
Nevertheless, there may still be grounds for substantial disagreement here. Russell may indeed answer Strawson's charges by saying
"Oh I was talking of propositions, not sentences"; but Strawson may
still raise the question "Well what about sentences?" After all, if
Strawson's theory can account for all the facts that Russell's theory
can, plus the issue over the difference between a sentence and the use
of a sentence, then Strawson's would seem the better theory. It is at
this point that Russell's discussion of egocentricity becomes germane.
Not only can Russell account for the difference between a
sentence and its use, and the difference between an expression and its
use, he has accounted for these differences in at least two earlier
works (In Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth, and Human
Knowledge).5 In the former he lists "This, that, I, you, here, there,
now, then, past, present, future, . . . and tense in verbs must also
be included."6 In the latter work he characterizes these "egocentric
particulars" as "words of which the meaning varies with the speaker
and his position in time and space."7 In that same article he reduces
all the above examples of egocentric particulars to "four fundamental
words of this sort . . . 'I', 'this', 'here', and 'now'. "8 It is obvious that
Russell holds that a sentence employing a denoting phrase containing
an egocentric particular can be used on different occasions to assert
different propositions. "Present" in "the present king of France" is
one of the egocentric particulars listed by Russell. Therefore, "The
4
Ibid., p. 131.
5 Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth (New York: Norton, 1940); Human
Knowledge (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948).
6 Inquiry, p. 108.
7 Human Knowledge, p. 84.
8 Ibid., p. 84.
RUSSELL'S CRYPTIC RESPONSE TO STRAWSON
535
present king of France is wise," may be used on different occasions to
refer to or mention different objects.
It is immediately apparent that Russell's comments on egocentric particulars are substantially equivalent to Strawson's on the differences between sentences and their uses, and expressions and their
uses. However, to say that Russell's thoughts on this matter precede
those of Strawson is not to say that his theory of descriptions is
necessarily immune from violating those thoughts. But we can test for
this. We can eliminate the egocentric particular from a proffered
counterexample to the theory of descriptions, and test the altered version against Strawson's criticism of the original counterexample. If
Strawson's criticisms fail to apply to the new sentence, it would be fair
to conclude with Russell that Strawson's remarks must be interpreted
as illuminating the nature of egocentric particulars -a task entirely
in agreement with Russellian philosophy -rather
than as attacking
the underpinnings of the theory of descriptions. Russell suggests a
new sentence: eliminating "present" from (S2), and inserting "in
1905," we have:
(S6) The king of France in 1905 is wise.
Now, let us examine a few of Strawson's remarks which were intended
as a commentary on the original (S2); but, let us see if they could be
intended instead as a commentary on the altered (S6).
The two men who uttered the sentence [(S6) ], one in the reign of Louis
XV, and one in the reign of Louis XIV, each made a different use of the
same sentence; whereas the two men who uttered the sentence
simultaneously in the reign of Louis XIV, made the same use of the same
sentence ... we cannot talk of the sentence being about a particular person, for the same sentence may be used at different times to talk about
quite different particular persons.9
Clearly these comments cannot be construed as applying to (S6). And
the only difference between (S2) and (S6) is that the egocentricity of
"present" has been eliminated from (S6). So we must conclude with
Russell that Strawson's comments should be taken as a description of
the linguistic function of egocentric particulars in sentences and not
as a criticism of the theory of descriptions.In conclusion then, I believe it might be helpful to set out some
of the fundamental claims which the theory of descriptions is and is
not asserting. First, what Russell is doing:
(1) The theory is meant to deal with denoting phrases which are
being used in order to refer uniquely, i.e., definite descriptions.
(2) Unlike proper names, definite descriptions have no meaning
in isolation, and, therefore, can only refer successfully if they entail a
uniquely existential claim.
9 Contemporary Readings, p. 11 1.
536
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
(3) Furthermore, the theory is able to handle significant, but
nondenoting instances of definite descriptions; i.e., they are false
since the existential claim is unfulfilled.
What Russell is not saying in the theory is:
(4) The theory is capable of analyzing all denoting phrases (all
'the' phrases), even those which are not uniquely referring (e.g., uses
of distributive singular terms such as "The elephant is a mammal").
(5) The theory deals with sentences and expressions which are
not used to make assertions (state propositions).
(6) The theory deals with sentences containing uneliminated
egocentric terms or expressions (and which thereby can be used to
state different propositions under varying circumstances).
I do not mean to imply by the foregoing that Russell's theory is
safe from all criticism. In particular, I believe, it fails ultimately
because of the inadequate theory of acquaintance by which the
primacy of proper names is supported. However, I feel that a good
deal of criticism of the theory of descriptions is predicated on a
misunderstanding of Russell's program as exemplified by the six propositions above.
In this essay I hope to have shed some light primarily on assertions (3), (5), and (6) above. A similar analysis is called for in order to
illuminate (1), (2), and (4). Under this suggested analysis one would
develop the difference between denoting phrases, generally speaking,
and the subset, definite descriptions, along with the crucial thesis embodied in the no-meaning-in-isolation principle. It is, I believe, in
such a discussion that the answer is to be found to those recent, hasty
criticisms that the theory of descriptions is circular. (See Linsky's
Referring, and Searle's Speech Acts for example.) I have completed
this discussion elsewhere.I0
It is clear that serious Russellian scholarship has foundered in
the last few decades. I suspect the reason for this is that Russell's
atomism has suffered from neglect. It has been lost in the shadow cast
by the early Wittgenstein no doubt. After all, why study "The
Philosophy of Logical Atomism" when you have the Tractatus?
Perhaps such an attitude is justifiable, but the harm done is that in
neglecting to scrutinize Russell's actual works, one is led to assume
that certain misinformed and misdirected attacks constitute the final
word on the views expressed in those works.
In this light, I hope to have corrected a flaw responsible for the
widespread tendency in the study of the theory of reference; the
tendency to ignore the substance of Russell's short, cryptic "Mr.
10 James Austin, "Denoting Phrases and Definite
Descriptions," The Southern
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIV, No. 4, pp. 393-399.
RUSSELL'S CRYPTIC RESPONSE TO STRAWSON
537
Strawson on Referring." Most read his article as the incomprehensible ramblings of an old warrior no longer able rationally to defend his
theory from its detractors. While his thoughts are admittedly skeletal
and recondite, they are neither ultimately incomprehensible nor ravings of senility. Moreover, they are right.
JESUSCOLLEGE,OXFORD UNIVERSITY.
JAMES W. AUSTIN.