The moral status of the human fetus: a pro-choice approach
Bobbie Farsides
Professor of Clinical and Biomedical Ethics
Brighton and Sussex Medical School
I have been asked to consider the status of the human fetus from a pro-choice perspective. I should
therefore state from the outset that there is no one fixed pro-choice position on this matter as those
who support a woman’s right to choose may do so whilst holding a wide range of views regarding
the embryo’s status, some of which will look very similar to those held by opponents of abortion.
When debating the issue of embryo research and assisted reproduction in the context of English law
Dame Mary Warnock famously asserted that the likelihood of getting people to agree on the moral
status of the embryo was slim to non-existent. In light of this she felt that what was needed was an
approach to the issue that allowed enough people to think things were ‘alright’ rather than
establishing what was ‘right’. It may be helpful to hold on to this way of thinking when considering
the fetus, because even if we cannot agree on the moral status of the fetus we nonetheless need to
find a way of making decisions about it.
Despite the tendency to disagree we continue to worry about this issue of moral status, and
particularly in relation to abortion we seem convinced that before we move to discussing the
relative rights of women and fetuses we need to establish what type of being we consider the fetus
to be. In doing so we make a metaphysical and/or religious claim which will go on to have profound
moral consequences, sometimes far beyond the issue at hand.
The fact that a fetus is carried in a woman’s body means that even once its identity and moral status
is determined there is further work needed to establish a way forward in terms of how to treat the
fetus, particularly when a conflict of interest arises. Early feminist commentators sometimes worked
with the idea of a woman exercising a right of self-defence against the fetus which did not rely upon
limiting the moral status of the fetus, but rather considered the place the fetus occupied in the
woman’s body and life and the impact thereof. Subsequent pro-choice advocates would probably
agree that whilst it might be helpful to establish some sense of the moral status of the fetus in order
to debate the rights and wrongs of abortion, it is not always going to be seen as sufficient to settling
the argument.
In many ways the simplest position to hold is that the fetus as a form of human life has special moral
status from the very beginning of its existence. This claim can be made in a number of different
ways, some of which depend upon sharing particular religious beliefs such as the sanctity of human
life and the concept of ensoulment, some of which depend upon making secular claims about the
intrinsic value of humanness, and others of which rely on arguments of potentiality – that is the idea
that because it could become a fully-fledged person the fetus should be given the rights afforded to
persons, particularly the right to life.
All these approaches have been challenged, even those of religious faith can differ in their beliefs
about issues such as when the soul enters the body. More importantly these types of explanation
are only compelling to people of faith or those with a particular world view. They are not subject to
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proof or scientific observation, but when enshrined in law they can be imposed on others who do
not share the beliefs upon which they rest.
Potentiality based arguments are subject to a number of criticisms. Just because something has the
potential to become something else this does not mean we have to treat the thing it is now in
exactly the same way as we would treat the thing it could become. So for example we choose to
protect aged oak trees because of their beauty, their history and their relationship to the wider
environment, yet we don’t feel the need to save and propagate every acorn that falls from the tree.
Similarly the destruction of a small sapling whilst regrettable would not be seen in the same way as
the felling the 200 year old tree. Whilst we sometimes rely on potentiality arguments in relation to
people who are already born, being careful not to thwart their potential to thrive and trying to give
them as open a future as possible, this need not necessarily go alongside a commitment to support
the existence of all possible people through the prohibition of contraception, embryo research and
abortion.
Having said this it is important to acknowledge that a fetus changes significantly through the nine
months of a pregnancy, and it is unsurprising that many people would consider linking a growing
moral status to that biological development. This is often presented in terms of a claim that at some
point during its biological development something happens to signal the beginning of a person in the
morally meaningful sense of the word. Somewhere along the line human material becomes a human
being, and many would accept that as this human being develops moral status grows. In the context
of this debate the most significant shift occurs when the fetus acquires a right to life which requires
others to respect and potentially protect its existence.
The development of sentience is often suggested as a morally significant development and has been
influential in terms of time limits set on both embryo research and abortion. It is however important
to acknowledge that basing a fetus’s right to life on its ability to feel pain raises profound questions
about our responsibilities to other sentient beings such as non-human animals. If the ability to feel
pain affords special status we need to question many of our practices in relation to other sentient
beings, many of which we harm or kill to serve our own interests. For a pro-choice advocate who
allows for the possibility of abortion sentience may speak to the question of when and how to end a
fetal life so that it can be done painlessly.
In common sense terms birth appears to mark the definitive arrival of a new human being in the
world and few would question the right to life of a new born baby. Having said this, some dispute
the moral relevance of travelling down the birth canal or being lifted from the womb claiming that
the fetus prior to and immediately after birth is exactly the same being and should be afforded the
same rights. Others would claim that birth this is the definitive marker of the fetus’s viability – its
ability to exist independently of the woman – and only once it has been born does it acquire rights
exactly equivalent to the woman and other persons. For some philosophers birth is irrelevant
because they see the term ‘person’ as being attached to certain advanced capacities or
characteristics of human beings such as self-consciousness, the sense of a past and a future and the
possession of goals and intentions a full right to life none of which are present at birth. This leads
them to hold that the life of a new born baby has less moral status than a more developed human
being and consequently fewer rights.
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So, the position is this. People fundamentally disagree about the identity of a fetus and therefore
find it even more difficult to agree on its moral status and the claims that can be based on that. At
the same time few believe that any form of human life is without some special status, requiring that
we treat it in particular ways for example by governing what is done to it and with it with great care
and avoiding causing it pain. Others would claim that the way in which we treat any form of human
life is an important marker of our societal values and a sign of our virtue (or lack of such). Whist its
status remains disputed we understand that we will be judged by how we behave in relation to the
fetus. We therefore need to reach some form of societal consensus on the important question of
how to treat the fetus in the full knowledge that we may never agree on its moral status. If this is the
case it seems particularly problematic to settle on the most conservative and therefore restrictive
interpretation, which means that all women are required to accept the full and equal moral status of
the fetus, particularly if it is increasingly challenged within the society in question.
The status that it is important to establish is the legal status of the fetus, and in establishing the legal
status of the fetus we cannot ignore the extent to which the fate of the fetus is bound up with that
of the woman carrying it. We cannot ignore the fact that a prima facie claim to status may not
always win out in competition with competing claims.
Those who have a clear and definite view of the moral status of the fetus will always be free to make
their own choices within a more permissive legal regime. If one believes that the fetus has a God
given right to life from the moment of conception you will remain free to make choices consistent
with that belief. However, for as long as the law depends entirely upon a claim of equal status that
many find difficult to sustain outside of a particular religious framework women will be subjected to
life changing and even life threatening decisions based upon a metaphysical claim which in their
eyes may be neither valid nor definitive. An increasingly contested account of the moral status of
the embryo and fetus can only hold sway through the exertion of political power affording it a
societal significance it no longer deserves. The battle is not therefore between competing accounts
of the moral status of the embryo but rather between moral liberalism and absolutism.
In conclusion a pro-choice account of the status of the human embryo acknowledges the uncertainty
and disagreement at the heart of the matter and asks that we desist from seeking agreement where
none will be found. The pro-choice position also asks that in place of imposing a unitary approach
on this most metaphysical of issues we should trust women to act morally and make choices that
they can individually live with. Those who have moral reservations based upon their interpretation
of the status of the human fetus will remain free to act in accordance with their conscience and at
the same time other women will have a new found freedom to act in ways that they find both
necessary and ethically permissible.
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