Patterns of Protest in Burma
Word Count: 16,193
© Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust UK
University of East London
AIM 403: Dissertation (Social Sciences)
MSc NGO and Development Management
Student number: 0818211
Date: 24.09.09
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Contents
1. Introduction
5
- Social Movement Theory
5
- Democracy
6
- Research Method
7
- Burma or Myanmar?
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2. Contextual issues
- Historical Background
3. The opposition
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11
15
- Lack of Trust and Cooperation within the Burmese Opposition
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- Efforts at Dialogue and Cooperation
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-
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Structural Strains as Catalyst for Opposition
- The Ethnic Opposition
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- Demands for autonomy
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- Struggle against Burmanisation
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- The Democratic Opposition
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- The 1988 Student Uprising
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- The Saffron Revolution
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2
4. Opportunities and Constraints posed by the Military junta
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- Force
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- Use of force against the opposition
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- Human Right abuses in the civilian population
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- Co-optation
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5. Opposition within and outside the Junta’s Control
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- The Roadmap towards Democracy
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- The Roadmap as a Co-optation Mechanism
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- The Ethnic Opposition
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- The Ceasefire Agreements
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- Ethnic groups’ Participation in the National Convention
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- Lack of Political Progress within the Legal Fold
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- The Democratic Opposition
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- The Democratic Voice of Burma
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- The Burmese Democratic Movement Association
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6. Framing and Construction of “Truth”
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- The Military Regime’s Rhetoric and Truth
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- The Ethnic Opposition
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- The Democratic Opposition
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- Legitimacy from the 1990 Election Results
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- Aung San Suu Kyi
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7. Conclusion
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References
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1. Introduction
Burma has a long history of military dictatorship. Since the military staged a coup in1962 the
country has been ruled by successive authoritarian governments (Charney, 2009: 108). The
years of military rule have been marked by severe repression of the people in Burma. The
Burma Campaign UK (BCUK) calls the regime one of “the world’s worst violators of human
rights” (BCUK, 2009a). The military junta has set strict limits on political participation from
its people and opposition against the government is severely repressed. The dictatorships have
enforced limits on freedom of speech, organisation and press and use brutal force to repress
its critics (Charney, 2009). This paper is about how the opposition in Burma is manoeuvring
within and outside these limits and their strategies to achieve democracy and political
participation within this repressive regime. It is about the relations between the state and its
opponents. It argues that the regime uses instruments of repression and co-optation to
maintain power. These strategies have stimulated strains and contradictions within the
regime’s approach, which are exploited by the opposition.
Social movement theory
To assist in the understanding of the dynamics between the military regime and its opposition
I believe it is useful to mobilise aspects from Social Movement Theory (SMT). SMT is the
study of social protest, collective action and social movements. Questions like how social
movements emerge, how social mobilisation happens, what shapes the movements and how
and under which conditions the movements bring about change are the centre of research
within SMT (Meyer, 2002). I will use the concept “structural strains” from SMT to
understand the background and the reasons for the rise of the anti-regime groups in Burma
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(Wiktorowicz, 2004: 6). Further I will use the concepts “opportunities” and “constraints” to
show how the military junta tries to restrict its opposition and sets the parameters for their
opportunities (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 13). In relation to this I will show how the government
rules through force and co-optation. I will further investigate how the opposition is
responding to these constraints and how the opposition manoeuvres within this terrain, or
finds alternative opportunities for opposition outside the regimes realm of control. I will also
use the concept “framing” to show how the government presents a certain reality through
propaganda and self representation and how the opposition movement is contesting this
discourse in different ways and with the aid of different resources (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 15).
Democracy
The underlying basis for this essay is a concern for democracy. In this paper I refer to a
broader definition of democracy than merely the right to vote. I agree with Welzel and
Ingleharts’ understanding of democracy as “governance by the people” (Welzel and Inglehart,
2008: 126). They argue that democracy is more than electing a government and letting elected
officials control the political scene. People should also be able to influence politicians’
decisions and actions. They argue that the essence of democracy is that it empowers ordinary
citizens. Human empowerment means that the people themselves get resources which enable
them to influence and place real pressure on the government in its decisions and actions.
Elections must be followed by deliberation where the people are able to influence decisions
made in the government, so that these can be the result of the will of the people. The
authorities must be responsive to the orientation of the population and respect the political and
civil rights in the country. For this to happen, important prerequisites must be in place, such as
channels for participation and forums where deliberations can take place. It is also essential
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that the people themselves see democracy as an important value worth maintaining (Welzel
and Inglehart, 2008). Not all formal democracies operate according to this definition of
democracy, and it can in many instances be more of an ideal than an actual description.
Nonetheless, certain basic requirements must be present in democracies, for example free and
fair elections and freedom of speech, organisation and press. None of these are present in
Burma. This paper is motivated from an interest in a people who demand these democratic
rights and in how they struggle to achieve democracy in their country.
Research method
The background information for this paper comes from an extensive literature review. The
sources are mainly from the library at the School of Oriental and African Studies. The
background information is also from interviews with seven informants1. These are all
involved in the struggle for democracy in Burma in various ways.
•
Khin Maung Win is the Deputy Chief Director of Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB),
a media institution based in Oslo which provides a forum for the Burmese people in
which they can voice their opinion. He was also active in the 1988 student protest.
•
Thant Zin Oo works at the London-based Burmese Democratic Movement
Association (BDMA) which works for democracy in Burma and supports the
democracy movement. He was a leader in the democratic student movement in 1988
and worked in the All Burmese Student Democratic Front (ABSDF) on the ThailandBurma border for 11 years.
1
Six of the interviews were executed in London and Oslo during August and September 2009. The interviews
were recorded with permission from the informants. The interview with the NCGUB official was performed via
email.
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•
Sasa is a Burmese doctor who is currently setting up a hospital at the India- Burma
border.
•
Ben Rogers is South Asia Advocacy Officer in Christian Solidarity Worldwide in
London. He is the author of the book “A land without evil. Stopping the genocide of
Burma’s Karen people” about the atrocities of the government and the struggles of the
Karen people of Burma (Rogers, 2004). He is also currently working on a book about
the Burmese military general Than Shwe. Through his work he has travelled
extensively in both the ethnic and urban areas of Burma.
•
Aase Sand is working in the Norwegian Burma Committee (NBC) which supports the
Burmese opposition inside and outside Burma. NBC is based in Oslo.
•
Hilde Salvesen is a Special Advisor in charge of the human rights programme at the
Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights which is promoting democracy and human
rights in Burma.
•
I also interviewed an official from the National Coalition Government of the Union of
Burma (NCGUB) who prefers to be anonymous. NCGUB has been created by exiled
members of the government elected in 1990 and is sometimes described as the
government in exile (Williams, 2009). It is based in Washington.
Burma or Myanmar?
In 1989 the military junta changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Some countries, like
France and Japan as well as the UN use the new name Myanmar. Others like the British
government and the government of the USA do not recognize the legitimacy of the military
junta and therefore do not see it as their right to change the country’s name. The opposition
movement also uses Burma (BBC, 2007). Based on the way it came to power and its human
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rights records I agree that the junta should not be recognised as a legitimate government and
will in this paper use the name Burma.
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2. Contextual issues
Burma has an ethnically diverse population of 55, 4 million people consisting of
approximately 135 ethnic groups (UNFPA, 2004). The largest ethnic group is the Burmans
who control the political, economic and military scene (Bowers, 2004: 19). Other larger
groups are Mon, Shan, Kachin, Karen, Chin, Karenni and Arakan (Gravers, 2007: 4). The
majority of Burmans live in the central areas of Burma, while the ethnic minorities live
mainly in the more densely populated and less accessible border areas (South, 2003: 7- 8).
Reliable data on the various ethnic groups are hard to find. While the Burman military
government claims that approximately 70% of the population is Burman, non- Burman groups
claim that 70% of the population is of non- Burman ethnicity and only 30% are Burman. Most
statistics lie somewhere between these two extremes (HRW, 2002: 15). The ethnic groups
controlled large amounts of territories for decades. In late 1980s through to the mid 1990s,
however, the military launched attacks against the ethnic groups to gain control over the
ethnic areas. This severely weakened the ethnic groups and led many of them to sign ceasefire
agreements with the government (IHRC, 2009: 14; South, 2003: 44).
Burma is one of the poorest countries in the world and classified by the UN as a Least
Developed Country. The paradox is that Burma could be one of the richest countries in Asia
because of its national resources in teak, oil, gas, gold and precious stones (ABSDF, 1998: 13;
IHRC, 2009: 11). Despite this, a large percentage of the Burmese population lives in poverty.
A survey from 1997 showed that 22.9% have expenditures below the minimum subsistence
level and the people in Burma spend an average 71% of their revenue on food (UNFPA,
2004). Burma ranked in 2006 as number 135 out of 179 countries on the UN’s Human
Development Index (UNDP, 2008). The reason for this contradiction lies in government
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corruption and spending that does not benefit the people of Burma. This is partly made
possible by corporate businesses investing in Burmese natural resources. All the major
opposition groups in Burma have “called on foreign companies not to invest in Burma
because of the role investment plays in perpetrating dictatorship” (BCUK, 2005: 6). Not only
is investments in the natural resources of Burma funding the dictators, it is also influencing
their countries’ policy towards Burma. One of the major investors in Burmese oil is the
French company TOTAL Oil. BCUK argues that TOTAL Oil “has influence over French
foreign policy and therefore on European Burma policy as a whole” (BCUK, 2005: 6). It
argues further that “as long as TOTAL remains in Burma, the dictatorship will be satisfied
that the chances of real pressure against it are unlikely” (BCUK, 2005: 6).
The military regime has one of the largest armies in Asia, consisting of 500,000 military
personnel (BCUK, 2009b). While the government is spending approximately 50% of the
national budget on its army, it has the lowest expenditure on health care compared to total
government expenditure in Southeast Asia. While Burma spent 1.8% of its total expenditure
on health care in 2006, neighbouring Thailand spent 11.3% of total expenditure on health care
(BCUK, 2009c; WHO, 2006). In 2000 World Health Organisation (WHO) ranked Burma as
190 out of 191 countries in the provision of health care services to its people (BCUK, 2005:
9).
Historical Background
Burma achieved independence from British colonial rule in 1948. It then became a
parliamentary democracy (IHRC, 2009: 9). This was a turbulent time in the history of Burma.
Old rivalries and calls for independence motivated many ethnic and political groups to fight
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the central government. This was the start of a civil war that continues today (Charney, 2009).
The democracy did not last very long: in 1962 the army led by General Ne Win staged a coup.
The country was then ruled by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) where the
“Burmese Way to Socialism” and isolationist politics were pursued (IHRC, 2009: 10). The
dictatorship under BSPP was characterised by human right violations and severe restriction of
opposition (BCUK, 2009d). In addition to violations of human rights the economy fell into
decline as a result of the government’s mismanagement. Civil discontent over the economy
and the conduct of the dictatorship grew and in August 1988 there were demonstrations of
hundreds of thousands of protesters all over Burma who demanded democracy and human
rights. The junta responded with a massive attack, using unrestrained violence to crack down
on the protesters. The exact number of deaths during the student uprising will probably never
be known. Most estimates lie around 3,000 deaths, but these are regarded as conservative
figures (HRW, 2009: 11, IHRC: 11- 12). The same year the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) seized power by a coup. It is not clear whether the coup was a result of
internal disputes or whether it was a strategy to consolidate further the power of the military.
SLORC removed themselves from the socialist isolationist economic policy and started to
liberalise the economy (Bowers, 2004: 8- 9).
The 1988 student uprising succeeded in pressuring the junta into holding elections. These
took place in 1990 with the National League for Democracy (NLD) winning a landslide
victory, securing 392 out of 485 seats in the parliament. To counteract their defeat the ruling
junta decided to change the rules and claimed that the election was not for parliament, but for
members of a constituency to create a new constitution, claiming that before a new
government could take over a new constitution had to be created. The military regime has
ruled ever since, changing only its name in 1997 to the State Peace and Development Council
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(SPDC) (HRW, 2009: 12). To create the constitution the SLORC set up a National
Convention led by the military. The NLD was a part of the National Convention until 1995
when it left in protest against the junta’s restrictions on speech and discussion. This led to the
suspension of the National Convention (Williams, 2009). The National Convention was later
reconvened again as a part of a so called “Seven-Step Roadmap” towards democracy which
was adopted by the government in 2003. The steps in the Roadmap include reconvening of
the National Convention, drafting a new constitution, holding a referendum to adopt the
constitution, elections, convening of parliament and the formation of a new government
(Kramer, 2009: 32). The reconvened National Convention drafted a constitution which was
adopted by a referendum in 2008 (Kramer: 35). The next step is the election, which is planned
to take place in 2010.
A second mass demonstration against the regime took place in 2007. It has been named the
“Saffron Revolution” after the colour of the robes worn by monks, who led the protests.
Again, deteriorating economic conditions and repression by the military dictatorship were key
reasons for the protests. The peaceful demonstration was soon violently attacked. Riot police
shooting into crowds and beating peaceful protesters caused many deaths. Civilian protesters
as well as activists from the 1988 demonstration were detained arbitrarily (IHRC, 2009: 17).
The Human Rights Documentation Unit (HRDU) estimates that approximately 6,000 people
were arrested in relation to the protests, many without proper procedures (HRDU, 2008: 13).
Some were arrested merely for applauding the protesters or giving water to the monks. Family
members of protesters were also arrested when protesters themselves could not be
apprehended (HRDU, 2008). Over 20 people died in custody due to torture under
interrogation and denial of medical treatment (HRDU, 2008: 111). Most of the arrests in
relation to the protest were night time abductions. Night raids were also executed in the
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monasteries, where the military assaulted and arrested monks to inhibit their participation in
the protests (HRDU, 2008). HRDU reports that “many of these raids were especially violent.
Monks were badly beaten, shots were fired, and monastic property was either looted of
destroyed” (HRDU, 2008: 13). The military also collectively punished neighbourhoods at
locations where protests had been conducted. The military took residents of whole streets into
custody, cut their phone lines, closed their stores and put restrictions on their movements
(HRDU, 2008).
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3. The opposition
The Burmese opposition is normally divided in two groups: the ethnic and the democratic
opposition. In the case of the former I refer to groups which are fighting for greater control in
what they see as their own territory. They also fight for democracy in Burma. Many of these
groups have since independence fought the central government with violent means to achieve
political change, but most have now been forced to agree on ceasefire agreements with the
military government (Williams, 2009). In the case of the democratic opposition I refer to the
movement fighting for democracy in Burma with Aung San Suu Kyi as its leading symbol.
An important actor is also the NLD, which won the 1990 election. NLD still see itself as the
legitimate government of Burma as to this day the military junta has not officially dissolved
the parliament. The democratic movement is seen by many ethnic leaders as dominated by
Burmans and Burman concerns (Williams, 2009). Each movement has its own umbrella
organisations. The Ethnic Nationalities Council is typically oriented toward the issues of the
ethnic groups, while the National Council of the Union of Burma is often thought to be more
oriented towards the Burmans. In reality the division between these two groups is not this
clear cut; membership overlaps and they each fight for the goal of democracy and replacing
the authoritarian military regime with a civilian elected government. Even though each
struggles against a common enemy, their goals are prioritised differently. Some in the
democratic movement want to fight for democracy in a unitary state first, and then deal with
the issue of greater self governance for the ethnic groups. For most ethnic groups, however,
the issue of greater self governance is just as important as democracy and some see
democracy in a unitary state as a prison (Williams, 2009).
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Lack of trust and cooperation within the Burmese opposition
As I will show later in this paper, the opposition in Burma is strategically taking advantage of
opportunities that exist to overcome constraints posed by the military junta. However, the
opposition has been too divided to co-operate fully. This is a very difficult area, but one that
could have a great potential in the struggle for democracy in Burma. If the opposition could
manage to coordinate themselves and pull together in a unified and stronger movement they
could have better chances of achieving their joint goal. According to Oo, the main weakness
in the opposition is lack of cooperation and coordination within the movement. Even though
all groups are fighting against the same regime, different aims, visions and strategies have
resulted in a lack of common strategy and coherence. If the opposition could pull together
under the same vision the opposition movement would have better chances of achieving
freedom and democracy in Burma. He says that this is one of the most important strategies to
achieve their joint goal of democracy in Burma. The military junta is very systematic. Oo
suggests that if the opposition movement could manage to do the same, to systemise
themselves and work for the same thing at the same time a lot could happen. He believes
many international organisations and governments are helping the junta with the upcoming
elections because that is the only current option. Oo argues that if the opposition movement
could unite itself, with the clear support of the international community, they could be able to
present an alternative. With the stronger bargaining power cooperation would bring, they
would have better chances at pressuring the SPDC into a tripartite dialogue, which is the main
strategy of the opposition.
The democratic and the ethnic movements have not been able to unite and form a shared
agenda because they have had serious problems trusting each other. The conflict about how
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much autonomy ethnic groups should have is an extremely important and difficult issue and
the centre of much of the conflict between the Burmans and the other groups. Even though the
general stance of the democratic opposition aims for a federal state which gives the various
ethnic groups greater self control, there is disagreement about what should be prioritised. The
democratic opposition, largely with backing from the international community, wants to see
democracy first and then to deal with the ethnic issues. The ethnic groups feel that their ethnic
issues are neglected and not prioritised and fear that they will not be given importance, even
under a civilian government. They feel that the Burmans have always regarded them as
inferior and are scared that this will lead to neglect in economic and social development in the
ethnic areas. So while the ethnic groups fear that ethnic claims for federalism will be ignored,
the democratic movement fears that the ethnic groups will use violence to press for their
independence and break up the union (Kramer, 2009: 31; Williams, 2009).
Because the ethnic dimension is so central on the political stage, it is essential for sustainable
peace and democracy that the ethnic demands are not ignored and that the ethnic groups are
included in decision making concerning their own situation. Kramer warns that if this does
not happen “the prospects for peace and democratisation are grim” (Kramer, 2009: 5). He
further states that “the single most important factor in achieving peace in Burma is to find a
lasting political solution for the repression of ethnic rights in Burma” (Kramer, 2009: 36).
Rogers also argues that:
Having a clear agreement for federal democracy and giving the states a certain amount
of autonomy within a federal union (..) will reduce the tensions. I think if the ethnic
peoples feel that the Burman democracy movement is imposing its will in the same
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way as the military is imposing its will, and is not acknowledging ethnic rights, then
the problems will continue.
Rogers is confident that civil war will cease if an acceptable federal agreement is in place.
Most of my other informants also argue that for the civil war to stop, ethnic groups must feel
that their ethnic rights are acknowledged. A solution where all stakeholders are participating
and where one can reach an agreement which all can benefit from was emphasised as vital for
peace and democracy in Burma. Amongst my informants there is a firm belief that with the
right preparations in place these problems could be overcome. In relation to this, the need for
dialogue and consolidation of forums for cooperation were emphasised.
Efforts at dialogue and cooperation
There are several positive signs which give hope for cooperation and trust between the
Burmans and the other ethnic groups, a point mentioned by several of my informants. An
example of this is an informal constitution drafting process currently taking place. This is a
collaborative effort between the ethnic and the democratic movements with the assistance of
the Burma Lawyers Council. The drafting process has been marked by deep and bitter
disagreements, conflicts, mutual criticism, tension and problems related to the lack of trust
between the two groups. Despite this, the process has served as a platform for dialogue and
for finding common ground between these groups. The process has helped in building a
united opposition movement with a clear and shared vision of what Burma can become in the
event of democracy. Both sides have experienced that they have more in common than they
thought, and have agreed on important compromises. Few of the ethnic minorities demand the
right to secession or independence any longer and few Burmans in the democratic movement
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demand a strong centralised state. New trust in each other has enabled them to enter honest
discussions about the deep and problematic issues between them. The informal drafting
process has also been educational for both the democratic and ethnic leaders in democratic
processes and constitution making which will prepare them for democracy in Burma
(Williams, 2009).
The NCGUB officer informed me about a conference held in Jakarta in August 2009. This
was organised by the Movement for Democracy and Rights for Ethnic Nationalities
(MDREN) an umbrella group consisting of NCGUB and other leading opposition groups.
MDREN calls itself a “historical coalition” (MDREN, 2009a) and an “unprecedented
alliance” (MDREN, 2009c: 1) between ethnic nationalities and pro- democracy groups. A
result of the conference was the “Proposal for National Reconciliation: Towards Democracy
and Development in Burma” (MDREN, 2009b). In this proposal cooperation between the
groups is described as an historic opportunity for the opposition movement because its
elements are able to speak with one voice and are willing to commit to compromises
(MDREN, 2009b: 3). The conference also resulted in a joint communiqué stating that
representatives from the ethnic, democratic and civil society organisations “have reached a
common vision for peaceful and all inclusive transition to democracy in Burma” (MDREN,
2009c: 1). The communiqué further states the importance of recognition of the ethnic
communities and that they must not be sidelined from the national political process. It also
states that national reconciliation is the main prerequisite for democracy and development
(MDREN, 2009c).
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Structural strains as a catalyst for opposition
I will use the concept of structural strains as a catalyst for opposition to assist in
understanding of the causes behind the opposition in Burma. In SMT structural strains are
seen as catalysts that cause people to create and join social movements (Wiktorowicz, 2004:
6- 9). In the Burmese context these strains are in different ways linked to the repressive nature
of the regime. Although the strains that have given rise to both the ethnic and democratic
opposition share common characteristics the different situations addressed by these two
groups have led to differences between them.
The ethnic opposition
The ethnic opposition consists of a myriad of elements whose main aim is greater self
governance for the group and control over territory each sees as a traditional land. The groups
demand autonomy in varying degrees, from federalism to secession. They also fight for
development in their areas, for minority rights and for a democratic Burma (Kramer, 2009;
Williams, 2009). The ethnic peoples have long suffered from repression from central
governments. According to South, “forms of ‘ethnic cleansing’ have for some 30 years been a
fact of life in many ethnic minority areas” (South, 2003: 9). Gravers explains the violent
repression of the ethnic peoples out of “nationalistic paranoia” in which the central
governments’ fear of disintegration, foreign takeover and the disappearance of Burmese
culture has motivated them to commit many atrocities (Gravers, 1999: 2). Fear of loosing
power within a Burman elite group has also motivated repression of the ethnic peoples
(Gravers, 1999: 2).
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Demands for autonomy
One of the structural strains that has led ethnic peoples to join insurgent movements is lack of
political channels which enables them to influence decision-making concerning their own
lives. Ethnic groups’ demands for greater autonomy have been ignored and neglected by the
central governments. While historically both the democratic and authoritarian governments
have prioritised national unity, ethnic groups have been struggling for independence and self
governance (Smith, 1999). Central governments have since independence tried to integrate the
ethnically diverse mini-states of Burma into a centralised union. The groups have historically
enjoyed a large degree of independence over their areas and have resisted efforts at
centralisation. This conflict of interest has led to repeated insurgencies and civil war (Smith,
1999: 27).
After independence the government adopted a constitution that concentrated power in the
central government instead of giving the ethnic peoples the autonomy they wanted. This led
the latter to fight the central government and was the beginning of a civil war which continues
today. The original plan in the preparations for independence was to grant some degree of
federalism to some ethnic groups through the Panglong Agreement of 1947. The agreement
identified a quasi- federal state, but power was in reality in the central government. However,
Aung San, the Burman leader of the Panglong process, was assassinated by his rivals before
these plans were realised (Williams, 2009; South, 2008: 25- 26). The demands of the ethnic
minorities have since been suppressed and ignored by the central government. The
dictatorships have refused to give the ethnic groups any rights which can lead to greater
independence. Neither have they been willing to enter into a dialogue with the ethnic groups
about their demands (Kramer, 2009).
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Struggle against Burmanisation
Within the ethnic struggle for independence is also a struggle against assimilation to the
Burman culture. The protection and survival of ethnic identity and culture is very important
for the ethnic minorities. The ethnic groups do not see themselves as part of a national unity,
but have for several years identified themselves in opposition to the Burman majority (South,
2003: 4). The governments, on the other hand, have since independence tried to impose the
idea of a common Burmese identity on the myriad of diverse ethnic groups (Smith, 1999: 35).
The Burmese nationalist movement, dominated by Burmans, is trying to impose Burman
history and culture as the singular ethnic culture in Burma. This has led the central
governments to suppress the various indigenous cultures (South, 2008: 28). Schools are built
up in ethnic areas to teach the various ethnic groups the Burmese language and Burman
national culture. Further, the government does not allow the teaching of local languages in
schools as part of the official curriculum (South, 2008: 51; South, 2007b: 10; Steinberg, 2007:
125). The ethnic groups fight against what they see as the threat of Burmanisation; the
suppression of ethnic cultures and assimilation into the Burman culture (South, 2008: 29). I
will discuss Burmanisation more fully in a later chapter. Sufficient to say here is that these
efforts by the central governments are also structural strains that have catalysed the ethnic
groups in the struggle for the preservation of what they see as their endangered cultures and
identities.
The democratic opposition
I will use the two pro- democratic mass protests in Burma, the 1988 student uprising and the
Saffron Revolution, to show how structural strains have served as catalysts for the democratic
22
movement. The two protests were both outcomes of economic shocks which severely affected
people’s already strained economic circumstances in combination with longstanding
dissatisfaction with the dictatorship and its repression of the people.
The 1988 student uprising
In September 1987, in an attempt to fight the black market, the BSPP demonetised all 25, 35
and 75 kyat notes without offering any compensation to the people. This effectively wiped out
80% of the currency in circulation and many people lost their savings overnight. The
increased hardship this brought to the already impoverished population led many to the streets
to protest. The protests were quickly brought under control but the frustrations over the
regime remained (Singh, 2006: 38- 39). The population in Burma had for a long time been
frustrated and dissatisfied with its government: The people were tired of the lack of change
and the regime’s manipulation and lies. The “Burmese road to socialism” had brought Burma
to a low in economic performance. LDC status, huge foreign debts, low GDP growth rate,
isolation of the economy, declining value of exports and low creditworthiness all contributed
to economic strain on the population (Charney, 2009: 144- 147).
The 1988 student uprising was sparked off by clashes between students and the army.
Students were initially protesting over the military’s excessive use of force after an incident
between students and locals. This would normally have been a minor incident. But because of
the widespread frustration over the regime and its policies this incident started several antiregime protests and eventually months later led to mass protests for democracy and economic
reforms all over Burma (Charney, 2009; HRW, 2007: 16- 17).
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The Saffron Revolution
The Saffron Revolution was also the result of sudden economic crisis and long standing
frustration with the regime. Dissatisfaction grew when the steps in the Roadmap proved to be
carefully planned shams to postpone the handing over of power to an elected civilian
government (Charney, 2009: 196). Also, mismanagement of the economy and corruption in
the Burmese elite resulted in poverty for the people while the military elite enjoyed extreme
wealth. The SPDC, for example, has a monopoly of Burma’s oil and gas exports which
enables them to enrich themselves at the expense of the wider population (HRDU, 2008: 1516).
Also the huge spending on the military while a large share of the population was not able to
cover their basic needs led to deep dissatisfaction (HRDU, 2008: 16). The Human Rights
Documentation Unit (HRDU) writes that “The SPDC’s pervasive military apparatus is also an
important factor in permitting the military oligarchs to exploit the country’s natural resources
while neglecting the economic situation for the civilian populace” (HRDU, 2008: 16). The
military junta needs huge resources to uphold their regime. To cover overspending they
started printing more money which resulted in inflation (HRDU, 2008: 20- 21). From late
2006 the price of daily necessities began to increase by up to 40% (Charney, 2009: 196).
When in August 2007 the government decided to stop subsidising fuel, leading to a steep
overnight increase in oil prices of between 100 and 500% the patience of the Burmese people
reached its limit (Charney, 2009:196). In September 2007 monks started taking to the streets,
openly declaring their dissatisfaction with the regime. The monks were soon followed by
hundreds of thousands of civilian protesters and this resulted in the second mass protest in
Burmese history (HRW, 2007).
24
4. Opportunities and constraints posed by the military
junta
In the SMT literature the concepts of “opportunities” and “constraints” are used to understand
how political, cultural, economic and social contexts shape movements and their dynamics.
The context movements are in influences their opportunity structures and can both limit and
empower them. In this way, external factors can assist in explaining the strategies and
dynamics of movements (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 13- 14). I will therefore mobilise the concepts
of opportunities and constraints to assist in understanding of strategies and dynamics of the
opposition movement in Burma.
To understand opportunities and constraints posed by the military junta, it is useful to take a
look at their strategies. Because the military government does not have the support of the
people, the junta is forced to focus upon security. Building up a strong regime is a huge drain
on their resources and use of force therefore has to be complemented with co-optation. Cooptation refers to “eliminating opposition to a cause, plan or organisation by assimilating
opponents into the group favouring the cause, plan or organisation. (..) Co-optation absorbs
the opposition.” (Kirst- Ashman and Hull, 2008: 444). This is often done by offering the
opposition some kind of benefit. For example, co-optation may imply that a “group’s
leadership (..) softens their demands and derive personal benefits from the dominants”
(Kriesberg, 2007: 116). I will later in the paper show that some leaders of ethnic groups have
been criticised by their own people for doing exactly that. However, co-optation strategies are
not only targeted at leaders of a group, but also at organisations, particular regions or at
society generally (Swamy and Gershman, 2003: 520). Later in the paper I will show how the
25
junta is assimilating and absorbing insurgency groups into its agenda and making them a part
of the political structure the junta has designed through the Roadmap. They achieve this by
using mechanisms of both force and co-optation. The regime is using brutal force towards its
opposition as well as giving it an opportunity to be co-opted into their political agenda and
operate within their sphere of influence. Recognition of these developments give an
understanding of the manoeuvring space the opposition is working within and how this has
shaped its strategies.
Force
Sasa told me:
The soldiers are everywhere. Nobody is fighting with them. They just come to rape and
take forced labour. They are not there to help people, they are there to make life
difficult. But some of the soldiers are suffering, because they are forced to do things
they don’t want to do.
Because the government is extremely unpopular with its own population it has been forced to
secure itself by building up an apparatus that can protect its position in power by force. After
the 1988 student uprising the junta expanded and modernised “for billions of dollars in arms
and military goods” (HRW, 2007b: 29). It dramatically expanded the number of its bases in
Burma and the numbers of battalions and infantry tripled (HRW, 2007b: 29). From 1988 to
the mid 1990s the state military, called Tatmandaw, increased from 200,000 to approximately
500,000 (HRW, 2007b: 29- 30). It also bought more modern weapon systems and improved
its already formidable intelligence system (Selth, 2000). Sasa explains this massive protection
26
apparatus out of the regime’s fear. It knows it’s guilty of 50 years of human right abuses and
dictatorship. It has no place in the international community and no popular support inside
Burma. He believes this leads the government to barricade itself inside their own extreme
military protection apparatus.
Use of force against the opposition
With an apparatus like this, the military is able to use extreme force against its opposition.
This was clearly demonstrated in the two mass protests. The 1988 student protests ended in a
massacre of peaceful protesters (Singh, 2006: 249). Torture and arrest became a daily
occurrence. Students were especially targeted and were arrested, killed, tortured (Singh, 2006:
77). The crackdown of the Saffron Revolution was executed in the same manner. The
enormous presence of riot police in the streets put an end to the protests with beatings of
monks and peaceful protesters, raiding of monasteries, mass arbitrary arrests and firing of
weapons to kill (HRW, 2007a). The NLD was also targeted after its 1990 election victory.
Members of the party have been victims of harassment, mass arrest, torture, detention,
disqualification, death in jail and many have been forced into exile (Singh, 2006: 249;
ABSDF, 1998).
The junta has also shown brutal force against the ethnic opposition. Most of the brutality, the
human rights abuses and the forced displacement concerning the ethnic minorites have
occurred in relation to the junta’s “four cuts strategy” (South, 2007a: 12- 13). The aim of this
strategy is to cut ties between the opposition and supporters in the villages in the four areas of
food, intelligence, funds and recruits (IHRC, 2009: 10). In relation to this strategy the UN has
27
reported widespread attacks on villages and forced displacement of villagers to scare or
punish the population from supporting rebel groups (IHRC, 2009: 44- 47).
Human rights abuses in the civilian population
A recent report “Crimes in Burma” published by the International Human Rights Clinic
(IHRC) at the University of Harvard claims that the situation in Burma is one of the worst
human rights crisis in the world (IHRC, 2009). The IHRC argues that the regime is guilty of
systematic and widespread violations of human rights and that the military government should
be charged with crimes against humanity. The report suggests that the human rights violations
executed by state officials are not only acts of individuals but are systematic state policy at the
highest level. The report concludes by suggesting that the UN Security Council should
establish a Commission of Inquiry to report on crimes against humanity in Burma. It also
suggests that UN member states should be prepared to bring the situation in Burma for the
International Criminal Court or a special tribunal for Burma (IHRC, 2009). The UN General
Assembly and Human Rights Council have passed resolutions condemning the regime’s
human rights violations every year since 1992, expressing concern over violations such as
torture, forced displacement of whole villages, forced labour, sexual violence, forced labour
and arbitrary executions (IHRC, 2009).
The four cuts strategy has led to the displacement of many rural people. UN evidence shows
over 3,000 villages being burnt to the ground or destroyed by the military regime and their
inhabitants forced to move (IHRC, 2009: 45). Sexual violence is also used as a tactic to
control the population. The scale is so serious that IHRC has argued that “the UN reports of
sexual violence occurring in eastern Burma establish a prima facie case of potential crimes
28
against the humanity and war crimes.” (IHRC, 2009: 51). Rape can be the army’s punishment
for supporting opposition groups or a means of terrorizing the population to control them.
Rape is often committed by military officers in front of their troops. Prosecution of those
involved is rare. Many victims are threatened, harassed and further assaulted if they report the
sexual assaults (IHRC, 2009, WLC, 2007). Human Right Watch (HRW) reported in 2002 that
“Burma is believed to have more child soldiers than any other country in the world” (HRW,
2002: 2). Sasa told me about how the military take children by force from schools or villages
and brainwash them and turn them into weapons of the military. His story is backed up by
HRW’s report: “My gun was as tall as me: Child soldiers in Burma” which shows how
children are forced to join the army and are bought and sold like commodities between
different battalions (HRW, 2007b).
Co-optation
The junta has built up an enormous apparatus to protect itself and its position through force. It
has realised, however, that this is not sufficient, it also needs the backing from civil society in
order to be safe (Steinberg, 2000: 114).
Beyond state-led organisations political organisation in Burma is severely restricted (South,
2007b: 157). Since BSPP took over government control, authoritarian governments have
passed several laws which restrict political organisations, except their own. To mobilise
popular support for the regime the governments created various organisations which serve as
co-optation mechanisms. These organisations have served as instruments to contain demands
and control the people instead of being effective channels for public participation as the
government have claimed them to be (Hlaing, 2007). In this way, while civil society is
29
repressed, the junta has created its own “civil society” to pre-empt the formation of a genuine
civil society and get the population behind its own goals (Steinberg, 2000). Steinberg writes
that, “While repressing the formation of spontaneously organized civil society, the military
has in a sense established its own ‘civil society’, one that is pliant and subservient”
(Steinberg, 2000: 115).
The largest of the state organisations is the Union Solidarity and Development Association
(USDA) claimed by SPDC to consist of 28 million members. It was created in 1993 by the
SLORC to mobilise support for the unpopular regime in the population. Its leadership consists
of high ranking government officials (Charney, 2009: 190). USDA is spread across Burma
and has village level townships in all states (USDA, 2009). Despite government claims
against coercion, evidence shows that members are pressured into joining (Steinberg, 2000:
115; HRDU, 2008: 144). Membership in USDA is essential for staying on good terms with
the SPDC and some members are given benefits from the state. The USDA offers, for
example, economic incentives like loans with low interests to some members (HRW, 2007a:
107; HRDU, 2008: 144). USDA also invests in rural development projects (Charney, 2009:
190).
The USDA members are used to gather support for the regime in the population and to
intimidate the political opposition (Callahan, 2000: 40). One of the aims of USDA is to
support the main goals of the regime: “non-disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of
national solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty” (USDA, 2009). Another goal of the
USDA is to “annihilate the threat of destructive elements” (USDA, 2009). USDA members
get military training and are deployed against the opposition (Callahan, 2000: 40; Charney,
2009: 190- 191).
30
Another state owned organisation deployed against the opposition is the Swan Arr Shin
(SAS). In the crackdown on the Saffron Revolution both USDA and the SAS were in the
streets working closely with the military (HRW, 2007a: 46; HRDU, 2008: 143). Swan Arr
Shin means “masters of physical force”. It is a militia recruited amongst the criminal, poor
and unemployed of Burma. The government pays these people much more than they would
normally be able to earn. The SAS members get military training from the government
(HRDU, 2008: 143- 146; Irrawaddy, 2003). According to Oo, employing these groups is an
important strategy of the regime in their war against the opposition. They are given the
authority to use any means they want in their attacks on protesters and activists, for example
rape and beatings: “anything is legal for them”.
Bhuddist monks are also targets of government co-optation strategies. Because of their
important religious and symbolic role in Burmese society the support of the monks has always
been very important for the SLORC/ SPDC. The junta has tried to silence them when they
have criticised the government, but also offered them many benefits if they agreed to support
the regime. The junta has created new titles and made large donations to leading monks. They
have also presented them with luxury items like expensive cars. Monks who have given in to
these efforts, as well as their monasteries, enjoy many benefits from the government.
However, most monks have not given in to these bribes (Hlaing, 2007: 167).
Government efforts to co-opt important institutions in Burma have parallels with other
authoritarian regimes. State- civil society relations in Algeria after independence, in the late
60s until the late 80s, can be compared to associational life in Burma. After independence all
associations were put under state control and used for propaganda and recruitment purposes.
In this way, the Algerian government sought to build a massive coalition to support itself
31
while at the same time prohibit formation of civil society outside state control (Entelis, 2001:
55- 56). So too in Syria, the Ba’ath Party controlled a large number of popular organisations
directly under the Party’s control. Some of these organisations were created by the
government while others were originally independent, but brought under state control after the
coup of 1963. The General Union of Peasants is the biggest popular union and is under direct
control of the Party’s Peasant Bureau. Their function is to enforce loyalty to the government,
assist in implementing government directives and serve as a channel for complaints to the
government. However, this channel is very restricted and do not allow complaints which
conflicts with the government’s interest (George, 2003: 74- 75). Another example can be
found in Egypt where repression and violence against opponents are used in combination with
methods of co-optation and patronage. Political organisations and trade unions are created by
the regime and used to co-opt and control society (Marfleet, 2009).
32
5. Opposition within and outside the junta’s control
The dictatorship sets strict boundaries for the opposition. The ethnic groups and the
democratic movement use different strategies to deal with these constraints: while the former
responds to the military’s constraints largely by operating outside the government channels,
the ethnic groups often do not have the same resources for this. They are largely forced to
operate and fight for their goals within the regime’s realm of control.
The Roadmap
The official strategy for both the ethnic groups and the democratic movement is a tripartite
dialogue between the military, the ethnic groups and the democratic movement (Kramer,
2009: 16). However, instead of entering into a dialogue with the opposition, the junta
unilaterally created the Roadmap which sets the ground rules for political participation on its
own terms. This gives the opposition the choice between voicing their grievances within the
official channels created through the Roadmap, where the military regime enjoys complete
control, or to try to oppose the dictatorship extra-legally.
My informants were extremely sceptical of the Roadmap and did not believe that it would
lead to democracy in Burma. In Rogers’ opinion the Roadmap “shouldn’t be given any
credibility at all” “knowing the nature of this regime, I think if people do take advantage of
the process and trying to open up space, I expect they will be clamped down on quite
harshly”. Many explicitly stated that they couldn’t see how the Roadmap ever could lead to
democracy in Burma. Halvorsen said that:
33
It is very clear that the junta’s Roadmap does not lay any foundation for true democracy,
quite contrary it lays the foundation to consolidate the military’s benefits further, both
through the constitution and the election next year.
According to Sand, elections based on junta’s constitution “are a way of ensuring continued
military rule and control, the only difference being that it will be in a civilian costume”. Oo
argued that the Roadmap is designed to protect the military leaders and their dynasty. The
general feeling amongst my informants is that the steps in the Roadmap, both in content and
process, are undemocratic and completely controlled by the junta. There is a clear agreement
among them that the Roadmap lacks credibility and legitimacy and excludes real participation
by civil society.
Win argues that a new roadmap should be created jointly with all stakeholders: the military,
the democratic opposition and civil society groups. He argues that because the roadmap will
have an impact on these groups they should be able to participate in creating it. Win further
states that “a roadmap unilaterally proposed by the regime can’t bring any change, no
democracy in Burma”. According to the official from NCGUB, the democracy movement has,
as an alternative to the Roadmap, “been calling for dialogue and reform for the constitutional
and electoral process to be participatory and inclusive”. There was general agreement that
tripartite dialogue between the opposition and the military junta, where all the main
stakeholders are included in a negotiated transition to democracy, is the way forward. Instead
of the military unilaterally imposing its will, dialogue and negotiation is a necessity for
democratic transition in Burma. However, according to the NCGUB official, “the junta is
obviously not willing to take any initiatives”. Many of my sources mentioned that the
prospects for the military regime to enter in a dialogue and commit to compromises, at least in
34
the near future, are bleak. This leads to a choice between using the channels opened up in the
Roadmap or oppose the government illegally.
The Roadmap as a co-optation mechanism
I will argue that the Roadmap can be understood as a co-optation mechanism created by the
junta to get the opposition to operate within a sphere where it is mostly harmless to the
government and where the junta is firmly in power. Within the legal fold, as the military junta
calls the government channels opened up in the Roadmap, the junta sets all the rules and can
prohibit systemic changes and dangerous opposition. In this way it makes opposition within
this sphere non- threatening.
All the steps in the Roadmap which have taken place have all been severely criticised. The
reconvened National Convention has widely been perceived as illegitimate because of the
lack of participation from the opposition. When the National Convention was reconvened the
majority of its delegates were handpicked by the junta (HRW, 2009:12). Delegates from the
ethnic groups numbered a little more than a hundred, which were the only delegates out of
1,076 who were independent of the military government (South, 2008: 128). Especially the
absence of the NLD has led many to criticise the Convention for being a sham. The NLD
announced before the opening that they would not to join because they did not believe the
junta would allow genuine debate by its opposition. In any case, they were never invited by
the junta. During the Convention the ethnic groups submitted several proposals, but these
were all dismissed without discussion. The Convention was completely controlled by the
junta, and the ethnic groups were not able to influence or even discuss the issues that mattered
for them (South, 2008: 125- 137).
35
The constitution which was created by the National Convention has been severely criticised
for consolidating the power of the SPDC (IHRC, 2009: 18). It has further been criticised for
not being representative of the desires of the people of Burma (Charney, 2009: 199). The
constitution ensures that no matter which party wins the election, the SPDC will have the final
say and will still be in position to do whatever it pleases. It will control the ministries of
Defence, Home Affairs and Border Areas. The military junta will always have 25% of the
seats in government which is enough to block constitutional changes. The constitution also
states that the military always shall be free to carry out its missions without interference. In
this way the constitution ensures that the civilian government will only govern in compliance
with the military generals. The constitution also gives the military the right to take over power
when they are not satisfied with the government, which will give legitimacy to a “coup” in the
future (Williams, 2009). The constitution also allows for serious restraints on the respect for
human rights on the basis of “national security” (Charney, 2009: 195).
The next step in the Roadmap was a referendum to adopt the constitution, which took place
on 10 May 2008 (Kramer, 2009: 35). This was only days after the devastating cyclone Nargis
hit Burma heavily with an estimated 150,000 people dead or missing and 2.5 million
homeless (Charney, 2009: 199). In most areas the counts were undertaken in secret, voters
were told that their votes had already been cast when they arrived at the polling station, some
were given ballot forms already filled out and voters were intimidated and bribed by officials
to vote in favour of the constitution (Newton, 2008: 9). These examples serve to show that the
military junta completely controls the steps in the Roadmap.
36
The ethnic opposition
The government’s co-optation efforts have been accepted by some ethnic insurgency groups.
While a few are still fighting the government through armed opposition, others have started
fighting on the government’s side. An example of the former is the Karen National Union
(KNU). An example of the latter is the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The
DKBA was originally a part of Karen National Union (KNU), but after conflicts between the
Christian and the Buddhist Karen, the Buddhist Karen split from the KNU and formed the
DKBA. The military immediately ceased the opportunity for cooperation with the DKBA and
the DKBA is now fighting on the side of the Tatmandaw (Charney, 2009: 188).
Most insurgency groups have now agreed on ceasefires with the regime. I will therefore focus
on these ceasefire-groups. Also, an examination of these can serve to show how the Roadmap
can be seen as an instrument of co-optation. The co-optation strategy is combined with the use
of force to weaken ethnic groups and to coerce them into using the Roadmap to voice their
grievances instead of fighting the government through other means. Offers of ceasefires were
often given at the same time as the Tatmandaw attacked ethnic areas to pressure them into
accepting the agreements (Charney, 2009: 188; Kramer, 2009: 9). Many of the insurgency
groups were pushed into a corner and felt they had no other chances left than agreeing to put
down their weapons and fight for political change within the legal fold (Kramer, 2009).
The ceasefire agreements
The ceasefire agreements are non-political military agreements. The ceasefire groups were
told that as long as the government did not have a constitution, it was not in a position to
37
make political agreements. After a constitution was created, they could put their political
demands forward to the government, but before that the ceasefire groups were told to voice
their political demands in the National Convention (Kramer, 2009: 13).
Ethnic groups have been promised some benefits in exchange for acceptance of ceasefire
agreements. The agreements give significant self control to ethnic groups over their territory,
more than any other government has granted them since independence (Charney, 2009: 189).
In addition to this the ceasefire groups are promised development assistance. Some ceasefire
groups, however, have complained that they have not seen much of this assistance and the
assistance that actually has been offered has been a mixed blessing (Kramer, 2009: 14; South,
2003: 219). Many schools and hospitals which were built lack proper equipment and staff and
many ethnic minorities still feel discriminated against in the provision of services (South,
2008: 51). In the case of Mon, infrastructure was built by using forced labour and financed
partly through extra taxation of the locals. The new infrastructure also gave Tatmandaw
greater access to the Mon area, compromising their base areas (South, 2003: 228). Most
ceasefire groups have also been given business opportunities by the military government.
Examples of this are the New Mon State Party which got licence to set up a company for
import, export and passenger transportation. The Kachin Independence Organization started
in the business of logging and jade and the Pao National Organisation and the United Wa
State Party both got concessions in mines (Kramer, 2009: 14). Profits from these business
opportunities are often not going to the local community. Despite reassurances both from the
SPDC and the ethnic leaders that the whole society will benefit, much of the profit has ended
up in leaders’ pockets who can be seen living in big houses and driving nice cars while their
communities do not see much of the profits (Kramer, 2009: 23). A NGO worker in the Kachin
38
state said about their leaders that, “they seem to have forgotten their political aims of the past,
and instead enjoying a better life” (Kramer, 2009: 23).
The junta has been very clear about which opportunities and constraints it offers the
opposition. According to the junta the only available option for the ethnic groups to get their
demands met is to through the Roadmap (Kramer, 2009: 32). For many ceasefire groups this
is a less than ideal but only option to achieve change on a long term basis. Groups within the
ethnic opposition have expressed understanding of that whether they like it or not, the
Roadmap is the only option available for them to influence politics in Burma and that it is
better to participate in the only game in town than completely excluding themselves (Kramer,
2009).
The informants I discussed the ceasefires with were very sceptical about the role the
ceasefires and entering the legal fold have had and will play in giving the ethnic groups
greater participation and development in their regions. Sand said that “the ceasefire
agreements have lasted for 20 years and they have not yet led to any political solutions, so I
don’t think they alone can lead to a solution”. One of the benefits mentioned by my
informants is that the somewhat fragile peace that exists under these ceasefires has meant less
killings and human rights violations in ethnic areas. A disadvantage noted by Rogers is that
ceasefire agreements can make the ethnic groups more afraid to speak out and inform the
international community about what is happening because they are worried about endangering
the ceasefires, “so in a way, their silence is being bought off”. Rogers also said the ceasefire
agreements have created divisions between the groups that are still fighting and the ceasefire
groups.
39
Ethnic groups’ participation in the National Convention
My informants criticised the National Convention for being undemocratic and controlled by
the military junta, a statement also supported by the Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2009: 12).
It was generally seen as a sham carefully constructed by the junta to give legitimacy to their
constitution. According to Sand, the National Convention:
was completely controlled by the junta. Even though they allowed and welcomed many
representatives from the ethnic groups, this was only a constructed sham to make it look
like the ethnic groups had true influence (..) which we later have seen that they did not
have.
When Rogers talked to representatives from the Kachin groups present at the National
Convention they told him that it was a completely meaningless process. They had at several
occasions tried to put forward their proposals in the National Convention, “and their proposals
where just ignored and dismissed and they weren’t even discussed. They said that the
National Convention was simply a series of speeches by the military generals”. When Rogers
asked a former delegate what he got out of the Convention, he answered: “I learned to play
golf”. Rogers further said that “some of the delegates were so bored during the speeches that
some of them slept and some of them brought their own reading material and just sat there
reading”.
The constitution produced by the National Convention failed in the end to address the main
grievances of the ethnic groups and there is still no political solution in sight which addresses
these issues. The government is instead of entering into dialogue with the ceasefire groups,
40
currently trying to persuade them to disarm and transform into political parties and contest the
2010 election. Those who decide to continue their efforts to achieve political change through
the election must take off their uniforms and leave their organisations. The government also
wants the ceasefire groups to become integrated in the army as border guards. A couple of
smaller groups have already accepted this offer, and chances are that other smaller rebel
forces will agree to this. It is unlikely however, that the larger ceasefire groups will agree to
this (Kramer, 2009).
Lack of political progress within the legal fold
With respect to the lack of political progress in the last 20 years of ceasefires, where the
government has shown no political will to enter into dialogue and discuss the issue of
federalism with the ethnic groups, the question is if the groups are willing to continue fighting
for their goals within the Roadmap and more specifically, the upcoming elections (Kramer,
2009: 23). The future of the ceasefire agreements remains uncertain. With the more hardline
approach from the government, pressuring the ceasefire groups to lay down their arms or be
integrated into the state army as border guards, some ethnic groups have started considering
taking up arms against the state again (Charney, 2009: 190; Kramer, 2009). In August 2009
fighting broke out in the northern Burma between ethnic groups and the military. The reason
for the renewed fighting was that ceasefire groups in the region refused to give in to pressure
to transform into border guard forces. This marked the end of 20 years old ceasefire
agreements with groups in the area (Noreen, 2009). Win said that “all the ceasefire groups
know that they are under pressure and in danger of attack sooner or later” if they are not
willing to kneel down to the generals and surrender their arms. He predicts heightened
violence in the time before the election next year. “Similar attacks will come in the near
41
future, and particularly before the election. When they [the SPDC] complete the election next
year, they don’t want any other ethnic group holding arms”. This was a concern also shared
by Sand.
According to informants with whom I discussed the ceasefires, the agreements have to be
more on the ethnic groups’ terms to achieve sustainable solutions. Unless this happens,
ceasefires will not lead to sustainable peace. Win said that:
Sooner or later these ceasefire groups will be crushed, unless they agree to kneel down
to the generals (..) The military regime always rejects and neglects their proposals.
There will not be any prosperity and peace in these ethnic areas as long as there is
military rule.
The democratic opposition
I will in this section show how the democratic opposition tries to get around constraints posed
by the military junta. Firstly, in contrast to the ethnic opposition which has largely been
forced to voice their demands within the sphere of government control, the democratic
opposition is operating largely outside the Roadmap and the state channels. Secondly, while
there are limited opportunities for formal organisation of opposition inside Burma, the
democratic movement has been able to draw upon the support of networks abroad, a
possibility created by new communication technology and diasporic networks. In this way,
they strategically overcome the constraints posed by their government by taking advantage of
the possibility for formal organisation abroad. This is a kind of double social movement,
operating parallel in Burma and abroad, taking advantage of the different opportunity
structures that exists in different locations.
42
One of the most important characteristics of the Burmese democratic movement is that they
operate on an increasingly global scale, largely through diasporic networks and
communication technology. Diaspora refers to transnational communities where migrants’
attachment toward the homeland remains over time. Migration leads to the dispersion of a
nation which was formerly concentrated at the same physical location. Attachment to the
nation of origin leads to these diasporic networks (Cochrane et al, 2009: 682). Within these
networks there is a triadic relationship between a collective self- identified group on one
location, groups with the same ethnicity in other parts of the world and the state of origin
(Vertovec, 2009: 133).
The Burmese opposition can be seen as composed of communities of resistance, sharing the
same background and cause which ties them together in networks of advocacy and assistance
groups across national borders. The representatives from DVB and BDMA both told me that
they have large networks which include the Burmese opposition inside and outside of Burma.
These diasporic networks have proven to be extremely valuable in the struggle for democracy
and have given the opposition the opportunity to take the resistance to a whole new level. This
is because of the advantages the Burmese opposition in exile is providing in organisational
resources, advocacy and freedom of speech outside the restriction of the military junta.
Because of the repressive nature of the regime, it is impossible for organisations like the DVB
to operate inside Burma. Win said that because the military government is trying to crush the
opposition movement, formal organisation is repressed in Burma and communication and
networking amongst the opposition is very weak. It is therefore extremely valuable that DVB
is able to broadcast outside Burma, where the repressive government can not shut them down
or punish them for giving a voice to the opposition.
43
New communication technology has made international cooperation possible in new ways.
The electronic media enables Burmese opposition to stay in contact, build networks and share
information despite geographical distance. The effect this can have on the opposition in the
sending communities and the struggle for democracy is extensive. Many Burmese people,
Win said, are using their mobile phones to record the situation in Burma. The problem for
them is to get the footages out of Burma. To have an institution outside Burma which can
provide the technology to get these images out is extremely valuable.
The advantage of communication technology has led to a compression of time and space
(Rantanen, 2005). Communications technology enables the opposition to co-operate,
coordinate and exchange information rapidly over national boundaries and large distances.
Many exiled Burmese opposition members are still involved in and identify with the struggle
for democracy in Burma. Though not physically in Burma anymore, through the diasporic
networks together with communication technology they are able to continue the struggle for
democracy in exile. In this way, new technology enables them to stay united and build links
with the Burmese opposition all over the world and still make a contribution to the cause they
had to leave in Burma. Burmese opposition members in exile are doing a significant job in the
struggle for democracy in assisting the opposition inside Burma. Diasporic networks and
communication technology are in this respect critical to the struggle for democracy.
An example of Burmese opposition taking advantage of the opportunity for diasporic
networks and formal organisation outside Burma is undercover journalists capturing the
reality inside Burma on tape or in pictures. During the Saffron Revolution the opposition
found ways of broadcasting news from Burma. For the first time in the isolated country’s
history, news was shown in pictures, on tape and blogs at the same time as the events
44
unfolded for a world wide audience. When the crackdown began, pictures of civilians and
monks being beaten by armed soldiers were broadcast worldwide (Larkin, 2009). So
dangerous for the military regime were these pictures that the government decided to turn off
the country’s internet servers and outlawed cell phones to stop images reaching the viewers
inside and outside Burma (Larkin, 2009, Charney, 2009: 197; HRDU, 2008: 156).
There was a general agreement amongst my informants about how essential these reports and
images are. Sand highlighted the role this information has in getting international attention
and how it is an important resource in putting pressure on the government, especially during
the Saffron revolution.
It is a very powerful way of showing what is happening in Burma (..) [It] led to very
strong international attention (..) It is a powerful means of getting information in and out
and get international pressure on Burma.
Most of my informants mentioned these images as a key difference between the Saffron
Revolution and the student uprising. While during the 2007 protests the news were released at
the same time as the events unfolded, in the 1988 protest it took days before news about the
protests and the violent crackdown reached the world and the rest of Burma (HRDU, 2008:
157).
Unfortunately, this came at a cost. Reporting from Burma is extremely dangerous for the
people involved. Several of the reporters and bloggers inside the country were put in prison as
a consequence of their documentations. At least 14 people have been reported arrested in
internet cafés in relation to the crackdown. It also proved to be dangerous for the people
45
showed on these pictures. Pictures of protesters were circulated amongst the policemen and
many were arrested based on them (HRDU, 2008: 157).
The Democratic Voice of Burma
One of the organisations vital in the work of broadcasting the reality inside Burma is the
DVB, a media channel for Burmese news. DVB’s mission is to give the opposition a voice.
Win explained that the organisation exists because in Burma the media is only used for
propaganda purposes. The Burmese people, especially the opposition movement, has no space
to express its opinions. The role of DVB is to create space and provide a forum where the
people can express their views and opinions. In addition to this, their aim is to inform people
outside Burma what is happening inside the country.
DVB has contact with large networks inside Burma. For regular and less sensitive information
DVB uses the existing government structures, like telephone lines and Internet. But these
channels are severely limited, they only exist in the cities and the government reduces Internet
speed so that people can’t easily get information. During the Saffron Revolution, they
completely cut phone lines and Internet access. Therefore DVB is not able to rely on the
government infrastructure. On occasions when these channels can’t be used, DVB has its own
infrastructure which is reliable but very costly. Therefore it is only used when necessary, for
example during the blackout during the Saffron revolution. Also, for footage which is of less
“breaking news nature”, it often relies on cross-border transportation to neighbouring
countries.
46
Win told me that news from DVB reaches people inside Burma in the form of radio and TV.
The whole population has access to their radio channel which is broadcasted through short
wave. DVB estimates that 10 million Burmese have access to their TV channel. According to
Win, sending out information and images from Burma is always a major challenge but DVB
as a media institution can make its own investment in infrastructure to overcome this problem.
In this way the opportunity for formal institutions outside Burma can be a crucial resource in
overcoming the constraints posed by the Burmese government.
Institutions abroad are not safe from the government’s attacks. While the Burmese opposition
has taken advantage of the new information technology, the government is following its lead
and has started warfare against this multi-dimensional movement in new and technological
sophisticated ways. Win told me that DVB has experienced attempts to restrict them in
several ways. First of all, the government attacks them through propaganda to hurt their
credibility. But it also uses more sophisticated methods. It has for example attacked their
website several times. In 2008 the government launched an attack on their website so
powerful that it totally blocked it. According to Win the junta must have spent a lot of money
to be able to launch an attack like that. Now DVB has invested in protection against attacks
like these. Unfortunately, they are not completely bulletproof and Win told me that two weeks
before we spoke, DVB had suffered another cyber-attack.
Inside Burma the government has increased satellite dish fees from $6 to $800 a year to make
it impossible for people to access channels which gives the opposition a voice. Also, lately
DVB discovered that tea shops and hotels which show DVB in public places are pressured
from the government to stop showing their channel.
47
The Burmese Democratic Movement Association
BDMA is another example of Burmese opposition outside Burma which is supporting the
democracy movement inside Burma. The main aims of BDMA are to achieve democracy and
human rights in Burma, to replace the dictatorship with a democratic elected government, to
establish a federal state in Burma and to support the Burmese pro-democracy organisations
(BDMA UK, 2009). Oo told me that BDMA has direct contact with opposition inside Burma.
BDMA is coordinating networks inside Burma as well as providing the assistance they need,
for example financial assistance or international publicity. The opposition in Burma, Oo told
me, is organised through underground networks. This is because of the repressive nature of
the military regime. Oo said that, “for the people inside Burma it is very dangerous do any
kind of organising, so they have to do it very secretly, very systematic so that these people
[the government spies] can not find out what they do.” When the regime thinks people have
information about the opposition movement or are active in this movement, they will make an
arrest and try to get the information from the suspected person. BDMA can only contact lowprofile people and have to find people outside the suspicion of the government because the
government is monitoring communication to those they suspect are involved in the opposition
movement.
BDMA in the UK is also target for SPDC attacks. According to Oo, government spies are
infiltrating their organisation and reporting to the Burmese embassy or government. Talking
about these people infiltrating his organisation he said, “they are really supporters of the
military regime. They just pretend that “we support your organisation, we want to help, what
can we do for you?””, “so you don’t know, you can’t name them and say you are not one of
us, because you can’t see and you can’t prove it”. These spies are attacking the organisation
48
ideologically, trying to influence individuals inside the BDMA to object the organisations
work. “They are trying to misguide someone who is one of us. They are trying to say that
these opposition people are doing the wrong thing, they are not really looking at the future of
Burma”.
49
6. Framing and construction of “truth”
I will in this chapter use the concept of framing from SMT to show how both the opposition
and the military junta are trying to emphasise their version of the truth in Burma. Framing is
used to understand how social movements are involved in the social construction of meaning.
This social construction of meaning is used in the mobilisation of participation and the
production of common interpretations and intersubjective meanings in movements
(Wiktorowicz, 2004: 15- 19). According to Wictorowicz social movements “are embedded in
a field of multiple actors that often vie for framing hegemony” (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 17). I
will in the remaining chapters show how both the ethnic and the democratic movement are in
different ways competing with the junta for framing hegemony.
Depending on which sources you use, you are presented with very different versions of the
situation inside Burma. The military junta is using many resources to create a hegemonic
discourse in Burma and present their version as the truth. But these efforts are constantly
being challenged from the opposition. With a combination of propaganda and limitation of
freedom of speech and press, the government is trying to frame a certain reality both for the
people inside Burma and the audience abroad. Within this framing they try to demonise and
neutralise the efforts of the opposition and present themselves as the saviours of Burma. The
opposition draws upon other resources to contest the junta’s version of reality. The most
important of these resources are their symbolic power and legitimacy. Because the military
junta lacks these resources the opposition, and the democratic movement in particular, are in a
special position to contest them.
50
The military regimes rhetoric and truth
According to Wictorowicz, regimes “attempt to limit the institutional resources and public
space available for the dissemination of alternative frames that could challenge the regimes
legitimacy” (Wictorowicz, 2004: 18). The regime in Burma is doing this through strict
surveillance and control over public space. All independent press must be reviewed by the
SPDC’s Press Scrutiny and Relations Department before printing. The junta also controls
Internet servers and maintains severe censorship (HRDU, 2008: 156). In addition to this, the
government has civilian spies which report criticism against the government amongst the
people in day to day life (Larkin, 2009). A government decree imposes a punishment of up to
20 years imprisonment for those who criticize regime policies in public (BCUK, 2009a).
The state owned newspapers are making an enormous effort to portrait a government caring
for its people. The articles in the state owned New Light of Myanmar for example, carefully
present the government in a positive light. Here you can read articles2 like “People to
participate in building a peaceful, modern and developed nation”, “People to make sustained
efforts to achieve better social-economic life” and “Information Minister holds discussions
with local people in Htilin”. The articles are presenting a government which is prioritising
local development and includes its people in the decision making processes. You can also
read about the country’s progress and development, about new hotels opening, the tourism
industry and improvements in telecommunication (New Light of Myanmar, 2009).
The state media is also filled with attacks directed at its opposition. An example of this is the
article “The KNU really is..” published by MRTV3, in a state owned media channel. The
2
All articles are from the 24 June 2009.
51
KNU, who is still fighting the regime by armed opposition, is represented as a terrorist group
which attacks and terrorises the civilians and the SPDC’s “peace operations”. The author
compares the KNU’s acts of “ethnic cleansing” to the genocide of the Nazis during World
War 2 (MRTV3, 2009). The article states that it is in fact KNU who is to blame for the human
rights violations in their region, which both the KNU and their masters abroad blame the
SPDC for. In this way, the KNU together with supporters abroad are conspiring against the
regime to give the world, and especially the UN, a distorted picture of the SPDC. The author
concludes that the SPDC would be guilty of human rights violations if it did not fight against
the massacres of the KNU, because this would mean that it is not securing the human lives
and property of its people (MRTV3, 2009).
The military regime legitimises itself on the grounds that, as a military government, they are
the only ones who can guarantee the unity of an ethnically diverse country (Steinberg, 2007).
The government stresses the fact that they are the ones who care about the people and national
unity. The NLD, with Aung San Suu Kyi in the forefront is criticised by the government for
practising personality- and party politics which leads to disunity at the national level.
According to SPDC, party politics means only taking care of the interests of one group in the
population, while the SPDC cares about the national interest. They are in this way trying to
keep popular personalities, like Aung San Suu Kyi, out of politics and to neutralise her
symbolic role in the country (Houtman, 2005).
The regime claims that the army has a special patronage role. They claim that if it had not
been for their strong leadership the Burmese union would disintegrate. This kind of
legitimation is based on an effort by the military regime to manufacture nationalism. The
central government’s nationalistic ideas have been used to delegitimize the NLD and
52
especially Aung San Suu Kyi, for example in her marriage to a foreigner. She is claimed to be
under the influence of foreigners and can therefore not represent the national interest like the
military junta can. Also, on a more indirect level, the notion of nationalism has been used in
attacking ethnic groups because they want greater autonomy (Steinberg, 2007).
The military also seeks legitimacy on the grounds that it is the only guarantor of sovereignty
of the state against foreign intruders and colonialism. Within the propaganda of the regime is
an effort to rewrite history and portrait themselves as the saviours of Burma (Steinberg,
2007). Amongst other things, they use the Burman General Aung San, a national hero who
got the credit for leading Burma to independence, as a figurehead for themselves. This use of
her father to legitimate themselves is severely criticised by Aung San Suu Kyi (Houtman,
2005: 136). In an effort to reconstruct history, museums have been built to testify about the
great deeds of the military and how much the country has depended on it for sovereignty and
cohesiveness (Steinberg, 2007). The regime also claims that the Burman army defeated the
Japanese in Burma. But the truth is that it did not join the British forces in their struggles to
drive out the Japanese army until after the Japanese had been defeated. In fact, there is no
evidence at all that the Burman army fought in any significant battles at that time (Williams,
2009).
A recent example of how the military junta is rewriting history is in the aftermath of the
Saffron revolution. It claims that the monks leading the protest were not real monks, but a
rebel group, and that only 10 people died during the protests. However, figures from the UN
states that 31 people were killed and 74 disappeared (Larkin, 2009). The regime went to
extreme measures to contain information about the protest both to the outside world and to its
own citizens. They blocked access to YouTube and closed down several Burmese blogs
53
where the population could find uploaded clips of the protesters. State-run news avoided
writing about the protest and private media channels were told to denounce the monks and
print conspiracy theories manufactured by the SPDC. Some publications decided to close
down instead of printing the government propaganda. Telephone lines were cut preventing
democracy activist and NLD members talking to national or international journalists. Towards
the end of the crackdown, SPDC also disconnected the mobile phone lines of most of the
country. As already mentioned, journalists were arrested and in the end the regime closed
down the national Internet servers (ALTSEAN, 2007). In the words of journalist Emma
Larkin, “The regime is able to distort the truth and rewrite the history in its favour.
Somewhere along the way, the true facts disappear and the real stories are lost” (Larkin, 2009:
xix).
Another example of the junta’s efforts to legitimise themselves is in its discourse on
democracy. Through its Roadmap, the military junta claims to move towards democracy.
Democracy is an important part of the government’s rhetoric and you find it often in their
speeches and on government websites. The government tries to convince the international
community and its own people that the Roadmap is the best strategy towards achieving
democracy in Burma. In this way they are trying to control the discourse of what democracy
should mean for Burma. However, as already shown, the junta’s vision of a protected
democracy through the Roadmap has been severely criticised by its opposition and the
international community.
The rhetoric of the military junta is not uncontested. Despite their massive “reality control
machine”, the government propaganda is overall not very successful (Larkin, 2009: xxi). The
experience of Rogers in his encounters with people all over Burma is that there is not much
54
support for the regime and that it does not have much respect or trust among the general
population. He says, for example, that it is generally acknowledged that the government
newspaper the New Light of Myanmar is not credible. Also Win says the state propaganda is
not successful. “I don’t think they are successful at all. People don’t buy their newspaper for
news, but they buy it because they are forced to”. Win also said that people buy state
newspapers because they get a higher price for recycling the paper than they pay for the news.
He added that the people experience and see for themselves a reality which is in stark contrast
to what they are presented with through the state media.
The ethnic opposition
The ethnic groups are contesting the military junta’s propaganda by framing themselves as
specific ethnic groups apart from the unified national identity which the government tries to
oppose on them. In this way they contest the idea of national unity and cohesiveness and resist
the military junta’s nationalistic Burmanisation. An example of this Burmanisation is a
statement by General Ne Win in 1962 claiming on the behalf of the ethnic group Mon, that
there is no need for their separate culture and ethnicity, because they are already fully
integrated into the national culture. The Mons should instead devote their energy to support
the military’s task of building a Burmese nation (South, 2003: 32). As a reaction to the threat
of Burmanisation, the various ethnic groups reinstate and emphasise their common ethnicity
and identity as ethnic groups separate from the Burmans. The leaders of the ethnic groups
have emphasised and constructed the homogeneity of their ethnic groups and promoted what
they see as typical traits of their identity to show their distinctiveness from other ethnic
groups. They emphasise their shared ethnicity, language and cultural heritage. Ethnicity in
this way serves as a foundation for mobilisation in the struggle against the central government
55
(South, 2008; South, 2003: 4- 6). In the words of Michael Gravers, “they desperately search
for a primordial ethnic essence in order to uphold a legitimate representation of their cultural
and political claims” (Gravers, 2007: 3).
One of the groups opposing the central government’s creation of one singular Burmese
ethnicity is the ethnic group Mon. Mon state is located in the southeast of Burma. The Mon
identify with this territory which they see as their own land. Religion and history have been
valuable assets in the preservation of a Mon identity. The Mon civilisation was one of the
most influential in Southeast Asia before colonialism and Mon kings ruled over large
territories in central Southeast Asia. This history is used by Mon leaders in the construction of
a distinct Mon identity. Buddhism is also an important part of the creation of a Mon identity,
and has a strong influence in the Mon society. Like many other ethnic groups in Burma, the
Mon celebrate their own national day, a day where Mon strength and unity is emphasised
(South, 2003). The Mon also have their own political party which “claims to represent all
Mon people and posits a (..) ethnic nationalist agenda as an alternative to Burman-dominated
military rule (South, 2003: 23).”
Representatives from both ceasefire groups and insurgency groups have decided to boycott
the upcoming election. KNU has stated that it does not believe the election will lead to any
political reform because it is the implementation of an unjust constitution which consolidates
the military’s power over any elected civilian government. They further state that the
government is heading in the wrong direction and it is therefore important to send a clear
message to them that this can not be tolerated. A representative from the Shan army also
called for boycott of the election because it is based on a constitution which does not serve the
people’s interests (Bangkok Post, 2009; Mungpi, 2009; Davies, 2009). The decision by some
56
ethnic groups not to contest the election serves as a clear testimony that they do not support
the government’s discourse on what democracy should mean in Burma. The ethnic groups
boycott the elections because they are not satisfied with its terms and do not want to give
legitimacy to something they see as a sham. This is a clear protest of the credibility and
legitimacy of the Roadmap and the SPDC’s version of what the meaning of democracy should
be in Burma.
The democratic opposition
The democratic opposition has useful resources to draw upon which put them in a unique
position in their opposition to the military government. This arises from their symbolic power
and legitimacy: while the military government draws their legitimacy from claiming that they
are the only ones which can uphold the unity of Burma, the NLD gets its legitimacy from
being the party elected by the people in 1990. This gives them a strong and internationally
backed claim for the legitimacy of governmental power in Burma. In this way they are
attacking the platform used by the military junta to legitimise their power.
Legitimacy from the 1990 election results
An example of the importance of legitimacy from election results is the report “Seeking
justice for Burma. A case for revoking the credentials of the SPDC” written on behalf of
Members of Parliamentary Union (MPU) and the National Council of the Union of Burma
(NCUB), which are organisations created by exiled NLD members (Newton, 2009). The
report, prepared by Professor Michael M. Newton at Vanderbilt University Law School, is a
clear example of how the democratic opposition is trying to oppose the legitimacy of the
57
SDPC. The agenda of the report is to revoke the credentials of the SPDC, especially within
the UN system. It declares that the MPU and NCUB are the legitimate government bodies of
Burma and should be declared as such by the UN, not the SPDC. The argument is based on
Resolution 369 (V), 14 December 1950 which states that if more than one authority claims the
entitlement as a country’s government, the issue should be viewed in light of the Purposes and
Principles in the UN charter, which amongst other things states the importance of human
rights. While the UN Credentials Committee earlier used control over territory as a primary
factor of whom to give the authority to, they have since 1990 put weight on other elements,
like how the parties came to power and their human rights records. The reports makes a strong
case that does, according to UN principles, revoke the credentials of the SPDC made possible
by the election results of 1990, the disastrous human right records of SPDC and the history of
the SPDC in undermining the Purposes and Principles of the UN charter (Newton, 2008).
In addition to this the NLD claims they have been the legitimate government of Burma since
1990. The SLORC/ SPDC have never officially dissolved the government elected in 1990.
Based on this the NLD has ever since 1990 called for reconvening of the elected parliament
(Nai, 2009). However, according to several of my informants, the military junta has to some
degree been successful in marginalising the role of NLD. Closing down of NLD offices and
putting leaders and members in prison have made it difficult for NLD to remain relevant in
the political landscape and mobilise the youth in Burma.
Aung San Suu Kyi
The democratic opposition has an important symbolic resource in the Nobel peace price
winner Aung San Suu Kyi. My informants emphasised the uniting role she can play in the
58
opposition movement because she is trusted by all the groups in the country and they all listen
to her. According to Rogers “she has been hugely important”:
She is a real unifying person. She is someone who pretty much all the people from
Burma, whether they are from the ethnic groups or the Burman majority, support. There
are not many other Burmans whom the ethnic people trust (..) but I think she is the one
Burman whom the ethnic peoples trust (..) She is the one who can unite the country.
According to Win she can play an important role in the struggle for democracy because
Burma “needs someone who is trusted by everybody so that negotiation, discussion and
compromise can be reached”. No other in Burma has the integrity and support she has. This
unique opportunity to unite and draw support partly stems from being the daughter of the
national hero Aung San, a point mentioned by most of my informants (Charney, 2009: 154155). Also according to Rogers “she gives the people in Burma great inspiration and hope”.
An example of this is during the Saffron revolution, when the marching protesters were
allowed a glimpse of her outside her home. Protesters said they got hope and strength from
seeing her. After seeing Aung San Suu Kyi the protesters got more courage and the protests
turned more political. The day after 20,000 people joined the protest. When the government
saw the effect she had on the protesters her house was barricaded by riot police prohibiting
anyone from coming near her house (HRWa, 2007: 39- 42).
With clout like this, both internationally and amongst the people of Burma, the democratic
opposition poses a relevant threat in the contest of what the meaning of democracy should be
in Burma. The democratic opposition challenges the government concept of democracy and
refuses to give credibility or legitimacy to a definition of democracy they don’t approve of.
59
According to the NCGUB officer, NCGUB and other major democratic and ethnic
organisations “do not accept the military junta’s so-called Seven-Step Roadmap to
democracy”. NLD is boycotting the upcoming election. This together with NLD’s boycott of
the National Convention is a clear sign of this rejection.
60
7. Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to research the patterns of protest in Burma. I believe the
rapidly expanding field of SMT has been useful in assisting in understanding of the dynamics
of social protest. I have utilised concepts from SMT to help assess the complex relations
between the state and its opponents. SMT can be useful in various contexts: concepts like
framing, opportunities, constraints and structural strains make comparative analysis possible
where research in different contexts can complement each other and result in a broader
understanding of the dynamics of social protests.
Because of a difference in resources and priorities, the ethnic and the democratic opposition
have responded to the opportunities and constraints that exist in different ways. The ethnic
groups have largely been forced to operate within the area of government control, more
specifically within the channels opened up in the Roadmap, where the government has
severely restricted their influence and participation. The Roadmap serves as an example of the
government’s strategy of force and co-optation. The military junta has launched military
attacks at the different insurgency groups while at the same time offered them ceasefires.
Through these ceasefires the government has offered them an opportunity to join the legal
fold and voice their demands within the channels opened up in the Roadmap. In this way
many ethnic groups are forced to voice their demands within a sphere where the military junta
enjoys complete control and sets all the ground rules.
The democratic opposition, on the other hand, has largely operated outside these government
channels. They have been able to take advantage of new opportunities which have presented
themselves through new communication technology and diasporic networks. By taking
61
advantage of these opportunities they have been able to create a multi-dimensional movement,
in which diasporic links assist communication and mobilisation globally, and locally in
Burma. While formal organisation of opposition is not possible inside Burma, the democratic
opposition has been able to draw upon support from formal organisational structures abroad to
overcome these constraints. In this way, opportunities and constraints have shaped both the
ethnic and the democratic opposition in their efforts to strategically adapt to or overcome the
challenges posed by the military government.
The military junta is also trying to restrict its opposition with its propaganda and rhetoric.
With propaganda and restriction on freedom of speech it is trying to construct its own version
of the reality in Burma. It is framing itself as the saviours of Burma while at the same time
demonising its opposition. The junta has also created its own version of what democracy
should be in Burma, an example of this is the Roadmap. The state propaganda is being
strongly opposed by its opposition which is trying to emphasise their versions of the reality
and what they believe the meaning of democracy should be in Burma.
While the Burmese opposition has strategically found and taken advantage of many
opportunities to overcome or work within the restrictions they face, there is one area which
could lead to new opportunities that the opposition has not yet been able to take advantage of.
There is much unrealised potential in cooperation between the ethnic and the democratic
movement. If these two movements could manage to cooperate and pull together in their
common causes, they could take advantage of a stronger bargaining position and could
together try to pressure the SPDC to the bargaining table. However, the issues between the
two groups are deep and go far back in history and therefore pose a serious constraint for the
opposition in Burma. There are, however, positive signs which show that cooperation and
62
building of trust is possible in Burma, and that the potential in cooperation can be realised.
Vital for this to happen, and for sustainable democracy and peace in Burma, is that the ethnic
minorities are included and taken seriously in the process.
63
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