Columbia East Asia Review 67
The Confucian Legacy: A Comparative Study
of the Critical Inheritance of Confucianism in
China and North Korea
Joanna Liu, Yale University
BACKGROUND, RATIONALE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE
STUDY
O
n November 26, 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited
Confucius’s hometown in Qufu, Shandong to take a tour of the
landmarks and speak with the local Confucian researchers and
experts. According to a Xinhua News Agency report, Xi was said to have given a
speech in which he “called for morality to be promoted among the people” because
“[t]he development and prosperity of Chinese culture is one of the preconditions
for China’s great rejuvenation.”1 He even selected two volumes on annotations
of classic Confucian works and promised to “read these two books carefully.”2 In
the aftermath of his visit, a stirring around the idea of a revival of Confucianism
arose within modern day China. Yang Chaoming, the director of the Confucius
Research Institute where Xi made his remarks, claims that Xi’s intention was to
“make clear an attitude, convey a message, which is to vigorously promote the
excellent traditional culture of the Chinese nation.”3 Another Confucian scholar,
Yang Yitang, believes that Xi’s positive recognition of Confucius and Chinese
traditional culture “showcases the confidence and pride of the Chinese nation.”4
Yet Bloomberg Businessweek notes Confucianism’s “big emphasis on obedience
to proper authority,” citing China’s yearly 30,000 to 50,000 protests as a more
probable and direct motivation for Xi to praise the ancient sage’s teachings.5
Although Xi and the Chinese government’s exact intentions in this step to embrace
1 Yan, “Xi Underlines Morality during Confucius Site Visits,” Xinhuanet, Nov. 28, 2013 (http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/28/c_132926800.htm).
2 Sun Yang, “Xi jinping: chuangzao zhonghua wenhua de xin huihang” [Xi Jinping: Creating the
new glory of Chinese culture], Xinhuanet, Nov. 26, 2013 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201311/26/c_118301261.htm). All translations not otherwise credited are my own.
3 Li Gong, “Meiti: Xijinping zai qufu zuotan hui shang tan ji wenge dui chuantong wenhua qianghai” [Media: Xi Jinping discusses the damage to traditional culture by the Cultural Revolution at the Qufu forum],
Sohu, Dec. 5, 2013 (http://history.sohu.com/20131205/n391311723.shtml).
4 Luan, “Xinhua Insight: China Sees Renewed Enthusiasm for Confucius,” Xinhuanet, Dec. 7, 2013 (http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/07/c_132949742.htm).
5 Dexter Roberts, “Xi Jinping Extols Confucian Values,” Bloomberg Businessweek, Nov. 27, 2013 (http://
www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-27/xi-jinping-extols-confucian-values).
68 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
Confucianism are expected to remain opaque as usual, a study of Confucianism’s
history can provide some hints as to what this expressed interest in Confucianism
by the top leader of China implies.
Xi’s recent visit and comments may have kick-started the newest round of
discussions on Confucianism’s potential role in the political and economic sphere
in China, but such discourse can be traced back through all periods of Chinese
history to the beginning of the modern era. In fact, the governments of nations all
over “Confucian Asia”—the region which was traditionally heavily dominated by
adherence to Confucianism—have tried to bring back elements of Confucianism
time and again in their political ideology or political culture to support their
various goals or to deal with various problems. Over time, these political uses
of Confucianism have formed a pattern of similar motivations and objectives,
which can be observed in both the dynamic, eventful history of modern China
and the relatively stagnant, unchanged history of the anti-reform North Korea.
Thus, the decision to embrace or promote Confucianism usually connotes certain
intentions of, or problems faced by, the leaders who do so.
This paper seeks to compare the Chinese and North Korean leaderships’
political uses of Confucianism and identify crucial similarities in the regimes’
motivations for utilizing Confucianism in such ways. I argue that following the
onset of modernization in either country, Chinese and North Korean leaders
have “critically inherited,” or selectively used, aspects of Confucianism for their
own political purposes, which are usually geared toward ensuring their power
and regime stability. First, I will give an overview of the premodern history of
Confucianism to investigate how its early origins have influenced how it has
been passed down to the modern day. Then, I will analyze how each country has
appropriated and utilized Confucianism according to the needs of the regimes
throughout the modern period. Finally, I will apply the findings to the present
day in an attempt to explain what significance the current rise of pro-Confucian
sentiment, boosted by Xi Jinping’s recent comments, may hold.
This study hopes to contribute to the broader understanding of
Confucianism’s role in East Asian political ideology, which in turn provides insight
into ideology’s role in maintaining authoritarian or communist regime stability.
It builds on previous research conducted on regime resilience, in particular the
recently published volume, Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding
Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe, edited by Martin Dimitrov.6
Dimitrov notes that communist autocracies are the most resilient type of
nondemocratic regime, significantly outlasting other types; this fact highlights
6 Martin K. Dimitrov, ed., Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
Columbia East Asia Review 69
the need to study the survival tools employed by communist regimes in order
to fully understand the sources of authoritarian regime stability.7 In addition,
Dimitrov and the authors of the book identify ideological adaptation as one of the
major types of adaptive change that regimes can implement to maximize chances
of regime survival.8
In underlining the inherent importance of ideology in legitimizing the
rule of a communist government, Vladimir Tismaneanu referred to communist
regimes as “partocratic ideocracies” whose “only claim to legitimacy was purely
ideological, …derived from the organized belief system shared by the elites and
inculcated into the masses that the party benefited by special access to historical
truth and therefore it enjoys infallibility.”9 Andrew Scobell supports this emphasis
on the importance of ideology, adding that communist regimes may “continue
to proclaim adherence to socialism…while reinterpreting or redefining its form
and content,” which consists of “a blend of imported Marxism-Leninism and
indigenous components.”10 For the countries of East Asia, Confucianism most
certainly makes up a part of those “indigenous components.”
Of course, Confucianism is only one player among many. While it
would take much more than just Confucianism to maintain the legitimacy and
stability of an authoritarian regime, the simple fact that three out of the five
surviving communist regimes – China, Vietnam, and North Korea – are countries
that have been and continue to be heavily influenced by Confucian ideas and
traditions warrants more in-depth studies of the impact of Confucian ideology.
The comparison between China and North Korea is particularly insightful in this
regard, in light of the fact that the North Korean regime has managed to sustain
its rule despite two leadership transitions and dire economic conditions largely
through reliance on ideology and ideological adaptation, as well as strict methods
of social control, in contrast to China’s economic success.
Historically, the close ties between the two countries had facilitated a
great degree of political, cultural, and economic interaction between them, which
has generated a considerable degree of similarity in their worldviews and way of
life, much of which can be attributed to their common Confucian heritage. Up
to the nineteenth century, China and North Korea both practiced self-isolation
until forced to open up by Western and Japanese imperial powers, events that
7 Ibid., 5. See also Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in
Comparative Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Benjamin Smith, “Life of the Party:
The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule,” World Politics 57:3 (April
2005), 421-451.
8 Ibid., 6.
9 Ibid., 67.
10 Andrew Scobell, “Making Sense of North Korea: Pyongyang and Comparative Communism,” Asian
Security 1:3 (2005): 245-266.
70 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
have left deep scars on the two nations’ collective memories and have shaped
the sentiment of the people and the governing strategies of the ruling regimes
ever since. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) have been in power for about the same duration of
time, with the DPRK being formally declared just one year before the PRC. Both
of the founding fathers of each regime, Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung, built up a
cult of personality around themselves, against the tenets of Marxism, in order to
centralize power and maintain top control, the effects of which are still apparent
in people’s views of Mao and Kim in China and North Korea today. These factors
have all had a great impact on how the two nations have come to perceive their
own history, which in turn affects how the leadership of each regime seeks to
exploit ideology and the national myth in order to legitimate their current power.
Since the death of Mao in 1976, China and North Korea took completely
divergent paths. China chose the route of economic liberalization and increased
globalization, while North Korea clamped down even harder on its social and
ideological control and rejected all thoughts of reform. Despite this radically
different approach in governance and strategy, the fact is that both governments
are still standing with no signs of collapse any time soon, defying the endless
predictions that have been flying around since the fall of the Soviet Union that
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the Kim regime were also on the verge
of imminent breakdown. This challenges the theory that economic liberalization
and political liberalization naturally share a mutually conducive relationship, as
well as the belief that the DPRK regime, with its utter disregard for the economic
plight and welfare of its people and its stubborn noncooperation with the rest
of the world, would not be able to survive solely through reliance on ideological
indoctrination and methods of repression.
Given this premise, my research will employ the method of paired
comparison of these two countries to gain insight into the methods of and
motivations behind historical and modern implementations of Confucianism in
the political ideology of East Asian authoritarian regimes. While other studies,
such as Doh Chull Shin’s book, Confucianism and Democratization in East
Asia, focus on the culture and traditions of Confucian Asian countries from
the viewpoint and attitudes of societies at large to determine what Confucian
legacies have survived and how they influence the political culture, I argue that
Confucianism’s relevance to present day China and North Korea lies largely in
how it is utilized and promoted in a top-down manner by the leaderships of each
country, which has allowed it to be revived time after time despite its trend of
gradual decline following the advent of modernization.11 Shin establishes through
11 Doh Chull Shin, Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2012).
Columbia East Asia Review 71
extensive quantitative and qualitative analysis that Confucian culture does indeed
shape conceptions of and attitudes towards democracy and its alternatives,
and that certain characteristics of Confucian legacies could discourage people
from accepting the principles of liberal democracy.12 While he emphasizes that
Confucianism’s ability to hinder cultural democratization is limited, especially
when compared to the more powerful influence of democratic regime experience
that induces people to lose their attachments to Confucian legacies, the perceived
conflict between Confucian culture and democracy has perhaps motivated
members of the Chinese and North Korean leadership to attempt to harness this
deterrent aspect of Confucianism to restrain and minimize popular demands for
democratic reform. I will focus on examining such leadership perceptions and
decisions, in the hopes of complementing research on popular viewpoints and
opinions.
PREMODERN CONFUCIANISM
Confucianism, as the dominant ideology governing the sociopolitical
behavior of both the state and the people in the nations of Confucian Asia for
much of their long histories, has undoubtedly shaped and continues to shape
the culture and society of each of these countries in terms of conceptions of
orthodox behavior and the people’s way of life. Scholars have attributed various
characteristics of Asian countries to the influence of Confucianism, including
“structures of authority, bureaucracy, hierarchy, familism, filial piety, mancenteredness, mentalism, moral education, patriarchy, and respect for elders.”13
Today, Confucianism is often regarded as a prime representative of East Asian
culture. But a look at history suggests that the eminent position Confucianism
commands in guiding thoughts and behavior is not simply a result of cultural
forces; in fact, decisions by specific top state authorities and elite classes have had
as much to do with Confucianism’s lasting legacy as the beliefs and sentiments of
the people. In pre-modern, as in modern times, I find that even in the beginning,
Confucianism was largely a top-down enforced ideology.
China
Confucianism evolved from the teachings of the fifth-century B.C.
12 Ibid., 15.
13 David-West, Azlo. “Between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism: Juche and the Case of Chong
Tasan.” Korean Studies 35 (2011): 94.
72 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
Chinese philosopher Confucius, which were organized and recorded into the
classical Confucian texts as we know them today by his numerous disciples and
followers. There was much war and strife in the Spring and Autumn Period
(770–476 B.C.) during which he lived, due to the power struggles between the
various feudal states that were competing for military and political dominance
over one another. In response, Confucius advocated the values of “social harmony,
benevolence, propriety, duty, the family, and rituals” in his teachings, principles
he deemed necessary to build a datong shehui, or “great harmonious society.”14,15
After his death, his students constructed an ethical and philosophical
system out of his teachings, which gained ground as a popular school of thought
within the scholarly community, even becoming the official state ideology of
the Han dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.). In the Tang (618–907) and Song (960–
1279) dynasties, various scholars resurrected Confucianism and transformed it
into a more rationalistic philosophical system as a reaction against the mysticism
of Buddhism and Taoism, although they borrowed and synthesized ideas from
both religions into the metaphysical framework for the revised thought system
now known as Neo-Confucianism.16 Neo-Confucianism “addressed citizens’
desire for spirituality” while maintaining the original tenets of Confucius’s works,
giving this new reinterpretation of Confucianism enough popular appeal to
spread rapidly throughout China and ultimately, across East Asia.17 It held sway
over China’s state and society until the fall of the Qing dynasty in the 1900s,
when Chinese culture and civilization was forced into confrontation with the
forces of modernization.
There are a few noteworthy points in this historical account of
Confucianism. First of all, Confucius developed an ethical and philosophical
system that emphasized harmony and moderation in response to the war and
chaos he observed in his lifetime; consequently, the ruling ideology that evolved
from his teachings was especially conducive to establishing social stability and
maintaining regime resilience, an attractive feature for rulers and government
officials. Second of all, Confucianism found little interest or support outside of
the elite scholarly community until it was adopted as the official state ideology of
the Han dynasty; from the beginning, Confucianism had to rely on endorsement
and utilization by the central ruling state to reach the other sectors of society. The
institutional components of Confucianism, namely, the civil service examination
and the educational system, produced an elite intelligentsia class well-versed in
14 Shin, 25.
15 Chinese
datong shehui [great harmonious society].
16 Jonathan Y. Tan, “Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism,” Berard L. Marthaler, ed., New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd Ed. (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2003) Vol. 4, 95-99.
17 Shin, 27.
Columbia East Asia Review 73
the Confucian principles and orthodoxy, who then had to transmit such ideas to
the commoners and instill them into society at large. The commoners were “less
enamored” with Confucian laws than the elites, so the elites had to “overcome
civilian reluctance to accept Confucianism.”18 This was evident in the case of
the resurrection and revision of Confucianism into neo-Confucianism, which
required a conscious effort by the scholar-officials to adapt the ideology to suit
popular tastes. Just from this extremely abridged narrative of Confucianism’s
early history, it can be seen that Confucianism was not a cultural force that was
resonant with the people and had a popular basis before being adopted by the
ruling body, but a top-down implemented ideology since early on in its history.
KOREA
Confucianism was first introduced to the Korean peninsula in 108 B.C.,
when Emperor Wu of China’s Han dynasty took over the northern region of
the country and established Chinese-governed administrative centers exerting
control over the native populace.19 The region was eventually reclaimed by the
Koguryo kingdom (37 B.C.–668 A.D.), which was more partial to Buddhism
than to Confucianism. Confucian thought was spread to the rest of the peninsula
and gained prestige during the Three Kingdoms period (57 B.C –668 A.D.) and
the United Silla period (668–935), particularly after Silla became a vassal state
of China, but Buddhism still remained the preferred school of thought of the
ruling elite. There was a slight shift in the following Koryo dynasty (918–1392),
when the state decided to adopt Confucian-style civil service examination and
educational systems, but as these institutions were only open to members of the
aristocratic class, Confucianism was “monopolized” by the ruling elites and “had
little effect on the life of commoners.”20
The Choson dynasty (1392–1897) saw the Confucianization of all levels
and realms of state and society, as the founders fully embraced neo-Confucianism
as their guiding ideology. They implemented widespread, deep-seated reforms that
aimed to purge non-Confucian traditions and reshape Korean political, social,
and cultural life to conform to the Confucian ideal. The civil service examination
and educational system, as well as Confucian institutions of accountability, were
established nationwide. In enforcing the Confucian precepts regarding patriarchy
and patrilineality, even the traditional practices of “equal inheritance between the
two genders, female property ownership, the remarriage of widows, and uxorilocal
18 Ibid., 39.
19 Shin, 29.
20 Ibid.
74 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
marriage” were prohibited.21 Thus, Korea surpassed China in becoming the most
Confucianized state in East Asia. The Koreans prided themselves on their strict,
steadfast adherence to the Confucian principles and practices as a sign of their
superior moral character, but eventually this faithfulness was eroded by the advent
of modernization in the nineteenth century.
For Korea, Confucianism was a foreign, imported ideology with no
foundation within native Korean culture and traditions. In fact, as detailed above,
some Confucian values came into direct conflict with Korean customs, and an
extensive uprooting and replacing of traditional beliefs had to take place before
Confucianism could assume the predominant role in the governing of the people’s
way of thinking and way of life. Therefore, the small circle of Korean scholarofficials who desired the adoption of Confucianism had to carry out an even
more intense campaign of propagation and indoctrination of the masses than
their counterparts in China, which they accomplished through “several eras of
vigorous government sponsorship and social legislation.”22 Just as in the Chinese
case, Confucian ideology was integrated into the Korea system primarily to serve
the needs of the central ruling state and the elite scholar class, and had to be
assiduously inculcated into the rest of society before it took root and grew into the
complex social and cultural phenomenon that it is known as today.
Such top-down implementations of Confucianism since its birth in
China and Korea imply that Confucian principles and practices are particularly
beneficial and desirable to those in the position of authority. In addition, its history
has caused it to develop a structure that facilitates state-sponsored enforcement of
its beliefs and values across society. This greatly impacted how governments later
on were able to inherit these qualities to bring about revivals of Confucianism in
the modern day.
POLITICAL USES OF CONFUCIANISM
Throughout its history, Confucianism23 has been embraced and
condemned in turn once and again in the nations of East Asia where the
21 Shin, 30.
22 Ibid., 28.
23 I use the term Confucianism throughout the remainder of the paper to refer to both classical Confucianism, the original philosophical teachings by Confucius and his disciples, and neo-Confucianism, the
rationalistic reinterpretations of these teachings by scholars in later dynasties. Modern revivals of Confucianism draw from both versions, and thus, for the purposes of this paper, I consider “Confucianism” to
encompass the entire history of the Confucian tradition, in its capacities as both a philosophical and ethical
system and a political ideology. A similar distinction is made by Jin Woong Kang. See Kang, Jin Woong,
“Political Uses of Confucianism in North Korea,” Journal of Koran Studies 16.1, (2011): 81.
Columbia East Asia Review 75
tradition has taken root. Shaohua Hu proposes that these “ups and downs” of
Confucianism in China can be explained with the concepts of secular trend and
cyclical rhythm, borrowed from the world-system theory.24 The secular trend
describes a continuous long-term weakening of Confucianism’s influence as
time goes on, while the cyclical rhythms define the pattern of the short-term rise
and fall of the status of Confucianism within the larger trend of decline.25 Kam
Louie finds a pattern in the motivations for such rises and falls in modern China,
observing that anti-Confucianism is linked to demand for radical change, while
pro-Confucianism is linked to desire for stability.26
It is clear that Confucianism’s influence and prestige has been on a
constant decline since its peak in premodern times, when it dominated all aspects
of social, political, and cultural life; this reflects the change in popular perceptions
of Confucianism as the nations undergo modernization, and is described in
the secular trend concept. However, I would like to emphasize that the cyclical
rhythm of the ascent and decline of Confucianism does not just reflect shifts in
popular opinion, but rather relies ultimately on agency on the part of the state to
reinstate Confucianism on a national scale. Demands for a return of Confucian
values from the populace are usually confined to a small faction of intellectuals,
and due to the very nature of Confucian ideology, which was developed from
the start with the hope that it would be employed by the ruler of China to exert
a form of social control that would promote values conducive to building a
“great harmonious society,” Confucianism can only be restored when adopted
by the central government. As such, it is imperative to study the objectives and
strategies behind top-down campaigns to revive Confucianism in order to fully
understand its relevance to modern day states and societies. However, this is not
to say that opinions from the public sphere are not important; popular sentiment
determines whether utilizing Confucianism would be effective at any particular
point in time. When popular demands for change are too strong, state efforts
to cultivate Confucian values encouraging stability within society often fail.
Therefore, I contend that the pattern Louie finds describing the links between
desire for change or stability and attitudes toward Confucianism runs on different
wavelengths for state and for society, and that alignment of the two dictates the
success of attempts to revive and utilize Confucian beliefs and ideology.
In this chapter, I will compare how members of the Chinese and North
Korean leaderships have selectively adopted elements of Confucian ideology
24 Shaohua Hu, “Confucianism and Contemporary Chinese Politics,” Politics and Policy 35.1 (2007): 138.
See also Thomas Shannon, “An Introduction to the World-System Perspective,” 2nd Ed. (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1996).
25 Ibid., 138-139.
26 Kam Louie, “Critiques of Confucius in Contemporary China” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980):
147.
76 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
throughout the modern era, and what their objectives were in choosing to utilize
Confucianism. To support my arguments, I will examine whether their methods
and motivations align with the patterns described by Hu and Louie, focusing only
on the decisions of the central governments. The two countries are compared in
order to evaluate whether the patterns hold true in a cross-national analysis.
THE MODERNIZATION PERIOD
Western and Japanese imperial forces infiltrated China in the nineteenth
century, forcing the weak Qing state that was ruling at the time to submit to
outrageous unequal treaties and hand over major concessions to the stronger
powers. Thus began China’s “century of national humiliation,” a period etched
into the collective memory of the nation as a great source of shame and anger as
well as a potent impetus for the desire to reform and modernize China to catch
up to the rest of the world. Such sentiments led to extreme dissatisfaction with
Qing rule, and in 1911, the Xinhai Revolution broke out, overthrowing the last
imperial dynasty of China and establishing the new Republic of China under the
control of Yuan Shikai. In the power struggle that ensued, factions advocating the
installation of Confucianism as China’s state religion arose, which Yuan supported
as a way to solidify his control and build up the ideological foundation for a
return to the monarchy system with him as emperor.27 This widely unpopular
move to restore the monarchy “blemished the reputation of Confucianism” and
“tipp[ed] the balance in favor of anti-Confucianism,” and Yuan was forced to
abandon the attempt.28
The disillusionment with the failings of the newly established Republic
of China led to a strong reaction against traditional Chinese culture, including
Confucianism, within the intellectual circles. Confucianism was blamed for
China’s weak, underdeveloped state and deemed irrelevant to modern times.
Many people turned instead to Western values, instead.
Despite the popularity of anti-Confucianism, many intellectual and
political figures disapproved of the pro-foreign, anti-tradition sentiments,
including Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, who were both staunch advocates of
Confucianism.. In particular, Sun believed that his “Three Principles of the People”
were “intimately related to, and vindicated by, the traditions of Confucianism,”
a restoration of which would provide an essential moral foundation for the Three
Principles to develop upon.29
27 Hu, 139-140.
28 Ibid., 140.
29 A. James Gregor, “Confucianism and the Political Thought of Sun Yat-Sen,” Philosophy East and West
Columbia East Asia Review 77
Upon the establishment of the Nationalist government in China, Chiang
adopted the Three Principles of the People as the ideology of the Nationalist Party
and the Republic of China. In 1934, Chiang launched the New Life Movement, a
campaign that sought to restore the central Confucian values of li, yi, lian, and chi
– “propriety, justice, integrity, and honor” – with the intention of reforming the
people’s behaviors and customs into those of a modern nation.30 For Chiang, it
was also a drive to boost public morale in light of mounting internal and external
problems, and turn the people against Western democracy and communism,
which was becoming a growing threat. The country was bankrupt, dominated by
warlords, and plagued by opium addiction. In 1932, Japan invaded Manchuria
and renamed it “Manchukuo” as a puppet state of the Japanese. With the New
Life Movement, Chiang used Confucian ideas to blame the worsening conditions
on a lack of morality among the people, in order to distract them from the real
roots of the problems lying in the weak and corrupt government. The campaign
was criticized for the “banality of its concerns,” and its unattainable goals, resulting
in its failure.31 Yuan, Sun, and Chiang all tried to bring back an appreciation of
and deference to Confucian values and practices for their own political purposes,
but the radical forces of modernization and change underway in society doomed
the success of these endeavors.
Korea, like China, practiced self-isolation from the outside world
throughout pre-modern times. This ended when it was forcibly annexed by Japan
in the year of 1910, after which Japan controlled the peninsula until the end of
World War II in 1945. Claiming that Korean culture was inferior, backwards, and
an impediment to modernization, Japan sought to eradicate Korean traditions
through policies such as the enforcement of the use of Japanese names and
language and the revision of school curriculums. However, the reforms carried out
under Japanese rule also allowed Korea to modernize at a highly rapid pace.32 The
fact that Japanese rule had a great impact on Korea’s modernization process, for
better or for worse, remains an extremely sensitive and contentious topic between
the two nations. Like with China’s “century of national humiliation,” the Japanese
colonial period has left a deep, painful scar on Korea’s conceptions of its own
history and its very national identity, the effects of which continue to be reflected
in the domestic and foreign policies of both North and South Korea today.
In their attacks on Korean traditional culture, the Japanese colonizers
naturally denounced Choson Confucianism as well. However, the “social value of
31.1, (1981): 57.
30 Chinese: 礼义廉耻l li, yi, lian, and chi “propriety, justice, integrity, and honor.”
31 Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution,”
The Journal of Asian Studies 34.4 (August 1975): 946.
32 Myung Soo Cha, “The Economic History of Korea,” EH.net, Economic History Association, Oct. 18,
2013 (http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-korea/).
78 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
Confucianism, especially the teachings on loyalty, and an orderly society, was…
fully appreciated by the Japanese,” and they utilized certain elements of Confucian
ideology, specifically the concept of the “five relationships,” to legitimize and
strengthen their control.33,34 Disapproving of the strict patrilineal clan system of
the Choson dynasty, the Japanese sought to establish the ruler-subject bond as the
dominant relationship, over familial ties. They reframed the familiar relationships
to place the Japanese emperor as the “symbolic head of household” of all his
subjects, “thus superseding individuals’ own ancestors.”35 This modification of
the Confucian relationship system would inspire a similar effort in North Korea
for the Kim family later on, one that was vastly more successful.
Popular sentiment towards Confucianism before and during the colonial
period in Korea was akin to that found in China during the New Cultural
Movement. Forced to compare the state of their own nation and society with those
of Japan and the West and face their own supposed backwardness and inferiority,
many Koreans rejected their past and their traditions, including Confucianism.
Yun Ch’iho, a prominent political activist from the late 1800s to early 1900s, stated
in a 1985 essay, “Behold Korea, with her oppressed masses, her general poverty,
her dirt and filth, her degraded women, her blighted families – behold all this and
judge for yourselves what Confucianism has done for Korea.”36 Although there
were some pro-Confucian voices who advocated turning to Confucian traditions
to cope with the rapid transformation of Korea, the majority of intellectuals in the
1940s to 1950s sought to eradicate Confucian legacies from Korean society and
culture.37
Both China and Korea’s arduous paths to modernization have left the
countries feeling severely conflicted about how to reconcile their traditional culture
with their visions of the future. On one hand, there is anger and resentment over
being forced to open up and subjugated by foreign imperialist powers. On the
other, there is a sense of shame and disillusionment with their own cultures, which
many perceived to be the deterrent that had prevented them from advancing on
their own while the Western world leapt ahead. These feelings would have great
impact on the nature of Chinese and North Korean ideologies later on, especially
33 Henrik H. Sørensen, “The Attitude of the Japanese Colonial Government Towards Religion In Korea
(1910-1919),” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 8 (1993): 62.
34 The five relationships are: sovereign-subject; husband-wife; parent-child; elder brother-younger
brother; and friend-friend. These fundamental relationships were believed to reflect the natural order of
the universe, and served as the models for all other relationships and as guidance for proper conduct in
society.
35 Kang, 329.
36 Yun Ch’iho, “Confucianism in Korea,” The Gospel in All Lands. (Methodist Episcopal Church Missionary Society, 1902): 109.
37 John Duncan, “The Problematic Modernity of Confucianism: The Question of Civil Society in Choson
Dynasty Korea,” in Charles Armstrong, ed., Civil Society in South Korea (New York: Routledge, 2001).
Columbia East Asia Review 79
in the formation of national identities and nationalist sentiments. Confucianism
came under especially harsh attack among the people as an obstacle to progress.
However, political leaders recognized the Confucian ideology’s conduciveness,
once implemented, to the legitimization of central power and regime stability. Yuan
Shikai tried to restore Confucian beliefs and practices to prepare for his attempt
to reinstate the Confucian monarchal system. Chiang invoked Confucian values
to deal with growing dissatisfaction among the people in light of rising domestic
and international challenges. Even with Sun Yat-sen, who was a true adherent
of Confucian ideology, it was still apparent that he often “exploited Chinese
traditional philosophy to lend support to some practical policy he had probably
chosen because of some immediate and very urgent problem.”38 In the same
way, Japanese colonizers saw the benefits of maintaining the orderly, hierarchal
nature of the Confucian Korean state, and strategically adapted elements of
Confucianism into their ruling mechanism, despite their explicit condemnation
of the traditional Confucian culture. While the process of modernization turned
the people away from Confucian thought and values, decisions and actions by
the central state and elite members of society repeatedly brought discussion about
Confucianism back into political discourse. Similar patterns and motivations
would continue to dictate Confucianism’s evolution after the establishment of
communist rule in both countries.
THE ERAS OF THE GREAT LEADERS
Following their victory in the Chinese Civil War and the establishment
of the PRC in mainland China in 1949, the CCP identified centralizing power
into a strong, unified state as one of their top priorities.39 To this end, the party
tried to legitimize their policies by connecting their cause to Chinese history and
tradition and praising Confucius, hoping to appeal to the people’s attachments
to the Confucian tradition of deference and hierarchy.40 Even before the PRC
was founded, Mao Zedong had stated, “Our nation has several thousand years of
history, with its own characteristics, with its many precious treasures. …Today’s
China is developed from historical China; we are the historicists of Marxism, we
should not cut off history. From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen, we should summarize
and inherit a share of this precious legacy.”41 Liu Shaoqi, a known admirer of
38 Gregor, 61.
39 John K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, Second Enlarged ed. (Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 2006): 361.
40 Tong Zhang and Barry Schwartz, “Confucius and the Cultural Revolution: A Study in Collective Memory,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 11: 2 (1997): 195.
41 International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 11: 2 (1997): 195.
80 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
Confucius, advocated that those who wished to become good communists should
undertake Confucian-styled self-cultivation.42 Despite the inherent contradictions
between Confucian and communist ideology, the CCP found Chinese traditional
symbols to be “great sources of energy,” and tried to “exploit them by detaching
them from their former contexts,” and appropriating only the desirable aspects
of Confucianism while rejecting the harmful feudal elements.43 This method of
pipan jicheng, or “critical inheritance,” would serve them time and again in their
formations and reformations of ideology, including with Marxism-Leninism and,
later, Maoism.44
A similar strategy of critical inheritance was utilized in North Korea. After
liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, the North Korean regime commenced an
attack on “feudal” Confucianism, targeting landlords and traditional clan systems
in their drive to reform the “anti-communist socio-economic structure” and
remove threats to their control.45 However, once the regime achieved a degree
of stability after the initial reforms in the 1950s, the state began to adopt and
appropriate Confucian ideas and values into their political ideology.46 It was
around this time that Kim Il Sung began to develop the Juche idea, which would
eventually become the official state ideology governing the regime’s every policy
as well as the sole guiding belief system dictating the behavior and way of life for
all the North Korean people.
In the beginning, Juche was conceived as an ideological tool with
which to attack and purge domestic rivals. As it was particularly aimed towards
criticizing the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions within the leadership, Kim
imbued Juche thought with the ideas of national self-reliance and independence
from foreign powers, facilitating its transformation into the regime’s nationalistic
ruling ideology. Over time, Juche has continued to evolve, absorbing ideas
from other political theories and thought system – including Confucianism –
to create a quasi-religious cult ideology whose primary, overarching objective is
legitimating the rule of the Kim family.47 Han Park identifies several themes in
Juche ideology that are consistent with and draw support from Confucian values:
Original quote: “我们这个民族有数千年的历史，有它的特点，有它的许多珍贵品。…今天的中国
是历史的中国的一个发展；我们是马克思主义的历史主义者，我们不应当割断历史。从孔夫子到
孙中山，我们应当给以总结，承继这一份珍贵的遗产。” “Zhongguo gongchandang zai minzu zhanzheng zhong de diwei” [The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War], Zhongwen Makesizhuyi, (http://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19381014.htm)
42 Liu Shaoqi. “Lun gongchandangyuan de xiuyang” [On the Self-Cultivation of Communist Party Members], (http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/8198/30513/30515/33955/2524494.html)
43 Zhang and Schwartz, 195.
44 Chinese: 批判继承 pipan jicheng “critical inheritance.”
45 Kang, 68.
46 Kang, 69.
47 Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, North Korea: Through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000): 18
Columbia East Asia Review 81
the human-centered worldview, the obligation to respect and obey the leader, the
concept of collectivism and hierarchy, the commitment to a single strong party,
the patriarchal nature of the system, and the idea that the state is an extension of
the family.48 Thus, it can be seen that these Confucian elements were selectively
integrated into Juche thought in order to encourage acceptance of oppressive social
control and generate loyalty and devotion to the ruler. Although Confucianism
was never credited in name for its contribution to Juche thought, and was in fact
actively erased and banned from textbooks, teachings, publications, and other
instruments of public discourse, the Confucian influence on Juche and the North
Korean ruling system is clear.49 Kim Il Sung even admitted to as much in a rare
moment of transparency: Don Oberdorfer records a conversation between Kim
and a Soviet official from the 1960s when Kim is confronted about the existence
of his personality cult, to which he replies, “You don’t know our country. Our
country is used to paying respect to elders – like China and Japan, we live by
Confucian culture.”50
As can be seen, the Chinese and North Korean regimes initially embraced
the integration of Confucian concepts and values into their political ideologies, in
practice if not in name. When thinking of Maoist China, though, the phenomenon
that Confucianism is most commonly associated with is the Cultural Revolution,
during which Confucianism came under fierce attack. In the Revolution’s massive
movement to eliminate traditional and cultural elements from Chinese society,
Confucianism, as a prime representative of traditional Chinese culture, naturally
became a target of vitriolic criticism. As a result, countless Confucian texts, relics,
monuments, and temples were ruthlessly confiscated or destroyed. Even during
the Cultural Revolution, however, it is noted that the state still “unofficially…
relied upon Confucian notions of hierarchy and authority to hold together a social
order, particularly one that was rent by Maoist mass mobilizations,” suggesting
that the movement did not truly seek to eradicate all aspects of Confucianism
from the roots.51
There are other indications that there were ulterior motives behind the
attack on Confucianism, most of which reflect the fact that the Revolution served
as a huge ploy for Mao Zedong to regain power within the CCP, leading to the
view that “Confucius was often just a label used to attack political enemies.”52
48 Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Inc., 2002): 64-67.
49 Han S. Park, North Korea Demystified, (New York: Cambria Press, 2012): 158.
50 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Basic Books, 2001): 21.
51 Kenan Malik. “A Book in Progress [part 21]: Communism & Confucianism,” Pandaemonium, Mar. 27,
2013. (http://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2013/03/27/a-book-in-progress-part-21-communism-confucianism).
52 Daniel Bell, “From Communism to Confucianism: China’s Alternative to Liberal Democracy,” New
82 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
Mao began to see a growing threat from local elites who could draw power away
from the central government; accordingly, he targeted criticism on the Confucian
concepts that “sanctified the decentralizing power” of the local authorities.53
Anti-Confucianism was also turned against Mao’s enemies within the members
of the top echelons of the leadership. The Gang of Four’s “Criticize Lin, Criticize
Confucius” campaign started with a denouncement of Confucianism, and then
linked Lin Biao to Confucius in order to more effectively paint him as a traitor and
enemy to the nation. A 1973 report written by Beijing and Tsinghua University
scholars and circulated by the government to launch the campaign against Lin
Biao illustrates the scathing criticisms and ludicrous connections made between
Lin and Confucius:
The capitalist careerist, conspirator, two-faced, turncoat, traitor Lin Biao, is a
downright disciple of Confucius… Due to his alignment with the reactionary
thought system of Confucius and Mencius, with them all wanting to restore
the old system and drive history backwards, he directed some people to collect
Confucius and Mencius’s teachings from all over …creating anti-revolutionary
propaganda, carrying out conspiratorial activities, and savagely attacking the
proletariats.54
The campaign was then used to subtly criticize Zhou Enlai, Deng
Xiaoping, and Hua Guofeng, among other prominent figures. In each case,
Confucius served as the proxy target in the rhetorical attacks, although the
real intended victims were clear. Chinese state and society’s attitude towards
Confucianism only began to slowly improve again after Mao’s death in 1976 and
the opening up to economic reform.
North Korea never fully denounced Confucianism in the way China did
during the Cultural Revolution; rather, the DPRK went the opposite way in fully
embracing many Confucian principles while disguising them under the name
of the Juche ideology. After the fall of the communist governments in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, North Korea suffered a crippling economic collapse,
resulting in widespread famine in the 1990s. In response, the regime tightened
Perspect 27:2 (2010): 18.
53 Tong Zhang and Barry Schwartz. Confucius and the Cultural Revolution: A Study in Collective
Memory. 1997. Pg. 198
54 Original Quote: “资产阶级野心家、阴谋家、两面派、叛徒、卖国贼林彪，是一个地地道道的孔
老二的信徒。…由于他和孔孟的反动思想体系一致，都要复辟旧制度，开历史倒车，他就指使一
些人，到处收集孔孟的言论…制造反革命舆论，大搞阴谋活动，向无产阶级猖狂进攻。” “Linbiao
yu kongmeng zhi dao” [The Way of Lin Biao and Confucius and Mencius], 1973 (http://www.360doc.com/
content/11/1102/08/6086479_160989551.shtml).
Columbia East Asia Review 83
their ideological control to boost the economy and public morale, working to
disassociate themselves from the international communist movement and turning
further to their own Juche thought as a sign that they were independent and
would not share the same fate as the Soviet bloc. Since before 1980, the year
when Kim Il Sung publicly introduced Kim Jong Il as the next in line to rule the
nation, the ideological apparatuses of the regime had been striving to incorporate
the patriarchal order, paternalism, and emphasis on the family unit found in
Confucianism into the North Korean thought system. The Kim family became
regarded as the paramount family, with Kim Il Sung depicted as the oboi suryong,
or “parental leader,” the wise and benevolent father of the entire nation.55 Thus,
when Kim Il Sung unexpectedly passed away in 1994, the people accepted Kim
Jong Il, the eldest son in the revered Kim family line, as the most reasonable and
worthy successor.
Under the control of the founding leaders of each country, both of the
newly established regimes of China and North Korea sought to centralize power
and legitimize policies by grounding them in the existing Confucian culture of
deference to authority and hierarchy. To resolve the conflict between Confucian
philosophy and the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, the leaders used the idea of
critical inheritance to selectively utilize beneficial elements of Confucian ideology
while rejecting the “feudalistic” institutional aspects. With the onset of the
Cultural Revolution, Confucius was denounced as a representative of undesirable
“old” Chinese culture, and served as an effective agent through whom Mao could
attack and purge his domestic enemies. North Korea, on the other hand, covertly
integrated the Confucian concept of the state as an extension of the family further
into their political ideology with the goal of facilitating a smooth succession from
Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il. The emphasis on ideology also helped them to
weather the economic and political crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
The desire for revolution on the part of Mao and the need for stability on the part
of the Kim family caused a difference in their attitudes towards and treatments of
Confucianism.
LEADERSHIP TRANSITION AND REFORM
Leadership transitions have conventionally been prime opportunities for
new leaders to take the country in a new direction. With China, this was certainly
the case, as Deng Xiaoping opened China up to economic reform and relaxed
governmental control. But in North Korea, the hereditary transition to Kim Jong
55 Korean: 어버이 수령 oboi suryong “parental leader,” also translated as “fatherly leader.”
84 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
Il, whose sole claim to the title was based on the belief that he would faithfully
continue the policies of his revered and beloved father, inhibited any hopes of
significant change in the regime. Perhaps due to the perceivable gap between the
popularity of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the junior Kim endeavored more
than ever to emphasize the paramount importance of the Kim family lineage
and the inherent righteousness of his leadership, invoking strong overtones of
Confucian ideology. After Kim Il Sung’s death, Kim Jong Il even waited before
formally taking on his political positions for three years, the proper length of time
to mourn for one’s parent for a conscientious Confucian.56 The North Korean
media promoted the cultivation of Confucian values and norms among the
people to “situate regime legitimacy more solidly in Korean history,” turning to
“traditional themes of popular Korean neo-Confucianism: filial piety, respect for
elders, and moral education.”57 In this way, stability was maintained during Kim
Jong Il’s reign through the continued reliance on the two pillars of social control
and ideology, the latter of which was supplemented by Confucian ideas.
Following the utter chaos of the Cultural Revolution period, the Chinese
leadership also looked for an ideological source of stability to accompany and
balance their reforms in the economic realm. Part of their answer, once again,
was Confucianism. Hoping to cultivate societal values based on the “Confucian
concern for education, harmonious social relations, and stability” to help the
nation heal after the devastation of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping tacitly
allowed appreciation and the study of Confucianism to grow.58 In 1989, this tacit
approval became an explicit announcement, symbolized by the state’s decision to
commemorate the 2540th anniversary of Confucius’s birth and verbalized during
the commemoration in a speech by Gu Mu.59 In a statement harkening back
to Mao’s 1938 speech on the treasured legacy of Chinese history and the idea of
critical inheritance, Gu declared that China had to reflect on its valuable history
and critically assess its events and causes:
China has a long history and splendid ancient culture. The Chinese culture
represented by Confucianism once shined brilliantly in our history but has
become dimmer during the last two hundred years… Vicissitudes of a country
may be due to complex objective causes as well as subjective causes. We should
have an introspective analysis of this problem.60
56 Charles Armstrong, “The Role and Influence of Ideology,” in Kyung-Ae Park and Scott Snyder, ed.,
North Korea in Transition (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013): 9.
57 Ibid., 10.
58 William T. De Bary and Wei-ming Tu, Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998): 264-265.
59 Zhang and Schwartz, 203
60 Gu Mu, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony Commemorating the 2540th Anniversary of Confucius’
Columbia East Asia Review 85
The timing of the commemoration and speech, coming at just four
months after the Tiananmen Square Incident, suggested that this explicit
recognition of Confucianism was a direct response to both the long-term push for
stability and the immediate threat of the “anti-traditional” trends embodied by
the mass protests.61
In 2005, perhaps as a result of the “introspective analysis” proposed by
Gu, Hu Jintao launched the Harmonious Society campaign, the name of which
refers to the Confucian idea of creating harmony by preserving balance within
society.62 This emphasis on attaining “harmony” and “balance” reflects several
major objectives of the CCP: first, the shift of the overarching national goal to
achieving social harmony and stability rather than just economic growth, due to the
social problems and moral decay caused by rapid, uneven economic development
in the past years, as well as the fear of the unsustainability of continued growth;
second, the appeasement of the rising popular discontent over the social inequality
brought about by years of targeted focus on economic development over political
reforms; and third, the quelling of international fears of China’s rise on the global
stage with an image of peace and cooperation. In the face of increasing numbers
of public protests and the expanding moral vacuum left by the abandonment of
Marxism-Leninism as a guiding ideology, the Chinese leadership, seeking social
stability and ideological control, has brought about a revival of Confucianism in
political discourse once more by selectively invoking certain Confucian ideas and
language. In late 2006, the Sixth Session of the 16th Central Committee of the
CCP adopted Hu Jintao’s resolution on the building of a socialist harmonious
society in China, and discussed the significance, objectives, and tasks of such an
undertaking, which is to be achieved by the year 2020.63
To reinforce the campaign, the CCP has also worked to promote positive
images of Confucius at home and overseas as much as possible. The establishment
of guoxue, or “national learning,” institutions partially devoted to the study
of Confucian philosophy in China; the quotations of Confucian teachings
in the opening performances of the 2008 Beijing Olympics; the spreading of
“Confucius” Institutes teaching Chinese language and culture all over the world,
and the building of a giant Confucius statue in Tiananmen Square in 2011 –
Birth and a Symposium on Confucianism.” Study of Confucius, 1989, vol.4, quoted in Zhang and Schwartz,
204.
61 Zhang and Schwartz, 204.
62 Chinese: 和谐社会. Also known as 社会主义和谐社会 shehui zhuyi hexie shehui, or “Socialist Harmonious Society”
63 Zhongguo gongchandang di shiliu jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi gongbao [Chinese
Communist Party’s Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee Communique] (http://cpc.
people.com.cn/GB/67481/71679/71680/4907274.html).
86 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
though it was taken down after its location became too controversial – are just a
few examples of these efforts.64,65,66
THE PATTERNS OF POLITICAL USES OF CONFUCIANISM
From this tracing of Confucianism’s appearance in the official rhetoric,
propaganda, campaigns, and political systems of the modern regimes of China
and North Korea throughout the modern era, it can be seen that the leaderships
of both countries have deliberately employed Confucianism for their own
political purposes, and in a selective matter that allowed them to appropriate only
certain elements of Confucianism. This practice of “critical inheritance” justified
their inclusion of the useful aspects of Confucian ideology and orthodoxy that
contribute to social stability while they excluded any harmful or undesirable
aspects that may be associated with Confucianism or its history.
Across time and international boundaries, Confucianism is found to
have been utilized in similar ways in response to comparable situations faced by
the governing bodies in China and North Korea. The primary motivation for
attempts to integrate Confucianism into the political ideology or revive respect
for Confucianism within society is the desire to establish the legitimacy of the
leaders’ rule and thus generate stability for the regime. Both the Chinese and the
North Korean governments embraced the Confucian principles that stressed the
right of the ruler to hold power and the duty of the ruled to respect and remain
loyal to authority, in order to strengthen and centralize power in the top levels of
the regimes. The rare cases when Confucianism was explicitly denounced by the
central leadership happened during times when there was a need for radical change
rather than stability, and usually for ulterior motives: the North Korean regime
labeled the landlords and the traditional clan system found in North Korea after
the establishment of the DPRK as feudal Confucian elements so as to attack and
eliminate these areas of threat to their control, and Mao attacked Confucianism
and Chinese traditions in order to incite a revolution, with the ultimate goal of
purging his political enemies and regaining power within the CCP.
In general, it seems clear that the East Asian central states want to exploit
the features of Confucianism that are conducive to establishing regime legitimacy
64 Chinese: 国学. See Hu 2007
65 Bell, Daniel, “From Communism to Confucianism: China’s Alternative to Liberal Democracy,” New
Perspect 27.2 (2010): 18-27.
66 “Rujia fengfan weihua taishan kongzi xiang cang san da kan dian.” Xinhuawang, 12 Jan. 2011 (http://
news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2011-01/12/c_12973492.htm); Andrew Jacobs, “Confucius Statue Vanishes
Near Tiananmen Square,” The New York Times, Apr. 2011 (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/
asia/23confucius.html).
Columbia East Asia Review 87
and social stability. However, because the people have been losing their attachments
to Confucian traditions as they experience modernization and develop desires
for change and reform, the state has to actively push for returns to Confucian
beliefs and norms at various points in time when they feel that they need the
support of Confucian ideology. Specifically, these times occur when they want
to generate stability for the regime and their hold on power. These observances
from the histories of China and North Korea align with the patterns suggested by
Shaohua Hu and Kam Louie at the beginning of this chapter. Against the secular
trend of the long-term decline of Confucianism, state agency induces revivals of
Confucianism time and again to create a cyclic rhythm of rise and fall, according
with Hu’s theory. Pro-Confucianism attitudes are linked to desires to establish
stability, while anti-Confucianism attitudes are linked to eagerness to stimulate
change, as observed by Kam Louie.
An overall comparison of the PRC and DPRK regimes indicate a
conformance to Louie’s pattern as well. The Kim family’s top priority has always
been maintaining their control on power and ensuring the stability of the regime,
preferring the status quo rather than attempting to instigate any sort of economic
reform despite the impoverished state of the country. In keeping with this, they
have been relatively consistent in their applications of Confucianism, integrating
and assimilating Confucian ideas into their own Juche ideology. In contrast, the
PRC’s dynamic history of power struggles, leadership transitions, and reform
movements have resulted in a significant fluctuation in the status of Confucianism
over time.
With the conclusion that a leader’s official decision to utilize and
promote Confucianism reflects certain objectives or concerns faced by the regime,
the patterns can now be applied to the present day, in an effort to understand
what the recent reports referring to Xi Jinping and the CCP’s promotion of
Confucian values and ideas in recent times may indicate about their current
issues along with their intentions and goals for China in the years ahead.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Returning to present day China, many correlations can be drawn
between the approach the CCP is taking in its treatment of Confucianism today
and similar attempts in the past. A closer examination of Xi Jinping’s statements
at the Confucius Research Institute on November 26, 2013 reveals a striking
similarity to Mao Zedong’s 1938 “precious legacy” speech:
88 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
The Chinese nation has a long history of traditional culture, and it will
certainly be able to renew the glory of Chinese culture. In the research of
Confucius and Confucianism, we must adhere to the position of historical
materialism, make the past serve the present, discard the crude and extract
the essence, eliminate the false and retain the true, take advantage of the
situation, and study more in-depth, to enable Confucianism to develop an
active role under the conditions in the new era.67
Like Mao, Xi indicates that China and Confucianism’s history holds
many valuable elements; therefore, the task at hand is to extract Confucianism’s
“essence” from its undesirable aspects so it can better serve the present. Another
attempt to critically inherit Confucianism in a new time is underway.
This step towards Confucianism aligns with the observation that efforts
to shore up regime legitimacy tend to heighten when there is fear of widespread
social discontent, indicating that the CCP is becoming increasingly concerned
about popular unrest over various issues afflicting the Chinese government and
society, as well as.68 Underlying and exacerbating all this is the dread of economic
slowdown in the near future. To combat these fears and threats to the CCP’s
legitimacy, Xi is bringing Confucianism back into public discourse to both
combat these issues and employ Confucian rhetoric to boost public morale and
promote the Confucian values that support and legitimize authoritarian rule.
Xi’s intent to contend with discontentment over government corruption
in a Confucian style was indicated early on by his “austerity measures,” a series
of restrictions on luxurious overspending by the government he imposed just a
few months after he was appointed as General Secretary of the CCP. John Delury
notes that because the traditional Confucian concept of a “clean official” still
resonates deeply with the Chinese people, these crackdowns on corruption
are “best understood as Xi’s attempt to put his own stamp on that traditional
notion of good governance” through a “Confucian approach to ensuring virtuous
government through frugality.”69 Xi hopes to incite a positive public reaction to
start off his first term. The real effectiveness of these austerity measures on fighting
corruption, a festering problem that has plagued the CCP for ages, will have to
67 Original quote: “中华民族有着源远流长的传统文化，也一定能创造中华文化新的辉煌。研究
孔子和儒家思想要坚持历史唯物主义立场，坚持古为今用，去粗取精，去伪存真，因势利导，
深化研究，使其在新的时代条件下发挥积极作用。” “Xi jinping: chuangzao zhonghua wenhua de xin
huihang” [Xi Jinping: Creating the new glory of Chinese culture], Xinhuanet (http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2013-11/26/c_118301261.htm)
68 Jacob Poushter, “Inflation, Corruption, Inequality Top List of Chinese Public’s Concerns,” Pew Research
Center, 8 Nov. 2013 (http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/11/08/inflation-corruption-inequalitytop-list-of-chinese-publics-concerns).
69 John Delury, “Austerity with Chinese Characteristics.” Council on Foreign Relations, 7 Aug. 2013 (http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139629/john-delury/austerity-with-chinese-characteristics).
Columbia East Asia Review 89
be judged at a later time.
Similar attempts to combat the gaping moral vacuum in Chinese society
today can be seen. With rampant materialism and ghastly reports of “food safety
scandals” and “hit-and-runs with apathetic passers-by” becoming a common
phenomenon, some Chinese people are pointing fingers at the targeted focus on
economic growth enforced by the government as the cause for China’s loss of
conscience and morality.70 Xi reportedly stated that he wished for the CCP to
be more tolerant of “tradition cultures”, meaning Confucianism, Buddhism, and
Taoism, in the hopes that these faiths would help to repair China’s moral compass
and fill the vacuum.71 Confucianism seems to garner the most favor, with the
government even passing a “filial piety law” in July to force children to adhere to
the Confucian principles of obedience and deference to their parents through the
legal system.72 While the “Law for the Protection of the Rights and Interests of
Elderly People” is largely seen as an effort to deal with the costs of caring for the
generation of aging parents who do not have enough kids to care for them, its
stipulations that children must, under the rule of law, visit their parents a certain
number of times each month and “obey, please, and tend to the ‘spiritual’ and
financial needs of their parents” seem like an extremely aggressive push to revive
Confucian morals within society.73
Confucianism, as “China’s most venerable political tradition,” is being
embraced for another reason as well: to appeal to nationalist sentiment and
discourage leanings toward Western ideas.74 Driven by haunting memories of the
“century of national humiliation,” the public would like nothing more than to
see China redeemed and restored to its former glory. Although Confucianism was
once faulted for China’s backwardness, now that China has become prosperous
and powerful, many Chinese people are turning back to Confucianism and taking
pride in its traditions. Noticing that “Western cultural icons have grabbed the
hearts of the nation’s young people,” China also hopes to utilize Confucianism
to compete with the West in terms of “cultural glamour,” to complement its
economic prominence and complete the “great renewal of the nation.”75 This
70 Wang, Jiaquan, “Will Passion for Reading Revive Confucianism?” Xinhuawang, 6 Dec. 2013. (http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/06/c_132947802.htm).
71 Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard, “Xi Jinping Hopes Traditional Faiths Can Fill Moral Void in
China: Sources,” Reuters. 29 Sept. 2013 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/29/us-china-politicsvacuum-idUSBRE98S0GS20130929).
72 “Laonian ren quanyi baozhang fa,” [The Elderly Protection Act], NPC.gov.cn, 6 July 2012 (http://www.
npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2012-07/06/content_1729109.htm).
73 Jessica Levine. “From Mao to Now: China Attempts to Revive Once-criticized Confucian Values with
Filial Piety Law.” Tea Leaf Nation. 14 July 2013 (http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/07/from-mao-to-nowchina-attempts-to-revive-once-criticized-confucian-values-with-filial-piety-law/).
74 Bell, 2010.
75 Wang Jiaquan. “Will Passion for Reading Revive Confucianism?” Xinhuawang, 6 Dec. 2013. (http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/06/c_132947802.htm).
90 Liu • The Confucian Legacy
desire has manifested in all the forms of soft power the CCP has been pushing,
most noticeably the Confucius Institutes proliferating across the globe.
Even domestically, Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” campaign seeks to
present Chinese traditional culture as a source of China’s greatness and rising
status, as can be seen from the official Chinese Dream propaganda posters.76 A
series of these posters are dedicated to extolling the values of ren, yi, cheng, jing,
and xiao – “benevolence, righteousness, honesty, respect, and filial piety” – a
clear adaptation of the classic five Confucian virtues, namely ren, yi, li, zhi, and
xin, or “benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness.”77,78
The replacement of “propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness” with “honesty,
respect, and filial piety” shows a conscious reevaluation of what values are more
important for modern day China, another sign of critical inheritance at play. The
CCP, fearing that the moral vacuum will be filled by Christianity, Falun Gong,
or extreme forms of nationalism, is encouraging Confucianism and Chinese
traditional culture’s revival as a much less threatening form of nationalism. 79
Finally, Confucianism serves as an ideal representative of China’s ideology
for the Chinese leadership because Confucius invokes an image of peace and
harmony to the outside world, which can help to “stand China and the world
in good stead.”80 As China rises as a global power, its spreading influence on the
world stage, particularly in the surrounding Asian countries that were traditionally
dominated by China in the past, has become a growing concern. Confucius’s
teachings emphasized pacifist values, which the CCP utilizes in its rhetoric to
dissipate such fears, in a sense “promising that China will not covet hegemony but
only seek peaceful development.”81 How faithfully they will keep to this promise
remains to be seen, especially in light of the multiple territorial disputes they are
waging in the region.
It must be noted that Confucianism as of yet plays a limited role in
truly influencing the policies and decision-making of the Chinese leadership –
ideology still takes a backseat to economic development. However, in the event
of an economic recession, if one of its pillars of stability weakens, the CCP may
very well resort to further strengthening its attachments to Confucian ideology in
order to hold onto its legitimacy and reinforce regime stability, if history and the
actions of the North Korean regime are any indication.
76 See http://www.wenming.cn/jwmsxf_294/zggygg/ for the full collection of Chinese Dream posters
77 Posters can be seen at http://www.wenming.cn/jwmsxf_294/zggygg/pml/rycjx/.
78 Chinese: 仁义诚敬孝 ren, yi, cheng, jing, and xiao “benevolence, righteousness, honesty, respect, and
filial piety.” 仁义礼智信ren, yi, li, zhi, and xin, “benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness.”
79 Bell, 2010.
80 Hu, 2007.
81 Hu, 2007.
Columbia East Asia Review 91
In regards to the people’s point of view, the impact of efforts to revive
Confucianism on the population is still questionable, as there are many cynics in
modern day China who are well aware that the state-sponsored campaigns may
be based on various ulterior motives. However, signs show that popular opinion
of Confucianism is moving in a positive direction. Several scholars have gained
popularity and prominence for advocating a larger role for Confucian values and
practices in the political and economic sphere in China.82 The tourism industry
in Qufu, the hometown of Confucius, is steadily growing.83 The two annotations
on Confucian works that Xi Jinping picked out to read during his recent visit to
Qufu have reportedly become hits on online bookstores, selling out in just a few
days and forcing publishing houses to rush to the press for more copies.84
China is by no means a “Confucian state” as it was in premodern times.
But a combination of state-driven ideology and positive popular sentiment may
lead to a full Confucian renaissance in the near future.
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