Alliance Response to the MoJ Consultation on Transforming Rehabilitation
‘The Alliance’ is the name given to the partnership between Catch22 and Turning Point, two
of the UKs leading social businesses and Serco, a FTSE 100 company and a major Provider of
Government contracts.
The Alliance operates the Payment by Results (PbR) contract at HMP & YOI Doncaster using
the Alliance Offender Management (AOM) model. This model also operates at the newly
established HMP Thameside. The Alliance has also delivered contracts working with
offenders in the community such as Path2Work, a NOMS pathfinder that found and
sustained over 1000 offenders in employment. The Alliance was created as an equal
partnership in 2006.
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B1: How can we maximise the results we get from our collective Government and public
sector resources?
The Alliance of Serco, Catch22 and Turning Point warmly welcomes the changes proposed by
the Ministry of Justice. We see tremendous opportunities to work in new ways with Public,
Private and Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise (VCSE) Sector partners to improve
outcomes for service users, which will in turn lead to reduced reoffending and safer
communities, whilst improving value for money.
To maximise results from collective Government and Public Sector resources the Alliance
suggests that the Authority consider the following 4 key points:
• Integrated and outcome led commissioning: adoption of a new commissioning
ethos that transforms traditional commissioning practices into an integrated and
outcome-led commissioning approach, which is co-designed with Providers at the
national and local level;
• End-to-end Integration: working with Providers, regardless of sector (i.e. public,
private, VCSE) to join up the silos that exist in criminal and social justice and to
identify important gaps in service provision and to remove duplication and waste;
• Exploration of new commercial and delivery models: for improved Government
collaboration and outcomes delivery;
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•
Ensuring change happens quickly: without disrupting current delivery or
compromising public protection.
Each of these points is explained below.
Integrated and outcome-led commissioning
We believe that there is scope for Government to commission in a more integrated and
holistic way that will save money and improve outcomes. To achieve this, Government
Departments and other organisations working with offenders/service users must first
develop a shared ethos and purpose. At present, it is widely observed that there are many
conflicting Government initiatives, views of purpose, desired outcomes, resources and
funding streams focusing on offenders, which has contributed to the creation a disjointed
and duplicative criminal and social justice system with many gaps in service provision.
The Alliance suggests that Government must think seriously about deploying new
collaborative commissioning models that are co-designed with the supply chain and we
have started to see evidence of this approach and the benefits it can bring during the
consultation period.
With an integrated and holistic commissioning approach that is co-designed with the supply
chain at both national and local levels, Government could more easily identify, prioritise and
engage with Government Departments/ bodies and Providers, regardless of sector, who
have resources for working with offenders/service users. We suggest that a single
independent Design Authority, supported by a Managing Agent, might well be best placed to
help achieve this. This approach would develop a Benefits Framework that would be used to
identify key benefits, policy and delivery partners and captured the shared values and ethos
of those organisations working with offenders.
This commissioning approach must also look at how it can share and disseminate best
practice. We feel that the commissioner should also build over time an evidence base for
statistical analysis of PbR outcomes. These can then be used to drive future decision making
and investment decisions.
End-to-end integration
The collaborative approach to commissioning would seek to better align social and criminal
justice resources through a life-journey model that maps risks and needs across an
individual’s lifetime. We believe that our ‘birth to death’ approach clearly identifies key
gaps in service provision that could, if addressed, have a marked and significant impact on
outcomes, as well as significantly reducing costs. Building on recent early intervention work
undertaken by NAO, we would seek to explore commissioning models that could be used to
divert people away from a life of crime, disrupt criminal activity or help offenders/service
users desist from their offending behaviours.
Clearly there is an important role to be played in the integration of national and local
commissioning strategies, especially with PCCs, and this will require careful thought and co2
working. However, in our view it is possible to successfully manage the interface between
national and local commissioning and delivery, which should quickly start to eradicate
duplication and waste from the system.
We also point out that it would be beneficial to engage Treasury in the commissioning
process as they have the potential to remove potentially artificial budgetary barriers that
might otherwise be seen as blockers and to create the financial links between social and
criminal outcomes.
Exploration of new models for improved Government collaboration and outcomes delivery
The Alliance suggests that Government should quickly explore new potential models for
multi agency and department working. There is strong evidence from Health policy and
from overseas markets of new integrated approaches that will deliver significant cost
savings. These models include, for example, Multi Agency Payment by Results (MAPbR),
whole region outsourcing and diversionary PbRs. The Alliance firmly believes that through
adoption of new models, many which can be transposed from existing applications, that it is
possible to integrate the complete public, private and voluntary supply chain.
Ensure change happens quickly without disrupting delivery or compromising public
protection
The Pareto principle provides the key to enabling rapid change. Pareto analysis suggests
that 80% of outcomes are delivered from 20% of the inputs, so commissioners and the
supply chain must quickly agree what are the key pieces of information and data that are
required to deliver quickly a successful competition and mobilisation, transition and
transformation (MTT). However, we must also plan carefully to ensure that current delivery
is not disrupted in any transition/transformation period.
To achieve this, it is suggested the commissioners and Providers create a forum to look at
the top 5 costs, which will include people and assets. By providing key information about
people (for example details on TUPE numbers, structures, pay, working practices, pensions
and their liabilities etc.) and assets (for example details on the number of buildings, their
lease or ownership status, locations, condition, whether the assets are for divestment or
lease by Providers, details on how co-location will work in practice, how ICT systems can be
separated etc) it will be possible to quickly identify key issues and potential solutions for
them. This will require the supply chain to work in new ways: they will have to be more
open and less worried about giving away intellectual property, which they fear may
materially impact their bids. However, it is this joint approach and candidness that will
deliver real and sustainable change quickly and could form part a significant part of the
MoJ’s evaluation process. We believe this would fundamentally change Provider’s
behaviours and encourage them to provide de bono advice and support to Government and
the competition.
Following the consultation period we strongly suggest that the MoJ rapidly issue a
specification, however first draft and, as they have done during the consultation period, run
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workshops looking at how the specification can be improved. It is through this constant
interaction with the supply chain that many of the issues that delay procurements can be
designed-out of the procurement process.
Finally, MoJ must recognise and use the wealth of knowledge that has been gained by
MoJ’s procurement teams during the PCP1, 2 and 3 prison competitions, Community
Payback competition and the PbR Innovation and Community pilot processes. Many of the
issues being raised in consultation workshops may have been addressed in these
competitions and the Alliance suggests that significant time savings could be made if these
staff worked on the Transforming Rehabilitation competition and its preparation.
B2: How can we use the reform of offender services in the community to enhance the
broader range of social justice outcomes for individuals?
The Alliance observes with interest the merging criminal and social justice agendas and we
actively encourage and support this and the benefits it brings. For our organisations –
collectively and separately – we recognise that behaviours whether, by way of example,
criminogenic or health-based, are often contingent on early life experiences. We, like the
NAO in their recent report, recognise the importance of early intervention in reducing costs
and improving direct and indirect outcomes. We would strongly encourage Government, as
part of this consultation, to consider a more holistic approach to social and criminal
justice, rather than reinforcing today’s existing silos. This could be accomplished
commercially using Payment by Results to reduce demand on the criminal justice system
through diversion (integrated community-based services) PbRs or through desistance PbRs,
upon release from custody. For an example, the work done through Family Nurse
Partnerships early in life shows a very strong cost benefit and social impact as behaviours
are changed that might in later life result in expensive health or custodial outcomes.
We view those requiring interventions in social and criminal justice as individuals with
multiple needs, often complex, and the Alliance believes that we should consider life
journeys, rather than looking at incidents as single points in time. By taking this life-journey
approach and assigning single points of contact (e.g. Case Workers) and building a multiagency approach, supported by appropriate Information Technology, it should be possible
to build strong relationships, trust and co-operation between the individual and the
agencies supporting them to change individual, group and family behaviours to deliver
improved social and criminal justice outcomes.
In addition, we know from the ‘what works’ literature that crucial desistance inputs for
offenders (services users) are: appropriate accommodation; a job; and a relationship with a
pro-social peer. Desistance is an active process in which agency (ability to make choices and
govern ones own life) is first discovered then exercised, placing the importance on self
confidence, involvement and participation. It requires the building of social capital or
opportunities, building ownership and belonging in the family and community. The Alliance
understands that effective offender services in the community should not focus solely on
treatment, ‘help’ or programmes without first understanding the human processes and
social contexts through which change in an offender occurs. It is important to focus on
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opportunities and motivations, to help service users discover their capacity to make and
enact choices so as to resist and overcome pressures that may lead them back to crime.
Interventions should not solely be concerned with preventing further offending, but to
encourage offenders to make good to victims and communities through restorative
processes, and through community/volunteering service.
Enabling offenders/service users to both be treated fairly and to behave fairly, to seek
support and give support to others, are the building blocks of improving social justice. Social
Capital is a determinant in desistance: it does not only refer to the social resources that an
individual can draw upon – their parents and families, partners’ friends and neighbours – it
also implies the offender’s engagement and commitment to the community and their
willingness to participate in its values.
Promoting active citizenship, community
reintegration, reparation models and restorative justice models and deploying ex-offenders
as mentors, are practical applications of this social justice agenda. Correctly deployed, this
will enable offenders to become social justice agents within their communities.
MOJ will also need to work with Providers and with the public through representative
bodies, including victims’ organisations and Community Safety Partnerships, to build consent
for offender provision and support in each of these areas. This will be complex and
challenging when many victims will themselves be struggling with housing and employment.
However, the ultimate goal for victims and communities is reduced reoffending; thus there
needs to be education and clear messages that the support provided to offenders is
evidence based and focused on reducing reoffending. The reforms that Transforming
Rehabilitation will bring must be credible to victims, improve their voice in the criminal
justice system and create more opportunities for reparation.
B3: Should any additional flexibility be built into the community sentencing framework to
strengthen the rehabilitative impact of community orders, and the reintegration of
offenders into society?
The Alliance believes that additional flexibility must be built into the sentencing framework
to strengthen the rehabilitative impact and to assist with the reintegration of offenders
into society. At present we see 3 key themes:
1. Improving compliance;
2. Additional flexibility without legislation;
3. Increased discretion and reduced national standards.
Improving Compliance
All Providers will need time to build and win the confidence of Sentencers, courts and
victims in operating a more flexible approach to enforcing Community Sentences and they
will do so by delivering results. However, Providers must recognise that flexibility is not a
tool to be operated in favour of the liberty of the offender, but one that should enable
compliance with the outcomes that the courts sought in original sentences. This offers
new Providers the potential to work with local courts and communities to promote a better
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understanding of Community Sentences and to explain how the approach will help prevent
reoffending, support victims and in turn, build stronger communities.
Every offender/service user will have a risks and needs-based assessment, which will identify
what practical support is needed for their rehabilitation. This will enable a tailored package
of interventions for each individual that draws on the different skills of the public, private
and voluntary, community and social enterprise sectors and that can be used flexibly to
respond to both changing risks and needs. An evidence-based, personalised Case Worker
approach will assist staff in evidencing defensible decision-making in relation to exercising
flexibility.
Additional flexibility without legislation
The Alliance believes that there is potential to change the delivery of supervisory
requirements to improve risk management and to create incentives for compliance. These
changes would require supervising officers to be given some limited additional discretion
on how packages of supervision are delivered. For example, offenders/service users will
normally be fitted with Radio Frequency tags, but we suggest that a Case Worker should be
able to move his or her offender to GPS tracking if their risk profile changes without a return
to court. Electronic Monitoring could also be used flexibly to ensure compliance with other
elements of a Community Order; for example, once the offender is complying with a set of
appointments, such as attending accredited programmes, the monitoring element of the
curfew requirement could then be relaxed.
London Community Payback (CP) introduced Level One and Level Two placements with
conditionality to move off a ‘sweat-on-brow’ placement to a higher skill, lower supervision
placement. This should be replicated with incentives in all Community Sentences and
rehabilitation programmes. There would be incentives to comply and consequences if they
do not that fall short of a formal breach, which should be reserved for serious noncompliance and major behavioural issues.
Increased discretion and reduced national standards
The Alliance supports the renewed focus on offender/service user engagement and
increased discretion in managing Community Sentences. We see an opportunity to give
more discretion to Case Workers to determine the specific measures that a Community
Order should contain throughout the course of supervision to best reduce reoffending and
manage risk. We note that legislation will be required, but dispensing with the rigid
structure of activity requirements could assist in delivering Community Sentences that are
tailored to risks and needs and have impact. Community sentences will need a range of
interventions to effectively reduce reoffending, but giving Providers flexibility to deliver the
sentences of the court could bring gains in both efficiencies and reducing reoffending.
This could build on the recent experience in West Yorkshire where Sentencers did not order
specific requirements when agreeing to a Community Sentence. The Alliance proposes that
the court could sentence the offender/service user to a low, medium or high intensity
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Community Order and the Case Worker would determine which requirements best met their
risk category.
Finally, we strongly suggest that Supervision needs to move away from a ‘once a week for 20
minutes’ model towards a pattern of reporting that is matched to both risks and needs,
provides appropriate interventions at the right time with plans that are regularly reviewed
and ensure that risk is managed dynamically and responsively in real-time.
C1: We are minded to introduce 16 Contract Package Areas. Do you think this is the right
number to support effective delivery of rehabilitation services? Do you have any views on
how the Contract Package Area boundaries should be drawn?
It is our understanding that Government wishes to create a mixed market economy that
allows multiple Providers from public, private and voluntary, community and social
enterprise sectors and of differing scale to flourish. We whole-heartedly support this
approach.
Whilst geography and co-terminosity with other provisions (for example the Work
Programme or PCCs) has been used to determine the boundaries of Contract Package Areas
(CPAs), the size of the offender population, the complexity of their criminogenic needs and
their physical location (for example as they journey through the prison system) should also
be deciding factors.
Derived from our experience of major regional competitions, we suggest that regions should
be designed around populations: for example London represents circa 20% of the current
caseload and revenue and other major population centres include the Midlands,
Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, South Wales etc. In contrast, other more rural areas have
populations that have far fewer offenders: East of England and central Wales for example.
The Alliance therefore believes that there is significant scope to design a mixed market
economy when regions are designed around populations. This approach also provides the
ability to match organisational size and capabilities to population. For example, it is possible
to see a system where larger prime contractors or consortia manage larger populations and
medium and smaller organisations manage medium and smaller populations. This has
multiple benefits in that MoJ can ensure that it has sufficient bidders in all regions to run a
successful competition, which would produce the scale necessary to enable significant
service redesign whilst reducing cost. At the same time it will ensure diversity of supply as
smaller organisations, regardless of legal structure, could work as subcontractors to larger
primes or be responsible in their own right for service delivery in regions matched to their
scale and capabilities.
In addition, the Alliance suggests that MoJ should recognise that in some geographies other
considerations must be taken into account: for example, in Wales the involvement of the
Welsh Assembly Government is critical in designing an effective and efficient service for
Wales, whilst local commissioning arrangements with PCCs will need to be co-ordinated
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effectively. However, we believe that it is possible to create effective commissioning, if
regions are of suitable scale and multiple agencies and stakeholders work together under a
single Strategy and Delivery Plan to improve the effectiveness of the overall geographically
defined system to reduce reoffending and to create safer communities. Therefore, in our
considered view, creating CPAs with large offender populations will lead to the greatest cost
savings and enable the desired commercial and transformational outcomes to be achieved.
We also anticipate that the procurement process will involve restrictions on the number of
regions or the percentage of population that can be won: for example, in the recent prison
completion 9 prisons were in scope, bidders could bid for up to 6 prisons, but only win 4 of
them. Obviously, the greatest cost efficiencies will exist where it is possible to cluster
regions, as shared front, middle and back office savings become possible. We would
strongly encourage Government in the design of regions to seriously consider the effects of
clustering.
C2: What payment by results payment structure would offer the right balance between
Provider incentive and financial risk transfer?
The Alliance welcomes the Government’s plans to introduce Payment by Results (PbR)
contracts, as we believe this will drive greater co-operation between Government, Public,
Private and Voluntary Sector Providers, whilst improving services to end users, which will in
turn reduce reoffending and create safer communities.
At this point in time, with a developing specification and a high degree of uncertainty, it is
difficult to provide a quantitative response to the question of right balance between
incentive and risk. Therefore, we have attempted to provide a number of important issues
for the Authority to consider whilst designing PbR contracts, which we hope will help answer
this question.
The Alliance is used to working with Payment by Results models in multiple markets and we
see first-hand some of the limitations posed by current PbR methodologies and binary
measurement systems. We propose that Government should consider PbR models and
outcome measures that:
•
•
Facilitate integrated multi-agency working;
Use more of a ‘Score Card’ type approach. Ideally metrics would be a mixture of
hard, soft and service outcomes. By this we mean hard outcomes such as the
reconviction rate or frequency of reoffending, soft outcome measures, for example,
of the critical soft metrics around relationships with Case Managers and service
outcomes as key contractual service deliverables. These might include measurement
of service quality or whether an offender has employment and accommodation on
release, which could be tracked over time in the community;
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•
•
•
•
Consider a range of hard outcomes rather than just a single binary outcome; for
example, frequency of reoffending or the distance travelled by offenders in terms of
criminogenic profile;
Consider PbR models is that reduce the overall demand on the Criminal Justice
System (e.g. diversion from custody) and that link the spheres of social and
criminal justice, whilst taking into account the recent work undertaken by the NAO
on early interventions. Our view is that this is best achieved by developing pathways
for life journeys that draw on multiple interventions from public, private and
voluntary organisations through a single point of contact model, based on
Integrated Case Management approaches;
Consider PbR models that are designed for specific offender groups e.g. women
offenders or particular risk or sentence cohorts. PbR models and payments could
differ for different segments of the offender management population or risk and
sentence cohorts. This approach, as in all other markets, simply recognises that PbR
models will require some form of segmentation and differing service design, which
will deliver differing results. For example, reoffending rates amongst prolific
offenders are very different to those amongst low risk first time offenders and the
models that service each segment may differ significantly. This may lead to parking
and creaming accusations, but the Alliance sees this as any other market would:
designing different services for different segments and expecting different results
from each segment. The parking and creaming criticism should be tackled by MoJ
who should explain to stakeholders that different models are applied to different
offender groups delivering different outcomes;
Do not ask Providers to take the risk on a whole cohort when the model they
propose only serves a proportion of the whole cohort. For example, if a Provider’s
model targets medium risk offenders on less than 12 month sentences, do not make
the Provider responsible through PbR for all releases, as to achieve a reduction in
reoffending in the whole cohort is extremely challenging and requires high levels of
behavioural change in the far smaller target cohort.
The Alliance also suggests that Government look carefully at the apportionment of supply
chain risk, especially by prime contractors. In our experience risk cannot be flowed down to
the lowest common denominator in the supply chain: it must instead be held at the
appropriate level, which is often with the prime contractor. Risk management should be
introduced to elements of the supply chain in an incremental way, over a period of time
(often years), at the same time that capacity is built in these elements of the supply chain,
to shoulder that risk and manage it effectively. All too often we observe organisations
being asked to carry too much risk versus reward and this is an issue that we believe should
be avoided through careful supply chain and commercial structural design. It is worth noting
that Serco is currently finalising a code of conduct for VCSE-Private Sector-Collaboration with
the NCVO.
It is also important for MoJ to recognise the importance of cashflow, especially to smaller
and VCSE organisations. PbR methodologies that involve upfront payment and claw-back for
under performance are far more beneficial to organisations and will decrease costs
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significantly for MoJ, as working capital finance & risk charges will only be passed back to
the Authority as part of PbR pricing.
One of the key learning points from the PbR contracts that we run is the importance of
high quality (i.e. clean and tagged) data. At present MoJ baseline data quality is of mixed
quality meaning that it is difficult to ascertain the quality of the interventions being made by
Service Providers and the outcomes delivered. We also observe that high quality
professional resources are needed to undertake PbR modelling in both contractor and
Authority teams, as staff must understand advanced statistical modelling and possess
advanced modelling capabilities. The Authority should consider that many smaller
organisations may not carry this type of expertise in-house. To help to improve the situation,
we suggest that knowledge is pooled on statistical modelling and base-lining issues and MoJ
consider creating a PbR data sharing forum. To do this however, data sharing/security
standards must be quickly developed for PbR to allow access to data by organisations and
supply chain partners who may not traditionally have the security clearance required to
access such data.
C3: What measurements and pricing structures would incentivise Providers to work with
all offenders including the most prolific?
As discussed in the response above, the Alliance is keen to explore PbR models that
incentivise Providers to work with all offenders including the most prolific. In addition, we
would also welcome the opportunity to discuss PbRs that both reduce overall demand on
the Criminal Justice System and also help to further break down the barriers between
criminal and social justice.
Central to our approach is market segmentation and the recognition that different PbR
models are needed for different offender risk profiles. The segmentation approach
proposed is used in all markets globally and the Alliance is merely applying a market
segmentation methodology to Offender Management. Therefore, tailoring PbR design to
segment needs offers significant benefits: it avoids the risks of parking and creaming
accusations and is far more likely to deliver the desired results as offenders/service users
needs are met more closely.
Using an assessment tool based on OGRs and other assessment methodologies (for
example, similar to those currently being deployed as part of the HMP Doncaster PbR pilot referred to as “OGR Plus-Plus”) it is possible to design PbR models that focus on reoffending
risk and particular offender segments of the market. This means that resources, risk
management and payment mechanisms can be tailored and designed to meet specific needs
rather than having a one-size-fits-all approach. This one-size-fits-all approach carries large
risks for Providers, as often the payment for outcomes can be linked to an entire segment,
rather than just the sub-segment for which the model is designed i.e. Providers’ payments
include responsibilities for reducing reoffending outcomes for the entire segment of low,
medium and high risk (of reoffending and harm) offenders regardless of sentence length,
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even if the PbR model they deploy only aims to reduce reoffending in the sub-segment of
medium risk offenders with less than 12 month sentences. This means that Providers are
responsible for reducing reoffending in segments over which they have no direct control or
influence meaning that their risk profile is extremely high.
We suggest to reduce this risk profile to acceptable levels segmentation should be deployed
meaning that that if a PbR model is designed to reduce reoffending in a the medium risk
segment for sentences of less than 12 months then payments should be linked to the
outcomes achieved in this segment.
As we also discussed above, we see the need for blended metrics rather than just binary
outcomes, so a score card of hard, soft and service outcomes would be more beneficial to
the Authority and Providers, as well as providing far greater understanding of what works in
the long term. We recognise that further debate is required on the potential options for
these metrics including the use of binary, frequency and distance travelled methodologies
and we look forward to these discussions with interest.
Taking as a given that the Alliance supports the need for a differentiated outcome measures,
we see a diverse range of options for measurement and payment that include, for example,
scope for longitudinal studies where a measure is taking at annual intervals to the 5 year
point or where the measure for Community Orders commences from the completion of the
Supervision Plan rather than from the commencement of Sentence. However, we must
stress that allocation of these metrics & methodologies is dependent on the offender
market segment being addressed.
For illustrative purposes, let us consider the costs associated with risk of reoffending. For
those with the highest risk of reoffending and harm interventions and supervision costs will
be far higher, so rewards for outcome delivery should be directly linked to costs. For
example, if costs for managing very high risk of reoffending service users are say 10-20 times
higher than the costs for managing low risk of reoffending service users the payment
mechanism should reflect this. Using this methodology it is possible to see how payments
are linked to risk of reoffending data.
Alternatively, using a frequency model, very high risk of reoffending offenders are extremely
likely to reoffend quickly. Therefore an Abstinence from Offending (AfO) payment
mechanism could be used. AfO might be a matter of a few months for high and very high risk
of reoffending offenders. By way of contrast, service users with very low risk of reoffending
profiles may not reoffend within 12 months, therefore far longer abstinence periods could
be specified, which might be in excess of 12 months.
Whichever metrics are assigned for offender market segments it is vital that Government
consider cashflow implications. The Doncaster PbR uses a claw-back arrangement and we
advise that this is an extremely sensible methodology for Government to use. It provides
the supply chain, many of whom are VCS organisations, with guaranteed cashflow, which
at the bare minimum means that they can pay their staff and essential costs. Government
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must also recognise that to fund the outcome payments-lag any organisation, regardless of
size or legal structure, will have to seek funding, which is simply passed back to the
Authority in pricing. Therefore by disrupting cashflow to the supply chain Government is
simply increasing the price significantly.
It is also important that Government considers macro-economic factors on PbR, such as
GDP fluctuations i.e. crime increases in economic downturns and it is more difficult to place
ex-offenders into employment. We would suggest that macro-economic counter balances
are used in the Payment Mechanism that take account of economic factors at the city or
regional level. For example, GDP/GDA could be used for individual cities or the average of
city GDP/GDAs for a region.
In our view, Government must be prepared to reward over-delivery and recognise that
Providers committed the reducing reoffending agenda will use surpluses to reinvest in
improving the system. This may well include pump-priming innovation through creation of
innovation funds.
Finally, we must strongly encourage Government to recognise the critical importance of
data, data taxonomy and the different data management and modelling skill sets that this
will require the entire supply chain to successfully manage PbR. This means that
information systems and in particular Case Management systems must be integrated and
data must be stored in robust ways, but at the same time provide access to supply chain
partners who may not normally have appropriate security clearance. These are challenges
the Alliance is well positioned to help solve and we look forward to discussions with the
Authority on these issues.
C4: How should we specify public sector oversight requirements in contracts, to avoid
bureaucracy but ensure effective public protection arrangements?
The suggestion in Transforming Rehabilitation is that the supervision of offenders will be
split on the basis of the risk of serious harm that they pose, with VCSE and private sector
Providers being given the lower risk offenders and a reconfigured Probation Service
retaining the higher risk of harm offenders. This presents a potential problem as the nature
of the risk of serious harm that an offender poses to themselves or the public is dynamic.
Probation Trusts note that around 25% of their caseload may change risk category during
the course of supervision. Concern has been consistently raised across the sector about a
sub-set within this 25% who represent offenders who are low or medium risk who then
become high or very high risk of committing serious harm to themselves or others.
Additionally, the evidence from Serious Further Offence Reviews is that those who
committed these offences tended to be assessed as medium rather than higher risk.
If the proposal is understood and applied in crude terms, then when an offender moves
from being lower risk to higher risk of harm, they would potentially transfer from a Provider
to the Probation Service. Desistance theory and best practice in risk management suggests
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that a continuous, high quality relationship with the service user is central to preventing
reoffending. This presents a challenge if Probation is to take statutory responsibility for
the supervision of high-risk-of-harm service users, as it could imply a case transfer made
due to risk concerns, when such a transfer is in itself known to escalate the risk that an
offender poses and creates the additional risk that the case may not be picked up quickly
enough. The Commissioner may also rightly be concerned about the opportunities such
transfers offer for ‘gaming’, either with the Probation Service overestimating risk in order to
retain their caseload or Provider understating risk in order to maintain theirs.
In previous Alliance consultation responses, we have outlined the successful ways in which
the Alliance partners manage high and very high risk of harm offenders/service users in a
number of services (for example in prisons, on bail information services and whilst delivering
drug treatment and rehabilitation). Drawing on this, we think there is a possible approach
that both enables the Probation Service to lead on risk assessment and risk management
but does not require changes in Case Worker at the point at which risk escalates. We
note:
•
It is common practice in Probation Trusts to have medium risk of harm
offenders/service users supervised by a Level 3 NVQ qualified members of staff and
for them to seek extra support and formal risk reassessment when they note that
the risk may be escalating. This is provided by an NVQ Level 4 or 5 qualified member
of staff who is part of the team. Occasionally, this may lead to the case being
transferred internally, but more usually it leads to added levels of scrutiny,
assessment and support with risk clearly being managed by the NVQ 4/5 member of
staff whilst the other case management functions continue to be delivered by the
NVQ 3 member of staff;
•
The model in Serco delivery of Community Payback in London. Here all risk
categories of offender are provided with case management by staff under
subcontract from London Probation Trust (LPT). Staff are mostly NVQ Level 3 staff
with a small number NVQ4 and 5 qualified. These provide risk assessment, risk
matching to placement, re-assess cases where risk appears to be changing and
enforce orders where offenders are not complying. They do not have significant
case management contact with service users and work through Supervisors in terms
of issues that may need to be considered and addressed on a day-to-day basis to
manage risk.
‘Risk Consultancy’ model
Our preference is for a ‘risk consultancy model’ in which Probation Service staff are
dispersed into localised Provider delivery structures as ‘risk consultants’ supporting the
day to day supervision of all service users. In this integrated model, the Provider would take
and keep the Case Worker role in relation to all service users, with statutory Probation Staff
taking responsibility for the risk assessment of all cases, writing the Risk Management Plan
for all service users and providing specific additional oversight, Case Worker support and
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joint-working on those cases which are assessed initially or become high/very high risk of
serious harm and those medium risk service users where there are some levels of concern.
The Provider Case Worker (who could be a transferred Probation Officer, Probation Service
Officer or from the VCSE Sector) would remain as the lead supervisory figure throughout the
supervision period and would be assisted by a lighter or heavier touch approach from the
Probation Service worker in a risk responsive manner.
This approach would then avoid the need for complex case transfer arrangements or cooperation policies and protocols: the single Case Worker principle would be applied as the
norm and Providers would use the Supervision Requirement in Community Orders to
provide the Case Worker role and manage all service users’ interventions in an integrated
manner. This integrated approach co-locates staff from both agencies in one area to provide
their skills in a seamless manner to ensure public protection. The Probation Service would
have direct accountability for public protection and managing the risk of serious harm for all
offenders and would attend MAPPAs and MARACs as required. The Provider would be
directly accountable for having taken all the actions that the Probation Service required
them to take via the Risk Management Plan that the Probation Service will originate. This
model provides a clear demarcation of responsibility and accountability without creating a
platform for ‘gaming’ between agencies over caseloads.
Accountability and public scrutiny
It does not seem logical to move statutory responsibility for reporting of Serious Further
Offences (SFOs) from Probation to new Providers. However, PCCs could perform a public
scrutiny and SFO monitoring role, ensuring local accountability for supervision and
rehabilitation of local offenders. As Providers of risk assessment and management plans in
the ‘Risk Consultancy’ model set out above, the Probation Service could not also assess its
own efficacy at doing this work. There will remain a significant role for Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP) in ensuring that these functions are regularly inspected
and that learning is disseminated across the whole system.
Information Communications Technology
The challenge of creating a reliable, secure common ICT infrastructure across the criminal
justice system is immense. The nature of these reforms will require a common platform for
case management and risk management that works across the Probation Service, Providers
and the public and private sector prisons. There are promising developments with the
introduction of PCMS, OASys-R and the Government will need to mandate co-operation in
this area without tying the hands of Providers to national ICT service contracts which has
added layers of cost and can deliver less than optimal service.
C5: We want to incentivise through the gate provision, but some prisoners will disperse to
a different part of the country following release. How can we best account for that in
contract design?
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Define CPAs by offenders and not geography
The Government should consider contracts that follow offenders rather than geography,
especially where high volumes of custodial sentences are delivered outside of the CPA, as
in London. A CPA that was configured ‘for Londoners’ rather than London and paid a
Provider to deliver services to an offender in prisons outside of London and then on
resettlement back into London (and thus control their whole rehabilitation programme) may
enable Providers to take a larger Payment by Results (PbR) risk than if they are dependent
on a Provider in another area to deliver some of this.
Reciprocal arrangements across CPAs
Alternatively, Providers could be required contractually to work together with Providers
from other CPAs as and where necessary, either paying a pre-defined tariff for
rehabilitation services, or establishing their own reciprocal arrangements and paying no
tariff but with a fallback complaint mechanism to prevent Providers from deprioritising
other CPAs’ offenders.
Universal video conferencing provision
ICT could provide for virtual supervisory or mentoring relationships to begin or develop.
This would enable a Provider from the area where a prisoner was resettling to provide the
service user with services when they were out of area. This may not be appropriate for
some services but might be a way to maintain contact once a relationship had been started
face-to-face at an initial meeting. Comprehensive secure video conferencing across England
and Wales should be a contract requirement for all Providers in order that Providers in other
CPAs are able to cost-effectively engage with distant custodial establishments and those
offenders for whom they are responsible but who are dispersed some distance from the
CPA.
C6: What mechanisms can be used to incentivise excellent performance and robustly
manage poor performance to ensure good value for money?
The mechanisms available to manage performance, good, bad and indifferent are often
contingent upon the commercials models deployed. If for example a ‘thin Prime’ model is
used where the Prime Contractor does not actually deliver services, but manages the supply
chain where subcontractors deliver services on their behalf, the model differs significantly
from an incorporated Joint Venture (JV) model, where partners may be responsible for selfdelivery within the JV. Again, a mutual model, which sees staff-led involvement, may see
different structures, models and reward incentives.
The Alliance find that to ensure high quality service provision to service users and to provide
the maximum value for money to our customers we must clearly define service delivery
specifications, responsibilities and outcomes to our supply chain, which become contractual
obligations. We also firmly believe in capacity & capability building the supply chain and
working in partnerships with our supply chains to achieve this.
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To improve capability and capacity of the supply chain, the prime contractor or lead
contractor provides auditing & support services, which examine & evaluate on a regular
basis all aspects of service delivery & quality. It should be noted at this point that different
contractors will define service delivery and quality in different ways, as these metrics are
contingent upon the operating and commercial models deployed. We have outlined
elsewhere in our response the need for balanced metrics: a blend of hard (i.e. binary,
frequency or distance travelled outcomes), soft outcomes (i.e. relationship with Case
Worker) and service metrics (i.e. Contractual KPIs) and expect different Providers to define
their different prerequisites for qualities required to deliver their specified outcomes, ideally
through a causal model and outcomes framework. It is therefore the role of the
Commissioner to define acceptable minimum performance standards against each of
these quality metrics during competitive dialogue process and to recognise that these
metrics might vary between Providers. This poses challenges for national benchmarking,
but provides tremendous potential for Commissioners to take on a new role as the
disseminator of best practice, the co-ordinator of pan-Government resources and as the
body that identifies correlations between methodologies and outcomes.
We should also recognise that not all elements of the supply chain, especially smaller VCS
Providers, can initially accept significant contractual/risk flow-down, but also that their
capability to accept financial risk will increase over time. Therefore the Alliance has a timecontrolled process where under-performance in the supply chain is addressed through
service points and rectification notices rather than financial penalties, although financial
penalties are introduced over a defined timeframe (this may be several years). Where poor
performance is established, our auditors work in a consultative & constructive way to help
our supply chain address these issues, offering help and assistance where required. If
however there is consistent under-performance, especially where there is risk of harm, the
prime contractor has step-in rights through the subcontract.
Although the prime contractor bears the financial and contractual risk of PbR, in time we
expect the supply chain to work with the PbR construct, which often requires significant
changes to working practices and process; for example, data collection and analysis. To
achieve this we would expect partnership working across the supply chain partners to raise
the capabilities of the supply chain and to allow them to fully understand the PbR model
within which they must work and upon which future payments may be based. Of course, as
outlined above we support them in achieving this.
To achieve excellent quality, there is a body of evidence in business literature on how to
achieve service excellence through continuous improvement and we would not wish to
replicate this in our response. However, the Alliance finds that continuous improvement is a
mix of culture and process; having a culture of continuous improvement based on a simple
‘Plan, Do, Review’ cycle that involves robust challenge coupled with the flexibility and desire
to experiment, which leads to deployment of a what-works best approach in service
delivery.
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Finally, we believe that there should be scope for significant rewards for over-performance
through PbR, which can be used to reinvest in improving the overall effectiveness of the
criminal justice system or services provided; however, we recognise that some of these
rewards should be shared through a gain-share arrangement with the Authority.
C7: What steps should we take to ensure that lead Providers manage and maintain a truly
diverse supply chain in a fair, sustainable and transparent manner?
The Alliance recognises the value of a diverse supply chain. As a private sector FTSE 100
company and two leading social businesses, the Alliance already works with a large number
of VCSE organisations as subcontractors in supply chains on different contracts in different
locations across England and Wales. In a sense, the Alliance acts as a diverse supply chain in
and of itself, though we value the specific knowledge, existing relationship and specialist
skills brought by local Providers. Serco was the first organisation to achieve Merlin
Accreditation for their Work Programme delivery, and the principles of subcontractor
engagement that it requires are ones that the Alliance has adopted in criminal justice
subcontracting as a minimum standard to build upon. We have created payment
mechanisms that enable VCSE organisations to sustain themselves whilst also challenging
them to evidence better and better outcomes over time as we capacity build them and
nurture their wider development. In applying this experience to the Transforming
Rehabilitation agenda, we would suggest the following steps to help ensure that a diverse
supply chain that is sustainable and transparent:
Analyse local provider landscapes and seek supply chain feedback
Nothing predicts how organisations will behave as well as their previous behaviour. The
Alliance would suggest that the Authority should seek feedback from any potential Providers
exiting supply chains on how they have been treated, whether it is accordance with the
Merlin Accreditation principles, whether the flow of work has been as indicated and
whether the contract value that has flowed down has been as anticipated. A complete
assessment of any potential Provider should take into account prior supply chain
management and contract delivery and include speaking to members of existing supply
chains as part of the assessment. This could be exercised as an anonymous 360 degree
appraisal of prime Providers and their supply chains, and the Authority should be clear that
this will be part of the bid assessment process.
Don’t impose quotas
The Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise Sector should not be immune to the
challenge of proving they are the best Providers. The sector may need help in evidencing
that, in making their performance visible and in the payment terms that they can sustain,
but this should not deflect from them being judged on the same core question of whether or
not they are the best to provide a specific service to a specific group. Any attempt to
suggest a formal or informal percentage of VCS that should be present in a supply chain will
immediately militate against the notion of choosing the best Provider. Put simply, the more
the nature of the supply chain is dictated, the more cost will be built into the solution as
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substandard performance becomes tolerated. The Alliance draws in local partners into its
delivery models as Local Alliance Partners (LAPs) based on a ‘who is the best to operate’
principle, designed to maximise value for money. An open Expression of Interest (EOI)
process is adopted and organisations are selected against clear criteria to ensure the best
organisations are selected.
Build on lessons learned from DWP’s Work Programme
There are many lessons to learn by each of the Commissioner, Prime Providers/Contractors
and VCSE organisations in how the Work Programme competition was run and how it has
operated since contract commencement. VCSE organisations often report that they have
not received the volume of work from some Primes that they had anticipated and/or that
the flow of service users they do receive tend to be the ones who are furthest from the
employment. Building upon the principles of the Merlin Standard and connecting the MoJ
team with the DWP commissioning team should both help to capture those lessons and
build them into future criminal justice competitions.
Help VCSE organisations to prepare for contracting
Smaller Providers will need encouragement to make the transition from grant funded
sustainment models to contracting in a market. The Authority could provide advice to
smaller organisations on how to handle risk transfer and complex contracting, as well as the
facility to network amongst themselves, even if only virtually through an online partnership
forum or portal. The Office of Civil Society (OCS) in the Cabinet Office is running a free
Commercial Skills programme from March 2013 to March 2014 for VCSE organisations
through the National Council of Voluntary Organisations (NCVO). Serco is acting as one of
the Tutors on the programme which could be widely publicised to VCSE organisations by the
Authority in preparation for subcontracting in the future competition. There will be other
capacity building programmes and master classes that VCSE organisations could be signposted towards and encouraged to see the value of.
The room for diversity in the supply chain for Rehabilitation becomes limited by two core
factors:
•
•
The reality of the application of TUPE law to the competition, meaning that large
numbers of Probation Staff will transfer employment to another organisation which
will have to be large another to meet the requirement of the legislations;
The formation of Mutuals and social enterprises by existing Probation Trusts and
their entry into the supply chain to deliver the services that the Trusts are
themselves delivering currently.
The diversity may be something that happens during the life of the contract as organisations
are performance managed rather than in the first iteration of the supply chain. It is worth
noting that Serco and NCVO are currently finalising a code of conduct establishing the
working principles for VCSE-Private Sector partnership working.
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C8: What processes should be established to ensure that supply chain mismanagement is
addressed?
Against the backdrop of ever larger and more complex public service contracts, networks
(supply chains) of organisations are emerging as the most desirable delivery model for a
range of services. In order to most effectively transfer risk and hold a single body to account,
a ‘prime’ contractor holds and leads the contract, subcontracting aspects of work to
appropriate specialist Providers. To date, most notably in the DWP Work Programme, the
majority of prime contractors in these networks have been capitalised private sector
organisations, typically far larger than the VCSE organisations subcontracted in their supply
chains. Whatever the model adopted for delivering Community Sentences, including
potentially new commercial vehicles, the Alliance considers it vitally important to ensure
that effective processes are in place for supply chain management that at a minimum take
account of the Merlin standards. In particular, careful consideration is needed regarding the
flow down of risk for the Community Sentences contracts.
The Alliance is well aware that VCSE organisations have had a mixed experience of
contracting to prime contractors. Serco and its partners all have a track record of effectively
managing supply chains and have been proactive in identifying best practice and establishing
the principles for selecting partners and managing effective and sustainable relationships in
the supply chain. With the right approach from day one, supply chain mismanagement can
be avoided and the effects mitigated through:
Addressing the structural and cultural barriers to collaboration
Particularly where commissioners are using prime contracts to bring in private sector
investment capital in services and attempt to drive down procurement costs, the delivery
model should recognise and mitigate the risk of perverse incentives in the supply chain, such
as the ‘cherry-picking’ of service users. Services should be designed wherever possible to
ensure that incentives to abuse market power by primes through its market position are
avoided.
Transparency throughout the supply chain will support self-regulation in this regard and
should be a principle of partnership. To facilitate trust between all parties, all parties signing
up to shared principles of transparency at the outset.
All parties must also be mindful that charity trustees have obligations under Charity Law to
ensure that the organisation delivers public benefit and operates within their charitable
objectives – particularly where this leads them to seek opportunities to support a distinct
groups rather than maximising their share of the overall contract value. To facilitate
fulfilment of these objectives the prime should take responsibility for ensuring that where its
delivery model demands niche provision that it is commercially viable and operationally
deliverable.
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Ensuring effective communication with potential and actual partners before and during
the contract
Where consortia leads and prime contractors are seeking new partners, a clear EOI process
including selection criteria should be widely advertised and enough information provided for
potential partners to assess whether it is worth investing. The expectations of contracted
and non-contracted Providers should be carefully managed before bid submission and
during service delivery. Less commercially experienced partners should, prior to signing, be
supported to understand their contractual obligations and the cash flow impact of relevant
funding arrangements.
Once network or supply chain partners have been selected, clear roles, responsibilities, risks,
payment process and terms, governance arrangements, monitoring and systems
management protocols should be agreed at the earliest opportunity and ideally prior to bid
submission. In terms of contracts, the Prime contractors and consortia leads should not
simply flow the full terms and conditions of the contract down the supply chain. Instead
‘heads of terms’ and Key Performance Indicators should be used to ensure contractual
agreements are in line with delivery responsibility.
Whilst recognising that their primary duty is to service users, consortia leads and prime
contractors should outline and provide a clear, universal, proportionate and supportive
process to improve performance of any subcontractors failing to meet KPIs. A clear
mechanism for raising problems or conflicts in service delivery should be agreed with other
delivery partners and for implementing solutions to them, with all organisations in a supply
chain having the right to trigger these procedures.
Ensuring that the benefits of scale and commercial experience of large primes are used to
enhance the sustainability of VCSE sector delivery
Risk, and the way it is identified and managed, is a critical factor determining the level of
involvement that the VCSE sector can have in supply chains. Primes should work to make
sure that subcontractors are not exposed to financial risks which are disproportionate to the
rewards available for good performance. This can be done through appropriate design of the
service and the terms that are applied to subcontractors; subject to the terms which the
prime contractors themselves accept from commissioners. In practice, this may involve
primes managing a suitable proportion of the delivery risk on behalf of their supply chain,
and/or structuring the interface of customer journey and supply chain so as to mitigate risks
for individual supply chain partners.
Prime contractors must also support the cash flow position of smaller members of their
supply chain. This includes passing on, as a minimum, Government’s 30 day maximum
payment terms, making clear in contracts the precise triggers for payments, and providing
appropriate break and compensation clauses where payments are not made on time.
Where practical and beneficial, primes can also share their own scale economies by:
20
•
Sharing their bulk purchasing power with subcontractors;
•
Designing into their delivery solutions, where applicable, the use of scale and
centralised middle office functions (e.g. Information Security compliance,
auditing and certification);
•
Designing into their delivery solutions, where applicable, centralised ICT so as to
reduce subcontractors’ ICT administration costs.
A central facet of Alliance thinking, primes and consortia leads should consider bringing in
small organisations with high potential – even where they lack experience – in order to bring
innovation into delivery. In such circumstances primes may need to work with such
organisations to develop skills and capacity. Commissioning models must however be
designed to protect the intellectual property rights of all Providers, including subcontractors.
C9: How can we ensure that the voluntary and community sector is able to participate in
the new system in a fair and meaningful way?
The Voluntary, Community and Enterprise Sector has a long tradition of engaging offenders /
service users. The Alliance views this experience as critical to the design of new models for
Community Sentences but safeguards need to be in place to ensure the Sector can engage in
a fair and meaningful way. By this we mean that the Sector needs to be treated as a
genuine partner and assessed on its ability to reduce reoffending. Organisations must not
be disadvantaged or excluded from delivery as a result of excessive exposure to financial
risk and the recognition of their delivery within a bid must translate through to actual
delivery. In fact, the Alliance expects VCSE sector delivery to be a core element of any
Community Sentence model.
The sector is diverse. It ranges from large organisations such as Catch22 and Turning Point to
very small local groups. However, all engage at a local level and using innovative approaches
draw in staff and volunteers/mentors providing services that are tailored to the specific
needs of individuals and groups. The take-up of these services by offenders/service users is
often on a voluntary basis. A common theme is an offer to a service user that meets a
specific need or needs and provision that makes a difference in helping them to re-integrate
into their community.
The MoJ proposals offer an opportunity to build on the knowledge and skills of the VCSE
sector in engaging service users, and the potential to design new models for Community
Sentences that capitalise on the skills of VCSE sector staff, mentors and including exoffender peer mentors. The Alliance welcomes this and is already modelling the different
role the VCSE sector can take in both Thameside and Doncaster prisons where Catch22 and
Turning Point have taken on a Case Worker role working with those serving short sentences.
The Alliance highlights that arrangements for commissioning and delivering new models for
21
Community Sentences must not just draw but build upon the current role of the VCSE
sector.
Fair, meaningful and transparent
The Alliance approach builds in delivery both by Catch22 and Turning Point working
alongside Probation and the Police but also through a diverse supply chain to draw in the
range of local skills and expertise required to reduce reoffending. We consider that
Providers need to be transparent in their approach to engaging the VCSE sector and through
supply chains and we do not believe there should be quotas or minimum VCSE sector
delivery levels set by the Commissioner. We consider that this reduces the likelihood of
delivery being focused on local needs, builds in extra cost and does not put the focus of
delivery on reducing reoffending.
However, during the competition phase there should be transparency within the Prime
contractors’ bids as to the estimated volumes of business that will go to their VCSE sector
supply chains as well as the financial risk that is being flowed down through the supply
chain. This transparency should continue after contract award and Primes be held to
account. Where a VCSE organisation is included within the supply chain they must be
supported to ensure their delivery is outcome focused and sustainable.
Financial risk
VCSE organisations should by-and-large be protected from the immediate flow-down of
financial risk, where they lack the balance sheet to hold it. To support VCSE organisations
transition into PbR delivery Prime Contractors should offer ‘participative payments’. Cash
flow tends to be the biggest barrier to VCS delivering within PbR contracts. Through
participative payments Prime contractors provide a larger service fee element initially and
then PbR is increased over time as delivery volumes and thus cash flow are established
and VCSE sector finances can bear the risk.
Capacity building
PbR has resulted in a significant culture change and many VCSE organisations are as yet
unable to evidence that the interventions and support they provide actually reduces
reoffending. During supply chain development and management Prime contractors should
support organisations so that they can evidence how the support they provide reduces
reoffending and that their business models are competitive and sustainable.
The Alliance has proven evidence of supporting and building capacity across its supply chains
to ensure sustainable, outcome-focused delivery from VCSE organisations.
Case Study: the responsible Prime
Serco has a proven record in going beyond contract delivery to act as a responsible prime in
developing SME and VCSE organisations. Serco entered the Welfare to Work market in 2008
and saw that there was a paucity of BME organisations that were contract ready to join our
networks and yet unemployment was often disproportionately focussed in some BME
groups. As a result we formed a partnership with CEMVO (Council for Minority Ethnic
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Voluntary Organisations), ACEVO (Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisation),
Salford City Council and MISPA (a social enterprise run by Manchester Metropolitan
University) and jointly ran a six month Provider Readiness Programme to get ten BME
organisation more contract ready and able to deliver on PbR-based contracts. Serco are
currently acting as Private Sector Partners on the Office of Civil Society (OCS) Programme to
develop VCSE organisations in the criminal justice sector to participate in PbR contracting
and sub-contracting more widely.
Case Study: Capacity building for the VCSE by Catch22 and Turning Point
Capacity building should not only be seen as the responsibility of the Prime contractor:
larger organisations higher up within the supply chain should also support the VCSE sector
in service delivery. Catch22 (Positive Futures for the Home Office and National Citizens
Service) and Turning Point (Strengthening Healthy Communities, Worcestershire CCG and
Secure Funding Workshops), as large scale national charities also have a long history of subcontracting to smaller VCSE organisations and undertake capacity building formally and
informally with them at a local level. Our Alliance approach consists of the Main Alliance
Partners (Serco, Turning Point and Catch22) and involving Local Alliance Partners who are
recruited on a bid by bid basis to provide the unique local services and community reach
that ensure that together we are able to meet the specific and complex needs of service
users.
The Alliance believes that the best way to engage such organisations in the market is not to
fragment commissioning arrangements or reduce the size and complexity of competition
lots to such an extent that their scale appears less challenging to smaller organisations.
Rather, large scale commissioning will allow Prime Contractors to assemble the right
Provider mix and these medium to small organisations can then contribute to the bid
process, design innovation and eventually service delivery. We believe our response to the
MoJ and DWP market places demonstrates that the market will deliver a vibrant group of
VCSE and SME organisations in supply chains, but only where they are the best organisations
to deliver and not simply because they come from a specific sector or happen to be a
specific size.
C10: How can we best use statutory supervision on release from custody to ensure that
offenders engage with rehabilitation effectively?
The proposals present an opportunity to review the approach to engaging all those released
into the community on statutory supervision/licences and that in our view should include
those serving short sentences. The current process whereby those serving sentences of 12
months or more are allocated an offender manager/Case Worker prior to release must be
extended to those serving sentences of less than 12 months and the rehabilitative
components be a statutory requirement. It is also important to highlight that some flexibility
around interventions and sanctions for all community sentences should be applied
regardless of whether someone has been released from custody or not, as discussed in B3.
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Our experience suggests that to ensure offenders/service users engage with rehabilitation
effectively there needs to be the practical and emotional support in place that takes account
of their individual risks and needs. However, we consider that this offer needs to be
conditional on the service user demonstrating their willingness to change their lives and stop
offending. This is important not least in making the case to partners who we are looking to
provide resources to assist them but also in engaging victims groups and communities who
need to know that the emphasis is on reducing reoffending, protecting the public and wider
social benefits.
Improved engagement in rehabilitation will only be achieved when the offender/service user
sees the value of the services being offered and their effectiveness in enabling the individual
to change their lives and desist from crime. Our experience is that offenders/service users
who fail to comply with statutory supervision and re-offend often present as those who
believe that licence conditions and interventions are ‘done to them’ not ‘with them’. Many
have disengaged with the Criminal Justice System and have failed to recognise that by not
addressing their risks and by not accepting support they are less likely to succeed on release.
Service user engagement should form part of the design and delivery of all community
sentences. There should be an expectation of all Providers for both individual and collective
engagement with service users regarding what interventions and the type of assistance has
most impact.
To ensure effective engagement the Commissioner may consider requiring Providers to
evidence engagement in rehabilitation requirements; this could be measured through
attendance and completion rates, personalised rehabilitation plans and ongoing
engagement self-assessment at required supervision sessions. However, there is likely to be
a valid view across the market that if Providers are being paid to achieve rehabilitation
outcomes via PbR, this should be the sole measure. To strike a balance between Provider
freedom to deliver outcomes and ensuring engagement in rehabilitation, an integrated
outcome-led commissioning model co-designed with Providers should be used. As a
result, it may be agreed that during the early stages of the contract engagement is used as a
proxy measure for reducing reoffending prior to evidence of hard reducing reoffending
outcomes becoming available.
We consider that effective rehabilitation for those that are to be released on statutory
supervision needs to begin with engagement and planning at the start of sentence and must
focus on the point of release and the weeks that follow given the high rates of reoffending,
in particular during that period. The emphasis should be on a tailored approach that takes
account of risks and needs and is proportionate before and following release from custody.
From our Alliance experience, including in HMP & YOI Doncaster that to ensure
offenders/service users engage with rehabilitation we highlight:
•
The importance of a Case Worker developing a high quality relationship with the
service user and the continuity of that relationship to support desistance from
crime;
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•
•
•
The importance of engaging the service user with a personalised rehabilitation plan
that starts during sentence and is followed up in the community tailored to their
risks and needs;
The key role mentors and peer mentors can play in ensuring engagement in
rehabilitation and community re-integration;
The vital role of local organisations to access the range of practical support upon
release needed to reduce reoffending.
The approach recognises that every service user should be given the opportunity and
support to aid their rehabilitation, but that assistance is conditional upon co-operation with
the full plan agreed with them. As part of the plan it needs to be made very clear to the
service user that Providers will be working very closely with Police and Statutory Probation
and that the risk of reoffending and harm will be assessed on an on going basis and action
taken as necessary. The emphasis is on engaging the service user in the plan for their
rehabilitation and being transparent regarding the basis of that support being provided.
C11: How can we ensure consequences for non-compliance are effective, without buildingin significant additional cost?
The Alliance believes that the first step to reducing the cost of non-compliance is to reduce
the level of non-compliance. A great improvement can be bought to offender/service user
compliance with supervision requirements and a more differentiated response can be taken
to non-compliance that could reduce overall system costs. We note that in the London
Project Diamond IOM there was around a 20% improvement in compliance with Community
Payback Requirement brought about by an early visit to offenders’ homes by local Police. It
may be that such arrangements used more broadly could improve offender compliance with
all forms of supervision. In a contrasting approach, we are also piloting mentor based
approaches through Catch22 that are bringing about improvements in the compliance of
young people on Community Payback.
Whilst it is important that offenders/service users comply with the sentence as ordered by
the Court and that non-compliance is dealt with in a transparent, consistent and fair
manner, a fundamental factor underpinning compliance is that the offender experiences
supervision as purposeful and useful. Asking service users to undertake long journeys simply
to report and not to receive any meaningful service is likely to lead to higher levels of noncompliance.
In general, compliance will be improved if:
•
•
The Provider of supervision delivers significant service user engagement in a timely
and respectful manner;
The supervisory relationship with the service user is based on a belief in the
offender’s ability to change and an interest in them holistically and not just in the
risk they pose;
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•
The consequences for non-compliance are clearly explained to the service user at
the start of their supervision and stuck to throughout.
Options in relation to non-compliance include creating regimes within Community Orders
that incentivise good behaviours and respond to poor behaviours without the need for
formal enforcement measures.
For example, in London Community Payback
offenders/service users must demonstrate consistent work-like behaviours in order to stay
on a Level Two Placement. If their behaviour is poor on a work session, they are instructed
back to work on a Level One ‘sweat on brow’ Placement until their behaviour improves. A
similar approach could be taken with other forms of supervision by increasing or decreasing
the frequency and length of supervision, varying Curfew hours or varying Exclusion
requirements.
Another option would be to impose Fines for consistent non-compliance and collect them
on a PbR basis to avoid simply adding the cost of the administration of the Fine into the
criminal justice system when there is very little prospect of ever recovering it. An approach
for serious non-compliance could be asset seizure, although an assessment on the impact on
risk of reoffending would have to be carried out before this approach was adopted.
The number of prison recalls of licencees might be reduced by offering a ‘Hostel Plus’ regime
in the local Approved Premises that would put offenders on lock-down for 24 hours a day for
a set number of days instead of going back to prison.
C12: Given our proposals for the commissioning structure and the proposed
responsibilities of the public sector, what kind of delivery structure would be most
appropriate for the public sector probation service?
The Alliance works with a number of Probation Trusts in different capacities:
•
•
•
As subcontractors to them; for example Catch22 provide a mentoring project jointly
with St Giles Trust for London Probation Trust;
As their Prime Contractor; for example Hertfordshire Probation Trust deliver on
Serco’s Job Deal in the East of England;
As stakeholders; for example Turning Point delivers the Drug Intervention
Programmes including Drug Rehabilitation Requirements and Alcohol Treatment
Requirements in Newcastle & Gateshead working alongside Northumbria Probation
Trust.
We have an excellent knowledge of the capacities of Trusts, of their different performance
and structures and of their frontline competencies. We value the role of Trusts as
independent advisors to the Courts both formally through the preparation and submission
of sentencing reports and informally through the day-to-day execution of their court liaison
role. This is consistent with the Offender Management Act 2007.
26
The best delivery structure: the ‘risk consultancy model’
The Alliance challenges the notion that Probation Trusts are exclusively able to work with
higher risk of harm offenders/service users and would propose that the risk assessment,
management and supervision role should be integrated into local Provider premises and
teams and not require routine case and file transfer between wholly separated agencies.
In effect, the Probation staff would operate as full-time ‘risk consultants’ to the Provider
team and be co-located with them. They could produce Risk Management Plans and then
hold the Provider Case Workers to account for all service users for taking the prescribed
actions within each plan. A delivery system that worked in this way would ensure relational
continuity between the Case Worker and the service user is maintained: a key
determinant of desistance. It recognises that risk is dynamic and that the risk of those
initially assesses as high risk of harm can de-escalate and equally that those who are
assessed as medium risk may become a source of concern.
Currently the level of risk management by Probation Trusts nationally has considerable room
for improvement, with an average 1 in 5 cases that HMIP inspects nationally not having their
risk managed satisfactorily. The demarcation of responsibilities that we are proposing would
enable to local Providers hold the Probation Service to account for providing timely and
accurate Risk Management Plans and this transparency will help to improve their
performance. This integrated approach makes the best use of the skills and resources of
Probation and the Voluntary Sector.
Such an integrated arrangement builds on how Integrated Offender Management (IOM) has
worked and manages risk in a seamless way across the agencies involved. We are not sure
that this approach would be workable without an alignment or sharing of financial
incentives between the agencies involved and ultimately the best way to integrate a
function is to deliver it from within one organisation.
Probation Trusts have historically managed an internal split in higher and lower risk cases
management, with NVQ4 staff managing higher risk offenders and NVQ3 staff managing
lower risk offenders. The Trusts have managed the dynamic nature of risk and moved
offenders between members of staff as required or provided additional support and
guidance. The new system will need to build on the elements of this existing practice that
work and improve upon them going forward.
On the public sector probation service side of any integrated team, there remain some key
questions as to how they will configure their service:
•
•
•
•
•
How will the statutory Probation role work in practice?
Will there be a named Probation Officer for every case for the whole rehabilitation
journey?
Will the cases be in effect operated via a call centre?
Could they be located locally?
And how much resource will they need to perform the new role?
27
It is important that Providers are seen as stakeholders and professional peers within the
criminal justice system by the Probation Service that emerges and that Providers can hold
them to account for their provision.
To an extent these relationships already exist. Locally, Probation Trusts build relationships
with key Providers now as elements of Community Orders are already being delivered by
other organisations, such as electronic monitoring of Curfew Order by Serco and G4S and
drug and alcohol treatment by VCSE Providers. The new risk split will simply extend an
already existing set of interfaces. It will be important that a ‘one service, one team, one
worker’ approach is taken to these new arrangements, not only for the reasons outlined
above in terms of risk of serious harm management but also in terms of reducing agency
interfaces which add costs and create additional issues.
Of concern to us is that the Probation Service, which it is proposed will provide services to
higher risk of harm offenders, is itself the organisation that will decide whether an offender
is lower or higher risk. This will give the Probation Service an inbuilt perverse incentive to
over-estimate risk, placing further risk management demands into the system and inevitably
diluting the response to higher risk offenders as more and more are added into the pool.
There is an apparent danger of then not being able to provide the necessary supervision and
surveillance to the offenders who genuinely do pose a serious risk. Allowing the future
Probation Service to retain both the supervision of higher risk offenders and the decision as
to which offenders constitute a high risk can only lead to a greater demand for resources
and may give the Probation Service the political leverage to claim that they are underfunded
and can’t protect the public from dangerous offenders.
One part of the solution could be to make the Probation Service accountable at a local level
to PCCs (as could Providers) and inspected by HMI Probation, which together should
constitute a robust and transparent and system of accountability for the assessment and
management of high risk of harm offenders and for holding Probation to account for their
assessment of risk.
C13: What else can we do to ensure the new system makes best use of local expertise and
arrangements, and integrates into existing local structures and provision?
In order to translate the national vision for these services into integrated local delivery that
both protects public safety and reduces reoffending, the Alliance recognises that delivery
must be integrated with local structures, nor replicate existing provision. And it must also
maximise local expertise in order to achieve outcomes. To ensure this we believe there is a
clear continuing role for Public Sector Probation and an opportunity for the MoJ to create
a contractual duty to co-operate, a need to partner with local VCSE organisations,
essential that the role of Sentencers is recognised and a more flexible and innovative
approach to utilising premises across the CJS.
28
Partnership with Probation: ‘risk consultancy model’
As we have set out in C10 we propose that to make best use of the skills and resources of
Probation and Providers a co-location approach should be adopted. The Alliance’s ‘risk
consultancy’ model brings together the skills of the statutory Probation staff alongside the
Provider who will take a Case Worker role in all cases. This enables continuity of
engagement with the offender/service user, which is critical to desistance. It places the
statutory Probation staff in a consultancy role in relation to the ongoing review of the risk
presented by all offenders/service users recognising that risk is dynamic and can both
escalate and reduce over time. This model supports both Probation and the Provider in also
taking an integrated approach to involvement in local IOM and MAPPA arrangements. The
statutory role could include representation at MAPPA meetings that are focused on the
management of those who present as a high risk of harm.
Make co-operation a Term of Contract
The Alliance believes that a successful Provider will also recognise the importance of local
integration in delivering outcomes. However, during the competition we feel that potential
Providers must clearly illustrate an understanding of the local structures, provision and
needs, and evidence how they integrate and maximise these.
A local model for Community Sentences needs to have at its core the ownership and
involvement of a range of partners in order to reduce reoffending. In order to secure the
resources required to reduce reoffending the Alliance proposes that a contractual duty
should be established for Providers to co-operate with PCCs, Health and Well Being Boards,
Local Authorities, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and Welfare to Work Providers, and
this would need to be monitored. In making the case for this contractual requirement the
case needs to be made for embedding reducing reoffending into the work of partners and
the wider benefits to partner organisations as we have set out in our response to C14. We
want to highlight the importance of information sharing protocols and the extent to which
they underpin a system and service which is risk aware rather than risk averse to ensure
effective joint work.
Partnership with the Voluntary ,Community and Social Enterprise Sector
The Alliance partners have a track record of engaging with local partners drawing upon local
skills and knowledge and the innovation that the sector brings to meeting the diverse needs
of service users. We see the role of VCSE organisations as critical to providing local, practical
and emotional support required to help service users stop offending as already outlined in
C7 and C9. Their involvement will also help build the numbers of mentors and peer mentors
needed to meet the specific local, diverse and different needs of service users including
women, young adults, BME service users etc.
Sentencers
The proposals will require both Probation and Providers to engage with local Sentencers.
They offer an opportunity to promote better understanding of community sentences. The
importance of engaging sentences and ensuring their confidence in the new approach to
delivering Community Sentences is stressed. What will need to be highlighted is that a more
29
flexible approach to managing sentences aims to better respond to the risks and needs of
each service user, to make better use of the skills of different sectors and achieve
efficiencies. Informing, consulting and involving Sentencers will assist in both gaining
ownership, understanding their local requirements and meeting any concerns.
Innovation
The Alliance considers that more could be done to make use of existing buildings to deliver
community sentences and that could draw in local partners and communities. We know that
some prisons do promote their work and, for example, use their visitor centres as
community centres. We know that local residents groups are aware of and support the work
of Approved Premises. We also recognise that planning permission is difficult to obtain and
therefore we should consider how we could use existing premises for a range of different
uses. This could include supervision, group work for offenders/service users, 24/7,
temporary residence etc. The buildings could be a facility for local partners who are
delivering community sentences with us and a space for Sentencers, victims groups and
others to visit and understand how community sentences are being delivered.
C14: Police and Crime Commissioners will play an integral role in our reforms. How best
can we maximise their input/involvement and that of other key partners locally?
The Alliance agrees that the new Police and Crime Commissioners must play an integral role
in reforming the approach to Transforming Rehabilitation. We see a number of elements to
the support and involvement of the PCCs:
•
•
•
Embedding reducing reoffending into Crime Plans and ensuring the critical role of
the police in reducing reoffending including involvement in Integrated Offender
Management and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements;
Deploying funding for Community Safety to secure the practical provision needed
to reduce reoffending , for example to tackle substance misuse;
Joint commissioning role, aligning and pooling funding, making the case for
investing in rehabilitation of offenders – including by recognising the shared
synergies and wider benefits for example to support the Troubled Families, Health
and Well Being and other related agendas.
Community Sentences
Whatever the model for commissioning of Community Sentences now and in the future, an
integrated approach must maintain some form of transparent local accountability and it
would seem fitting that this should sit with PCCs, along with the necessary powers and
responsibility of scrutiny. We note that a number of PCCs have already included Reducing
Reoffending in their Crime Plans, which is welcomed. The progress that has been made in
recent years to reduce reoffending and protect the public through IOM and MAPPA that has
brought together police, probation and partners needs to be built upon as core element of
delivering Community Sentences in the future.
30
PCCs will hold budgets for drugs and community safety and their role in making the case for
investing in the rehabilitation of offenders, their role in aligning and pooling budgets and
joint commissioning arrangements will be vital in securing the practical resources required
to reduce reoffending. The right connections will need to be in place with other local
partners and their commissioning frameworks. For instance, health and wellbeing boards
will be important partners given their role in setting joint needs assessments against which
services will be commissioned.
The new national probation service and Providers will both need to engage with the PCCs to
ensure an integrated approach to delivering Community Sentences that both reduces
reoffending and protect the public.
Serco’s work with the Offices of the Police and Crime Commissioners (OPCCs)
With the right levers, exercising collective leadership and working with the range of local
Providers in criminal justice, in community safety and in mainstream services like health and
children’s services, PCCs should be able to improve outcomes.
In order to understand how the Office of the PCC (OPCC) will support and enable their PCC
to achieve this, Serco, advised by its work on the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR)
through its Emergency Planning College contract, is developing a Guide Operating Model
(GOM) with a number of Offices of the PCC. This model should enable a more clearly defined
view of the desired outcomes for local rehabilitation in the short-to-medium term (3-5
years’ time depending on legislative and policy developments) through incorporating all of
the recommendations as seen in question B1. Driven by West Yorkshire and supported by
West Midlands, Lancashire and Hampshire, a key attribute of the model is an emphasis on
the network of relationships within the reach of a PCC, which, used in this context, could
mobilise discussion, action and potentially commitments from stakeholders at a pace that
might be next to unachievable through more traditional routes.
The model should incorporate and support a Community Outcomes Framework that aims to
improve outcomes for communities through the delivery of services across a range of interrelated agencies involved in policing, community safety and criminal justice.
For Transforming Rehabilitation, the model would enable the PCC to collaborate with and
influence partners to incorporate the development of a set of shared principles across
partners to secure an initial agreement to underpin commissioning activity. These principles
would reflect good practice and involvement in the commissioning processes for
rehabilitation. The model would enable these principles to remain constant no matter what
happens to the future partnership landscape and structure thereby allowing the desired
outcomes from the recommendations in question B1 to be scoped and modelled in a stable,
unified and agreed framework.
C15: How can we ensure that professional standards are maintained and that the quality
of training and accreditation is assured? A professional body or institute has been
31
suggested as one way of achieving this. What are your views on the benefits of this
approach and on the practicalities of establishing such arrangements, including how costs
might be met?
Professional standards and training are vital to any supply chain and the Alliance fully
recognises their importance. In our view there are 2 potential models of merit that may be
of importance to this competition: (a) Market-led, Market-defined models; and (b) Selfdelivery.
The Market-led, Market-defined model, which is ideally suited to commercial vehicles that
involve a diverse supply chain, sees the commissioner and market come together to define
training standards. This approach has been used with success in the Work Programme, as
the market came together to create the Institute of Employability Professionals. This
organisation, funded by its members, creates and specifies training standards for the
industry, as well as the skills required to work within the industry. The Institute offers
accredited programmes and it audits standards across the supply chain to ensure that
standards are maintained and improved. This is achieved by auditing training policies,
Personal Development Plans (PDPs) and common processes such as, for example, appraisals
across the entire supply chain.
We find that the greatest returns are provided by setting common standards for items such
as Information Systems, Process and Performance Management and Quality, which in turn
are used to define minimum acceptable standards.
The Self-delivery model is, in our view, more applicable when a single Provider has control of
a high proportion of, or the whole, supply chain. The model in this instance sees the Provider
invest in training provision, which is provided to defined standards agreed with the
commissioner; and this is often a contractual requirement. For example, in all of Serco’s UK
prisons our Prison Custody Officers undergo a 7-8 week intensive training course upon
recruitment. The training provides theoretical and practical training (e.g. Control and
Restraint training) as well real-world experience gained working with training supervisors on
‘live’ prison wings.
For the upcoming competition, which potentially sees large diverse supply chains as an
option, the Alliance would suggest that the Authority strongly considers a Market-led,
Market-defined model with view to creating a Commissioner market-led Institute of
Offender Management or some similar vehicle, which is jointly funded by the market and
the commissioner.
C16: What role can the Inspectorate of Probation best play in assuring effective practice
and a high standard of service delivery?
HM Inspectorate of Probation has a continuing critical role to plays in assuring effective risk
assessment and management and a high standard of service delivery from whoever is
32
delivering Community Sentences. The independence of the Inspectorate will be even more
important in an environment of competition and a focus on PbR and they should be both
promoting good practice as well as raising concerns. This role will be critical during a period
of what will be significant transformation of the system and following it and highlighting the
importance of maintaining performance and improving it.
HMIP needs to have the resources required to inspect the work of the Statutory Probation
Service and all those Providers engaging with offenders/service users in the community. The
Alliance highlights the role of other Inspectorates too, including HMI Prisons and Police,
building on the current CJS and other inspection arrangements that impact on this agenda.
HMIP’s independent role will be key to establishing that Probation and all Providers are
delivering services that protect the public and reduce reoffending, achieving this through:
•
•
•
Providing independent inspections of all Community Sentences;
Engaging in the Joint Criminal Justice inspections programme;
Wider inspections including Safeguarding, Health, and other relevant programmes.
The Inspectorate should be consulted on the design and delivering of commissioning
arrangements drawing on its learning, its unparalleled insights into the day to day work of
Probation and other relevant organisations. HMIP should equally continue to consult its
stakeholders in designing its own and joint inspection programmes.
C17: How can we use this new commissioning model, including payment by results, to
ensure better outcomes for female offenders and others with complex needs or protected
characteristics?
The new commissioning model should take account of women’s complex needs and
consider the implications for PBR. We consider:
•
•
•
•
Commissioning arrangements need to ensure that the Courts have Community
Sentences with different options for women that meet their complex needs and
effectively support their rehabilitation;
Residential models, access to alcohol treatment and women only centres run by
the voluntary and community sector should form part of the Community Sentence
offer;
Commissioners and Providers will need to communicate that Community
sentences are not a ‘soft option’, and if such sentences are to be effective then they
must adequately confront the personal difficulties which contribute to women’s
offending behaviour;
Female offenders/service users outcomes should be monitored separately.
Different outcomes for women need to be considered for PbR purposes to reflect
33
their different offending profile and the complexity of the needs that have to be
addressed to reduce their reoffending.
We welcome the recognition that the offending profile of women is different. It is known
that women have complex needs and many have been victims. Women within the criminal
justice system have often suffered protracted abuse, be it physical or sexual and there is a
high prevalence of mental health issues and self-harm. The complex multiple needs of many
female offenders and in particular the high percentage with mental health issues requires a
different approach.
Too many women are remanded into custody, including for first offences. A significant
proportion of female offenders serve short sentences and too many go into prison for failing
to comply with community sentences. This affects not just them but their children. The
courts now have available in just some places Community Sentences that include residential
provision and/or provide the option to use women’s community centres run by the
voluntary and community sector. Probation has made inroads into promoting community
sentences including this provision and there has been a small reduction in the numbers
serving short sentences. However, the Alliance has concerns that the numbers of women in
prison remain unnecessarily high.
A significant proportion of women sentenced to immediate imprisonment receive sentences
of less than 12 months. As a result it is unlikely that, unless they have a serious mental
illness, their mental health issues will be addressed and thus its role in reoffending will not
be reduced. Community sentences can ensure that they receive appropriate treatment
which results in reduced reoffending. As such, integrated treatment packages focussing on
psychological interventions for complex needs, alongside more traditional diversion and
referral may not be enough alone. For example, packages must also include safe treatment
focussed accommodation options, including compulsory treatment. In particular, the
Alliance supports the development of Health Treatment Orders as a method of ensuring
female service users engage with supportive services.
There is also a need to increase access to specialist community alcohol treatment services
focused on reducing reoffending. The Thematic Inspection Report: Equal but different (HMIP,
2011) highlighted that at least 60% of female offenders have alcohol misuse issues. Many of
the services provided for alcohol abuse were seen as supportive, rather than being focused
on the priority of reducing reoffending. In many areas across the country there are currently
significant delays in accessing alcohol services, even in cases where a specific ‘alcohol
treatment requirement’ has formed part of the Community Order.
The Turning Point model provides a tailored approach to respond to women’s very different
needs.
Case Study: Turning Point at Garrow House
34
Garrow House is a 12 bedded high support residential service for women with complex
needs and forensic histories which is delivered through Northern Pathways (a partnership
between the Retreat and Turning Point). Opened in February 2009, it is one of four
Department of Health national pilot schemes set up to test new step-down provision from
low secure services for women.
The transition from a low and medium secure unit to a high support service can be difficult
for the women in Garrow House who may not be used to taking responsibility for their
environment. This difficulty is addressed through founding the service on a therapeutic
model which places a great importance on the relationships between staff members and the
women they support. Central to this is the establishment of trust between staff and the
women and a focus is placed on building positive relationships to create a safe and
supportive atmosphere.
The service offers a range of integrated psychological therapies to address the issues which
are most commonly presented at Garrow House, including eating disorders, self-harm,
substance misuse, mental health difficulties and offending behaviour. This ensures that the
wider context at the heart of the women’s difficulties is addressed rather than limiting
support to the immediate presenting problem. This approach should be rolled-out
nationally to create services which allow women to progress towards community
reintegration in a level of security appropriate to their needs.
C18: What are the likely impacts of our proposals on groups with protected
characteristics? Please let us have any examples, case studies, research or other types of
evidence to support your views.
Whilst the focus on women offenders/service users is welcome we consider that there are
omissions for three significant groups of service users that require specific consideration as
part of commissioning arrangements:
•
It will be important to pay attention to the different needs of Asian and BME
offenders/service users and to address the issue of disproportionality;
•
It will be important for Commissioners and Providers to take a different approach to
young adults noting that they will need to be assessed not only in relation to their
risks and needs but also developing levels of maturity with relevant services
provided.
•
Consideration will also need to be given to the potential impacts of the proposals
on service users with mental health and learning disabilities.
The Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise Sector has significant experience to draw
upon in delivering services for these groups. It requires a different approach and relevant
provision, an ‘offer’ that secures the engagement of service users with these services. This
experience should be drawn upon in designing commission specifications, building in
35
provision for those with protected characteristics as an integral element of the new
Community Sentences.
BME service users
There is a surprising gap in the paper in relation to BME service users. It is known that BME
groups are disproportionately represented right across the criminal justice system. As an
example, in 2010:
•
Just under 26 per cent of the prison population were from BME groups (despite
making up about 9 per cent of the general population);
•
Out of the British national prison population, 11% are black and 5% are Asian. For
black Britons this is significantly higher than the 2.8% of the general population they
represent (Bromley Briefings prison Factfile, Prison Reform Trust, 2012);
•
In terms of community sentences, in London Probation 43% of services users are
BME compared to 35% in the general population (MoJ, 2012).
CLINKS and the Prison Reform Trust’s most recent report on this issue Double Trouble
recommends that when developing and providing generic services, statutory and nonstatutory agencies take account of the ways in which BME service users experience services,
and perceptions of, racial discrimination and stereotyping. This affects willingness and
motivation to engage with services. Cultural sensitivity training for all staff is crucial for the
effective delivery of services that are relevant and accessible to BME service users. The
experience of VCS engagement with BME groups should be drawn upon as they are
experienced in, delivering culturally sensitive provision and personalised services that are
tailored to the needs and circumstances of service users who are members of minority
ethnic groups.
Young adults
The Alliance points to the important work undertaken by the Transition to Adulthood
Alliance; their response to this and previous consultations. We stress the importance of
assessing and providing services that respond not just to the risks and needs of 18-24 year
olds service users, but also to their developing levels of maturity. We consider that
Commissioners must set an expectation of Providers to take account of and ensure provision
that is tailored to the distinct social and economic needs as well as maturity of this group in
order to impact on their prolific reoffending and support desistance. Furthermore, the
Alliance would like to see an expectation set for Community Sentence models to take of
account the different types of transitions experienced by young adults in the criminal justice
system and ensure effective transitions: from Youth Offending Team (YOT) supervision to
Adult Providers; YOT supervision to adult custody; Youth custody to adult custody; Probation
to secure estate; and lastly the transition to adulthood. These should be a key outcome for
commissioners. The government-commissioned Riots Panel Report and the findings of the
October 2012 HMIP Joint Thematic Review on Transitions have indicated poor transitions
can exacerbate offending and delay desistance from crime.
36
Mental health & learning disabilities
Consideration for these groups is imperative: 90% of offender/service users have some kind
of diagnosable mental health problem and 70% have 2 or more mental health problems.
When this is contrasted with the fact that only 1 in 15 of all short-stay prisoners receive any
help at all with a mental health problem, it becomes clear that there should be a role for
diversion from the criminal justice system. The Bradley Review assertion that the NHS and
National Offender Management Service should reconfigure mental health and learning
disability provision for offenders/service users in secure services indicates how diversion can
be applied within the criminal justice system.
It is essential for this group with mental health problems and learning disabilities to consider
safe and secure treatment options, as opposed to high or low secure hospital settings or
prison to rehabilitate such offenders. Of course, the Bradley Review suggested, where
appropriate, diversion away from prison at the earliest possible moment (either police
custody or court) into appropriate alternatives, is key for people with mental health
problems and/ or learning disabilities.
Where service users with mental health problems and learning disabilities enter the
criminal justice system it is essential that they have access to the specialist support
required to challenge offending behaviour and prevent reoffending. Community
reintegration is another challenge for this group and appropriate services are essential to
bridge the gap between custody and the community.
Case Study: Douglas House Project
The Douglas House Project (DHP) is part of the Department of Health Dangerous and Severe
Personality Disorder programme. The service is a high support residential hostel for men
with personality disorders and a history of offending who need further help to return to the
community following detention. It also provides outreach support for men with complex
mental health issues living in the community. The service is an excellent example of
partnership working between Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust, Turning Point and the London
Probation Service.
The service bridges the gaps between health, housing and probation and caters for 6
residents whilst providing outreach support for 12 community clients as well as providing
outpatient psychological therapy. The clients are provided with support to address their
offending behaviour, mental health, psychological well-being and social functioning.
The project emphasises an integrative model of care which addresses the potential tensions,
splits and fragmentation that can arise at many levels when supporting people with a
personality disorder:
•
Between mental health and criminal justice responsibilities;
•
Between addressing risk and psychological need;
37
•
Between social inclusion and protecting the public.
The service supports offenders with a personality disorder to address the difficulties that are
negatively affecting their quality of life while also supporting them to live in the community.
C19: Do you have any further comments on our proposals for Transforming Rehabilitation
in this document?
The Alliance warmly welcomes the changes proposed by Ministry of Justice and we see
tremendous opportunities to work in new ways with Public, Private and Voluntary,
Community and Social Enterprise Sectors to improve outcomes for service users, which will
in turn lead to reduced reoffending and safer communities whilst improving value for
money.
We welcome the opportunity to respond to the Transforming Rehabilitation Consultation
and believe that the MoJ should continue to work collaboratively with its supply chain to
co-design commissioning models predicated on the outcomes to be procured.
Government, potentially assisted by a Managing Agent, could deliver agreed benefits by coordinating stakeholders, whether Government, Private or Voluntary Sector, and by working
across the Offender Management market space locally and nationally. Government’s role
should extend to one that: pools knowledge on best practice (i.e. what-works-best); pools
budgets (which in some cases already exist and operate successfully at grass-roots levels);
and ultimately contracts on a multi agency basis for PbR outcomes.
We also strongly urge Government to consider population in designing the Contract Package
Areas (CPAs) and the importance of being able to cluster regions to provide maximum cost
savings and service improvements across front, middle and back office functions. We have
explained elsewhere in this paper how we see significant scope for creating a mixed market
economy in Offender Management: one where larger Providers manage larger populations
and smaller organisations manage smaller populations. This approach matches size of
population to organisational capabilities, which significantly reduces risk and provides the
opportunity for increased cost savings.
To ensure that the transformation the MoJ seeks occurs at speed we also suggest the
formation of new collaborative commissioning models, managed by MoJ but co-designed
with the supply chain, regardless of sector, to help define requirements, roles and models
for the upcoming competition.
We would also welcome clarity on the future of Probation Trusts: on the statutory
elements that will remain in the Public Sector and on the commercial models that might
be employed by some Trusts i.e. those that might become Mutuals, Social Enterprises or
may take some other structure.
38
Of central importance to Providers is to understand how Trusts will enter the supply chain:
be it as primes, subcontractors or partners. We also would welcome greater clarity and
debate on the management of risk issue, as the Alliance is experienced in managing high
risk offenders (as are other Providers). Whilst we do recognise that if high risk offenders are
retained by ‘Statutory Probation’ Providers will need a mechanism to manage risk
dynamically, we do not believe that this process is as difficult as some might have Authority
believe (see risk consultancy model).
The Alliance would also welcome and strongly encourage far greater debate on the future of
Approved Premises, as we believe it is vital that Approved Premises are included in the
upcoming competition. Approved Premises provide tremendous scope for investment in the
asset base and for fundamentally changing delivery models. Often in city locations, planning
issues and local concerns will be far simpler to address if existing sites are used. The
argument as presented for keeping Approved Premises in Statutory Probation seems to rely
on the logic that High Risk and Prolific Offenders are often housed in Approved Premises.
We would encourage the Authority to take a fresh look at this important asset and look
how it could be transformed into an asset with both social and criminal justice benefits.
Social Finance is often promoted to the VCSE sector and small organisations as a mechanism
through which they can overcome the cash flow issues that present themselves in delivering
PbR contracts. As already highlighted, The Alliance recognises the role the VCSE sector and
small and medium size enterprises will play in the new service and has proposed alternative
solutions to cash flow . However, The Alliance feels it is important to highlight that from our
experience Social Finance represents an expensive form of funding for both Providers and
commissioners.
The Alliance would also welcome more clarity on the ‘mechanics’ of the competition. This
includes timelines for the competition, procurement processes to be used (i.e.
Competitive Dialogue versus Competitive Negotiation), TUPE details and Pension
arrangements.
Finally, we would encourage the Authority to think differently about PbR and whether it
might be possible to better link social and criminal justice outcomes during the contract
period. We believe that there is potential to commission on a PbR basis services that reduce
demand on the criminal justice system and we would be keen to explore these with the
Authority.
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