Policy and Studies Series
2012
COORDINATION
to SAVE LIVES
History and Emerging Challenges
This study was made possible through funding provided by Australia, Germany and Qatar.
The study was drafted by Julia Steets and Claudia Meier (Global Public Policy Institute – GPPI) with Daniel Christensen, Natasha Kindergan and Daniel Pfister (OCHA).
Disclaimer: The contents of this study do not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations or its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
© United Nations 2012. This publication enjoys copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. No portion of this publication may be reproduced
for sale of mass publication without the express and written consent from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)/Policy
Development and Studies Branch (PDSB).
For more information, please contact:
Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB)
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
E-mail: [email protected]
Tel: +1 917 367 4263
Contents
Foreword by Valerie Amos......................................................................................................... iii
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................... v
Setting the stage......................................................................................................................................................1
Part 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination................................ 1
1991-1998 – Expansion in search of commitment...................................................................................2
1998-2005 – Creation of OCHA and mandate refocus...........................................................................4
2005-2010 – Humanitarian reform and consolidation...........................................................................6
2011 and beyond......................................................................................................................................................8
PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing
operating environment for humanitarian action............................................................10
Drivers of humanitarian need: conflict, natural disasters and global challenges...................... 10
The changing context for humanitarian action.......................................................................................14
Concluding remarks...................................................................................................................19
Foreword
by Valerie Amos
Every year, disasters and conflict cause immense suffering
for millions of people —usually the world’s poorest, most
marginalized and vulnerable. Our humanitarian aid system
strives to provide much needed life-saving help and support.
We are reminded every day of the importance of our work, and
of our duty to make our system as effective as possible.
Effective coordination is the hidden force multiplier in emergency
response. With coordination, one plus one plus one does not equal
three; it equals five, or ten. It reduces duplication and competition,
and allows different agencies and organizations to complement
each other and give added value. UN General Assembly resolution
46/182 put today’s global humanitarian coordination mechanism
in place. Important examples of our work since then, from
advocacy to fundraising, from policy development to information
management, are detailed in this study. The study also sets out the
ongoing and emerging challenges which face us and identifies the
opportunities to be harnessed.
I would like to thank everyone who has made this study possible,
particularly the Governments of Australia, Germany and Qatar,
and my predecessors as Emergency Relief Coordinator. I hope you
will find their accounts as fascinating and inspiring as I have. To
shape our future, we must understand our past, and I hope this
study makes a small contribution to us doing so.
Valerie Amos
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator
Executive Summary
Over the two decades since General Assembly Resolution 46/182 was
passed, the multilateral coordination system, including the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), has adapted to rapidly
changing circumstances.
The Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC), the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF) remain the cornerstones of humanitarian coordination.
But the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has grown
significantly; the number of people targeted for humanitarian assistance through
the CAP has almost doubled in the past decade.
Looking ahead, humanitarian needs are expected to continue to rise in the
coming decades, because of an increase in the frequency and intensity of natural
disasters, rapid population growth, urbanization, rising food prices and other
global trends. The increase should be mitigated by continued economic growth
in many of the countries most likely to be affected by disasters, making them
better able to prepare and respond and to reduce their vulnerability to the
impact of shocks. However, this study concludes that overall, additional needs
will outweigh improved coping capacities.
Conflicts continue to be a key driver of humanitarian needs, and this is likely
to continue. The trend of the militarization of aid will continue to present a
challenge, and we will need to continue our strong advocacy to keep our work
independent, impartial and neutral.
Advances in information technology are an important development that will
help to improve the accuracy and timeliness of humanitarian assessments and
response and provide new opportunities for creative advocacy.
The number of humanitarian actors is likely to increase as governments and
NGOs from emerging economies become engaged in humanitarian work. This
will represent a challenge for humanitarian coordination and an opportunity to
bring additional engagement and resources to the humanitarian effort.
As humanitarian requirements escalate, there will be a need for governments
and humanitarian organizations to anticipate, prepare for and respond to crises
more successfully, and to improve their analytical capabilities to understand how
global trends and challenges affect vulnerability and needs.
Our internal reforms over the years include the introduction of the Cluster
approach in 2005, to make the system more effective. The next phase of the
reform process, the IASC Transformative Agenda, aims to improve the leadership,
coordination and accountability of the system. OCHA and its partners will need
to continue to develop and adapt to meet the evolving challenges.
PART 1
A history of international humanitarian
coordination
Humanitarian coordination has evolved significantly. This first part of
the report traces the forces, tensions, opportunities and shocks that have
shaped its development over the past decades.
Setting the stage
An actor entirely dedicated to coordinating international humanitarian action
is a relatively recent development. Before the Second World War, only a small
number of organizations were dedicated to humanitarian assistance, and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) led the way. Noticeable
early coordination attempts were either short lived or concentrated in
immediate post-Second World War Europe.1 With the founding of the
United Nations (UN) in 1945, humanitarian coordination received
more universal attention, as the first article of the UN’s charter calls for
international cooperation for solving “problems of a humanitarian character.”2
However, in the early days of the UN there was no formal push to establish a
single coordinating body.
Over the following decades, an increasing number of specialized UN and
non-UN organizations joined the humanitarian community. However,
the large-scale emergencies of the 1960s and 1970s—the Biafra crisis, the
earthquake in Peru, the cyclone in East Pakistan and the Indo-Pakistani
war—highlighted the need for a dedicated coordination capacity. In 1971,
with General Assembly resolution 2816, UN Member States created the
Disaster Relief Coordinator position and established the UN Disaster Relief
Organization (UNDRO). It had a strong mandate to mobilize, direct and
coordinate UN humanitarian assistance to natural disasters, and to coordinate
UN assistance with the activities of non-UN actors.3
UNDRO had limited financial and personnel capacities to fulfil and
translate its mandate into robust coordination mechanisms. As a result, the
organization tended to be overshadowed by parallel, separate coordination
arrangements established for specific humanitarian situations, such as the
Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA), or the UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes
relating to Afghanistan (UNOCA).4 The “lead agency” concept—the practice
of designating the operationally best-placed UN agency as lead for a specific
response—was increasingly used and eventually formalized by the General
Assembly in 1981.5 The UN often discussed rationalizing these diverse
coordination models, but major decisions in this area were taken only in the
1970s and 1980s.6
PART 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination
2
Humanitarian
Principles
Humanity
Human suffering
must be addressed
wherever it is found. The
purpose of humanitarian
action is to protect life
and health and ensure
respect for human beings.
Impartiality
Humanitarian action
must be carried out on
the basis of need alone,
giving priority to the
most urgent cases of
distress and making
no distinctions on the
basis of nationality,
race, gender, religious
belief, class or political
opinions.
Neutrality
Humanitarian actors
must not take sides in
hostilities or engage
in controversies of
political, racial, religious
or ideological nature.
Independence (added in
2004 through General
Assembly Resolution
58/114)
Humanitarian action
must be autonomous
from the political,
economic, military or
other objectives that
any actor may hold with
regard to areas where
humanitarian action is
being implemented.
The Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the Kurdish refugee crisis at the Iraq-Turkey
border towards the end of the war highlighted the need for a dedicated
and more empowered humanitarian coordination entity. As the latter
crisis unfolded, a large number of Kurds became trapped within Iraq and
many were left without assistance. Technically, UNDRO was in charge of
coordination, but mandates for assistance to internally displaced persons
(IDPs) were unclear. In addition, military forces were actively engaged
in relief, which required humanitarians to coordinate with them.7 In this
context, UNDRO did not manage to effectively coordinate humanitarian
response, and subsequently UNHCR was designated as lead agency in early
1991. However, the coordinated response came too late to avert a high and
rising death toll and suffering among IDPs. In the aftermath of the crisis,
Member States and humanitarian organizations called for the placing of
humanitarian coordination and leadership higher on the political agenda.
The 1991 G7 summit in London suggested the appointment of a highlevel humanitarian official answerable only to the UN Secretary-General to
“strengthen the coordination, and to accelerate the effective delivery, of all
UN relief for major disasters.”8 The end of the cold war opened the door to
reform. While the previous super-power stalemate had effectively paralysed
some of the UN decision-making bodies, by 1991 the organization was
revitalized and the General Assembly was ready to take on the strengthening
of humanitarian assistance and coordination.
1991-1998 – Expansion in search of commitment
However, reaching agreement still required serious political bargaining among
Member States. In October 1991, the Secretary-General’s report9 on reviewing
coordination arrangements for humanitarian assistance set out ideas for reform.
Member States subsequently developed a draft resolution under the leadership
of Swedish Ambassador Jan Eliasson. Almost all accepted the need for stronger
coordination in disasters and complex emergencies. At the same time, there
was a growing discussion amongst Member States on intervention in internal
affairs, with memories of cold war superpower interference in domestic affairs
still fresh. Some Member States feared that the proposed resolution would
legitimize foreign interventions under a humanitarian guise. After difficult
negotiations, Member States managed to balance concerns for national
sovereignty with support for humanitarian coordination. They agreed on a list
of guiding principles for humanitarian action including humanity, neutrality
and impartiality, as well as the respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and
national unity of States. Late in the evening of 19 December 1991, the General
Assembly adopted resolution 46/182.
The resolution provided a forward-looking and comprehensive framework for
international humanitarian assistance and coordination that still holds today.
It transformed the previous Disaster Relief Coordinator into the Emergency
Relief Coordinator (ERC) who would be responsible for coordinating and
facilitating the humanitarian assistance of the UN system and serve as a
central focal point with Governments and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). The ERC would administer the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)
PART 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination
to coordinate funding appeals, and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund,
a pooled donor fund of initially $50 million. The Inter- Agency Standing
Committee (IASC) was created as the central coordination platform for
humanitarian UN organizations, NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent
movement, under the ERC’s chairmanship.
The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)
The CAP is much more than an appeal for money. It is a tool used by aid organizations
to plan, implement and monitor their activities. Since its inception, the CAP has become
a main tool for coordination, strategic planning and programming. As a planning
mechanism, the CAP has contributed significantly to developing a more strategic
approach to the provision of humanitarian aid. As a coordination mechanism, the CAP
has fostered closer cooperation between Governments, donors and aid agencies, in
particular UN agencies, NGOs and members of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement. Speaking with a common voice, UN agencies and NGOs have been
able to raise funds for immediate action, demand greater protection, get better access
to vulnerable people, and work more effectively with governments and other actors.
Since 1992, well over 100 donor countries have provided more than $42 billion for 330
appeals to address the needs of people in more than 50 countries and regions.
Under Jan Eliasson’s leadership as the first ERC, the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was established in April 1992 as the coordination
secretariat. As the department was quite small, it took some years before it was
able to fulfil its extensive mandate as laid out in resolution 46/182.
The department focused on institutionalizing its field coordination services
that were seen as adding value to the broader humanitarian community.
It strengthened its surge capacity by deploying more of the then-new UN
Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams. In parallel, the IASC
strengthened the independent stature of the Humanitarian Coordinators
(HCs) and endorsed generic terms of reference for them in 1994.
Emergency Relief Coordinators 1991 to present
Mr. Jan Eliasson January 1992 – February 1994
Mr. Peter Hansen
March 1994 – February 1996
Mr. Yasushi Akashi
March 1996 – December 1997
Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello
January 1998 – January 2001
Ms. Carolyn McAskie*
November 1999 – January 2001
Mr. Kenzo Oshima
January 2001 – June 2003
Mr. Jan Egeland
June 2003 – December 2006
Mr. John Holmes
January 2007 – September 2010
Ms. Valerie Amos
September 2010 – present
*Emergency Relief Coordinator ad interim
3
4
PART 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination
Under ERC Peter Hansen, information management developed into a key
service of DHA.10 At the global level, this included the establishment of IRIN—
Integrated Regional Information Networks, which provides reporting from the
frontline of humanitarian action to cover gaps in the mainstream media, and
ReliefWeb, a web-based platform for sharing disaster-specific information.
Starting in 1992, a collaborative project on the use of military and civil
defence assets (MCDA) in disaster relief was established by DHA and NATO.
The project aimed to maximize existing government capacities to support
relief operations after natural disasters. Within the project, the “Guidelines
on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets” (“Oslo Guidelines”) were
developed and released in May 1994. Revised in 2007, the Oslo Guidelines
still serve as the main guiding tool when using the military in disaster relief.
The early 1990s also saw the operating environment for humanitarian
organizations become increasingly complex. The wars in the Balkans, the
Great Lakes region and Somalia led to a wave of political pressure to use
assisting States’ militaries to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Humanitarian action became politically more sensitive as Member States and
the UN Security Council sought to address the fallout from political crises
in a more comprehensive manner, including the humanitarian, human rights
and economic dimensions.11 Peacekeeping forces also became more habitual
players in the humanitarian arena. Safeguarding space for impartial, neutral
and independent assistance to people in need therefore required stronger
policy and advocacy efforts.
At the same time, the genocide and civil wars in Rwanda and the Great
Lakes region in 1994 raised questions about the international community’s
willingness to act. Despite clear warning signs, the international community
did not take action to prevent the deaths of 800,000 people during the
genocide. Poorly managed humanitarian relief operations following the civil
war could not stop tens of thousands dying in camps.12 The severity of the
crisis led to a first comprehensive review of the international relief effort
and pushed humanitarian organizations to further professionalize their
assistance.13 DHA also commissioned a review of its role.14 The evaluation
concluded that DHA needed a clearer mandate, more flexibility, some
independent resources and greater authority to operate credibly.15 DHA
started investing more in developing system-wide policy and advocacy under
ERCs Peter Hansen and Yasushi Akashi. This coincided with greater efforts
outside the UN to develop standards and professionalize assistance. For
example, in December 1994 humanitarian organizations adopted the Code
of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
NGOs, and launched the Sphere standards handbook project in 1997.16
1998-2005 – Creation of OCHA and mandate refocus
With a focus on the challenges to humanitarian coordination since resolution
46/182, Secretary-General Kofi Annan prepared a report in 1997 on United
Nations reform. It recommended that the UN retain a stand-alone, nonoperational humanitarian coordination office.17 Member States agreed
PART 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination
that this arrangement created fewer conflicts of interest than other possible
coordination models. A non-operational coordination body would stand a
better chance of earning the necessary trust to develop strong partnerships
with other humanitarian organizations. In line with the Secretary-General’s
recommendations, some of DHA’s operational responsibilities were transferred
to other UN entities, and DHA was transformed into the leaner Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Responsibility for its
disaster-preparedness mitigation activities was largely transferred to the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). DHA’s mine-action mandate was
transferred to the Department for Peacekeeping Operations and supervision of
the Iraq programme to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.18
OCHA focused at first on its internal management under the leadership of
Sergio Vieira de Mello and his second deputy (and later ERC ad interim)
Carolyn McAskie. They initiated a management-review process that involved
staff members. Reform ideas focused on better management at all levels and
how best to support OCHA’s field offices, which had gained importance under
Vieira de Mello. The process created a spirit of reform in the organization and
rallied staff and managers around a common vision for OCHA’s work.
Vieira de Mello’s charisma and strong relationship with High Commissioner
for Refugees Sadako Ogata helped to elevate OCHA’s standing with its
partners. An important success that created trust and confidence in OCHA
was Vieira de Mello’s leadership in bringing the first UN assessment mission
to Kosovo during the NATO bombings.19 The creation of rosters and standby
capacity enabled OCHA to deploy personnel faster and to provide common
services in the early phases of emergencies. In addition, OCHA’s policy
development and advocacy efforts led to much-needed progress regarding
the protection of civilians and IDPs, two issues that were not addressed
in General Assembly resolution 46/182. In 1999, OCHA contributed to
the first dedicated report of the UN Secretary-General on the protection
of civilians in armed conflict. This was followed by the landmark Security
Council resolution 1265 on protection.20
After a thorough review, the previously separate functions (response to natural
disasters and response to complex emergencies) were merged. Meanwhile, a
new challenge for the humanitarian system was brewing. A wave of political
pressure on humanitarianism followed the 11 September 2001 attacks when
a number of Member States increasingly focused their attention on so-called
fragile and failing States, the alleged breeding grounds for terrorist networks.
Many argued that “stabilizing” these States required an integrated approach,
addressing foreign, security, development and humanitarian issues. Inside
the UN, the integration debate had already started with the 2000 Brahimi
Report. Integrated UN missions linked peacekeeping, development and
humanitarian activities more closely than before. Some relief organizations
felt the need to position themselves in this context and decide whether to
adopt an integrationist or independent attitude.21 In addition, concerns for
the security of humanitarian staff rose dramatically, especially after the 2003
Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad, which claimed the lives of many UN staff
members, including that of Sergio Vieira de Mello.
5
6
PART 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination
Due to attempts to integrate humanitarian action with other policy
areas, which would have undermined the independence and neutrality of
humanitarian action, and a lack of attention to forgotten crises, it became
necessary for OCHA to increase its advocacy. Vieira de Mello had already
started to brief the UN Security Council more regularly on humanitarian
affairs. Under ERC Kenzo Oshima, OCHA designed a comprehensive
advocacy strategy to convince political actors of the importance of respecting
humanitarian law and principles, and to raise awareness of forgotten or
overlooked crises.22 These activities received a boost when a range of donors
agreed on the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles in 2003.23 OCHA
continued its advocacy efforts in the years that followed. In 2004, for
example, then ERC Jan Egeland put the spotlight on the unfolding crisis in
Darfur and brought the issue before the UN Security Council. As part of
the UN Secretariat, OCHA was well-placed to raise humanitarian concerns
in the political and security arms of the organization. However, many in
the humanitarian community, particularly NGOs, saw this very proximity
to the political and related military sphere as endangering the neutrality of
humanitarian action. OCHA, with others, needed to address the demands for
UN-wide integration and the need to maintain neutrality of humanitarian
action. Somewhat overshadowed by the attention to complex emergencies,
natural hazards continued to claim many lives.
As in earlier years, large-scale, highly visible crises, such as the Darfur crisis,
which began in 2003, and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, uncovered
limitations in the humanitarian response system and triggered the next major
developments in humanitarian coordination. Evaluations carried out under
the umbrella of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and the Humanitarian
Response Review, an independent system-wide review following the Darfur
experience, identified many areas where effectiveness had to improve. At
the same time, UN Secretary-General Annan’s report ‘In Larger Freedom’
and his High-Level Panel on System-Wide Coherence echoed the need
for predictable standby arrangements, funding and strengthening field
coordination for humanitarian response. The concerted voice of these reports
gave ERC Egeland a strong mandate to reform the multilateral humanitarian
coordination system.
2005-2010 – Humanitarian reform and consolidation
Egeland initiated a new “humanitarian reform” in an attempt to strengthen
coordination, financing, leadership and partnership to provide more
accountable, effective and predictable humanitarian response. Under Egeland
and his successor John Holmes, humanitarian reform and its consolidation
became a major focus area for OCHA and its partners.
A key element of the reform was the cluster approach. Lead organizations
became responsible for organizing coordination in individual sectors
of response, for example UNICEF for nutrition and the World Health
Organization for health. At the global level, cluster leads provided policy
guidance, maintained surge-capacity rosters and pre-positioned materials. At
PART 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination
the country and local levels, clusters led operational coordination through
information exchange and common planning. Initially, the cluster approach
met some resistance, as some Member States and NGOs had questions about
the difference between clusters and traditional sector-based coordination
forums and felt that they had not been sufficiently consulted. OCHA
invested in clarifying how clusters were intended to work and how they
linked to government mechanisms. Over the years, OCHA has taken on key
tasks in support of clusters, such as facilitating the introduction of the cluster
approach on the ground, guidance development, and organizing inter-cluster
coordination at the national and local level.
To enhance predictability, flexibility and rapid response to humanitarian
needs, humanitarian reform also strengthened pooled-funding mechanisms.
At the global level, a grant facility of up to US$450 million for rapid
response and underfunded emergencies was added to the Central Emergency
Revolving Fund’s loan facility of up to $50 million. The fund was, in 2006,
renamed the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). It currently enjoys
support from over 120 government and private-sector donors. At the country
level, new country-based pooled funds enabled HCs to allocate funding to
commonly agreed strategic priorities or underfunded areas.24
Humanitarian Pooled Funds
OCHA supports the management of three types of pooled funds. The Central
Emergency Response Fund (CERF) saves lives by providing rapid initial funding to
UN agencies for life-saving assistance at the onset of humanitarian crises, and
critical support for poorly funded, essential humanitarian response operations. Its
objectives are to promote early and coordinated action and response to save lives; to
enhance response to time-crucial requirements based on demonstrable needs; and to
strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in under-funded crises.
The Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) were established to provide rapid and flexible
funding to address unforeseen needs and gaps at the country level. ERFs increase
opportunities for local actors, including NGOs, to respond to needs in areas where
international NGOs face access challenges due to security or political constraints.
The Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) provide early and predictable funding to the
most critical humanitarian needs, as identified and formulated in a CAP. However, CHFs
also maintain an emergency reserve for responding to unplanned emergency needs
outside the CAP. All humanitarian partners participating in the CAP process are eligible
for CHF funding.
Humanitarian reform also sought to enhance leadership, primarily by
strengthening the role and capacity of Resident and Humanitarian
Coordinators (RC/HCs) at the country level. Much effort was made in
training RC/HCs on humanitarian issues and strengthening the pool of
candidates for HC positions. Accountability to the humanitarian system was
strengthened through individual compacts for performance management
between HCs and the ERC.
7
PART 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination
8
Partnership between core humanitarian UN organizations, the Red Cross
movement and NGOs was consolidated when they jointly endorsed the
Principles of Partnership in 2007. The principles commit signatories
to respect equality, transparency, results orientation, responsibility and
complementarity in their operations.
2011 and beyond
When the present ERC, Valerie Amos, took office in September 2010, the
challenges for the humanitarian coordination system continued. Over the last
few years, the international humanitarian system’s capacity has been stretched
to the limit by frequent and large-scale disasters, including Cyclone Nargis
in Myanmar in 2008, the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods in 2010,
and the drought and famine in the Horn of Africa in 2011. At the same time,
humanitarian actors were working in many other major emergency settings,
including in protracted crises in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Sudan; Libya; and Côte d’Ivoire in 2011. In addition, there were
many climate-related emergencies in Asia, Latin America and Africa. As of
mid-2012, humanitarian agencies were also responding to a major droughtrelated food and nutrition crisis in the Sahel Region.
Under ERC Amos’s leadership, the IASC decided to strengthen its response
to disasters. Building on the achievements of the 2005 humanitarian reform
and on lessons learnt from crises in 2010 and 2011, the IASC agreed on a
set of recommendations, which would significantly improve humanitarian
response and accountability to affected people. This ‘Transformative
Agenda’ includes: establishing a mechanism to deploy experienced senior
humanitarian leaders to guide the response effort from the onset of a
major crisis; the rapid deployment of well-trained staff; improving strategic
planning at the country level; enhancing accountability of Humanitarian
Coordinators and members of Humanitarian Country Teams for achieving
collective results; and streamlining coordination mechanisms.
A particular focus for OCHA under Amos’s leadership has been improving
OCHA’s own field effectiveness, strengthening advocacy and building
stronger partnerships with governments, regional organizations, private
companies, civic groups and technology experts. Through high-level
contacts and coordination at the operational level, OCHA is developing
a new relationship with governments and humanitarian responders from
the Islamic world, including through the signing of a memorandum of
understanding with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
OCHA has also expanded its partnership with the African Union and other
organizations on the African continent. At the global level, OCHA supported
the establishment, in 2011, of a new Member State forum, the Dialogue on
Humanitarian Partnership (DHP), to enhance support for humanitarian
work from a wide range of Member States.
PART 1 | A history of international humanitarian coordination
The pressure on the system’s capacity to deliver effectively, combined with
the rise in the number of emergencies around the world, means that the
humanitarian system will need to be flexible and responsive to remain
relevant. Over the last few decades the multilateral coordination system,
including OCHA, has adapted to changing circumstances and supported the
implementation of necessary reforms. The humanitarian enterprise has grown
significantly over the last decade. This growth can be seen through the CAP,
which requested funding to assist almost twice as many people in the past
decade—from 39 million people in 2002 to 68 million people in 2011.
Making humanitarian coordination work
The historical overview in the first part of this report shows how humanitarian coordination has evolved over the last
decades. Today, humanitarian coordination comprises a set of interlinked actors and networks with different mandates
and capacities and is a shared responsibility.
There are direct and indirect costs to humanitarian coordination, but the benefits outweigh the costs. Through
coordination, humanitarian response is more strategic, predictable, timely and coherent. Coordination reduces
duplication and competition, allowing for complementarity and for scarce resources to be used more effectively to
reach more people and fill specific gaps in response to needs. It improves transparency and makes humanitarian
response easier to understand, ultimately increasing accountability to affected people. Coordinated humanitarian
action also facilitates the transition from relief to development. Coordination makes humanitarian assistance more
effective and efficient, resulting in more lives saved.25
The General Assembly, with resolution 46/182, charged the ERC, supported by an office, to coordinate and facilitate
humanitarian assistance of the UN system, to coordinate with humanitarian and other actors outside the UN system,
and to chair the IASC.26 The ERC is also a designated humanitarian advocate ensuring that the humanitarian dimension,
particularly the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality of relief assistance, are fully considered in the wider
political, developmental and security agendas of the UN.27
The ERC and OCHA provide services to support successful coordination. At the practical level, OCHA supports
humanitarian coordination through five core functions: coordination, information management, policy and guidance,
humanitarian financing and advocacy.
To be effective, coordination must build on partnership. The IASC at the global level and the Humanitarian Country
Teams at the country level (both supported by OCHA) bring together the main operational players to agree on common
objectives, priorities and strategies, as well as coordination structures in an emergency situation. OCHA plays an
important part in strengthening relationships with national and local governments and authorities of affected States.
OCHA maintains partnerships with UN Member States, the private sector, academia, other UN Secretariat entities, such
as the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, and other relevant operational humanitarian and
development actors.
To ensure successful coordination, coordination products and services need to be provided on a timely, demand-driven
basis, be context specific, and provide incentives for others to engage in coordinated, principled humanitarian action.
9
PART 2
Emerging Challenges: Increasing
needs and the changing operating
environment for humanitarian action
This part of the report outlines the emerging challenges that the
humanitarian community is facing. Conflicts and natural disasters
will remain the main drivers of humanitarian needs. The number of
people in need of humanitarian help is expected to increase due to the
increased frequency and severity of disasters coupled with increased
vulnerabilities resulting from global trends. These trends include climate
change, population growth, urbanization, environmental degradation
and resource scarcity. At the same time, advances in information
technology and the increasing wealth of emerging economies present new
opportunities for making humanitarian response more effective and for
engaging a wider group of actors in the global humanitarian effort.
Drivers of humanitarian need: conflict, natural disasters and global
challenges
Conflict and natural disasters
The numbers of interstate and intrastate conflicts have steadily declined over
the past 20 years. However, protracted and some new conflicts still affect
tens of millions of people, and the number of people internally displaced by
armed conflict around the world has been increasing—from about 17 million
in 1997 to an estimated 26.4 million people at the end of 2011.28 The effects
of armed conflicts are mostly felt by the most vulnerable in communities,
destroying lives and livelihoods and resulting in massive needs, including in
Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan.
The frequency and intensity of natural disasters has also been increasing.
Between 2000 and 2011, more than one natural disaster with a humanitarian
impact occurred every day.29 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
estimated that in 2010, 42 million people were forced to flee due to disasters
triggered by sudden-onset natural hazards.30 The increasing magnitude of
disaster impact is felt most acutely in the developing world with Africa and
Asia the hardest hit. Over the last 30 years, people on these continents have
made up approximately 88 per cent of the total number of reported deaths,
and 96 per cent of the people affected by natural disasters.31 The geographical
distribution, amount, intensity and frequency of disasters are changing and
are predicted to accelerate.32, 33
PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing operating environment for humanitarian action
Due to population growth and urbanization, more people are living in areas
exposed to natural hazards. Rapid economic and urban development will
lead to a growing concentration of people in hazard-prone cities, fertile river
valleys and coastal areas. Between 1970 and 2010, the average number of
people exposed to flooding increased by 114 per cent (32.5 to 69.4 million
annually). The global population increased by 87 per cent during the same
period. This suggests that despite the risks, more people are moving to floodprone areas. Populations are also growing in cyclone-prone areas.34
Significant numbers of people in urban areas are vulnerable to humanitarian
crises of moderate intensity. This is due to rapid, uncontrolled urban growth
and densely populated informal settlements in hazard-prone locations, and
the failure of urban authorities to regulate building standards and land-use.
As more people are exposed to natural hazards in urban areas, humanitarian
organizations will need to develop new approaches to humanitarian action,
as the majority of tools developed for humanitarian response are designed for
rural settings.35
When natural hazards affect industrialized areas or installations, such as
oil pipelines or dams, they can trigger technological and environmental
disasters.36 The broken levees in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in
2005, and the Fukushima nuclear emergency after the Japanese earthquake
and tsunami in 2011 show that even highly industrialized countries have
difficulty protecting their infrastructure from extreme shocks. Risks are
even higher in countries that are unable or unwilling to sufficiently protect
hazard-prone infrastructure from extreme events. As weather-related hazards
become more intense, they may exceed the limits that such infrastructure was
designed to withstand.37 The humanitarian community may therefore have to
respond more frequently to technological and environmental disasters, either
separately or as part of a wider response to a natural disaster.
Global trends and increased humanitarian needs
The extent to which natural and human-induced hazards result in
humanitarian emergencies depends on communities’ vulnerability and
resilience. For example, when a storm hits a slum where many poor people
live in badly constructed houses, more people will require humanitarian
assistance than if the same storm hits an affluent area where people live in
well-constructed homes. Therefore, the effects of trends such as population
growth, resource scarcity, migration, urbanization and climate change on
resilience and vulnerability are of great concern to humanitarians.
The world’s population surpassed 7 billion during 2011 and is expected to
reach 8.4 billion by 2025.38 The population of the 49 least developed countries
is growing nearly twice as fast as the rest of the developing world.39 Within
those countries, population growth is fastest in cities and in the poorest, most
vulnerable areas.40 Population growth, especially in the poorest countries, will
mean that the absolute number of vulnerable people will rise, and that more
people will be exposed to the effects of natural and other hazards.
Resilience is
the “ability of a
system, community
or society exposed
to hazards to resist,
absorb, accommodate
and recover from
the effects of a
hazard in a timely
and efficient manner,
including through
the preservation
and restoration of
its essential basic
structures and
functions.” (ISDR, 2009)
Vulnerability refers
to the “characteristics
and circumstances of
a community, system
or asset that make
it susceptible to the
damaging effects of a
hazard” that can arise
from “various physical,
social, economic
and environmental
factors.” (ISDR, 2009)
11
12 PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing operating environment for humanitarian action
Population growth will also put pressure on food, water and energy resources.
While economic growth generally has benefits for people’s resilience, by
allowing them to build up assets and construct higher-quality housing, it
can exacerbate this pressure because as people become more affluent, their
demand for resources increases. Meeting the basic nutritional, water and
energy needs of the world’s population will therefore become increasingly
difficult. At the same time, as demand for natural resources, such as food,
water and land is increasing, ecosystem decline is reducing the capacity
to provide these resources. With the growing population and changed
consumption patterns, global food production will have to increase by 50 per
cent by 2030.41 Yet the rate of growth of agricultural productivity is declining
and is unlikely to match this rising demand.42
Water is essential for survival. Yet, more than 1 billion people in developing
countries do not have access to clean water.43 By 2030, 47 per cent of the
world’s population will live in areas of high water stress.44 Water scarcity
represents a major political, economic and human rights issue, threatening to
amplify conflict, food insecurity, and poor health and sanitation.
Pressure on energy resources is also likely to increase as a result of rising
demand and dwindling supplies of conventional energy reserves. Increased
demands for energy and declining resources have resulted in tripling oil prices
since 2001, and energy demand may increase by an additional 45 per cent
by 2030. High energy prices will contribute to food price rises as production
costs increase and crops are diverted to produce biofuels.45
Poor people are especially vulnerable to high prices and price volatility, since
they spend a larger proportion of their income on basic commodities such as
food, water and fuel. The food price increases of 2008 resulted in millions of
poor households being unable to buy the food they needed. More recently, the
World Bank estimated that 44 million people fell into extreme poverty as a
result of rising food prices in the nine months leading up to February 2011.46
When the cost of food spikes, families need to find ways to cope. Many
reduce their food consumption, and the nutritious intake of pregnant women,
young children and those who are sick falls. Selling animals or other assets,
and reducing purchase of medicine and health care and usage of education
are other coping mechanisms. This ultimately makes affected people more
vulnerable to the effects of natural hazards and complex emergencies.
In addition to putting pressure on poor households, high and volatile
commodity prices also directly affect the cost of humanitarian operations.
While the number of people in need of assistance increases, so does the cost
of providing that assistance because humanitarian organizations have to pay
more for food and the fuel that is used to deliver them.47 If prices continue to
rise, humanitarian organizations can be faced with serious funding shortfalls
and have to reduce the amount of people they can help.
Today, more people are on the move than at any other point in history.
Globally, there are 214 million international migrants and 740 million internal
migrants.48 Over the next few decades, migration is likely to increase because
PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing operating environment for humanitarian action
of population growth, economic disparities, and environmental degradation.
Many people will want or need to relocate, and most will go to cities. By 2025,
57 per cent of the world’s population will live in urban areas, primarily in fastgrowing, medium-sized cities.49 Eighty per cent of these city dwellers will be
in developing countries.50 At the expected pace of urbanization, cities may be
unable to meet their inhabitants’ needs for food, employment, infrastructure
and basic services, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.51
Some people will move because they have no choice—their livelihoods
made unsustainable because of environmental degradation and lack of
access to the basic resources needed to sustain life. Those who cross borders
because of these conditions fall between the cracks of the current protection
system because they are neither legally defined as refugees fleeing from
political persecution, nor as legal economic migrants.52 They have little legal
protection in foreign territories, are often forced to live clandestinely, and
often live in very poor conditions.53
Climate change will not only lead to more frequent and intense natural
disasters, but will also exacerbate people’s vulnerability to all types of
hazards and act as a multiplier of the risks related to other global trends
and challenges. The effects of climate change on sea levels, water availability
and agricultural production are already increasing food insecurity and
threatening livelihoods. They will contribute to rising competition over scarce
resources, such as water and fertile land, and increase the likelihood of forced
displacement and migration, political instability and even violent conflict.54
Although the effects of climate change are felt worldwide, the poorest and
most vulnerable communities will suffer most because they have the least
capacity to adapt. The effects of climate change will always be difficult to
separate from other factors, but will contribute to a large growth in the
number of people requiring humanitarian assistance.
When the adverse impacts of global trends are particularly sudden, they
can themselves result in humanitarian crises, often without obvious triggers
for response. For example, the food price crisis of 2007/08 demonstrated
how global commodity price shocks can lead to simultaneous humanitarian
needs in many countries – examples in this case include Haiti, Senegal
and Yemen. The winter crises of Central Asia in 2007/08 were not only
the result of extreme weather, but of an array of interrelated global and
local factors, including food price increases, energy insecurity and failing
infrastructure. These types of “non-traditional” humanitarian situations may
become more common in the future, and will pose a number of challenges
for the humanitarian community. They may occur outside settings that are
commonly thought of as humanitarian emergencies.
Global trends – some positive aspects
Not all global trends will have negative consequences: some will help
to strengthen the resilience of certain communities and make them less
vulnerable to humanitarian crises. Most importantly, economic growth in
emerging and developing economies will lead to an expansion of the middle
13
14 PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing operating environment for humanitarian action
class in those countries.55 People in this income bracket will be able to sustain
better living conditions in terms of health and housing, and accumulate more
savings, making them more resilient to crises. However, growing wealth in
developing countries may also create additional problems, particularly for the
environment, not least due to increased waste and pollution of air and water.
Preparedness:
The knowledge and
capacities developed
by governments,
professional responseand-recovery
organizations,
communities and
individuals to
effectively anticipate,
respond to, and
recover from the
impact of likely,
imminent or current
hazard events or other
emergency situations,
including conflicts
and generalized
violence, warranting
humanitarian
response.
Disaster Risk:
The concept and
practice of reducing
disaster risks through
systematic efforts to
analyse and manage
the causal factors of
disasters, including
through reduced
exposure to hazards,
lessened vulnerability
of people and property,
wise management
of land and the
environment, and
improved preparedness
for adverse events.
Education is becoming more accessible to the poor and has already resulted
in fast-growing literacy rates throughout the world. Between 2000 and 2010,
illiteracy declined by more than 5 per cent to 16.5 per cent.56 Education gives
people more access to economic opportunities and access to information that
can help reduce their vulnerability and exposure to hazards.
Another positive trend that will lead to reduced vulnerability is the declining
rate of new HIV infections in many of the most affected countries, partly
due to the increasing availability and use of anti-retroviral medicines.
Technological innovation will also help to improve people’s resilience. For
example, developments in food production will increase productivity and
reduce waste. Improvements in weather forecasting services will help people
manage the risk of extreme-weather events. New technology has the potential
to improve water management for poor rural populations and improve access
to clean energy. Access to microfinance, insurance and other financial services
can help people make their livelihoods more sustainable.
Greater economic independence, improved educational opportunities, rising
levels of literacy, declining HIV infections and technological innovations
will make some people more resilient to hazards. However, a larger number
of people will become more vulnerable as a consequence of the challenges
described above. In some countries with rapidly increasing populations,
economic growth may not be fast enough to prevent increases in the number
of poor people who may require international humanitarian aid. Ultimately,
more people will require assistance due to conflicts, natural disasters and
other emergencies. And while the number of people in need is likely to grow,
the nature of emergencies that will affect them will also change.
The changing context for humanitarian action
A more central role for affected states and populations
Economists predict that by 2030, developing economies will make up
57 per cent of the global economy as compared to 49 per cent today.57
Global wealth will be spread more equally among countries than today,58
giving more governments resources to invest in disaster preparedness, risk
reduction, and response.
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) reports a significant
growth in the number of states that have set up national disaster management
authorities, civil protection systems and legislation to regulate incoming aid.59
It will thus be increasingly important for international assistance efforts to
link with and support such existing structures.60
PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing operating environment for humanitarian action
Affected people can also be expected to become more proactive and vocal in
disaster response as they are better informed and aware of their rights. Access
to communication technologies is growing fast. In 2010, 67 per cent of the
world’s population had mobile phones.61 In developing countries the rate
is 57 per cent, more than double the rate of five years earlier.62 As Internet
access becomes available on ever-cheaper mobile devices in developing
countries, connectivity through social networks will increase, even in places
not accessible to humanitarian workers. As a result, more individuals will
have access to information about hazards, risks, humanitarian response
and their rights in emergencies. They will be better able to communicate
their situation and to mobilize if the assistance offered does not cover their
needs, which may also raise their expectations and demands for effective
humanitarian assistance.
A broader set of partners
Local and national actors have always been at the forefront of responding
to emergencies. Where required, they have received help from regional and
international partners, including from international organizations which are
part of the multilateral system. Over the past decade the relative importance
of these different response capacities has shifted, and will continue to shift,
in favour of national and regional responses. Specific drivers of this change
include heightened awareness of the risks to development that disasters and
crises pose, coupled with newly enacted disaster management legislation
generated by the Hyogo Framework for Action and related initiatives.
Globalized media has brought a new level of international public attention to
humanitarian emergencies, and with that has come an increase in the level of
engagement by actors who desire to help.
In purely financial terms, government members of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance
Committee (OECD-DAC) provide most multilateral funds for humanitarian
action, approximately 90 per cent in 2008.63, 64 In addition, many of the
major implementing organizations outside the UN, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the largest international NGOs, have their
origins in Europe and North America. This is changing as governments and
NGOs in emerging economies become more engaged in humanitarian efforts.
The Gulf States and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
have for example significantly increased commitment and public spending for
humanitarian action over the past 10 years.65
To date, most emerging economies have used mainly bilateral channels for
their assistance. However, some have begun to provide increased and more
predictable political and financial support for multilateral mechanisms. Brazil,
for example, was a main contributor to the Haiti Emergency Response Fund
and joined the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative in 2011. Saudi Arabia
contributed $500 million to the World Food Programme’s food crisis appeal
in 2008. India provided $25 million to multilateral organizations for the flood
response in Pakistan in 2010. The Russian Federation has become a regular
donor to OCHA, and joined the OCHA Donor Support Group in 2011.
15
PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing operating environment for humanitarian action
16 TNT and
WFP: A
HumanitarianPrivate
Partnership
Beyond Money
The international
delivery company
TNT supports WFP in
three ways. Firstly,
knowledge-transfer
projects use the
expertise of TNT’s
employees to support
WFP in areas such
as preparing for
emergencies, fundraising from the
private sector and
improving WFP’s
transportation network
by offering expertise
in fleet and supplychain management.
Secondly, TNT provides
hands-on logistical
support to WFP in
emergency operations;
for its school-feeding
support as well
as private-sector
fundraising to help
WFP attract other
corporate donors and
partners. TNT also
has a standby team
ready to help WFP in
any large emergency.
TNT supports WFP by
increasing awareness
of WFP activities and
issues of world hunger
among TNT employees,
corporations and
the public.69
Linked to the growth in humanitarian engagement by emerging economies,
the number of NGO partners supporting humanitarian action will probably
increase, as governments generally favour funding organizations from their own
countries. This is already the case in several Gulf countries as well as Turkey.
Regional organizations’ participation in humanitarian action is also increasing
and is expected to grow in the future. Several regional organizations are
already playing an active role in emergency preparedness and response.66 The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, was the first
organization to adopt a legally binding regional cooperation agreement for
disaster risk reduction in 2005. It also played a pivotal role in facilitating access
to disaster-affected communities in Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
In 2008, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation established a humanitarian
affairs department to coordinate humanitarian assistance programmes of
OIC Member States. In recent years, the OIC’s humanitarian engagement
has evolved from fundraising and donating relief items to playing a more
active role in operational humanitarian response. The OIC has a comparative
advantage through its regional networks and local knowledge that can
significantly facilitate humanitarian operations, including by negotiating access
to people in need. The OIC currently supports humanitarian operations in
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, the occupied
Palestinian territory (oPt), Somalia, Yemen and several other countries. The
African Union is also playing an increasing role in humanitarian work, having
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with OCHA in August 2010 and a
corresponding Plan of Action in November 2011.67
A competitive funding environment, heightened awareness of the risks
to development that disaster and crises pose and the need for innovative
solutions has also shifted humanitarian partners’ attention to the
opportunities of engaging more closely with the private sector. At the same
time, the demands from employees for engagement, brand identity, and
capturing new markets are motivating businesses to focus on humanitarian
issues as part of their social responsibility commitments. Companies already
support humanitarian action in important areas such as logistics and
communications technology. Current trends indicate that they prefer to focus
on contributing assets that are close to their core business, including staff
expertise, products or cause-related marketing campaigns.68
This increasing diversity of humanitarian actors is positive because it helps
bring new resources and capacities to address needs, and can also contribute
to reducing the perception of humanitarian action as Western-dominated.
At the same time, unless there is a commitment to inclusive, coordinated
and complementary humanitarian action from all partners, fragmentation
will result. This can be problematic, particularly inlarge-scale disasters such
as the 2010 Haiti earthquake, where thousands of NGOs (including more
than 1,000 from abroad) joined the aid effort without any commitment to
agreed standards and principles.70, 71 While acting with the best intentions,
some of these partners provided out-of-date medicines, low-quality food,
inappropriate equipment or helpers without the necessary qualifications.
As was the case in Haiti, the sheer number of humanitarian workers and
organizations pouring into a country after a major disaster can clog vital
PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing operating environment for humanitarian action
access routes and swamp a government’s remaining administrative capacities.
In order to address the challenge of fragmentation, a concerted effort to build
inclusive networks and to strengthen partnerships between and among the
different sets of humanitarian actors is critical.
Continued political and military interests in humanitarian action
As public awareness of emergencies increases, so does the stake that politicians
have in responding to them and in aligning this response with national
and security interests. States taking a more proactive role in coordinating
humanitarian response to complex emergencies on their territory may use
humanitarian assistance to further their own political or military objectives,
undermining the principles of neutrality and impartiality which are critical
to the credibility of humanitarian work. In such situations, humanitarian
actors have to carefully balance the need to support States in developing
their response and coordination capacities, while simultaneously ensuring
assistance is fully aligned with humanitarian principles and available to all.
Many donors are increasing links between their humanitarian engagement
and security agendas. This may mean that donors are less likely to support
humanitarian assistance where there is less perceived benefit for their national
security, despite high levels of need. Anti-terrorism legislation in some
countries has already seriously limited the ability of UN agencies and NGOs
to engage in dialogue with some groups participating in conflict.72 This
demonstrates how conflating humanitarian and security agendas can create
challenges in upholding humanitarian principles.
In addition, military forces of established and emerging partners frequently
provide relief, either as part of their national response structure, as foreign
military support to affected States, and as support to international response
efforts. Where there are major humanitarian needs in natural disasters,
armies, navies and air forces are essential to humanitarian work, not only to
deliver life-saving aid as quickly as possible, but to repair infrastructure and
offer logistical support. However, if humanitarian actors work too closely
with military partners, particularly in conflict situations, misperceptions
arise about the motives and intentions of humanitarian work. The inclusion
of “hearts and minds” campaigns as part of some governments’ military
strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq, where aid was delivered by soldiers in
areas of strategic importance and not necessarily based on demonstrated
need, conflated the aims of humanitarian assistance with the objectives of
military forces operating on the ground. Operating in environments where
such misperceptions are at play impairs humanitarian organizations’ ability
to do their work and creates security risks for humanitarian workers on the
ground—particularly for national staff.73
Advocacy by OCHA and the wider humanitarian community on these issues
has helped to put in place measures to create distinctions between humanitarian
assistance and other interventions, including by asking military forces to
limit their aid interventions to infrastructure support. This advocacy also led
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to develop
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on its role in supporting humanitarian
17
Disaster Relief
2.0 – trends
in emergency
information sharing
In 2011, the Harvard
Humanitarian Initiative,
in partnership with
OCHA, the UN
Foundation and the
Vodafone Foundation,
published the “Disaster
Relief 2.0” report on the
future of information
sharing in humanitarian
situations. The report
takes stock of innovative
information-sharing
initiatives used in the
response to the 2010
earthquake in Haiti. They
include OpenStreetMap,
a free interactive map
that humanitarian
organizations and
affected persons could
view and edit, and link
to geographic data.
The African non-profit
company Ushahidi
provided a software
platform relying on
crowdsourcing to map
needs and responses.
Sahana, another
initiative, mainly
tries to coordinate
data flows between
volunteer communities
and international
organizations. The
report proposes
creating an interfae
between humanitarian
organizations and these
initiatives to make
systems and approaches
more compatible.
18 PART 2 | Emerging Challenges: Increasing needs and the changing operating environment for humanitarian action
assistance and disaster relief, recognizing the responsibility of the Afghan
Government to lead, the international humanitarian community to assist, and
ISAF to support, as a last resort upon request, and based on an identified need.
New technological options for providing assistance and managing
information
Technological innovations are having a huge impact on humanitarian
response, and will continue to do so. The widespread use of mobile phones
is already helping to warn people of impending disasters, providing an
easy and quick way for the public to donate money, and enabling the
delivery of aid via vouchers and cash grants.74 In future, the development
of more sophisticated sensors could make mine clearance far easier and
faster. Developments in satellite imagery and the use of unmanned aircraft
could improve needs assessments and help deliver humanitarian goods to
inaccessible areas in a more targeted way.
Mobile technology and internet access will also enable humanitarian agencies
to communicate with each other, and with those they are trying to support
during emergencies. People affected by emergencies have already started using
these tools; following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, social networks and short
message services were widely used to communicate needs.75 Social media sites
could turn into the emergency numbers of the future.
Humanitarian actors are taking advantage of these new opportunities to
communicate with affected people, inform them about programmes, get their
feedback and report on improvements.
Technological developments also create new possibilities for volunteers to
support humanitarian work remotely. Far from the location of an emergency
people can process and analyse information, or help humanitarian workers
with administrative tasks.76 The emergence of interactive and collaborative
online tools is revolutionizing the creation of maps, which are a crucial tool
for humanitarian work. After the Haiti earthquake, volunteer communities
created an interactive live map using the Ushahidi platform77. They shared
information about the status of collapsed buildings and created virtual
support networks through mobile phones and social media like Twitter78. The
challenge is to link the humanitarian system to these volunteer initiatives and
harness their full potential.
These developments will also build stronger links between the donor
community and people affected by disasters. Online platforms linking
affected people and private individuals are already making direct cash
transfers possible. This trend is slowly taking off for microcredit and
development projects.79 In Somalia, the Danish Refugee Council,an NGO,
is running an online map that shows the status of its development projects
at the village level, allowing donors to decide exactly where they want their
money to go. The World Bank has a similar Mapping for Results platform
that tracks its projects and enables people to provide direct feedback on
them. These channels will provide new tools for accountability and new
levels of transparency.
Concluding Remarks
Looking back over the past two decades, it is clear that there has been great
progress since the adoption of resolution 46/182. More lives are being saved,
more quickly and efficiently, because of humanitarian coordination and new
financial instruments like the CERF.
The humanitarian coordination system has continuously adapted to a rapidly
changing world. The reform process that began in 2005 and the IASC
Transformative Agenda of 2011 are just part of the effort to ensure that the
system remains fit for purpose.
This study argues that the need to adapt to a changing operating
environment is likely to continue. An increase in the number and severity
of hazards, due to climate change and environmental degradation,
combined with greater vulnerability because of population growth,
urbanization and water scarcity are expected to lead to a steady increase
in humanitarian needs in the foreseeable future. Conflicts and political
and social crises will continue to result in humanitarian needs as they
affect the most vulnerable. Food and energy prices are likely to continue
at historically high levels and to remain volatile, which will also have an
impact on humanitarian needs and patterns of global migration.
To cope with these changing requirements, it will be important to harness
the potential of other global trends described in this study, including the
increasing engagement of emerging economies in humanitarian efforts.
Strengthening partnerships with a greater number of Member States and
organizations will be increasingly important.
Developments in information technology promise to make humanitarian
coordination, assessment and response more efficient, and will provide new
platforms for advocacy, particularly through social networks. As the former ERC
Peter Hansen has said, OCHA should and must remain the place to go to for
cutting-edge humanitarian information. This gives it the authority to exercise an
effective coordination role that goes beyond its formal mandate and status.
Above all, the humanitarian coordination system must improve its ability
to anticipate and mitigate emergencies and crises. This will require better
monitoring and analysis of trends, the expansion of early warning systems,
and the formation of stronger partnerships with governments, specialist
agencies and academia.
By rapidly adapting to an ever-changing world, adopting new information
technologies, broadening our donor and partnership base and improving
our research and analysis capabilities, we will ensure that the humanitarian
coordination system remains central to the effort to save lives, for the next
twenty years and beyond.
20 CONCLUDING REMARKS
CONCLUDING REMARKS
21
The Birth of resolution 46/182
Jan Eliasson
Emergency Relief Coordinator from January 1992 to February 1994
With the end of the cold war, we all felt that the time
had come at last for the UN to play a pivotal role in the
maintenance of peace and security, and in the promotion
of economic and social progress. I was privileged, as
Permanent Representative of Sweden, to oversee the
revitalization of one important aspect of the work of the
UN: the coordination of humanitarian assistance.
I first presided over the dialogue during the 1991 summer
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting on the
subject. The discussion highlighted the concern of many
that vigorous international humanitarian action may
bring foreign intervention in through the back door. It had
also become clear that any agreements must also include
measures to strengthen the response capacity of disasterprone countries, as well as to promote early recovery.
The negotiation during the General Assembly, in the second half of 1991, proved to be extremely difficult,
compounded by the traditional resistance for change within the UN system. Long hours were spent from
September onward to put together a comprehensive draft addressing the many diversified concerns of delegations.
Until the very last minute of 18 December 1991, it was far from certain whether Member States would agree to
a text. Many issues were still open. Yet that night was our very last opportunity to come to an agreement before
the end of the Assembly. If we failed, we would have had to wait for at least one year, if not more, to pass the
resolution. Thus, although the diplomats had already spent the whole day negotiating, we continued until the early
morning hours of 19 December.
At 1:30 a.m., the delegations of the EU and the G77 came back from their respective group meetings. Absolute
silence filled the room as they walked in. When both delegations announced their groups’ agreement to the latest
proposed text put forward by me as the Chair, the exhausted diplomats spontaneously broke out in applause. This
meant that we had an agreement—something I had not dared to hope for.
The final text emphasized the importance of respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of the
affected state as much as the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Member States agreed
that each country has the primary responsibility for providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance and that
international assistance should be based on consent. We also highlighted the importance of disaster prevention and
preparedness, as well as the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development. Based on the guiding principles,
the resolution identified institutions and mechanisms to implement disaster prevention, preparedness and response.
As we walked out into the cold New York winter night, we were exhausted but satisfied that we had managed to
agree on a comprehensive framework for humanitarian assistance and coordination — a framework that still guides
actions in today’s world.
22 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Information management:
Basic, but essential for coordination
Peter Hansen
Emergency Relief Coordinator from March 1994 to February 1996
In the early days of DHA, when the Department had very little clout with other agencies
who resented its pretention to “coordinate” their activities and no authority to back it up,
it was necessary to develop and demonstrate capacities to convince these agencies that
we could add value to the humanitarian community.
One thing that we recognized as being in short supply was timely integrated information
about what everybody was doing in various emergencies. Collecting, managing,
analysing and sharing such information was an essential service (among others) that
was needed and that could best be provided by a central coordination machinery. But to
do so, we needed to create innovative tools at the global level.
In those days, “cyberspace” sounded like science fiction to most, and the Internet was
barely used as an instrument for managing humanitarian information. It was — for
somebody with as limited literacy in the brave new world of computer and information
technology as I had — a leap of faith to go for it and invest some of our limited resources
in it. But I sensed that there was great potential for developing useful instruments for
effective and useful coordination tools. Two main platforms were launched during my tenure. ReliefWeb collected
country- and disaster-specific information at the global level. Bit by bit, the platform grew into what it is today: the
place to go when looking for updates on any humanitarian situation. A second initiative was IRIN—the Integrated
Regional Information Networks. It provides reporting from the frontline of humanitarian action to cover gaps in the
mainstream media. IRIN has won several awards, and a survey identified it as the premier online source of news for
humanitarians. Those who had warned me against technological boondoggles were fortunately proven wrong.
Reliable timely information remains a crucial ingredient to effective emergency response. So are policy analysis,
evaluation and lessons learned. These capacities that were developed in the mid-1990s helped provide incentives for
humanitarian organizations to occasionally act more as a team and participate in coordination efforts as more than
window dressing. The instruments of the 1990s have entered mainstream use, but OCHA needs to stay abreast of
current developments, and to remain the place to go to for cutting-edge humanitarian information, knowledge and
insight in the big picture. Being recognized as such by its humanitarian partners should enable OCHA to exercise a
real leadership role that rests on more than claims of an increase in formal authority and status.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
23
Policy development:
A key coordination function
Yasushi Akashi
Emergency Relief Coordinator from March 1996 to December 1997
Yasushi Akashi talking to farmers on a visit to North Korea, 1997
During the 1990s, the suffering caused by internal
armed conflicts—especially the genocide in Rwanda and
the Great Lakes crisis—tested the humanitarian system.
The developments made clear that humanitarian action
is no substitute for political action. We humanitarians
needed to work more closely with the political bodies of
the United Nations, in particular the Security Council,
the Department for Political Affairs and the Department
for Peacekeeping Operations, to be able to address such
conflicts. At the same time, the complexity of these
situations called for common guidance to ensure a
coherent position.
Revitalizing DHA’s policymaking function thus became
one of my key priorities. First, we jointly developed common policies and approaches, such as ones covering a set
of rules to be observed by UN agencies and the Taliban in Afghanistan; involving female humanitarian workers; and
the designation of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (in this case
WFP) on behalf of all UN agencies. Then, we worked hard to defend our common line in political forums such as the
Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, the body that brings the humanitarian components together with
development, human rights, political and security arms of the UN Secretariat. I was also able to organize the first
humanitarian NGO briefing to the Security Council. On behalf of the NGO community, Médecins Sans Frontières,
CARE International and Oxfam spoke about the humanitarian situation in Central Africa. The Council members were
greatly impressed by the quality of these briefings.
Today, it is well understood that OCHA’s policy function includes bringing humanitarians together to develop
common approaches, to defend these positions in discussions with political and security actors, and to have these
positions accepted by national, local or international authorities through negotiation and persuasion. In my time, by
comparison, it took a significant effort to give humanitarian work the necessary political clout
24 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Humanitarian action must be
paralleled by political action
Sergio Vieira de Mello
Emergency Relief Coordinator from January 1998 to January 2001
Sergio Vieira de Mello was killed in the Canal Hotel suicide bombing in August 2003
while serving as UN Special Representative to Iraq. The following are excerpts of his
writings and speeches (1):
“Humanitarian aid is a palliative rather than a cure. It addresses symptoms rather than
causes. It can to a limited extent help contain a crisis, reduce casualty levels and alleviate
suffering. It can occasionally even help build bridges between opposing groups and
restore confidence, but it can do little or nothing to affect underlying causes and to bring
about the resolution of conflict.”
“Perhaps the most vivid example comes from Bosnia: In Bosnia the international
community, with humanitarian agencies on the front line, backed up by a significant
“peacekeeping” force, provided aid, mostly food, to civilians, many of whom were
subsequently killed. Well-fed civilian populations were trapped in safe areas and were murdered by snipers and
shellfire. Here the absurdity of providing relief, humanitarian assistance, without security, was all too apparent.”
“Humanitarian aid is often compared to an ambulance service. This ambulance service is too often seen as the only
means to prevent — to extend the analogy — road deaths. Little is done to ensure the proper standards of the roads,
control drunken driving, introduce speed limits and enforce safety standards. If we wish to do more than deal with
symptoms, more than simply put a band aid on gaping, festering wounds, humanitarian action has to be paralleled by
political efforts to resolve the causes underlying the conflict, or as a minimum, to effectively protect the innocent at
an early stage of conflict.”
[August 1999 briefing to the UN Security Council on Angola]
“In Angola, as in other conflicts, an end to human suffering will not be brought about through humanitarian aid but by
political or military measures. A more forceful attempt must be made to stop hostilities. Since 1992, there have been
over 40 resolutions by the Security Council covering the Angolan crisis. In the same period there have been countless
dead, tens of thousands injured, maimed, deprived of basic dignity and well over 2 million internally displaced persons
and refugees generated by the conflict. We are, Mr. President, at an impasse. Aren’t there other measures that the
Council can adopt in order to bring this war to a halt and to ensure full compliance with its previous decisions?”
(1) The original quotes are from an undated paper “From War and Politics: The Humanitarian Deceit” and Sergio’s
talking points for a panel discussion at an ICRC seminar for diplomats: “Humanitarian Assistance and Human Security:
Concepts and Challenges”, 2000.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The importance of management
Carolyn McAskie
Emergency Relief Coordinator ad interim from November 1999 to January 2001
Assistant Secretary-General from 1999 to 2004
When I took office as Deputy Emergency Relief
Coordinator, I became ERC a.i. while Sergio Vieira
de Mello, who had brought me into OCHA, left to
become SRSG in East Timor. He inspired me to make
organizational management one of my top priorities.
The UN is often criticized for not paying attention
to management issues, but this is a product of a
number of factors: a highly politicized financial and
management oversight by Member States through the
Fifth Committee of the GA; the fact that senior officials
Carolyn McAskie launching a funding appeal for the Liberia response
come from so many diverse management cultures;
in 2003
and, in OCHA’s case the fact that almost 90 per cent of
its budget came from voluntary donor contributions
and only 12 per cent from the Secretariat budget.
In addition, having been created from more than one entity, it had competing offices in New York and Geneva.
Survival of the humanitarian enterprise depended on creating a common work culture in New York, Geneva and in
the field, along with a shared vision. Geneva was very focused on the critical work of emergency response in the
field, a fundamental element of success. But Sergio had started a process which I saw as critical to the success, not
just of OCHA, but of the UN, and that was making sure that the humanitarian enterprise was recognized by the
Security Council as one of the major pillars of the UN. Why was that important? Essentially, because a political and
peacekeeping crisis is almost invariably rooted in a humanitarian tragedy. For the Security Council to understand
a political crisis they had to recognize and understand the humanitarian crisis. OCHA therefore had more than
one coordination job: firstly to help coordinate the humanitarian response players, and secondly to coordinate the
humanitarian with the political and security elements of a crisis. OCHA therefore had to understand its dual role,
and management had to be committed to end the wasteful competition within OCHA and between OCHA and other
parts of the UN system.
The Change Management exercise was an exciting time for OCHA staff. Rather than being imposed from above, it
became an exercise involving everyone. The Change Management process and report were led by the management
team and an excellent external adviser, but it was driven (and written) by teams of staff members, and culminated
in a rousing global management meeting of New York and Geneva staff with field staff, facilitated by the external
adviser, a first in the history of OCHA. Staff members were galvanized and ready to make the change. It was
inclusive and transparent and the donors loved it. We discovered that far from rejecting good management practice,
UN staffers are thirsty for good management and are prepared to apply good practices to their work.
25
26 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The importance of disasters
Kenzo Oshima
Emergency Relief Coordinator from January 2001 to June 2003
As I arrived in OCHA in the early 2000s, I saw policy
people and humanitarians preoccupied with the raging
conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, and pretty soon with
wars in Afghanistan and then Iraq. So much that, it
seemed to me, not enough attention was being paid
to natural disaster issues. Yet the world faced severe
natural disasters, with about 700 cases, large and small,
recorded in 2001 alone. The January 2001 earthquake in
Gujarat, India, the first major one we had to deal with,
killed nearly 20,000.
Kenzo Oshima with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
Coming from the world’s most disaster-prone region,
Asia, I felt that one of my goals should be to ensure that
natural disasters receive closer attention in OCHA and
the UN system, and to mobilize better support for disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response.
The Emergency Relief Coordinator had another related responsibility: that of placing on a secure footing the then
newly established International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), based in Geneva. With the support from the
Swiss Government and several others, I strived to establish the ISDR Support Group and to prepare the ground for a
framework of collaboration on disaster reduction strategies.
Additionally, being a Hiroshima survivor myself, I tried to be proactive on preparedness to technological disasters,
particularly in my capacity as UN Coordinator of International Cooperation on Chernobyl.
In comparison to a decade ago, the dynamics seem to have changed today: Large-scale natural disasters occur more
frequently and in greater intensity, no doubt propelled by climate change, in developed and developing countries
alike: Haiti, Pakistan, the US, Australia, Russia and most recently my own country, Japan. This has forced disaster
preparedness, risk reduction and response into higher gears, in public awareness, on the agenda of the United
Nations and in individual countries. This dynamic should lead to an enhanced concerted effort to strengthen our
capacity to deal with natural disasters and minimize their impact on human lives and sustainable development.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
27
Speaking out on behalf of affected people
Jan Egeland
Emergency Relief Coordinator from June 2003 to December 2006
An important priority during my tenure was public
advocacy. The ability and willingness of humanitarians
to speak the uncensored truth about the plight of
defenceless and neglected communities is often a
question of life or death for the latter.
During a field visit to war-torn Côte d’Ivoire in February
2006, I met with several hundred Burkinabe refugees.
Their grey-haired leaders asked me heartbreakingly
simple questions: “We have no protection nor supplies
if we do not get it from the international community.
Jan Egeland briefing media about the humanitarian situation
So why did you all flee with your peacekeepers and aid
in Lebanon, 2006
workers and leave us behind to our fate?” Yet, with no
security guarantees from the authorities and with no
new UN peacekeepers in sight, we were not able to offer
even basic protection against future attacks or lootings of the already meagre supplies. As we left the camp to drive
back to our comfortable security in New York and Geneva, one of the camp spokesmen, who held a baby girl on
his shoulder, would not let go of my hand: “You say you will not forget us. Will you remember? Do you realize that
tonight we will again be alone with no one to protect and to help us?”
I took their message with me and brought their situation to the attention of international policymakers. The UN
Security Council, national Governments and parliaments and the international media must be told what is at stake
and what needs to be done. That no nation can any longer afford to be seen as insensitive to mass murder or mass
hunger is a step in the right direction, but we still have a long way to go to ensure these issues receive sufficient
attention and effective response.
From the chambers of the UN Security Council it is a mere 25 paces to the place where the international news media
are waiting. We, who have the opportunity to see some unpleasant realities firsthand, have both the possibility and
the responsibility to speak the truth, always, to shake up and embarrass the powerful and to ensure those in need
receive assistance and protection.
28 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Humanitarian financing
John Holmes
Emergency Relief Coordinator from January 2007 to September 2010
When I started as Emergency Relief Coordinator in early
2007, one of the challenges of humanitarian reform was
financing—speeding it up at the beginning of a crisis and
ensuring fairness between crises. It became increasingly
a core part of OCHA’s business during my time.
My first priority was to ensure that the Central
Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was reaching the
right targets and attracting enough resources. I am
proud of the fund’s success, appreciated by donors,
John Holmes speaks to the residents of an IDP camp in Kibati, DRC,
recipients, agencies and outside observers alike for its
February 2009
speed and flexibility. With up to $450 million a year,
CERF makes a difference in a new disaster by assuring
all concerned of money upfront. It is also important
in underfunded emergencies, when a little money at the right moment can have a huge impact on many lives.
One of its unique strengths is its broad donor base. Almost two thirds of UN Member States were contributing
by the time I left in 2010, including many who had benefitted from CERF and wanted to show their appreciation,
however little they could afford. UN agencies were suspicious at the beginning but came to see CERF as a valuable
source of quick funds. NGOs would have loved direct access to CERF too, and often told me so, yet the General
Assembly had ruled otherwise.
But CERF was only a small part of the picture. Local pooled funds were also increasingly important, flexible
tools, and we created a new financing unit to professionalize and regularize their management. Through annual
Consolidated Appeals, and Flash Appeals for new disasters, in addition, we helped to raise billions of dollars for the
whole system. Improving the ability of the appeals process to prioritize, and building in more reporting on impact,
were vital to its credibility.
OCHA’s involvement in financing risks jeopardizing our neutrality within the system. But the opportunities outweigh
the risks. For me, promoting coordination and coherence, and making the whole system run smoothly, are much
easier with a say in where some of the money goes.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
ENDNOTES
1 1 The operational coordination mandate of the International
Relief Union, created in 1927 as part of the League of
Nations, was never fully implemented (Hutchinson, 2001,
Disasters and international order). The United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), created in
1943, was more successful and coordinated relief operations
worth $10 billion in post-war Europe (Judt, 2005: 28,
History of Europe).
2 UN Charter, 1945, Article 1 § 3.
3 General Assembly (GA) resolution 2816 (XXVI) gives the
Disaster Relief Coordinator the mandate (a) “To establish
and maintain the closest co-operation with all organisations
concerned and to make all feasible advance arrangements with
them for the purpose of ensuring the most effective assistance;
(2) To mobilise, direct and co-ordinate the relief activities of
the various organisations of the United Nations system in
response to a request for disaster assistance from a stricken
State; (c) To co-ordinate United Nations assistance with
assistance given by intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations, in particular by the International Red Cross.
(…)”.
4 The OEOA coordinated assistance to 12 food-insecure African
countries between 1985 and 1986. UNOCA was operating
in Afghanistan from 1988 onward, later, in 1992, its name
changed to UNOCHA and it became part of DHA/OCHA.
See La Munière (1987, Managing the UN’s Emergency
Operations in Africa) on the history of the OEOA and
Donini (1996, The Policies of Mercy) for a comprehensive
study on UN coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and
Rwanda.
5 In GA resolution 36/225 (1981), Member States decided that
in “exceptional or complex natural disaster or other disaster
situations requiring system-wide action”, “the SecretaryGeneral shall designate, at the international level, a lead entity
from among the United Nations organisations, agencies and
bodies, including the Office of the United Nations Disaster
Relief Co-ordinator, and, at the country level, the appropriate
entity of the United Nations system to carry out relief
operations, taking into account the specific requirements of
the situation and in consultation with the host Government,
and calls on all organs, organisations and bodies of the United
Nations system to cooperate closely with one another in their
relief operations.”
6 Katoch, The responder’s cauldron (2003: 49)
7 In Operation Provide Comfort, the US and its allies secured
several no-fly zones and provided direct relief goods.
8 G7, Political declaration (London 1991)
9 Report of the Secretary-General on the Review of the capacity,
experience and coordination arrangements in the United
Nations for humanitarian assistance (A/46/568) (1991).
10 Among the tools introduced at the time were the
Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC), which provided
all types of information support, from maps to reports, at the
country and local level.
29
11 A trend facilitated by the Security Council’s greater willingness
to interpret humanitarian disasters as threats to international
peace and security, for example in Security Council resolution
794 (December 1992), authorizing military intervention for
humanitarian purposes in Somalia. After 18 US soldiers were
killed there in 1993, Western powers’ willingness to intervene
reduced drastically, resulting in the non-action during the
Rwandan genocide.
12 UNHCR, The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath (2000)
13 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda was
implemented through four separate studies on the history,
early warning and conflict management, humanitarian aid and
its effects and the rebuilding effort. The Rwanda evaluation
was one of very few joint donor evaluations undertaken to
date. It involved 21 donors, nine multilateral organizations,
IFRC, ICRC and four major NGO consortia.
14 DHA, Rwanda–lessons learned (1994)
15 DHA, Rwanda–lessons learned (1994: 13)
16 The latest 2011 edition of the Sphere handbook can be
accessed from www.sphereproject.org/.
17 Report of the Secretary-General on Renewing the United
Nations: A programme for reform (A/51/950), (July 1997).
18 OCHA, OCHA in 1999 (1999: 3)
19 Power, Chasing the flame (2008: 244)
20 OCHA also established an IDP Section in 1998.
21 On the different options, see OCHA, Integration: structural
arrangements (2010).
22 For an example of a subsequent strategy, see OCHA, Advocacy
strategy (2003: 3-5).
23 Good humanitarian donorship initiative, Principles and practice
of good donorship (2003).
24 Common Humanitarian Funds and Emergency Response
Funds. At the end of 2010, Emergency Response Funds were
active in 16 countries and larger Common Humanitarian
Funds in four countries.
25 The second phase of the cluster approach evaluation, for
example, found some evidence that the introduction of the
clusters as coordinating bodies had led to increased coverage
in certain areas of response (Steets et al., 2010, Cluster
Approach evaluation 2).
26 Resolution 46/182 implies this function in op35 (b). In
op34, the ERC is given the functions previously carried
out by the representatives of the Secretary-General for
major and complex emergencies and the UN Disaster
Relief Coordinator. The latter was explicitly tasked “to coordinate United Nations assistance with assistance given by
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, in
particular the International Red Cross” (RES-2816-XXVI).
27 See for instance A/RES/48/57 integrated mission planning
documents.
28 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2011 (Internal
Displacement – Overview of Trends and Developments in 2010)
29 www.cred.be/sites/default/files/ADSR_2010.pdf
30 30 IDMC, Report: Displacement due to natural hazard-induced
disasters: Global estimates for 2009 and 2010 (2011),
CONCLUDING REMARKS
62 Cisco, Visual networking index (2011)
32 IPCC, Fourth assessment report (2007); Climate change and its
humanitarian impacts (Morinière, 2009)
63 According to OECD Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) data and Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data. Since
many emerging economies do not report to FTS, the actual
percentage might be lower.
33 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007
(fourth assessment report), see also Climate change and its
humanitarian impacts (Morinière, 2009).
64 OECD, Shifting wealth (2010)
65 Harmer et al., Diversity in donorship (2005 and 2010) ; Binder
et al., Truly universal? (2010)
34 ISDR, Global Assessment Report (2011)
66 For an analysis of regional disaster risk reduction activities,
refer to ISDR, Aligning regional and global agendas (2011)
31 ODI, humanitarian impact of natural disasters (2006).
35 IASC, Meeting challenges in urban areas (2010)
36 Grünewald, Catastrophes technologiques (2011)
37 Grünewald et al., Mapping the future unintentional risk (2010)
38 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA),
World population prospects, 2010 revision (2011)
39 UN DESA, World population prospects, 2010 revision (2011)
40 UN DESA data, analysed by Haub, Demographic trends and
their humanitarian implications (2009: 8)
41 World Bank, World development report 2008 (2007)
42 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Global food losses and
food waste (2011)
43 UNDP, HDR (2006)
44 OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030 (2008)
45 World Bank, Global economic prospects (2009)
67 Other examples are the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which maintains a disaster
management centre that focuses on knowledge exchange
but is also developing a common funding pool and response
system. In the same vein, the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) is developing a common risk analysis
tool and the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) is further developing its humanitarian
department. In Latin America, the Organisation of American
States (OAS) and all regional and sub-regional organizations
give disaster risk reduction and response much attention,
increasingly so after the devastating earthquakes hit Haiti and
Chile in 2010.
68 United Nations Global Compact, Coming of Age: UN-Private
Sector Collaboration since 2000 (2010)
46 World Bank, Food price hike (2011)
69 http://business.un.org/en/documents/16
47 WFP, How is WFP affected by rising food prices (2011). For an
overview of global food price spikes refer to FAO, 2011 (Food
price index).
71 MSF, Haiti: where aid failed (2010)
70 Grünewald and Binder, Haiti IA RTE (2010)
48 IOM, World Migration Report (2010)
72 Bruderlein et al., Criminalizing humanitarian engagement
(2011)
49 UN DESA, World population prospects, 2010 revision (2011)
73 Egeland et al., To stay and deliver (2011)
50 IASC, Meeting challenges in urban areas (2010)
74 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011; American Red Cross,
2011
51 Kent and White, Practitioners’ guide (2010: 4)
52 See UNHCR, 10-Point plan of action (2007)
53 Betts, Survival migration (2010)
54 European Commission, Climate Change and International Security,
Document #S113/08 (2008), http://www. consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ reports/99387.pdf
55 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) (2010)
56 UNESCO, Institute of statistics (2009)
57 In purchasing power parity terms, Maddison (2010) found in
OECD, Shifting wealth (2010)
58 OECD, Shifting Wealth (2010)
59 ISDR, Global assessment report (2011) . For in-depth case
studies on current status on disaster response law in several
countries, refer to IFRC (2011, IDRL global and regional
studies).
60 DARA, Pakistan Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (2011);
Steets et al., Cluster Approach evaluation 2 (2010); Grünewald
and Binder, Haiti IA RTE (2010)
61 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Measuring
information society (2010)
75 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011; American Red Cross,
2011
76 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011
77 See Haiti IA RTE (2010)
78 For an analysis of these developments, refer to Meier P.
Changing the world, one map at a time (2011)
79 Two examples are Kiva.org, where individuals can give
microloans to others, or Betterplace.org, which links
development projects with individual donors.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
ACRONYMS
ASEAN AU
CAP CARE
CERF
DHA
DHP
DPA
DPKO
ECHA
ECOSOC
ERC GA
GHD
HCs HERF
HIV ISDR
IASC ICRC
IDMC
IDPs
ISAF IRIN
ISDR
MCDA
MSF
NATO
NGOs
OCHA
OECD-DAC
OEOA
OIC
Oxfam
SOP
SRSG
UNDAC
UNDP
UNDRO
UNGA
UNHCR
UNICEF
UN UNOCHA
UNSC
WB
WFP
WHO
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
African Union
Consolidated Appeals Process
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
Central Emergency Response Fund
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
Dialogue on Humanitarian Partnership
Department for Political Affairs
Department of Peace Keeping Operations
Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
Economic and Social Council
Emergency Relief Coordinator
General Assembly
Good Humanitarian Donorship
Humanitarian Coordinators
Haiti Emergency Response Fund
Human immunodeficiency virus
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Inter-Agency Standing Committee
International Committee of the Red Cross
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
Internally Displaced Persons
International Security Assistance Forces
Integrated Regional Information Networks
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Military and Civil Defence Assets
Médecins Sans Frontières
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Non-governmental Organization
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee
Office of Emergency Operations in Africa
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly Organisation of the Islamic Conference)
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
Standard Operating Procedures
Special Representative to the Secretary General
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
United Nations Development Programme
UN Disaster Relief Organization
United Nations General Assembly
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations Security Council
World Bank
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
31