FORT ANNE:
HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND ARCHEOLOGICAL
INVESTIGATIONS OF BATTLE HILL BATTLEFIELD
GA-2287-13-012
FORT ANN, NEW YORK
ARPA COMPLIANT COPY
Research Based on a Grant from
The American Battlefield Protection Program
To
Raymond W. Harvey Post 703, American Legion
Report Prepared By:
Michael Jacobson, PhD, RPA
For the
Raymond W. Harvey Post 703, American Legion
and
Kristen L. McMasters
Archeologist and Grants Manager
National Park Service
American Battlefield Protection Program
1201 Eye Street NW (2287)
Washington, DC 20005
April 8, 2015
This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park
Service American Battlefield Protection Program. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Department of Interior.
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Acknowledgements
The Public Archaeology Facility and authors of this report would like to acknowledge those who aided in
the research and analysis for this project. We would like to thank the Raymond W. Harvey Post 703,
American Legion for allowing us to take part in this study and for helping to arrange for the presentation
of our results at the public presentation in April 2015. We would also like to thank members of the Fort
Ann community that aided our research into the Battle of Fort Anne. We would also like to acknowledge
George Sherwood. He was kind enough to provide us with a tour of Battle Hill and some of his
interpretations of the battle that aided our own interpretations of the battlefield’s landscape. We would also
like to acknowledge Saratoga National Historic Park Historian Eric Schnitzer and the rest of the Sarartoga
National Historic Park staff for discussing the Battle of Fort Anne’s relation with the larger Burgyone
campaign and allowing us access to their collections. The staffs of the New York State Archives, New
York Public Library, and the Massachuettes Historical Society were also more than accomidating in
providing acces to their archives.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Overview of the Battle of Fort Anne .................................................................................................. 2 1.2 Project Overview ................................................................................................................................ 4 II. RESEARCH GOALS ............................................................................................................................... 9 2.1 Identification of Archives and Collections ......................................................................................... 9 2.2 Defining Features of the Battle of Fort Anne ..................................................................................... 9 2.3 Identifying the Boundaries of the Fort Anne Battlefield .................................................................. 10 2.4 Developing an Archeological Research Design for Fort Anne Battlefield ...................................... 10 III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 11 3.1 Documentary Research ..................................................................................................................... 11 3.2 Initial GIS Mapping and Analysis .................................................................................................... 12 3.3 Field Survey Methods....................................................................................................................... 13 3.4 Final GIS Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 13 IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 16 4.1 Burgoyne’s Campaign ...................................................................................................................... 16 4.2 Fall of Fort Ticonderoga ................................................................................................................... 19 4.3 Fort Anne .......................................................................................................................................... 24 4.4 Battle of Fort Anne - Day 1 (July 7, 1777) ....................................................................................... 25 4.5 Battle of Fort Anne - Day 2 (July 8, 1777) ....................................................................................... 26 4.6 Battle Results .................................................................................................................................... 32 4.7 Aftermath.......................................................................................................................................... 32 V. DEFINING FEATURES AND KOCOA ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 37 5.1 KOCOA Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 37 5.2 Historic Perspectives of Defining Features ...................................................................................... 42 Withdrawal from Skenesborough....................................................................................................... 42 First Day of Battle: July 7 .................................................................................................................. 45 Second Day of Battle- July 8.............................................................................................................. 48 Withdraw from Fort Anne .................................................................................................................. 52 5.3 Geographic Analysis of Defining Features....................................................................................... 54 VI. DEFINING FEATURE INTEGRITY .................................................................................................. 65 6.1 Environmental Setting ...................................................................................................................... 65 6.2 Post Battle Land Use and Alterations ............................................................................................... 70 6.3 General Threats to Defining Feature Integrity.................................................................................. 91 6.4 Condition of Battlefield Defining Features ...................................................................................... 94 VII. ARCHEOLOGICAL RESEARCH DESIGN.................................................................................... 107 7.1 Research Goals ..................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.2 Research Questions ...........................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.3 Data Needs and Field Methodology ..................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.4 Laboratory Analysis ..........................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.5 Curation .............................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.6 Report ................................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.7 Conclusions .......................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. VIII. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................... 108 APPENDIX I: BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 111 APPENDIX II: BATTLE OF FORT ANNE REPOSITORY COLLECTION DATAError!
Bookmark
not defined. APPENDIX III: FORT ANNE BATTLEFIELD DEFINING FEATURES DATABASE .................. Error!
Bookmark not defined. Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1. Location of Fort Anne Battlefield in New York State. .............................................................. 6 Figure 1.2. Location of Fort Anne Battlefield in Washington County. ....................................................... 6 Figure 1.3. Boundaries of Fort Anne Battlefield established by National Park Service Study.................... 7 Figure 1.4. Potential National Register Boundary for Fort Anne Battlefield. ............................................. 8 Figure 4.1. Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne’s 1777 campaign strategy. ................................................................ 17 Figure 4.2. Map of 18th century fort system in Champlain-Hudson region. .............................................. 20 Figure 4.3. Map of Battle of Fort Anne, July 7, 1777. ............................................................................... 26 Figure 4.4. Map of Battle of Fort Anne, July 8, 1777. ............................................................................... 30 Figure 4.5. 1789 Lithograph of Fort Anne - probably depicts sawmill and blockhouse at Kane’s Falls.... 31 Figure 4.6. 1777 Faden map of Burgoyne Campaign with approximate routes of Continenal and British
Armies. ........................................................................................................................................... 36 Figure 5.1. Overview of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features. ............................................................. 40 Figure 5.2. Detailed view of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features........................................................ 41 Figure 5.3. Continental Army’s viewshed from Fort Anne. ...................................................................... 56 Figure 5.4. British viewshed from summit of Battle Hill. ......................................................................... 57 Figure 5.5. Viewshed of Continental positions during Battle of Fort Anne. ............................................. 58 Figure 5.6. British Range of Musket Fire from the Summit of Battle Hill. ............................................... 60 Figure 5.7. Continental Range of Musket Fire from Base and Side of Battle Hill. ................................... 61 Figure 5.8. Continental Range of Fire for Rifles from Base and Side of Battle Hill. ................................ 62 Figure 5.9. Degree of Slope for Fort Anne Battlefield. ............................................................................. 63 Figure 5.10. Three dimensional rendering of Battle of Fort Anne............................................................. 64 Figure 6.1. Terrain and watershed map showing Fort Anne Battlefield defining features. ....................... 67 Figure 6.2. USDA Soil Series associated with Battle of Fort Anne defining features............................... 69 Figure 6.3. Undated map of "Skenesborough" and Artillery Patent, now Whitehall Township................ 72 Figure 6.4. Site of Fort Anne c. 1860 (Lossing 1860:139). ....................................................................... 73 Figure 6.5. Site of Battle Hill c. 1860 (Lossing 1860:141). ....................................................................... 73 Figure 6.6. Overlay of defining features on 1762 Brassier map. ............................................................... 78 Figure 6.7. Overlay of defining features on 1777 Faden map of Burgoyne Campaign. ............................ 79 Figure 6.8. Overlay of defining features on 1780 map (Burgoyne 1780). ................................................. 80 Figure 6.9. Overlay of defining features on 1825 Geddes map. ................................................................ 81 Figure 6.10. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1853 Levey map. ............................. 82 Figure 6.11. Overlay of defining features on 1866 Stone and Stewart map. ............................................. 83 Figure 6.12. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1893 Fort Anne, NY-VT 15’ USGS
Quadrangle. .................................................................................................................................... 84 Figure 6.13. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1904 Fort Anne, NY-VT 15’ USGS
Quadrangle. .................................................................................................................................... 85 Figure 6.14. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1944 Fort Anne, NY 7.5’ USGS
Quadrangle. .................................................................................................................................... 86 Figure 6.15. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 1
of 4). ............................................................................................................................................... 87 Figure 6.16. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 2
of 4). ............................................................................................................................................... 88 Figure 6.17. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 3
of 4). ............................................................................................................................................... 89 Figure 6.18. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 4
of 4). ............................................................................................................................................... 90 Figure 6.19. Impacts to Battle Hill section of Fort Anne Battlefield. ........................................................ 93 Figure 7.1. Proposed areas for archeological testing highlighted in red. ... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 8.1. Revised study and core areas for Fort Anne Battlefield. ....................................................... 110 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Figure 8.2. Revised area of Potential National Register nomination (PotNR) for the Fort Anne Battlefield.
.................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS
Photo 4.1. Capt. William Montgomery’s headstone at Trinity Church, New York City. .......................... 28 Photo 5.1. Facing north across Skenesborough (Whitehall) Harbor. ......................................................... 43 Photo 5.2. Facing west at reconstruction of Fort Anne well. ..................................................................... 44 Photo 5.3. Facing west at New York State historical marker for Fort Anne well...................................... 45 Photo 5.4. Facing south from summit of Battle Hill towards Fort Anne and Wood Creek. ...................... 46 Photo 5.5. Facing north across Continental Army’s avenue of approach on morning of July 7, with Battle
Hill in the background. .................................................................................................................. 47 Photo 5.6. Facing east at Battle Hill from area of Kane’s Falls. ................................................................ 47 Photo 5.7. Facing northeast across woods on Battle Hill. .......................................................................... 50 Photo 5.8. Facing north across summit of Battle Hill. ............................................................................... 51 Photo 5.9. Facing north across ravine west of Battle Hill’s summit. ......................................................... 51 Photo 5.10. Facing northwest across eastern slope of Battle Hill from Continental Army’s position....... 52 Photo 5.11. Facing north across Great Meadows, possible area of post-battle British camp. ................... 53 Photo 6.1. Facing southwest at Daniel Weller burial. ................................................................................ 74 Photo 6.2. Facing west across stone wall on Battle Hill. ........................................................................... 74 Photo 6.3. Facing west at cut into Battle Hill and Battle Hill plaque. ....................................................... 75 Photo 6.4. Facing north across Champlain Canal. ..................................................................................... 76 Photo 6.5. Facing south across rail line near base of Battle Hill. .............................................................. 77 Photo 6.6. Facing south at southern portion of defile. ............................................................................... 95 Photo 6.7. Facing south across southeastern face of Battle Hill. ............................................................... 96 Photo 6.8. Facing north across access road. ............................................................................................... 97 Photo 6.9. Facing north at granite mine area. ............................................................................................ 97 Photo 6.10. Facing north across Battle Hill summit. ................................................................................. 98 Photo 6.11. Facing west across 20th century landfill at base of Battle Hill. ............................................... 99 Photo 6.12. Facing south across British camp post-battle. ...................................................................... 100 Photo 6.13. Facing east at area of Fort Anne. .......................................................................................... 102 Photo 6.14. Facing northwest at area of Fort Anne and surrounding Continental camp. ........................ 102 Photo 6.15. Facing south across start of Skenesborough Road in Whitehall (Skenesborough)............... 103 Photo 6.16. Facing west at cut along US Route 4, Skenesborough Road and Battle Hill defining features.
..................................................................................................................................................... 104 Photo 6.17. Facing south across Skenesborough Road, Old Route 4. ..................................................... 104 Photo 6.18. Facing south along Champlain Canal and Wood Creek near Comstock, Wood Creek along left
side of channel. ............................................................................................................................ 105 Photo 6.19. Facing west at Champlain Canal, area of Wood Creek near Battle Hill, showing impacts from
construction of the canal. ............................................................................................................. 106 LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1. Battle of Fort Anne Order of Battle. ......................................................................................... 35 Table 5.1. Battle of Fort Anne Defining Features. ..................................................................................... 38 Table 6.1. USDA Soil Series for Fort Anne Battlefield (USDA 1975). .................................................... 68 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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I. INTRODUCTION
During June and July of 1777, British forces under the command of Lieutenant General John
Burgoyne advanced across the Lake Champlain region attacking the Continental Army’s Northern
Department. This was part of Burgoyne’s ultimate plan to divide the northern colonies from the other
rebellious colonies and end the American Revolution using a multi-pronged attack (Alden 1969:287-295;
Cubbison 2012:178-186; Graymont 1972:114; Ketchum 1997:84; Luzader 2010:1-32; Scott 1927:62; Watt
2002:49-51; Williams 2005:50). Burgoyne’s forces attained early victories by easily capturing Continental
posts at Crown Point, Fort Ticonderoga, and Skenesborough as well as defeating Continenal forces at the
Battle of Hubbardton. In these early stages of his campaign, Burgoyne’s seemed unstoppable.
On July 7 and 8, 1777, remnants of the Continental Army’s evacuees from Fort Tichonderoga took
a stand at the small outpost of Fort Anne1 against Burgoyne’s 9th Regiment of Foot in what became known
as the Battle of Fort Anne (Ketchum 1997:226-228; Luzader 2010:69-71). A small contingent of
Continental troops who fled Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough with women and injured soldiers arrived
at Fort Anne on the night of July 6. The 6th Regiment of the Albany Militia would soon arrive to help
reinforce those at Fort Anne. During July 7 and 8, the soldiers at Fort Anne put up a steady and strong
attack on the advancing British. Only when their position became untenable did they withdraw to Fort
Edward.
The Fort Anne battlefield is in an area of rock quarrying and granite mining. The community of
Fort Ann, New York and the American Legion Raymond W. Harvey Post 703 in Fort Ann are concerned
with the threat of impacts presented by such mining activities. Members of the community are also
interested in long term strategies for preserving the battlefield. To help with such preservation efforts, a
better understanding of the historic events and landscape features associated with the battle was needed.
To aid in its preservation efforts, the American Legion Post 703 received a grant from the National Park
Service’s American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP). Researchers at the Public Archaeology
Facility (PAF) of Binghamton University conducted the historical research and battlefield delineation to
better determine the locations of battle related landscape features and their integrity and research potential.
The information gained from the project will enhance the interpretation of the battle and help to inform
preservation and development in the area.
The ABPP documented the Battle of Fort Anne (ABPP Number NY215) in 2001 and reported on
their survey of the battlefield in the program’s 2007 Revolutionary War and War of 1812 study (NPS 2007).
The 2007 study lists the Battle of Fort Anne as being a Priority II/Class C battlefield. Under the ABPP’s
criteria, Class C battlefields are “[S]ites with high or medium short- or long-term threats…Priority II, Class
C sites need immediate preservation or may be lost by 2017” (NPS 2007:10). The determination of threat
for the Fort Anne Battlefield states that preservation initiatives are needed directly.
1
Historic accounts and histories have varied in spelling Fort Ann as “Fort Ann” or as “Fort Anne”. The name of the
Village of Fort Ann was officially named without the “e” in 1808 (Fort Ann 2007:8, 12). For the purposes of this
report, when referring to the battle and 18th century associations of the fort, the “Fort Anne” spelling will be used and
when referring to post 18th century associations of the area, the “Fort Ann” spelling will be used.
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As a first step to delineate the Battle of Fort Anne, this project included detailed documentary
research to identify the defining features related to the battle. This report presents historical research and
spatial analyses related to the Battle of Fort Anne. The project, as presented here, consisted of historical
research to identify landscape features related to the battle, field verification of the features, and an initial
assessment of their integrity. Project researchers conducted military terrain analysis of the landscape.
Researchers applied KOCOA (Key Terrain, Observation, Cover/Concealment, Obstruction, and Avenue of
Approach/Retreat) criteria for conducting the military terrain analysis. The results of the historical research
and field survey presented in this report suggest that there is a wide range of integrity among the individual
defining features with generally good integrity for the battlefield as a whole. Most of the battlefield has
remained relatively undeveloped since the 18th century. The impacts are limited to residential development
in the Village of Fort Ann as well as the development of transportation routes along Wood Creek. Taken
as a whole, the defining features provide a high research and interpretive potential for the Fort Anne
Battlefield. It is important to note that this study focused on historic and archival research as well as field
mapping. No archeological survey or excavation occurred as part of this research. Section 7 (p. 107)
provides a research design for future archeological testing.
1.1 Overview of the Battle of Fort Anne
In 1777, British General John Burgoyne attempted to divide New England from the other colonies
in rebellion and thus end the American Revolution. His plan involved a multi-pronged attack into present
day New York State (Alden 1969:287-295; Cubbison 2012:178-186; Graymont 1972:114; Ketchum
1997:84; Luzader 2010:1-32; Scott 1927:62; Watt 2002:49-51; Williams 2005:50). Burgoyne led his main
force through the Champlain and Hudson Valleys towards Albany, while Brigadier General Barry St. Leger
led a force across the Mohawk Valley towards Albany. Burgoyne hoped General William Howe would aid
him from New York City and the southern Hudson River Valley. The result of such a campaign would cut
off New England, specifically Boston, from the rest of the colonies and force their submission.
At the beginning of his campaign, Burgoyne was successful in routing the Continental Army. On
June 30, 1777, he captured Crown Point (Ketchum 1997:162-163; Luzader 2010:45). The next week, the
Continental Major General Arthur St. Clair abandoned Fort Ticonderoga to Burgoyne (Ketchum 1997:172184; Luzader 2010:56). St. Clair presented no effective defense against the British; instead withdrawing
from the fort during the night. On July 7, Burgoyne’s army defeated the main Continental Army
withdrawing from Fort Ticonderoga at the Battle of Hubbardton (Ketchum 1997:194-207; Luzader
2010:60-67). By mid-July 1777, Burgoyne controlled the Champlain Valley and was on the verge of
entering the Hudson River Valley. Up to this point, the Continentals presented minimal resistance to
Burgoyne’s army.
Following the evacuation of Fort Ticonderoga, a small contingent of withdrawing Continentals
resisted the British advance at the Battle of Fort Anne. A mixed group of soldiers from various regiments
and companies came together under the command of New Hampshire’s Colonel Pierse Long to form a
unified stand against Burgoyne’s army (Ketchum 1997:226-228; Luzader 2010:69-71). The stand was a
temporary one, and made only after a long and difficult withdrawal. The stand at Fort Anne allowed time
for the rest of the Continental Army’s Northern Department under the command of Major General Philip
Schuyler to concentrate its resources and troops to mount a more effective defense at Fort Edward and later
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Stillwater, New York (Hogeboom Pension 1818; Miller Pension 1832; Van Alstyne Pension 1818; Van
Rensselaer Pension 1818; Wittbeck Pension 1818).
During the withdrawal from Fort Ticonderoga, St. Clair divided his Continental troops. He led the
main army overland towards present day Vermont, while a second group composed of women, sick and
injured soldiers, and guards under the command of New Hampshire’s Colonel Pierse Long withdrew to
Skenesborough (Ketchum 1997:172-184). At Skenesborough, Long’s forces joined with a company of the
Continental Army’s 3rd NH under the command of Captain James Gray (Gray 1777). The trip from Fort
Ticonderoga to Skenesborough brought the Continentals across the southern portion of Lake Champlain; it
also provided Burgoyne’s naval fleet a quick means for attacking the Continentals (Burgoyne
1780:Appendix XVII). Shortly after the Long’s forces reached Skenesborough, Burgoyne’s ships arrived
and commenced bombardment of the port of Skenesborough (Thacher 1823:100). Facing cannon fire from
Burgoyne’s ships and approaching land forces, Colonel Long ordered the destruction of the Continental
Army’s baggage, supplies, and artillery before withdrawing the Continental Army to Fort Anne (Gray
1777).
The withdrawal to Fort Anne was not easy - the withdrawing Continentals made slow progress
along bad roads and a shallow creek throughout the night of July 6 into the morning of July 7. Long’s
withdrawal to Fort Anne followed the military road from Skenesborough to Fort Anne while the women,
sick, and injured soldiers took boats on Wood Creek. The military road running parallel to Wood Creek
was in disrepair having received little maintenance, and its bridges were destroyed (Burgoyne 1780:
Appendix XVIII). Burgoyne dispatched 190 soldiers of the 9th Regiment of Foot to pursue the Continentals
(Hagist 2004:39). Most of the Continentals arrived at Fort Anne in the early hours of July 7.
The Battle of Fort Anne was composed of two skirmishes fought over two days and centered on
Battle Hill. The hill was located approximately ¾ mile north of Fort Anne (Hagist 2004:39). On July 7,
the 9th Regiment of Foot under Colonel John Hill established a camp to observe Fort Anne. That same day,
Capt. Gray led a force to engage the British (Gray 1777). He started by attacking the British camp ½ mile
north of Fort Anne. The fighting occurred in an area of heavy woods. The British soldiers were unable to
see the Continentals attacking them (Hagist 2004:39). Unable to withstand the Continental attack and
obstructed by the woods, the British withdrew up the slope of Battle Hill. The Continentals returned to
Fort Anne ending the first day of the battle.
On July 8, the Continentals returned to the base of Battle Hill in another attack against the British.
The Albany Militia’s 6th Regiment arrived at Fort Anne to reinforce the Continentals (Van Rensselaer
Pension 1818). The fighting was fierce as the Continentals attacked the British on Battle Hill (Gray 1777).
On the summit of Battle Hill, the British established a fighting line. The line was long consisting of a single
row of scattered British Regulars to prevent the Continentals from surrounding them (Hagist 2004:40). The
steep slope and heavy fire prevented the Continentals from overwhelming the British position. That
afternoon both sides were running low on ammunition.
A war whoop from a British scout put an end to the battle. Captain John Money advanced towards
Battle Hill with a contingent of Native American warriors. Seeing the fighting, the warriors abandonded
Captain Money rather than join the battle. Alone, Captain Money let out a war whoop and created the
impression that British reinforcements had arrived (Hagist 2004:40). With their ammunition running low
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and believing that Burgoyne came to reinforce the 9th Regiment, the Continentals withrew from Battle Hill,
and burned Fort Anne before withdrawing to Fort Edward (Gray 1777).
The Battle of Fort Anne allowed Gen. Schuyler time to prepare a sustained strategy against
Burgoyne. While the British were occupied at Fort Anne, he removed supplies from Fort George and Fort
Anne (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). He concentrated his forces at Fort Edward and made his way to
Stillwater in preparation for Burgoyne’s advance. As Burgoyne advanced, he became more committed to
following his campaign to the end. His supply line grew longer and his advance slowed as he invested
more time in moving his supplies and artillery across the terrain of the Hudson Valley. Along the way,
Schuyler’s forces destroyed and obstructed roads causing more delays (Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010).
Fort Anne became a turning point in Burgoyne’s campaign, slowing his momentum and leading to his
defeat and surrender at Saratoga in October of 1777.
1.2 Project Overview
The Battle of Fort Anne occurred along the southern edge of the Champlain Valley in present day
Washington County, New York (Figures 1.1 and 1.2, p. 6). The extent of the battlefield stretched from
Skenesborough (present day Whitehall) to Fort Edward, New York. However, the majority of the battle
was located in the area immediately north of the Village of Fort Ann at the base and summit of Battle Hill
(Figures 5.1 and 5.2, pp. 40 and 41). The name, Battle Hill, is from the 19th century and derives from the
events of the Battle of Fort Anne. During the 19th century, the construction and trade related to the
Champlain Canal led to increased settlement and development in the area of Fort Anne, leading to the
development of the Village of Fort Ann (Fort Ann 2007). The 18th century fortification Fort Anne is no
longer visible on the landscape, but the overall terrain and landscape related to the Fort Anne Battlefield is
still present.
An initial survey of the Fort Anne Battlefield conducted for the ABPP (NPS 2007) described the
battlefield area as having a study area consisting of 2,395 acres (969 ha) and a core area of 858 acres (347
ha) (Figure 1.3, p. 7). The core area is that portion of the battlefield that included direct combat or fighting.
The study area includes the entire extent of the battlefield. Historic accounts and the presence of related
material culture define the battlefield’s extent. The study area includes not only the core, but also secondary
areas, such as avenues of advance/retreat, supply lines, and observation posts. These areas were essential
for the greater conflict, but were not directly involved with the actual combat actions. The Fort Anne
Battlefield is in a rural area consisting of small farms, forests, and hills.
The research presented here consists of historical research and mapping of the Fort Anne
Battlefield. In reviewing the accounts of British and Continental troops in terms of how they viewed the
battlefield’s landscape, a new and integrated interpretation of the battle can be made. As mentioned
previously, the analysis presented here relies on military terrain analysis (KOCOA). Military historians
and the ABPP have used such a system to help in the interpretation of how battles unfolded (McMasters
2009). The analysis recognizes the concept of landscape as a military resource used by officers and soldiers
in their attempt to gain an advantage in battle, and influence the outcome of an engagement. Maximizing
observable areas for oneself and limiting or obstructing the views and advance of the other side is the
foundation of such a battle strategy. The application of this approach to the Battle of Fort Anne produced
a more inclusive interpretation of the battle’s history.
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Researchers based their identification and interpretation of the battlefield’s defining features on a
review of journals, letters, pension applications, maps, and other historic documents created by or
originating from participants in the Battle of Fort Anne. Due to the relatively small number of identifiable
accounts of the battle, it was important to ensure that each perspective from both sides of the conflict,
British and Continental, was used in the analysis to develop a comprehensive and integrated view of the
battle. Researchers made use of accounts from British, Continental, and militia participants and associated
individuals. Battles are not monolithic; they are a conflictive process between multiple sides, each with
their own ideologies and views of warfare. Interpreting the battle accurately requires that the researcher
addresses these multiple perspectives. The inclusion of multiple historical views combined with mapping
using a geographic information system (GIS) approach, provides a more integrative and visual approach to
understanding the battlefield and its features.
A defining feature in this study was defined as either a natural (i.e., creek or hill) or cultural (i.e.,
structure or road) feature that was integral to the progress of the battle. Contextual information related to
the defining features aided the determination of their role in the battle. Contextual information included
aspects of the feature, such as their size, composition, function, and distance from other features. Field
verification in the form of a pedestrian walkover followed the identification of defining features from
historic documents. The walkover allowed an interpretation of the features’ role in the battle and relation
to the battlefield’s landscape as a whole. The walkover also provided an initial determination of their
integrity by identifying any surface evidence of disturbance. The comparison of the soldiers’ views of
space to the current use of space provides an initial assessment for the defining features. Using this baseline
information, further analysis of the landscape using visual assessment and spatial analyses helps to
determine the integrity of the features. Integrity is defined here as the level in which a defining feature
represents its location, setting, feeling, contains material deposits related to its use during the battle, and the
ability of the information related to the feature to answer possible research questions concerning the overall
battle (See Section 6.4, p. 94, for a full definition used in assessing defining feature integrity). The spatial
inventory of features and their integrity helps to determine priorities for preservation.
The following sections will elaborate on the historical background from these several perspectives,
summarize the battlefield’s defining features using KOCOA analysis, and present a research design that
will assist with assessing integrity and development of a preservation plan for the Battle of Fort Anne
Battlefield.
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Figure 1.1. Location of Fort Anne Battlefield in New York State.
Figure 1.2. Location of Fort Anne Battlefield in Washington County.
p. 6
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
Grant # (GA-2287-13-012)
This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 1.3. Boundaries of Fort Anne Battlefield established by National Park Service Study.
p. 7
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
Grant # (GA-2287-13-012)
This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 1.4. Potential National Register Boundary for Fort Anne Battlefield.
p. 8
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II. RESEARCH GOALS
The primary goal of this project is to identify the boundaries for the Battle of Fort Anne and the
locations of any associated features. It is a first step on a path of preservation by identifying the cultural
resources associated with the battle. The American Legion Post 703 and the community of Fort Anne wish
to better understand the importance of this battle and establish a path of preservation of the battlefield’s
landscape and its interpretation to a larger public.
To locate the battlefield’s boundaries, researchers formulated a set of research goals for this project.
Those research goals include the identification of historical archives and documents related to the Battle of
Fort Anne; the identification of defining features; and an initial assessment of the integrity and context of
the battlefield’s defining features and general landscape.
2.1 Identification of Archives and Collections
Due to the significance of the Battles of Saratoga and Burgoyne’s campaign, the overall campaign
has received attention from numerous historians (Alden 1969:287-295; Corbett 2012; Cubbison 2012;
Graymont 1972:114; Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010; Scott 1927:62; Watt 2002:49-51; Williams 2005:50).
However, most of these secondary histories have focused on the larger battles of the campaign, such as the
Battle of Hubbardton, which occurred on the same day as the Battle of Fort Anne (July 7, 1777). The
secondary histories provide narrow descriptions of the Battle of Fort Anne. This presented a limited
foundation for project researchers in developing a base of primary documents to help with the identification
of the battlefield’s landscape features.
To expand this foundation for research, the project’s first task was to identify archives and
collections holding materials related to the Battle of Fort Anne. The documents, images, and letters related
to the battle are distributed among various institutions and archives. The identification of archives with
relevant materials established a broader foundation for research, allowing researchers to prioritize and
quickly access relevant records. This aided our research by providing a means to access efficiently the
materials most helpful to our study; it also establishes a central reference for researchers to use in future
studies of this battle (See Appendix II, p. Error! Bookmark not defined. for list of archives with relevant
materials). Section 3.1 (p. 11) details the methods used to conduct the historic documentation of the
battlefield’s defining features. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 (pp. 37 and 42) present the results of the documentary
research and the military terrain analysis.
2.2 Defining Features of the Battle of Fort Anne
Following the identification of historic resources and archives, researchers proceeded to the second
research goal of identifying the defining features of the Battle of Fort Anne using military terrain analysis
and KOCOA standards. As mentioned previously, KOCOA is an application of military terrain analysis
and an acronym categorized as Key Terrain, Observation and fields of fire, Cover and concealment,
Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach and Retreat. The categorization of a battle’s defining features
provides standardization in the interpretation of a battle’s flow and its landscape.
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Researchers determined the general locations of defining features by reviewing historical texts,
oral histories, and maps. Analysts mapped the defining features into a geographic information system (GIS)
to allow for additional analysis. Project researchers followed the initial mapping with a field survey, during
which teams walked portions of the battlefield, mapping those landmarks and defining features visible in
the current landscape. Field survey and GIS analysis helped to refine the perception of how the troops used
these features, most specifically by interpreting firing ranges of weaponry probably used during the battle.
Analysis of historic maps and imagery that postdate the battle help to support interpretations of
changes in the landscape noted by disturbance of the ground surface. This comparison and analysis allowed
an initial assessment of the features’ integrity. The characterization of these features using a KOCOA
analysis helped researchers determine the function of each feature in the battle and how each feature
influenced the course of the battle. Section 3.2 (p. 12) details the methods used to analyze the battlefield’s
defining features. Section 5 (p. 37) presents the results of these landscape analyses. Appendix III (p. Error!
Bookmark not defined.) provides a list of identified defining features and associated information.
2.3 Identifying the Boundaries of the Fort Anne Battlefield
The resulting information on defining features helped to fulfill the third research goal, that of
identifying the Battle of Fort Anne’s boundaries. Secondary histories and the knowledge of the local
community at Fort Anne acknowledged the presence of the Fort Anne battlefield. The presence of markers
placed throughout the 20th century provides an understanding of the battlefield’s presence in the landscape.
However, the precise boundaries or those limits used for the listing of the site on National Register of
Historic Places have not been delineated. The data compiled from the historic research and spatial and
military terrain analysis provide the information needed to identify and map the boundaries and features
associated with the Fort Anne Battlefield. Contextual information on the defining features allows an
evaluation of defining feature boundaries, as well as the boundaries for the study area, core area, and
potential National Register area. All of this information requires field confirmation or archeological field
survey to more accurately determine the integrity of the major defining features and answer questions
related to the history of the battle.
2.4 Developing an Archeological Research Design for Fort Anne Battlefield
This report identifies the Battle of Fort Anne’s boundaries, details the battle’s defining features,
and prioritizes them according to their influence on the battle and initial integrity assessment. The next
step in a path to preservation is to use this priority classification to determine further research questions.
The primary one is the determination of integrity of battlefield deposits associated with defining features
as identified by the presence of subfeatures and concentrations of battle related artifacts in a spatial pattern
reflective of troop positions or movements during the battle. More specific research questions for future
research are presented in Section 7.2 (p. Error! Bookmark not defined.).
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section outlines the strategies used to accomplish the goals of this project.
3.1 Documentary Research
The first task in researching the Battle of Fort Anne was the identification of primary historic
records and secondary histories related to the Battle of Fort Anne and/or the Burgoyne Campaign of 1777.
This task consisted of compiling a list of archives that contained materials associated with the Battle of Fort
Anne. Project researchers searched archives using archives on-line catalogs, contact with archivists, and
information gathered from other historians or secondary sources. Appendix II (p. Error! Bookmark not
defined.) contains a list of archival sources reviewed for this study. From this list, researchers prioritized
which archives to access to aquire information related to the battle. Project researchers put a high priority
on the archives that had materials that were associated with direct participants of the battle (e.g., Captain
James Gray’s accounts at the Massachusetts Historical Society). Project researchers did not travel to
archives whose collections or materials were available using interlibrary loan or on-line access; instead,
researchers reviewed these documents at the PAF facilities.
Researchers followed the listing of archival materials with a review of the historic records of the
battle. Project researchers examined documents, including pension applications, correspondence, journals,
military reports, and maps to identify landmarks, positions, and topographic features related to the Fort
Anne Battlefield. The review of documents also focused on information that would help researchers
understand the combatants’ motives and tactics, both of which are closely related to how the battle unfolded
and its aftermath. Research teams recorded any references or remarks relating to landscape features on a
common form. This form recorded the name of the feature, the location of the feature, the relevance to the
battle, the bibliographic source of the statement, the perspective of the source, any additional comments,
and if the reference contained a map or illustration of the feature. Researchers entered the records into an
Access database for use in cataloging and GIS mapping (See Appendix III, p. Error! Bookmark not
defined.).
Project researchers often established the names of features from the source’s reference to the
feature, such as “hill,” “ridge,” or “ambuscade.” Researchers standardized these names for use in the
defining features database and the GIS. If descriptions of features contained different names, such as hill
versus mountain, but the locations and overall descriptions were similar, we concluded that the sources
were referring to the same feature and they were given the most widely used name.
Researchers also recorded the contextual information of the source or witness, including
bibliographic referencing. This contextual information included the source perspective, rank, and military
unit. Perspective was defined as the source’s “side” – British or Continental. Rank and military unit
represents a further breakdown of the perspective information. The contextual information allowed for
comparisons of various sources. Analysts could compare different views of the same feature, or visualize
how the same participant saw different features on the battlefield. The contextual information also helped
to track individuals across the battlefield for the duration of the battle, providing there was enough
information from the witness. The identification of military unit helped to place the individual in the
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battlefield based on general troop movements. The placement of individuals allowed researchers to
determine the reliability of the source’s perspective of certain features and movements. For example, a
Continental troop who engaged the enemy on Battle Hill was given more credence than those accounts that
provided secondary descriptions of the battle, such as the military chaplain, Enos Hitchcock. Those troops
who were describing a feature or movement with which they were not directly associated were probably
relaying secondary information, and although it may be correct, a direct participant’s observations of an
action took precedence. Although researchers prioritized some sources given the context, researchers
included other more indirect sources. Relevance to the battle was an attempt to categorize the function of
the feature or the role it held in the battle. It was also an initial step towards performing a KOCOA analysis.
This relevance can be further categorized using KOCOA analysis.
The recording of each observation of the different features also allowed for a comparison of views.
The back and forth comparison of various sources’ observations on features permitted a commonality
between sources and general view of the landscape to develop. This comparative interpretation was
illustrated on a series of GIS maps to present the relationship to known features. The alignment of
historically identified features with the present landscape with added information, such as historic images,
maps, and soil maps, helped to show the changes in the battlefield’s landscape and determine associations
between present day features and the battlefield’s features.
3.2 Initial GIS Mapping and Analysis
Analysts constructed a GIS map for the project using the software program ArcGIS 10.1. Basemaps
for GIS were made using USGS 7.5 minute quadrangles for Fort Ann, NY (1944) and modern aerial
imagery. Analysts examined and imported available aerial photographs of the project area from the 1940s
to the present into GIS to serve as basemaps and to provide a visual tool for seeing changes to the project
area’s landscape through time. Project analysts used and analyzed digital elevation models (DEMs) for the
Fort Ann, NY quadrangle in ArcMap 10.1 to conduct slope and viewshed analysis. Shapefiles with
hydrography and USDA soil survey data helped inform the environmental contextual information related
to the project area. Historic maps from c. 1762 to the mid-20th century were georeferenced in GIS to
visualize the landscapes from different times and to identify the locations of defining features and post
battle disturbances to the landscape. Project analysts used historic illustrations and historic photographs to
aid in the identification of defining features as to their locations and any post battle impacts.
Integrated with this GIS basemap was an initial mapping of the defining features identified in the
documentary research. Analysts based their initial interpretation of locations and boundaries of the features
on the descriptions of distances and sizes related to other defining features and other topographic features,
and historic maps of the battlefields. Boundaries were also initially compared to the topographic and aerial
photographs to relate the general locations of the defining features to the present landscape. The initial
mapping allowed a basis for field survey and further analysis and interpretation of the documentary
accounts. The accounts provided an initial insight that field mapping and further GIS analysis would later
help to either confirm or contradict.
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3.3 Field Survey Methods
Following the historic research and initial GIS analysis, project teams conducted a field walkover
of the battlefield and the areas associated with the battlefield’s defining features. During the walkover,
crews mapped the location of the defining feature with a point; if an area was involved, then a general
outline of the feature was recorded using a GPS receiver. The crews also photographed the defining feature
and took note of its condition. Since this project did not include subsurface testing, features were identified
based on measurements provided in historic sources, relation to larger features (hills), and presence above
the surface or as part of the terrain.
The survey team logged each battlefield feature using a Trimble GeoXH series global positioning
system (GPS) running Windows Mobile and ArcPad 10. The data dictionary used was based on the one
developed by the National Park Service for the Revolutionary War/War of 1812 documentation project
(NPS 2001). Not all items in the data dictionary were relevant to this study. The team used this dictionary
in order to be consistent with the previously collected NPS data. The GPS system parameters were set to
those used in previous studies: PDOP Mask: 6.0; SNR Mask: 6.0; Elevation Mask: 15: Minimum satellites:
4.
Project researchers took photographs of the battlefield’s overall landscapes and the areas of
defining features. Whenever possible, the survey team took multiple shots in a 360-degree pan from a
central point. Together, these photographs presented an overall perspective of the landscape surrounding a
defining feature.
3.4 Final GIS Analysis
Using the results of the field mapping, project analysts conducted a final, more in-depth spatial
analysis using GIS. The information from the walkover allowed for refinement of the defining feature
locations and boundaries, which were further refined with more spatial analysis. The data recorded by the
GPS and the project photographs were integrated into the GIS base map. The data aided in the comparison
of the different accounts and data sets reviewed in this study. The comparative analysis of historic sources,
present location and condition of landscape features, and known changes to the battlefield’s landscape
permitted a refinement of the locations and boundaries for the battle’s defining features. Specialized GIS
analysis was conducted to refine further these boundaries and locations.
Analysts used Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) to identify elevation changes across the battlefield
aiding in the analysis of terrain. Terrain features, such as rises and depressions, can inform analysis of
avenues of approach and retreat, areas of concealment, and firing or observer positions. Project analysts
attempted to identify a source for LiDAR data or close interval DEM data. However, no such information
sources could be located. A DEM of 10 m resolution was used for this project’s analyses. The 10 m
resolution offers a more generalized view of elevation than close interval DEM, such as 2 m or 1 m.
Although not as detailed as the close interval elevation data, the 10 m DEM data still provided information
useful in conducting viewshed and slope analysis.
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The general mapping of the defining features was further refined using the military terrain analysis
extension for ArcGIS 10.1. When analysts linked distance or range of fire to the viewshed analysis, the
spatial analysis established a predicative model for ascertaining areas of gunfire for the battle. The
extension allows for the interpolation of viewsheds using DEM data based on various conditions, such as
observer height, target height, azimuth, distance between observer and target, and elevation angle of
observation. By integrating the range of fire with a viewshed analysis, factors related to terrain and
attributes of the shooter can be changed and accounted for in the analysis. Within the attributes of the
viewshed, observer height can be changed for those troops standing or hidden at a lower height behind an
obstacle, such as brush or fallen timber. Distance can be changed to account for the different firing ranges
of various weapons, such as musket and rifle. Changing these attributes for the interpolation of viewsheds
allowed for experimentation in the positioning of observers and seeing the effects of the landscape, such as
accounting for trees or obstacles.
For this study, project researchers based the range of fire on muskets. Both the main Continental
Line and British 9th Regiment of Foot present at the Battle of Fort Anne were using mainly muskets (Spring
2008:204). The members of the 6th Albany Militia may have been using rifles since the state government
expected the militia members to provide their own supplies (Militia 1775)2. No records of artillery units
were identified in relation to this battle. For the range of fire analysis, muskets had an assumed range of
100 yards. Muskets were accurate to within 50 to 80 yards of a target whereas rifles had a range within
200 to 500 yards (Babits 1998:12-15). When analysts conducted the range of fire analyses of possible firing
positions, analysts used an average range of 300 yards for the rifle and an average range of 100 yards for
the musket to determine the area firing ranges from specific positions within the battlefield. Due to
increased accuracy and firing range of rifles, troops and warriors were more likely to aim and fire rifles for
accuracy, whereas soldiers fired muskets with little regard to aim or accuracy (Babits 1998:12-15). Those
musket balls at the maximum extent of the range of fire would most likely not be accurate on their target.
In this analysis, positions of the observer were akin to the positions of shooters and artillery positions. The
range of fire analysis helped to clarify where firing positions were located and reinforced whether defining
features were associated with fields of fire or outside of these areas.
Range of fire analysis helped to estimate general firing positions and determine areas for future
archeological testing. Most of the accounts provided only general locations and troop positions in relation
to the battlefield’s landscape rather than stating exact positions. Based on this information, analysts were
not able to determine the firing ranges from exact locations. However, they conducted range of fire analyses
from more generalized areas or defining features, such as the summit of Battle Hill. Project analysts also
used the information provided by metal detector hobbyists or relic hunters on general areas where they
found battle related material culture on the battlefield. Since their information was more about general
areas rather than specific locations, range of fire analysis was based again on a general position.
GIS allowed a common venue to compare the different data sets used in this study. Historical
viewpoints gained from the documentary evidence varied among individuals. With GIS, researchers could
place these views within the same database and compare them to provide an integrated historical perception
2
According to Section VI of the “Rules and Orders for Regulating the Militia of the Colony of New York” (Militia
1775) “…every man…do with all convenient speed furnish himself with a good musket, or firelock, and bayonet,
sword, or tomahawk, a steel ram-rod, worm, priminin-wire, and brush fitted thereto, a cartouch box containing twenty
three rounds of cartriddges, twelve flints, and a knap-sack, agreeable to the directions of the Continental Congress.”
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of the battle. The addition of other data sets and analysis to the historical perspective provided a deeper
understanding of the battle. Primary documents and the documentary record often do not directly address
spatial analyses, such as viewsheds and firing ranges. However, with the aid of spatial data (DEMs),
analysts could use the results of such analyses in comparison with documentary accounts to develop an
improved image of combat not available strictly from the historical records. The data sets served to inform
each other, providing new interpretation of, and insights into, the battle.
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IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This section provides a summary of the history associated with the Battle of Fort Anne. It is not
meant to be an exhaustive study of the Burgoyne campaign and associated events, such as the fall of Fort
Ticonderoga, Battle of Hubbardton, and the Battles of Saratoga. The section provides a general background
to the events that led to and include the Battle of Fort Anne, and the results of the battle on the campaign.
It also introduces the battlefield’s landscape and defining features that are covered in depth in Section 5 (p.
37).
4.1 Burgoyne’s Campaign
During the winter of 1777, British Lieutenant General John Burgoyne developed an extensive plan
to divide the northern rebel colonies. In October of 1776, Burgoyne returned to Britain to deal with his
wife’s estate following her death (Cubbison 2012:28). During the trip to Britain, Burgoyne shaped his plan
to end the rebellion. Burgoyne laid out his plan in a treatise “Thoughts for Conducting the War from the
Side of Canada” (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:178-186). Burgoyne’s plan was an answer
to what he saw as Governor-General Sir Guy Carlton’s failure to end the revolution (Cubbison 2012:28;
Watt 2002:36-37). In 1776, Burgoyne served under Carlton in Upper Canada (Cubbison 2012:27-28).
During that campaign season, Carlton led the British army to push the Americans out of Quebec and
followed them into Lake Champlain. The campaign culminated in the Battle of Valcour Island in which
the British navy defeated Major General Benedict Arnold’s navy on October 11, 1776 (Ketchum 1997:41).
The timing of this battle so late in the campaign season pushed Carleton to end his movement down Lake
Champlain without attempting a siege of Fort Ticonderoga (Ketchum 1997:42) Burgoyne and other British
officers saw an opportunity for Carlton to push further and defeat the Continentals and ultimately end the
rebellion (Ketchum 1997:42). However, Carlton cautiously ended the campaign and returned to Canada
for winter quarters ending the campaign season.
With his plan, Burgoyne sought to advance further than Carleton and put and end to the conflict.
Burgoyne’s design for conducting the campaign primarily consisted of a three-prong attack on the New
York colony, specifically the Champlain, Mohawk, and Hudson Valleys. His goal was to divide the New
England colonies from the rest of the colonies. Burgoyne assumed that the rebellion was centered in New
England and that by isolating New England the rebellion would end.3 Burgoyne’s army was the main force
of the campaign and would leave Upper Canada and move south along Lake Champlain and into the Hudson
Valley towards Albany. Lieutenant Colonel (holding the rank of Brigadier General during the campaign)
Barry St. Leger would lead an army along the Mohawk Valley and meet with Burgoyne’s forces in Albany
(Alden 1969:310-311; Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:178-186) (Figure 4.1, p. 17).
Burgoyne’s forces included over 8,000 British regulars and Hessians, 150 French Canadians, 100 Loyalists,
and 400 Native American warriors, while Brigadier General Barry St. Leger led a group of approximately
1,900 British regulars, Hesse-Hanau Jagers, French Canadians, Loyalists, and Canadian and
3
American support for the Revolutionary War went beyond New England’s regional boundaires and extended
throughout the colonies leading to the continuation of the conflict outside of New England (Alden 1969).
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Haudenosaunee4 (Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga) Native American warriors (Alden 1969:311).
Burgoyne expected Sir William Howe to provide additional reinforcement by moving north from New York
City into the Hudson Highlands (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183). He also asked that a
diversion be made within New England (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:184). Burgoyne
calculated that the British Army, Loyalists, and British allied Native Americans attacking American
settlements on multiple fronts would create “alarm” through the region helping to overpower the
Continental Army (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:178-186). Lord George Germain and
King George III put their support behind Burgoyne.
Figure 4.1. Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne’s 1777 campaign strategy.
General William Howe’s role in Burgoyne’s campaign was unclear and tenuous. Burgoyne’s plan
discussed cooperating with Howe’s army, but Burgoyne did not provide details on how this cooperation
was to happen (Luzader 2010:19). General Howe’s goal for the 1777 campaign season was the capture of
Philadelphia (Ketchum 1997:56; Luzader 2010:5-8). Germain intended Howe to reinforce Burgoyne by
moving troops up the Hudson River, but due to Germain’s mistake, the orders for Howe did not arrive until
4
Haudenosaunee is the name preferred by Native Americans who are part of the six Nations of the Iroquois
Confederacy. The Haudenosaunee originally consisted of five nations: Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and
Seneca. In the early 18th century, the Tuscarora were adopted into the Haudenosaunee, which became known as the
Six Nations (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:23; Graymont 1972:6).
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
August 1777 (Luzader 2010:24-25).
Philadelphia by sea.
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By that time, Howe had already begun his advance towards
Burgoyne based his plan on the experience he gained in the 1776 campaign and by consulting with
Loyalists from the region. His meetings with members of the exiled Johnson family in Canada shaped his
design for action in the Mohawk Valley. They told him that a strong contingent of Loyalists remained in
the Mohawk Valley and the Johnson family’s ties with the Haudenosaunee, specifically the Mohawk, would
ensure their loyalty with Britain (Watt 2002:21, 33). Sir John Johnson’s formation of a Loyalist force in
the Mohawk Valley and their trek across the Adirondacks to Canada supported the idea of loyalist
determination in the area (Watt 2002:30-32). Loyalists and Native Americans would rise up to reinforce a
small British contingent marching along the Mohawk Valley leaving the main body of British troops to
move south along Lake Champlain and the Hudson Valley.
Based on his experience fighting across Upper Canada and the Champlain region under Carlton in
1776, Burgoyne predicted the type of terrain he would face during his 1777 campaign. He recognized the
importance of Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga for maintaining a supply chain (Burgoyne 1777
transcribed in Cubbison 2012:182-183). He also knew how Continental Major General Philip Schuyler
would react to such an invasion.
“… [I]t is natural likewise to expect that he (Schuyler) will take measures
to block up the road from Ticonderoga to Albany by the way of
Skenesborough, by fortifying the strong ground at different places, and
thereby oblige the King’s Army to carry a weight of artillery with it, and
by falling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments to
delay…” (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:179).
These would become major issues for Burgoyne during the campaign, but during the winter of 1777, he
used his experience to shape his initial strategy for the campaign.
In his plan, Burgoyne noted the choice of route he would need to make to move from Lake
Champlain to the Hudson River Valley. His first target was Crown Point. From there he could base his
operations and stores for attacking Fort Ticonderoga, which would then serve as a base for his army as they
continued along Lake Champlain (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183). Following his
army’s taking control of Lake Champlain, he would make the cross over from Lake Champlain to the
Hudson River towards Albany. Burgoyne proposed that the simplest route would be by way of Lake
George, but thought that the Continental Navy may have too large of a force to pass that way. If his allied
Native American warriors and light infantry were unable to take Lake George, he would have to follow a
secondary route. This second route was along Lake Champlain’s South Bay to Skenesborough (present
day Whitehall). His army would follow the waterways (Wood Creek) towards the Hudson River Valley
(Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183). Burgoyne realized this was a riskier route as
“considerable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river may be easily chocked up and
rendered impassable, and at best there will be necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the artillery,
provisions, etc. which can only be supplied from Canada” (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison
2012:183). Burgoyne knew the possible risks to his campaign. The Continental Army’s reaction to his
attack, the terrain, and his increasing distance from Canada would all be factors that could limit his success.
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4.2 Fall of Fort Ticonderoga
Following a winter of preparations in Britain, Burgoyne arrived in Quebec in early May of 1777.
During that month, Carleton and Burgoyne made final preparations in Montreal for the campaign. On May
27, 1777, Burgoyne initiated his campaign leading his main force from Montreal towards the Champlain
Valley (Cubbison 2012:46). Burgoyne’s army included about 8,671 infantry and 516 artillerymen
composed of British, German, and Canadian troops (Luzader 2010:33). Loyalist and Native Americans
would join his campaign as he progressed south from Canada. Burgoyne’s forces travelled with a fleet of
boats consisting of five ships and about 200 bateau and other craft (Luzader 2010:56) that made use of the
rivers and lakes that stretched from Montreal to the Hudson Valley. By June 15, Burgoyne’s army arrived
at Fort St. John followed by Crown Point on June 30 (Cubbison 2012:46). The Continentals previously
abandoned Crown Point. This provided Burgoyne with a simple path to prepare his attack on his first target,
Fort Ticonderoga.
Occupation of the Lake Champlain-Hudson River region was essential to control the New York
and New England colonies. Trade and transportation were concentrated in this conduit and as a result
whoever controlled the route controlled political, military, and economic access to Upper Canada and the
Northern Colonies. Throughout the 18th century, the French and British fought to control this region. To
aid occupation of the region, both nations established a system of forts across the Lake Champlain Hudson
River area (Figure 4.2, p. 20). The British and French militaries generally positioned these forts about 10
miles apart or the approximate distance of a day’s march (Ketchum 1997:26-27). Fort Miller, Fort Edward,
and Fort Anne were part of this fortification system. Due to its location on Lake Champlain, Fort
Ticonderoga became one of the central forts in the system.
Fort Ticonderoga served as a supply post for ships traveling along Lake Champlain. It was an
observation post witnessing traffic on the lake. It also served as a defensive position by creating an obstacle
to advancing enemy forces. To be able to control movement across Lake Champlain, a military force had
to hold Fort Ticonderoga. The French originally built the fortification in the 1750s and named it Fort
Carillon (Ketchum 1997:29; Luzader 2010:47). During the French and Indian War, British General Jeffery
Amherst captured both Fort Carillon (renamed Fort Ticonderoga) and Crown Point (Ketchum 1997:18, 29;
Luzader 2010:47). Although Fort Ticonderoga was vital to controlling travel between the Hudson River
and Upper Canada, the British let the fortification decay after the French and Indian War due to the lack of
threat. The lack of British investment and security in the fort aided the Continental Army's capture of Fort
Ticonderoga in 1775 as one of the first actions of the war (Ketchum 1997:29; Luzader 2010:48). The
Continentals made use of the fort as a staging point in their 1775 invasion of Canada. To defend the
fortification, the Continental Army conducted massive repairs to the fort during 1776.
The Continental Army’s occupation of Fort Ticonderoga was tenuous. Its condition and design
made it difficult to defend. The French designed the fort to prevent a British attack from the south; however,
the Continentals needed the fort to defend against a British invasion from the north (Ketchum 1997:116).
The fort’s location on the fringes of New York’s wilderness also required a large effort to supply the fort
(Luzader 2010:48-49; Wayne to Council of Safety December 4, 1776). The lack of threat from Canada
meant the British did not need to maintain the fort and so the British left the fort in disrepair. Fort
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Ticonderoga’s orientation, difficulty in supplying, and disrepair required a large investment on the part of
the Continentals5.
Figure 4.2. Map of 18th century fort system in Champlain-Hudson region.
5
Major General Anthony Wayne (Wayne to Council of Safety December 4, 1776) placed the blame on the lack of
supplying and preparing Fort Ticonderoga on the Continental Congress. Most of the soliders did not receive pay or
supplies. “The wretched condition they are in for want of almost every necessary and convenience of life except flour
& bad [meat] is shocking to humanity & beggars all description.”
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In 1776, the Continental Army attempted to strengthen their position on Lake Champlain and
prevent a British attack from Canada by repairing Fort Ticonderoga. A major part of the reconstruction of
Fort Ticonderoga was the buildup of artillery placements on the hills around the fort (Luzader 2010:48).
An artillery battery was placed atop Rattlesnake Hill (renamed Mount Independence) south of Fort
Ticonderoga (Ketchum 1997: 117-118). The guns on Mount Independence served to defend Fort
Ticonderoga by firing on ships approaching the fort on Lake Champlain. The Continentals added to their
defense against an advancing British navy by constructing a boom and bridge between Fort Ticonderoga
and Mount Independence separating Lake Champlain from South Bay (Ketchum 1997:122). The
Continentals, under the supervision of Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin, made basic repairs to the fort’s
infrastructure. These included improved drinking water, gardens, as well as the great bridge and defensive
works on Mount Independence (Ketchum 1997:122). However, by 1777 most of Fort Ticonderoga was
still unrepaired.
The fort’s defenses centered on stopping an attack from Lake Champlain. There was little
investment in stopping an attack from land. The Continentals did not construct defenses on Sugar Loaf Hill
(renamed Mount Defiance) southwest of Fort Ticonderoga. It is debated whether Major General Horatio
Gates rejected suggestions to put artillery on the hill (Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010:48-49). It appears that
the Continental Army’s lack of resources made it prioritize its reconstruction of the fort to defend against
attacks from Lake Champlain. Mount Defiance’s position required an attacking force to access it by land
and climb up a steep slope. The Continentals saw these factors as meaning there was less of a threat from
Mount Defiance than from Lake Champlain.
Burgoyne saw the capture of Fort Ticonderoga as vital to keeping his army supplied during the
campaign (Cubbison 2012:48 based on Burgoyne 1777:182-183). His plan included a large force to take
the fortification. As of July 1, Burgoyne’s army consisted of 3,576 British soldiers, 2,919 German soldiers,
511 artillery, and additional allied Native American warriors (Cubbison 2012:48 based on Burgoyne
1777:96-97). The size of Burgoyne’s army allowed him to attack Fort Ticonderoga from both Lake
Champlain and the land west and south of Fort Ticonderoga. With over 7,000 troops, Burgoyne was able
to split his forces and overcome whatever defenses the Continentals were able to establish at Fort
Ticonderoga.
Beginning June 30, he started his advance from Crown Point. He divided his forces into three
groups. He sent Brigadier General Simon Fraser with an advance corps consisting of British light infantry
and grenadiers, the 24th regiment, Canadians, allied Native American warriors, and ten light artillery pieces
along the west shore of Lake Champlain. He ordered the German soldiers under Major General Friedrich
Adolph Baron von Riedesel and consisting of Brunswick chaffeurs, light infantry, and grenadiers along the
eastern shore of Lake Champlain (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIV). Burgoyne and his flotilla advanced
along the lake preventing an attack from the Continentals along the lake (Ketchum 1997:164). Burgoyne
anchored his vessels just out of reach of Fort Ticonderoga’s cannons (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIV) and
waited for his land forces to engage the Continentals.
Major General Arthur St. Clair led the Continental forces at Fort Ticonderoga in the face of the
approaching British army. St. Clair arrived at Fort Ticonderoga to take command of the fort on June 12,
1777 (Ketchum 1997:114). He was joined by a force of troops from New England, specifically New
Hampshire and Massachusetts, to garrison the outpost (Furnham 1777; Gray 1777; Ketchum 1997:147-
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150). St. Clair’s soldiers numbered about 2,000 (Ketchum 1997: 163). Baldwin and the Continental’s
fatigue units were still making repairs to the fort during June of 1777. Burgoyne noted the additional
defensive works and blockhouses at Fort Ticonderoga as being in good condition (Burgoyne
1780:Appendix XIV-XV). Throughout the month of June, St. Clair’s scouts reported on the British
advances along Lake Champlain. Ambushes of scouting and fatigue parties outside of the fort also told of
the approaching British army. Limited resources and soldiers as well as incomplete defenses forced St.
Clair to prioritize his defenses. He did not have enough troops to defend both Fort Tichonderoga and Mount
Independence simoultanesously. Instead, he concentrated his troops at Fort Ticonderoga hoping to hold
the fort. If he could no longer hold his position at Fort Ticonderoga, he planned on withdrawing to Mount
Independence (Ketchum 1997:158).
Fraser’s advance was the first to engage the Continentals on July 2. The British attacked a group
of Continentals at a small outpost and sawmill northwest of Fort Ticonderoga at Mount Hope (Burgoyne
1780:Appendix XV; Ketchum 1997:165). James Thacher, the 16th Massachusetts’s surgeon stated that the
Continentals abandoned their positions outside of the fort due to the approaching British and their Native
American allies (Thacher 1823:98). Over the next few days, Burgoyne’s forces closed in on Fort
Ticonderoga while St. Clair’s soldiers maintained what defenses they could within the fort (Burgoyne
1780:Appendix XV; Thacher 1823:98).
On July 5, the Continental Army's position became untenable. That day, Fraser noticed the open
position on Mount Defiance and began setting up a gun placement atop the hill aimed at Fort Ticonderoga
and Mount Independence (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XV-XVI). Thacher (1823:98-99) described the
situation in a distressing tone, “It is with astonishment that we find the enemy have taken possession of an
eminence called Sugar Loaf Hill, or Mount Defiance, which, from its height and proximity, completely
overlooks and commands all our works at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence…The situation of our
garrison is viewed as critical and alarming.” Fraser’s artillery on Mount Defiance had an open range of fire
onto both Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, the two areas St. Clair was concentrating his troops
for a final defense. The Continentals held no recourse against the artillery on Mount Defiance.
The officers at the Council of War held by St. Clair agreed that the British position on Mount
Defiance and the lack of troops and supplies in the fort made a successful defense of Fort Ticonderoga
unfeasible (Ketchum 1997:172-173). The only choice was to abandon the fort and withdraw to Mount
Independence. The night of July 5, St. Clair began the withdrawal from Fort Ticonderoga. St. Clair’s
original plan was to move supplies and personnel secretly from the fort without signaling the British of
their withdrawal. Thacher (1823:99) described the withdrawal as confused as the occupants of the fort were
forced to gather their belongings for an immediate exit. He was responsible for securing the sick and
wounded as well as medical supplies.
St. Clair divided the occupants of Fort Ticonderoga into two groups. The main army of about 2,000
soldiers was to leave the fort and march towards Hubbardton. The rest of the fort’s contingent consisting
of women, and injured and sick (mostly measles) soldiers were to travel by bateau to Skenesborough
(present day Whitehall) with Colonel Pierse Long’s New Hampshire Regiment serving as protection
(Ketchum 1997:174). At about 3 o’clock am July 6, the boats were ready to leave Fort Ticonderoga for
Skenesborough. Long’s flotilla consisted of five armed gallies and about 200 bateau full of artillery,
supplies, and people (Ketchum 1997:180; Thacher 1823:99). St. Clair and the rest of the withdrawing
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Continentals would make their way east on land and regroup with Col. Long on the way to Fort Edward.
The morning of July 6, the British entered Fort Ticonderoga and saw it abandoned. After securing the fort,
Burgoyne’s army began its pursuit of the withdrawing Continentals.
Fraser reported to Burgoyne that he observed the Continentals withdraw and decided to pursue
them. Burgoyne felt confident in Fraser’s ability and allowed him to continue his pursuit of the fleeing
Continentals over land while he followed the Continentals across the water. When the Germans reached
Mount Independence, Burgoyne ordered Reidesel to take his troops and reinforce Fraser (Burgoyne
1780:Appendix XVI-XVII). St. Clair’s main army arrived at Hubbardton July 6 and established a camp
unaware of the close proximity of the British and German troops (Luzader 2010:61). On the morning of
July 7, Fraser surprised the St. Clair’s rear guard under the command of Colonel Seth Warner. Fraser
divided his troops along with the Germans to flank the Continentals (Ketchum 1997:198-200). The battle
fell into disorder as the Continentals panicked under heavy fire (Ketchum 1997:200). Warner was able to
reform his troops and counter the attack. However, the Continental right flank was hard-pressed. Unable
to stand against the fight and loss of leadership, the Continentals withdrew (Ketchum 1997:205).
While the Continentals continued to lose ground at Hubbardton, Colonel Pierse Long’s flotilla
arrived at Skenesborough6 around 3 o’clock on the afternoon of July 6. Long’s troops joined with members
of the 3rd NH, Scammell’s company under the command of Captain James Gray who were stationed at
Skenesborough. It took Burgoyne’s navy only two hours to catch up with Long’s flotilla (Thacher
1823:100). Fort Ticonderoga’s boom and bridge were unable to delay Burgoyne’s attack (Thacher
1823:100). Commodore Lutwidge took about a half hour to cut a passage through the boom and bridge
(Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVII). Burgoyne’s vessels commenced cannon fire on Long’s boats, while
British troops and allied warriors made landfall attempting to surround the Continentals (Thacher
1823:100). Burgoyne dispatched the 9th, 20th, and 21st regiments to flank and surround the Continentals at
Skenesborough (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVII). In the face of the British attack, the Continentals fell
into disorder. “The officers of our guard now attempted to rally the men and form them in battle array; but
this was found impossible, every effort proved unavailing, and in the utmost panic, they were seen to fly in
every direction for personal safety” (Thacher 1823:100). Continental Captain John Calfe stated the British
arrived at Skenesborough just as he arrived and began firing on them, which occasioned a great confusion”
(Calfe in Noyes 1899:290).
With Skenesborough lost, Col. Long ordered the destruction of the flotilla and the sinking of the
baggage into the Skenesborough port rather than lose it to the British. Private Roger Lamb of the British
9th Regiment of Foot put the Americans’ loss at 200 boats, 130 pieces of cannon, and all provisions and
baggage (Hagist 2004:35). Included in this loss were three destroyed gallies and two captured gallies. Lord
Francis Napier (Bradford 1962:305) listed the gallies taken or burned as: Trubull Galley taken with two 18
pound, two 6 pound, six 4 pound, and four 2 pound cannons and 12 swivels; Liberty Schooner taken with
powder; Revenge Sloop destroyed; Gates Galley with two 12 pound, two 6 pound, three 4 pound, and four
2 pound cannons and 8 swivels destroyed; and Enterprize Schooner destroyed with provisions. Corporal
George Fox of the British 7th Regiment of Foot stated that the British used iron hooks to collect the
provisions abandoned by the Continentals; “…we got our grappling irons to hook up the barrels of pork
6
Major General Benedict Arnold constructed his navy at Skenesborough for use in the Battle of Valcour Island (Alden
1969:278).
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and flour, but we had such quantities of pork that we were sick at the site of it” (Houlding and Yates
1990:18). Burgoyne noted that 30 prisoners were taken at Skenesborough (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix
XVII). The Continentals evacuating Fort Ticonderoga lost personal belongings, artillery, and basic
provisions. They had minimal supplies to continue a fight against the British.
With the British closing in and Skenesborough a loss, Long order a withdrawal towards Fort Anne
located approximately 14 miles south of Skenesborough. The women, sick, and injured from Fort
Ticonderoga floated south along Wood Creek, while soldiers continued along the military road and adjacent
woods attempting to stop or slow any advance from the pursuing British. Close behind the evacuees was a
small contingent of the British Army. Burgoyne dispatched 190 men of the 9th Regiment of Foot under the
command of Colonel John Hill “to take post near Fort Anne, to observe their [Continental Army] motions.”
(Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII) and to intercept the fleeing rebels (Hagist 2004:39).
The Continentals under Col. Long spent their second consecutive night on the march from Fort
Ticonderoga under harsh circumstances. The road was in bad condition as the path was in disrepair and
bridges were out (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII). Continental Chaplain Enos Hitchcock claimed that
Wood Creek was filled with logs and along with its shallowness made the withdrawal difficult and slow
(Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:117). The British private, Roger Lamb of the 9th Regiment of Foot, stated that
they captured some of the withdrawing Americans’ boats (Hagist 2004:39). The British secured the boats
capturing 30 prisoners, including women, sick, wounded and two officers before continuing the pursuit of
the Continentals (Hagist 2004:39; Schnitzer 2012). The Continentals were aware of the capture, but unable
to stop it (Calfe in Noyes 1899:290; Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:117). Capt. Gray and his troops were in
the Continentals rear attempting to defend the withdrawing army. “Retreated from Skensboro [sic]; & lost
all my money, Baggage &- lodged in the woods at Night” (Gray 1777).
4.3 Fort Anne
On July 8, 1777, Colonel Jonathan Trumball wrote to his father of the evacuation of Fort
Ticonderoga. He also mentioned the dire situation developing at Fort Anne, “Genll Schuyler with the little
Handfull of Fugitives From Ty. and the Small Body of Militia already Collected, is forming his Stand
at Fort Ann where they are in Want of Every thing that Can be Conceived Necessary for the Subsistance of
an Army” (Johnathan Trumbull Sr. to Washington July 14, 1777). From the end of June through July 8,
1777 Burgoyne’s forces crossed the Champlain Valley against minimal resistance. They took over Crown
Point and Fort Ticonderoga without firing a shot. Burgoyne’s navy decimated Skenesborough. The British
faced a challenge at the Battle of Hubbardton when they met with the main body of Continentals
withdrawing from Fort Ticonderoga, but General Fraser was still able to defeat the Continentals.
At Fort Anne, the Continentals decided to make a stand. The army under Colonel Pierse Long’s
command at Fort Anne consisted of a mixed group of soldiers from various units (See Table 4.1, p. 35 for
a detail on numbers of soldiers). Long’s 2nd New Hampshire composed the core of the force. Sick and
injured soldiers, women, military surgeons, and chaplains fled Fort Ticonderoga with the 2nd NH. Members
of the 3rd New Hampshire’s Scammell’s Company under Captain James Gray’s command joined the
withdrawing 2nd NH at Skenesborough. The 15th Massachusetts under Captain Benjamin Farnum was
already at Fort Anne when the Fort Ticonderoga evacuees arrived. The 6th Regiment of the Albany Militia
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would arrive on July 8 to reinforce the Continentals. Together this mixed group prepared to fight the
oncoming British.
Fort Anne was a small outpost defending the crossing from the Champlain Valley to the Hudson
Valley. The area of Fort Anne was associated with fortifications since 1692. In that year, Fitz John
Winthrop built a simple fortification called Stone Fort near the confluence of Halfway Creek and Wood
Creek (Fort Ann 2007:9). British forces built a second fort to the south of the original fort in 1709.
Following an epidemic, the fort was abandoned and destroyed. In 1711, the British built Queen’s Fort
(renamed Fort Anne) in the location of the original Stone Fort (Fort Ann 2007:10). In 1757, to defend
against French incursions during the French and Indian War, the British rebuilt Fort Anne again at the
confluence of Halfway Creek and Wood Creek. During the period between the French and Indian War and
the American Revolution, the fort fell into disrepair. The Continentals took control and rebuilt the fort to
aid their invasion of Canada in 1775 (Fort Ann 2007:11). By 1777, British reconnaissance defined Fort
Anne as a small fortification supporting 30 troops (CO42-36:129). Fort Anne became part of a larger
fortification system present in the Lake Champlain and Hudson Valley region.
On the night of July 6, the first of the Continentals fleeing Skenesborough arrived at Fort Anne.
Captain Benjamin Farnum of the 15th MA noted in his journal “Nuse [sic] of Tyconderogea [sic] & Mount
independence being Veaqueated [sic] this Evening the retreating [people?] begun to Come into this
Gearison [sic]” (Farnum 1777). Evacuees from Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesboro continued to arrive at
Fort Anne into the morning of July 7 (Calfe in Noyes 1899:290). Capt. Gray arrived at Fort Anne around
6 am noting that the fort was in confusion (Gray 1777).
4.4 Battle of Fort Anne - Day 1 (July 7, 1777)
As the Continentals arrived at Fort Anne during the night of July 6 and into the morning of July 7,
the British 9th Regiment of Foot came to within a quarter mile of the fort (Hagist 2004:39). Although he
just arrived at Fort Anne at 6 am that morning and had no time to eat, Capt. Gray was sent out around 11
am with 150 men and 17 Rangers from Fort Anne to scout for the enemy. “More than a half a mile” march
from Fort Anne, Gray’s troops entered some woods. He ordered his troops into formation, front, rear, and
flanking guards, in preparation for an engagement. The Continentals met a group of British Regulars, the
9th Regiment of Foot. Gray’s troops exchanged fire with the British. The British withdrew with Gray’s
troops advancing close behind them. The members of the 9th Regiment of Foot withdrew up a hill in their
rear (Battle Hill). Gray waited with his troops at the base of this hill and they continued their fire against
the British until 6 pm. Sometime during the day, Gray was reinforced by an additional 150 men. With the
approach of night, the Continentals withdrew from the base of the hill for Fort Anne (Gray 1777). Gray
(Gray 1777) noted his casualties included 1 killed and 3 wounded and 3 British killed. This number was
supported by Capt. Calfe (Calfe in Noyes 1899:290). Roger Lamb stated that the British “halted and laid
upon their arms all night” (Hagist 2004:39).
The first action of the two-day battle near Fort Anne was a skirmish. The troops from both sides
were still in a transitory state as evacuees and reinforcements were still arriving at Fort Anne and the British
9th Regiment of Foot was establishing itself in relation to Fort Anne. The skirmish between Capt. Gray’s
troops and the 9th Regiment established the battle’s terrain. By moving out of the fort and confronting the
British, Gray determined that the battle would not be a siege of Fort Anne, but an attack against the British
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position. The British withdrawal up Battle Hill established their position for the duration of the battle.
Rather than a fight around Fort Anne’s fortification, the Battle of Fort Anne became a conflict over Battle
Hill.
Figure 4.3. Map of Battle of Fort Anne, July 7, 1777.
4.5 Battle of Fort Anne - Day 2 (July 8, 1777)
The second day of the Battle of Fort Anne was more intense than the first. The morning began
with a Continental deserter entering the British camp. The deserter informed the British that the Continental
force included 1,000 soldiers (Hagist 2004:39). Colonel Hill’s 190 men could not match the 1,000
Continental soldiers. Hill sent for reinforcements from Skenesborough. Burgoyne’s forces at
Skenesborough were occupied hauling artillery and baggage over the falls at Skenesborough for the
overland trip towards Fort Anne (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII-XIX). Burgoyne ordered the 21st and
20th Regiments of Foot to “quicken their march” to Fort Anne, but they were delayed by a rain storm.
Shortly after Hill sent for reinforcements, the deserter disappeared and was discovered to be a Continental
spy (Hagist 2004:39). The spy was able to determine the strength of the British army outside of Fort Anne.
With this new information, the Continentals returned to attack the British position.
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Besides the added information supplied by their spy in the British camp, the Continentals at Fort
Anne were also aided by additional reenforcements. The Albany Militia’s 6th Regiment arrived under the
command of Colonel Henry K. Van Rensselaer. Major General Philip Schuyler sent the Albany Militia’s
6th Regiment to reinforce the Continentals at Fort Anne, but also to delay Burgoyne’s Army (Hogeboom
Pension 1818; Miller Pension 1832; Van Alstyne Pension 1818; Van Rensselaer Pension 1818; Wittbeck
Pension 1818). This strategy of delaying the British rather than holding position at Fort Anne differed from
the strategy held July 7. The Continental evacuees from Fort Ticonderoga were still reeling from
Burgoyne’s attack on Fort Ticonderoga and their continuous withdrawal from Burgoyne’s advancing army.
They were in a state of confusion attempting to maintain a stand and end the withdrawal. With the arrival
of the militia reenforcements, Schuyler was asserting a new strategy to temporarily delay Burgoyne’s forces
rather than steadfastly hold Fort Anne. By delaying Burgoyne’s advance, Schuyler gained time to remove
supplies and personnel from Fort George and Fort Anne and centralized his forces at Fort Edward and later
Stillwater (Hogeboom Pension 1818; Miller Pension 1832; Van Alstyne Pension 1818; Van Rensselaer
Pension 1818; Wittbeck Pension 1818). He understood the garrison would be lost. This new directive of
delaying the British rather than holding Fort Anne guided the Continentals’ attack on the British postion on
Battle Hill during the fighting of July 8.
The Continentals returned to the ground they fought on the previous day. Captains Gray and
Hutchins left Fort Anne with the same troops as the first day of battle, approximately 300 men. They
marched to the base of the hill and began their attack on the British. After two hours of fighting, Long
ordered the Albany Militia from Fort Anne to reinforce Captains Gray and Hutchins (Gray 1777). Roger
Lamb stated that the British sentries were able to repel the initial Continental attack, but the Continentals
reformed and attacked again (Hagist 2004:39). The woods were so thick that the British view was
obstructed; they could hear the Continentals, but not see them (Hagist 2004:39).
The Albany Militia began to out flank and surround the British. Not being able to see, but hear that
they were about to be surrounded, the British were “obliged to change their ground, and retiere [sic] up a
high hill, which was in their rear” (Hagist 2004:39). Burgoyne referred to the withdrawal as “Colonel Hill
found it necessary to change his position in the height of battle” (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX). Several
British troops were killed during this repositioning (Hagist 2004:39-40). Roger Lamb was one of the last
of the British to withdraw to the top of the hill.
“I had not been there five minutes when lieutenant Westrop, who was by
my side was shot through the heart; a few minutes after a man, a short
distance upon my left, received a ball in his forehead, which took off the
roof of his scull [sic]; he reeled round, turned up his eyes, muttered some
words, and fell dead at my feet!” (Hagist 2004:40)
The Continentals followed the British up the hillside with a heavy fire. The Continentals overcame
a British surgeon helping Captain William Montgomery who was injured near the base of the hill (Gray
1777; Hagist 2004:40). Montgomery’s wounds proved to be mortal as he was paroled in New York City
where he died of his wounds the following year (Photo 4.1, p. 28). The advancing Continentals also found
the women, injured, and sick evacuees who the British took as prisoners on Wood Creek. At some point
during the afternoon, Colonel Van Rensselaer was shot in his upper thigh (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818).
Although his men thought it was a mortal wound, he stayed on the battlefield while the Continentals sent
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Capt. Montgomery, the British Surgeon, and the rescued evacuees back to Fort Anne as they continued to
fight the British on Battle Hill.
Photo 4.1. Capt. William Montgomery’s headstone at Trinity Church, New York City.
The British atop Battle Hill were facing a Continental force larger than their own. To defend their
position on the top of the hill, the British formed a single file across the hill’s summit (Hagist 2004:40).
This was a unique formation. Due to North America’s wooded terrain the British Army adopted a two rank
formation replacing the three rank formation used in Europe (Spring 2008:138-151). Burgoyne ordered the
use of the two rank formation during his campaign (Spring 2008:142). A German officer described the
formation used by Burgoyne’s Army as two soldiers deep separated by 18 inches to allow space to move
through wooded areas (Spring 2008:144). The formation allowed for quicker and more orderly maneuvers
in woods and hilly terrain. With Col. Hill’s 9th Regiment on Battle Hill, the expanse of the hill along with
limited troop size forced him to space his troops further than the two rank formation to prevent the
Continentals from surrounding his position (Spring 2008:152). The spacing of the 9th Regiment of Foot
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helped to determine how much of Battle Hill the British position occupied during the battle. If the British
were using what Major General William Howe termed an extended order spacing of 10 feet (Spring
2008:139), the 190 troops would have made a line formation of approximately 2,000 feet in length. In
comparison, the Loyalist and Native American defensive line at the Battle of Newtown reached a mile and
a half and included about 800 rangers and warriors (PAF 2010). This distance also averages to a spacing
of approximately 10 feet.
The British and Continentals continued their firefight throughout the afternoon. Captain Money
claimed that he saw the heaviest fire during the campaign at the Battle of Fort Anne. It was only equaled
by the Battle of Freeman’s Farm (Burgoyne 1780:42). The effect of British fire against the Continentals
may have been limited. Lamb stated that the British soldiers adopted a quicker method of reloading their
muskets. “It was our custom after loading and priming, instead of ramming down cartridge, to strike the
breech of the firelock to the ground, and bring it to the present and fire” (Hagist 2004:37). Such a method
was not a standard practice or officially sanctioned, but British soldiers used this method elsewhere in the
Burgoyne campaign, such as at the Battle of Hubbarton (Spring 2008:209). The method may have allowed
for quicker loading, but was related to more misfires. During heavy fire engagements, such as Fort Anne,
the sound of constant fire could hide a misfire. A soldier could think his musket fired, but not realize his
musket misfired leading him to reload an already loaded weapon that continued to misfire (Spring
2008:209-210). Lamb acknowledged that it was possible for the cartridge to misfire and possibly lead to
the explosion of the musket injuring the solider and those around him (Hagist 2004:37). Lamb stated the
British used this loading technique because of the thick woods in America. It allowed for a quicker fire in
the face of Continentals hiding in the woods (Hagist 2004:37). British use of such musket loading methods
at Fort Anne may have influenced the battle as the battle ended with both sides running low on ammunition
(Hagist 2004:40).7
The Continentals realized the lack of return fire from the British and attempted to finally surround
the British on the hill. As the Continentals advanced around the British on Battle Hill, both sides heard a
war whoop (Hagist 2004:40). The Continentals interpreted the war whoop as coming from British allied
Native Americans arriving to reinforce the 9th Regiment of Foot. The Continentals were also running low
on ammunition and decided to withdraw to Fort Anne rather than face the Native Americans. However,
the war whoop was not from British allied Native Americans. Rather, the call came from Captain Money,
Burgoyne’s quartermaster. He arrived with a contingent of Native American warriors to reinforce the
British on Battle Hill. As Capt. Money and the warriors approached within four miles of the battle, they
heard the heavy fighting. The warriors refused to join the engagement despite Capt. Money’s orders.
Wanting to help, Money approached the base of Battle Hill and called out with his war whoop (Hagist
2004:40). The Continentals withdrew from Battle Hill to Fort Anne ending the Battle of Fort Anne (Figure
4.5, p. 31).
At Fort Anne, Colonel Long considered his options to either continue to delay the British or
withdraw to Fort Edward. One of the prisoners rescued during the battle, informed the Continentals that
Col. Hill requested reinforcements and Burgoyne was dispatching two brigades, which amounted to 2000
soldiers (Farnum 1777; Gray 1777). With low ammunition and few soldiers fit to fight the oncoming
7
A July 7, 1777 receipt for John H. Beekman and Henry K. Van Rensselaer stated that Col. Van Rensselaer acquired
from Fort Edward 100 weight of ball and seven pounds of powder for his regiment (Beekman and Rensselaer Receipt
1777).
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reinforcements, Long’s Council of War decided to withdraw to Fort Edward after burning Fort Anne (Gray
1777). The Continentals achieved their ordered mission. Maj. Gen. Schuyler ordered Van Rensselaer to
delay the British at Fort Anne for 24 hours to allow him to move provisions from Fort Anne and Fort George
to Fort Edward (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). During their withdrawal from Fort Anne, the Continentals
attempted to deny Burgoyne’s army the use of the fort or the associated infrastructure by burning the fort
and sawmills. Yet, Burgoyne stated that although the Continentals burned Fort Anne, they left a blockhouse
and sawmill intact (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX).
Figure 4.4. Map of Battle of Fort Anne, July 8, 1777.
The withdrawal from Fort Anne was not easy for the Continentals. During the withdrawal they
marched 14 miles to Fort Edward in a steady rain (Gray 1777). Capt. Gray’s company was in the rear
defending against any pursuing British or allied Native American warriors. His account of the withdrawal
expresses the drudgery felt by the Continentals on their march to Fort Edward. The wounded and sick in
Col. Long’s army grew in numbers from those originally brought from Fort Ticonderoga to include those
injured during the fighting at Skenesborough and at Fort Anne (Calfe in Noyes 1899:290-291; Gray 1777)8.
8
One of the members of Capt. Gray’s company was thought to be mortally wounded. The surgeon suggested that the
soldier stay at Fort Anne to either perish from his injures or have the British care for him. “This I knew not of till we
were ordered to march, at which time I turn’d back alone (my Company being gone) to the rear of the Army, where I
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The army left Fort Anne at 3 pm and arrived at Fort Edward at 10 pm (Gray 1777). There were no barracks
or food waiting for the withdrawing Continentals at Fort Edward. Since they lost their baggage on the
withdrawal from Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough the troops did not have blankets. This resulted in
many of the soldiers spending the night sleeping on the ground in the rain (Gray 1777). As Capt. Gray
wrote, “The fatigue of this day I believe I shall always remember” (Gray 1777).
Figure 4.5. 1789 Lithograph of Fort Anne - probably depicts sawmill and blockhouse at Kane’s Falls
(Emmet Collection- New York Public Library)
found him, I then pick’d up a tent, & fastn’d it between two poles laid him in it, and ordered four soldiers to carry
him- I took their 4 guns with my own and carried them to Fort Edward” (Gray 1777).
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4.6 Battle Results
The Battle of Fort Anne was a technical win for the British as the Continentals were the first to
withdraw from the battlefield. However, the Continentals were close to surrounding Col. Hill and the 9th
Regiment. The steep terrain on Battle Hill and lack of ammunition prevented the Continentals from
overcoming the British control of the hill’s summit. The Continentals suffered 15 soldiers (men) killed and
wounded. Capt. Gray stated, “Our loss in the two skirmishes about 15- The Enemy’s unknown” (Gray
1777). Gouverneur Morris in a letter to the Provincial Congress stated that the Continentals suffered 12
killed and “many wounded” including Colonel Van Rensselaer. The Continentals also captured 3 or 4
prisoners including a captain and a doctor (Morris to Provincial Congress July 14, 1777). Burgoyne stated
that the British captured 30 prisoners, provisions, and the 2nd NH Regimental colors (Burgoyne
1780:Appendix XIX). These prisoners may have been the sick or wounded who were unable to continue
the withdrawal to Fort Anne. Gray’s (Gray 1777) account of the surgeon telling him to leave an injured
soldier at Fort Anne for the British to care for him supports this.
The official British record of loss listed 13 killed, 22 wounded, and 2 captured at the Battle of Fort
Anne (CO42-36:709). These included one lieutenant (Lt. Westrop), one sergeant, and eleven rank and file
killed; one captain (Captain Montgomery also taken prisoner), 2 lieutenants (Lt. Stavely and Lt. Murray),
19 rank and file wounded; Adjunct Fielding was also listed as wounded; the surgeon was also captured. A
Brunswick officer agreed with the official accounting when he listed the British losses as one officer (Lt.
Westrop), one non-commissioned officer, and 11 privates killed and four officers wounded (Capt.
Montgomery, Lt. Stavely, Adj. Fielding, Lt. Murray) (Brunswick Journal 1777). The Brunswick officer
overestimated the Continental Army’s losses at Fort Anne as 200 dead and 50 captured. Burgoyne’s listing
of capturing 30 Continentals also seems high, as the Continentals make no mention of such a loss of troops.
Roger Lamb stated that the British suffered three officers and 19 men killed in the battle (Hagist 2004:40).
His account of losses is almost double the official list of losses and may reflect a poor recollection of the
losses during the battle.
4.7 Aftermath
On July 11, Burgoyne wrote to Lord George Germain concerning the success of his campaign.
“I have the honor to inform your lordship, that the enemy, dislodged from
Ticonderoga and Mount Independent [sic], on the 6th instant, and were
driven, on the same day, beyond Skenesborough on the right, and to
Humerton [sic] on the left, with the loss of 128 pieces of cannon, all their
armed vessels and bateaux, the gratest [sic] part of their baggage and
ammunition, provision, and military stores, to a very large amount. The
success has been followed by events equally fortunate and rapid”
(Burgoyne to Germain July 11, 1777 in Burgoyne 1780: Appendix XIV).
Burgoyne’s army occupied Crown Point, Fort Ticonderoga, Skenesborough, and Fort Anne as well as
thwarted the main Continental Army withdrawing from Fort Ticonderoga at the Battle of Hubbardton. His
army managed to accomplish this with little retaliation from the Continentals. The Continentals at Fort
Anne took the fight to the British and delayed their advance for a time. However, the British Army’s quick
advance through the Champlain Valley put the Continental Army and government into panic.
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While Burgoyne chased the withdrawing Continentals throughout the Champlain region, General
Schuyler was concentrating his resources and creating obstacles to delay Burgoyne’s campaign. Schuyler
ordered Col. Van Rensselaer to serve as a diversion or to delay the British advance at Fort Anne providing
Schuyler time to move supplies and troops to Fort Edward, then Fort Miller, and then at Stillwater as
Burgoyne advanced (Hogeboom Pension 1818; Miller Pension 1832; Schuyler to Washington July 10,
1777; Van Alstyne Pension 1818; Van Rensselaer Pension 1818; Wittbeck Pension 1818). “Our force at
Fort Edward is at present 10,000 men, who are determined to maintain their ground at all events- Our Army
augments very fast” (James Gray to Theodore Parsons July 14, 1777)9. Governor Morris reported on his
visit to Fort Edward that Schuyler moved the “provisions, stores, bateaux, &c.” from Fort George prior to
destroying it (Morris July 17, 1777). The destruction of Fort George also points to another of Schuyler’s
strategies, the destruction of the infrastructure. Morris suggested to Schuyler to “prevent them [British]
from procuring forage” (Morris July 17, 1777). This included the destruction of farms, settlements, forage,
livestock, and infrastructure like sawmills. Morris suggested the Continentals should “leave nothing but a
wilderness to the enemy” (Morris July 17, 1777). Without the ability to procure resources for his troops or
establish posts, Burgoyne’s army would become weaker and easier to defeat.
Schuyler also worked to delay Burgoyne’s advance by constructing obstacles. He ordered troops
to cut trees into waterways to prevent the British advance by boat and to break up roads to slow the advance
of artillery, baggage, and troops. Accounts of Albany Militia state that they were active in the destruction
of roads and creating of obstacles throughout the summer of 1777 (Adams Pension 1832; Anthony Pension
1832) Following the Battle of Fort Anne, Schuyler concentrated on the destruction of the road between
Fort Anne and Fort Edward.
General Fellows with a small Body of the Militia, but all I could get, is
breaking up the Road between this and Fort Ann and felling Trees into it.
I will throw every Obstacle in their Rout I possibly can and retard their
progress as much as possible—for this purpose I shall disengage myself
of every Thing cumbersome, the Artillery especially as I can make no Use
of it (Schuyler to Washington July 10, 1777).
The destruction of the roads affected the British as one of the Brunswick troops stated that the British began
constructing a new road between Skenesborough and Fort Anne on July 11, due to the previous one’s
damage rendering it impassible (Brunswick Journal 1777).
The destruction of the roads and obstruction of waterways was Schuyler’s gamble that Burgoyne
would follow the withdrawing Continentals towards him at Fort Edward. Schuyler’s movement of
resources and troops would help to draw Burgoyne into a location the Continentals could better defend and
control. After the Battle of Fort Anne, Burgoyne took the rest of his army to Fort Anne. In his journal
(Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX) he stated that a large army of Continentals were amassed at Fort Edward
and that defeating this army became his goal. The British Army’s opening of roads and clearing of creeks
allowed for the movement of baggage, artillery, and provisions. As he moved along the land route to the
9
Schuyler’s amassing of troops did not include the majority of the 2nd NH, Long’s Brigade. The one-year enlistments
of the soldiers in Long’s Brigade expired following the Battle of Fort Anne (Ketchum 1997:280). Most of these
soliders decided to end their service in the war and return to New Hampshire. Col. Long as well as two other officers
decided to reenlist and continued the fight against Burgoyne to Saratoga.
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Hudson and continued his advance, the opening of these routes became increasingly important to ensure
the continuation of supplying his army. He also ordered his troops to move his gun boats and supplies from
Fort Ticonderoga towards Lake George (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX). His plan was to have his forces
march from Fort Anne and from Lake George converging on Fort Edward. If successful, he could decimate
the Continental Army’s Northern Department. It would also dedicate him to a path made more difficult
with the requirement of investing in repairing or building roads, and moving provisions and artillery across
a wilderness terrain. He did, however, acknowledge the difficulties inherent in his plan of action, especially
in light of the expected Continental delaying tactics
Should those efforts fail the route by South Bay and Skenesborough may
be attempted, but considerable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow
parts of the river may be easily chocked up and rendered impassible, and
at best there will be necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the
artillery, provisions, etc. which can only be supplied from Canada
(Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183)
Burgoyne realized what could be the downfall of his campaign and still followed that path.
Even with the withdrawal of the Continental Army at Fort Anne on July 8, Burgoyne’s forces did
not take full control of the fortification until late July. Burgoyne established his campaign headquarters at
Fort Anne around July 22 (Burgoyne 1780: Appendix 42; Digby in Baxter 1887:233; Hadden 1884:96).
By July 28, the main army began to march from Fort Anne leaving soldiers to help with supplies (Digby in
Baxter 1887:239; Hadden 1884:98). In September of 1777, Burgoyne ordered the abandonment of Fort
Anne as he was unable to defend the post in the face of an approaching Continental Army (Hadden
1884:lxxxiii-lxxxiv; Ketchum 1997:340). Continental soldiers quickly reestablished control of Fort Anne
and used it to undermine Burgoyne’s supply chain.
By September of 1777, Burgoyne’s campaign began to falter. He lost troops during the campaign
and he was unable to replenish his ranks. The Loyalist forces he thought would join him never emerged
(Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010). Burgoyne’s Native American allies began to leave due to the lack of
combat and his criticism of their treatment of civilians (Ketchum 1997:274-277, 282). The result was that
his force was decreasing. Although he spent July and August trying to ensure his supply lines, the long
distance between Canada and his army led to gaps and opportunities for the Continental Army to attack it
(Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010). The Continentals increasingly surrounded his forces. With his losses of
soldiers at Freeman’s Farm and Bennington, and the defeat at Bemis Heights and the death of his leading
officer, General Simon Fraser, Burgoyne found few options for victory. General Henry Clinton attempted
to aid Burgoyne by moving north from New York City to the Hudson Highlands and attacking Fort Clinton
and Fort Montgomery on October 6, 1777 (Fisher 2004). However, he was too late to have an effect;
Burgoyne surrendered to Continental Major General Horatio Gates at Saratoga on October 16, 1777
(Ketchum 1997:425).
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Table 4.1. Battle of Fort Anne Order of Battle.
Overall Order of Battle
British
Continentals
9th Regiment of Foot- Colonel Hill- 2nd NH - Colonel Pierse Long- 600 (Ketchum 1997:222; Thacher
190 soldiers (Hagist 2004:39)
1823:99) 150 (Cubbison 2012:72; Luzader 2010:70) plus injured
soldiers. Unclear on exact number, made up of soldiers from
various regiments and companies at Fort Ticonderoga.
3rd NH - Cpt. James Gray Company*- 50 (Gray Muster 1777)
15th MA - Cpt. Benjamin Farnum Company-44 (Bailey 1880:362)
6th Albany Militia - Col. Henry Van Rensselaer- 400 soldiers (Van
Rensselaer Pension 1818)
July 7 Order of Battle
th
9 Regiment of Foot- Colonel Hill- Capt. James Gray- 150 soldiers plus 17 rangers (Gray 1777)
190 soldiers (Hagist 2004:39)
Reinforcement of 150 soldiers (Gray 1777)
July 8 Order of Battle
th
9 Regiment of Foot- Colonel Hill- Capt. James Gray- ~150 (Gray 1777)
190 soldiers (Hagist 2004:39)
Capt. Nathaniel Hutchins (1st NH)-~150 (Gray 1777)
6th Albany Militia - Col. Henry Van Rensselaer- 400 soldiers (Van
Rensselaer Pension 1818)
*Gray stated that he commanded over 220 men on march from Skenesborough to Fort Anne (Gray to
Parsons July 14, 1777).
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Figure 4.6. 1777 Faden map of Burgoyne Campaign with approximate routes of Continenal and British
Armies.
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V. DEFINING FEATURES AND KOCOA ANALYSIS
5.1 KOCOA Analysis
The main unit of study for this project is the defining feature. A defining feature, as either a natural
or a cultural feature, is the basic unit in the KOCOA system of military terrain analysis. Developed by
military experts and historians, the KOCOA system is a specialized technique for landscape analysis in
which natural and cultural terrain features or landmarks are studied for their relation to a battle (McMasters
2009). KOCOA is an acronym that stands for:
 Key terrain
 Obstacles
 Cover and concealment
 Observation points
 Avenues of approach and retreat.
How combatants used a defining feature during a battle defines its categorization in the KOCOA system.
Although a feature may have served multiple functions during the battle by the different sides in the conflict,
to be termed a defining feature, the feature must meet at least one of these uses. The importance of a
defining feature is based upon its role in determining the success or failure of a military unit in the battle.
Table 5.1 (p. 38) lists the defining features related to the Battle of Fort Anne. These defining
features are limited to those features or landmarks discussed in the historical records reviewed for this study.
The list includes the major and influential features related to the battles. Records for each feature also
include descriptions of its location; relevance to the battle; comment; its KOCOA description; and an
integrity assessment. Appendix III (p. Error! Bookmark not defined.) lists a full record of all accounts
recorded for the KOCOA analysis. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (pp. 40 and 41) show the location of the major
defining features.
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Table 5.1. Battle of Fort Anne Defining Features.
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 5.1. Overview of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features.
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Figure 5.2. Detailed view of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features.
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5.2 Historic Perspectives of Defining Features
The Battle of Fort Anne consisted of two skirmishes fought July 7-8, 1777. In both skirmishes, the
British and Continental armies made use of the natural terrain of hills, creeks, and woods for their
advantage. These natural features also posed difficulties by acting as obstacles or concealing enemy
movements. Due to the confusion of the withdrawal from Burgoyne’s advance and the small number of
troops, specifically officers, there are few direct accounts of the battle. Second hand accounts made by
individuals and official reports provide some insight, but can be problematic when attempting to identify
landscape features related to the battle. Project researchers made every attempt to review accounts from
combatants directly involved in the battle. Often these accounts referred to troop movements without
discussion of distances.
This section presents a review of the historical accounts of the Battle of Fort Anne’s defining
features and their roles in the battle. The following descriptions of the defining features include physical
details of the features from the historical documents, the relation of the defining features to the overall
battlefield, and the KOCOA classification of the defining feature. Given the fluid nature of combat,
defining features can be classified into multiple KOCOA groups and the multiple roles defining features
held are considered. Section 5.3 (p. 54) presents a discussion of spatial analyses that helped to refine the
locations and boundaries of defining features by filling in any gaps from the historical record. Section 6.4
(p. 94) provides an initial assessment of the integrity of these defining features and any post-battle impacts
on the features.
Withdrawal from Skenesborough
For the purposes of this project, the Battle of Fort Anne begins with the Continental army’s
withdrawal from Skenesborough. Under the ABPP’s definition (McMasters 2009), a battle begins when
an army decides to engage an enemy in combat. The Continental soldiers under Col. Long were in a running
withdraw from Burgoyne’s Army starting with the abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga (Ketchum 1997:222).
The events at Skenesborough were a violent engagement between British and Continentals ships as well as
land-based troops (Luzader 2010:69-73; Thacher 1823:100). Colonel Pierse Long decided that the
Continental Army’s position at Skenesborough was lost and a new position at Fort Anne would be more
beneficial. The British Army’s 9th Regiment of Foot followed the withdrawing Continentals towards Fort
Anne. They even engaged and captured one of the Continental’s bateau (Hagist 2004:39). The withdrawal
towards Fort Anne was an active engagement. The influence of the larger Continental Army led to a
difference between the fighting at Skenesborough and Fort Anne.
Major General Philip Schuyler’s involvement of the Albany militia at Fort Anne added a new factor
that differentiated the engagement of Fort Anne from Skenesborough. Whereas the fighting at
Skenesborough served the goal of survival in withdrawing from the British, Schuyler directed Col. Van
Rensselaer to make a stand and delay Burgoyne’s army to allow time for Schuyler to implement larger
logistical and strategic initiatives (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). The result was a different goal and means
of engagement between the fighting at Fort Anne and Skenesborough. The dissimilar experience of
engagement allows this project to distiguish the fighting at Skenesborough from Fort Anne while
recognizing its influence on the Battle of Fort Anne.
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Photo 5.1. Facing north across Skenesborough (Whitehall) Harbor.
The Continentals withdrawing from Skenesborough (Photo 5.1, above) followed one of two paths
on an avenue of retreat towards Fort Anne 14 miles south of Skenesborough, either the Skenesborough
Road or Wood Creek. The routes both took a generally parallel path between Skenesborough and Fort
Anne. Long’s Continental troops and women and injured conducted the withdrawal during the night of
July 6 into the morning hours of July 7 (Farnum 1777; Gray 1777). The condition of the road was bad as
it fell into disrepair and the Continentals razed the bridges (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII). Due to the
bad conditions, the march was slow for both sides. Wood Creek’s channel was shallow and obstructed by
fallen trees leading to slow progress (Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:117). The creek’s meandering nature also
hindered a direct route allowing those taking the road to overtake those on the creek. British troops
overcame and captured some of the Continental’s boats and their occupants, and took them towards Fort
Anne as prisoners (Hagist 2004:39).
In the early morning of July 7, the Continentals began to arrive at Fort Anne. Capt. Gray arrived
at the fort with the Continental Army’s rear guard around 6 am (Gray 1777). Fort Anne was a small
fortification made to resupply passing troops and observe movement between Lake Champlain and the
Hudson Valley. The British, and later the Continentals, located a fortification in the area of Fort Anne since
the end of the 17th century through the 18th century (Fort Ann 2007:9-11).10 Its position on the rise above
the confluence of Wood Creek and the Halfway Brook presented a good observation point for movement
between the two valleys (Napier in Bradford 1962:306). The fort was associated with a blockhouse and
sawmill. A sawmill located approximately 1.6 km (1 mile) northwest of Fort Anne along Halfway Creek
10
Continental soldier Issac Glynne stated that in the Spring of 1777, British allied Native Americans held Fort Anne.
He also stated that the ground around Fort Anne was clear of woods, but was surrounded by tall fire weed (Glynne
1777).
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at Kane’s Falls further supported the need for timber resources in the region (Farnum 1777). A well,
identified now with a historical marker and reconstruction (Photos 5.2 and 5.3, below, p. 45), was a water
source for Fort Anne. The well was located directly east of Fort Anne’s location.
The outpost was not large and not meant to be a major defensive position. A British 1777
reconnaissance report made by Captain McMackay (CO42-36:129) described Fort Anne as “About 30 men
at this place; have a [barracks] picketed round.” The size of the fort allowed the housing of about 30 troops,
but during the Battle of Fort Anne, the number of Continentals exceeded this number. Long’s group of
about 600 troops, plus women and sick and injured troops brought from Fort Ticonderoga, plus those of
Schammell’s Company (Capt. Gray’s troops) who joined in the withdrawal from Skenesborough would
have exceeded Fort Anne’s space. Captain Benjamin Farnham's company of the 15th MA was posted at
Fort Anne since June 14 (Farnum 1777). The additional troops and people withdrawing to Fort Anne most
likely were too numerous to fit within the fort. It is likely that the Continental troops established a camp
outside the walls of Fort Anne allowing space for the troops.
Photo 5.2. Facing west at reconstruction of Fort Anne well.
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Photo 5.3. Facing west at New York State historical marker for Fort Anne well.
First Day of Battle: July 7
As the withdrawing Continentals established themselves at Fort Anne, the British 9th Regiment of
Foot set up a camp outside of Fort Anne. Based on Private Roger Lamb’s description, the British Camp
for July 7 seems to have been expedient. He stated that the British marched to within ¼ mile of Fort Anne
then “halted and lay upon their arms all night” (Hagist 2004:39). The camp served the main purpose of the
British 9th’s advance, to observe Fort Anne (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII) (Photo 5.4, p. 46). The
distance from Fort Anne provided by Pvt. Lamb and the purpose of observing Fort Anne would suggest
that the British camp’s location for the night of July 6-7 was located at the southern base of Battle Hill,
more precisely between the base of Battle Hill and a stream flowing into Wood Creek. The British may
have seen the stream as a resource for water as well as providing an obstacle to any Continental Advance.
The Continental Advance against the British position began about 11 o’clock. Capt. Gray quickly
prepared after arriving at Fort Anne at 6 o’clock that same morning (Gray 1777). Gray marched from Fort
Anne towards the British position with 150 troops and 17 rangers (Gray 1777). His forces first engaged
the British within a ½ mile of Fort Anne. Prior to the engagement, he detached his troops into “front, rear,
and flanking gaurds [sic]” (Gray 1777). He implemented such a maneuver to help identify the British
position without being surprised by a British attack. He described the landscape as wooded, which would
have limited his area of observation. The avenue of approach in this area consists of wetlands (Photo 5.5,
p. 47). It is unclear if these wetlands were present during the time of the battle or if they are a result of the
redirection and rechanneling of the creeks related to the Champlain Canal. Participants in the battle discuss
woods, but not specifically wetlands (Gray 1777; Hagist 2004:39). Wood Creek and a small feeder stream
were present during the battle and may have presented obstacles for the Continentals in their advance.
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The Continentals’ advance quickly overpowered the British, forcing the 9th to withdraw up to the
summit of Battle Hill (Photo 5.6, p. 47). Capt. Gray described it as “…we met with a party of Regualrs
[sic] and gave them fire, which was Return’d [sic] (by the Enemy) who then gave back- I then pursued them
with close fire till they betook themselves to the top of a mountain” (Gray 1777). The Continental troops
positioned themselves at the base of the hill and continued to fire upon the British’s position at the top of
the hill. Around 6 pm, 150 Continentals arrived from Fort Anne to reinforce Capt. Gray’s force. At that
time, the Continentals had a little over 300 soldiers along the base of Battle Hill. Capt. Gray did not provide
details on the spacing of his troops. In estimating of the area covered by the Continentals, with 300 troops
spaced in a single line about 10 ft (3 m) apart, which would be a wide spacing for troops, the line would
stretch 3,000 ft (914 m) in length. This would allow coverage for most of the south and eastern base of
Battle Hill. This may be an overestimate of length if the Continental troops maintained a closer spacing
and multiple lines. This spacing allows for an initial view that can be investigated with archeological
testing. With darkness approaching, Cpt. Gray (Gray 1777) called off the attack and withdrew to Fort Anne.
It is of note that neither of the two main British sources of the Battle of Fort Anne, Pvt. Lamb and
Maj. Forbes, mention the fighting on July 7. Their accounts focus on the engagement of July 8. Pvt. Lamb
misidentifies the date as July 9 (Hagist 2004:39). It may be that the British saw the July 7 skirmish as
minor, especially in comparison to the main battle of July 8.
This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 5.4. Facing south from summit of Battle Hill towards Fort Anne and Wood Creek.
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This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 5.5. Facing north across Continental Army’s avenue of approach on morning of July 7, with Battle
Hill in the background.
Photo 5.6. Facing east at Battle Hill from area of Kane’s Falls.
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Second Day of Battle- July 8
The focus of the Battle of Fort Anne was a defile or pass made by the gap of Wood Creek crossing
between Battle Hill to the north and a series of hills to the south. The narrow pass restricted movement
between the Champlain and Hudson Valleys throughout the 18th century and became a focal point in
engaging the British. The 9th Regiment positioned themselves in the pass to observe and attack the
Continental army at Fort Anne. The Continental Army used the defile’s restrictive landscape to halt the
British from crossing into the Hudson Valley. Major General Philip Schuyler ordered Col. Henry Van
Rensselaer to march with 400 volunteers to the defile and halt the British advance (Van Rensselaer Pension
1818). “…take post at a defile or pass past Fort Ann formed by a ledge of rocks on his (Van Rensselaer)
left and Wood Creek with a thick swamp on his right” (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). Van Rensselaer
was able to reach the defile the morning of July 8. Schuyler wanted Van Rensselaer to delay the British at
the defile until 4 o’clock in the afternoon to allow time for Schuyler to remove stores and personnel to Fort
Edward from Fort George and Fort Anne. Van Rensselaer and his force of Albany Militia held their ground
until dusk surpassing Schuyler’s orders.
Van Rensselaer and the 6th Regiment of the Albany Militia were a major part of the Continental
Army’s July 8 advance against the British. The start of the Continental Army’s advance paralleled the
advance of the preceding day. Capt. Gray, joined by Captain Hutchins, marched with their troops (estimated
300) back to the base of Battle Hill (Gray 1777). British Major Gordon Forbes stated that the attack
commenced at “half past ten” (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61). After about 2 hours, Van Rensselaer’s militia
reinforced the Continentals. The army fired up Battle Hill at the British position. During the advance, the
Continental Army attacked the British following the withdrawing British up the summit of Battle Hill. In
pursuing the British, the Continental troops overcame the injured Capt. Montgomery and surgeon caring
for him as well as the prisoners taken by the British on Wood Creek during the withdrawal from
Skenesborough. The Continental troops’ recovery of the prisoners suggests that the Continentals crossed
the British camp.
The location of the British Camp for July 7-8 is not clear from the historical documents. Pvt. Lamb
provided no details on the location of the camp after the first night’s camp. He mentions that the Continental
advance on the morning of July 8 was first met by British sentries, who were able to attack the Continental
troops initially. Ultimately, the British sentries fell back after the Continental soldiers regrouped (Hagist
2004:39). Maj. Forbes offered some information on the British camp or main position on the morning of
July 8. He described the Continental troops beginning their attack against the British “front” (Forbes in
Burgoyne 1780:61). He also stated that the Continentals oriented their attack on Wood Creek. “A large
body of them passed the creek on the left, fired from a thick wood across the creek on the left flank of the
regiment; they began to re-cross the creek, and attack us in the rear” (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61). The
British were grouped together between Battle Hill and Wood Creek. The Continentals were able to conduct
a flanking maneuver while occupying the British front. After the Continental Army’s flankers crossed back
over Wood Creek, they were in a position to surround the British. Forbes stated that with the possibility of
being surrounded, “we then found it necessary to change our ground… we took post on top of a high hill
to our right” (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61). Forbes description of landmarks suggest that the British camp
was located along the eastern base of Battle Hill between the hill and Wood Creek; the description of the
summit of Battle Hill being on their right, suggests that they were along the eastern side of Battle Hill rather
than the southern side.
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Accounts from Continentals also describe the British camp as located on the eastern base of Battle
Hill. Capt. John Calfe stated that the Continental Army encountered the British within a mile march of Fort
Anne (Calfe in Noyes 1899:291). The Continentals would engage the British along the eastern base of
Battle Hill given this distance by following Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek north from Fort Anne.
The account of the Continental officer, Major Beach, offered by Mr. Weller in 1848 confirms the location
of the British along the eastern side of Battle Hill on July 8. Beach claimed that the British were in a heavily
wooded area at the base of Battle Hill (Fort Anne 2007:19). The British did not cross into the southern
portion of the hill to avoid being exposed to fire. According to Maj. Beach, the Continentals crossed Wood
Creek to outflank the British at a location described as “where the canal enters the old bed of Wood Creek,
at the southwest end of the precipice which here rises perpendicular from the brink of the creek” (Fort
Anne 2007:19). The crossing was north of the British position requiring the Continentals to move south
along Wood Creek as they attempted to surround the British. In the fighting of July 8, Wood Creek served
as a slight obstacle for the Continentals troops, but they were able to overcome it.
The Woods (Photo 5.7, p. 50) on Battle Hill and the surrounding area limited visibility. Roger
Lamb (Hagist 2004:39) stated that the British could hear Continental soldiers attempting to outflank and
surround their position, but could not see them due to the large number of trees. Capt. Money (Money in
Burgoyne 1780:39) while on a scouting mission before Burgoyne’s campaign described the woods as so
thick that a party was required to pass through them for protection. The descriptions of thick woods suggest
that the woods on Battle Hill were secondary growth rather than old-growth woods. An old-growth forest
would have limited undergrowth and vegetation and would allow some visibility rather than the thick
vegetation depicted in the historic accounts.11 Such a situation provided an advantage to rangers who were
experienced in woods fighting, concealing themselves behind trees and firing on the enemy often using
rifles rather than muskets. The British Regulars of the 9th would have been more acquainted with fighting
in more open areas (Spring 2008:139).
The British withdrawal up Battle Hill was a violent one. Pvt. Lamb stated that the British suffered
several casualties as they withdrew up the hill (Hagist 2004:39-41). He was one of the last to withdraw up
the hill and witnessed the soldiers around him shot as they attempted to reach the summit. Forbes does not
detail the heavy firing associated with the move up the hill (Cubbison 2012:73). Capt. Money stated that
the Battle of Fort Anne included some of the heaviest firing he witnessed during the Burgoyne campaign
(Money in Burgoyne 1780:41). Pvt. Lamb stated that the British established a single firing line (“Indian
file”) at the summit of Battle Hill (Hagist 2004:40). This formation was out of the ordinary two rank
formation adopted by the British during the Burgoyne campaign (Spring 2008:152). The formation reflects
the desperation of the British to establish a long line of defense across the summit of Battle Hill to thwart
the Continental army’s attempts at surrounding them.
11
Although settlement around Battle Hill was sparse during the 18th century, there is evidence of logging in the vicinity
that would account for the secondary growth on Battle Hill. In 1709, as a part of Queen Anne’s War, British Colonel
Peter Schuyler built an outpost (Fort Schuyler) in the area of Fort Anne as well as approxiamtly 200 bark canoes and
battaeux for use on Wood Creek (Johnson 1878:16). In 1711, a second fort (Queen’s Fort or Fort Anne) was built to
replace Fort Schuyler. Subsequent reconstructions of Fort Anne during the French and Indian War (Stone 1901) as
well as the presence of a sawmill operated by Philip Skene southeast of Battle Hill at Kane’s Falls (Johnson 1878:302)
show the presence of logging in the area of Battle Hill and the probability of secondary forest on the hill during the
battle.
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This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 5.7. Facing northeast across woods on Battle Hill.
The terrain at the summit of Battle Hill is fairly flat and provided a good staging location to stop
the advancing Continental Army. Photo 5.8 (p. 51) shows the flat terrain on the summit. To the west of
the summit is a ravine with a steep to vertical incline that would serve as a good backdrop dissuading a
Continental attack on the British 9th’s rear (Photo 5.9, p. 51). On the eastern side of the summit, the slope
proved to be an obstacle to the Continentals. They were unable to make a simple and direct advance against
the British (Photo 5.10, p. 52). Chaplain Enos Hitchcock claimed that the British built breastworks
(Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:118). There is no other mention of breastworks related to Battle Hill.
Hitchcock was not in the engagement and his information was second hand. It is likely that the British
were using the natural terrain of boulders and rock outcrops as expedient firing positions. Pvt. Lamb stated
that the firing between the British and Continentals continued until the British ran out of ammunition. The
Continentals realized this and moved forward attempting to surround the British position (Hagist 2004: 40).
The fighting on Battle Hill lasted for a couple of hours (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61) as neither side was
able to advance or withdraw due to the steep terrain.
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This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 5.8. Facing north across summit of Battle Hill.
This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 5.9. Facing north across ravine west of Battle Hill’s summit.
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This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 5.10. Facing northwest across eastern slope of Battle Hill from Continental Army’s position.
Withdraw from Fort Anne
The fighting on Battle Hill came to an end as both the British and Continentals ran out of
ammunition. The Continentals were close to making a final attack on the British on the summit of Battle
Hill when Captain Money’s war whoop led the Continentals to withdraw from Battle Hill (Forbes in
Burgoyne 1780:61; Hagist 2004:40). Money advanced to within 4 miles of the battle with a group of Native
American warriors (Hagist 2004:40). Money ordered the warriors to accompany him into the battle, but
the warriors abandoned him, refusing to fight. He advanced to the “bottom of the hill” and made his war
call influencing the Continentals’ withdrawal (Hagist 2004:40). Capt. Gray and other Continental accounts
did not detail the Continental troops’ avenue of retreat to Fort Anne. They probably withdrew down Battle
Hill to Skenesborough Road and towards Fort Anne.
Informed of Burgoyne’s approaching reinforcements, Colonel Pierse Long in a council of war
decided to withdraw to Fort Edward. Again, the Continental accounts do not detail the path taken to Fort
Edward. Captain Gray listed the distance between Fort Anne and Fort Edward as 14 miles (Gray 1777;
Hadden Journal 1884:89). The avenue of retreat was probably along the Fort Anne-Fort Edward Road,
which corresponds with the present day NY 4. The Continentals burned Fort Anne (Gray 1777) when they
left. The Continentals arrived at Fort Edward the night of July 8 (Calfe in Noyes 1899:292; Gray 1777).
Burgoyne (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX) noted that the Continentals destroyed Fort Anne, but left the
sawmill and blockhouse (at Kane’s Falls) intact, suggesting there was little Continental presence at this
position during the battle. British Lt. Digby noted the presence of unburied British and Continental dead
around Fort Anne. (Digby in Baxter 1887:233-234). His account suggests that the British attempted a
quick burial of the remains, which were already beginning to decompose. The Continental withdrawal from
Fort Anne was quick.
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The British avenue of retreat from Battle Hill appears to have followed a path to the north meeting
with Skenesborough Road. As with the Continental accounts, there is little detail on the path the British
took during the withdrawal from Battle Hill. Pvt. Lamb stated that the British reformed on the hill following
the Continentals’ withdrawal (Hagist 2004:40). The number of injured British soldiers made leaving Battle
Hill difficult. Lamb, along with a soldier’s wife, dressed the wounded and moved them on blankets to a
hut two miles behind the 9th’s position (Hagist 2004:41). The hut was probably located in an area called
the Great Meadows northeast of Battle Hill along both the Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek (Photo
5.11, below). He remained at the hut while the rest of the 9th rejoined Burgoyne’s army at Skenesborough
after following the Skenesborough Road.
Following the Battle of Fort Anne, Maj. Gen. Schuyler commenced an expansive project to create
obstacles to Burgoyne’s forces. He ordered the blocking of roads between Fort Anne and Fort Edward as
well as Wood Creek. The Continentals created the obstructions primarily by cutting trees across the roads
and creek (Adams Pension 1832; Anthony Pension 1832; Digby in Baxter 1887:233; Hadden 1884:94-95
Morris July 17, 1777).
This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 5.11. Facing north across Great Meadows, possible area of post-battle British camp.
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5.3 Geographic Analysis of Defining Features
Project analysts applied various spatial analyses to the landscape of the Battle of Fort Anne to better
identify the boundaries, locations and functions of the defining features identified in the documentary
record. Analysts conducted the analyses using ArcGIS 10.1 software, a geographic information system
(GIS) that provides a digital arena for the storage, analysis, and comparison of various types of spatial data.
The analyses presented here include georeferencing of historic maps, viewshed analysis, interpolation of
slope, and firing ranges for the core areas. Each of these analyses help to refine the locations of the defining
features and provides a foundation for future research and preservation initiatives.
The georeferencing of historic maps was an initial analysis conducted within GIS. Georeferencing
involves the matching of shared points on historic and modern maps. The process fits historic maps into a
similar scale and projection as the modern map overlaying the historic map on the modern map. The result
is a historic image that is comparable to other data sets. By comparing historic maps with a shared scale,
projection, and spatial reference, changes to the landscape and post battle disturbances to defining features
become evident. Historic maps from the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries were georeferenced (Figures 6.6-18,
pp. 78-90). Analysts used common points that they assumed were static over the 200 plus years between
the original drafting of a map and the present for georeferencing. Analysts avoided points that are subject
to change, such as riverbanks and road widths whenever possible. Although georeferencing can provide a
reasonable match between projections of past and current landscapes, error based on inaccurate cartography
practices in the past and uncertain changes to assumed common points can lead to a relative level of
inaccuracy in the overlay. Section 6.2 (p. 70) details the results of this georeferencing.
Viewshed analysis aided the determination of areas of observation and cover/concealment. The
analysis relies on elevation data in the form of a digital elevation model (DEM) to determine line of site
over a set range or distance. Elevation data related to the observers position in the surrounding landscape
determines any obstacles that would limit or obstruct observations. For the Battle of Fort Anne, hills and
slope were the major terrain obstacles, while historic accounts state that woods were another factor that
limited observation on the battlefield.
The viewshed analysis for the Battle of Fort Anne was conducted from the main positions for both
Continentals and British. For the Continentals, observer positions were made at Fort Anne and potential
firing positions along the base and slope of Battle Hill. For the British, observer positions were located at
the base and summit of Battle Hill. The presence of trees on Battle Hill would have greatly restricted the
sight distance for observers and increased the ability for combatants to conceal themselves.
Fort Anne’s purpose was to serve as an observation point and defensive post for the crossing
between the Champlain and Hudson Valleys. Lake Champlain and the Hudson Rivers were the main travel
corridors between Canada and New York. Both routes were defended with a system of fortifications, such
as Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga for Lake Champlain and Fort Edward and Fort Miller for the north
Hudson River. Wood Creek and the associated carry served as the crossing between Lake Champlain and
the Hudson River Valley. Fort Anne’s postion on the carry provided observations of the movements
between the two corridors. Throughout the 18th century, Fort Anne was not a large fortification. It did not
need to be as other paths, such as South Bay and Lake George, offered alternative crossings between the
Champlain and Hudson Valleys (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:182-184). Fort Anne was
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able to serve as an observation post and provide initial defenses while preparing larger defenses at larger
fortifications, such as Fort Edward, as was the case with Schuyler. Viewshed analysis conducted on the
location of Fort Anne, supports Fort Anne’s role as an observation post since it was in a prime location to
view movement through the defile or pass along the Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek between Battle
Hill to the north and other hills to the south (Figure 5.3, p. 56). The fort’s viewshed quickly stops after the
defile, but the valley west of the defile or pass is open to the fort’s observation.
The British positions on Battle Hill during the Battle of Fort Anne provide some open areas of
observation, while also facing limits in observation distance. The British moved across Battle Hill
throughout the battle, moving from the base of the hill to the summit on both days of battle. The viewshed
analysis of Battle Hill’s summit shows the northern portion of the summit provided a better observation
post than the southern ridge (Figure 5.4, p. 57). The summit provides an extensive view of the surrounding
area including the valley to the west (area of Kane’s Falls) and the Great Meadow to the east. However,
observation of the lower elevations of Battle Hill was limited. The southern ridge’s distance of observation
is halted by the presence of steep slope. The presence of slope and trees meant those soldiers positioned
along the southern ridge were in effect blind to movements immediately below them. The middle and
northern sections of the summit held some improvement in sight over the southern ridge, but were still
limited. Observers could see the flat terrace below the summit’s northern section. With this observational
context, the difficulty for the Continental soldiers was to move along either the southern ridge or the
northern ridge. The southern ridge offered greater concealment, but the terrain was steeper and more
difficult to cross. The northern portion was easier to traverse, but offered less concealment.
The Continental soldiers’ avenues of approach covered much of the defile or pass along Wood
Creek and resulted in a wide area of observation. The Continentals did not make a choice between attacking
the British by way of the southern or northern ridge; they attacked by both sides. Their advance along the
base of Battle Hill on both sides of Wood Creek allowed them a clear view of defile and Battle Hill’s slope
(Figure 5.5, p. 58). The one area that was out of their sight was the summit of Battle Hill. The limits of
observation for both sides contributed to the standoff at the Battle of Fort Anne. Neither side held a clear
view of their enemy’s position. They could advance, but not confidently know their enemy’s position or
numbers. This may have led to both sides remaining cautious and not aggressively advancing into an
unknown situation.
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Figure 5.3. Continental Army’s viewshed from Fort Anne.
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Figure 5.4. British viewshed from summit of Battle Hill.
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Figure 5.5. Viewshed of Continental positions during Battle of Fort Anne.
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Range of fire analysis adds some more information on the development of the standoff at Battle
Hill. Captain Money (Money in Burgoyne 1780:41) testified that the gunfire at the Battle of Fort Anne was
intense. Although neither side had a clear view of the other and they may not have aggressively attacked
the other, both sides attempted to use gunfire to hold their enemy in position or break their enemy’s resolve.
Analysts based the range of fire analysis on musket fire with a range of fire of 100 yards (91 m). Muskets
had an accurate range of 50 yards (46 m), but the 100 yards (91 m) distance allowed for the identification
of areas that may have musket balls even if not accurately aimed at a target. Analysts used a distance of
300 yards (274 m) for the range of rifle fire due to the presence of rangers (Gray 1777) and Albany Militia
who may have used rifles due to tactics or supplying of their own arms, respectively.
As with viewshed, the terrain was the determining factor for the range of fire. The slope limited
the range of fire from the British position on Battle Hill’s summit (Figure 5.6, p. 60). They had effective
coverage across the ridges and some limited coverage below the northern ridge, but they did not hold a
clear field of fire below that ridge. The British soldiers may have been able to achieve an increased firing
range by positioning themselves at the edge of the summit and firing below them. The British may have
positioned themselves a little lower than the summit for portions of the battle. Pvt. Lamb stated that he
stayed on the lower slopes of Battle Hill as long as possible before withdrawing to the summit (Hagist
2004:40). He may have known from the July 7 engagement that his range of fire on the summit was limited
and tried to maintain direct fire on the Continentals as long as possible.
The field of fire from the base and slope of Battle Hill provided increased coverage relative to the
summit of Battle Hill (Figure 5.7, p. 61). The field of fire from the middle elevation on Battle Hill firing
down was open. The distance of the weapon seemed to be the limiting factor in the range of fire. As with
the viewshed, there was little to no coverage of the top of Battle Hill. The range of fire for rifle shows a
similar pattern (Figure 5.8, p. 62). The lower slopes and base of Battle Hill were exposed to gunfire, but
the terrain blocked gunfire from lower elevations on the hill. This may have resulted in the British not
suffering many casualties while on the summit. Pvt. Lamb’s description of British soldiers being shot
suggests that they were shot either at the base (Cpt. Montgomery) or on the slope while withdrawing to the
summit (Lt. Westrop) (Hagist 2004:40). The British soldiers’ inability to effectively observe or fire on the
Continentals below them may explain why the British suffered more casualties than the Continentals. The
standoff created by the terrain’s imposed limits on viewshed and range of fire probably also led to the
Continentals waiting until they thought the British were running low on ammunition before finally
advancing on the summit. They were only stopped by Cpt. Money’s war whoop.
Based on historic accounts, along with the viewshed and range of fire analyses, slope was a major
factor in the fighting on Battle Hill. To better understand the role of slope and determine possible avenues
of advance and retreat on the hill, analysts conducted a slope analysis. As with the viewshed analysis,
DEMs were used to identify the percent rise and degree of slope on Battle Hill. Battle Hill consists primarily
of areas of steep slope, especially along its southern and western sections (Figure 5.9, p. 63). The northern
section of Battle Hill contains some flat areas dispersed between areas of steep slope. The summit also
provides a thin but flat top. These flat areas may have provided staging areas for fighting or troop positions.
This was the case with the summit. Figure 5.10 (p. 64) shows the general location of troop positions on
Battle Hill in a 3D context.
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This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its
implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 5.6. British Range of Musket Fire from the Summit of Battle Hill.
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Figure 5.7. Continental Range of Musket Fire from Base and Side of Battle Hill.
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Figure 5.8. Continental Range of Fire for Rifles from Base and Side of Battle Hill.
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Figure 5.9. Degree of Slope for Fort Anne Battlefield.
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Figure 5.10. Three dimensional rendering of Battle of Fort Anne.
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VI. DEFINING FEATURE INTEGRITY
The steep hills and ridges along with the creeks and rivers of the Champlain and Hudson Valleys
influenced the tactics and movements of those engaged in the Battle of Fort Anne and the larger Burgoyne
Campaign. The valleys carved by the waterways, such as Wood Creek, allowed paths for movement across
the landscape, while ridges and hills, such as Battle Hill, posed obstacles for movement. The defile or pass
formed by Wood Creek running south of Battle Hill established a gateway between the Champlain Valley
and the Hudson Valley. The narrowness of the pass allowed armies to defend or block access to the other
valleys. Throughout the 18th century, colonists recognized the importance of this crossover and established
Fort Anne to observe and restrict movement through the pass. On a smaller scale, the forests and rocky
terrain of landmarks, such as Battle Hill, provided defensible positions. During the Battle of Fort Anne,
both the British and Continentals made use of the natural landscape as avenues of approach and retreat as
well as for their own observations and defense.
This section presents the natural and cultural setting for the Fort Anne Battlefield. The discussion
presented here details the natural geological and climatic environment experienced by the battle’s
combatants. This is followed by a history of the changes to the battlefield’s landscape following the battle
and the American Revolution. A listing of the effects of development and changes to the economy and
transportation in the region considers the direct and indirect effects on the battlefield’s integrity. The
section closes with an assessment of each defining feature’s integrity based on surficial observation.
6.1 Environmental Setting
The Fort Anne Battlefield extends for approximately 30 miles from Whitehall (Skenesborough) in
the north to Fort Edward to the south. The focal point for the battlefield is centered on the Village of Fort
Anne and Battle Hill. To help inform the archeological research design (Section 7, p. 107) the discussion
of soils in this section focuses on the areas of Fort Anne and Battle Hill since that is the most likely area
for future archeological testing. The discussion also provides a baseline of expected soils associated with
the battle’s defining features. Due to the ephemeral nature of battles, combat related activity did not occur
long enough to allow extensive deposition or widespread alteration of the natural soils. Instead, limited
material deposits made a slight impact on the natural soils. Therefore, this discussion informs more about
the potential post-battle impacts to soils. There is an expectation that urban development will affect soils
with construction and cut-fill activities. Agricultural practices may also affect soil deposits. However,
pasture and plowing activities have a different impact than urban development. By reviewing soils, primary
soil impacts become evident and can inform future testing and feature evaluation.
The Fort Anne Battlefield is located within the Hudson-Champlain Lowlands physiographic area
located between the Adirondack Mountains to the west and the Taconic Uplands to the south and east
(USDA 1975:141). The entire region’s topography is the result of glaciation during the Pleistocene epoch
(USDA 1975:141). The ice sheets carved the bedrock while depositing unconsolidated debris consisting
of boulders and gravel. The Hudson-Champlain Lowland was shaped by the erosion of soft bedrock by
glacial lakes and streams resulting from the melting glaciers at the end of the Pleistocene epoch (USDA
1975:142). The glacial Champlain Sea transitioned to Lake Champlain while the associated rivers
transitioned to the Hudson River and feeder streams and creeks. The result of the glaciation and erosion
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was a series of steep hills and ridges sided by waterways. Battle Hill and Wood Creek are examples of this
resulting terrain. The ridges and hills created by glaciation also divided the main waterways in the area of
Lake Champlain and the Hudson River into separate watersheds. The smaller feeder streams and creeks,
such as Wood Creek, helped to erode through the ridges establishing passes and connections between the
watersheds (Figure 6.1, p. 67). Glacial activity established a steep terrain on Battle Hill devoid of much
soil and exposed bedrock covering most of the hill. The glacial meltwater forming into streams like Wood
Creek further added to the steepness and shape of the hills and valleys by cutting and eroding the hills and
ridges.
The glaciation also led to the development of the soils associated with the battlefield (Table 6.1, p.
68; Figure 6.2, p. 69). For the purposes of this project, the soils reviewed focused on the core area of the
battlefield, including Fort Anne, Battle Hill, and the area of Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek defining
features. There are two main types of soils within the central area of the battlefield and these are related to
the terrain. Flood plain and lacustrian soils are associated with the lower elevations along Wood Creek and
Skenesborough Road defining features. The Battle Hill defining features are associated with soils
consistent with rock outcrops, glacial till, and terraces. There is one soil type that provides evidence of
disturbance- Orthents and Psamments (OP). This soil series is associated with dredging of the Hudson
River and Champlain Canal. This soil is very limited in the battlefield and localized to a section of the
Skenesborough Road defining feature. Overall, the soils suggest a landscape of high integrity with limited
soil development at higher elevations (Battle Hill) and deeper soil deposition in the lower elevations
(Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek).
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Figure 6.1. Terrain and watershed map showing Fort Anne Battlefield defining features.
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Table 6.1. USDA Soil Series for Fort Anne Battlefield (USDA 1975).
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
p. 68
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Figure 6.2. USDA Soil Series associated with Battle of Fort Anne defining features.
(See Table 6.1, p. 68, for soil descriptions)
p. 69
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6.2 Post Battle Land Use and Alterations
Due to its location as a travel route between the Champlain Valley and the Hudson Valley, troops
traveled near the Fort Anne Battlefield for the duration of the American Revolution. Burgoyne established
his campaign headquarters at Fort Anne in late July of 1777 (Burgoyne 1780: Appendix 42; Digby in Baxter
1887:233; Hadden 1884:96). By July 28, the main army began to march from Fort Anne leaving soldiers
to help with supplies (Digby in Baxter 1887:239; Hadden 1884:98). By September of 1777, Burgoyne was
unable to defend against an approaching Continental Army and ordered Fort Anne evacuated (Hadden
1884:lxxxiii-lxxxiv; Ketchum 1997:340). The Continental Army continued to hold Fort Anne until October
10, 1780 when British Major Christopher Carleton burned the fort (Hadden 1884:21n). At this time the fort
consisted of about 75 troops, a blockhouse, and stockade. The events associated with the area of Fort Anne
after the battle were focused on fortification rather than the overall battlefield.
Post War Settlement
Although the British established settlement in the area of Fort Anne during the 18th century, it was
not until after the American Revolution that settlement reached sizable numbers. Fort Anne was located
within the Artillery Patent consisting of 2,400 acres, which the British government granted to British Army
officers on October 24, 1764 (Johnson 1878:301) (Figure 6.3, p. 72). Even with this patent, settlement to
the area was slow. One of the early settlers in the region, Philip Skene, established Skenesborough and a
sawmill at Kane’s Falls (Johnson 1878:302). Skene was a Loyalist and lost his lands as a result of the war.
Immediately following the war, settlement increased. George Wray established the Hamlet of
Westfield, surveying the streets and naming them after his family (Fort Ann 2007:11). Wray also owned
the falls along Halfway Brook, which he sold to Charles Kane who changed the name to Kane’s Falls (Fort
Ann 2007:11). The Hamlet of Westfield was renamed Fort Ann in 1808. The Village of Fort Ann was
incorporated in 1820 (Fort Ann 2007:12). The early settlement around Fort Ann followed a pattern common
throughout New York with the establishment of sawmills and gristmills. Villages grew around these mills
(Johnson1878:302; Stradling 2010:39). Logging was the primary economy during the early 19th century as
settlers made use of the resources from the woods and opened up the area for farming (Stradling 2010:3235). Following the opening of land, farming took a more prominent role in the economy. The Village of
Fort Ann became the commercial center for the surrounding rural area.
Battle Hill was subject to logging throughout the 19th century. Logging in the area was conducted
by Skene during the 18th century and Major General Benedict Arnold may have used timber from the Battle
Hill area for building his Lake Champlain fleet. During the early 19th century, the Weller family owned
most of Battle Hill. Daniel Weller was a Revolutionary War veteran who settled in Fort Ann and possibly
fought in the battle of Fort Anne. He drowned in Wood Creek in 1827. He was buried on a portion of his
property that he said was part of the Fort Anne Battlefield (Photo 6.1, p. 74). His burial along US Route 4
coincides with the Continental Advance.
The steep slope and lack of soil on Battle Hill made it difficult to farm. A c. 1860 lithograph of the
defile area (Figure 6.5, p. 73) shows Battle Hill covered with trees. The description of the image states that
“the forest on the left is ‘thick wood’ of the Revolution” while the area west of Battle Hill is covered with
agricultural fields (Lossing 1860:141). A 1942 USDA aerial photograph of Battle Hill shows it covered
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with forest, suggesting there was little farming attempted on the hill even into the 20th century (Figure 6.15,
p. 87). During a walkover of the hill, project archaeologists saw no evidence of historic farming activities,
but identified a stonewall property marker with a depression possibly associated with a structure in the
southern portion of Battle Hill (Photo 6.2, p. 74). The area of Battle Hill appears to have had few impacts
and limited utilization from the 19th through the 20th centuries.
Recognition of the Battle of Fort Anne began with the settlement of the region. The Village of Fort
Ann was given its name in 1808 due to the presence of the fortification and battle (Fort Ann 2007:12). An
1844 description of the Fort Ann area details the Fort Anne Battlefield.
On leaving the street of Fort Ann Village, there is a bridge over Wood Creek,
leading to its left bank. Immediately beyond the bridge there is a narrow pass,
only wide enough for a carriage, and cut, in great measure, out of a rocky
ledge, which terminates here exactly at the creek. The ledge is the southern
end of a rocky hill, which converges towards Wood Creek, and between the
two is a narrow tract of level ground, which terminates at the pass already
mentioned. On this ground the battle took place, and the wood on the right
bank of the creek, from which the Americans fired upon the left flank of the
British, is still there, and it is up this rocky hill that they retreated and took
their stand (Nielson 1844:30-31).
Nineteenth century lithographs with accompanying descriptions of the battlefield (Figures 6.4-5, p. 73) also
define the battlefield as centered on Battle Hill (Lossing 1860:139-141). Beginning with an 1853 map
(Figure 6.10, p. 82), the hill north of the Village of Fort Anne is labeled as Battle Hill. It is of note that the
historic USGS maps from 1893 and 1904 list Battle Hill on the hill south of Wood Creek (Figures 6.12-13,
pp. 84-85). This is a mislabeling as the other maps have Battle Hill labeled on the current Battle Hill. In
1927, the Town of Fort Ann and the State of New York erected a plaque on Battle Hill to commemorate
the 150 year anniversary of the battle (Photo 6.3, p. 75). The plaque was moved with changes to US Route
4. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Battle Hill served as a commemorative landscape for the
memorialization of the Battle of Fort Anne.
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Figure 6.3. Undated map of "Skenesborough" and Artillery Patent, now Whitehall Township
(NY State Library).
p. 72
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Figure 6.4. Site of Fort Anne c. 1860 (Lossing 1860:139).
Figure 6.5. Site of Battle Hill c. 1860 (Lossing 1860:141).
p. 73
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Photo 6.1. Facing southwest at Daniel Weller burial.
This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 6.2. Facing west across stone wall on Battle Hill.
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Photo 6.3. Facing west at cut into Battle Hill and Battle Hill plaque.
Transportation
Transportation developments presented the most definitive impacts to the Fort Anne Battlefield.
The area of Fort Ann continued to be an active transportation route between the Champlain and Hudson
Valleys throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. With rising industrial and commercial trade in the 19th
century, the connection between these two valleys increased in importance connecting Canadian ports with
New York City and Albany.
The first transportation development was the construction of the Champlain Canal. The canal
began in 1817 with the charter of the Delaware Hudson Canal Company (Fort Ann 2007:173). The canal
opened in 1823 and connected Lake Champlain and the Hudson River by connecting Whitehall to Fort
Edward (Whitford 1906). The route generally followed Wood Creek leading to dramatic rechanneling and
eradication of Wood Creek (Photo 6.4, p. 76). The initial depth was three feet deep with a 30 foot width
(Whitford 1906:79). In the 1860s, the canal was deepened to five and later seven feet deep (Whitford
1906:13-14). In the early 20th century, the canal was redesigned. Portions of the original canal were
abandoned and new channels cut (Fort Ann 2007:176). Those working on the canal constructed small huts
or structures along the canal for housing. Some of these structures were in proximity to the base of Battle
Hill.
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In 1848, transportation was improved in the area with the construction of the Saratoga Washington
Railroad (Fort Ann 2007:173). The railroad paralleled the Champlain Canal connecting Saratoga Springs
to Whitehall. The railroad passed along the base of Battle Hill and west of the Village of Fort Ann. The
train transported iron ore from the surrounding area and tourists to Lake Champlain (Fort Ann 2007:175).
The rail line is still in use as a line for commercial and passenger service (Photo 6.5, p. 77).
The Skenesborough Road continued to be used into the 19th century. The historic maps suggest
there was little alteration of the road throughout the 19th century (Figures 6.10-18, pp. 82-90). The major
changes to the roadway began during the 20th century. A portion of what became US Route 4 moved west
of the Skenesborough Road following the base of the hills rather than the creek. The southern base of Battle
Hill was also cut into to make room for US Route 4, moving it to the west. Portions of the road abandoned
with the construction of US Route 4 became used as local roads, such as Flat Rock Road and Old Route 4.
The newer portions of US Route 4 moved the road away from the Fort Anne Battlefield limiting impacts
related to its construction.
Photo 6.4. Facing north across Champlain Canal.
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Photo 6.5. Facing south across rail line near base of Battle Hill.
p. 77
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.6. Overlay of defining features on 1762 Brassier map.
p. 78
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.7. Overlay of defining features on 1777 Faden map of Burgoyne Campaign.
p. 79
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.8. Overlay of defining features on 1780 map (Burgoyne 1780).
p. 80
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.9. Overlay of defining features on 1825 Geddes map.
p. 81
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Figure 6.10. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1853 Levey map.
p. 82
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.11. Overlay of defining features on 1866 Stone and Stewart map.
p. 83
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Figure 6.12. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1893 Fort Anne, NY-VT 15’ USGS
Quadrangle.
p. 84
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Figure 6.13. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1904 Fort Anne, NY-VT 15’ USGS
Quadrangle.
p. 85
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.14. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1944 Fort Anne, NY 7.5’ USGS
Quadrangle.
p. 86
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.15. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 1
of 4).
p. 87
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.16. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 2
of 4).
p. 88
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 6.17. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 3
of 4).
p. 89
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Figure 6.18. Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 4
of 4).
p. 90
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p. 91
6.3 General Threats to Defining Feature Integrity
The Fort Anne Battlefield is located on private property with multiple landowners. The site is not
listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The lack of listing is not due to ineligibility. Instead, the
battlefield has not been listed since no one has attempted to list the property prior to this project. The result
is that the battlefield is not protected from threats to its integrity. The main threats to the battlefield’s
defining features include the mining of the granite bedrock on Battle Hill and relic hunting.
The impacts to the Fort Anne Battlefield have been localized and limited. The largest impacts
resulted from the development of canal, railroad, and roadway transportation routes. The construction of
these transportation routes resulted in the reshaping of the valley containing the Skenesborough Road and
Wood Creek. Such reshaping distorted the setting and feeling associated with the paths taken by
Continental and British forces from Skenesborough to Fort Anne. Other impacts were small, including a
small refuse dump in the vicinity of the British July 7 camp, Daniel Weller’s burial, and logging roads on
Battle Hill. Figure 6.19 (p. 93) shows the location of impacts visible during the walkover survey.
The most pressing threat to the remains of the Fort Anne Battlefield in the vicinity of Battle Hill is
a proposed granite mine. A construction company is proposing a topsoil and granite mine on Battle Hill.
The project plans include the construction of a haulage road connecting the mine area to US Route 4,
clearing of trees and brush, stockpiling of topsoil, quarrying of granite, and construction of a berm to block
visibility of the operations from the east (Oberon 2010). The proposed mine encompasses 50 acres (20.2
ha) (Oberon 2010, 2011). Figure 6.19 (p. 93) shows the proposed boundary for the project (Oberon 2011).
In 2010 and 2011, Stephen Oberon conducted archeological reconnaissance in the area of the
proposed topsoil and granite mine (Oberon 2010, 2011). Oberon briefly mentioned the Battle of Fort Anne
and determined that the battle was localized at the base of Battle Hill. He based this determination on two
19th century secondary sources (Oberon 2010:6, 2011:4-5). Oberon’s recommendation suggested testing
for Precontact materials and a low sensitivity for Euroamerican cultural material remains (Oberon 2010:7).
Oberon did not test areas with a greater than 12 percent rise (Oberon 2010:11). This meant that
approximately 50% of the parcel was not tested (Oberon 2010:20; 2011:9). The testing consisted of a grid
of shovel test pits placed at an interval of 15 m (49 ft). No artifacts were recovered from the shovel test
pits. In 2011, at the request of New York’s Office of Parks Recreation and Historic Preservation, Oberon
conducted an intensive metal detector survey of the proposed access road and flatter areas in the eastern
portion of the proposed mine site (Oberon 2011:3). Jeff Slade conducted the metal detecting survey. The
sampling strategy consisted of overlapping systematic transects 12 feet (3.6 m) in width (Oberon 2011:3).
The metal detector survey identified three items: an iron ox shoe, a brass bullet, and an iron horse shoe.
The testing methodology presents some issues in identification of battle related materials. The
majority of the parcel was either not tested due to slope or tested with shovel test pits. Shovel test pits are
an ineffective method for identification of battlefield remains due to their ephemeral nature (Reeves
2011:88). The metal detector survey was limited to the eastern portion of the proposed project area. This
left the portion most likely associated with the Fort Anne Battlefield and most likely to have battlefield
remains not covered by the metal detector survey area. Portions of the British position on the summit of
Battle Hill are within the boundaries of the proposed mine, but this area was not tested with a metal detector
survey, and survey in this area consisted of limited testing with shovel test pits.
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The metal detector survey also limited the identification of battle remains. The size of the sweep
is larger than recommended. Transect widths should be about 1 m (3.3 ft) rather than the 12 feet (3.6 m) to
ensure there is close contact between the detector and the ground as well as tight coverage. Oberon stated
they used a White’s 5500D metal detector with a Blue Max coil (Oberon 2011:3). White’s produced this
detector in the 1980s as part of the Coinmaster line, White’s entry-level line for metal detectors. Metal
Detector survey involves the use of a technical instrument and so the age and design of the detector need
to be considered when evaluating the survey. Members of the Register of Professional Archaeologists’
Advanced Metal Detecting for the Archaeologist training staff suggest that archaeologists should not use
detectors older than 5-10 years in archeological survey (Powis 2012:10). For military sites, especially those
that have been subjected to relic hunting (Fort Anne) a mid-to high level machine should be used (Powis
2012:10). Neither of these standards was met with the metal detecting survey conducted by Oberon
(2011:3).
The archeological testing on Battle Hill did not provide an effective means to evaluate the impacts
of the proposed granite mine or identify cultural remains within or adjacent to the proposed granite mine.
The archaeologist’s methodology was not appropriate for identification of battle related materials. The
methodology also did not fit current professional standards. The historical research conducted for the 2010
and 2011 survey was limited and did not take into account primary accounts that provided descriptions of
the landscape used during the battle.
The research presented for this battlefield preservation project identified the location of the Battle
of Fort Anne’s defining features and determined that the proposed granite mine will directly impact portions
of the battlefield. The proposed topsoil and granite mine will impact the British position on the summit of
Battle Hill, portions of the Continental advance, and the British retreat. The impact will be both direct and
indirect. The removal of topsoils and granite bedrock will remove battle related cultural material, such as
lead balls, buttons, and personal items of combatants. The impacts will also have long-term indirect effects
as quarrying may undermine the rest of the summit of Battle Hill leading to future erosion. The quarrying
will also impact the viewshed of the defining features influencing the feeling and setting of the features. It
will also distort any research that relies on landscape or spatial analysis by altering the terrain of the area
in and around the battlefield. The impacts on the terrain will distort the setting and feeling of the battlefield,
which will adversely influence the experience and use of the battlefield as a commemorative landscape.
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
Grant # (GA-2287-13-012)
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Figure 6.19. Impacts to Battle Hill section of Fort Anne Battlefield.
_p._93
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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p. 94
6.4 Condition of Battlefield Defining Features
The National Register of Historic Place’s evaluation of integrity (National Park Service 1997) forms the
definition of integrity used in this project’s assessment of defining feature integrity. The individual assessments
for the defining features presented here are not a determination of the eligibility of the Fort Anne Battlefield for
the National Register of Historic Places. Taken together, the individual assessments inform an initial
determination of integrity and the boundary for potential listing on the National Register of Historic Places.
Further archeological investigations may be needed to better determine eligibility for listing on the National
Register. This project uses the criteria established by the National Register of Historic Places as a guideline rather
than an actual determination of eligibility. The National Register of Historic Places lists seven criteria for
evaluation of integrity. These seven include location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and
association (Hardesty and Little 2009:63).
Given that the defining features were associated with a battlefield and contained little to no structural
remains, the common way to approach the defining features is to view them as archeological sites following under
Criterion D of the National Register Criteria for evaluation, “That have yielded or may be likely to yield,
information important in history or prehistory” (NPS 1997). As archeological features, to have a high level of
integrity, not all seven need to be present. The defining features are associated with a battlefield and some of the
criteria will not be applicable, such as design and workmanship. The criterion of setting is an evaluation of how
similar the current landscape is to the time of its significance. The period of significance for this study is 1777
during Burgoyne’s campaign. Feeling is defined such that the feature along with its setting provides “a historic
sense of the property during its period of significance” (Hardesty and Little 2009:64). The location criterion
relates to whether the defining feature’s location is identifiable. For this project, material relates to the presence
of archeological or cultural deposits associated with the defining feature. Association is defined as the ability of
the feature and/or cultural deposits to answer potential research questions (Hardesty and Little 2009:64).
Understanding that none of the features will meet all seven of these criteria and that some, such as design
and workmanship will not be applicable, researchers established a scale to guide the integrity assessment. If a
defining feature meets none or one of these criteria, it will be assessed as having low integrity. If it has two to
three, it will be assessed as having moderate integrity, and if it has four or more, it will be assessed as having high
integrity.
The following is a list of the defining features associated with the 1777 Battle of Fort Anne with a
description of their current conditions (See Table 5.1, p. 38). Evaluation of the defining features, based strictly
on above surface indications, is limited and can be wrong when buried cultural deposits are considered. As such,
these assessments should be considered preliminary. Further archeological field testing for buried cultural
deposits should be conducted to better define the integrity assessment. Limited resources in terms of time and
access prevented an extensive review of all of the defining features.
Battle Hill
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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p. 95
Battle Hill consists of a complex of defining features associated with the Battle of Fort Anne. It was the
core area of the battlefield and as such was the focal point for the engagements that occurred between July 7 and
8, 1777. The defining features associated with Battle Hill included: Defile/Pass, Battle Hill Breastworks, British
Retreat, Continental Hill Retreat, and Battle Hill Woods.
Defile/Pass
The defile/pass was a location formed by the passing of Wood Creek between Battle Hill to the north and
a set of hills to the south (Photo 6.6, below). The defile/pass was the focus of the Battle of Fort Anne and part of
the core area of the battlefield. The Champlain Canal, construction of a railroad, and the straightening of US
Route 4 have impacted the shape of the defile. However, material from the battle may still be present in the area
and can still be interpreted to public audiences to establish a feeling of the Battle of Fort Anne. Therefore, the
feature has moderate to high integrity.
This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 6.6. Facing south at southern portion of defile.
Battle Hill Breastworks
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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p. 96
There is only one historical account of breastworks associated with the British position in the Battle of
Fort Anne. Chaplain Enos Hitchcock mentions them in a secondary account (Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:118).
The British do not mention the construction of breastworks. It is possible they used the natural terrain of boulders
and rock outcrops as expedient forms of breastworks. Further archeological testing may help with this
identification. However, with no clear identification for the location or identity of this feature, the feature has a
low integrity.
Battle Hill
The British withdrawals and Continental advances and withdrawals on Battle Hill cover much of the same
area. These avenues of approach and retreat covered the southern, eastern, and northern faces of Battle Hill as
the British withdrew to the summit and the Continentals advanced towards them. At some point along the hill’s
slope the Continentals were unable to overcome the summit facing fire from the British on the top of the hill
(Photo 6.7, below). The area between the two lines was a field of fire that covered much of Battle Hill (Photo
6.8, p. 97). Logging roads that cut into Battle Hill’s slope present the biggest impact. These were probably
constructed during the 19th and 20th centuries, with the most evident related to the 20th century. Initial attempts at
granite mining have also made an impact (Photo 6.9, p. 97). These impacts are localized. Reforestation has also
covered much of these impacts meaning the feeling and setting for the defining feature is not adversely affected.
This feature has high integrity.
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 6.7. Facing south across southeastern face of Battle Hill.
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p. 97
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Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 6.8. Facing north across access road.
This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 6.9. Facing north at granite mine area.
Summit of Battle Hill
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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p. 98
The British 9th Regiment positioned itself along the summit of Battle Hill after withdrawing from the base
of the hill. The soldiers formed a single line that stretched across the full length of the summit to prevent the
Continental troops from surrounding them. There are no identifiable impacts to the summit (Photo 6.10, below).
Agriculture and other ventures were probably too difficult to attempt and so people left the area alone. Relic
hunting may have occurred, but battle related materials are still likely to be present. The trees, low lying ridges,
and boulders provide both a setting and feeling that help to inform visitors to the summit of the events that
occurred there during the Battle of Fort Anne. The feature has high integrity.
This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 6.10. Facing north across Battle Hill summit.
Woods
The woods on Battle Hill presented an obstacle and cover for those fighting in the Battle of Fort Anne.
The British seemed to be the most concerned by the presence of the woods blocking their view of the advancing
Continental Army. It is unclear how much of the original hill was deforested and for what purpose. The 1942
aerial photographs of the hill show intact woods. As the woods are associated with Battle Hill, they have a definite
location. Although the trees on Battle Hill presently do not date to the Battle of Fort Anne, their presence provides
a setting and feeling reflecting the landscape of Battle Hill during the American Revolution. The feature has high
integrity.
Base of Western Side of Battle Hill (British Camp July 7)
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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p. 99
The British established their first camp within ½ mile of Fort Anne at the southern base of Battle Hill to
observe the Continental Army at Fort Anne. On July 7, the Continentals attacked and overran the British camp
and forced the British to withdraw up the slopes of Battle Hill. There is surface evidence of an early to mid-20th
century dumping site in the location of the feature (Photo 6.11, below). The presence of the metal and more
recent refuse would make it difficult to identify the material remains of the British camp. The presence of the
refuse takes away from the feeling of the feature as a Revolutionary war camp. The presence of the trees is
suggestive of the wooded landscape present during the battle. Together, the feature has low to moderate integrity.
This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 6.11. Facing west across 20th century landfill at base of Battle Hill.
Eastern Base of Battle Hill (British Camp July 8)
Following the attack on their position on July 7, the British established a new camp. The location of the
British Camp from July 7-8 is not clear. Based on historical descriptions it is located on the eastern base of Battle
Hill. Wood Creek and Battle Hill bounded the camp. On July 8, the Continentals attacked and overran the camp
forcing the British to withdraw up Battle Hill. Further archeological testing could help to identify the camp’s
location. There has been little impact to the probable location of the camp. The setting and feeling are also
present as woods still cover the area, and Wood Creek and Battle Hill in that area have experienced little change.
As such the feature has moderate to high integrity. Identification with archeological testing could show the feature
has high integrity.
Flat Area Northeast of Battle Hill (British Camp Post-Battle)
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Following the Continental Army’s withdrawal from Battle Hill, the British also withdrew from Battle
Hill. Most of the 9th Regiment returned to Skenesborough to rejoin Burgoyne’s main army. However, Pvt. Lamb
and the wounded British soldiers remained in a camp (Photo 6.12, below). Pvt. Lamb stated he established a
refuge to stay with the wounded in a hut two miles from the summit of Battle Hill. The precise location is
unknown, but the camp probably was located in an area called the Great Meadow. There is no evidence of the
hut, but material remains of the camp may still be present. The setting and feeling associated with the Great
Meadow at the northern base of Battle Hill is suggestive of a camp area, which could help with interpretation.
Therefore, the feature has moderate integrity.
This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Photo 6.12. Facing south across British camp post-battle.
Wood Creek/ Skenesborough Road
The Continental Army’s advance from Fort Anne to the British positions at Battle Hill crossed both the
Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek. The terrain covered by the feature consists of wetlands and woods. The
construction of US Route 4, the railroad, and the Champlain Canal impacted the feature. However, the impacts
are localized to portions of the advance. For those sections of the advance not associated with these impacts,
there are no other noted impacts. As such the feature has moderate integrity based on its location, setting, and
feeling.
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Fort Anne Fort Edward Road
The Fort Anne-Fort Edward road was the Continental Army’s avenue of retreat from Fort Anne.
Following the battle, Maj. Gen. Schuyler obstructed the road with fallen trees. The path generally follows that of
US Route 4. There are no visible remains of the road from 1777 and straightening and redesigning of the road
has occurred since 1777. Since the exact location of the feature is unidentified, there is little ability for the feature
to meet the feeling, or association criteria. Setting is also difficult to meet with the development of rural farm
fields and the urban development in the area of Fort Edward. There may be possible materials dropped by
advancing troops. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity.
Fort Anne
The area of the Fort Anne defining feature includes the location of Fort Anne and the Continental camp
in the vicinity of the fort. Fort Anne was a fortification repeatedly built and razed throughout the 18th century.
During the Battle of Fort Anne, it was the central position of the Continental Army. The areas of the fort and
camp have been impacted by the 19th and 20th century development of the Village of Fort Ann. The construction
of a bank directly impacted the location of Fort Anne. Part of this development included the construction of a
building in the style of the Fort Anne blockhouse (Photo 6.13, p. 102). A 19th century residential structure
impacted the area surrounding the Fort Anne location and possible site of the Continental Army’s camp (Photo
6.14, p. 102). There is no surface integrity to the Fort Anne defining feature meaning the feature does not meet
the setting and feeling criteria. With no definitive material remains, the association criterion is not met. The
defining feature meets the location criteria. Therefore, the feature has low integrity.
Fort Edward
Fort Edward was a British fortification during the French and Indian War and a Continental fortification
during the American Revolution. Maj. Gen. Schuyler used Fort Edward as a staging area to consolidate resources,
supplies, and personnel to defend against British Gen. Burgoyne’s advance. The Continentals withdrew to Fort
Edward following the Battle of Fort Anne. David Starbuck (2010) has been conducting archeological excavations
of Fort Edward since 1996. Although the Village of Fort Edward developed around the site of the 18th century
fortification, much of the feeling and setting are still present. Due to the location, feeling, and setting criteria
being met, along with the presence of material artifacts the Fort Edward defining feature has high integrity.
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
Grant # (GA-2287-13-012)
Photo 6.13. Facing east at area of Fort Anne.
Photo 6.14. Facing northwest at area of Fort Anne and surrounding Continental camp.
p. 102
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Skenesborough Road
The Skenesborough Road was a military road connecting Skenesborough (Whitehall) to Fort Anne. The
road paralleled Wood Creek. Members of the Continental Army withdrawing from Skenesborough followed the
road to Fort Anne. The British 9th Regiment of Foot used the road to pursue the Continentals and to return to
Burgoyne’s main army in Skenesborough following the Battle of Fort Anne. The present US Route 4 roadway
generally follows the path of Skenesborough Road. Nineteenth and 20th century development in the area of
Whitehall impacted portions of the road (Photo 6.15, below). Redesign of US Route 4 led to straightening and
leveling of the path. This cut into the hills and ridges, most notably in portions of Battle Hill (Photo 6.16, p. 104).
Overall, the road is paved, but still representative of the location of the Skenesborough Road (Photo 6.17, p. 104).
The setting of Skenesborough Road changed due to urban development in the area of Whitehall, the construction
and expansion of the Champlain Canal, loss of forests for farms, logging, and rock quarries. Since the feature
still has location, and feeling, along with the possibility of materials related to the approaches and retreats, the
feature has moderate integrity.
Photo 6.15. Facing south across start of Skenesborough Road in Whitehall (Skenesborough).
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Photo 6.16. Facing west at cut along US Route 4, Skenesborough Road and Battle Hill defining features.
Photo 6.17. Facing south across Skenesborough Road, Old Route 4.
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Wood Creek
Wood Creek was used as an avenue of approach and retreat during the Battle of Fort Anne. It connected
Skenesborough to Fort Anne. Its proximity to Battle Hill meant it also functioned as an obstacle to the Continental
Army’s attack on British positions. Historically, the creek meandered throughout the small valley between
Skenesborough (Whitehall) and Fort Ann, also called the Great Meadow. During the early 19th century,
construction of the Champlain Canal straightened and rechanneled much of Wood Creek. Portions of the original
creek channel are still present near Whitehall (Photo 6.18, below), but the Champlain Canal has subsumed other
portions of Wood Creek. This is the case near Battle Hill (Photo 6.19, p. 106).
For those areas associated with the Champlain Canal, the feature has low integrity in that location is the
only criteria met. The others (setting, association, feeling, and material) have all been impacted. For portions of
Wood Creek that still retain the original channeling, the criteria increase to include: location, association, and
possibly material. Much of the landscape changed from the old growth woods found in the area in 1777 to the
farm fields of today, affecting setting and feeling. This means that for portions of Wood Creek the integrity level
is moderate to possibly high if materials are determined to be present.
Photo 6.18. Facing south along Champlain Canal and Wood Creek near Comstock, Wood Creek along left side
of channel.
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Photo 6.19. Facing west at Champlain Canal, area of Wood Creek near Battle Hill, showing impacts from
construction of the canal.
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VII. ARCHEOLOGICAL RESEARCH DESIGN
This section was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
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VIII. SUMMARY
This report detailed the results of a documentary and field study of the Battle of Fort Anne. The primary
goal of this study was to identify the location of the Fort Anne Battlefield and its defining features. Project
researchers also developed an initial assessment of the integrity of these defining features based on a walkover
and observations of the surface and spatial analysis. To aid in the documentary study, project researchers
developed an inventory of archives with materials associated with the Battle of Fort Anne (Appendix II, p. Error!
Bookmark not defined.). Researchers prioritized these archives when conducting a review of historic documents
on the Battle of Fort Anne. Project researchers reviewed historic documents, including maps, pension
applications, correspondence, and journals, for remarks or references to landscape features and general
background information on the battle. Project analysts conducted spatial and military terrain analysis on these
spatial landmarks (defining features) to determine how combatants used these features during the battle. Each
defining feature was classified as serving as key terrain, observation, cover/conceal, obstacle, or avenue of
approach/retreat. Such an analysis is a KOCOA or military terrain analysis (Appendix III, p. Error! Bookmark
not defined.). With this determination, project teams conducted field assessment and further spatial analyses to
develop further research questions and insights into the Battle of Fort Anne that may have been missed by historic
accounts.
The Battle of Fort Anne was an important battle during Burgoyne’s 1777 Campaign. Burgoyne began
with victories across the Champlain Valley. He quickly took control over Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga and
dealt the Continentals defeats at the Battle of Hubbardton and at Skenesborough. Fort Anne appeared to be the
next to fall to Burgoyne’s army, but instead changed the momentum of his campaign from a quick advance to a
slow drive to move his supplies and artillery. The Continental soldiers under Colonel Pierse Long fleeing from
Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough used the opportunity at Fort Anne to directly engage Burgoyne’s army
rather than continue their withdrawal. They left Fort Anne and advanced to fight Burgoyne’s troops emplaced
along Battle Hill. Burgoyne did not send a large force. He sent about 190 soldiers of the 9th Regiment of Foot
under Colonel John Hill to observe and attack the Continental soldiers at Fort Anne. The Continental Army at
Fort Anne consisted of about 300 to 700 soldiers plus women and injured soldiers from mixed companies
including the 15th MA, 2nd NH, and 3rd NH. The 6th Albany Militia under the command of Lt. Col. Henry Van
Rensselaer would arrive on July 8 and reinforce the continentals with another 400 soldiers.
The Battle of Fort Anne was actually two skirmishes fought over two days - July 7 and 8, 1777. The
fighting on July 7 consisted of about 300 Continental troops under Captain James Gray advancing from Fort Anne
to attack the British camp at the base of Battle Hill. The British withdrew up to the summit of Battle Hill. The
Continental soldiers continued to fire upon the British position until dark. The July 8 engagement started the
same way as the previous day as the Continentals advance on the British camp. During the afternoon, the militia
flanked the British position on the base of the hill by marching on the other side of Wood Creek. The militia
crossed the creek and attacked the British 9th’s rear. The British soldiers withdrew to the summit of Battle Hill.
Both sides were unable to advance against the other. As both sides ran out of ammunition, a British soldier (Capt.
Money) gave a war whoop after his Native American allies left him. The Continentals believed he was with a
larger force and withdrew from the hill. Col. Pierse Long called for the burning of Fort Anne and withdrew to
Fort Edward.
The British technically won the Battle of Fort Anne on the tactical level, as they remained on the field.
At the operational and strategic levels, however, the victory led to a change in the campaign’s momentum.
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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Burgoyne brought the rest of his army to Fort Anne along the land path towards the Hudson River despite his
own previous misgivings. Continental Major General Philip Schuyler used the Battle of Fort Anne to delay the
British while he concentrated supplies and personnel at Fort Edward. He destroyed roads and obstructed creeks
to slow Burgoyne’s progress. Burgoyne lost valuable time repairing and clearing paths to move his large supply
line. This delay would help to lead to his defeat and surrender at Saratoga in October of 1777.
In 2001, the National Park Service and the American Battlefield Protection Program initiated a
reassessment of Revolutionary War and War of 1812 battlefields, including the Battle of Fort Anne. The
reassessment was guided by the goal of preservation. For these battlefields, three boundaries were established:
core, study area, and area of Potential National Register Eligibility (PotNR) (Figures 1.3-4, pp. 7, 8). The core is
the areas of the battlefield related to the most intensive and direct fighting; the study area includes the overall
battlefield including the core area and the secondary features, such as staging areas and avenues of movement
including approach and retreat; the PotNR boundaries include those portions of the battlefield that meet the
National Register’s integrity criteria. The determination of the boundaries for the Battle of Fort Anne was based
on a review of secondary historic sources and a walkover (NPS 2001). The historic research presented in this
report expanded on this initial survey by including an analysis of primary documents for references to the
battlefield’s landscape and spatial features. The result is a revised boundary for the study and core areas (Figure
8.1, p. 110).
There is a potential and immediate threat to the Fort Anne Battlefield, specifically Battle Hill. A proposed
granite and topsoil mine may directly and indirectly impact portions of the battlefield associated with both British
and Continental positions. The mine may also impact a mass burial of those who died in the battle. In 2010 and
2011, archeological testing was conducted on portions of the battlefield (Oberon 2010, 2011). Archaeologists
did not test approximately 50% of the area of impact due to slope >12 percent. Of the areas surveyed, testing
consisted of shovel test pits. A small portion of Battle Hill was surveyed with a metal detector using equipment
and methods that did not meet the standards proposed by professional metal detecting archaeologists. The
historical data, spatial analysis, and research design presented in this report should help to develop an improved
testing strategy to determine if there are any potential impacts from the granite and topsoil mine on the Fort Anne
Battlefield.
This report presents an initial step in planning to preserve the landscape of the Fort Anne Battlefield by
identifying and mapping the associated defining features. All of this information will aid in the determination of
an overall preservation plan for the landscape associated with the Battle of Fort Anne. The landscape has multiple
uses from urban development to agricultural fields and woods and each type of land use has affected the battlefield
differently. Impacts from the development of villages such as Fort Ann and Whitehall have altered the landscape
to fit the commercial and residential needs of recent populations. Transportation needs have reshaped the terrain
of the valleys, ridges, and creeks near the Battle of Fort Anne and altered the paths used by the combatants of the
Battle of Fort Anne. Battle Hill, the focal point of the Fort Anne Battlefield remained relatively untouched since
the time of the battle. It offers the best opportunity for future research, preservation, and public interpretation.
The next step will be to evaluate integrity of these features more exactly in order to determine what remains intact
and what has been disturbed. Taken as a whole, the gathered information will provide the groundwork for placing
the Battle of Fort Anne on a path to preservation.
Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne
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This map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection
Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).
Figure 8.1. Revised study and core areas for Fort Anne Battlefield.
p. 110
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APPENDIX I: BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Manuscript Sources
Beekman, John H. and Henry K. Van Rensselaer Receipt Fort Edward July 7, 1777. New York Public Library.
Brassier Map
1762
A Survey of Lake Champlain including Lake George, Crown Point and St. John. Surveyed by Order of His Excellency Major
General Sir Jeffery Amherst. By William Brassier, Draughtman. Library of Congress.
Brunswick Journal
1777
Journal of the Brunswick troops in North America under the orders of General von Riedesel. Translator Unknown.
Unpublished microfilm and microfiche from Lidgerwood Collection at Morristown National Historical Park. Available at
Saratoga National Historical Park Archives, Stillwater, New York.
CO42-36,37
British Colonial Office Records-Canada 1700-1922. Library and Archives Canada.
CCK
Cockburn Family Land Papers. Map of "Skenesborough" and Artillary Patent, now Whitehall Township, n.d. New York
State Library, Albany, NY.
EM
Thomas Adis Emmet Collection. New York Public Library.
Farnum Benjamin Farnum Diary 1777 Massachussettes Historical Society.
GAW
General Anthony Wayne Papers. New York Public Library.
GCP
Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York, 1777-1795–1801-1804, ed Hugh Hastings, 10 vols. Albany
and New York: [various pubs.].
Geddes Map
1825
Map and Profile of the Champlain Canal as made from Lake Champlain to the Hudson River and surveyed thence to the tide
at Waterford. New York Public Library.
Glynne, Isaac
1777
Journal of Isaac Glynne. American Antiquarian Society.
Gray
Gray Family Papers. Massachussettes Historical Society.
1777
James Gray Journal. Massachussettes Historical Society.
1777
Muster of Capt. James Gray’s Company 3rd NH. June 23, 1777. National Archives.
GWP
The Papers of George Washington Digital Edition, ed. Theodore J. Crackel. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
Rotunda, 2008.
HGP
Gen. Horatio Gates Papers 1728-1806. New York Historical Society.
PCC
Papers of the Continental Congress (National Archives, Washington, D.C)
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Revolutionary War Pensions. Applications National Archives.
1832
Elijah Adams
1832
Israel Anthony
1834
David Defreest
1818
James Hogeboom
1832
William Miller
1818
Jacob Van Alstyne
1818
Henry Van Rensselaer (widow)
1818
Abraham Wittbeck
B. Correspondence
James Gray to Theodore Parsons July 14, 1777. From Massachussettes Historical Society.
Governeur Morris to Provincial Congress July 14, 1777. From Journal of the Council of Safety.
Governeur Morris letter July 17, 1777. From Journal of the Council of Safety.
Philip Schuyler to George Washington July 10, 1777. From George Washington Papers.
Johnathan Trumbull Sr. to George Washington July 14, 1777. From George Washington Papers.
Wayne (Anthony) to Council of Safety December 4, 1776. From General Anthony Wayne Papers.
C. Published Primary Sources
Baxter, James Phinney
1887
The British Invasion from the North. The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada 1776-1777 with the
Journal of Lieut. William Digby. Joel, Munsell’s Sons, Albany, NY.
Bradford, S. Sydney (editor)
1962
Lord Francis Napier’s Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign. In Maryland Historical Magazine 57(4):285-333.
Burgoyne, John
1780
A State of the Expedition from Canada, as Laid Before the House of Commons by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne. J. Almon,
London, UK.
Cubbison, Douglas
2012
Burgoyne and the Saratoga Campaign: His Papers. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK.
Faden, William
1777
A New and Correct Map, of the Country in which the Army, under Lt. Gl. Burgoyne acted in 1777, shewing all the places
where the principle actions happened. Norman B. Leventhal Map Center, Boston Public Library.
Hagist, Don (editor)
2004
A British Soldier’s Story: Roger Lamb’s Narrative of the American Revolution. Ballindalloch Press, Baraboo, WI.
Hadden, Lieut. James
1884
A Journal Kept in Canada and Upon Burgoyne’s Campaing in 1776 and 1777 by Lieut. James M. Hadden. Joel Munsell’s
Sons, Albany, NY.
Houlding, J.A. and G. Kenneth Yates
1990
Corporal Fox’s Memoir of Service, 1766-1783: Quebec, Saratoga, and the Convention Army. Journal for the Society for
Army Historical Research. LXVIII(275):1-37.
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Journal of the Council of Safety
1777
Committee of safety and Council of safety of the state of New York, 1775-1777. T. Weed printer to the state, Albany, NY.
Noyes, Harriette
1899
A Memorial History of Hampstead, New Hampshire. George B. Reed, Boston, MA.
Thacher, James
1823
Military Journal of the American Revolution. Hurlbut, Williams, and Company. Hartford, CT.
D. General Bibliography
Alden, Joseph
1969
A History of the American Revolution. Da Capo Press, New York, NY.
Babits, Lawrence
1998
A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.
Bailey, Sarah Loring
1880
Historical Sketches of Andover Massachusettes. Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, Boston, MA.
Corbett, Theodore
2012
No Turning Point: The Saratoga Campaign in Perspective. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK.
Fisher, Charles (editor)
2004
The Most Advantageous Situation in the Highlands: An Archaeological Study of Fort Montgomery State Historic Site. New
York State Museum, Albay, NY.
Fort Ann (Fort Ann Historical Society)
2007
Fort Ann: 300 Years of History. Thomas-Shore Inc., Dexter, MI.
Glatthaar, Joseph and James Kirby Martin
2007
Forgotten Allies: The Oneida Indians and the American Revolution. Macmillan, New York, NY. Digital Edition
Graymont, Barbara
1972
The Iroquois in the American Revolution. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York.
Hardesty, Donald and Barbara Little
2009
Assessing Site Significance: A Guide for Archaeologists and Historians. Altamira Press, New York, NY.
Johnson, Crisfield
1878
History of Washington County New York. Everts and Ensign, Philadelphia, PA.
Ketchum, Richard
1997
Saratoga: Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War. Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY.
Levey, Morris
1853
Map of Washington County, New York. James D. Scott & Robert Pearsall Smith, Philadelphia, PA.
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Lossing, Benson
1860
Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution. Volume 1. Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, NY.
Luzader, John
2010
Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution. Savas Beatie, New York, NY.
McMasters, Kristen
2009
KOCOA (Military Terrain Analysis) –Cheat Sheet. National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program,
Washington, D.C.
Militia
1775
Rules and Orders for the Regulating the Militia of the Colony of New York: Recommended by the Provincial Congress,
August 22, 1775.
National Park Service (NPS)
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National Register Bulletin. How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation. National Park Service, Washington
DC.
2001
Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Historic Preservation Study: GPS and GIS Concepts and Methodology. National Park
Service: Cultural Resources Geographic Information Services.
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Battlefield Protection Program, National Park Service, Washington D.C.
Nielson, Charles
1844
An Original, Compiled, and Corrected Account of Burgoyne’s Campaign. J. Munsell, Albany, NY
NYAC
2004
Standards for Cultural Resource Investigations and the Curation of Archaeological Collections in New York State. The New
York Archaeological Council.
Oberon, Stephen
2010
Phase 1 Cultural Resources Survey Site Assessment and Site Identification Phases Proposed Troy Topsoil Fort Ann Mine
Town of Fort Ann, Washington County, New York. OPRHP File 10PR07670. Columbia Heritage, Old Chatham, NY.
2011
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Fort Ann Mine Town of Fort Ann, Washington County, New York. OPRHP File 10PR07670. Columbia Heritage, Old
Chatham, NY.
PAF (Public Archaeology Facility)
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Chemung County, New York Grant # (GA225508017). Prepared for National Park Service- American Battlefield Protection
Program. Public Archaeology Facility, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY.
2012
Revolutionary War Newtown Battlefield Project (August 29th, 1779) Chemung County, New York Report on Archeological
Survey and Excavations. Grant #GA-2255-10-015. Prepared for National Park Service- American Battlefield Protection
Program. Public Archaeology Facility, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY.
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Powis, Terry (editor)
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Mountain, GA.
Reeves, Matthew
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Sites: Method and Topic. Edited by Clarence Geier, Lawrence Babits, Douglas Scott, and David Orr. Texas A&M University
Press, College Station, TX.
Schnitzer, Eric
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The Battles of Fort Anne, 7 and 8 July 1777. Saratoga NHP, Stillwater, NY.
Scott, John Albert
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Fort Stanwix and Oriskany. Rome Sentinel Company, Rome, NY.
Sivilich, Daniel
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State Park. In Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution. 2(1): 719.
Sivilich, Daniel, and Garry Wheeler Stone
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Starbuck, David
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England, Lebanon, NH.
Stone, William
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1893
1904
1944
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Fort Ann, NY-VT 15’ Quadrangle Map
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Fort Ann, NY 7.5’ Quadrangle Map
Watt, Gavin K.
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Whitford, Nobel
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