DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 1
Content
1. INTRODUCTION
3
PROBLEM FIELD
4
PROBLEM FORMULATION
5
SUB-QUESTIONS
5
2. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
6
SHORT THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
6
THEORETICAL KEY CONCEPTS
7
RELATIONS OF POWER
7
DISCOURSE
9
ARCHAEOLOGY AND GENEALOGY
9
GOVERNMENTALITY
11
BIO-POLITICS AND PASTORAL POWER – THE MODERN STATE
12
PRESENTATION OF CASE MATERIAL
19
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS - CHAPTER BY CHAPTER
20
3. REMEMBERING RACE: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL TRAJECTORY
22
DISCOURSES OF RACE IN CHINA UNTIL 1976
22
THE ‘OTHERS’ - TALES OF THE FIRST BARBARIANS
22
DECLINE OF THE DYNASTIES
24
INSPIRATION FROM WESTERN SCIENCE
25
CHINESE RACE AND EUGENICS
27
THE LIBERALISATION
29
CONCLUDING THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF RACE
31
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 2
4. BIO-POLITICS: A NEW ERA FOR RACIAL TECHNOLOGIES
33
THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
34
INTRODUCTION TO THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
34
ANALYSING THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
36
CONCLUDING THE ONE-CHILD POLICY
44
5. BIO-POLITICS OUT OF HAND
45
HESHANG: A TV-SERIES
45
AN INTRODUCTION
46
THE HESHANG EFFECT
48
EXPLAINING HESHANG THROUGH SELF-CRITICISM
48
HESHANG AND EUGENIC DISCOURSES
53
HESHANG AS AN EXERCISE OF FREEDOM
55
HESHANG AS A PASTORAL POWER
57
SUBJECTIFICATION AND MODERNITY: BIO-POLITICS OUT OF HAND
60
CONCLUDING THE HESHANG EFFECT
64
6. CONCLUSION
66
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
68
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 3
1. Introduction
China: a word, which for many westerners is synonymous with a gigantic nation, inhabited by the
world’s largest population and ruled by the authoritarian Chinese Communistic Party. Old in
history, art, poetry, philosophy and civilisation, but still somehow enigmatic and closed.
Things are changing and China is now emerging as a major economical player in the world and will
- if it is not already- in the near future be a political power to be reckoned with. Thus, it becomes
increasingly interesting and crucial for the political forces and populations of Europe and America
to grasp and understand how the Chinese government rules, how it works, what rationalities that
lies behind and how these can be identified.
One of the most evident examples of this practice is how westerners, ranging from researchers to
laymen, are trying to understand the one-child policy, which is often viewed as a suppressive
technique implemented by a authoritarian regime ruling through nothing but control and fear.
Using a post-structuralist approach, inspired by the theoretical framework developed by the French
philosopher Michel Foucault we will try to go beyond the usual state-society dichotomy and
thereby map out the rationalities behind the one-child policy and investigate to what extend it can
be understood as yet another articulation of an existing discourse of race in China.
“Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, is not a way to force people to do what the
governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between
techniques, which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified
by him-self” (Michel Foucault, 1993, ‘About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self’
(Transcription of two lectures in Darthmouth on Nov. 17 and 24, 1980, ed., page 203/204).
The issue of our project is then to map out the mentalities that are used to govern the Chinese
population through the One-child policy.
This will be done by arguing that a central rationale of the one-child policy can be chased to a shift
in racial discourses taking place around the death of Mao Zedong and the beginning of economical
reform, where the explanation for Chinas underdevelopment was no longer sought by excluding the
foreign influence, but instead was centred around the quality of the Chinese people. This argument
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 4
will be elaborated by analysing the Chinese TV-series Heshang. This TV-series was an attempt to
raise doubts about the Chinese Culture, its society, and race.
As mentioned in the start of this paragraph people look at China with fear and fascination doubts
and disbelieves trying hard to grasp the enormous scope of its potential. With a little luck this paper
will bring clarity to at least a minor part of this ongoing quest for knowledge.
Problem field
From 1949 to his death in 1976 Mao Zedong and China’s Communist Party (CCP) was set out on a
course to develop China into a modern socialistic state. For most of the period the reason for
China’s underdevelopment was viewed as a result of foreign pressure and presence, which led Mao
to lead a policy of isolation throughout his regime and take a strong pro-natal stance.
Deng Xiaoping was the next great leader of China. He gained power shortly after Mao’s death and
didn’t wait long before he commenced great changes in policy of the CCP. First of all he
formulated the four modernisations1, which diminished Mao’s focus on social reform in order to
meet the challenge posed by economical reform. One of the most crucial, short-term visible and
long-term visionary instruments in trying to bring forward the Chinese was the one-child policy
(OCP), implemented as early as 1978. With this policy Deng articulated one of the most interesting
shifts in Chinese politics in the era of CCP; the shift from ‘blaming’ the outside (the others, in shape
of foreigners) for Chinas underdevelopment to looking inwards in order to both find faults and
solutions to China’s development problems.
Here lies the first issue to be investigated in this paper, since this change from outwards to inwards
and the bio-political aspects of eugenics embedded in such a policy as the one-child policy are a
vital element in relationship to the reformation of China. What is it in the Chinese relationship to
eugenics and race that offers the one-child policy as a solution? How is the imagined dichotomy
between population quantity and quality understood? To what extent is the concept of ‘China’
represented in the subjects – the Chinese – in order for them to sacrifice their right to siblings? And,
finally, what does the implementation of the one-child policy initially tell us about the managing of
the subjects?
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 5
Taking the discussion further brings us closer to the present and the representation and governing
of subjects in contemporary China. Through the 1980ies the inward looking self-criticism was
applied to other areas than reproduction. This was a more critical and deep-reaching criticism that
was expressed in a number of ways, most importantly in 1988 with the showing of the TV-series
Heshang that questions China’s ability to adjust itself and become fit for the modern World of
liberal market-mechanics.
Problem formulation
“How are eugenics and principles of OCP articulated with each other and brought to effect in
mentalities of government in China, and how are these governmentalities rearticulated in the
controversial TV-series Heshang?”
Sub-questions
In order to answer this question feasibly we will use a set of sub-questions, which will also serve as
a structure for our project.
•
What kind of racial discourses have emerged in China until 1978?
•
What governmental rationalities lies behind the One-child policy, is it in line with existing racial
discourses, and what role did bio-political techniques play in the implementation?
•
What can the TV-series Heshang tell us about the change in the self-subjectification the Chinese
people went through during the ten years who has passed since the implementation of the Onechild policy?
1
1) Agriculture, 2) Industry, 3) National defence, 4) Science and technology
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 6
2. Approach and methodology
In this project, the analysis takes a theoretical point of departure in the post-structuralist approach,
meaning a line of theory centring on the works of Michel Foucault and the authors who have
expanded and modified his theory, namely Mitchell Dean and John S. Ransom. Our theoretical
approach is operating within a rather small and sophisticated theoretical space. Working with
different authors means that we do not use a complete, coherent system of thought, but rather we
use approaches that might have differences in methodology but share some basic assumptions,
which we will clarify in the following.
Short theoretical overview
Post-structuralism rejects any claims of essentialism, stating that concepts such as ‘truth’ are a
product of human social activity, and thus there is no reality independent of language or ideology,
existing to be discovered and taken refuge in.
In the same line of thought, individuals are culturally and discursively structured, that is, we are
situated, symbolic and not metaphysical beings. Having as a theoretical point of departure that
human beings are without a stable nature poses different questions for the theory to address. Unlike
political philosophy, which seeks to describe the most appropriate political and social institutions,
or political science, which seeks to determine universal laws of predictable behaviour according a
certain human nature, post-structuralism, has a different aim. (Ransom,1997; 28).
Trying to understand a human nature that is mutable and contextual becomes a huge and impossible
task, and post-structuralism thus examines with the individual by historicizing the creation of it,
instead of looking for essential explanations. Acknowledging that there is “no single historical
answer to what the individual is” (ibid, 28) creates the need for a theoretical approach that seeks to
understand how human beings have been fashioned and can be refashioned. In the same line of
thought, it makes no sense to identify legitimate or illegitimate political and social institutions,
disclosing how they either respect of disrespect the basic human nature. Rather this theoretical
approach focuses on how the institutions are instrumental in fashioning the individual itself.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 7
Theoretical key concepts
Relations of power
The concept of power in this methodology is complex and intrinsically linked with the ontology of
the subject. Basically all relations are seen as relations of power, which thus permeates the entire
social fabric and the way subjects perceive themselves, in fact, creating the subjects.
Power is thus not perceived as being either legitimate or illegitimate, and distinguishing between
the two is well outside the scope of post-structuralism. Having a normative judgment of power as
the ultimate theoretical goal does not only clash with the ontology of post-structuralism, it would
also obstruct the focus of the theory, which is to examine how power-relations are affecting our
self-subjectification, in other words, how power constitutes us as individuals. Exploring the
different techniques used for this, and explaining how they emerged and were taken for granted is
much more important than merely condemning certain uses of power. This explanatory power is
lost, if conventional judgements are given, because a normative value judgment might make us see
less clearly the connection between the practices of power. Exemplifying this could be the use of
power and discipline in a navy hospital and a prison. There are major similarities between the use of
power in these two institutions - most people would agree that the use of discipline in a hospitable
is legit, aiming to separate the sick from the healthy, stopping the spreading of disease. Likewise it
could easily be argued that the use of discipline in a prison is inherently more prone to criticism,
that the possibilities for abuse are greater. If, however, these two institutions are not analysed in the
same frame of mind, treating their practices of power the same way – asking the how instead of
why, this similarity between them would be lost, and the analysis consequently more shallow.
A notion of good and bad stems either from a normative standpoint or possible basic valuation
norm – which is incompatible with the post-structuralist approach, stating that any institution or
power relation is merely a product of the given circumstances (Ransom, 1997, 27).
Possibilities for resistance
There is no escaping power in the sense that resistance cannot be launched from some place outside
power, which makes sense since there is no authentic, essential, primordial, unpolluted condition
the individual can return to. Trying to find a way out of the disciplinarian maze is a useless way of
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 8
thinking about resistance – there is no outside, in Foucauldian and post-structuralist ontology
(Ransom, 1997,35).
A recurrent critique of this notion of power has been that it leaves very little room for manoeuvre
for the individual, that it is too deterministic and, indeed, pessimistic. Since, if there is no outside,
how is opposition then feasible? And if it is not feasible, why even bother devoting time and effort
analysing relations of power immune to change? A clarification of the multiplicity of power is then
needed, in order to understand how resistance is possible.
Firstly, power is never a question of a single top-down relation, but rather there are multiple
networks of power, each with their own pattern and a relative sense of autonomy. Secondly, power
is not necessarily the same as suppression or coercion. Since power has no specific traits, but is
dependent on the institutions or networks it forms part of for its characteristics.
The above means that power is neither monolithic nor omnipotent, but both frail and contingent,
subject to the discursive formations reproducing it.
This is not the only thing making resistance possible though. By being created by discipline, the
subject is not necessarily determined by it, and furthermore has access to changing the discourse.
Also being the vehicle for power, the individual is in a better position to challenge it, since “such
vehicles might go off in the designated path in directions that frustrate the purpose for which they
were originally developed” (Ransom; 1997,36).
Thus it would be unproductive to think of power as stemming from one fountainhead only, and
rather analyse how these mechanism of power function, and thereby discover their intended as well
as unintended consequences. In this sense power becomes a far more complex concept, but also
more analytically approachable – leaving greater scope for analysing the subject, the other end of
the relation, which is how we use the concept of power in this project.
Discipline ‘makes’ the individuals, it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals
both as objects and as instruments of its exercise”. (Foucault in Ransom, 1997; 44) Disciplining the
individual is a goal for the government, but even though discipline makes individuals, this creation
is not final, it leaves room for change and opposition. (Ransom, 1997; 46)
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 9
Discourse
Discourse covers a chain of statements, institutionalised practices and the historically and culturally
determined rules which controls the shape and content of the conversational procedure (Andersen &
Kaspersen; 1996: 329). In this context ‘conversational procedure’ is understood, as an articulation
of a certain power relationship that is produced by the discourse, exists within the discourse and
supports the discourse – all three at the same time. This creates a strong power relationship that can
be understood as a truth within the discourse, existing both as means to an end, and the end by
which these means operate. In this way discourses of race produces perceptions of archetype
notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and sciences that work to improve the race.
Archaeology and genealogy
Archaeology and genealogy are two closely related concepts used to clarify and understand the
making of truth on two levels:
-
The archaeology discloses the formation of objects through an historical examination
-
The genealogy examines how discourses and power relations are developed.
The understanding of objects that are achieved through the archaeology is therefore further
examined in the genealogy in terms of how theses objects are perceived, used and internalised by
subjects (individuals) in a given situation or time. Our genealogy will examine how the subjects’
understanding of race affects their daily life, and more importantly, how they understand
themselves.
An important aspect of this methodology that goes for both archaeology and genealogy is taking
every document used at its face value. This means not searching for an underlying secret hidden
meaning, not aiming at decoding or conducting a hermeneutical interpretation, but rather “take
statements as objects of study in their own right, making no effort to use them as means to revive
the thoughts of the dead” (Ransom, 1997; 231). The ambitions of this approach is to denaturalise
what is taken for given, and show the process of this naturalization, how a certain phenomenon
came to be perceived as “natural”. The purpose of the theoretical approach is thus a debunking of
any universal laws, and to show that the existence of any social phenomenon is contingent, arbitrary
and subject to relations of power.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 10
In the following archaeology and genealogy are separated in order to give a more elaborated
definition of the two and briefly show how they separately will be used in the analysis. Finally a
word of attention that needs to be underlined: Usually archaeology and genealogy are viewed as
supporting and completing each other. Using them separately, to the extent we do though, does not
imply that we assume the traditional use to be wrong. On the contrary they are separated in order
for the analysis to obtain surgical precision, which will enable us to base the final analysis on
elements disclosed separately in the archaeology and the genealogy, whereby we end up tying
Foucault’s two central techniques together again.
It should also be stressed that Foucault himself never made any explicit framework for using this
kind of analytical approach, but rather developed it while analysing specific subjects, which
underlines the theory’s rejecting of any universal claims.
Archaeology
The archaeology will be used as a historical method of research which primary aim is to disclose
the different discursive formations that constitute a field of research. That means disclosing, within
a certain period of time, how different regimes of truths have changed, what has been excluded, and
what has been constructed as being essential. In other words: the archaeology is about examining
modes of knowing (epistemology).
A crucial point about the archaeology is, that it is not set out to disclose any form of causality
between historical events and the constructions of truth. Instead, an archaeology should always look
at power relationships that are constituted within a certain field/sphere - the basis upon which truths
are constructed. In addition the archaeology therefore also shouldn’t pursue a linear mode of
explanation mode of explanation of truth and discourses. A linear mode of explanation can only be
acknowledged if the concept of causality also is acknowledged, and since the archaeology does not
do so, it is essential to bear in mind that truth and discourses are viewed as the arbitrary and
contingent result of equally arbitrary and contingent power relations.
From theory to practice
The above-mentioned understanding of power relations as opposed to causality and linear mode of
explanation is meant to exemplify the ideal archaeology, which Foucault by the way never clearly
defined. Conducting research in the manner we have chosen to in this project introduces some
difficulties regarding the usage of archaeology. In our analysis we will try to use our sources in
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 11
order to disclose such power relationships, but it’s most likely that this can only be done to a certain
extent, which is why the archaeology also will hold some elements derived from causality and
linear mode of explanation.
In this project archaeology will be used to identify different discourses of race through China’s
history. This is done in order, first, to disclose how race has been understood in various historical
periods, and, secondly, to disclose ‘race’ as an object open for subjectification by the individual.
Genealogy
The genealogy is an inquiry into the development of contemporary discourses, whereby it seeks to
explain how subjects understand objects and thus create discourses. Following this notion, the
genealogy discloses how modes of knowing become modes of being: how given regimes of
knowing are recast in regimes of social practices (ontology). In this way the genealogy is set out to
explain what historical and political roles different practices play and what the consequences are.
Having identified and historicized an object in the archaeology, it becomes possible, through the
genealogy, to show how this object is disseminated in the imaginations of practitioners of power.
The other important element in this dissemination is subjectification. By subjectification is meant
the process by which the individual subject internalises and recasts perceived knowledge and truths
as presented by the discourse into modes of being. In this way it can be said, that the genealogy
discloses the formation of the individual subject.
In this project genealogy will be used to look in detail at the OCP and Heshang as concrete
examples of how subjects internalise and recasts discourses of race in contemporary China.
Governmentality
The concept of governmentality examines power techniques and forms of knowledge, in a modern
state. Governmentality links governing with ways of thinking, and as such is more concerned with
analysing the technologies of power through an analysis of the political rationality underpinning
them. Consequently this concept deals with the social imagination of actual practitioners of power
and with the techniques of organizing and producing power (Ransom, 1997; 44). But that is not all;
there are two sides to governmentality. The first being representation; government defines a
discursive field in which exercising power is ‘rationalized’. Second, ‘government’ also signifies
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 12
techniques of bio-politics: self-control, guidance for the family and for children, management of the
household, directing the soul, etc. ‘Government’ can thus be defined as conduct and
(governmentality) following, ‘the conduct of conduct’ and thus as a term that encapsulates both
governing ‘the self’ and the governing of ‘others’.2
Bio-politics and pastoral power – the modern state
Foucault distinguishes between two rationalities of governmentality, that he traces back to their
historical origin, and which together makes up the governmentality of the modern state: the citycitizen and shepherd-flock games, originated in respectively city-states of ancient Greece and the
old Christian communities.
City-citizen game and reason of state
Starting in ancient Greece, one of the most important aspects of the city-citizen game is the way
authority is given and reproduced. The rulers’ (the nobility) first and most important obligation was
to the city itself, not their subjects. This was called civic duty or philopatris, love of the city (Dean
79) The term “subject”, or rather “citizen” was exclusively restricted to those living within the city
limits, and no concern was given to those who did not fit this category. This made the relationship
between the ruler and the ruled one of “hardened solidarity that a free citizen feels with his fellow
citizen, rather than a feeling of pity or charity ”. (Veyne in Ransom, 1997; 78) This hardened
solidarity between peers also resulted in a phenomenon called euergersia, which means gift giving.
These gifts were often rather unnecessary, or at least luxurious, such as plays and choruses, or
public buildings. The gifts served two purposes, as they both justified the unequal relation of power
and glorified the ruler for posterity, who was hoping to secure undying fame through lavish gifts. It
is important to stress that this is gift - not almsgiving - and that the object of its glorification was the
city and the donator rather than the well being of (the exclusive group of) recipients. Thus the
interests of the individual is submitted to those of the state, and the individual subject is only of
interest to the rulers to the extent they either benefit or harm the city, in other words, “political
marginalism” (Dean, 1999; 86). Thus the authority was founded more on deeds than blood, and the
ultimate goal of these deeds was the continued existence of the city.
The subjects were defined as legal subjects, following rules and fulfilling obligations of their own
making.
2
"The Birth of bio-politics" Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 13
Shepherd-flock game
The shepherd-flock game stands in direct contrast to the city-citizen game on almost every level.
Naturally the historical origins are different; in this case the start of this specific kind of rationality
is traced to the old Christian communities.
Foucault points out four defining aspects of the shepherd-flock game:
-
The fundamental structure between the ruler and the ruled is built on the relationship
between the pastor and his pastorate, which mirrors that of the God and his subjects
-
The constitution as a flock, or later the population, is due to the fact that the shepherd has
gathered and guided a number of individuals, and thus turned them into a flock
-
The importance placed on the salvation of each and every individual, by all means and in
particular by the shepherd’s individual kindness
-
The shepherd’s duty to know every member of his flock and be devoted without rest
(Ransom, 1997; 74)
As we can see this is a completely different way of imagining the individual and the proper
relationship with authority. Instead of being obligated to defend and promote the city, the task
facing the governor is acquiring intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the soul and minds of
his subjects and on the background of this, leading them to salvation. Instead of a legal and political
subject with rights and obligations we are dealing with a living individual, needful and obedient.
This is mirrored in the confessional tendency, literally confessing to the pastor, subjecting one’s
soul to scrutiny and accepting the verdict. The early Christian community was concerned about
rooting out ““the zones of negative privacy” that contained dangerous opacities to both God and
community”, a simple community, founded on “single-mindedness, simplicity and transparency to
God and openness to others” (Brown.1987: 254 in Dean, 1997; 79).
The shepherd-flock game is also very inclusive, reflected in the way the old Christian communities
included those previously excluded by the city-states, to a certain extent the women, the rural
population, the sick and most importantly the poor. Whereas gift giving in the city-states ultimately
were an act of self-interest (promoting one’s status and only be benefiting one’s peers), almsgiving,
compassion with the poor became the locus of authority in the Christian communities. The
Christian ruler was thus a philoptochos, a lover of the poor (Dean, 1997; 79). This love could go
against the self-interest of the state or the community, but the community or city is only relevant to
the degree it manages to support this goal of inclusion and soul saving. This priority is in contrast to
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 14
the city-citizen game, but there are similarities between the ways of imagining authority. The
shepherd-flock game elaborated the “care of the self”, the self-examination and guidance of
conscience that was being practised in the Greek and Roman city-states among the notables, but
disassociated it from the self-government of the free citizens and tied them to the notion of the total
obedience. The ultimate goal of these practices of guidance, self-examination and obedience was
the renunciation of this world for another more pure and permanent.
The emergence of the modern state – bio-politics and pastoral power
Both the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game originated in pre-modern societies, but
what makes them relevant to the discussion today is the way they have influenced modern states.
The governmental rationality, indeed the governmentality, of the modern liberal state consists of
both these rationalities. The operative word in this equation is modernity, as the modern versions of
shepherd-flock and city-citizen games came into being with the emergence of the modern state,
indeed, they were instrumental to creation of the modern state.
From the city-citizen game stems the “rationality of state”, the concept of setting the interests of the
state above the interests of the individual, most extremely articulated by the state’s right to send its
citizens to war. So the modern state is a state among other states, forming part of an international
system based on competition and occasionally conflict. These aspects also form part of the
rationality of state, striving to protect the longevity and prosperity of the state, relatively to other
states3. To achieve this end, the state needs to know its subjects, in order to better it, to create a
economically strong, capable, competitive, organized population out of the unorganised, different,
unruly individuals, while at the same time ensuring their political docility (Ransom, 1997, 40).
This marriage of convenience between these two very different rationalities – shepherd-flock and
city-citizen game, came about around the French Revolution, at a time in history when:
”starvation, plague, and other causes of early demise” ceased to torment life so directly” (ibid; 61).
In other words, because of the agricultural and industrial revolutions, there was the possibility of
focusing on life itself, instead of merely avoiding an untimely death. In the Foucauldian sense of the
word, the lives of the population now became an entity to be “administrated, optimised and
multiplied while subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulation” (ibid, 62).
3
This is the sense the expression is most often used today, when a certain political decision is referred to as made from
“reasons of state”, meaning out of the self-interest of the state.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 15
In order to achieve this goal, the modern state draws on rationalities with a seemingly completely
different way of relating to the individual, i.e. the pastoral power. Foucault argues that the pastoral
influence survived the long decline of influence of religion in Western societies, and in its secular
form, takes the shape of psychiatrists and social workers and different state agencies which are
vehicles for the state’s concern about the state of the individual.4 This points to one important
difference between old Christian communities and the way pastoral power is represented in our
societies: The individual is now normalized in relation to scientific knowledge of the populations.
This normalization of bodies implies accepting an expanded conception of truth about one self.
First, that there is such a thing as a normal body, with all the scientific exceptions and
classifications this view includes.
Secondly ascribing values to these standards, going from a mere mean distribution of individuals to
a valuation, and judging one’s own body accordingly, “truth thus straddles and mediates between
the individual as an empirical object and as a moral being”. (Ransom, 1997,52-53)
Bio-politics and governmentality
The result of the merging of the two different ways of perceiving power is according to Foucault the
emergence of bio-politics.
“The politics and strategies that are the result of this confrontation is called bio-politics, literally
meaning politics of life, and encapsulating the health, habitation, urban environment, working
conditions and education of various populations” (Dean, 1999)
The concept of the population as a living entity composed of vital processes is essential to biopolitics. The population thus becomes a social body, open to intervention and classification, a body
to be studied and influenced, both to serve the interests of the state. In doing this, more and more
aspects of life was brought “into knowledge’s field of control and sphere of intervention” (Ransom,
1997,62), and a whole new array of forces sought to confront the illnesses of the social body, real
and imagined.
To sum up, the governmentality of the modern state is founded on the city-citizenship game,
contributing with the rationality of state, and the shepherd-flock game supplying the pastoral
4
However there is no reason for reducing the human sciences to mere instrumental needs of the state, as the very
premise for reliable and thus useful research is independence. Moreover, the human sciences get a dynamic of their own
and pursue their own agendas independently of the state discourse (ibid, 69)
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 16
techniques by using bio-political means to achieve its ends. This specific way of governing is a
historical product of the development in the Western world and is termed liberal governmentality,
which we will elaborate at a later point.
Discipline and governance:
Accordingly with these profound changes in the way of imagining the population as a whole and
the individual subject, the notion of power changes as well. Ransom points out that from the
beginning of the 16th century and onwards the practitioners of power were presented with new
opportunities (Ransom, 1997; 28). Implementing bio-politics posed new challenges to the role of
the rulers, with the new and profound interest in the individual and the concern for the state, it was
no longer enough having a sovereign simply imposing his will on the subjects. Governance
becomes more focused on guiding, and this guiding, is practiced on two levels – the macrolevel, or
public, national level, dealing with the public welfare, and the individual level, dealing with
disciplining the individual.
The distinction between discipline and other practices of power, is complex, but most importantly,
discipline refers to the micro-mechanisms of power used to guide the individual, without the
awareness of this happening. Governing a body of individuals, a population, entails manipulating
already existing, conscious, motivations. Disciplining is creating a particular capacity in a group of
individuals, and in particular without prompting them to critically question what they are asked to
do.
This reflects the double ambition of the modern state, and especially the emergent modern state,
which is to create economically strong but politically docile subjects (Ransom, 1997, 31).
Liberal governmentality
We will now shortly define liberal governmentality, in order to understand authoritarian
governmentality in the next paragraph.
One of the defining aspects of liberal governmentality is the way it seeks to rule through the
capacities and freedoms of its subjects. The individual is perceived as fundamentally capable of
governing itself, as essentially free, and this very freedom of the subject is a way for the
government to govern, a technique of meeting their goals. This freedom is not accessible to every
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 17
member of the population though, and thus there is an illiberal aspect of liberalism, a capacity for
despotism, under certain conditions. Certain categories of subjects have been excluded in varying
degrees from joining the ranks of the citizens, historically among others the criminals, the insane,
the homosexuals, the young, the old and even the destitute and women. These categories of the
population open up the possibility for a legitimate despotism within liberalism (Mitchell, 1999;
133), as long as it serves the subjects in question own best interest. Needless to say, what is in the
subject’s best interest is not defined by the subject itself, but a matter left to the experts, acting with
the best of bio-political intentions. Thus the exercise of freedom depends on who you are, and how
well you deal with the responsibility of freedom. This systematic exclusion can be seen as echoing
the City-citizen game.
The important aspect of this exclusion though, is the very illiberal means that historically have been
applied, with the important difference that in some cases the excluded subjects can rejoin the ranks
of autonomous citizens. With the help of the experts, the psychiatrists, social workers, doctors,
prison wardens etc. can reform, re-educate the pervert, the criminal and the insane. Crucial to this
re-educating is not so much just the re-socialization of the above mentioned categories of
individuals, but the creation of the general docile subject, “the individual subjected to habit, rules,
orders, an authority that is exercised around and upon him, and which he must allow to function
automatically within him.“ (Ransom, 1997, 30)
This leads to the second illiberal aspect of liberalism, the way the subject is divided against himself,
a distinction that is “at the heart of liberal government prior to any division between those capable
of bearing the freedoms and responsibilities of mature subjectivity and those who are not”
(Mitchell, 199; 133)
Thus we return to the point made about governing being a process that takes place on two levels,
both within liberal and authoritarian governmentalities: The external level where a sovereign power
has the right and opportunity to overrule the subjects’ decision, and equally important, on the
internal level, where the subject governs itself, or in Foucault’s words, “ a form of action of the ‘self
on the self’” (Mitchell, 1999; 13).
It is this action of the self on the self that liberal modes of governing depend on, rather than direct
coercion. Seeing how the modes of governing, discipline and a more collective form of governing is
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 18
so intertwined within liberal governmentality, stresses Foucault’s point of the futility of trying to
distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ uses of power. Trying to explore the mechanisms of
discipline, of the way the subject is being created and recreated with new capabilities makes more
sense, if the goal is to learn more about how power is exercised and received. If the individual
somehow needs assistance in its self-subjectification, there is thus a wide choice of secular experts
with scientific knowledge available to replace the religious confessions of the pastor and help the
individual define the normal and how to live up to that norm.
Governance is seen as the opposite of personal freedom, thus trying to set limits to how far the
government can go, with the judicial system.
Authoritarian governmentality
Authoritarian governmentality covers a rationality different from the liberal in the sense that it does
not seek to rule through freedom, but rather through obedient subjects, or at the least it seeks to
neutralize opposition. Dean argues that this obviously different relationship with freedom does not
transcend the definition of governmentality. Authoritarian governmentality is a different, but no less
distinct, articulation of the same components that make up liberal governmentality;
“Liberalism, as we have just seen, makes that articulation in a specific way. Other types of rule are
no less distinctive assemblages of elements of a bio-politics concerned with the detailed
administration of life and of a sovereign power that reserves the right of death to itself” (Dean,
1999, 138).
Foucault and authoritarian government – a short summary of an on-going theoretical
debate
Can analytical instruments that are formulated in order to understand Western liberal societies be
used for the same purpose only in an authoritarian context?
It’s essential to bear in mind that any analysis of the management of subjects in an authoritarian
society can end up merely concluding that consensus is reached only by exercising power through
control. Such a situation can – and most probably will – ultimately rule out the element of
‘rationalities’ that the governmentality-approach draws so heavily on, which excludes further
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 19
analysis. On the other hand, the governmentality-approach wishes to go beyond that usual statesociety dichotomy in which it’s only too easy to fall for the ‘control-thesis’.
The latter holds great importance in the making of this paper, since we’ll be trying to look closely at
how and why China and the Chinese are governed – and as part of this how they might be excluded
from governing the self.
Presentation of case material
Ann Anagnost’s National Past-Times
Ann Anagnost is an anthropologist who has worked in and with China for several years. We have
used her book “National past-times” as empiric material, and drawn on her analysis and
conclusions. More precisely National Past-Times is about the fashioning and refashioning of
modern Chinese subjectivity as it relates to the literal and figurative body of the nation. The book
shares our theoretical framework and focuses on the tendency in Chinese cultural discourses to look
to the past in order to visualize the future.
Heshang – The River Elegy
Heshang is a documentary TV-series in six parts, broadcasted in China in 1988 on national, CCP
controlled TV – whereby it was given a certain credibility, and a stamp of approval. A team of
intellectuals headed by Su Xiaokang wrote it.
Heshang was the first open criticism of the Chinese culture in the PRC– seen perhaps by as many as
100 million viewers. Furthermore it was printed in book-form and published in newspapers.
Heshang won wide popularity amongst the intellectuals and the general population.
The main topic throughout Heshang is a metaphor of the Yellow River symbolising the Chinese
civilization, which also inspired the name: Heshang – Death song of the River. The Yellow river
has been both a blessing and a curse to China; Using the Yellow River as a metaphor implies that
the Chinese civilization and the Confucian society-structure is: backward, old, feudal, agricultural
and conservative – creating an inferior culture. Heshang leaves the viewer with a picture of China
as an impoverished Third World country, relying on massive infusions of foreign capital and
technology to create an illusion of modernization.
Heshang also criticises two other important symbols of Chinese culture: the Dragon and the Great
Wall – both symbols that had been used heavily back from the early dynastical times to the Maoist
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 20
China. By putting these popular symbols under heavy fire, Heshang spoke to the general
population.
Su Xiaokang, the main author, and many of the other contributors also played a role in the 1989
uprising at Tiananmen Square.
Heshang caused a lot of controversy both within the government and in society as whole. Some
parts of the CCP e.g. the reform friendly General Secretary Zhao Ziyang protected Heshang from
the heavy criticism and attempts at censorship made by conservative Vice-president Wang Zhen.
The result of the controversy was, that Heshang was only allowed to be aired twice - were after it
was banned as being unsuitable and polluting (Xiaokang, 1992: 19-20).
All in all the authors behind Heshang versioned it as “a call to arms” for the Chinese people to join
the modern Western World in order to reclaim the position their civilisation is entitled to.
Structure of the thesis - chapter by chapter
1. Introduction
Includes: Introduction, Problem Field, Problem Formulation, and Working questions
2. Methodology and Approach
In chapter 2 will we introduce our theory including the definition of theoretical terms, introduce our
case-material and describe the structure of the project.
3. Remembering Race - An archaeological trajectory
In chapter 3 we will make a What governmental rationalities lies behind the One-child policy, is it
in line with existing racial discourses, and what role did bio-political techniques play in the
implementation? This is done through an archaeology of the discourse of race and purity, and
shows the historical development from the time of the Classics through modernisation to the Maoyears. This is done in order to clarify what kind of racial discourses that have emerged in China
until 1978.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 21
4. Bio-politics: A New era for racial technologies
In chapter 4 we will analyse how China after 1976 to an increasing extent explained
underdevelopment by looking inwards. This is done with a genealogy of the One-child policy, the
intended and unintended consequences, to show how it isn’t possible for the government to predict
the outcome of it’s implemented bio-politics entirely. Afterwards we will look at which unintended
consequences the government uses to its own advantage and which ones it couldn’t use. Or to put it
in other words we will look at: what governmental rationalities that lies behind the One-child
policy.
5. Heshang: Bio-politics out of hand
In chapter 5 will we analyse the TV-series Heshang, Heshang was aired in 1988 and raised a
massive critique of the Chinese culture. We wish by this analysis to show that Heshang reflects and
articulates a change in self-subjectfication in the Chinese people since the implementation of the
One-child policy.
6. Conclusion
The sum of all the other conclusions in the project
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 22
3. Remembering Race: an archaeological trajectory
Through history the discourse of race in China has undergone various changes. One thing, though,
that has never changed, is the importance of purity. The aim of this chapter is to show this
importance through an archaeological trajectory.
Discourses of race in China until 1976
The archaeology of racial discourse in China takes its beginning around the ‘Spring and Autumn
period’ from 770 to 476 B.C that produced some of the first written material regarding encounters
with so called ‘foreigners’, continues through the dynastical period, to the modernization and the
1920s and, finally, concludes with China under the rule of Mao Zedong.
The ‘others’ - tales of the first barbarians
Historically there has been an almost iconoclastic perception of what on the one hand ‘it is to be
Chinese’ and therefore superior and on the other hand what ‘it is not to be Chinese’ and therefore
barbarian. This notion dates back to the time of the Classics around 750 to 500 years BC. The
Classics presented, among many other things, guidelines for what it meant to be Chinese, and what
was to be expected of barbarians. The Classics was based on Confucian values and formulated by a
cultural elite that was considered superior and lived in the geographical area that is known as China
today.
This notion of superiority is interesting since it implies the existence of a somewhat inferior race.
Who would this race be? And how did this notion of racial hierarchy come about?
The Classics treats these questions on the basis of two different rationalities stemming from the
same underlying understanding: China as being rule by an emperor who holds the ‘mandate of
heaven’, which equals superior knowledge of rule, justice and the welfare of human beings 5. The
foreigners at this time were the neighbouring barbarian states that were not ruled by the ‘mandate of
heaven’ and therefore inferior. The Classics ‘legitimise’ two different ways of dealing with these
barbarians: through a notion of cultural universalism or through separatism. The cultural
5
http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/GLOSSARY/TIENMING.HTM
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 23
universalism is to be understood in the way that the barbarians could learn and be raised to a higher
level - the level of Chinese. Separatism on the other hand is to be understood as encapsulating the
notion that barbarian is not ‘our’ race and is therefore sure to have a different mind (Dikötter, 1998;
3ff).
The latter can be seen as the Chinese discourse of race ‘losing’ its confidence, which transpired into
an emerging exclusionist approach towards foreign barbarians. The ‘losing’ of confidence implies a
belief in environmental determinism: Different environments had different spatial energies, and
only China possessed the central and most beneficial one in the cosmos (Dikötter, 1998: 18-21).
With this remark the initially outlining of the dichotomy between China and the ‘foreign’ is
concluded, and we therefore move on to chasing down an understanding of how and when a
dichotomy within the Chinese race itself emerged.
The first sign of dividing or ‘valuating’ the population within China was seen under the Yuan
dynasty from 1279 to 1368 – a dynasty ruled by the Mongols. The Mongols divided the population
into the following four groups: the Mongols, the Western/Central Asian, the Han-people (primarily
North-China) and the ‘Nanren’ (literally: People from the South - meaning South-China). Being
ruled and divided by the Mongols heightened the elite’s awareness of race (Dikötter, 1998: 23).
This focus on race was given even more attention during the next foreign rule: the Qing dynasty
from 1644 to 1911. It was now the Manchu who ruled China – like the Mongols a people from the
North. The Manchu rulers implemented a variety of rules regarding looks to distinguish between
themselves and the Chinese – the most famous being the now ‘characteristic’ Chinese hairstyle
(partly shaved and with a long ponytail). They furthermore banned intermarriage between Manchu
and Chinese, which all in all lead to an even larger awareness of racial differences among the
Chinese elite. Especially because both Mongols and Manchu benefited from the strong bureaucratic
structure and tradition in China, which proved that the ‘Chinese way of ruling’ was the most
effective, even though the country was occupied.6
Contrary to previous occupation, the rule of the Manchu led to intellectual struggle from the
Chinese elite. In particular the Yellow Book written in 1656 by the scholar Wang Fuzhi, questioned
the purity and impurity of race. Wang Fuzhi claimed that the Mongols were the first to exploit the
emperorship in order to enforce artificial proximity of alien peoples to the Chinese, which was used
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 24
as a direct explanation for the occupation of China – a practice the Manchu was seen to continue
(Dikötter, 1998: 27-28). Airing these points of view could nevertheless be dangerous business under
foreign rule, which the case of Lü Liuliang tells us. The Manchu decapitated him in 1733 for
“having propagated anti-Manchu views based on racial grounds” (Dikötter, 1998: 26). This didn’t
end the dissatisfaction, but with the increasing presence of westerners the focus did change towards
the ‘more different race’, as the westerners could be classified. Elite cosmology was still much
more elaborate than popular culture, but both were based in the same symbolic universe. This
symbolic universe consisted for example of strong Confucian values etc. which was very visible to
the first westerners in China, since they themselves were met not with interest and curiosity, but
with dislike and watched from a distance (Dikötter, 1998: 35-36).
Decline of the dynasties
The end of the 19th century marked a change in the Chinese discourse of race similar to the one seen
in Europe around the beginning/mid of the 19th century. Previously the discourse had been centred
on identifying race through appearance and cultural differences whereby impurity could be detected
and attempted to be avoided (Dikötter, 1998:35). Now, in the last chaotic years of the Qing dynasty,
the question of avoiding impurity was no longer relevant. China was already polluted and the
question was how it would survive - both racially and as a political entity.
This critical situation was stemming from the Chinese emperor rejecting the Western tradesmen,
which ultimately led to The Opium War and a catastrophic Chinese defeat that meant opening the
country to the western barbarians. Dissatisfaction with both the foreign suppression and the weak
Manchu government lead firstly to the peasant uprisings known as the Taiping War, which is
considered one of the most catastrophic civil-wars in world history with more than twenty million
casualties. Later came the Boxer Rebellion, which further undermined the Manchu government to
such a degree that it only held on to its power through substantial western support.
The Manchu Dynasty was overthrown in 1911 and the Republic of China was born.7 This marked
the emergence of new discourses of race.
6
7
http://www.leksikon.org/art.php?n=2920
http://www.index-china.com/index-english/people-invasion-s.html
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 25
Finishing mapping out these new discourses in the archaeology, we will now continue by
questioning the importance of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary thinking in order to clarifying how
western sciences influence the making of Chinese eugenic discourses (Dikötter, 1998: 67).
Inspiration from western science
How was the discourse of race influenced by Europe’s scientific contribution – especially in terms
of developing a eugenic notion of race? And how was it perceived in terms of China’s salvation?
At the brink of the 20th century a group of reformers emerged on the intellectual scene advocating
racial awareness. The opponent was clearly the ‘white’ race and the primary fear was that China
would “either merge with the defeated hordes of degenerate breeds or join the ranks of the
dominating races” (Dikötter, 1998: 82). But since the westerners (the white) were also the
dominant species some also viewed it as a rolemodel to follow for the sake of China. The acclaimed
scholar Kang Youwei, therefore, proposed dietary change, migration, intermarriage and
sterilization. In the following the focus will be on the latter two.
First of all what was to be gained from intermarriage and who was to engage in intermarriage?
Intermarriage was viewed as a kind of ‘racial communication’ between white and yellow – the last
group, black, were inferior and intermarriage with this group was discarded as pollution. This
notion drew heavily on Darwin’s theory, natural selection and the elimination of the unfit. It would
even, by the scholar Tang Caichang, be linked to the old Confucian thinking, believing that it was
only through intermarriage that the strength of the yellow race could re-establish itself as it was
described by Confucius. Secondly; who were to be sterilized and why? At this early stage in the
eugenic thinking done by Kang Youwei, it was the inferior races represented by the colour black
that were to be sterilized due to sheer fear, that they would pollute both purity of the yellow and
white race (Dikötter, 1998: 89-90). In this way eugenic-thinking was introduced in China, but it was
focused on the impurity of ‘outside’ races. We therefore still need to identify an introvert racial
discourse looking to purify the Chinese race without including ‘seeds’ of the white race (or
excluding ‘seeds’ of other races).
Sun Yatsen entered the political stage around the turn of the century. He has later been known as
‘father of the nation’ since he was the key-architect behind the formation of the Nationalist Party
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 26
and the formation of the Chinese Republic in 1911. Furthermore, Sun helped heighten the racial
awareness both in the political, intellectual and public sphere for the purpose of national rebuilding.
The question is what techniques Sun and his nationalist party used, what their aim were and
whether they were achieved or not?
First of all Sun and the intellectuals surrounding him tried to bring the question of race into the
emotional realm stating that China and the Chinese had degenerated to the level of the black and
would surely be considered an inferior race, if nothing was done. This feeling of humiliation was
used to mobilize patriotism and promote in-group solidarity (Dikötter, 1992: 114). Sun’s dream was
to awaken the population since: “the race was in decline and would soon be outstripped by its rivals
unless more care was taken with medicine and hygiene” (Fitzgerald, 1996; 36). To show why, Sun
cited the young Shang emperor, Dai Jia: “The emperor was sovereign under the empire, as citizens
were sovereign in a republic. Where the sovereign needed his tutor, the citizen required a tutelary
state” (Fitzgerald, 1996:35).
Following this it seems that there were two different but co-existing and interrelated approaches –
one promoting the Chinese race as a group, and one appealing directly to the Chinese individuals
beckoning them to improve. The former underlined the group as the crucial unit for its survival
rather than the individual. This can be seen as an anti-Darwinist approach since it mirrors a
perception of race as related to a group and, furthermore, that the survival of race would be the
survival of the group in competition with other groups – other races (Dikötter, 1992: 104).
The latter focused to a higher extent on the individual, its purity, discipline, morals etc. and was
incorporated in Sun’s reform program named: ‘Three Principles of the People’. One of the three
principles was that of ‘racial nationalism’ building upon notions of the Han race as pure and the
population as the strength of the race. Sun appealed to the individual but rejected individualism
since it was dangerous to the survival of the nation-race (Dikötter, 1992: 124) and a result of
western pollution of the Chinese ‘mind’ and ‘blood’. Especially affected by pollution were the
traditional Chinese matrimonial practices which had become romanticized subjected to western
influence – advocating, among other things, late marriage age and financial independence for the
female party (Dikötter, 1992: 176).
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 27
Chinese race and eugenics
The strong influence from the west became the starting point for a vivid discussion on the
intellectual scene regarding eugenic practices focusing on which elements in society that should
prevail and which should be eliminated. Especially the New Cultural Movement showed an
increasing interest in eugenic discourses. It further excelled in the promotion of a number of
methods for improving the reproduction such as prenatal education, medicine, sterilization of
disabled and mentally diseased, interbreeding, educational textbooks etc.. In 1923 the book
Evolution and Eugenics written by Liu Xiong became a best seller. It established a link between
progress and eugenics saying that western states were already engaging in eugenic technologies and
that China would fall even further behind if an attempt was not made to control societal evolution
(Dikötter, 1992; 169). Some of the most radical eugenic thinking was seen in this period, though it
wasn’t nearly as influential as the thinking of Sun Yatsen for instance and furthermore was limited
to the intellectual sphere. Liu Xiong for example wanted to eliminate the lower classes of society by
improving their racial health, which should be done by restricting the freedom of the individual, so
that it would be subordinate to the group (Dikötter, 1992: 172-73).
Before moving on, at shot note should be made regarding the New Cultural Movement, since it
viewed as an important reason for the forming of the May Fourth Movement in 1919. The May
Fourth Movement was a nationalistic movement that arose after the peace treaty of Versailles. It
was mainly formed by intellectuals, but found great support in the general public. Furthermore, it is
viewed as the beginning of Chinese nationalism, which becomes increasingly important in the
analysis of Heshang.8
It has now been shown that a eugenic discourse was established in China around the nationalist
movement. But what was the link between the intellectual sphere and the general public? We will
try to clarify if or at least to what extent eugenic thinking has been part of the symbolic universe for
the ordinary Chinese. Furthermore it is interesting to look if and how eugenic thinking was used by
the state.
In 1925 Pan Guangdan, an intellectual educated in the West, published an article in which he
argued that eugenics could no longer be the sole responsibility of scientists – in order to work
8
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Fourth_Movement
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 28
properly eugenics needed to be state-politics. Pan was against birth control, late marriage and
female independence, pointing instead to the positive aspects of the traditional marriage system
putting great faith in the superiority of Chinese intellectual heredity, which was supported by many
contemporary ecumenists. In the coming years Pan helped establish the Chinese Committee for
Racial Hygiene and engaged himself in the promotion of the family as China’s ‘racial organization’
and key to the country’s survival. Most importantly, though, this new inspiration started the
publishing of popular textbooks explaining the basis of eugenics, racial degeneration, Mendelian
genetics etc. while university students were encouraged to “undertake research in eugenics for the
advancement of the race, the state, and the individual” (Dikötter, 1992: 175-78).
In the 1930ies eugenic thinking was a common topic in newspapers all over China, which lead to an
increased awareness in the general population, most vividly seen in that “physical education was
exalted; strength and fitness replaced Confucian values of delicacy and frailty”(Dikötter, 1992:
179) - stemming from a notion of the healthy (pure) body as being better at reproducing than an
unhealthy (impure) body. This might be the best evidence of a common, popular discourse in the
population regarding eugenics. One reason why it can be difficult to trace other direct indicators in
the population can be explained by the fact that “eugenics remained narrowly confined to the realm
of ideas. It achieved organizational expression only rarely; nor did it affect practical
politics”(Dikötter, 1992: 190).
It is nevertheless important to underline that even though the population might to some extend have
been alienated by the elite theories, it has been suggested that a certain degree of reciprocal
influence existed between elite and popular culture in terms of a constant interaction (Dikötter,
1992: 35).
Another reason for the lack of more strong instrumental achievements of the eugenics policies, was
the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war where China once again was cast into turmoil non-the least
represented by the struggle between Nationalist and Communists. The result is well known: Mao
Zedong, the Communists, and the Liberation Army won and in 1949 the Peoples Republic of China
was formed. This marked the beginning of a new and much ‘simpler’ era for eugenics – an era
where reproduction became the solution to Chinas troubles..
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 29
The Liberalisation
In the 1950s Tiananmen, the square in front of the Forbidden City, former home of the emperors,
was enlarged so that it would give space to one million Chinese, who could celebrate Mao, the
victory of communism and the founding of the Peoples Republic of China. The one million people
who could gather in the square had, above all, two things in common: being Chinese and being
communist – and that was ‘purity’ enough in it self.
With the communist takeover the discourse of race was officially abandoned, since it was a science
belonging to the ‘bourgeois’. What then prevailed unofficially? And can a discourse of eugenics
still be seen in the Maoist China?
The messianic idea of unification was now expressed in a phraseology based on the concept of class
struggle, whereas the artificial dichotomization between Chinese and Westerners in biological
terms of ‘race’ was merely reformulated in social terms of ‘class’. (Dikötter, 1992: 191)
In this way the discourse of race was recasted in order to fulfil CCP’s purpose for 1) unification of
the Chinese people under one leader, and, 2) marking a clear distinction between ‘being Chinese’
and ‘being foreign’ – being communistic or being capitalist. The latter was again used in order to
explain why China needed to close its doors to the outside world and only deal with those countries,
which shared the same ideals and values. Again this can be traced to a discourse of purity vs.
impurity – and a recast of the discourse of race seen in the beginning of the twentieth century.
What about eugenics? With the official suppression of the discourse of ‘race’, the question of
eugenics faded – at first glance. Because Mao believed that one of China’s greatest strengths was
the number of its population: “The large size of the Chinese population is a very good thing. No
matter how many times the population should double, we could always deal with it; our solution is
[increasing] production” (Note in Xiaokang, 1991; 167). This is interesting in terms of the OCP,
since it implies an economic rationality behind Mao’s understanding of population in general and
population quality in specific. At a later point it will be shown, that an economical rationality also
lies behind the OCP – this time one that justifies decreasing the population. The difference can be
seen as: Governing people through economical measures (under Mao) and governing economy
through population control (under Deng).
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 30
At the time of the communist victory in 1949 China’s population was approximately half a billion.
Half a billion people who up till the end of the 1930s had been viewed as inferior to the westerners
and of poor quality, but under Mao’s peasantry revolution was the pure raw material of which the
rise of China were to be manufactured. The propaganda machinery was therefore no longer advising
purity and improvement, but: give birth to as many Chinese children as possible - the more the
merrier, and more importantly, stronger, and thus the greater chance of achieving the true socialistic
society (Dikötter, 1992: 192).
Following the above it is important to mention an aspect that is related to the old Confucian
understanding of racial purity as something that can be achieved by education. From 1949 to Mao’s
death there were great emphasis on the necessity hailing “the richness of rural life, the nobility of
the peasant, and the transforming effect of work in the countryside on the petit bourgeois
intellectual” (Bodman in Xiaokang, 1991; 14). This shows that Mao viewed the hard work in the
rice fields as being able to ‘educate’ reactionary intellectuals and bring them back within the
socialistic discourse. Previously it was argued, that the concept of race in Mao’s regime equalled
class. Bringing this notion of race together with the notion of countryside-education it thus becomes
clear that it is not far from the Confucian measures prescribed in the Classics, meaning that
barbarians could be educated through contact with the superior Chinese – in the same way
intellectuals can be re-educated by spending time with peasants in the countryside.
Mao furthermore sought to unite the developing countries suppressed by westerners, wishing that
they would recognize China as their ‘leader’. This is why at an early stage China began to invite
students from especially Africa to study in China - an idealistic arrangement that was not always
supported by the Chinese students. This is reflected in the number of harassment cases that popped
up in various places at various times. It indicates that even though discourses of race have been
present in the Chinese population, there has not always been a sheer compliance between
government politics and population incitements.
The class discourse found its extreme under the Cultural Revolution where it was a ‘sin’ not to have
the right class background and a motive for being harassed and expelled. This, though, did not
mean, that the previous dichotomies disappeared; they were to a large degree recasted in order to
comply with socialistic/communistic theory. Foreigners were still the opposite part, but no longer as
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 31
westerners, now they were capitalist as opposed to the Chinese who were communists. Regarding
the population it was no longer a question of quality, but a question of being communist or not.
A final note should be stressed regarding racial discourses before we turn to the concluding remarks
on racial discourses. From an early stage in history China emerge as a ‘strong state’ in the sense the
bureaucratic system and governmental institutions possessed significant control over society. This
was increasingly the case with the forming of the CCP that positioned it self as an even stronger
entity within the Peoples Republic of China. This meant that CCP could use techniques of
government that would be unthinkable in other authoritarian states, since their position is very often
quiet weak e.g. those in Africa or South America.
In the following we will argue, that the state-capacity needed to implement the OCP in the 1978
was founded at an early stage in China’s history, but perfected from the liberation in 1949 where
CCP managed to strengthen the bureaucracy and governmental institutions. This briefly explains
the reason for perceiving China as a ‘strong state’9 in the context of racial discourses in general and
in this project in specific.
It is fair to say that control, power and thereby bio-politics had an increasingly important role to
play as CCP strived to form Chinese subject capable of fulfil their socialistic obligations (Dikötter,
1992: 194).
Concluding the archaeology of race
Although the discourse of race is situated on the periphery of the Chinese symbolic universe, it has
shown singular resilience throughout recent history and has tended to drift towards the centre in
periods of instability (Dikötter, 1992: 195).
The earliest discourse of race in China was one of superiority and it was strongly connected to the
relationship between the Chinese and the foreigners. The Chinese perception of foreigners has been
diverse: 1) The Chinese elite believed that foreigners where barbarians who eventually could be
changed and lifted up to the Chinese level. 2) When the cultural hegemony of the elite was
threatened, they claimed categorical differences and wanted to expel the barbarians. 3) In the first
contact with the westerners, the Chinese where indifferent and with the rejection of non-Chinese
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 32
western goods the Opium War began and ended with Chinese defeat. This was the beginning of the
decline for the Chinese dynasties.
With the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of Sun Yatsen and his Nationalist Party, the discourse
of race changed on three fronts; Firstly there were no longer an internal enemy in terms of the
Manchu-rulers, so the focus of diversity was placed on the foreigners from the West, who had been
suppressing China. Secondly the suppression had been possible to conduct for the westerners due to
the impurity and bad quality of the Chinese. And thirdly the growing interaction with the foreigners
led to adoption of the western scientific ideas of race, and the introduction of bio-politics and
eugenics in China.
With the defeat of the Japanese, and the victory in the civil war Mao and the CCP were the new
rulers and eugenics and the discourse of race was abandoned in favour of a discourse of class.
Furthermore Mao viewed population size as crucial to China’s development and survival, which is
why CCP articulated a policy of ‘giving birth to as many children as possible’. This was not the
least a consequence of Mao’s belief that since class was race – a communist would give birth to a
communist, which in time would bring China closer to achieving a world socialistic society.
9
For elaboration on the concept of the Strong state vs. the Weak state and state capacity see Peter Evans 1995.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 33
4. Bio-politics: A new era for racial technologies
“To what extend had the meaning of the one-child family policy expanded from a mere remedy for
underdevelopment to become a sign of the modern itself?” (Anagnost, 2003: 117)
In chapter three we showed how a discourse of race prevailed, but changed, since the time of the
Classics through modernisation to the end of Maoist China. The continuous preoccupation will be a
focal point in the following chapters analyse of both the on-child policy and Heshang. But before
we approach the two analytical objects, a word about the time span between them and the reason
why they have been chosen.
We will argue that China in the last years of the 1970ies was facing groundbreaking questions in
terms of how to develop. Mao’s vision of a superior socialistic state had failed and the closed-door
policy had proven to be incapable of developing China. A scapegoat was needed and one of the first
to be identified was population quality. Meaning that Mao’s focus on population quantity had been
damaging for the quality, which was deemed as an obstacle for the development of China. This was
the reason for conceiving and implementing the one-child policy and is also the turning point of this
project, since it is the moment about which can Anagnost states:
“Population quality has become central to an emerging Chinese cultural critique that, as the
Chinese economy has opened out to the World, has turned in on itself, reassigning the onus of
underdevelopment form Western imperialism to factors endogenous to Chinese society” (Anagnost,
2003, 119).
Our analysis will be used to outline a genealogy of race as eugenics that hopefully will explain the
underlying rationalities in the power relations between the Chinese population and the government.
This is done in order to understand what governmentalities that are applied in the implementation of
the OCP.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 34
The One-Child Policy
First, we will introduce the one-child policy in terms of its goals, administration and instruments.
Second, we will follow an analysis of how the technologies clash or comply with the contemporary
discourse of race in China. Finally, a short concluding remark that sum up the analysis and guide us
towards the analysis of the TV-series Heshang.
Introduction to the One-Child policy
The one-child policy (OCP) was passed in 1978 on the basis of two primary and related purposes:
1) it was to limit the population growth-rate and ultimately stable it at zero, and thereby, 2) heighten
the population quality.
There were used three main measures to implement OCP: 1) ideological education, 2) economical
and 3) administrative measures (Brødsgaard and Strand, 1998; 95)
Through programs of social change the CCP used ideological education in order to inform the
individuals/subjects. Leading cadres and birth planning workers, explained the policy in relation to
the national economical situation, the modernisation process, and the development of the country in
general. Ideally this would lead to that ”The people will definitely and immediately accept the
program for control of the population growth” (Brødsgaard and Strand, 1998; 94)
If this was not the case and ideological education thereby was concluded by the CCP as have failed
in terms of enlightening the people, economic measures in the form of penalties were used. E.g. in
1992 in Beijing the fine for a second child was between 5.000 and 50.000 YUAN, which is quite a
lot of money, when one take into consideration, that an ordinary monthly salary is app. 200-300
YUAN. Other economical measures could be incentives, such as the one-child certificate, which
carries with it a range of financial and educational benefits (Brødsgaard and Strand, 1998; 95).
The third measure that was used to implement the OCP was the administrative, which means,
“birth-planning cadres at the level of the work unit and the residential area manage the distribution
of the annual quota of births to women in their jurisdiction” (Brødsgaard and Strand, 1998; 97).
The national annual quota is determined centrally, and made part of the national economic plan.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 35
The provinces are given their share of the available births, who in turn distribute those under their
counties, and in this manner, finally the individual birth-planning worker is held responsible for her
allotted households’ productive performance (Sigley, 1997; 474). Before becoming pregnant the
‘mother to be’ therefore must apply for permission to have a child, and when it is granted, she can
become pregnant. If a child is born without permission, it will be labelled ‘outside the plan’.
Concluding this part it is important to underline, though, that ideological education and
encouragement was identified as the major focal points for the implementation of the OCP, while
the economical and administrative measures to larger extend was meant as alternative measures
(Brødsgaard and Strand 1998; 97). In our analyses it will thus be argued that precisely the
administrative measures can be understood as bio-political techniques working together with both
ideological and economical measures, whereby their importance increase dramatically.
The birth planning institutions are usually structured into two different levels: a residential unit and
a work unit. The latter provides vertical control, from above to below, and has a special birthplanning cadre with the overall responsibility, which covers groups of part-time birth planning
cadres working together with a group of propagandists. The residential planning institutions, on the
other hand, provides overall daily surveillance. It is not as powerful as the work unit, but the two
work closely together, whereby control is increased (Brødsgaard and Strand, 1998; 96).
There are big differences in how the people living in rural and urban areas responded to the OCP.
People living in urban areas, especially those employed in state-industries complied in large
measures with the policy already after one year, which can be explained by a number of factors.
Among them is the fact that the urban population is subjected to an amount of propaganda, both at
work and at home, exceeding that of the rural areas. In the urban areas the ideological education and
encouragement is therefore more or less sufficient towards all but a relatively small group in
opposition. This small group consists of people, who have given birth to daughters as the first child
and then, under the influence of the older generation and or cultural norms, wished to have yet
another child - a son. Within this group, which are also people who marry a second time and want
another child in their new relationship. Finally, but not less importantly, the urban population to a
large extent lack some of the most important incentives of the rural population to have more
children.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 36
In the rural areas life conditions are somewhat different from the urban areas. People ‘traditionally’
have more children to: 1) manage the household including work such as harvesting, 2) provide
social security in old age 3) Following a cultural norm of many children that is stronger here,
maybe for exactly those reasons. This is part of the explanation of why the implementation of the
OCP has been much more difficult in the rural areas. When a couple, do not follow the OCP after
having received preliminary ideological education, the mother is subjected to ‘persuasion’. This
consists of personal interviews with birth-planning workers or cadres, where the content of the
interview varies in accordance with the individual case. It could be the problem of having a child
when being too young, the economical hazards of having a second child etc. Furthermore it will be
explained why it is so important to follow the policy – in an individual and even more importantly,
the national context (Brødsgaard and Strand, 1998; 97-98).
There has been much debate about the use of force and coercion in the implementation of the OCP,
and the matter remains unresolved and highly controversial (Milwertz, 1994; 66). Quantifying the
relative importance of the different techniques falls beyond the scope of this project. Coercion and
violence will thus only be treated in its capacity to illuminate any illiberal aspects of bio-politics.
Analysing the One-Child Policy
In this chapter we argue that the OCP can be seen as an example of a bio-politicisation of the
discourses of race, and that its rationalities can be placed within a city-citizen rationality, conceived
and implemented with bio-political techniques.
First we will use the archaeological findings in the previous chapter to shed light on the eugenic
discourses in contemporary China in order to examine the rationalities of the OCP.
To further elaborate this point we will analyse some of its unintended consequences and see how
some of these are sought implemented in state discourse, and how some escape state discourse
Race, eugenics and the one-child policy
In chapter 3, we showed how discourses of race have changed in accordance with historical
developments. In this paragraph we will therefore argue, by mapping out a genealogy of eugenics in
contemporary China, that the OCP can be viewed as one possible recast of previous discourses of
race - and eugenics. The central theme to be investigated in the genealogy is the ways the object of
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 37
our archaeology, discourses of race and eugenics have been disseminated in the population.
Thereby explaining compliance without resorting to the argument of coercion, through a recast of
the OCP and the self-subjectification of the subjects.
As shown in the previous chapter the archaeology of racial discourses in China showed that until
the end of the 18th century race and the improvement of race was performed as a matter of
education for the elite, and correct practice in the general population. In general this educational
hierarchy meant suppression of the ‘others’, but in some cases it was also used as an expression of
‘cultural universalism’, which meant that ‘foreigners’ (the others) by education an contact with the
superior Chinese (us) could obtain a higher cultural level. In the following we will argue that the
idea of improvement of race through eugenics in the 20th century can be seen as a recast of these
discourses of possible improvement.
Another important point for the understanding of the present genealogy is the emergence of a
western ‘other’ that met the Chinese in 19th century and challenge their World-view. This challenge
also had an important role to play in the emerging of the eugenic discourses – mainly amongst the
intellectuals and through those, to a lesser extent also in the population.
The One-child Policy as City-citizen game
In order to understand the contemporary implementation of the OCP, we will draw on some
Foucauldian understandings of discipline and individuals.
The act of reproduction becomes subject of normalization, where the desired norm is having one
child, and a set of values is ascribed to fulfilling that norm. Thus in having one child the subject is
behaving patriotically, putting the welfare of the country above personal interests and implicitly
participating in the modernisation of China. By doing so the subject also ascribes to a set of racial
and eugenic discourses, perceiving the population as open to intervention – in fact, as needing it.
In order to explain this acceptance of intervention into what in western liberal societies would be
consider as the private sphere, out of bounds for governmental intrusion, one needs to look at the
lesser emphasis that is placed upon the autonomous subject in China. Liberal governmentality
presupposes “ a pregiven and clearly marked division between state and society: good government
fosters mechanisms to cultivate and protect individual autonomy not means for promoting
intervention”. (Sigley, 1997, 458) Following this line of argument, presupposing any such division
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 38
in China would only add to our confusion. On the other hand, acknowledging “a specific form of
governmental reasoning in China” (ibid, 458) will overcome this unnecessary state-society
dichotomy in China. This does not however transcend the applicability of the term governmentality
as an analytical point of departure. On the contrary, acknowledging these specific forms of
governmental reasoning, what Dean might term different constellations of the components making
up liberal governmentality (sovereignty and pastoral power) shed further light on the paradox of the
OCP.
This leads us directly to the next part of the analysis, identifying the rationalities from the citycitizen game in the OCP.
First and foremost the subject is viewed in general terms, meaning that the governed subject is
under an obligation to comply with certain rules set up between the governors and the governed – in
the same way the governors obligate themselves to provide certain guaranties for the governed. The
relationship can therefore be seen as a system of ‘mutual obligations’, where the individual care that
is constituted to a large extend takes the form of general education. There is no interest in the
individual beyond the extent it contributes to or harms the state. In the Chinese context this can be
illustrated by the so-called interviews performed by birth-planning workers. These interviews took
place when individuals were having doubts or concerns about the OCP. The interviews was to a
large extend meant as ‘putting the subject back on track’ and in compliance with the OCP, instead
of looking for alternative, unique solutions to the individual’s particular situation. Sigley stresses
the fact that bio-political strategies used to implement the OCP does not reflect the pastoral care
found in the liberal governmentalities: “In China, the expert is not a tutor – does not play a
confessional role in tutoring the individuals in certain techniques of self-mastery” (Sigley, 1997,
475). Supporting this point is the fact that Chinese birth-policy workers are not experts in the same
sense as their Western counterparts who are working with similar areas of expertise. The fact that
Chinese birth-policy workers are non-specialized, as in “of the people” (not as in “incompetent”) is
actually stressed in state discourse, as a way for the CCP to reassert its ideological hegemony, and
make the OCP more palatable. Thus it is not the scientific gaze that lends authority to the OCP, and
“Planning authorities can act from a distance without the necessary direct intermediaries of
expertise as understood in the West” (Sigley, 1997, 475).
Within the OCP there are a range of means available to achieve this end. Some more coercive than
others, and some pastoral in their way of seeking to discipline the individual, drawing on the
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 39
modern secular pastoral way of gathering expert scientific knowledge about the population, and
using it to implement the strategy most efficiently. But as noted above, this expert knowledge is not
embodied in the practitioners of power at a popular level, like in the Western liberal societies. But
the way of regarding the population, as a body open to intervention and subject to the scientific
gaze remains the same. We argue that this usage of bio-political techniques, that the OCP is
conceived within a rationality stemming from the city-citizen game.
In sum, in concordance with Dean’s definition of city-citizen game, the most important aspect that
classifies the OCP within this rationality is the placing of the state above the citizens. The rationale
expressed and acted upon behind the OCP is the improvement of the quality of the population. But
the object is not to make every single individual live up to a specified norm, for their own sake, but
to induce behaviour that leads to the achievement of that higher goal, which is improving China.
The dissemination of state discourses – self-sacrifice and nationhood
In contemporary China the issue of the OCP and quality of the people rely as stated above on
ideological education and, as a part of this, propaganda. An effective medium for channeling these
techniques of government is the person who links and the represent both the CCP and the people:
the birth-planning worker.
It is illuminating to investigate the image of the party representative carrying out the
implementation of the OCP on the micro-level, when it comes to attempts made by the CCP to
include the OCP in their self-representation, both within the CCP and in the population.
As Ann Anagnost points out, the OCP is intimately connected to discourses of nationalism, and the
policy is seen in an international context, where the success of the implementation is linked to
China’s place in the global competition: “The birth policy is frequently stated to be a massive effort
unprecedented in history, and China’s achievement in birth planning, to be a contribution to the
world. Clearly there are large stakes at play in demonstrating the superiority of the socialist
system” (Anagnost, 2003; 129). First of all, this competitive aspect of the OCP further links it to the
rationalities of the city-citizen game. Secondly, keeping notions of nationhood in mind, will shed
further light on how the CCP seeks disseminate its discourses.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 40
The birth-policy worker on the micro-level is portrayed in the national press as a party worker so
committed to pursuing the interests of the nation that she sacrifices her self, neglecting her own
family and household. She bravely faces the social sanctions imposed on her by a population that
does not always understand the imperative of the birth control work. Particularly interesting is the
emphasis given to the emotive component of the work carried out, the almost paternal way the
birth-policy worker lavishes care, attention and time on difficult cases, and thus wins them over by
her selfless dedication. Anagnost argues that this self-sacrifice is meant to induce “tears of shame
and emotion in the subjects, compelling the subject” (Anagnost, 2003; 132). This emotional aspect
of birth-policy work also serves as distraction and legitimization of more coercive measures,
shifting the moral high ground to the birth-policy worker, despite the fact that she carries out a
policy that is potentially unpopular.
This attention to the individual must not be confused with pastoral attention in the shape it took in
Western liberal societies, because the ultimate goal is not winning over the unwilling mothers for
their own sake, but rather achieving the higher goal of helping China take its rightful role as a
leading nation in the international community. In performing this work, the birth-policy worker
becomes “the very image of funü…’national woman’ whose liberation launched her as a political
subject harnessed to the interests of the state” (ibid, 131).
Birth-policy work thus takes on an added significance, as a defining character of the nation. The
self-sacrifice illustrated in the birth-policy worker reflects back on the Party, which she represents.
Implementing the policy is thus teaching the subjects how to achieve Chinese citizenship,
disciplinating them into becoming a proper population, using bio-political means.
“No Policy is more resisted at the level of popular practices than the one-child policy, and yet no
other policy has greater power to reinvigorate the imperative for strong, centralised control”
(Anagnost, 2003; 118).
In the next paragraph we will argue that the focus on nation building rests uneasy with the notion of
the nations identity. The historical, primordial identity that is needed in order to become a nation is
also the same identity that is perceived as standing in the way of modernisation. A paradox that is
articulated in the debate that arised over Heshang; the TV-series that tried to address this
contradiction within Chinese national and racial discourse.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 41
Trying to achieve discursive hegemony – unintended consequences harnessed for state
purposes
As described in the previous paragraph there are several unintended consequences of the OCP. In
this paragraph we will focus on how the CCP tries to include these in the state discourses, and thus
uses them to reassert their ideological hegemony.
One of the most significant unintended consequences of the implementation of the OCP is the
sizeable demographical imbalance between the sexes.10 The cultural norm of ascribing higher value
to boys rather than girls is especially prevalent in the rural areas, where there are also more
practical, societal reasons for wanting a boy. First of all, a boy contributes more to the household in
the sense that he can work harder, secondly he does not leave home when he grows up, thirdly he
brings his new wife home, where she also will form part of the family, lessening the work load and
caring for the ageing parents in time. On the contrary, a girl will leave the home, abandon her
parents and even need a dowry. Economically fostering girls, especially if only one child is
allowed, is thus a bad deal for poor, rural households, who cannot depend on anyone but them
selves to provide for their old age. These factors contribute to this demographic imbalance. The
higher rate of abortion of female foetuses and the general maltreatment of infant girls (abandoning
them to orphanages, malnourishment etc.) are well documented and a deep cause for concern
among human rights activists in China as well as abroad.11
However, this is not the focus of our argument. Not because we wish to downplay the scope or
gravity of the plight of Chinese girls and women, but because we wish to focus on how the
consequences of this imbalance is re-imagined and sought integrated in to a state discourse.
The lack of women in especially the rural areas has lead to a lucrative trafficking of women, either
selling brides to areas in need of wives or downright abductions. These incidents have by no means
been downplayed in the media, as could be expected of the CCP if it would try to hide the fact. On
the contrary it is given a lot of attention, extolling the gory details of this commodification of
women.
10
The ratio of girls to boys was 100: 111,3 in 1990 and 100:116,9 in 2000 according to official sources. But there have
been raised serious doubts about the validity of these statistics, because people may hide the fact that they have given
birth to a girl, in order to have another chance for having a boy. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/19/chinausa.htm.
11
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/China1.htm
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 42
Other consequence of the OCP that have received ample media attention is 1) the disproportionate
relationship between generations - and the difficulty of the relatively small, younger generations
caring for the elder and much more numerous generations. And 2) the hordes of potentially
delinquent, dangerous young Chinese men, supposedly turning to liquor, loose women and drugs
because they are deprived of a normal family life, since there simply are not enough women to go
round. These gruesome prospects of the OCP are used to spell out the necessity of a continued
strong centralised government: This strong government is the only one who is able of handling
these problems. Anagnost argues that implicit in the media coverage of these social disorders is an
attempt at reactivating of the CCP leadership. This activation becomes all the more potent and
crucial as the OCP has become the only remaining ideological project left for the CCP to assert its
moral claim with, as capitalism has lost its role of ideological scarecrow. It seems the CCP itself
acknowledges the paramount status of the OCP, naming it “the number one difficulty of the nation”
(Anagnost, 2003; 139). The message given is thus that the population might be in need of reeducation and a qualitative upgrade, but it is certainly not ready for freedom. Within state discourse
the CCP is the only vehicle for dealing with these problems, providing care for the elders12,
cracking down on the trafficking of women, disciplining the young and restless - rocking the boat
demanding political changes will thus only lead to further chaos and destruction.
Multi-vocalism – modes of resistance and ethical consequences of the intended citizencity game that are not included in state discourse
In chapter 3 it was argued that prior to the OCP there had been discourses of race and concerns
about population quality among the population. This gives an indicator of the many contributors to
the discourse, and a hint of the difficulty of controlling the direction they are taking.
The above quote shows that even though there might be a general acceptance of the rationale behind
the OCP on a collective level, these rationales are articulated on numerous levels, gaining a new
meaning on each one. Thus, there is little articulated direct criticism of the argument that China
needs to heighten the quality of the race, and that the population as a whole is perceived as being
“too large”. This is exemplified in the next chapter, by the fact that there was no criticism of the
OPC in Heshang, and, to make a further note, neither were there any protest over OCP in the
movement surrounding Tiananmen 1989.
12
This notion is according to Anagnost contested in popular discourse, as the prospect of state-sponsored elder care
seem unrealistic to especially the rural population, which the comparatively higher birth rates in the rural areas can be
seem as a testimony to.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 43
On the individual level there is, never the less, a different hunger for bodies. The individual
household or person ascribes great value to the particular body that is needed - be it an extra child
or a wife. In sum, there is a confusion of the values ascribed to the body.
Interestingly, one of the very goals of the OCP, modernization, provides a challenge to the
attempted discursive state hegemony, in the shape of the emerging private market. The market
offers another venue for ascribing value to the body, more independently of the state discourses.
This adds yet another interesting aspect of the commodification of women and their children. When
it comes to renegotiate in terms of reproductive rights, the emerging economically independent
class, the private entrepreneurs, ‘China’s new aristocracy’ are in a radically different position than
the state employees and the poorer part of the rural population. This is partly because the CCP is
dependent on them to provide the economical progress legitimising the continued CCP leadership.
Partly because they have the means to overcome the sanctions imposed on them. In other words,
they are wealthy enough to pay the fines, and important enough to get away with it. Thus the state
monopoly is challenged on many levels. Regarding status symbols, as economical success can be
achieved independently of the Party, and this implicitly changes the distribution of status symbols.
Being a party member is no longer the only way of achieving high standing in the Chinese society,
and having two children thus becomes a symbol of achieved success – a symbol of ones
achievements in the market economy. This stresses the importance of the OCP as an ideological
project for the CCP. Since, if a wealthy businessman or farmer can pay his way out of violating the
policy, only ideology will remain to assert the authority of the CCP cadre birth-policy worker, and
with him, the CCP as a whole.
The economic development also unleashes forces in the opposite side of the social hierarchy: At the
bottom there is an appearance of an increased ‘floating population’. It escapes bureaucratic control
by being unregistrated and can therefore use this newfound mobility and loosened strings of the
bureaucratic system as means to achieve reproductive freedom (Anagnost 1997, 136).
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 44
Concluding the one-child policy
In this chapter we have explored the links between the OCP and the city-citizen game and pointed
out some of the ways the unintended consequences are sought included in state discourses and how
others have escaped that attempt. The lack of direct criticism of the OCP in China could be seen as
measure of the extent to which the subjects have internalised state discourse on reproduction, but
we will argue, along with Anagnost, that this question is far to complex for such a reductionist point
of view. Rather, the subject has numerous ways of recasting their self-subjectification, some of
which have been outlined in the chapter, for example according to the market. Whatever lines of
differentiation that this process of self-subjectification runs by, there exists no yardstick with which
to measure the extent of externalisation of state discourses. Paraphrasing a pivotal paragraph by
Foucault, there is always room for thought, even under the most dire circumstances, and herein lies
a certain type of freedom, and especially so in an authoritarian governmentality like China. The
mere fact that the Chinese governmentality does not seek to rule through the capacities for freedom
like the liberal, should not blind us to the notion that an equally complex and important process of
recast, renegotiation and self-subjectification takes place in the Chinese society.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 45
5. Bio-politics out of hand
“At present, the burden of population has become the most difficult problem to solve of all China’s
problems. How many generations will have to taste the bitter fruit it has borne?” (Heshang in
Xiaokang 1992, 167)
What we are aiming to clarify by analysing Heshang is if there can be found a link between the biopolitical techniques used by CCP to promote the OCP and the effect Heshang had on the Chinese
subjects. This is done in order to understand better how bio-political techniques work and effect the
population. We will argue, that Heshang and its success can be seen as a direct consequence of the
OCP, and that it therefore, like the OCP, is both a result of bio-politics and a bio-political measure
in it self.
Heshang: a TV-series
This chapter begins with an introduction to Heshang, continues with an analysis of its effect and
relation to bio-political techniques. Finally, the chapter will end with a short conclusion of the
findings.
There is exactly 10 years between the formulation of the one-child policy and the broadcasting of
Heshang; 10 years of reform and open-door policy and 10 years of ‘self-criticising’ thought-work
(propaganda) telling the subjects, that they can only have one child. Economical reform had been
put to work and had started working resulting in unprecedented growth rates, with severe
consequences in society. Inflations was rising and surplus labour from poor areas purred into the
coastal cities, causing crime and prostitution to rise, which made people feel increasingly insecure.
Furthermore a democracy movement had been unfolding around the democracy wall in Beijing
beginning in 1978 and ending already in 1979. The authorities formally closed down the movement
after some direct criticism of Deng Xiaoping, who was the new man in power after he had been
chosen as General Secretary and President in 1978. CCP was thus keeping up appearance of a
steady leadership, but major struggles are thought to have taken place behind closed doors: what
was going to be the focal point for development? Continued economical reform, political reform,
neither or a combination? It was in this atmosphere Heshang was conceived and in this atmosphere
that it stroke a nerve in both the intellectual and public sphere (Xiaokang, 1991; 23-25).
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 46
An introduction
Heshang is a documentary TV-series in six parts, broadcasted in China in 1988 on national, CCP
controlled TV – whereby it was given authority, and a stamp of approval (Bodman in Xiaokang,
1991; 60). A team of intellectuals headed by the author Su Xiaokang wrote it.
Heshang was the first open criticism of the Chinese culture – seen perhaps by as many as 100
million viewers. Furthermore it was printed in book-form and published in newspapers (Xiaokang,
1991, 19). Heshang won wide popularity amongst the intellectuals and the general population.13
The main topic throughout Heshang is a metaphor of the Yellow river symbolizing the Chinese
civilization, which also inspired the name: Heshang – Death song of the River. The Yellow river
has been both a blessing and a curse to China; “it conceived and gave birth to the Chinese people”
(Heshang, Xiaokang, 1991; 104) but it is also “the most brutal river and most unrestrained river in
the world” (Heshang, Xiaokang, 1991; 106) causing innumerable deaths due to its uncontrollable
floods. Using the Yellow River as a metaphor implies that the Chinese civilization and the
Confucian society-structure is: backward, old, feudal, agricultural and conservative – creating an
inferior culture. Heshang left the viewers with a picture of China as an impoverished Third World
country, relying on massive infusions of foreign capital and technology to create an illusion of
modernization.
Heshang also criticizes two other important symbols of Chinese culture: the Dragon and the Great
Wall – both symbols that had been used heavily from Empirical times to the Maoist China. The
former criticism is delicate since the dragon is the overall symbol of China’s strength. There is even
an spoken legend about Napoleon, that tells us, that he named China the ‘sleeping dragon’ and
awaited its awakening with utter fear. For China the legend “suggest that the nation’s destiny lay in
being awakened by a hero of Napoleonic vision and stature – perhaps by a Chinese Napoleon”
(Fitzgerald, 1996: 62). Criticising the latter is delicate since the great wall used to symbolise
China’s ability to achieve greatness. By putting these popular symbols under heavy fire, Heshang
spoke to the general population, who could relate to the objects, causing direct and indirect
reflection on the basis and validity of the narration China was build upon – meaning not the least
the CCP thought-work that, after the death of Mao and the open-door policy, enhanced namely
13
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/eacp/webcourse/chinaworkbook/what/read6c.htm
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 47
these symbols, to show unification and a collective strive towards the future (Heshang, 1992: 1012).
Another interesting element of Heshang is its critique of the ‘truths’ about what is Chinese – and
what used to be considered as positive elements/strengths embedded in Chinese history. Going
throughout the series one finds the theme that the Chinese society is a ‘super stable structure’14,
which in the Confucian universe is considered crucial to the health of a nation, since through
stability, harmony can be achieved. Heshang, never the less uses the ‘super stable structure’ to show
that China in cycles of 300 years encounters revolutions that come and go, but continuously fail to
develop China, which remains an agricultural feudal society. Other issues, which subject to
criticism were the Cultural Revolution, The great leap forward and the usefulness of Marxism in
China.
Heshang furthermore used the western blue civilisation as an image China needs to copy in order to
achieve development and modernization. Blue is thus used as a metaphor for: dynamics, trade,
science, openness, curiousness, democracy, liberalism, and capitalism – creating a superior culture.
Su Xiaokang, the main author, and many of the other contributors also played a role in the 1989
uprising at Tiananmen Square. They saw themselves as intellectuals and cultural illuminators,
representatives of a new intellectual elite which, with the western intellectual as an ideal, were
independent of their government, free of censorship, and therefore capable of acting as the
country’s true conscience (Xiaokang, 1992: 71).
Heshang caused a lot of controversy both within the government and in society as whole. Some
parts of the CCP e.g. the reform friendly General Secretary Zhao Ziyang protected Heshang from
the heavy criticism and attempts at censorship made by conservative Vice-president Wang Zhen.
The result of the controversy was, that Heshang was only allowed to be aired twice - were after it
was banned as being unsuitable and polluting (Xiaokang, 1992: 19-20).
14
The ‘super stable structure’ stems from a bureaucracy made up by Confucian scholars in which there were a tendency
for corruption leading in the end to the corruption of power and collapse of the dynasty. But when the old dynasty
collapsed a new would replace it and the social structure would be restored – proceeding towards its own collapse
(Heshang, Xiaokang, 1991; 196)
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 48
All in all the authors behind Heshang versioned it as “a call to arms” for the Chinese people to join
the modern western world in order to reclaim the position their civilisation is entitled to (Xiaokang,
1992: 4).
The following paragraphs will show how Heshang’s agenda can be linked both directly and
indirectly through bio-politics to the OCP.
The Heshang effect
How is Heshang linked to China’s underdevelopment problem? What is the link between Heshang
and the CCP ‘controlled’ bio-politics? What is the connection if any between the subjects recast of
the bio-politics and the image Heshang creates? Theses are some of the questions we’ll seek to
answer in the following.
Explaining Heshang through self-criticism
“In our feelings about ourselves as a nation, there is a misapprehension we seem to think that the
humiliation of the past was merely an aberration in our long and glorious history. Since 1840, there
have always been people who like to use the glories and greatness of the old times to cover up the
poverty and backwardness of the recent past” (Xiaokang 1991, 113).
The quote demonstrates how Heshang questions the racial discourse in contemporary China, by
claiming that the Chinese people live in a long gone past and therefore fail to see and live up to the
reality of a modern world, which is why: “...Our civilization has declined” (Xiaokang 1991, 113).
The fact that Heshang was aired on national (and CCP controlled) TV, first of all, raises the
question of how CCP understood Heshang as means to supporting the ongoing quest for improving
the quality of the Chinese race – and reduce its number. And even more important to what extend it
was understood as being too radical.
As part of the reform process CCP launched a new policy regarding literature and art; abandoning
the censorship on these two areas, but still the CCP was divided in a “pro/contra” reform struggle,
which was quiet evident on the issue of Heshang (Wan in Xiaokang, 1991, 85). Watching Heshang
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 49
was therefore easily interpreted as yet another ‘boost’ in the reform process (Xiaokang, 1991, 308),
since the racial discourse it represented common points of references to the official CCP policy
underlying the OCP. On the other hand Heshang contained a large amount of subtle hints about the
contemporary regime in China, which were done in order to make the public question Chinese
history and culture - in which a certain kind of rule was embedded. Namely: an authoritarian regime
– the CCP. It is unclear precisely what made contra-reformist resist Heshang, but there is clear
evidence of their resistance and especially Vice President Wang Zhen tried to use his position to
stop the airing (Pin P. Wan in Xiaokang, 1991, 85-86).
This shows that CCP was far from a monolithic and uniformed actor, since fractions within the
party were aiming at achieving different objectives in the development of China and, furthermore,
wished to use different means to achieve the desired ends.
To link Heshang more directly to the bio-political issues surrounding OCP, it is necessary to look
closer at the reasons for writing Heshang and ask the question of how it ended up as being such a
political issue? The latter in the end contributed to the notion of Heshang as bio-politics ‘out of
hand’.
First of all, three central reasons can be identified as founding the basis for the birth of Heshang
(Pin P. Wan in Xiaokang, 1991: 84):
o A fixed idea among intellectuals that culture had failed
o An anti-traditional bias and cultural iconoclasm inherited from the May Fourth
Movement
o A way of giving vent to the strong emotions of anger and despair, shared by the
authors and the general public
As a ‘fixed idea’ Heshang is to a large extend in line with the reasons for implementing the OCP,
meaning that if culture had not failed China, the population would not be to large and the quality
would be better. In OCP the link between culture and population quality is not explicit. We argue,
that the reason for this is, that CCP had represented itself as the sole guardian of Chinese culture in
order to represent itself as the sole representative of the Chinese people.15 This means, that if the
objective of OCP were to criticise the Chinese culture, it would be the same as criticizing CCP. We
15
Geremie Barme; TV Requiem for the Myths of the Middle Kingdom in Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1st
1988; 41-43: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/eacp/webcourse/chinaworkbook/what/read6a.htm
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 50
therefore argue, that when Heshang launches its critique on Chinese culture, it is implicitly
criticizing CCP – and that this is the first sign of Heshang as being bio-politics out of hand, since it
introduces an unintended and potentially dangerous critique regarding power relations between
CCP and the Chinese population. What is further to be understood of Heshang as bio-politics out of
hand will be elaborated in the last paragraph of this chapter. For the current discussion, however,
the interest among intellectuals to challenge the ‘given way’ - and their possibility to do so - is more
relevant.
The ‘given way’ is a term coined to capture truths that has been constructed either by public
discourses or, more importantly, by official CCP discourses e.g. the symbolic understanding of the
Great Wall, the dragon, historical events etc. Furthermore it needs to be stressed, that we are not
arguing that the interest among intellectuals to raise critique had emerged ‘suddenly’ around the
airing of Heshang, rather we would argue, that it can have been present, but that is was only when
CCP aloud the liberalization of art and literature – and to a certain extend media – that it became
possible to articulate it.
Thus, the interest to criticize is related to CCP encouraging of the intellectuals to ‘seek truth trough
fact’ instead of seeking it in political ideology, which was the case during Mao’s regime.
Developing this argument, two focal points emerge: 1) it is an articulation of modernity, as we
know it in the so-called West, meaning the trust we place in science and scholars in order to outline
reality, 2) the recast of Chinese intellectuals as the ‘moral’ backbone of the rulers. Both will be
elaborated in the following paragraphs, for now it’s enough to notice their existence and
characterize them shortly.
The first articulation of modernity can be related to several issues, but using it to understand the
rationality underlying the OCP it would be to recognizing that the population size were too large (as
a fact) and then concluding following that it makes the population quality poor (the truth).
The second, is related to the role played by intellectuals as a educated elite passing on wisdom to
the imperial government and thereby acting as an integral part of China’s bureaucracy and a cultural
identity.16 Previous to Heshang a similar kind of power relation between intellectuals and
government had been present during the May Fourth Movement, which is also the reason for
identifying reason number two for the birth of Heshang as namely: ‘An anti-traditional bias and
cultural iconoclasm inherited from the May Fourth Movement’.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 51
This second reason should be linked closely to critique of Chinese culture, since these are concrete
examples of focal points symbolized by the Wall, the dragon etc. This becomes increasingly
interesting when compared to the May Fourth Movement, since there are quite a few similarities
between the agenda of 1919 and Heshang.
The New Cultural Movement, which is mentioned in Chapter 3, led to the May Fourth Movement.
It was a movement spearheaded mainly by intellectuals and students, who perceived themselves as
highly patriotic and believed that China could be restored to its former status, free of foreign rule,
by focusing on western concepts such as democracy, equality and liberty. The movement found
great support among patriotic Chinese of all classes.17
In this context we argue, that the New Cultural Movement revolved around discourses of
patriotism, nationalism, racial inferiority and purity. These are the same discourses present in the
post-Mao CCP’s effort to implement the OCP. However given the tumults and profound changes in
the status of the Chinese intellectuals in the last sixty years, it is hardly feasible to expect that a new
breed of intellectuals would or could resume the precise same positions they held during the New
Cultural Movement. Instead we argue that subjects, both intellectuals and the general public, shared
a recast of the May Fourth Movement and an idealization of this specific past as a mean to escape
the deadlock of Chinese culture in general. The link we argue that can be find between the May
Fourth Movement and Heshang is therefore not one of causality, but one of sharing similar racial
discourses. The crucial difference is thus the presence of a state in post-Mao China. In the
beginning of the 20th century it was a chaotic time and the focal point for the May Fourth
Movement was nation building. Whereas the focal point for Heshang was ‘nation’/ culture-critique.
In this the presence of the state becomes crucial since it makes bio-political technologies a possible
measurement by which subjects can be governed through freedom and liberal practices.
When it comes to the general population, we find the last reason for the birth of Heshang: A way of
giving vent to the strong emotions of anger and despair, shared by the authors and the general
public.
As mentioned earlier the economical reforms had, needles to say, significant effects on the Chinese
society: inflation, surplus labour, increased crime and prostitution, and inequality between
16
17
http://www.watson.org/~leigh/specterpast.html
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Fourth_Movement
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 52
economical growth in different provinces (low in West, high in East). It was also mentioned, that
these changes in society to some extend created a feeling of insecurity among in the Chinese
population (Xiaokang, 1991; 23-25). We argue, that the anger and despair shared by intellectuals
and the general population was a result partly of the effects caused by economical reforms, partly
of the bio-political technologies used to implement OCP in order to ‘promote’ the self-critical
attitude towards the individual and its quality. These emotions were recasted by Heshang, which
transformed them info a more general disappointment with culture – and implicitly embedded in
this: political questions. This point can be exemplified by quoting Su Xiaokang when he explains
how he perceives the critic within Heshang: “they [Heshang’s authors] could not confront the party
and the government directly, they attacked China’s ancestors instead as a form of indirect critique”
(Xiaokang, 1991: 84). We argue, that the criticism found in Heshang is a recast of the self-criticism
embedded in the OCP, which is why it can be classified as an unintended consequence. This is a
point that will be elaborated in a later paragraph.
To sum this paragraph: At its starting point Heshang was given an aura of authority and a stamp of
approval, since it was shown on national, state controlled TV. But the authors behind Heshang
knew, that the kind of criticism they were launching could be taken too far, since it would then
reflect too much on the contemporary system, which could prevent the airing despite CCP noninterference policy regarding art and literature. A primary reason for this was identified to be the
representation of CCP as both the sole guardian of national symbols (culture) and representative of
the Chinese people, whereby criticizing culture would mean criticizing CCP and their mandate to
rule.
After having analysed Heshang and its relations to CCP, the following paragraph will seek to
analyse it in the context of eugenic discourses.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 53
Heshang and eugenic discourses
“We cannot change the colour of our skins just as we cannot change the colour of the yellow river.
And yet we must rebuild the culture of Chinese people – the structure of our minds. This will be an
extremely difficult and complex piece of culturo-philosophical systems engineering” (Xiaokang,
1991: 98).
Part four of Heshang is named “The New Era” and its content is to some extend limited to the
concept of ‘suzhi’ meaning quality – quality of the people. It’s partly a harsh critique of the racial
discourse from liberation in 1949 to 1976, and partly caused by realizing, that compared to other
contemporary nations (especially Europe, US, Japan and the four Asian Tigers) the Chinese
civilization is lacking dramatically behind (Heshang, Xiaokang, 1991; 162). The latter is
exemplified by the quote above, while the former can be illustrated by mentioning, that Heshang
regarded Mao Zedong’s idea that “The large size of the Chinese population is a very good thing. No
matter how many times the population should double, we could always deal with it; our solution is
[increasing] production” (Note in Xiaokang, 1991; 167) is directly unwise. Furthermore it’s
important to stress, that Heshang at no point criticizes OCP, which is a point to be elaborated in the
following in terms of why this is and what it means.
What attitude can be found in Heshang regarding the eugenics, OCP and population-quality? And
why has it become so evident in the population at this point in time?
Heshang is explicitly in line with official CCP policy, when it is stated that “the decline in the
makeup of the general population is caused precisely by the rapid increases in its numbers”
(Heshang in Xiaokang, 1991; 170). But a difference is found when CCP strives to achieve both
symbolic and factual power by claiming that OCP leads to the perfection of a ‘socialistic mind-set’,
which is the same as saying, that CCP is the rightful governor of China. Heshang on the other hand
seeks to illuminate the viewers so that they can become part of the modernised world. To do this
Heshang focuses on education as a mean to achieve the so-called ‘culturo-philosophical
engineering’ (in the following: cultural engineering).
We’re not arguing, that these to goals are completely different, but rather that the goal presented by
the CCP is one anchored in a city-citizen rationality placing the state above the individual. On the
contrary Heshang is willing to ‘jeopardise’ state stability by placing the individual above the state,
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 54
asking it to be critical towards the given. This is seen as a quest to promote a ‘second
enlightenment’ aiming at awakening the masses, which is not unlike the agenda of the May Fourth
Movement in 1919 (Pin P. Wan in Xiaokang, 1991; 89).
What does this mean? First of all Heshang is agreeing with the OCP and its purpose; to minimize
the population size and thereby heighten its quality. Second, Heshang is being very specific about
what qualities are needed: a strong spirit of enterprise and a high ability to accept risk (Bodman in
Xiaokang, 1991: 7). Regarding this process, though, as one of ‘cultural engineering’ seems to be
somewhat off line with OCP – or at least contributing in a rather sophisticated way to the concept of
improving race presented by the OCP.
Heshang points out one very specific and crucial element in the European history, namely: the birth
of capitalism dated to Venice in 1160 – which made “the tie between goods and money the
principal tie in society” (Heshang in Xiaokang, 1991: 163). Hereby introducing a paradox that
cannot be directly solved by the OCP, since Heshang finds evidence, that the Chinese civilization is
culturally unequipped to make this transformation, which is why the cultural engineering is needed.
We argue, like it was done regarding the reasons for making Heshang in the previous paragraph,
that the cultural engineering can be understood as a recast of previous discourses of race and racial
improvement in China. Turning to the Confucian ideals of how to improve barbarians, it was shown
earlier that it was believed this could be done through education and mere contact with the superior
Chinese race. Heshang also stresses the importance of education and actually names it as “China’s
most urgent crisis” (Bodman in Xiaokang, 1991; 7). What does this imply? It implies, that even
though Confucian values was viewed by Heshang as a central cause for China’s underdevelopment,
it was still possible for the authors to recast notions embedded in the Confucian values and use,
what they found effective in their own project, being: bring the Chinese population through a
transition-phase and ultimately modernise China.
To conclude this paragraph let us sum up: There is no evidence in Heshang telling us, that the
authors are against the measures presented by the OCP. On the contrary it was shown, that Heshang
was in line with the OCP, but only viewed it as one strategy, which in collaboration with other
technologies, the most important being education, could lead China out of its backwardness. This
leads naturally to the question of how radical in its critique and exclusive towards the CCP policy
Heshang really was. This question is extremely difficult to answer since a critique of culture
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 55
becomes a political critique when culture has been monopolized by state discourses. But at this
point an understanding can be sought in Xiaokang’s self-reflecting thoughts written in exile, postTiananmen, where he states, that due to the reform process initiated by Deng Xiaoping Chinese
intellectuals were actually arguing, that the system had a chance of gaining new life. Therefore
many intellectuals were inspired by the mantra ‘seeking truth through facts’ and wanted to help
perfection the system – not overthrow it (Xiaokang, 1991; 47). Why then, was Heshang then
ultimately labelled as a threat to the CCP? This question we will try to answer in the paragraph
‘Bio-politics out of hand’.
Heshang as an exercise of freedom
In this paragraph it will be argued, that Heshang can be seen as an exercise of freedom launched
from within existing racial discourses, meaning that it is not trying to escape existing disciplines
and power relations, but thus aims at resisting, questioning, disagreeing or even perform a recast of
the discourses presented by CCP.
The self-criticism launched by the CCP is aimed at the improving the Chinese race and a solution is
provided implicitly in their critique, namely: the OCP - and the CCP itself since its presence is
needed to implement the OCP. Heshang on the other hand was articulating a self-criticism aimed at
cultural symbols monopolized by state discourses, since CCP had recasted itself as the sole
guardian of these symbols. The effect of this articulation is that the question of where to search for
solutions becomes open-ended, potentially including the CCP.
The analysis will be unfolded around the two following observations, which is understood as
closely related: 1) Heshang did not claim to present one set of correct ideas. Rather the authors saw
it as their task to present a variety of different opinions and different points of views in order to start
a dialogue with the audience. 2) And precisely because of this, Heshang came dangerously close to
saying that CCP had lost its mandate to rule (Both: Xiaokang, 1991; 34). The two observations will
be used separately. The first is the starting point from which the next paragraph (Heshang as a
pastoral power) is unfolding, while the second will be used to unfold the analysis in this paragraph.
Heshang’s authors belonged to a generation, which was known as ‘the fourth generation’. This
generation can, a bit ironically, be classified as ‘modern’ in the Western sense. They were
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 56
characterized by having lost their identity, but not their desire to seek for recognition and identity
by showing their concern for the nation. Neither had they lost the belief, that they should do
something in an orderly fashion, since they felt, that the older generation were morally bankrupt and
the younger generation not yet ready to be trusted (Xiaokang, 1991; 76). In this void between two
generations there was ample space for the ‘fourth generation’ to resist the older generations and act
as guidance for the younger generation.
The idea we are claiming is, that in order to implement the OCP the CCP used liberal techniques of
government i.e. bio-politics. Implicitly in these techniques is the scope for enabling the subject to
govern itself. A crucial point in this is, thus, that these liberal techniques also opened the possibility
for the subjects to recast official policy. Heshang is an example showing how this recast was
performed among intellectuals and in the general population.
In post-Mao China the power relationship between intellectuals and government were still under
great influence from the Mao-years, meaning that prior to the liberation in 1949 intellectuals had
had an extensive influence on the emperor/government as moral and political guidance (mentioned
earlier). Whereas Mao discarded them as reactionary if they went against official communistic
policy. Following this, it is highly questionable in which areas ‘truth’ were to be sought, when CCP
asked the intellectuals in post-Mao to ‘seek truth through facts’.
Clearly ‘truths’ could be sought in a variety of sciences without threatening CCP hegemony of
power, whereas especially science of history and culture might pose a danger since their the moral
standard for the intellectual was the “pursuit of knowledge and truth, which transcends all political
and personal interests; and on the other hand it should be the creation and passing on of culture”
(Pin P. Wan in Xiaokang, 1991; 77). The intellectual mission was therefore understood as
somewhat split between their wish to act/criticize and their fear that if critique was too bold it might
not be looked upon with gratitude by the CCP. This is likely to have placed the authors behind
Heshang in a profound dilemma: On the one hand they had been given a much-desired role in the
post-Mao China, but on the other hand the role was distant from, and had only little in common
with the role, played by intellectuals previously. It seems, though, that the dilemma created a room
for creative thinking.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 57
Three elements was used, to solve this problem: 1) promotion of self-criticism exemplified by OCP,
2) the fact that the fourth generations need to act and help in order to escape their confusion and, 3)
the propaganda apartments decision not to interfere with literature and art.
It was previously noted, that Xiaokang and the other authors knew, that they couldn’t criticize the
CCP directly, which is why the past was chosen as ‘analytical’ object. We will further argue, that
this need to criticize or guide, can be view as a recast of the role played be Chinese ‘old school’
intellectuals, who: “felt concern for the rest of the world, and enjoyed themselves only after the rest
of the world had enjoyed themselves” (Xiaokang, 1991; 78). Furthermore the intellectuals were
looking to the west, to see what roles the intellectuals played there. Their role was adjusted, since
the clear-cut ‘traditional’ power relationship could not be established. Their rationale must therefore
have been, that to make the best of the kind of self-criticism they thought necessary, they could use
the liberalizing of arts and literature to establish a critique that in a subtle way could criticize the
contemporary system. This is the basic exercise of freedom, as we understand it performed by the
intellectuals: launched from within the discourse existing in the OCP, but opposing the power
relationship between intellectuals and government. This becomes increasingly interesting, when the
population of more than one billion is taken into consideration in the following we will therefore
ask the question: what about the general public?
Heshang as a pastoral power
In this paragraph we will argue that the intellectual’s new role presented by Heshang can be
understood as an articulation of a pastoral power relation (shepherd-flock game).
Compared to the intellectual’s exercise of freedom, it is increasingly difficult to narrow down the
exercise of freedom performed by the public. To do this, we will introduce the concept of Heshang
as an act of ‘pastoral power’ guiding the public to resist existing disciplines.
As stated in the previous paragraph the analysis of ‘Heshang as a pastoral power’ will take as its
starting point the following quote: Heshang did not claim to present one set of correct ideas. Rather
the authors saw it as their task to present a variety of different opinions and different points of
views in order to start a dialogue with the audience.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 58
To being the analysis we argue that the foregoing observation was a cry out for dialogue between
the authors of Heshang and the public. Embedded in this notion we find an understanding of the
power relationship between the authors (as experts: shepherd) and the public (flock) not unlike the
one found in the shepherd-flock game, though, not entirely the same. Heshang is placing increased
focus on he individual, asking each subject share their thoughts, increase their knowledge and be
critical towards cultural symbols such as e.g. the dragon and the Great Wall, which are symbols of
China’s greatness.
We argue, that when Heshang was shown on national TV, the subjects performed two simultaneous
actions: 1) recognizing the existence of certain cultural-bound power relations between CCP and the
public, and, 2) internalising Heshang as propaganda (thought-work) whereby the self-criticism held
in the OCP was recasted to the form expressed in Heshang.
The question is then if this is an expression of an internalisation of Heshang as an official
discourse? Or did the subjects actually claim the right to exercise their freedom using Heshang to
resist the existing power relations?
It’s extremely difficult to answer this question without looking ‘into’ the heads of the individual
Chinese, but there are a few points, that can be made which ultimately will bring us close to a
reliable understanding.
On the one hand, due to Confucian values Chinese culture estimates correctness and harmony
higher than the needs of the individual. When Heshang presented its criticism, it was done in a
radical fashion easily understood as celebrating incorrectness and disharmony. To viewers carrying
this opinion, Heshang was clearly a rebel out of line with official discourse on several issues such
as political and economical reform, historic understanding etc. (Xiaokang, 1991, 22).
On the other hand, could most of the opinions presented in Heshang be seen as mirroring the
political debate that had been unfolding throughout the 1980ies between General Secretary Zhao
Ziyang and the conservative fraction of CCP regarding the increasing room for liberal opinion
making in China (Xiaokang, 1991, 22).
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 59
In the eyes of a viewer, Heshang was “the most spectacular television programme ever shown in
China. It is sure to occupy a unique position in the history of Chinese television”.18 So how does the
great interest comply with the two views stated above?
First of all, being ‘rebel’ is equal to resisting power – or in this context: resisting power relations.
This means that a power relation has become visible, which is also the case, if a viewer chose to
understand Heshang as an articulation of the political struggle, taking place within CCP.
When a power relationship becomes visible, it can be resisted, protected or enforced – anyhow it
becomes object for change. Not that change necessarily will occur, but the potential is present as a
contrary to when power relationships are not recognized. Our claim, and the closest we get to an
understanding of the above-posed question, is then, that Heshang succeeded in its mission: dialogue
was achieved, subjects chose to resist, question or protect existing power relations and discourses.
Because had the subjects not done this, Heshang would not have been recognized and debated the
way it was.
The answer to the question, of whether Heshang was understood as CCP propaganda or the
population recasted Heshang as a pastoral power guiding them towards an exercise of freedom, is
then: The public did claim their freedom, but not all used it necessarily to resist or question power
relations existing between subjects and government, rather some also chose to protect or strengthen
their (the power relations) importance.
“…. whether in past or in present, it was rare for someone to speak out, even indirectly, without a
patron” (Bodman in Xiaokang, 1991; 53). The quote underlines the scope of the achievement it was
that Heshang gave the Chinese subjects ‘a voice of their own’. Furthermore due to the policy of
‘seeking truth through facts’ it seems reliable, that the population looked towards Heshang and the
experts who wrote it, for guidance and expert-knowledge on what to expect from reform-China.
These two elements support the understanding of Heshang as a pastoral power and this
understanding can be elaborated by pointing to conclusions made in the previous chapter. It was
shown that CCP as means to implementing the OCP launched liberal techniques of government that
can be characterized as a version of the city-citizen game. This was thus in the modern version of
the concept, making it a ‘reason of state’. To implement such a rationality and power relations
18
Geremie Barme; TV Requiem for the Myths of the Middle Kingdom in Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1st
1988; 41-43: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/eacp/webcourse/chinaworkbook/what/read6a.htm
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 60
requires the use of bio-political techniques. These techniques draw on both games – the city-citizen
and the shepherd-flock. We therefore argue, that Heshang is the unavoidable pastoral element in
China’s modern and bio-political implementation of the OCP. Governing through liberal techniques
is thus understood as mentalities of government made possible by modernity. Though, this can only
be done by adopting ‘the full package’ of modernity i.e. realizing that liberal techniques holds an
incontrollable element, which ultimately justifies the use of illiberal practices. And this is the object
of analysis within the final paragraph.
Subjectification and modernity: Bio-politics out of hand
“The truth is, …, that the history of China over the past 60 to 70 years has proved that only under
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and by taking the socialist road can China have a
bright future.”19
In this last paragraph we will introduce the term ‘bio-politics out of hand’. The expression is coined
in order to describe what is also referred to as unintended consequences of bio-politics, which is not
a new and unexplored area in the theory of governmentality. On the contrary, both the intended and
unintended consequences are analysed to fully expose and understand the power mechanisms of
bio-politics.
Furthermore the notion of unintended consequences of bio-politics is embedded in the theory, since
subjects through subjectification can recast power relations in unforeseen ways and thereby, in the
most radical cases, test the structure of precisely the power relations they are recasting.
The analysis of ‘bio-politics out of hand’ will question the nature of an authoritarian government
using liberal practices to govern its subjects, meaning: how can Heshang as a collective body be
understood as bio-politics out of hand? What is the result of Heshang as bio-politics out of had for
the individual subject? And, finally, what was the scope of possible reactions from the CCP (being
an authoritarian regime) and why were the chosen measures taken?
19
Beijing, New China Broadcast, August 1st 1989, in Another View on River Elegy: The Government’s Response:
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/eacp/webcourse/chinaworkbook/what/read6b.htm
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 61
As stated above, bio-politics out of hand is indeed regarding unintended consequences, and the
larges of all unintended consequences would be the one expressed by Vice-president Wang Zhen in
the following quote: “If things continue this fashion, the Party and the State will be finished” Vice-president Wang Zhen about Heshang and the furore it caused among intellectual and in
society-general (Bodman in Xiaokang, 1991, 20). Meaning the collapse of the Party and the State.
The following analysis will therefore identify three areas due to which Heshang can be understood
as a challenge to CCP and thus the stability of the nation. The two areas can be identified as (Wan
in Xiaokang, 1991, 88):
o Denial of Mao Zedong theory and criticizing the current regime
o Favouring economical reform
A third: Criticizing the ‘spectre of great unity’ is mentioned, but will not be elaborated further,
since it is behind the scope of this project.
Denial of Mao Zedong theory and criticizing the current regime
It is evident that as long as Mao Zedong’s picture hangs over the entrance to the Forbidden City in
Beijing, he will officially be appointed a great and significant role in CCP. This might not be seen
in the real-politics today, but Mao is still part of the founding identity of CCP - this was even more
so in 1988 when Heshang was aired. The accusations against Mao in Heshang are non-the less far
from subtle: “The distinguishing marks of a despotic government are secrecy, rule by an individual,
and the fickleness of his temperament” (Heshang in Xiaokang 1992, 221).
Heshang was accused of being unpatriotic, showing signs of ethnic and cultural nihilism and failing
to be guided by a correct and scientific [read Marxist] view of history, as well as basic errors of fact
(Xiaokang, 1991, 22). They, the authors, would at any time dismiss these accusations and describe
themselves as patriotic, concerned with the nation’s problems and driven by their social conscience
(Xiaokang, 1991, 89) – maybe even speaking on behalf of the people, which can certainly be argued
due the debate and interest Heshang arose. This forms an interesting dichotomy: how can the CCP,
despite its constant representation of itself as being equal to the Chinese people, be out of line with
desires present in the population? This question leads to another: did the emergence of Heshang
inspire the population to recast their image of CCP? Did the discourse remained so the CCP was
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 62
viewed as ‘us’ (representative of the people) or did the power relations uncovered by Heshang push
forward a notion of the CCP as ‘them’?
“Chinese culture did not nurture a sense of citizenship. On the contrary, it taught a subject
mentality. A subject mentality can only produce obedient people who meekly submit to oppression
on the one hand and madmen who act recklessly on the other” (Yuan Zhiming in Xiaokang 1992,
217).
In a regime that is using bio-politics and thereby freedom to govern its subjects, the accusations
stated in the quote are critical. They are critical not so much because they proposes the theory, that
the Chinese people is obedient, but because it states, that they are lacking a sense of citizenship,
which means, that a modern state is somewhat impossible to imagine. When a state is impossible to
imagine, so is a modern government using liberal techniques of government, which the CCP has
been identified as with regards to the implementation of OCP. If this dichotomy presented in
Heshang were to be internalised by the subjects, it could have endangered the legitimate rule of the
CCP. Since their representation as ‘us’ would become increasingly difficult, which ultimately could
lead to a recast among the subjects of the CCP as ‘them’ whereby their mandate to rule would be
lost.
To escape such a deadlock the CCP uses its capacity as an authoritarian government to stall or even
end the development by the use of illiberal techniques such as force or cohesion. Two different
manifestations of such techniques that can be mentioned in this context are the abolishing of the
Democracy Wall Movement and the launching of the Mental Purity Campaign in the 1980ies
(Xiaokang, 1991; 24). Both aimed at preventing ‘hostile’ discourses in spreading beyond control
and thereby securing that the representation of the CCP as ‘us’ – sole representative of the Chinese
people – is kept unchallenged.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 63
Favour economical reform
Heshang place itself in possible opposition to CCP by saying that what China needs is: “A spirit of
democracy and a spirit of science is precisely what our people most lack” (Xiaokang 1992, 217).
Which was elaborated by stating “The marks of a democratic government should be transparency,
responsiveness to the popular will” (Xiaokang, 1992; 221).
Both Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang believed that the Chinese people were not yet mature to
embrace notions of democracy, human rights and freedom.20 Following this we argue, that the same
goes for the articulation of economical reform. Heshang were stressing the importance of taking the
initial steps towards developing ‘market economy’, which is to be done by legating private
ownership – the cornerstone in capitalism. Taking this at face value, it is the same as discarding
socialism, since the basic and all-important element of socialism is the namely the opposite:
collective-ownership.
A standard joke tells us, that if you want to study truly liberal market economy, then you should go
to China. Why is it then so critical, that Heshang favour economical reform the way it does?
Because it brakes with CCP monopoly on articulating economical reform, which is to be done at a
pace CCP saw fit in concordance with Deng and Zhao’s understanding of democracy, freedom and
human rights in a Chinese context. In other words: we argue, that CCP is the sole authority capable
of articulating economical reform, since CCP alone knows how and when to develop the Chinese
people. The fact is that CCP in 1988 commenced the implementation of reforms allowing a larger
scope for private ownership (Brødsgaard, 1997; 83). But as contrary to social and cultural critique,
economical questions were not yet to be debated in the public sphere. In general this means that
while we have identified certain liberal practices in the implementation of the OCP, there were
evidently still areas in which CCP would not accept critique or ‘guidance’ from the population,
since this would challenge their mandate to rule.
And again, as it was the case with the Democracy Wall Movement and the Mental Purity
Campaign, CCP chose use illiberal techniques of government as a mean of ‘damage control’ by
censoring Heshang after the second airing. Considering Heshang’s emphasis on democracy and the
authors involvement in the 1989 Democracy Movement and the Tiananmen-incident, it is thus
20
Geremie Barme; TV Requiem for the Myths of the Middle Kingdom in Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1st
1988; 41-43: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/eacp/webcourse/chinaworkbook/what/read6a.htm
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 64
highly questionable if the ‘damage control’ worked. Maybe the truly unintended consequence of the
liberal techniques used to implement the OCP was not evident until June 1989. At which point it
had become an exercise of freedom so potent and compelling, that it could only be controlled by the
use of force – by the use of the Liberation Army.
Concluding the Heshang effect
Before turning to the overall conclusion of this project, a few specifics conclusions will be made
about Heshang.
First of all, the authors behind Heshang envisioned it as “a call to arms” for the Chinese people,
asking them to embrace modernization. Heshang was thus given an aura of authority, since it was
shown on national TV. But the criticism that was launched was subtle and based on historical
elements symbolizing contemporary problems. This was still risky business, since CCP is
represented as both the sole guardian of national symbols (culture) and the Chinese people, whereby
criticizing culture would mean criticizing CCP and their mandate to rule.
Further, Heshang was in line with the OCP, but only viewed it as one strategy, which in
collaboration with other technologies could lead China out of its backwardness. Their rationale
were that to make the best of the kind of self-criticism they thought necessary, they could use the
liberalizing of arts and literature to establish a critique that in a subtle way could criticize the
contemporary system. This is per se an exercise of freedom performed by the intellectuals. Acting
as expects the authors behind Heshang gave vent to the population compelling them to question ‘the
given’ and embrace a ‘a voice of their own’. In these ways Heshang put the individual above the
state, which lead us to identify it as a pastoral power – being the unavoidable element in China’s
modern and bio-political implementation of the OCP.
Finally Heshang was identified as ‘bio-politics out of hand’. Showing that the liberal techniques of
government that was used to implement the OCP holds the risk of subjects being able to recast
discourses and produce unintended consequences. This ultimately ‘legitimises’ the use of force
and/or cohesion – in other words: the use of illiberal practices as means of ‘damage control’ in
order to secure continued stability – economically, politically, socially and culturally.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 65
This is also a know element of so-called western societies, making both society-systems modern in
the sense that they combine liberal techniques and pastoral power to assemble their individual
mentalities of government – while striving for societal purity through stability in an, at times, truly
demonic fashion.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 66
6. Conclusion
Throughout the project we have worked with a notion of all states as being modern. This means that
they share modernity and therefore also potentially share rationalities aimed at governing through
freedom and liberal practices. To do this a society needs to celebrate the existence of sciences as
means of expert-knowledge that can be used to distinguish normal from deviant, since this is crucial
when governing by bio-politics. Bio-politics is thus understood as techniques made possible by
enlightenment and modernity. Furthermore, bio-politics consists of both liberal and illiberal
practices of government. What we argued then, is that through modernity societies not only share
globalisation or the present, they also share understandings of governmentalities, which is
ultimately reflected in power relations produced e.g. between government and population.
Therefore it is feasibly in any modern society to try to map out the underlying rationales of power
relations stemming from the city-citizen and shepherd-flock games – and their modern version:
‘sovereignty’ and ‘pastoral power’, which together ensures the existence of bio-politics.
Summing up what we have concluded in the project, the discourses of race prior to the OCP have
been and are pivotal to the acceptance of the policy. This answer presents a welcome alternative
explanation to the relative lack of public, collective critique of the policy, contesting the
conventional view on China as being an oppressive and totalitarian regime, ruling through
meticulous and relentless control and fear, prevalent in both academic circles and the general
discourse. We are however, not contesting the severity of the Chinese regime, merely pointing out
the many different rationalities and practices of power and, thus, equally important, the numerous
ways the subjects can deal and recast these practices of power.
Trying to paint a more nuanced view of China, we have identified rationalities recognizable from
the liberal governmentality, at work within a Chinese setting. In doing so we argue that even though
the constellation of the components is different from liberal governmentality, it is still analytically
fertile to apply them in order to analyse other types of rule.
By showing that the OCP is the bio-politisation of race and Heshang ‘bio-politics out of hand’, we
have argued that ruling through sovereignty and pastoral techniques i.e. bio-politics it becomes
impossible to control and foresee all the consequences, since subjects are free to recast official
discourse, resisting disciplines and power relations.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
DEMONIC PURITY: bio-politics, the one-child policy and a TV-series
PAGE 67
As far as there consists a consensus about the OCP outside China, surprise of the continued
implementation of this radical strategy persists. On the use of coercive measures, and the
deployment of violence opinions are more divided. At any rate, looking at China and in particular
the OCP from a distance, easily influenced by prejudgements, condemning is the easiest thing to do,
as the country itself, and the policy in particular appear so alien to the western liberal societies and
the way we perceive ourselves. Thus, if this should be the case we are distancing ourselves from the
possibility of looking at the bio-political play as an important game, which we, as development
workers need to approach.
The important link to be stressed is then, that any measurement whether subtle or forceful found in
modern societies might not be so distant from our own ‘reality’, which is an observation that can be
underlined by mentioning Michel Foucault’s characteristic of the modern liberal society as ‘truly
demonic’. A term, that in this project has been reformulated as ‘Demonic purity’ in order to mirror
liberal western societies in China’s quest for racial purity through the use of bio-politics.
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003
Analysing mentalities of government in contemporary China
PAGE 68
8. Bibliography
Anagnost, Ann: National Past-Times, Duke 2003
Brødsgaard, Erik Kjeld: Kina efter Deng, København 1997
Brødsgaard And Strand: Reconstructing Twentieth-Century China, New York 1998
Dikötter, Frank: The Discourse of race in Modern China, London 1992
Dean, Mitchell: Governmentality: power and rule in modern society, London: Sage, 1999
Evans, Peter: Embedded autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, 1995
Fitzgerald, John: Awakening China: Politics, Culture & Class in the Nationalist Revolution,
Stanford University Press: 1996
Milwertz, Nathansen Cecilia: Accepting Population Control – The perspective of Urban Chinese
Women on the One-Child Family Policy, Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of Asian Studies,
University of Copenhagen: 1994
Ransom, John S. Foucault’s Discipline, The Politics of Subjectivity, Duke University Press,1997
Sigley, Gary: Governing Chinese bodies: The Significance of studies in Governmentality for the
analyses of Birth Control in China in Clare O’Farrel (ed) Foucault: The Legacy, Brisbane
University of Technology Press, 1997
Xiaokang, Su et all. Deathsong of the river: A readers guide to the Chinese TV series Heshang
East Asia Program, Cornell University; 1992
RUC / INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
MODULE 2 / SUMMER 2003