Huei-ying Kuo
Nationalism Against Its People? Chinese Business and
Nationalist Activities in Inter-War Singapore, 1919-1941
Working Papers Series
No. 48
July 2003
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NATIONALISM AGAINST ITS PEOPLE? CHINESE
BUSINESS AND NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES IN
INTER-WAR SINGAPORE, 1919-19411
Huei-ying Kuo2
Dept. of Sociology
State University of New York at Binghamton
[email protected]
Abstract: This paper examines the rationale and impact of accelerating Chineseled anti-Japanese nationalist activities in Singapore from the late 1920s within the
context of Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages and business networks in Southeast
Asia. More specifically, despite the fact that leading Chinese business elites were
mobilized by the nationalist calls to confront Japanese interests, not only
Japanese agents but also some Chinese were targeted. I further point out that
within Singapore’s Chinese business communities the division between those
who led the nationalist campaigns and those importing Japanese goods fell into
Chinese sub-ethnic categories. The term ‘sub-ethnic economic nationalism’ is
advanced to interpret these relationships.
Introduction
From late spring to autumn of 1928, several Chinese stores trading Japanese
goods announced that ‘due to the current economic depression, we must cease
business activities for the time being’ (NYSB, 24 September 1928) 3 . Any
Chinese business carrying Japanese goods that did not close, would be
condemned publicly or, in the worst cases, their stores would be destroyed
(NYSB, 2 October 1928).
1
An earlier version of this paper was presented in the joint seminar of the Southeast Asian
Research Centre and the Department of Applied Social Science, City University of Hong Kong,
on 27 March 2003. The author acknowledges the exchanges with scholars in the seminar,
particularly those from Professor Kevin Hewison and Dr Vivienne Wee. The research is partially
assisted by the Small Grant Program of the China and Inner Asian Council of the Association for
Asian Studies (2002-2003) (funds provided by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation). Materials on
Japanese intelligence reports were collected during my visit in the Institute of Sociology,
Academia Sinica, Taipei, under the guidance of Professor Ka Chih-ming. Acknowledgment also
goes to professors from the Department of Sociology of Binghamton University, particularly the
comments and encouragement from Professor Mark Selden, Dale Tomich and Frederic Deyo
2
The author is a Visiting PhD Fellow at the Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of
Hong Kong.
3
Note on romanization: Most of the Chinese terms are romanized in Mandarin pinyin with
several exceptions: First, terms of Chinese sub-ethnic groups are written in according to their
most familiar English spellings. For example, Hakka [Mandarin: Kejia], Hokkien [Mandarin:
Fujian], Cantonese [Guangdong ren]. Second, for some famous names that have recorded
according to the pronunciation in their particular dialect, I will follow the conventional records.
For example, Tan Kah Kee [Chen Jiagen in Mandarin pinyin], Dr. Sun Yat-sen [Sun Zhongshan
in Mandrin pinyin].
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
1
These were among the responses to the surging anti-Japanese boycotts of
1928. From early May, when news of China's military clashes with the Japanese
army in Jinan (the Jinan Incident) were confirmed, anti-Japanese sentiments
spread throughout the Chinese communities in Singapore. Chinese hostility
against Japan led to the development of anti-Japanese boycotts, causing a
heavy slump in Japanese exports to British Malaya in general and Singapore in
particular. In the first month of the strike, Japan's exports to British Malaya
plummeted to 81% of the amount in the previous year. As the boycott continued,
Japan's trade with British Malaya reached to its lowest in July and August 1928,
that is, only 16% and 20% of Japan's exports during the same periods last
year.4
The 1928 anti-Japanese boycott was far from the first nationalist activity
organized in Singapore. Neither was it the last one prior to World War II.
Throughout the inter-war period, Chinese nationalist sentiment surged
whenever relationship between China and Japan was in a collision course, such
as during the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the 1928 Jinan Incident, the 1931
Manchurian Incident, the 1932 Shanghai Incident and after the outbreak of the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937 untill Japan's occupying Singapore in
December 1941 (TTK, 1942).
But the 1928 anti-Japanese boycott was a watershed for both Chinese
nationalist activities and Sino-Japanese business connections in Singapore. In
contrast to previous anti-Japanese activities, the 1928 event was directly
backed by Chinese elites through their organizing of and subscribing to
nationalist fund-raising campaigns. Although these campaigns did not directly
carry out economic boycotts, they mad up the institutional framework to channel
and reinforce Chinese discontent against the Japanese.
Why were Singapore Chinese provoked so profoundly by the distant affairs of
China? Why did anti-Japanese boycotts accelerate from the late 1920s onward?
Why did Chinese business elites respond enthusiastically to the nationalist
events? To answer these questions, the rest of this paper will center on two
recurring themes. First, rhetoric of Chinese nationalism strategically boosted
some Chinese businesses, although at the same time damaging other Chinese
4
Japan's exports to British Malaya from May through August 1927 as well as the amounts for
the same period in 1928 are as follows:
May 1927
$ 2,782,293 Straits Dollars,
May 1928
$ 2,254,738
June
$ 2,626,516
June
$ 1,148,154
July
$ 2,773,540
July
$ 443,490
August
$ 2,521,169
August
$ 501,852
These figures are based on surveys conducted by the ad hoc organization of Japan's business
expansion in Singapore, the Japanese Commercial Museum of Singapore. This institute was
founded in 1918, managed under the Singapore Branch of the South Seas Association (the
Nanyô Kyokai). The South Seas Association was the most critical intelligence institute erected
for Japan's business expansion in Southeast Asia. It was financially supported by the Office of
the Government-General, Taiwan, and the Department of Commerce and Industry of Japan
(based on my survey of the monthly reports of the South Seas Association, the Nanyô Kyokai
Zashi [NKZ], 1915-1942. The figures above are cited from NKZ: V. 15, N. 7: 41-42. For an
introduction to Japan's intelligence works in Southeast Asia, see Chong (1998; 1999).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
2
businesses. Second, divergent positions toward Chinese anti-Japanese
activities were, to a certain extent, attributable to Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages.
These sub-ethnic cleavages, characteristic of trans-national Chinese business
networks, evolved during China’s long-term maritime activities between the
sixteenth to the twentieth centuries.
The concept of ‘sub-ethnic economic nationalism’ set forth in my conclusion
emerges from revisiting the previous literature on Singapore Chinese
nationalism as well as my interpretations of nationalist activities during the interwar period. The economically motivated nationalist appeals shaped the patterns
of nationalist activities, taking the form of economic boycotts. These boycotts
involved not only Chinese against the foreign business competitors but also
conflicts among Chinese sub-ethnic business networks. The overlap between
Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages and conflicting positions toward Chinese-led antiJapanese boycotts is explained by the diverse Chinese sub-ethnic business
networks that emerged over a long historical perspective.
Rationale of Chinese Nationalist Activities in Singapore
Ardent supporters of Chinese nationalist activities in early twentieth-century
Singapore have caught the attention of scholars on pre-war Southeast Asian
Chinese societies. The correspondence between the surges of Chinese
nationalist sentiment in mainland China and those in Singapore suggests that
Singapore Chinese nationalist activities were ‘implanted’ by mainland
intellectuals and partisans (Yen 1976; 1986; 1989; Wang 1976; Yong 1987;
Yong and McKennon 1990). But compared with the overall nationalist
development in China, one may well query why Singapore was free from
significant anti-British strikes during the inter-war period.5 Nationalist calls and
Chinese partisans obviously carried much weight with Singapore Chinese, but
the latter had their own rationale for subscribing to Chinese nationalist
movements. This rationale is revealed by an analysis of the leadership structure
of dominant Chinese nationalist activities.
Most leaders of well-accepted Chinese nationalist activities in Singapore from
the late 1920s had close ties with either the Singapore Chinese Chamber of
Commerce (SCCC), the Chinese Advisory Board (CAB), or both. The SCCC
was an association that mediated local business affairs and labor disputes, as
well as channeling grievances to either the local British regime or the Chinese
government and other Chinese chambers afar (Liu 2000). The SCCC officers
were considered as both leaders in Singapore Chinese communities and
important consultants to the British Straits Settlements regime that then
governed Singapore, Penang and Malacca. As consultants, they were appointed by the British regime to the CAB, an institution set up by the Chinese
5
For example, during the mid-1920s, overall anti-British riots and boycotts took place in Central
and South China. The strikes later triggered to a ten-month strike in the Guangzhou-Hong Kong
area (with Hong Kong as the primary target), but no related event followed in Singapore. This
contrast was firstly noted by Ku Hung-ting (1994), but Ku does not speculate on why there was
a difference. On anti-foreign strikes in inter-war China, see Remer (1933) and Chesneaux
(1968).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
3
Protectorate for British ‘indirect rule’ of the Chinese communities. Figure 1
shows that chairs and vice-chairs of the SCCC were mostly members of the
CAB. And the SCCC chairmanship in the 1930s all subscribed to Chinese
nationalist campaigns.
Figure 1: The SCCC Chairmanship, 1911-1940, and their Other Communal
Services
Chair-persons
NAME1
Years of
Birth and
Death2
Liau Chia Heng
[Liao Zhengxing]
1874-1934 China-born
Teochew
Lim Peng Siang
[Lin Bingxiang]
1872-1948 Straits-born
Hokkien
Tan Teck Joon
[Chen Derun]
1859-1918 China-born
Teochew
Tan Sian Cheng ?-1937
[Chen Xianzhong]
Tan Jiak Ngoh
1866-1938
[Chen Ruoyu]
China-born
Hokkien
China-born
Teochew
See Tiong Wah
[Xue Zhonghua]
Straits-born
Hokkien
1886-?
Other Communal Services
Appointment Officeof the CAB
bearers in
between 1921 Nationalist
and 19403
Campaigns
in 1928,
1932 or
4
1937
Import-export trade 1911, 1912, 1910, 1913 1921-34
N
(Western piece1914
goods)
Banking, shipping, 1913, 1915, 1914
1921-41
N
parboiled rice, oil
1916
mill, cement,
coconut business
Import-export trade 1917
1915, 1916 N
(Western piecegoods and Siamese goods), banker
(Four Seas Bank)
Banking business 1912, 1917, 1921-37
N
1918
Garment store,
1918
1919 N
Siamese rice trade
and bank.
Banker (Hong Kong 1919, 1920, 1921-41
N
and Shanghai
1923-1924
Bank)
Pepper and gam- 1920, 1923- N
bier, harbour dredg24
ing (in Johore)
Rubber, pineapple, 1921-22,
N
banking, insurance 1925-1926
and general
commission
business
Shipping, mining
1921-22
1921-23
N
and plantation
Rubber and
1927-28
1925-26,
1922-33
N
banking business
1929-30
Banker, import1929-30
1927-28
1930-41
1937
export trade
Garment store
1931-32
1932, 1937
Sub-ethnic
Note: Profession
Background2
Tan Keng Tong
1856-1941 China-born
[Cheng Jing Tang]
Teochew
Lim Nee Soon
[Lin Yishun]
1879-1936 Straits-born
Teochew
Lim Chwee Chian
[Lim Twe Chian]
See Boon Ih
[Shi Wu Yuan]
Lee Wee Nam
[Li Wei Nam]
Yeo Chan Boon
[Yang Zunwen]
Lee Choon Seng
[Li Juncheng]
Lum Boon Thin
[Lin Wen Tian]
1864-1923 China-born
Hokkien
N/A
Hokkien
1880-1964 China-born
Teochew
1881-1967 China-born
Teochew
1888-1966 China-born
Hokkien
1873-1943 China-born
Cantonese
(Siyi)
2
The SCCC
Serving
Serving
Presidency Vicein SCCC1
presidency
in SCCC1
Biscuit, rubber and 1931-32
banking business
Pawnshop owner, 1933-34
hospital manager
-
-
1932
1935-36,
1939-40
1931-41
1937
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
4
Lim Keng Lian
[Lin Qingnian]
N/A
China-born
Hokkien
Tan Chin Hian
[Chen Zhenxian]
Lee Kong Chian
[Li Guangqian]
1893-?
China-born
Teochew
China-born
Hokkien
1893-?
Tea trade, rubber 1935-36
plantation, GMD
member, graduate
from the Beijing
University.
Banker (the Four
1937-38
Seas Bank)
Manufacturer
1939-40
(rubber, pineapple),
printing business,
banker
1937-38
1933-35, 1939- 1937
41
-
1937-39
1937
-
1935-1941
1937
Sources:
1
List of Chairmanship of the SCCC: Souvenir Issue of the Opening Ceremony of the Newly Completed
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce Building, 1964; Yao Nan et al. 1940: 933-937.
2
Personal backgrounds (ethnic groups and professions) are based on Song ([1923] 1967); Su Xiaoxian
(eds.) (1948), Pan (1950), Koh (1965) and Yong (1977).
3
Service in the CAB is based on my documentation of SSGG, 1921: No. 269; 1922, No. 843, p. 703; 1923,
No. 164; 1924, No. 207; 1925, No. 234; 1927, p. 194; 1928, No. 517, p. 418; 1929: No. 324, p. 454; 1930:
No. 245; 1931, No. 750, p. 727; 1933: No. 1296; 1935: No. 3230; 1939: No. 1899. Please note that the list
of the CAB members was no longer released annually after 1932. Only replacement of old members or
appointments of new members was posted in the gazettes.
4
Lists of Office-bearers in 1928 campaign is based on NYSB, 19 May 1928; 1932 campaign: NYSB, 25
February 1932; 1937 campaign: Yong (1989: 205).
But Japan's invasions in China did not always motivate Singapore’s Chinese
business elite in general, or the SCCC in particular, toward a nationalist move.
In the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the first ‘mass movement’ in China as most
literature on the event has concluded (see for example, Remer 1933;
Chesneaux 1968), Singapore Chinese business elite remained aloof from antiJapanese riots.
In that event, anti-Japanese strikes in Singapore were sporadic riots referred to
by Chinese media as conflicts and misunderstandings between Cantonese and
people from Fujian. According to an editorial statement in Lat Pau, a Chinese
newspaper, titled ‘Please Do Not Confuse the Cantonese’, what happened then
can be summarized as follows: Cantonese attacked rickshaws belonged to
people from Fujian for revenge because Cantonese properties had been ruined
by Fujian people under the guise of anti-Japanese boycotts. But in fact, those
who attacked the Cantonese were Hokkien people from southern Fujian, while
those making their livings as rickshaw coolies were Hokchia and Hokchiu
people from northern Fujian. Hokkien and Hokchia all came from the same
Fujian province in China, but they stood on different social and economic
footings in Singapore (LP, 21 June 1919).6 To be sure, how effective the antiJapanese boycotts were in 1919 is doubtful. Advertisements of Japanese
commodities continued posted in the newspapers until 20 June 1919 when
sporadic anti-Japanese riots were running high (LP, 20 June 1919).
6
Hokkien held the highest position in Singapore in terms of wealth and power, while Hokchia
and Hokchiu were mostly manual laborers. The difference can be explained by the timing of
overseas migration. For a study on the Hokchia, Hokchiu, and other Chinese immigrants from
northern Fujian, see Warren (1986).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
5
Perhaps provoked by the lukewarm manner of the SCCC, over-enthusiastic
nationalists sent bombs packed in biscuit tins to two of its key members to
express their discontent. 7 In contrast, leading Chinese elites including the
SCCC officers organized a counter-movement to check the surge of antiJapanese strikes (NKZ, Vol. 5, N. 9: 39-49).
The relationship between the Chinese business elite and Japan remained
amicable till the mid-1920s. For example, the SCCC organized a fund-raising
campaign, the 1923 Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for Earthquake Victims in
Japan, for the victims of the earthquake in Tokyo in September 1923.8 In the
following year, the Singapore Japanese Association organized a relief fund
committee to assist victims of China's floods (NYSB, 11 September 1924). On
4March 1928, two months before the Jinan Incident, Japanese business groups
invited officers of the SCCC along with other Cantonese and Hokkien business
people for a banquet (NYSB, 5 March 1927). But the friendship was disrupted
by the outbreak of the Jinan Incident on 3 May 1928. Some Chinese guests at
the banquet later became organizers of anti-Japanese nationalist campaigns.9
But the 1928 Jinan Incident motivated Singapore’s Chinese elite to take a stern
anti-Japanese position. As soon as news of Sino-Japanese military action was
confirmed, the Chinese General Consulate in Singapore issued a statement. It
reads,
All overseas Chinese should keep calm and be patient. The
Chinese government will work for justice. As for economic boycotts,
we believe that these are spontaneous, patriotic and peaceful
activities. People undertake them out of conscience. But except for
economic boycotts, please do not over-react and do not violate law
and order (NYSB, 9 May 1928).
This statement legitimized anti-Japanese boycotts while warning against
violence. This paved the way for the development of non-violent nationalist
activities, such as fund-raising campaigns led by business elite.
The 1928 Shandong Relief Fund became the first and foremost business-led
anti-Japanese nationalist campaign. Its primary goal was to collect funds to help
Chinese victims of the Sino-Japanese warfare. Fund-raising campaigns later
7
These bombs were addressed to See Tiong Wah (also documented as See Teong Wah and
See Tong Wah) (1886-?) and Lim Chwee Chian (1864-1923). See chaired the SCCC during
1919, 1920, 1923, and 1924. Lim became the vice-chair of the SCCC in 1921 and 1922. Based
on: Supplement to SSGG 1919, ‘Annual Report on the Straits Settlement Police Force and on
the State of Crime for the Year 1919’, Section of ‘Secret Societies, etc’ (p. 14).
8
Major SCCC members in the movement included Liau Chia Heng, president of the SCCC in
1911-12; Lim Peng Siang, president oin 1913, 1915-16; and See Tiong Wah, president in 191920, 1923-24 (NYSB, 28 September 1923).
9
Among the SCCC guests in the March banquet, Lim Kim Tian and Wooi Woo Yan later
became treasurers of the 1928 Shangdong Relief Fund (NYSB. 26 September 1928, p. 8). Lim
was also a committee member of 1932 China Relief Fund, an organization aimed at collecting
donations to support Chinese victims of Japan's attacks in Manchuria (starting on September 18,
1931) and Shanghai (28 January 1932) (NYSB, 25 February 1932). See also Figures 1 and 2.
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
6
became the standard Chinese business response to the accelerating SinoJapanese conflict. Another similar organization, the China Relief Fund
Committee, was founded after the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 and
the Shanghai Incident in January 1932. In addition, the Singapore China Relief
Fund Committee was organized after the 1937 Marco Bridge Incident.
Scholars have documented how the 1928 Shandong Relief Fund ‘swept
Singapore's Chinese communities like a brush fire’ (Yong 1987: 186; see also
Yen 1989). The campaign appealed to all ranks of Chinese people, including
shop-owners, teachers, students, cooks, and coolies who donated toward the
nationalist cause. Total donations amounted to 134 million Straits Dollars by
January 1929 (Yong 1987: 186), of which 104 million Straits Dollars were
collected in the first four months of the campaign (NYSB, 26 September 1928).
But the 1928 campaign and similar organizations actually functioned as more
than charities. These campaigns also served to organize China-oriented
business elite in Singapore, where economic achievements were regarded as
crucial to becoming communal leaders. 10 And their mobilization led Chinese
nationalism to spread to the Chinese communities at large.
The 1928 campaign was composed of the SCCC officers and the ‘millionaire
club’ of well-to-do Chinese, the Ee Ho Hean Club.11 Right after the statement of
the Chinese Consulate on the Jinan Incident was issued, the Ee Ho Hean Club
took the initiative in calling Chinese people to a meeting in the SCCC Office to
respond to the ‘national tragedy’ (NYSB, 11 May 1928). It is worth noting that
many office-bearers of the 1928 campaign were connected to the 1923
Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for Earthquake Victims in Japan or those who
had attended the Japanese banquet a few months ago (see Figure 2).
This campaign was chaired by Tan Kah Kee (1874-1964). Tan’s social
influences reached beyond his Hokkien group. He and his inner-circle friends of
various sub-ethnic backgrounds were the backbone of the Ee Ho Hean Club
and the SCCC experienced a constitutional reform under his guidance at the
turn of the 1930s (Yong 1987: 145-7; see also Tan's reform proposal in NYSB,
4 February 1929). Moreover, before turning to the Chinese Communist Party in
the early 1940s, Tan's embrace of Chinese nationalism and his commitment to
the British status quo accounted for his rise to the leading position in Chinese
nationalist activities. Tan was appointed as a Justice of Peace (J. P.) in 1924
(SSGG, 4 June 1924: 953) and from then on he served on the Chinese
Advisory Board as a Hokkien representative (SSGG, 1 February 1924: 176).
10
In an immigrant society like Singapore, social hierarchy was based on economic achievement
rather than intellectual capability as on the Chinese mainland (Wang 1981: 162; Yen 1986: Ch.
5).
11
For the significance of the Ee Ho Hean Club in Singapore from 1911, see the introduction in
Lin Xiaosheng (1986: 79-90).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
7
Figure 2: Major Office-bearers of the 1928 Shandong Relief Fund and their
Backgrounds
Major Committee
Officers 1
President:
Tan Kah Kee
[Chen Jiageng]
Vice President:
Tan Chiew Cha
[Chen Qiucuo]
Chief-Treasurer:
Lee Cheng Tien
[Li Zhendian]
Treasurer:
Chia Thian Hock
[Xie Tianfu]
Treasurer:
Lim Kim Tian
[Lin Jindian]
Treasurer:
Ng Sing Phang
[Wu Shengpeng]
Treasurer:
Low Peng Ser
[Liu Bingsi]
Treasurer:
Wooi Woo Yan
[Huang Youyuan]
Posts in the
EEH Members 3 Singapore Chinese
Relief Fund for the
SCCC Officers
September 1923 Tokyo
during 1927-28
2
Earthquake 4
-
E
Honorable President
Treasurer
E
Honorable President
-
E
Honorable President
-
E
-
-
E
Honorable President
Treasurer
E
Honorable President
-
-
-
Treasurer
E
Honorable President
Sources:
1
Here I only list the positions of president, vice president and treasurer. The list is based on
NYSB, May 19, 1928.
2
Positions in the SCCC during 1927-1928 (the 16th. board), see NYSB, Feb. 5, 1927.
3
Member list of the Ee Ho Hean Club is from Yong (1987: 183).
4
List of the Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for the September 1923 Tokyo Earthquake is cited
from NYSB, Sept. 28, 1923.
But British support of Tan was far from unconditional. In November 1931, Tan
publicly circulated a brochure attacking Japan's military ambition.12 The Straits
Settlements was then under the administration of Sir Cecil Clmenti (1930-34).
Due to his experiences while governing Hong Kong during the ten-month antiBritish strike in 1925-26, Clementi was sensitive to anything with anti-imperialist
rhetoric, even if the concern here was the Japanese imperialism. He constrained Tan to keep a low political profile. It was then that the Manchurian and
Shanghai incidents broke out (Turnbull 1984; Lin 1986: 85-86; Yong 1987: 1667).
12
The brochure, the Tanaka Memorial, discloses Japan's military plan to advance into north
China in 1927. Tan sought to arouse Chinese people to act against the ambitions of Japanese
imperialism. He circulated the information in the Nanyang Shangbao (Chinese Commercial
Daily), the newspaper founded by Tan Kah Kee (NYSB, 19 November 1931).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
8
With Tan retreating from the front line, the 1932 nationalist campaign was
chaired by the president of the SCCC, Lee Choon Seng (1888-1966). Lee was
also a GMD (Guomindang; the Chinese Nationalist Party) member. Under his
leadership, many influential GMD partisans subscribed to the campaign,
including Teo Eng Hock (1871-1958), a pioneering GMD member who had
backed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary campaign before 1911 (Song [1923]
1967: 473; Yong and McKenna 1990: 9-15). Although this campaign was
operated by Chinese partisans who were dissatisfied with the British, it received
wide support from Singapore Chinese communities. By 10 September 1932,
when Singapore had not yet recovered from the economic downturn of the
depression, the campaign collected 200 thousand Straits Dollars plus 56,701
Chinese currency (NYSB, 10 September 1932).
For the British, the GMD was a more threatening force than Tan. The success
of the 1932 campaign made the British appreciate all the more Tan's nonpartisan leadership style. Therefore, they encouraged Tan to lead nationalist
activities in response to the accelerating Sino-Japanese conflicts after the 1937
Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Yong 1987: 189-93; 195-6; 203-5). Under Tan's
leadership, the 1937 campaign later developed into a region-wide nationalist
organization influencing Chinese in Southeast Asia (Akashi 1970; Leong 1976:
Ch. 5; Yong 1987: 189-93; 202-6).
Interplay between Chinese Business and Nationalist Activities
Thus, Tan Kah Kee and Teo Eng Hock can be viewed as two representative figures in the anti-Japanese nationalist campaigns. Before analyzing what motivated Singapore Chinese business elites to join these activities, an outline of Tan
and Teo's business activities can illuminate the interplay between Chinese
business and nationalist activities during the research period.
Teo and Tan were contemporaries. Their life trajectories followed a similar
pattern: both witnessed China's transition from an Empire to a republic in the
1910s, reaped their economic successes in the 1910s and 1920s, liquidated
their rubber manufacturing interests in the early 1930s, and from then on retired
from the business sphere and turned to become fully committed to China’s
affairs. Last but not least, though Tan was a China-born Hokkien and Teo a
Straits-born Teochew, their families were connected by marriage: Tan's
daughter married a son of Teo's nephew's, Lim Nee Soon (Yong 1987: 111-2).13
Both the Tan Kah Kee & Co. and Teo Eng Hock's People's Rubber Goods
Manufactory were successful Chinese-owned manufacturing companies in the
1920s. In the production of rubber shoes for example, it was estimated that
Tan's company contributed to 91% local produced shoes, Teo's another 6%.14
13
Lim Nee Soon (1979-1936) was also a notable Chinese businessperson and nationalist who
chaired the SCCC during 1921-22 and 1925-26. On Teo and Lim’s family networks and careers,
see Song (1967: 34; 516-7; Leung 1994; Yen 1994).
14
The other 3% of rubber shoes manufactured locally came from the Nanyang Manufacturing
Company, another Chinese-owned rubber manufacturer. Productivity of local rubber
manufacturers is cited from NKZ, V. 19, N. 3: 9-17.
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
9
Their success can be understood in terms of their commitment to important
technological innovations, unlike most Chinese businesspersons. In 1922, Teo
obtained a patent on a rubber vaccination shield (SSGG: Jan. 13, 1922, p. 60,
see Plate 1). Two years later, Tan was granted sixteenth years of exclusive
rights for his improved methods of manufacturing rubber tires and shoes (SSGG:
April 11, 1924; May 17, 1924). Unfortunately, both men’s companies had to be
liquidated in 1933 and 1934.
Before closing their businesses, Tan and Teo's rubber shoe companies were
regarded as the most formidable competitors with Japanese shoes in the
Southeast Asian markets. Rubber shoes were popular commodities for middle
and lower-class people in Singapore. Particularly after 1927 when global rubber
prices slumped and an ordinance was enacted in Singapore prohibiting people
walking barefoot in urban streets. Had people all followed the ordinance, the
market might have expanded another 40%.15
But the expanding market might benefit Japanese shoes as well as any others.
Market shares of Japanese rubber shoes among all imported shoes in the early
1930s were: 81.3% in 1930, 82.85 in 1931, 60.3% in 1932, 77.63% in 1933 and
78.7% in 1934 (Figure 3). Unfortunately, no statistics are available to compare
these Japanese imports with domestic-made Chinese rubber shoes. But
Japanese intelligence reports document the retail prices for rubber-soled
canvas shoes of different makes. We can therefore gauge the competitive niche
of the Japanese product (Figure 4). Shoes of Singapore Chinese manufacturers
could not cut their prices as sharply as could the Japanese, whereas according
to the report figures rubber shoes made in China and Hong Kong were cheaper.
The conventional perspective was that products from mainland China and Hong
Kong were not durable as Japanese shoes at the higher price (NKZ, V. 20, N. 4:
37-47).
To be sure, Japanese imports not only dominated the market of rubber shoes in
British Malaya. From the late 1920s, Japan replaced the British as the major
supplier of textiles. If Japan's growing business power in this region accounted
for, at least partially, the acceleration of Chinese-led anti-Japanese nationalist
activities, the British transition from a free-trade policy to a colonial preference
system after 1932 was another (and more aggressive) strategy to countermand
the Japanese imports. The system was aimed at stimulating trade among
different British territories. In the trade of rubber-soled canvas shoes for
example, new tariffs imposed on the importation of Japanese shoes of 50 cents
each pair; but British products were only subject to 10 cents per pair. From
1934, a quota ordinance was enacted to limit textiles imported from non-British
countries to British territories including Singapore, with Japan's imports as the
primary target of discrimination (Shinya and Guerrero [eds.] 1994; Howe 1996:
15
A survey conducted in the late 1920s suggested that 40% of the population in British Malaya
did not have the habit of wearing shoes. Compared to easily broken cloth shoes or expensive
rubber shoes, rubber shoes became ordinary people's first pair of footwear (NKZ, V. 17, N. 5:
47-52).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
10
201-231). In this regard, as long as no anti-imperial rhetoric was involved,
Chinese-led anti-Japanese boycotts suited the British interests.
Plate 1: Teo Eng Hock's Patent of Rubber Vaccination Shield
Source: SSGG, 13 January 1922, p. 60 (section of Miscellaneous).*
*The plate is annotated in the gazette as follows:
‘Notice is hereby given that The PEOPLE'S RUBBER GOODS MANUFACTORY
of No. 119, North Bridge Road, Singapore, are the Sole Manufacture of the
Rubber Vaccination Shield as shown above this notice and that a patent for same
is being applied for. TEO ENG HOCK.’
Chinese business groups in general distanced themselves from direct antiimperialist rhetoric. What involved in dominant nationalist discourses were
commercial advertisements or trademarks colored with nationalist propaganda.
For business elites like Tan Kah Kee, to manage a successful enterprise was
the same as committing to Chinese nationalist activities. This can be
understood by the then popular slogan, ‘save the nation by developing business
and industry’ (shi ye jiu guo), the idea being that China's current problems could
be overcome by developing ethnic Chinese enterprises. Advertisements of Tan
Kah Kee & Co. called for Chinese customers to buy his products in order to
save the nation and the national economy (Plate 2).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
11
Figure 3: Market Shares of Rubber Shoes Imported from Japan, Hong
Kong, China, America and Britain in British Malaya
Japan
19271
19281
19291
19301
19312
19323
19333
19344
248,936
(34.51%)*
318,731
(46.14%)
282,259
(53.38%)
556,018
(81.34%)
421,964
(82.84%)
235,666
(60.30%)
327,650
(77.63%)
649,925
(78.73%)
Hong Kong
134,738
(18.68%)
129,485
(18.74%)
103,368
(19.55%)
92,213
(13.49%)
39,518
(7.76%)
95,954
(24.55%)
-
China
America
90,289 162,440
(12.52%) (22.52%)
61,933
(8.96%) 106,949
(15.48%)
5,603
(1.06%) 102,853
(19.45%)
10,130
(1.48%)
8,838
(1.29%)
25,574
6,552
(5.02%) (1.29%)
28,440
(7.28%)
Britain
Total
(Straits
Dollars)
54,360
(7.54%) 721,274
27,237 690,860
(3.94% )
17,163 528,814
(3.25%)
4,437 683,558
(0.65%)
2,689 509,380
(0.53%)
-
-
-
-
-
1,124 390,807
(0.29%)
422,079
825,481
*Parentheses indicate percentage of the imports in total market shares.
Sources:
1
Data on 1927-1930: compiled from NKZ, V. 18, N. 3, pp. 11-12;
2
1931: compiled from NKZ, V. 19, N. 3:13;
3
1932-1933, from NKZ, V. 20, N. 4: 38-39;
4
1934: NKZ, V. 22, N. 4: 24-25.
Figure 4: Estimation of Retail Prices of Rubber-Soled Canvas Shoes by
Production Areas
Singapore
Survey Tan Kah Kee & People's Rubber
Year Co.
Shoes Manufactory
19311
95 cents
65 cents
1934
2
25/50 cents**
***
Japan*
Nanyang
Manufacturing Co.
80 cents
63 cents
N/A
31 cents
Hong
Kong
China
39 cents
N/A
30 cents
23 cents
* Based on the prices of the most popular trademarks: ‘Washington’, ‘Moon & Stars’, ‘3 Heroes’
and ‘B. B. B.’
** 50 cents for a pair of white shoes; 25 cents for a pair of black or other color shoes.
*** The People's Rubber Shoes Co. was out of business by autumn 1933.
Sources:
1
Data on 1931: NKZ, V. 17, N. 5: 48-50
2
Data on 1934: NKZ, V. 20, N. 4: 37-47
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
12
Plate 2: Advertisement of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.: Woollen Hats
Source: NYSB, 20 January 1927.
But what is ‘national economy’ for a naturalized British subject like Tan who
established his fortunes in a British colony? A commercial for his rubber shoes,
titled ‘national economy’, illustrated Tan's perspectives explicitly (Plate 3). The
dialogue in the advertisement can be translated as follows:
A student asked a teacher, ‘What does national economy mean?’
The teacher replied, ‘National economy means people only
purchase products made by their own nation. Are you wearing
shoes made by Chinese?’
All students said, ‘Sure! All are products of the Tan Kah Kee &
Co.’
The teacher cheerfully said, ‘That is exactly what national
economy means. All products of Tan Kah Kee & Co. are national
goods.’ (Posted in NYSB 1930)
In Tan's accounts, a Chinese product means a product made by ethnic Chinese. To purchase ‘national products’ is to encourage national businesses, which
were crucial to prosper and empower China. Tan argued that though his company was founded overseas, all employees were ethnic Chinese.16 In addition,
16
This is supported by official statistics. It documents that Tan Kah Kee & Co. hired 4,088
employees in the beginning of 1929, and all of them were ethnic Chinese (Supplement to SSGG,
Friday, 11 July 1930, Annual Report on the Working of the Labor Department for the year 1929,
Appendix F).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
13
profits of Tan Kah Kee & Co. were contributed to education in China (especially
the Amoy University and Jimei School that he founded in 1918 and 1921)
(NYSB, 3 November 1927; 21 March 1930; 1 April 1930; 18 August 1930; 6
December 1930).
Plate 3: Advertisement of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.: Rubber Shoes
Source: NYSB, January 1930.
Tan once believed that the Chinese nationalist regime would protect nationalist
businesses like his. From the late 1920s, he tried to request tariff deductions for
the commodities he exported to China, as its newly achieved tariff autonomy
imposed heavy customs on all foreign imports including those made by
overseas Chinese. Disappointedly his demands were never approved (NYSB, 7
June 1934).
Tenacious Growth of Chinese Sub-ethnic Conflicts in Nationalist Activities
The above discussion highlights the rapid growth of Japan's business power in
the region that underlined the operations of Chinese-led anti-Japanese boycotts.
This evidence supports the existing research framing Chinese nationalist
activities in inter-war Singapore as ‘economic nationalism’ (for examples, see
Akashi 1968; 1970; Ku 1994; Horimoto 1997). But my argument here is: not
only Japanese but also some Chinese were targeted in the Chinese ‘economic
nationalism’. Whenever anti-Japanese sentiments were stirred, even Chinese
merchants handling Japanese stock would be ruined.
Existing studies have concluded that ‘ethnic division of labor’ (in W. G. Skinner's
terms) can be used to define the overlap between Chinese sub-ethnic
boundaries and economic pursuits in Singapore (and British Malaya in general)
(Purcell 1968; Lee 1978; Yen 1986; among others). I further elaborate on how
different economic interests led to divergent positions toward Chinese-led antiJapanese nationalist activities. More concretely, nationalist activities were led
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
14
by officers of the SCCC which was dominated by two Chinese sub-ethnic
groups (the Hokkien and the Teochew) throughout most of the research period,
while targets of these activities were Chinese agents involved in Japanese trade.
The latter were mostly Cantonese in the Kôbe-Singapore business networks. In
other words, Chinese nationalist activities could be framed, to a certain extent,
as conflicts between Cantonese and Hokkien as well as Teochew.
The SCCC and Hokkien-Teochew Dominance
The board of directors of the SCCC was composed of about thirty-two members
with each major sub-ethnic group represented on the basis of a quota. 17
Election of the SCCC’s chairperson and vice chairperson was as follows: one
position had to be selected from people from the Fujian province and one from
the Guangdong province. Geographically speaking, Hokkien (southern Fujian),
Hokchia (northern Fujian) and Hakka (western Fujian) could all be considered
as candidates for the Fujian representative, while the representative of
Guangdong could be selected from Cantonese (the Pearl River Delta),
Teochew (the eastern coast of Guangdong), and Hakka (the mountainous
northeastern Guangdong). But as a matter of fact, from its establishment in
1906 till 1941, chairmanship of the SCCC was mostly shared by Hokkien (on
behalf of the Fujian groups) and Teochew (on behalf of the Guangdong groups).
Only one Cantonese broke the pattern (Yao Nan et al. 1940: 933-937; see also
sub-ethnic backgrounds of the SCCC’s chairmanship from Figure 1).
The influence of the Hokkien was understandable because they were the
largest Chinese sub-ethnic group. But why were the Teochew the other
dominant group? To be sure, the Teochew had been the second largest group
in the nineteenth century, but after the twentieth century their numbers were
less than the Cantonese (Figure 5). The growth of the Cantonese population in
Singapore, however, was not reflected in the SCCC. In the 1930s, Teochew's
participation in the SCCC was larger than that of the Cantonese (Figure 6).
How do we explain the sustaining Teochew influence in the SCCC vis-à-vis
Cantonese in inter-war Singapore? Power structures of Chinese communities in
early twentieth-century Singapore can be understood within the framework of
Singapore as a British port-city since the nineteenth century. The Hokkiens and
Teochews shared the highest level of Singapore’s economy: the Hokkien
dominated shipping and finance, and controlled most opium farms and alcoholic
sales in the nineteenth century; while the Teochew controlled the pepper and
gambier farms (Jackson 1968; Lee 1978; Mak 1981: 41-44; Turnbull 1989).
Together these two sectors constituted the British chartered revenue farming
17
Between 1914 and 1930, the board was composed of the following fixed quotas: thirteen
Hokkien, five Cantonese, nine Teochew, three Hakka and two Hainanese (compiled from Yao
Nan et al. 1940: 934; NYSB: 5 February 1927; 27 February 1929). After the 1930s, quota for
each sub-ethnic group was contingent upon the members subscribed to the association. The
Hokkiens assumed thirteen to fifteen positions in the board, Teochew eight to nine members,
Cantonese one to four and another one or two seats for Hakka. Chinese immigrants from the
Yangzi River Delta were first permitted to register for membership in the name of the Sanjiang
from 1930. They were arranged for one person in the board (SCCC 1964: 174-176).
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
15
system (Trocki 1990). But why did the Hokkiens and Teochews but not others
attain these lucrative opportunities in the first place? The nineteenth century
differences had to be traced back to the history of China’s long-term migration
and sea-borne activities in Southeast Asia.
Figure 5: Population of Major Chinese Sub-ethnic Groups in Singapore
Census
Years
18811
18911
19112
19212
19313
StraitsHokkien
born
Chinese
25,268
46,476
(14%)*
(27%)
34,757
74,759
(15%)
(33%)
43,883
94,549
(12%)
(26%)
79,686
136,823
(16%)
(27%)
180,108
(45%)
China-born Chinese
Teochew Cantonese
Hakka Hainanese Chinese
Population Total
42,132
28,231
15,891
15,591
174,327
(24%)
(16%)
(9%)
(9%)
43,791
42,008
16,736
15,938
227,989
(19%)
(18%)
(7%)
(7%)
37,507
48,739
12,487
10,775
369,843
(10%)
(13%)
(3%)
(3%)
53,428
78,959
14,572
14,547
498,547
(11%)
(16%)
(3%)
(3%)
82,405
94,742
19,317
19,896
403,952
(20%)
(23%)
(5%)
(5%)
* Percentage in the parentheses indicates percentage of the sub-ethnic group in total Chinese
population.
Sources:
1
Censuses 1881 and 1891: Merewether (1892: Section on Chinese population in Straits
Settlements).
2
Censuses 1911 and 1921: Nathan (1922: 77-83).
3
Census 1931: Tufo (1949: 77).
Figure 6: Members of the SCCC by Sub-ethnic Groups, 1934, 36, 38, 40
Sub-ethnic Groups
Hokkien
Teochew
Cantonese
Hakka
Haianese
Sanjiang
Commercial Group
Others
Total
1934
221
152
82
32
12
13
14
4
530
1936
362
218
97
53
21
19
17
3
790
1938
330
202
93
35
26
16
14
3
719
1940
348
201
103
40
23
24
22
0
761
Source: Compiled from the SCCC, 1964: 174-177.
When booming economic opportunities were introduced to Malacca, Penang
and Singapore by Dutch and British powers in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, not only Chinese from South China but also those
Chinese who had settled overseas were attracted. The latter relocated themselves from the Mekong Delta, Riau, Java or Malacca. These were among the
earliest Chinese sea-borne traders active in the intra-Asian trade during the
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
16
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, when Chinese silk was the most soughtafter commodity in the world market.
The intra-Asian trade accounted for large-scale Chinese sea borne migration
and business practices, navigating junks from either Amoy (the Hokkien dialectgroup) or Swatow (a mostly Teochew group). These junks stopped at major
Western footholds in maritime Asia, such as Dutch Formosa (in present-day
southwestern Taiwan), Dutch Batavia (present-day Jakarta), Spanish Manila,
and French Cochin-China to trade Chinese silk for Western and Japanese silver.
Later, these trade spots became Chinese settlements overseas (Ts'ao 1972; Ng
1983; Blussé and Gaastra [eds.] 1981; Blusse 1986; Li Tana and Reid [eds.]
1993; Ptak 1999). This is best illustrated by Leonard Blussé in his classical
accounts of Dutch Batavia. In his words, between 1619 (the year that Dutch
settlement was established) and 1740 (when a large-scale Chinese massacre
occurred), Batavia was ‘economically speaking, basically a Chinese colonial
town under Dutch protection’ (1988: 74). In addition, from the seventeenth
century onward, concomitant with the lifting of the maritime ban, rice trade
between Siam (Thailand) and China became another booming industry. It led to
the establishment of Sino-Thai communities in the Mekong Delta, with Teochew
the primary Chinese immigrants to Thailand (Cushman 1993).
In the nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants assimilated with local people.
They were thus designated as ‘Baba’ (for male), ‘Nonya’ (for female) or
‘Malacca Chinese’ in Malaya, ‘mestizos’ in the Philippines and ‘perenaka’ in
Java, and ‘Thai-assimilated Chinese’, among others. Collectively, these earlier
Chinese immigrants from the sixteenth century forward are framed by W. G.
Skinner (in Reid [ed.] 1996) as ‘creolized Chinese’. In general, they formed
closer contacts with the British than any other Chinese (Turnbull 1989).
These ‘creolized’ Hokkien and Teochew were crucial to their co-ethnic new
immigrants. New immigrants from China looked for assistance or cooperation
from people they could trust. And, considering that most Chinese immigrants
could only communicate with people who shared the same dialect, Chinese
sub-ethnic boundaries were established along dialect ties (Purcell 1948; Lee
1978; Yen 1986). Once group boundaries were demarcated, each group was
organized to secure their economic interests and to protect them from the
encroachment of the others (Mak 1981). Under these circumstances, Hokkien
and Teochew immigrants from China had the greatest opportunities to ‘step out’.
Not only because they came in greater numbers, but also because they could
easily plug into the business and social networks established by their co-dialect
pioneers. Though boundaries between ‘creolized’ and new arrivals existed,
mutual marriages between these two groups reduced differences: in Song Ong
Siang's (1967) One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore, one
finds that it was common practice for a Hokkien or Teochew immigrant to marry
one or mare ‘creolized’ Chinese women.
However, when China-born immigrants rose to power, they in turn pressured
‘creolized’ Chinese to re-sinify’. From the mid-nineteenth century, many Malayassimilated ‘creolized’ Hokkien associated themselves with China-born Hokkien,
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
17
for example by donating to a Hokkien temple of their traditional faith. This was
considered a strategy to cultivate ‘trust’ for business purposes (Lee 1978: 4547). Finally, after the 1921 census, Straits-born Chinese were classified as their
China-born counterparts in the same ‘Hokkien’ category (PuruShotam 1998: 71).
On the other hand, Teochew who had settled earlier were challenged by Chinaborn Teochew in the early twentieth century. It can be seen in the replacement
of the Seah family in the Ngee Ann Kongsi by other China-oriented Teochew as
leaders of the Singapore Teochew community. In 1845, the Ngee Ann Kongsi
was founded by China-born Teochew Seah Eu Chin (1805-1883), who was
regarded as a pro-British Teochew due to his fine British connections and his
marriage ties with a ‘creolized’ Chinese family. The Seah family dominated the
association till the 1930s, when a group of China-oriented Teochew (most also
officers of the SCCC) forced it to reorganize as a corporation subject to public
monitoring (SSGG, Sept. 23, 1932 [No. 1800 of 1932]; Song 1967: 50-51; Pan
1950: 46; Leung 1994: 828-30; Yen 1994: 687-688; Zhou 1995).
Although the golden age of both the Teochew’s pepper and gambier economy
and the Hokkien’s opium trade ended in the early twentieth century, their broad
power base facilitated the extension of their economic and social influence to
another phase. The Hokkiens reaped the most profits from the early twentiethcentury rubber boom of any other Chinese sub-ethnic group while the Teochew
group sustained their economic influences on import and export trade between
China and Southeast Asia (Pan 1950; Skinner 1957: 315-7; Cheng 1972; Brown
1994; Chen Shuzen 1994; Cui 1994: 653-654).
Cantonese Middlemen Trade
Why, then, did the Cantonese become targets of the Chinese-led anti-Japanese
strikes? In Singapore, most Chinese agents importing Japanese goods were
Cantonese. These Cantonese merchants were part and parcel of the transnational Cantonese business networks in maritime Asia. Though pioneering
Cantonese immigrants had conducted tin mining and other labor-intensive
pursuits in the Malay Peninsula from the eighteenth century, they did not obtain
a sufficiently formidable power to attract British regime cooperation (Yen 1986:
42-43; 121-22; 200-2). Development of the Cantonese community in Singapore
hinged upon support and connections from the outside.
From the mid-nineteenth century, in view of growing Cantonese collie
immigrants overseas, trade agents based in Guangzhou started to set up
branch offices in Hong Kong, Singapore and other major ports-of-call in
Southeast Asia. Because most Chinese coolies were shipped from Guangdong
(home region of the Cantonese), a new market for Cantonese-flavored goods
and services was created overseas (XG 1953: 2). In addition, Cantonese
business networks also developed into trans-national ‘middlemen’, the kind of
international business that the Cantonese were noted for. In his study on
China's rapid commercialization in the late nineteenth century, Hao Yen-p'ing
points out that Cantonese ‘middlemen’ (‘compradors’ in his terms) spread their
influence to Japan, Cochin China (present-day Vietnam), Bangkok, Rangoon,
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
18
Penang, Malacca, Singapore, Java and Manila (Hao 1970: 55). Under these
circumstances, the Cantonese community rose to become the second largest
sub-ethnic group in Singapore in the early twentieth century.
Development of Cantonese business networks in Singapore, the most important
distribution center in Southeast Asia, can be attributed to Japan's
industrialization beginning in the 1880s. The booming Japanese manufactures
needed to develop overseas outlets. But Japan did not have the required trade
skills and personnel to carry out overseas trade, as it had not yet recovered
from its seclusion policy (1653-1857). In contrast, long-distance credit system
had long been established among Chinese merchants. In conjunction with the
development of Japan’s steamship transportation, a long-distance trade
network linking up Japan, China and Southeast Asia was developed. In the
1880s, Cantonese in Kôbe dominated most of Japan's foreign trade (Yamaoka
1995: 20-22; Nagotani 2000: 70) while Singapore became the most important
distribution center of Japanese goods in Southeast Asia (Post 1995; Horimoto
1997: Ch. 10; Shimizu and Hirakawa 1999: Ch. 3). According to a survey by the
Japanese Commercial Museum, an intelligence arm of the Japanese statesponsored Nanyô Kyokai (the South Seas Association) on High Street in
Singapore where major dealers of Japanese goods concentrated, all Chinese
agents were Cantonese except for one Hakka (NKZ, V. 26, N. 12: 127).
Significance of the Chinese/Cantonese agents in the trans-national JapanSingapore trade can be gauged quantitatively: In 1914, on the eve of Japan's
systematic business expansion in Southeast Asia, Chinese trade agents
controlled 72% percent of the export of Japan's textiles to Southeast Asia,
97.6% of marine products and 34.6% of clothes (Post 1995: 162). Even though,
until the 1930s, Japan tried to establish a ‘direct selling system’ to bypass these
Cantonese middlemen, the Kôbe-Singapore Cantonese networks were
nonetheless responsible for 30.6% of the importation of Japan's rubber shoes in
1931 (NKZ, V 18 N3: 26-8) and 33.3% of Japan's cotton piece-goods in 1934
(compiled from NKZ, V. 20, N. 8: 95).
Because of their business connections, these Cantonese merchants became
targets of anti-Japanese nationalist activities operated by their Chinese
counterparts. From the 1928 Jinan Incident, strikes against Japaneseassociated merchants ‘upgraded’ into other systematic measures. According to
Japanese intelligence reports, if a Chinese shop was found to be trading
Japanese goods during the Sino-Japanese warfare, overzealous nationalists
would charge the owner fines and for an apology. If the owner continued
conducting the trade, the store would be destroyed. If none of the above threats
could stop the business, the owner would be physically abused, having his/her
ears cut off, or even murdered (NKZ, V. 23, No. 10: 113; No, 11: 105-7; NKZ, V.
24, N. 1: 108-116).
Finally, the outbreak of the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident seemed to be the
last straw for these merchants. Importation of Japanese cotton piece-goods in
1938 and 1939 fell to circa 50% of their assigned quotas (Figure 7). This
indicates the ‘economic effectiveness’ of anti-Japanese boycotts.
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
19
Figure 7: Importation of Cotton Piece-Goods from China and Japan,
Compared with Quotas
From
Japan
China
Year
Mid1938
Clothes (made of
Cotton
Artificial-silk
Cotton or
Underwear
Underwear
Artificial Silk)
Quota Imports Quota Imports Quota Imports
10,593
3,704 381,845 209,869 28,102
(35%)*
(55%)
Total
Quota
Imports
15377
(55%)
420,540
228,950
(54%)
5,617 381,845 200,809 28,102 19,276
(53%)
(53%)
(69%)
420,540
225,702
(54%)
Mid1939
10,593
Mid1938
3,529
3,218 106,370 91,927
(91%)
(86%)
1,556
1,378
(89%)
111,455
96,523
(87%)
Mid1939
3,529
3,140 106,370 101,068
(89%)
(95%)
1,556
1,348
(87%)
111,455
105,556
(95%)
Unit: Dozen
* Parentheses indicate percentage of quota that was actually utilized.
Source: Compiled from NKZ, V. 27, N. 4: 60-63.
Conclusion: ‘Sub-ethnic Economic Nationalism’
By the late 1930s, when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, Chinese
nationalist sentiments had been mobilized to a fervent scale far greater than
ever before. But Singapore Chinese communities did not unify under the
nationalist cause.
The tenacious growth of Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages once puzzled scholars
studying the development of Singapore Chinese nationalism. This puzzle is best
framed by Wang Gungwu's citation of Tan Kah Kee’s comments at that critical
moment, ‘As for the word 'unity', all the organizations of the overseas Chinese
are mainly united in form only. Where substance is concerned, there is really
very little worth talking about.... [They] talk emptily of unity when still like
scattered sand...’ (Wang 1976: 46).18
Development of Chinese nationalist activities in inter-war Singapore, as well as
the limitations of these movements, has been attributed to the ‘implantation’ of
Chinese nationalism and political organs from mainland China (Wang 1976;
Yen 1976; 1989; Yong and McKennon 1990). This paper, however, emphasizes
local economic motivations (business competition between the Chinese and the
Japanese in particular) that were underlying these activities. By analyzing the
processes and confrontations during these nationalist upheavals, I point out that
the cleavages within the Chinese communities could be delineated along sub18
The phase ‘scattered sand’ was originally coined by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to refer the lack of
solidarity among Chinese.
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
20
ethnic lines. The various trans-national sub-ethnic business networks, which
constituted the ‘substance’ of Singapore Chinese communities, were ‘scattered
sand’ in view of Chinese nationalist leader however. It can therefore conclude
that local economic interests, while motivating some Chinese business elite to
subscribe to nationalist campaigns, constrained these activities to reach to all
Chinese communities. Chinese-led anti-Japanese activities targeted their
Chinese counterparts who were trading with the Japanese.
In sum, Chinese sub-ethnic ties, albeit transformed and challenged through time,
were where the strength of Chinese business power lay, and the nascent
Chinese nationalism could not override them. It was these trans-national subethnic business networks that constituted the ‘substance’ of Singapore Chinese
communities, and accounted for the metaphor of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s ‘scattered
sand’.
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003
21
REFERENCES
Newspapers and Series
LP: Lat Pao [Le Bao]. Singapore: Le Bao Gongsi. 1 January 1919-31 March
1932.
NKZ: Nanyô Kyôkai Zashi [Newsletters of the South Sea Association]. Issued
monthly by the Nanyô Kyôkai [the South Sea Association], 1915-1942. Title
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