Liberated Arts: a journal for undergraduate research
Volume 1 | Issue 1
Article 12
2015
The Expanding Universe: An Argument in Favour
of W.V.O. Quine’s Account of Scientific Progress
Nathaniel F. Sussman
Huron University College, [email protected]
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Sussman, Nathaniel F. (2015) "The Expanding Universe: An Argument in Favour of W.V.O. Quine’s Account of Scientific Progress,"
Liberated Arts: a journal for undergraduate research: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lajur/vol1/iss1/12
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Liberated Arts: A Journal for Undergraduate Research
Sussman 1
The Expanding Universe: An Argument in Favour of W.V.O. Quine’s
Account of Scientific Progress
Nathaniel F. Sussman, Huron University College
Abstract: The epistemic model by which scientific progress can be most appropriately described
was the subject of debate throughout the 20th century. When Thomas Kuhn published The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962, his theory of paradigms introduced a new way of
understanding knowledge to the scientific community and beyond. Since then, and with some
proposed adjustments, Kuhn’s paradigms have been widely accepted as the most plausible
account of scientific knowledge and progress. This paper challenges Kuhn’s theory in favor of
W.V.O. Quine’s model of scientific progress as implied by the description of epistemic holism in
his 1951 essay, Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Using the theory of the expanding universe as a
case study, this paper explores the durability of both Kuhn and Quine’s epistemic models. It
concludes that, though both models are applicable, Quine’s is better suited to accurately describe
this particular scientific episode.
Keywords: Quine; Kuhn; epistemology; science; expanding universe
The development of the theory of the expanding universe is a scientific episode that can be
understood at least partially through a variety of different epistemic theories in the philosophy of
science. Two such theories are Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigms and Willard Van Orman
Quine’s epistemic holism. In this essay, I will argue that while either theory can seemingly
explain the expanding universe episode, Quine’s holism is more completely applicable due to his
account of how scientific knowledge shifts. The incommensurability of Kuhn’s paradigms
necessitates the use of arational persuasion in bringing about a scientific revolution. This is the
root of the model’s inadequacy for explaining the development of the expanding universe theory
because this episode does not seem to have progressed by arational means at all. This essay will
begin by outlining Kuhn’s theory and the ways in which it seems to apply to the evaluation of the
expanding universe model. It will then outline Quine’s theory of epistemic holism and the ways
in which it applies to the same scientific event. The result will show that Quine’s theory is more
appropriate for understanding how this episode progressed.
Thomas S. Kuhn takes a historical approach to his philosophy in response to his
dissatisfaction with prior inadequacies in how scientific progress was viewed (Kuhn 1). Such
inadequacies would include, for example, the Logical Positivists’ attempt to explain scientific
confirmation using the hypothetico-deductive method, which views science as a purely logical
and empirical exercise. Kuhn believes that many social and psychological factors shape scientific
progress and therefore should not be ignored, as the Logical Positivists would attempt to do
(Kuhn 2). Kuhn therefore developed what we often refer to as his paradigm theory. He believes
that, in many cases, the early development of a field of science is “characterized by continual
competition between a number of distinct views of nature, each partially derived from, and all
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Sussman 2
roughly compatible with, the dictates of scientific observation and method” (Kuhn 4). Any given
one of these schools begins with answers to fundamental and theoretical questions (Kuhn 4).
Kuhn coins the term “paradigm” to describe these schools that define themselves by their unique
answers to fundamental, theoretical questions, as well as unique methodological techniques
(Kuhn 10). All scientific inquiry requires some implicit assumptions, and therefore must take
place within a paradigm (Kuhn 16). Since each paradigm has a unique base of theories and
assumptions, he asserts that paradigms are “incommensurable” in both the concepts they use and
the ways in which they practice science, leaving rational reasoning useless for determining which
paradigm to follow (Kuhn 4). From a rational perspective, no paradigm is better than another.
Rather, there are arational, “arbitrary” reasons for why scientific communities accept one
paradigm over others (Kuhn 4).
When the scientific community embraces a paradigm, it becomes institutionalized in the
education of upcoming scientific professionals, and so these fundamental theoretical assumptions
“come to exert a deep hold on the scientific mind” (Kuhn 5). Within a given paradigm, “normal
science” takes place - this is the efficient “research activity” that we tend to think of when
imagining the workings of science (Kuhn 5). Normal science solves “problems” within the
paradigm by reconciling events in the world with explanations from the paradigm’s principles
(Kuhn 5). Eventually and inevitably, Kuhn argues, normal science goes “astray” and can “no
longer evade the anomalies that subvert the existing [paradigm]” (Kuhn 6). When normal science
fails to sufficiently address the anomalies that evade problem-solving, a “scientific revolution”
takes place in which the scientific community rejects the dominant paradigm in favour of a new
one (Kuhn 6). Cyclically, it follows that normal science will then take place under the new
paradigm: an entirely new conceptual and methodological framework. After a scientific
revolution, old problems solved under the previous paradigm “may be relegated to another
science or declared entirely ‘unscientific’” (Kuhn 103).
The development of the theory of the expanding universe in the first half of the 20th
century displays elements that seem to support Kuhn’s theory of scientific paradigms. In 1917,
when Einstein investigated the structure of the universe, he did so under the assumption that the
universe was static (Nussbaumer 72). Initially, however, Einstein could not use his general
theory of relativity to model a universe that was both static and had matter in it: under such
conditions, gravity would cause the universe to collapse (Nussbaumer 72). Rather than adjust his
assumptions, Einstein included an arbitrary term known as the “cosmological constant” into his
equations to stabilize the model (Nussbaumer 72). In Kuhn’s terms, this could be seen as
Einstein engaging in normal science to solve a problem within a paradigm. In this case, the
problem is that Einstein’s result was incompatible with the paradigm’s assumption that the
universe was static, and he solved the problem by adding his cosmological constant. While
another cosmologist named Alexander Friedmann brought forth the possibility that Einstein’s
general theory of relativity could mean evidence for a dynamic universe, the suggestion did not
become popular in the scientific community because it did not adhere to the static universe
paradigm (Nussbaumer 88-89). Even later in 1927, Georges Lemaitre used Einstein’s field
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Sussman 3
equations to suggest that the universe was expanding; yet his article was not widely read for the
same reason (Nussbaumer 99).
In 1917, Vesto Slipher used “redshifts” due to the Doppler effect to detect motion among
the bodies in the galaxy (Nussbaumer 57). He theorized that this motion was our galaxy moving
towards certain nebulae and away from others, while the nebulae themselves did not move
(Nussbaumer 57). Kuhn might say that Slipher’s observation presented a problem that he
attempted to solve using normal science, continuing to operate within the paradigm that the
universe was static. Importantly, however, Slipher’s “drift hypothesis” did not gain popularity in
the scientific world (Hetherington 115). Eventually, in 1929, Hubble and Humason collected
data that yielded two major results: nebulae appeared to be receding from our galaxy in all
directions, and the speed at which they were receding was increasing as their distance from our
solar system increased (Nussbaumer 115). This presented a problem that normal science could
not seem to solve. Despite these new observations, Slipher continued to support his own drift
hypothesis (Hetherington 115).
The astronomer Arthur Eddington was reminded of George Lemaitre’s expanding
universe suggestion in 1930, and after this he and physicist Willem de Sitter realized that this
theory could explain both Hubble and Slipher’s observations (Nussbaumer 99). After Einstein
was convinced of the existence of the expanding universe through the correlation of theory to
observation, the cosmological constant from his original equation was removed from his model
in 1932 and the expanding universe became the dominant cosmological view (Nussbaumer 144;
151). Kuhn would say that the problem that could not be solved in the contemporary paradigm
was solved by a different theoretical supposition, and so a new paradigm came to rise in
cosmology. Kuhn’s emphasis on the interaction between members of the scientific community as
a driver for scientific progress is evident here as well, when one considers the time span and
number of actors that were required for the expanding universe model to gain prominence.
Before continuing, I will attempt to provide evidence that Kuhn would have to consider
the acceptance of the expanding universe theory to be a scientific revolution as opposed to
normal science within a paradigm. If a paradigm provides a conceptual and methodological
framework for normal science to operate in, and normal science attempts to make observational
evidence fit into this framework, then it is unclear how shifting from a static universe to a
dynamic one can be considered normal science. It seems that, in the field of cosmology, there is
no greater concept to change than that of the universe. If this change was to be labeled as normal
science, then it is not clear what greater conceptual framework this change could be made within.
Furthermore, the conception of the universe as expanding has become so indispensible to our
understanding of cosmology and to the assumptions under which we experiment that it has given
rise to our current understanding of the origin of the universe as well as the workings of
spacetime (Nussbaumer 166). Therefore, the conception of an expanding universe should be
considered one of the most fundamental theories of the current cosmological paradigm and Kuhn
should consider its initial acceptance to have come about in a scientific revolution.
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Sussman 4
W.V.O. Quine has an approach to scientific knowledge and progress different to that of
Thomas Kuhn. In his 1951 essay Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine addresses analytic truths,
defined as “statements of reason which could not possibly be false”, and synthetic truths, or facts
that are verifiable through inquiry and real-world observation (Quine 20). He lays the foundation
for his epistemic theory by first claiming there is no difference between analytic and synthetic
truths, and that to draw a distinction is “an unempirical dogma of empiricists” (Quine 37). He
does this by explaining that, “if ‘analytic’ means ‘true by semantical rules’, no truth of [a
language] is analytic to the exclusion of another” because a semantical rule is significant “only
relative to an act of inquiry” (Quine 35). If this is the case, then all statements are synthetic.
The second part of Quine’s argument targets the verification theory of the Logical
Positivists, which defines the meaning of a statement as “the method of empirically confirming
or infirming it” (Quine 37). Quine suggests that the verification theory fails because no statement
about the “external world face[s] the tribunal of sense experience individually”, but rather “as a
corporate body” (Quine 41). In a scientific context, Quine’s assertion means that no hypothesis is
tested in isolation, but rather along with a bloc of assumptions and theories. The consequence of
this finding is that no observation can confirm or infirm a hypothesis. This is then relevant to
Quine’s first argument because, if all statements are actually synthetic, no statement can be
confirmed on its own.
Quine’s arguments come together to form his theory of epistemic holism: “the totality of
our so-called knowledge or beliefs…is a man-made fabric which impinges on experiences only
along the edges” (Quine 42). He conceives of a web of beliefs that we build over time and refer
to as “knowledge”, with our experiences forming the outer boundary of this web (Quine 42). The
beliefs held at the outer edge of the web are closely supported by experience, but the beliefs
inward from the boundary are “underdetermined” by observations (Quine 45). It follows that
“any statement can be held true…if we make drastic enough changes elsewhere in the system”
(Quine 43). The implication for science is that any theory can be made to fit into the web as long
as one is willing to adjust other accepted theories or presuppositions. If one wished to continue
holding one belief in their web, they could even go as far as to adjust their understanding of logic
or mathematics. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Quine asserts that we select which
principles to add to our web of belief with the objective of constructing the simplest possible
theories; the addition should be the “smoother and more convenient” of all options (Quine 45).
Similar to Kuhn’s view, Quine’s conception of knowledge applies to the discovery of the
expanding universe in many ways. It seems certain that Slipher and Lemaitre’s respective
hypotheses were not tested in isolation, but against the background of a bloc of presuppositions.
One such presupposition was the belief in the Doppler effect and the understanding that it gave a
certain meaning to observed redshifts (Nussbaumer 94). Einstein’s initial inclusion of the
cosmological constant in his model makes sense in Quine’s view as well: it was the simplest way
to make observations fit within the web of belief because it did not disturb the accepted theory
that the universe was static. When enough evidence in favour of the expanding universe model
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was presented, Einstein again revised his model because this was the smoothest, simplest change
to make to the web of belief.
Kuhn and Quine’s individual theories feature many similarities. Indeed, Kuhn’s
paradigms may even be understood as one conception of advanced epistemic holism. However,
the factor that distinguishes which of the two models provides a more appropriate account of the
episode is the distinct perspective in which each model views the cause of shifts between
scientific theories. For Kuhn’s model, the incommensurability of paradigms necessitates a purely
arational and arbitrary move from one paradigm to another, based largely on persuasive
measures within the scientific community. For Quine’s model, the determination of which theory
the scientific community will rally around is not arbitrary at all, but rather based on whichever
theory offers the least disruption to preexisting suppositions within the web of belief. It is this
difference that determines Quine’s theory as that which better describes the scientific episode of
the discovery of the expanding universe. Evidence shows that the major actors, such as
Eddington, de Sitter, and Einstein, reacted to Hubble’s strong evidence of Lemaitre’s expanding
universe and adjusted their presuppositions according to pragmatic considerations and over a
short period of time (Nussbaumer 125-126). Therefore, Kuhn’s paradigms do not adequately
explain how an expanding universe came to be accepted over a static one.
For example, one might ask why Vesto Slipher’s hypothesis, that our solar system was
moving among other stationary bodies, was not widely accepted as a solution to the problem
posed by the redshift evidence? Kuhn does not have an answer to this problem – it is unclear
why scientists generally did not accept Slipher’s hypothesis as solving a problem within the
prevailing cosmological paradigm, but instead chose to move from one paradigm to another in
accordance with Lemaitre’s suggestion that the universe might actually be expanding. After all,
Hubble’s further observations provided only one anomaly and so it seems unlikely that this
should cause an entire paradigm shift. Additionally, it seems clear that all science prior to the
discovery of the expanding universe was not discarded as “unscientific”, as Kuhn suggests would
happen upon a paradigm shift (Kuhn 103).
Quine’s theory would successfully address these problems by identifying Slipher’s
theory as more disruptive to the web of belief than Lemaitre’s. Based on the observed evidence,
Slipher’s theory entailed that our solar system was the only moving celestial entity in the
universe, which could have theoretical consequences reaching as far as our understanding of how
gravity worked. Conversely, Lemaitre’s theory allowed the scientific community to continue
using theoretical structures such as general relativity, and therefore the theory of an expanding
universe disturbed the web of belief minimally. The choice of the scientific community was
therefore not entirely arational and arbitrary, as Kuhn would suggest. Evidence from Einstein’s
own diary shows that he was persuaded of the expanding universe because it “follow[ed] without
problem from the theory of relativity” and because of the “simplicity of the theory” (Nussbaumer
146-147). Furthermore, Lemaitre’s expanding universe theory eliminated the previous need for
Einstein’s arbitrary cosmological constant (Nussbaumer 146).
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Quine’s theory also explains how Slipher clung to his own hypothesis when faced with
contrary evidence, and why all science previous to the expanding universe theory was not
discarded. Slipher continued to believe in his drift hypothesis because he was willing to accept a
more drastically adjusted, less smooth web of belief in order to make the evidence fit with his
theory. This is consistent with Quine’s underdetermination thesis. Previous science was not
discarded as unscientific because, instead of a paradigm shift, the expanding universe entailed
some minor changes in the web of belief. This allowed for the majority of prior theories and
assumptions to remain intact because the concepts used in the expanding universe theory were
not incommensurable from the concepts of existing scientific theories.
This essay has shown that W.V.O. Quine’s epistemic holism gives a more appropriate
account of scientific progress than Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigms, using examples from
the development of the theory of the expanding universe. Kuhn’s theory was first outlined, along
with an explanation of the ways in which the theory seem to apply to this scientific episode.
Quine’s theory was then outlined, followed by an explanation of how his theories apply as well.
The result shows that Kuhn’s account is not entirely compatible with the facts concerning this
scientific episode, because it fails to adequately explain the adoption of the expanding universe
theory within cosmology. Conversely, these shortcomings are successfully addressed and treated
by Quine’s epistemic holism.
Bibliography
Hetherington, Norris S. (2002). Theories of an Expanding Universe. In Prematurity in Scientific
Discovery: On Resistance and Neglect, First edition, pp. 115. Berkeley: University of
California.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Theories, Third edition. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press.
Nussbaumer, H. and Bieri, L. (2009). Discovering the Expanding Universe, First edition. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W.V.O. (1964). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In From a Logical Point of View, Second
edition, pp. 20-46. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
NATHANIEL SUSSMAN is currently in his third year of study at Huron University College.
He is enrolled in an Honors B.A. in Political Science, but also takes great interest in the
discipline of Philosophy. This paper was written for a philosophy class entitled, “Science and
Knowledge in the 20th Century”.