A Comparative Study of Public Support for the Police

A Comparative Study of Public
Support for the Police
International Criminal
Justice Review
Volume 18 Number 4
December 2008 406-434
© 2008 Georgia State University
Research Foundation, Inc.
10.1177/1057567708326481
http://icjr.sagepub.com
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http://online.sagepub.com
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic′
Michigan State University
I use the data from the International Crime Victimization Survey and the World Values Survey
to study the determinants of public support for the police in 28 countries. I find that the respondents’ views of the police, both general confidence and specific ability to control crime, are
affected by who the respondents are (gender, age) and by the quality of governance in the
country in which they live. Their general views of the police also are related very strongly to
what they think about other parts of the government (the armed forces, parliament, and the
legal system). Their evaluations of the police ability to control crime are strongly colored by
their individual experiences and contacts with the police (crime victimization, fear of crime,
being asked to pay a bribe, frequency of seeing police patrols). In addition, police-related characteristics (police size, percentage of women as a measure of heterogeneity of the police,
police structure) shape their opinions as well.
Keywords:
police, confidence, ICVS, WVS
Introduction
Public support for the police across the world varies from open admiration to unequivocal resentment. Why are the police hated in some countries and highly respected in others?
What factors shape public opinion about the police? Prior research has identified a host of
individual (e.g., race, gender, education) and neighborhood factors (e.g., fear of crime,
extent of disorder) as well as a limited number of police-related factors (e.g., contact with
the police).
Police-related variables are potentially crucial in explaining the level of confidence in
the police, yet prior research has explored very little beyond the basic contact-with-thepolice approach. Although the nature of the contact with the police is indeed highly relevant for how citizens view the police, features of the police agencies themselves—be they
metropolitan police departments or centralized national Ministries of the Interior—could
be related to impact on the public view as well. The level of confidence in a police agency
with decades-long history of human rights abuses and pervasive corruption likely is quite
Please address correspondence to Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State
University, 560 Baker Hall, East Lansing, Michigan 48824; e-mail: [email protected].
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different from the level of confidence in a police agency that has a history and reputation
of a “clean” agency that also protects citizens’ civil rights.
Police agencies are not isolated entities; they are integral parts of the society at large.
Accordingly, other societal factors also could be related to the way citizens perceive the
police. For example, when society tolerates misconduct of government employees and fails
to control it, police officers are more likely to be corrupt, milk calls for service, plant
evidence, and use excessive force. When insufficient resources are channeled from the state
or city budget into the police budget, the numbers of police officers will be too low, the
quality of applicants will suffer, hiring processes will be inadequate, training will be shortened, internal control will be sketchy, salaries will be low, and equipment will be obsolete.
Such shortcomings are very likely to have adverse consequences on the public satisfaction
with, and support for, the police.
The Transparency International’s (2007) corruption perception index demonstrates that
the level of tolerable standards of governmental corruption varies greatly across the world.
It is not difficult to imagine that the acceptable level of police misconduct and the standards
of policing may well be related to the views and values within the society at large. In
particular, one may expect that governments in the societies that promote higher levels of
commitment toward implementing and maintaining efficient services, well-established
legal rules enforced on a regular basis, a philosophy of serving the public, a widespread
protection of citizens’ civil rights, culture intolerant of misconduct by public employees,
operational control mechanisms preventing and punishing misconduct by government
employees, freedom of the press, and resources devoted toward control of misconduct by
government employees would yield a stronger level of support from the public they serve
than governments in the societies unable or unwilling to promote such a system.
Given the rich potential embedded in the heterogeneity of legal, political, societal,
macroeconomic, and police-related factors surrounding public support for the police, the
scope of the prior research studies—which routinely have a narrow focus, be it in connection with specific police departments (e.g., Brandl, Frank, Worden, & Bynum, 1994; Cao,
Frank, & Cullen, 1996; Sullivan, Dunham, & Alpert, 1987) or, at best, the level of a single
nation (e.g., Brillon, Louis-Guerin, Lamarche, & Crelisten, 1984; Huang & Vaughn, 1996;
Weitzer & Tuch, 2002; Yeo & Budd, 1996)—is inherently limited. Only a comparative
perspective would enable the inclusion of country-level variables that would illustrate this
heterogeneity. The task of determining key factors related to the development of public
confidence in the police is of particular importance today, with a wave of police democratization sweeping through the world.
This article provides a unique, cross-cultural insight into the factors that are related to public support for the police in 28 European and North American countries. By design, it is a
cross-sectional, multinational, quantitative, and analytic study (see Bennett, 2004, p. 5). The
comparative perspective is particularly beneficial in this context because it provides a broader
and more comprehensive view than previous studies did. As Fields, Arrigo, and Webb (2005)
argue, comparative research can add elements that traditional research cannot:
Our typical parochial approach to the study of social problems, especially crime and criminal
behavior, is largely inadequate for the study of “world order” problems. One thing we have (or
should have) learned is that criminality and criminal justice systems cannot be studied apart
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from the other “systems” (cultural, political, economic, etc.), nor can they be examined using
our typical reductionist approaches. (p. 3)
Using the data from the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) and the World
Values Survey (WVS), the article engages in a detailed empirical analysis of the factors that
are related to public opinion about the police, from individual-level and experience-related
variables to the police-related variables and macro-level society-wide variables. Countries
covered by the study are sufficiently heterogeneous to provide substantial variations in
basic socioeconomic indicators, tolerance of misconduct by government employees, and
the state of civil rights and liberties.
Theoretical Background and Review of Research
Public Support for Government Institutions
Four decades ago, Easton (1965) introduced the concept of support for political institutions. He differentiated between two types of support: specific support, “a return for the
specific benefits and advantages that members of a system experience as part of their membership [in the system],” and diffuse support, which “continues independently of the specific reward which the member may feel he obtains from belonging to the system” (Easton,
1965, p. 125). Diffuse support should be relatively stable over time, whereas specific support may vary and, more strongly, should depend on the outcome of a specific relationship
between the government agents and citizens.
Dennis (1976) links specific support with the performance of a particular role incumbent
within the government institution and the benefits expected or received by the members of
the public. On the other hand, he argues that diffuse support “involves a generalization of
support for the institution. . . . It is a reservoir of goodwill normally directed toward the institution rather than particular incumbents. It is a regime-level sentiment and support or rejection of institutional authority” (Dennis, 1976, p. 50). Because the level of diffuse support is
built through an extensive series of experiences with the authorities, it does not change as
rapidly as specific support might. According to Dennis, in general, changes in the level of
specific support for particular role incumbents typically would have no substantial effect on
the level of diffuse support for the institution, unless there was “a sharp rise or fall in specific support, or repeated situations of high or low specific support, [which] can have a
marked impact on the level of diffuse institutional support” (Dennis, 1976, p. 50). Thus,
although a single incident should not substantially affect the level of diffuse support, consistent underperformance and chronic decrease in the level of specific support will eventually
lead toward a decrease in the level of diffuse support as well (Easton, 1965).
A few studies incorporated measures of both specific and diffuse support (Bouma, 1973;
Brandl et al., 1994; Furstenberg & Wellford, 1973; Kaminski & Jefferis, 1998; Walker
et al., 1972; White & Menke, 1982). More specifically, some of these studies examined
possible differences in the extent of support for the police depending on whether the questions tapped specific or diffuse support. On a sample of more than 10,000 high school students in Michigan, Bouma (1973) observed that general attitudes were more positive than
the specific ones. He varied questions tapping specific attitudes, from those involving others
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(“police try not to arrest innocent people”) to those that are more personal in nature (“police
don’t even give you a chance to explain” and “police accuse you of things you didn’t even
do”). He concluded that “the closer the question approached situations which the student
perceived to be real to him, the greater the possibility that he would view the police operations negatively” (Bouma, 1973, p. 222).
White and Menke (1982) asked a series of questions about public attitudes toward the
police, ranging from very general ones measuring diffuse support to very specific ones
measuring specific support. The results of their study indicated that the reservoir of goodwill directed toward the police in general was larger than the reservoir of goodwill directed
toward the specific, performance-related items: “Items eliciting evaluations of a general
nature show the public as supportive of the police, while items of a specific nature show
much less public support” (White & Menke, 1982, p. 211). The authors pointed out that
these general and specific questions “assess different universes of meaning” (White &
Menke, 1982, p. 227). In a more recent study, Kaminski and Jefferis (1998) argued that it
is possible that the differences between opinions resulting from the questions tapping into
diffuse support and those resulting from the questions tapping into specific support are “not
due to the specificity of the survey questions, but rather to the effects of a critical incident”
(p. 683). The results of their own study showed that a televised use-of-force arrest had no
impact on any measure of the Cincinnati respondents’ diffuse support; its effect was limited to just one aspect of specific support (the perceptions of the police use of excessive
force) and to a subset of their Cincinnati sample (non-White residents; Kaminski & Jefferis,
1998). In accordance with Easton’s (1965) predictions, which repeated that specific incidents can affect the level of diffuse support, it seems that the overall reservoir of goodwill
held by non-White residents in the study by Kaminski and Jefferis (1998) was not only
lower, but also less robust to the effect of a single incident.
Furstenberg and Wellford (1973) attempted to measure the mutual impact of diffuse and
specific support. They concluded that general attitudes toward the police have a stronger
impact on the specific ratings of quality of service than the other way round. Brandl et al.
(1994) further expanded this type of study by using panel data. Their findings supported
some of Easton’s (1965) and Dennis’s (1976) basic propositions. First, their measurements
indicated that diffuse support for the police had been relatively stable over a period of 6
years. Second, whereas they also found that diffuse and specific attitudes had an impact on
each other, the effects of general attitudes on specific attitudes were stronger than vice versa.
Public Support for the Police
Whereas the theory differentiates between diffuse and specific support for the police, as a
rule, the policing literature routinely addressed either the issue of diffuse support or the issue
of specific support. Broadly speaking, the confidence-related questions addressed in the literature range on a continuum from the very general ones, such as the level of confidence in the
police or the evaluations of the job the police were doing (e.g., Correia, Reisig, & Lovrich,
1996; Reiss, 1967; Walker et al., 1972), to the fairly specific ones. The latter ranged from the
ones about providing safety in the area (Brillon et al., 1984; Cao et al., 1996); maintaining
order, protecting property, and protecting against crime (Cao et al., 1996); and respecting citizens’ rights (Brillon et al., 1984), to the responsiveness, promptness in answering emergency
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calls (Brillon et al., 1984; Cao et al., 1996), courtesy and equality in treatment (Reisig &
Correia, 1997), general demeanor of police officers (Webb & Marshall, 1995), availability of
information and leisure programs for young people, and quality of various programs (see,
e.g., Brillon et al., 1984; Reisig & Correia, 1997; Reisig & Parks, 2000). As a general rule, it
seems that studies tended to rely more on some form of specific support for the police than
on the diffuse one. Heterogeneity of the questions asked across the studies and the inclusion
of both specific and diffuse questions in some of the studies make it very cumbersome and
complicated to follow the dichotomy of specific support and diffuse support in the section of
the article that discusses the impact of various correlates of public support for the police.
Thus, I focus on the correlates of support for the police regardless of the types of the questions asked in the study and use the more general term public support instead.
Most of the research studies that examine public support for the police, particularly the
projects that provide an in-depth exploration of various factors related to public opinion, have
been conducted in the United States. The researchers have primarily explored the impact of
the respondents’ demographic characteristics, their experience with the police, and the neighborhood effects. Compared with the other factors, the effects of police-related variables (other
than the contact with the police) and society-wide factors have been studied relatively rarely.
Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics
Analyses reported in previous studies of public opinion about the police typically
include several demographic characteristics such as gender, age, race, and socioeconomic
status. The underlying rationale for considering gender is that, as a consequence of different gender roles and the associated socialization processes and different experiences with
the police, women and men might express different levels of support for the police. The
official rates (see, e.g., Pastore & Maguire, 2002, p. 354) indeed suggest that men (still)
substantially outnumber women in official statistics of crimes known to the police and,
thus, are likely to have more frequent contact with the police than women are. Empirical
studies of public opinion about the police range from those that find no gender effect (e.g.,
Garofalo, 1977; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Jesilow, Meyer, & Namazzi, 1995; Murty,
Roebuck, & Smith, 1990; Reisig & Parks, 2000, 2002; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Smith
& Hawkins, 1973; Walker et al., 1972; Weitzer & Tuch, 2006), to those that find a weak
effect (e.g., Decker, 1981; Percy, 1980), to those that report that the effect is strong (e.g.,
Cao et al., 1996; Correia et al., 1996; Hadar & Snortum, 1975; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002).
Also, although sometimes there was no gender effect per se reported in a study, gender
could become a significant factor in the interactions involving, for example, gender, age,
and race (see Weitzer & Tuch, 2006).
Because older individuals are much less likely to be represented in the crime rates than
the younger ones, at least partially because of the aging-out process and the stronger attachments to conventional society, they are more likely to be supportive of the police than
younger individuals are. Findings of research studies on the age effect support this hypothesis (Cao et al., 1996; Correia et al., 1996; Garofalo, 1977; Hadar & Snortum 1975; Huang
& Vaughn, 1996; Jesilow et al., 1995; Murty et al., 1990; Percy, 1980; Reisig & Correia,
1997; Reisig & Parks, 2000, 2002; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Smith & Hawkins, 1973;
van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002).
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Finally, race or ethnicity (e.g., African American in the United States, Arabic descent in
France, Indians in the United Kingdom, Roma in Europe) may be related to the level of
support for the police, with the members of the majority group being more satisfied with
the police than the members of the minority groups. Potentially divergent opinions may
stem from heterogeneous experiences and cultural norms and expectations. The police may
treat minority citizens differently, including more frequent searches (but not more frequent
questioning or chasing; Erez, 1984), stops and arrests (e.g., Harris, 1997; Tuch & Weitzer,
1997), or failure to investigate (see, e.g., Secic v. Croatia Judgement, 2007), all of which
might induce perceptions of injustice and differential treatment.
Since the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement (1967) and the Kerner
Commission (National Advisory Commission, 1968) in the United States, research studies have found that race unequivocally matters in the context of analyzing public opinion about the police: African American respondents seem less satisfied with and less
confident in the local police than White respondents are (e.g., Albrecht & Green, 1977;
Cao et al., 1996; Correia et al., 1996; Flanagan & Vaughn, 1996; Garofalo, 1977; Hadar
& Snortum, 1975; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Jacob, 1971; Jesilow et al., 1995; Kaminski
& Jefferis, 1998; Peek, Lowe, & Alston, 1981; Reisig & Parks, 2000, 2002; Sampson &
Bartusch, 1998; Scaglion & Condon, 1980; Tuch & Weitzer, 1997; Walker et al., 1973;
Webb & Marshall, 1995; Weitzer & Tuch, 1999, 2002). Some studies report that the race
effect disappears or weakens substantially once various neighborhood characteristics,
such as fear of crime, perceptions of disorder, and informal collective security, are taken
into consideration (see, e.g., Cao et al., 1996; Reisig & Parks, 2002; Sampson &
Bartusch, 1998).
Various measures of socioeconomic status (e.g., education, occupation, income, occupational prestige, type of residence) yield mixed results. Some studies find that the more educated respondents express a more positive image of the police or are more supportive of the
police than the less educated respondents are (e.g., Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Murty et al.,
1990; Reisig & Parks, 2000, 2002), several other studies report no differences with respect
to the respondents’ education (e.g., Correia et al., 1996; Smith & Hawkins, 1973; Walker
et al., 1973), and still others report that the more educated respondents have less positive
opinions about the police (e.g., Weitzer & Tuch, 1999). Income, as a measure of socioeconomic status, also does not produce a clear distinction: Cao et al. (1996), Garofalo (1977),
and Walker et al. (1973) report a positive relation between income and confidence in the
police, whereas Scaglion and Condon (1980) find no relation.
In the present study, I employ measures of gender and age.
Contact With the Police
Some studies (e.g., Winfree & Griffiths, 1977) suggest that involuntary contacts—
contacts initiated by the police, such as being arrested or receiving a traffic ticket—have a
stronger impact on the public opinion about the police than voluntary contacts—contacts
initiated by the citizens, such as requesting police service or reporting victimization.
Moreover, whereas involuntary contacts erode the individual’s opinion about the police,
voluntary contacts do not substantially improve it (Jacob, 1971).
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Other studies (see, e.g., Carter, 1985) find that, regardless of the nature of contacts (i.e.,
voluntary or involuntary), as the number of contacts with the police increases, the level of
satisfaction decreases. Thus, it is quite possible that the nature of the contact may not have
as much impact on the level of public opinion about the police as the satisfaction with the
contact does. Indeed, several studies confirm this conclusion (see, e.g., Correia et al., 1996;
Reisig & Parks, 2000). Correia et al. (1996) report that “in terms of whether or not the contact was voluntary or involuntary, the results show that, regardless of the type of initiation,
unsatisfactory treatment of the individual decreases the likelihood of positive perceptions
of the state police” (p. 19). Thus, although certain types of contacts are more likely than
others to generate dissatisfaction (see, e.g., Skogan, 1996), it seems that having any contact
with the police results in more negative attitudes (Yeo & Budd, 2000; see also Dean, 1980)
because the chances of a negative contact and/or unsatisfactory contact increase.
The most frequently studied type of voluntary contact occurs when a person becomes a
crime victim and decides to report the victimization to the police. Reporting the victimization to the police further erodes the overall satisfaction with the police (e.g., Homant,
Kennedy, & Fleming, 1984). Poister and McDavid (1978) report that the overall satisfaction with the police is related to the satisfaction with the response time and satisfaction with
the initial investigation, as well as to the initiation and the quality of the subsequent investigation and the likelihood of an arrest. Similarly, Shapland et al. (1985) report that the victims’ “lack of knowledge of what was happening to the case and, for a few, the consequent
feeling that the police did not care and were not doing anything” are detrimental for the victims’ opinions about the police (p. 85).
However, prior studies have shown that what matters is not only the treatment, but also
the outcome of these cases. The 1996 ICVS results demonstrate that the respondents from
a number of European and North American countries who were victimized and were dissatisfied with their reporting experiences related reasons for their dissatisfaction to both
procedural-justice issues (e.g., lack of interest in pursuing the case, impoliteness, slow to
arrive) and substantive-justice issues (e.g., the offender was not caught, the property was
not recovered; van Dijk, 1996, p. 39). The results of the 1998 British Crime Survey support
the same argument: Yeo and Budd (2000) found that the “police received higher ratings
when they: recovered all or some of the victim’s property (77%), charged the offender
(73%), [and] had face-to-face contact with the victim (66%)” (p. 3).
In the present study, I use several variables that measure contact with the police: victimization experience, experience of being asked to pay a bribe to a government official,
including a police officer, and frequency of seeing the patrols.
Neighborhood Factors
The results reported by Cao et al. (1996), Reisig and Parks (2002), and Reisig and
Giacomazzi (1998) suggest that the level of safety, fear of crime, and extent of disorder in the
community may have an additional impact on the overall satisfaction with the police. Residents
living in low-income, high-crime neighborhoods are most likely to experience a negative contact with the police, have lower expectations of police service, have higher level of fear
of crime, and dislike the neighborhood. All these factors could be related to their opinions
about the police (see, e.g., Dunham & Alpert, 1988; Jesilow et al., 1995; Murty et al., 1990;
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Reisig & Parks, 2002; Walker et al., 1973). Once internalized as part of the neighborhood culture, these opinions are further echoed to reinforce negative attitudes toward the police
(Decker, 1985, p. 94). Similarly, a Slovenian study reports that the feeling of safety and visibility of the police are the two key variables affecting the views about the quality of police service (Pavlovic, 1998, p. 553).
In the present study, I incorporate a Fear-Of-Crime scale and a variable measuring informal collective security. The nature of the data is such that we do not have these measures
are not available at the neighborhood level, but at the level of individual respondents.
Police-Related Factors
Although several potentially relevant police-related concepts can be operationalized and
measured (e.g., the heterogeneity and size of the police; availability of resources and equipment; quality of administration, recruitment, training, and supervision; operation of the
internal control mechanisms; and the norms of the police culture), most of the existing studies focus on one or few police agencies and thereby implicitly disregard the potential influence of police-related factors.
One of the defining police-related factors tied to public support for the police is the
nature of the official roles or functions performed by the police. In particular, if police tasks
are defined primarily as the protection of the existing totalitarian regime and/or if the police
are in charge of enforcing unpopular, biased, or discriminatory laws, the level of support
for the police tends to be low. The results of the ICVS yield some support for the hypothesis that the nature of police roles is related to the public opinion about the police. Van Dijk
et al. (1990, p. 71) report that support for the police was weaker in Poland than in any of
the 15 industrialized nations included in the survey. Subsequent analyses of the survey data
further suggest that the public in the countries in transition does not perceive the police as
doing a good job in controlling crime (Zvekic, 1996, p. 55).
Public opinion about the police could also be related to the way the police perform
their official functions. Overly aggressive, discriminatory, or corrupt police agencies generally induce a lower level of support by the public at large. Racial profiling studies and
studies about other forms of police misconduct yield similar conclusions: The respondents who perceive the police to engage in misconduct more frequently are also less
likely to express strong support for the police (see, e.g., Benson, 1981; Dean, 1980;
Smith & Hawkins, 1973; Soo Son et al., 1996). When incidents of police misconduct are
highly publicized by the media, they seem to have not only direct, short-term effects on
public support for the police, but also sizeable long-term effects. Based on the results of
a series of national opinion polls, Tuch and Weitzer (1997, p. 647) conclude that wellpublicized incidents of police brutality are strongly related to the levels of public support
for the police, both at the national and at the local level. In their subsequent study,
Weitzer and Tuch (2006) report that serial or ongoing exposure to negative media reporting on the police was one of the most consistent factors related to public support for the
police. However, with the exception of the studies by Kaminski and Jefferis (1998) and
Weitzer and Tuch (2006), the current literature does not have a firm grasp of
the actual short-term and long-term effects of well-publicized incidents on specific and
diffuse support for the police.
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In the present study, I include measures of police size and an approximation of police
heterogeneity (percentage of women in the agency). A number of other variables are highly
correlated and thus will not be entered into the analyses. Instead, I include a measure of
quality of governance that incorporates several of these police-related variables.
Society-Wide Factors
As discussed earlier, although countries can be quite heterogeneous in terms of the factors potentially relevant for the public opinion about the police (e.g., legal, socioeconomic,
political, and historical frameworks; level of tolerance for police misconduct or misconduct
by government employees in general; the existence and quality of the external control
mechanisms; resources devoted to the control of misconduct; extent of the freedom of the
press; the degree of protection for citizens’ civil rights and liberties), prior research almost
exclusively focused on only one or a few police agencies in a single country. Strangely
enough, the importance of the countrywide factors is illustrated by the findings of a onecountry study conducted by Brown and Coulter (1983). They asked the respondents living
in different sections of a midsize city in Alabama (and thus potentially experiencing different quality of police and other government service, just like the residents in different countries might) to evaluate the quality of their local government. They reported that “the most
consistent and significant variable in explaining citizen satisfaction with response time,
treatment by police, and the belief that the police protection in one’s neighborhood is better than in others, is satisfaction with the quality of local government” (p. 54). Quite possibly, “the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority
to shape public policy and provide public goods and services” (World Bank, 2007,
p. 1) is probably strongly related to how citizens in the country perceive these institutions
of the government. Quality of governance, perhaps not surprisingly, differs greatly across
the world (see Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007).
Rothstein and Stolle (2001, p. 7) develop a theory of the relation between the trust and
the quality of the government. They argue that “despite different political leanings in government, people are able (or not) to trust that institutions responsible for the implementation of public policies are run and guided by the principles of impartiality and fairness.”
Furthermore, they write as follows:
The argument here is that if we have reason to believe that government institutions responsible for implementing laws and policies behave according to the principles of fairness and
impartiality, we may trust them with our demands for education, social insurance, health
care, protection from crime and other essentially private goods. This logic is easy enough
to follow: it makes no sense to pay your taxes if you think that the tax authorities are discriminating against you or are heavily corrupt. You would not take your dispute to a court
if you did not trust the judge to be impartial and to follow the universal rules guaranteeing
equality before the law; or if you had to, you would maybe try to bribe a judge in your
favor. . . . Again, people are not likely to trust political institutions because they think the
officials will act in their interests as their agents. Instead, they will trust public institutions
if they have reason to believe that they are fair, impartial and competent. (Rothstein &
Stolle, 2001, p. 10)
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The most extensive and comprehensive measure of quality of government or governance
is developed by the World Bank. Whereas the concept of governance cannot be measured
directly, the researchers within the World Bank have developed six aggregate indicators of
governance (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) based on the data from
30 organizations (Kaufman & Kraay, 2008, p. 18). The World Bank indicators have not been
used previously to assess the relation between the level of support for the police and quality
of governance.
Following this argument about the quality of governance, it comes as no surprise that a
few prior studies (Albrecht & Green, 1977; Cao et al., 1998; Cao & Zhao, 2005; Stack &
Cao, 1998) find that the confidence in the police is strongly related to the confidence in
other parts of the government. Cao and Zhao (2005) analyze the confidence in the police in
17 Latin American countries and develop a specific variable measuring confidence in the
government—trust in the political system. It was composed of the respondents’ trust and
confidence in other government institutions—namely, the armed forces, legal system, political parties, parliament, and the civil service. Their results show that trust in the political
system is the most important explanatory variable in the model of support for the police
(Cao & Zhao, 2005, p. 410).
The survey of the existing comparative studies is rather short. The studies use the data
that originated from one of the two data sources: the WVS (e.g., Cao, 2001; Cao & Zhao,
2005; Stack & Cao, 1998) or the ICVS (e.g., van Dijk et al., 1990; Kesteren et al., 2000;
Zvekic, 1996). The WVS contains a question that measures diffuse support, whereas the
ICVS targets specific support.
Cao and colleagues use WVS data to explore diffuse support for the police in 17 European
countries (Stack & Cao, 1998), in Germany and the United States (Cao, 2001), and 9 Latin
American countries (Cao and Zhao, 2005). Compared to the respondents from the United
States, Stack and Cao (1998) write that “the public in Britain, Canada, Denmark, Ireland,
and Norway have higher confidence in the police,” whereas “the public in Belgium, France,
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Japan show lower confidence in
the police” (p. 74). Their analyses show that political conservatism, age, social class, and
marriage are positively related to confidence in the police, whereas education is negatively
related to confidence in the police. In their study on Latin American countries, Cao and Zhao
(2005) indeed find a range of levels of confidence in the police. They also report that trust
in the government is the strongest predictor of confidence in the police.
The focus of the ICVS studies has been primarily on determining the degree to which
confidence in the police differs across countries (although countries included in each sweep
of the survey vary), with very limited analysis of the factors that affect public opinion.
According to the first sweep of the ICVS, conducted in 1989, van Dijk et al. (1990, p. 71)
reported that the support for the police was weaker in Poland, Switzerland, Spain, and
Belgium than in any of the other 12 industrialized nations included in the survey. Although
van Dijk et al. (1990, p. 72) considered several variables that may affect the level of confidence in the police, none of those variables measured the heterogeneity of the states or
police agencies. They concluded, just like most studies conducted in the United States did,
that age and victimization experience are related to the respondents’ opinions.
In the analyses of the two subsequent sweeps (in 1992 and 1996/1997), Zvekic (1996)
focuses only on the countries in transition and reports that, with few exceptions (e.g.,
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Slovenia and the Slovak Republic), the public in a number of countries in transition consistently evaluate the police as not doing a good job in controlling crime. Zvekic (1996)
reports that the respondents from Albania, Romania, Georgia, and Yugoslavia were more
likely to express more confidence in the police than the respondents from Russia,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, or the Czech Republic were. The results from the subsequent 2000
sweep show that the police performance was most positively evaluated in Canada and the
United States, followed by Scotland, Australia, England and Wales, Finland, Switzerland,
and Northern Ireland (Kesteren et al., 2000, pp. 75-76). The lowest confidence was noted
in the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, and France (van Kesteren et al., 2000, pp. 75-76).
The most recent sweep (2004/2005) explores the level of support for police in 30 countries
(van Dijk, van Kesteren, & Smit, 2007). The findings indicate that the level of support for
the police also varies greatly across the 30 countries, from more than 80% of the respondents in countries such as Finland, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia,
Denmark, and Austria showing substantial support for the police to less than one-half of the
respondents doing the same in Estonia, Mexico, and Poland (van Dijk et al., 2007, p. 142).
The analyses of the ICVS data to date primarily focus on showing the victims’ dissatisfaction with the reporting experience and the overall satisfaction with the police efforts to control crime, without providing in-depth analyses of the countrywide or police agency–related
factors that could be related to the public opinion about the police.
In the present study, I include a complex index measuring quality of governance. It
incorporates measures of freedom to participate in the government, government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of corruption.
Data and Measures
Data
The data I use in the study come from the second (1992-1994) and third (1996/1997)
sweeps of the ICVS and the third (1995-1997) sweep of the WVS. The third sweep of the
ICVS (1996-1997) focused on 12 industrialized countries, 12 developing countries, and 20
countries in transition. In all industrialized countries, the survey was carried out on a
national sample by computer-assisted telephone interviewing, whereas researchers in most
countries in transition used face-to-face interviewing. The surveys conducted in countries
in transition mostly focused on large cities (for the description of methodology see, e.g.,
Nieuwbeerta, 2002; van Dijk, 1999; van Dijk et al., 1990; Zvekic, 1996). To ameliorate the
potential effect of the different nature of samples (nationwide in developed countries and
mostly large cities in countries in transition) on the results and to enhance comparability,
for countries in which nationwide samples were collected, I use only the part of the sample coming from large cities. The third wave of the WVS (1995-1997) covered 53 countries
and was distributed in an even larger number of countries in transition (18). All interviews
were carried out face-to-face, and samples were national stratified samples (for a description of the methodology see, e.g., Inglehart, 2000).
The choice of countries selected for the analyses is governed by three criteria. First, the
nature of the analyses requires that countries be included both in the ICVS and the WVS.1
Second, because public opinion could change over longer periods of time, countries
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Table 1
Countries Included in the Study
ICVS Urban
Sample Size
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
England and Wales
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Netherlands
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United States
Yugoslavia
Total
413
999
223
1,076
666
930
560
387
999
175
567
756
554
1,011
654
700
427
1,007
1,000
1,018
1,105
1,033
920
226
87
1,000
202
1,094
19,788
Percentage of the
ICVS Sample
2.1
5.0
1.1
5.4
3.4
4.7
2.8
2.0
5.0
0.9
2.9
3.8
2.8
5.1
3.3
3.5
2.2
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.6
5.1
4.7
1.1
0.4
5.1
1.0
5.5
100.0
WVS Sample
Size
Percentage of
the WVS Sample
1,460
2,092
2,792
1,072
1,730
1,196
1,093
1,021
987
1,002
2,593
999
2,018
1,200
1,009
995
1,017
1,153
1,103
2,040
466
1,007
1,211
1,009
1,212
2,811
1,542
1,520
39,350
3.7
5.3
7.1
2.7
4.4
3.0
2.8
2.6
2.5
2.5
6.6
2.5
5.1
3.0
2.6
2.5
2.6
2.9
2.8
5.2
1.2
2.6
3.1
2.6
3.1
7.1
3.9
3.9
100.0
Note: ICVS = International Crime Victimization Survey; WVS = World Values Survey.
selected for the analyses should have been surveyed within a shorter time frame. This is
especially true for countries in transition, in which a mere 10-year span from 1990 to 2000
encompasses extensive political, legal, economic, and social changes. The third wave of the
ICVS (1996/1997) is also the wave that incorporated the largest number of European and
North American countries, both established democracies and countries in transition.
Although a similar number of established democracies were surveyed in the first three
waves, and a number of them participated in two or all three of those waves, I selected the
established democracies that participated in the most recent of the three waves to match the
data from the countries in transition. The exceptions are Belgium, Italy, and Spain, for
which the data come from the 1992-1994 survey because these countries did not participate
in the 1996/1997 wave. The third criterion is that socioeconomic and other standard indicators, such as crime indicators or the percentage of women in the police force, should be
available for the countries included in the analyses.
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The data set ultimately consists of the respondents from 28 European and North
American countries (Table 1). To adjust for the effect of unequal sample sizes across countries in the ICVS data set, I use weighted samples. The ICVS codebook suggests that the
sample from each country is weighted to include approximately 1,000 cases. Similarly, the
WVS samples were weighted to include approximately 1,500 respondents per country.
Measures
Dependent Variables
The question about general support for the police asked the WVS respondents to express
the level of confidence they had in the police. I coded the answers a great deal or a lot of
confidence in the police as 1 and the answers not very much and none at all as 0. On the
other hand, the ICVS question about specific support for the police asked the respondents
to specify how good a job the police were doing in controlling crime in the area. I coded
the answer good job as 1 and not a good job as 0, and excluded answers “don’t know” from
further analyses.
Independent Variables
Contact with the police. Prior research has indicated that the experience of reporting
crime to the police decreases the level of confidence in the police (see, e.g., Homant et al.,
1984). Respondents in the ICVS were asked about their victimization experience. For five
typical street crimes common across the globe—burglary, robbery, assault, sexual offenses,
and theft of property from a car—the ICVS questionnaires allowed the interviewers to ask
the respondents more detailed follow-up questions about their experiences (e.g., whether
they reported the crime to the police; if they did not report, they were asked to provide reasons for not reporting). In the analyses, I categorized the respondents into those who were
victimized and did report their victimization to the police, those who were victimized and
did not report their victimization to the police, and those who were not victimized.
The ICVS contains two questions about participation in corrupt transactions, another
type of contact with the police. The respondents were asked whether a government official
asked them to pay a bribe and, if so, what type of government official it was (one listed
option is police officers). In the analyses, I classified the respondents into three groups:
those who said that they were not asked to pay a bribe, those who said that they were asked
to pay a bribe by a police officer, and those who said that they were asked to pay a bribe
by another government official.
The ICVS also contains a question about the frequency with which the respondents noticed
police patrols and, thus, had opportunities to observe and interact with police officers.
Neighborhood factors. Previous literature suggests that citizens in communities characterized by a high level of disorder are likely to experience high fear of crime (see Skogan,
1990, p. 77). The ICVS respondents were asked a series of three questions about their fear
of crime and related behavior (feeling safe after dark; avoiding certain areas by night; and
estimating chances that over the next 12 months someone will break into their home). For
the first two variables (feeling safe after dark and avoiding certain areas by night), I coded
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the answers very safe and fairly safe as 0 and the answers a bit unsafe and very unsafe as 1.
For the third variable (estimating chances that over the next 12 months someone will break
into their home), I coded the answers very likely and likely as 1 and not likely as 0. I combined the answers to the three questions into the Fear-Of-Crime scale: The overall score
could range from 3 (a score of 1 on each of the three questions), indicating the highest level
of fear of crime, to 0, indicating the lowest level of fear of crime.
Communities characterized by disorder also have a low level of informal collective security in the community (see Cao et al., 1996, p. 7). In the analyses, I use answers that the
ICVS respondents provided when asked an indirect question about this issue: Would they
ask a neighbor or another caretaker to watch their residence if they were out of town for a
day or two?
Police-related factors. The police across the world can differ in a number of ways, including the way in which they treat citizens, appreciation for their human rights, public accountability, and transparency of their work. Unfortunately, a worldwide data set that would
provide such level of detail does not exist. In the absence of such information, another option
would be to rely on citizen and/or expert opinions, which, by their nature, are more subjective measures. Previous research (e.g., Benson, 1981; Dean, 1980; Smith & Hawkins, 1973;
Weitzer & Tuch, 2002) has demonstrated that knowledge about actual police misconduct or
perceptions of its prevalence are related to public support for the police. One indirect measure of the level of police misconduct could be the extent to which civil liberties in a country are respected (discussed under the society-wide factors); countries that rank the highest
on the civil liberties part of the Freedom in the World survey “come closest to the ideals
expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, and religion” (Freedom House, 2000, p. 6). Another indirect measure could be the
transparency international corruption perceptions index (CPI), which ranks countries based
on the perceived extent of corruption in a country. Such measures, however, are highly correlated and are a potential source of multicollinearity issues. To avoid such problems, I use
Kaufman’s measure of governance (described under society-wide factors). It incorporates
the measures of both civil liberties and corruption.
The data for the police size come from the fifth UN survey and are provided by the
HEUNI (European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control) as the number of police
(sworn and civilian) per 100,000 inhabitants in 1994. The data are available for 24 countries and are not available for Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Yugoslavia. The subsequent
UN surveys contained additional data for Belarus (ninth survey) and Georgia (seventh survey).2 Bulgaria and Yugoslavia did not provide the data on the size of their police force on
either of the most recent surveys (fifth through ninth surveys). I tried to find the data in
alternative sources: The Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement (Sullivan & Haberfeld, 2005)
contains the information necessary to calculate the rate for Yugoslavia (composed of Serbia
and Montenegro at the time). An additional Internet search, which included the search of
the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior Web page, did not yield the number of police officers
in Bulgaria. Consequently, I substituted the overall mean for Bulgaria.
The percentage of women in policing, a proxy for the heterogeneity of the police, relies
on the figures provided by the fifth UN survey. Despite potential problems associated with
this measure (e.g., whether only sworn personnel are included, and police discrimination
may occur on a racial/ethnic basis rather than gender), this is the best measure available to
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date. The data for Italy and Poland come from the sixth UN survey, and the data for the
Netherlands come from the HEUNI (Kangaspunta, 1994). Furthermore, the four countries
that did not disclose the overall number of police officers did not provide the percentage of
female police officers either. I found Serbia’s percentage of women in the police in the
World Police Encyclopedia (Das & Palmiotto, 2006) and the Georgian one in the seventh
UN survey (United Nations, 2008). For Belarus and Bulgaria, the results of the ninth UN
survey about the percentage of women in the police were not available, and subsequent
Internet search did not yield this percentage; accordingly, I substituted the overall mean for
these two countries.
Society-wide factors. A variety of indicators could be used to measure the extent of economic and social development, including the traditional ones such as the gross domestic
product, literacy level, population density, or income levels (see, e.g., Newman & Howard,
1999, p. 18). Not surprisingly, a number of these measures—the GDP (gross domestic
product), the human development index (HDI), status of civil liberties (Civil Liberties), and
the CPI (see also Newman & Howard, 1999, p. 18)—are highly correlated among themselves. The correlation coefficients of .80 or stronger clearly indicate that strong multicollinearity would confound the analyses. However, Kaufman’s index of governance or
“the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to
shape public policy and provide public goods and services” (World Bank, 2007, p. 1) incorporates six different indicators, a number of which include similar or the same measures.
More specifically, Kaufman et al. (2007, p. 3) include six measures of governance:
Voice and accountability (VA) measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and
a free media.
Political stability and absence of violence (PV) measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including
domestic violence and terrorism.
Government effectiveness (GE) measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil services and the degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of police formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory quality (RQ) measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Rule of law (RL) measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society and, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, and the
likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of corruption (CC) measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and
private interests.
The data come from 33 sources, constructed by 30 different organizations (Kaufman et al.,
2007, pp. 2, 27). Based on an unobserved components model methodology, they construct
aggregate indicators for each of the six measures. The methodology of constructing each
of these six dimensions is explained in detail in Kaufman et al. (2007). I use four out of
six measures of governance (VA, GE, RL, and CC) that I regard as critical to the study of
public confidence in the police. VA incorporates measures of human rights and civil liberties;
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GE measures the quality of public service; RL measures the extent to which civil servants’
actions, including the police ones, are in accordance with the law; and, finally, CC measures the extent of corruption. To avoid multicollinearity problems, I created a scale—
Governance—composed of the four indices (Cronbach’s α = .972). As Kaufman et al. (2007)
emphasize, “a useful role of the aggregate indicators is that they allow us to summarize in a
compact way the diversity of information on governance available for each country, and so
make comparisons across countries and over time” (p. 16).
Prior studies (Albrecht & Green, 1977; Cao et al., 1998; Cao & Zhao, 2005; Stack & Cao,
1998) have indicated that the trust in the police is strongly related to trust in the other parts of
the same government. In fact, Cao and Zhao (2005) showed that the trust in the political system is the most important explanatory variable in the model of support for the police (Cao &
Zhao, 2005, p. 410). The WVS data set also features a set of questions about confidence in
other government institutions, particularly the level of confidence in the armed forces, the
legal system, and the parliament. I use these variables in the empirical analyses; their
dichotomization is implemented in the same manner as the one for the dependent variable in
the analyses concerning the general support for the police.
Respondents’ demographic characteristics. My choice of demographic characteristics
included in the multivariate analyses is governed by the questions asked of the respondents
both in the ICVS and the WVS. Unfortunately, although the ICVS asks the respondents
about their gender and age, it does not ask about their race or ethnicity.
Statistical Issues. I use the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) logistic regression models (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to study the relation between levels of support for the
police and a number of covariates detailed in the previous sections. Police-related and society-wide variables are Level 2 variables (countrywide predictors), whereas the individual
respondents’ characteristics and experience with the police are Level 1 variables in the models (individual-level predictors).
Results
General Support for the Police
The respondents participating in the WVS were asked to express the degree of confidence in various social institutions, from the church and the press to government agencies
such as the police or the armed forces. The percentage of the respondents who expressed
either a “great deal” or “a lot” of confidence in these institutions is shown in Table 2.
The level of confidence in the police varies greatly across these 28 countries, from just a
few percent of the respondents in some countries to those countries in which almost all the
respondents express a high degree of confidence in the police. Specifically, the respondents
in two Scandinavian countries (Finland, Sweden) and Canada are the most supportive of
their police: More than 80% of the respondents in these countries indicated that they either
have “a great deal” or “a lot” of confidence in the police (Table 2). The respondents in
Austria, Canada, Croatia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United
States are also quite supportive of their police because two thirds of the respondents or more
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Table 2
Confidence in Various Social Institutions by Country (World Values Survey)
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Netherlands
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United States
Yugoslavia
Church,
Percentage
Press,
Percentage
Parliament,
Percentage
(Rank)
Legal System,
Percentage
(Rank)
49.8
74.0
49.5
57.5
63.5
63.6
60.3
55.6
49.6
75.6
56.2
60.2
64.2
69.8
31.2
31.4
67.4
72.4
66.3
50.2
37.7
49.0
49.4
38.9
67.0
75.9
38.3
17.7
41.4
44.3
46.7
46.4
27.0
54.8
31.2
38.3
55.9
40.0
39.3
49.5
70.7
17.7
34.1
46.3
27.8
40.4
36.7
43.0
43.0
28.7
22.1
43.6
27.4
28.0
41.2 (3)
29.9 (4)
42.8 (3)
45.3 (3)
37.9 (4)
48.5 (4)
43.8 (4)
32.4 (4)
48.2 (4)
38.4 (3)
39.9 (4)
30.6 (4)
25.0 (4)
25.7 (2)
15.7 (4)
51.6 (3)
34.5 (4)
20.8 (4)
22.0 (4)
35.5 (3)
24.7 (4)
36.6 (4)
44.6 (4)
43.9 (4)
37.8 (3)
30.3 (4)
39.0 (4)
58.4 (2)
48.8 (2)
44.6 (2)
38.6 (4)
54.4 (3)
58.5 (3)
61.7 (1)
66.7 (3)
57.5 (2)
43.3 (2)
59.5 (1)
31.8 (3)
38.3 (1)
22.9 (3)
24.4 (3)
63.8 (2)
52.6 (3)
47.6 (2)
39.3 (2)
37.6 (1)
35.9 (3)
46.7 (2)
62.5 (2)
66.0 (2)
43.9 (2)
36.3 (3)
52.3 (2)
Armed Forces,
Police,
Percentage
Percentage
(Rank)
(Rank)
28.9 (4)
72.8 (1)
33.1 (4)
81.4 (1)
56.9 (2)
82.3 (1)
47.9 (3)
81.1 (2)
56.4 (3)
50.0 (1)
51.7 (2)
45.6 (2)
30.9 (3)
41.1 (1)
38.7 (1)
31.6 (4)
79.5 (1)
82.3 (1)
69.1 (1)
37.1 (2)
44.7 (2)
43.4 (3)
54.5 (3)
49.9 (3)
68.0 (1)
86.4 (1)
61.6 (1)
67.8 (1)
37.8 (3)
51.0 (1)
51.2 (2)
84.1 (1)
66.3 (2)
50.9 (2)
85.0 (1)
66.5 (1)
35.2 (4)
50.6 (3)
64.9 (1)
31.1 (2)
20.1 (4)
26.7 (2)
73.2 (1)
53.2 (2)
45.1 (3)
30.2 (3)
27.3 (4)
47.4 (1)
62.1 (1)
81.1 (1)
68.6 (1)
37.5 (4)
71.2 (2)
50.0 (3)
Note: Percentage of respondents saying that they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the institution
in question.
indicated that they have substantial confidence in the police (Table 2). On the other end of
the spectrum are countries such as Lithuania, Macedonia, and Slovakia, in which only about
one-quarter of the respondents or even fewer showed a substantial degree of support for the
police (Table 2). The level of confidence in the police is low in Belarus, Georgia, Latvia,
Russia, and Ukraine as well—only about one-third of the respondents expressed confidence
in the police. The confidence in the police in Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia is somewhat higher because about one-half of the
respondents said that they are confident in their police (Table 2). Generally speaking, the
police in the established democracies typically elicit more confidence than the police in
countries in transition do (χ2 = 3,326.01; df = 1; p < .001; Phi = .288).
The police are among the most trusted institutions of the government. Calculation of the
mean rank for each institution across all countries reveals that the mean for the police (2.07)
was one of the two highest means, second only to the mean for the armed forces (2.00),
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Table 3
HLM Logistic Regression Analysis of General Support:
Confidence in the Policea (WVS)
Individual-specific variables
Genderb
Agec
Youngest
Middle-aged
Confidence in the legal systema
Confidence in the parliamenta
Confidence in the armed forcesa
Country-specific variables
Police size
Percentage women
Kaufman governance index
ICVS crime index
Police structured
Multiple, coordinated
Multiple, uncoordinated
Constant
χ2
Model 1, b (SE)
Model 2, b (SE)
−0.118 (0.026)***
−0.124 (0.027)***
−0.203 (0.043)***
−0.199 (0.031)***
1.085 (0.061)***
0.928 (0.059)***
0.870 (0.069)***
−0.204 (0.045)***
−0.203 (0.034)***
1.134 (0.058)***
0.968 (0.054)***
0.914 (0.071)***
0.000 (0.000)
0.008 (0.021)
0.125 (0.028)***
0.021 (0.022)
−1.053 (0.188)***
4287.62
−0.079 (0.423)
0.344 (0.252)
−2.358 (0.607)***
2792.45
Note: HLM = hierarchical linear modeling; WVS = World Values Survey.
a. Variable coded as follows: 0 = no confidence; 1 = a lot of confidence.
b. Variable coded as follows: 0 = female; 1 = male.
c. Reference category: Oldest.
d. Reference category: Single agency.
***
p < .01.
suggesting that overall, next to the armed forces, the police are the government institution
that elicits the highest degree of confidence. These are averages across countries, and how
the police compare with the other government institutions varies from one country to
another (see Table 2). However, in 11 out of 27 countries, they are the government institution with the most confidence (Table 2), and in 7 other countries, they are the second most
trusted institution of government. In the countries in which the level of confidence in the
police is rather low (e.g., Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine), the level
of confidence in other institutions of the government is not necessarily as low, and the
police in these countries seem to be among the least trusted institutions of the government
(see Table 2).
To further examine the issue of general support for the police, I perform the HLM logistic regression analyses (Table 3). Considering individual-specific predictors first (Model 1
in Table 3), the results show that both measures of sociodemographic characteristics (gender, age) exhibit effects on the confidence in the police. In accordance with prior research
that found strong effects of gender (Cao et al., 1996; Correia et al., 1996; Hadar & Snortum,
1975; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002), my results also indicate that women were more likely to say
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International Criminal Justice Review
that they have a lot of confidence in the police than men were (b = −0.118). Age was also
a relevant predictor, as the bulk of prior research had suggested (see, e.g., Cao et al., 1996;
Correia et al., 1996; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Jesilow et al., 1995; Reisig & Parks, 2002;
Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; van Dijk et al., 1990; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002): Compared to the
oldest respondents, both the youngest (b = −0.203) and middle-aged respondents
(b = −0.199) were less likely to say that they had a lot of confidence in the police.
Model 1 also incorporates measures of what Cao and Zhao (2005) called “trust in the
political system” and reported that trust in the political system was the key explanatory
variable in confidence in the police in 17 Latin American countries. The results of my study
suggest that the respondents’ general support for the police is also strongly related to their
level of confidence in other government institutions (b = 0.870 for the armed forces,
b = 1.085 for the legal system, and b = 0.928 for the parliament).
Model 2 adds country-specific variables, including police-related ones (police size, percentage of women in the police, the nature of the police structure), as well as society-wide
ones (Kaufman governance index). The only country-specific variable that is related to the
confidence in the police is the Kaufman’s governance index. Given the direction of coding
of the index (from −2.5 to 2.5, where 2.5 indicates excellent governance), the results imply
that the countries with a higher quality of governance are more likely to yield more confidence in the police than the countries with a lower quality of governance (b = 0.125). As
expected, “the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the
authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services” (World Bank,
2007, p. 1), particularly the specific accountability and rule of law indicators, are critical
countrywide factors shaping public opinion about the police.
Specific Support for the Police
The ICVS respondents were asked to evaluate the police ability to control crime in the
area—a highly relevant measure of specific support for the police. Figure 1 depicts the percentage of the respondents, by country, who said that the police were doing a good job in
controlling crime.
The reported percentages range from 16.1% in Estonia to 90.8% in Canada, suggesting quite a large heterogeneity of opinions across countries on how good a job the
police in their country were doing in controlling crime (Figure 1). The overwhelming
majority of the respondents, more than three-quarters, in Canada, Finland, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, thought that the police were
doing a good job. In addition, a strong majority of the respondents, between one-half
and two-thirds, said that the police were doing a good job in mostly established democracies such as Austria, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, as well as in two countries in transition—Croatia and Slovenia (Figure 1). On the other end of the spectrum
are countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia, where a small fraction of the
respondents, only about one-eighth, reported that the police were doing a good job. The
rest of the countries fall somewhere between these two ends of the continuum, with
only a minority of the respondents evaluating the police ability to control crime in the
area positively (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1
Percentage of Respondents, by Country, Saying That the Police Are Doing a Good
Job in Controlling Crime in the Area
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Netherland
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
UK
USA
Yugoslavia
65.7
36.3
51.6
37.3
90.8
55.9
16.1
71.2
67.4
35.6
37.6
46.4
17.7
46.9
61.9
27.1
34.7
17.6
41.3
53.6
44.2
84.9
74.7
28.7
74
75.9
38.8
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
To assess the determinants of the specific support for the police, I perform the HLM
logistic regression analyses and present results in Table 4. An exploration of individualspecific predictors (Model 1 in Table 4) suggests that two demographic characteristics, gender
and age, both exhibit effects on the specific support for the police. In accordance with prior
research (Cao et al., 1996; Correia et al., 1996; Hadar & Snortum, 1975; Weitzer & Tuch,
2002) and the results regarding general support for the police (see Table 3), the results of
this analysis show that women were more likely to have positive views about the police
ability to control crime than men were (b = −0.356). Respondents’ age also had an impact
on the respondents’ views of the police, as identified in prior research (see, e.g., Cao et al.,
1996; Correia et al., 1996; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Jesilow et al., 1995; Reisig & Parks,
2002; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; van Dijk et al., 1990; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002) and the
present analysis of the WVS data (see Table 3). The youngest respondents (b = −0.399) and
middle-aged respondents (b = −0.372) were less likely to say that the police were doing a
good job in controlling crime than the oldest respondents were.
Model 1 also incorporates three individual-specific predictors measuring contact with
the police or experience with the police: victimization and reporting experience, corrupt
experience, and the frequency of seeing the police patrol. Personal experiences of becoming a crime victim—notions directly related to crime control—were strongly related to the
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International Criminal Justice Review
Table 4
HLM Logistic Regression Analysis of Specific Support:
Police Ability to Control Crimea (ICVS)
Individual-specific variables
Genderb
Agec
Youngest
Middle-aged
Victimd
Not a victim
Victim who did not report
Bribee
Not asked for a bribe
Asked for a bribe by other official
Fear of crimef
No fear
Low fear
Medium fear
Trust in community
Frequency of patrols
Country-specific variables
Police size
Percentage women
Kaufman governance index
ICVS crime index
Police structureg
Multiple, coordinated
Multiple, uncoordinated
Constant
χ2
Model 1, b (SE)
Model 2, b (SE)
−0.382 (0.066)***
−0.434 (0.078)***
−0.397 (0.108)***
−0.368 (0.116)***
−0.456 (0.122)***
−0.429 (0.134)***
0.319 (0.154)**
0.098 (0.151)
0.368 (0.187)**
0.117 (0.183)
0.574 (0.082)***
−0.169 (0.144)
0.641 (0.109)***
−0.195 (0.193)
1.422 (0.137)***
0.926 (0.142)***
0.493 (0.117)***
0.111 (0.106)
1.094 (0.106)***
1.603 (0.126)***
1.055 (0.151)***
0.568 (0.140)***
0.124 (0.128)
1.237 (0.119)***
−0.002 (0.000)***
0.051 (0.016)***
0.075 (0.026)***
−0.028 (0.017)
−1.481 (0.347)***
1055.54
0.803 (0.354)**
0.244 (0.304)
−1.553 (0.514)***
414.54
Note: HLM = hierarchical linear modeling; ICVS = International Crime Victimization Survey.
a. Variable coded as follows: 0 = no confidence; 1 = a lot of confidence.
b. Variable coded as follows: 0 = female; 1 = male.
c. Reference category: Oldest.
d. Reference category: Victim, reported to the police.
e. Reference category: Asked for bribe by a police officer
f. Reference category: High fear of crime
g. Reference category: Single agency
***
p < .01.
respondents’ specific support for the police (b = 0.319). However, once a person becomes
a crime victim, the decision whether to report the crime to the police is not directly related
to the person’s opinion about the ability of the police to control crime (b = 0.098, n.s.).
This demonstrates very clearly, and quite expectedly (see, e.g., Homant et al., 1984), that
crime victimization is related to less positive views of the police ability to control crime
in the area, probably because the police were not able to prevent the victimization in the
first place.
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The respondents could have had another type of experience with the police or other government officials: They could have been asked to pay a bribe. The results reported in Model 1
indicate that, compared to the respondents who were asked to pay a bribe by a police officer, the respondents who were not asked to pay a bribe at all were more likely to evaluate
the police ability to control the crime positively (b = 0.574). Exactly what type of official
asked for a bribe does not appear to matter: Those who were asked to pay a bribe by
another, nonpolice government official did not have a significantly different opinion about
the police from the respondents who were asked to pay a bribe by the police (b =–0.168,
n.s.). Finally, the respondents who reported seeing the patrols more frequently were more
likely to express a positive evaluation of the police ability to control crime in the area (b =
1.093) than the respondents who reported seeing the patrols less frequently were.
The last group of variables in Model 1 includes neighborhood variables.3 Although the
respondents’ fear of crime is significantly related to specific support for the police, the perception of the extent of informal social control is not (b = 0.110, n.s.; Model 1, Table 4).
As expected (see, e.g., Skogan, 1990, p. 77), decrease in the extent of fear of crime substantially increases the extent of specific support (culminating with the highest coefficient,
b = 1.427 in Model 1, associated with no fear of crime). Compared to the respondents with
a high fear of crime, the respondents who had no fear of crime at all (b = 1.427), low fear
(b = 0.931), or medium fear (b = 0.496) were more likely to evaluate the police performance positively.
Model 2 adds country-specific variables, both the police-related ones (police size, percentage of women in the police, nature of the police structure, ICVS crime index) and the societywide ones (Kaufman governance index). In contrast to the case in the WVS analysis, where the
only country-specific variable that had an effect on the general support for the police was
Kaufman’s governance index (see Table 3), Kaufman governance index and several other
country-specific variables turned out to be relevant for the specific support for the police.
Regarding the Kaufman index, the results of the ICVS data are in accordance with the WVS
results. Specifically, respondents from the countries with a higher quality of governance are
more likely to yield more positive evaluations of police ability to control crime than the respondents from the countries with a lower quality of governance (b = 0.075). Several police-related
variables were also related to the respondents’ views about the police ability to control crime.
Police size was related negatively, indicating that the larger the number of sworn officers, the
less likely it was that the respondents would say that the police were doing a good job in controlling crime (b = −0.002). The percentage of women in the police—the measure of heterogeneity on the police—is related positively to the respondents’ views on the police ability to
control crime (b = 0.051). Finally, compared with the respondents from the countries with
single agencies, the respondents from countries with multiple, coordinated police agencies
expressed more positive opinions on the police ability to control crime (b = 0.802).
Summary and Discussion
My analyses of public support for the police across 28 European and North American
countries indicate that public support (both general support and specific support) is a complex
phenomenon. It is related to the respondents’ individual characteristics, their experience with
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the police, police-related variables, and country-specific variables (primarily the quality of
governance in the country). The nature of the questions asked in the two surveys differs and,
accordingly, the models exploring general and specific support are not identical. However,
there are some common themes that emerge across both models.
Respondents’ individual characteristics, namely their gender and age, are related to both
general and specific support for the police. Prior research, including studies that did and did
not include countrywide variables (Cao et al., 1996; Correia et al., 1996; Garofalo, 1977;
Hadar & Snortum 1975; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Jesilow et al., 1995; Murty et al., 1990;
Percy, 1980; Reisig & Correia, 1997; Reisig & Parks, 2000, 2002; Sampson & Bartusch,
1998; Smith & Hawkins, 1973; van Dijk et al., 1990; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002), is uniform in
suggesting that the respondents’ age is related to their views about the police. The results
of this study strongly suggest that age is an important explanatory variable even when experience with the police and country-specific variables are included in the model. Probably
because of the aging-out process and differential experience with the police, older respondents tend to hold more positive views about the police.
On the other hand, the results of prior studies on gender are not as uniform, reporting no
gender effect (e.g., Garofalo, 1977; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Jesilow et al., 1995; Murty
et al., 1990; Reisig & Parks, 2000, 2002; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Smith & Hawkins,
1973; Walker et al., 1973), weak effect (e.g., Decker, 1981; Percy, 1980), or strong effect
(e.g., Cao et al., 1996; Correia et al., 1996; Hadar & Snortum, 1975; Weitzer & Tuch,
2002). My exploration of the views on both general and specific support show a gender
effect, with women providing more positive evaluations of the police, regardless of whether
they were asked about the police in general or about a specific police characteristic (i.e., the
ability to control crime). Studies have shown that having any contact with the police (Dean,
1980; Yeo & Budd, 2000), particularly a negative one (Correia et al., 1996; Reisig & Parks,
2000), significantly erodes confidence in the police. Because men are more likely to have
any contact with the police, especially a negative one (such as being arrested), the finding
that their confidence in the police is lower matches the intuition very well.
Indeed, the use of the ICVS data enables the inclusion of several measures of contact
with the police such as experience of reporting victimization, being asked to pay a bribe,
and seeing police patrols. As expected, compared to those who were victims of crime, not
being a crime victim resulted in a more positive evaluation of the police ability to control
crime. On the other hand, going through the reporting experience after the victimization,
thus having what might be considered a positive contact with the police, did not yield more
positive attitudes toward the police than if the victim had decided not to report the crime to
the police. The nature of the data did not allow more focus on the reporting experience and
the reasons for the respondents’ dissatisfaction with the reporting experience. However,
limited prior research conducted in the United States (e.g., Poister & McDavid, 1978) suggests that satisfaction with the response time and satisfaction with the initial investigation,
as well as the initiation and the quality of the subsequent investigation and the likelihood
of an arrest, seem to be related to the victims’ views of the police. Future research could
explore the reasons for victims’ dissatisfaction with the reporting experience in a comparative arena and the degree to which the reasons for dissatisfaction converge or diverge
across countries.
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Another type of direct experience with the police includes police officers asking the citizens for a bribe. Prior research has indicated that the respondents who are more likely to perceive that the police are corrupt or engaging in other forms of misconduct (e.g., racial
profiling) are also less likely to trust the police (Dean, 1980; Benson, 1981; Smith &
Hawkins, 1973; Soon Son et al., 1996). I find that being asked to pay a bribe erodes confidence in the police to about equal extents whether the bribe was asked for by a police officer or by another government official, whereas not being asked to pay a bribe by any
government official resulted in a more positive opinion about the police. This finding provides support for the argument that confidence in the police and confidence in other parts of
the government are related. In fact, the results of my analysis of WVS data show that in
accordance with a handful of prior studies (Albrecht & Green, 1977; Cao et al., 1998; Cao
& Zhao, 2005; Stack & Cao, 1998), respondents’ extent of support for other government
institutions is closely related to the respondents’ general support for the police: Respondents
who had more confidence in the legal system, armed forces, and the parliament expressed
more confidence in the police as well. It seems that, indeed, it is impossible to evaluate one
part of the government while completely disregarding the views about other segments of the
same government. Thus, both the ICVS analyses on corrupt experience and the WVS analyses on confidence in other parts of the government strongly support the Cao and Zhao (2005)
argument that attitudes on specific segments of the government compose a set of underlying
values oriented toward the government, which they called trust in the political system.
Quality of governance is the only countrywide variable that has a strong effect on the
respondents’ general support for the police and is one of the key countrywide variables
related to their specific support for the police as well. Kaufman et al. (2007) argued that the
principles of governance are not directly measurable, and proceed to design a way of measuring governance indirectly. Their governance index consists of a series of rules-based and
outcome-based indicators of governance. In other words, the indicators measure not only
the existence and quality of legal rules but also how these laws are actually enforced. My
results show that the public has more confidence in the police in general (general support)
and in the police ability to control crime (specific support) in those countries in which there
is a greater degree to which citizens participate in the selection of government and enjoy
civil liberties, in which there is a higher quality of independent public services, in which
the government officials are more likely to obey the rules, and in which corruption is less
likely to affect both low- and high-ranking officials. These findings clearly speak to the
need to include country-level variables in the future models of public support for the police
or, for that matter, any government institution.
Focusing on the issues of specific support for the police, results also indicate that other
key factors that affect public opinion about the police ability to control crime in the area
are closely associated with the specific task (i.e., crime control) and the respondents’ personal experience. In particular, the frequency with which respondents observed police
patrols was crucial: The more frequently they saw the patrols, the more likely they were to
say that the police were able to control crime in the area. Similarly, when respondents felt
safer after dark, reported that they were less likely to avoid certain areas by night, and estimated that the chances of someone breaking into their apartment were slim, they were also
more likely to express a lot of confidence in the police ability to control crime in the area.
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Kelling and Wilson (1982) argued that the level of disorder in the community, rather than
the rates of serious crimes, is what causes high fear of crime, and a handful of prior research
(see, e.g., Skogan, 1990) indeed showed that the citizens in the communities characterized
by high level of disorder are likely to experience high fear of crime as well. Whereas I had
neither a measure of crime nor disorder in the respondents’ specific neighborhoods, I did
have a measure of the respondents’ fear of crime (which was highly related to specific support for the police) and countrywide crime rates (which turned out to be unrelated to their
views about the police ability to control crime). Several prior studies linked fear of crime and
satisfaction with the police (Cao et al., 1996; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998; Reisig & Parks,
2002) and suggested that the level of safety, fear of crime, and extent of disorder in the community may have an additional impact on the overall satisfaction with the police. Similarly,
another study reported that the feeling of safety and visibility of the police are the two key
variables affecting the views about the quality of police service in Slovenia (Pavlovic, 1998,
p. 553). The results of my study also show that both visibility of the police patrols and lower
fear of crime are positively related to the public evaluations of the police ability to control
crime. Future research could seek to incorporate measures of neighborhood-level variables
(fear of crime, crime rates, trust in the community, visibility of police patrol) and analyze the
data using three levels (individual, neighborhood, country).
Although police size and percentage of women both turned out not turn out to be relevant predictors of the general support for the police, they both are related to the respondents’ evaluations of the police ability to control crime in the area. At this point, the existing
literature does not provide a clear answer about the relation between police size/percentage
of women in the police and public confidence in the police. Aromaa, Leppa, Nevala, and
Ollus (2003) examined correlates of police size (policing rates) and concluded that policing rates tended to be higher in the countries in transition than they were in established
democracies. They argued as follows:
One explanation for differences in policing levels will be country differences in the functions
that police officers are expected to perform. But other factors may also play a part. The level
of development is one fairly commonly used correlate. With the current selection of countries,
there was a weak negative relationship between policing rates and the United Nations 1998
HDI (r = −0.27, p < .10; n = 42). In other words, countries that scored lower on the HDI tended
to have rather more police officers per capita. This relationship goes in the opposite direction
to that found by Newman and Howard (1999b) on a broader range of countries.
The absence of clear identification of the nature and the strength of the relation between
the police size and heterogeneity of the police, and public attitudes toward the police presents an opportunity for future research.
In summary, this study explores both general and specific support for the police in a comparative arena and suggests that future research should go beyond individual and neighborhood characteristics and should incorporate police-related and society-wide characteristics
as well. The respondents’ views of the police, both general confidence and specific ability to
control crime, are affected by who the respondents are (gender, age) and by the quality of
governance in the country in which they live. Their general views of the police also are
related very strongly to what they think about other parts of the government—namely, the
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armed forces, parliament, and the legal system. Their evaluations of the police ability to control crime are strongly colored by their individual experiences and contacts with the police
(crime victimization, fear of crime, being asked to pay a bribe, frequency of seeing police
patrols). In addition, police-related characteristics (police size, percentage of women as a
measure of heterogeneity of the police, police structure) are related to their opinions as well.
Notes
1. The only exception is the United Kingdom. Although it is included in both surveys, the questions about
confidence in the police were not asked of the UK respondents in the World Values Survey (WVS).
2. Although Georgia provided the data for both the seventh and the ninth survey, the figures differ substantially. The number of police officers per 100,000 citizens reported on the seventh survey for 1998 is 225.16,
whereas it was 966 on the ninth survey for 2003-2004 (United Nations, 2008). I use the data for 1998, the year
much closer to the time when the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) and the WVS were conducted. At the same time, this rate is very similar to the rate I calculated based on the data provided in the
Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement (Sullivan & Haberfeld, 2005, p. 235).
3. However, because of the nature of the ICVS, these variables are not measured at the neighborhood level
but at the individual-respondent level.
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Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic′, PhD, SJD, is an associate professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State
University. Trained both in criminology (PhD in criminology, University of Delaware) and criminal
law (SJD, Harvard Law School), her research interests are policing, courts, and comparative/international criminology and criminal justice. Her coedited book Contours of Police Integrity (with Carl B. Klockars and Maria
R. Haberfeld, 2004, Sage) received honorable mention by the 2005 American Society of Criminology
International Division Book Award Committee. To date, her other books on the subject of police corruption and
police integrity are Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption (2005, Oxford University Press) and
Enhancing Police Integrity (with Carl B. Klockars and Maria R. Haberfeld, 2006, Springer). Her research has
appeared in journals such as Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Law and Society Review, Law and
Social Inquiry, Law and Policy, Stanford Journal of International Law, Cornell International Law Journal,
International Criminal Justice Review, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice,
Policing and Society, and Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management.
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