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Volume 2, Issue 12, December 2014
Inferential approach: A proposedresearch
methodology for ad hoc investigation in
marketing
Rafael Lucian, PhD
Mestrado Profissional em Gestão Empresarial / Faculdade Boa Viagem / DeVry
ABSTRACT
The production of knowledge is of interest from academia, fostered by society and desired by the market, however, the
inferential knowledge by itself, although it can be taken as logically true, is not sufficient to achieve the scientific rigor of
propositional knowledge, or does not seem to be, since no method criteria findings are taken as beliefs (or proposition is not
justified). Thus, this theoretical essay focuses on the theme of knowledge contribution of research undergoing inferential
method to obtain academic recognition (DUTRA, 2010), and in addition, proposes a new research method based on inferential
knowledge that has its application aimed at studies in media, specifically in the area of advertising and propaganda. This
method has the intention to capture the particularities of the research on advertising that accurately possess own operating
style. If neither the rigors of the exact sciences as little to anarchism should operationalize research, however every particular
process must be understood and confronted with the foundations of the scientific method to propose something new, useful and
valid.
1.INTRODUCTION
Knowledge is treated as necessities by philosophers of knowledge and its followers and there is a large concentration of
studies dedicated to epistemological and methodological discussions, both have their value and are considered essential
in academia as the basis for guiding knowledge that can be developed and validated. In practice what we see is that to
some degree the scientific rigor judges construction of propositional knowledge, but this is not the only accepted form
of knowledge, there are inferences. The inferential knowledge by itself, although it can be taken as logically true, is not
sufficient to achieve the scientific rigor of propositional knowledge, or appears to be, since its conclusions without
methodological criteria are taken only as a belief (or unjustified proposition).
Thus, this theoretical essay focuses on the theme of the contribution of knowledge and inferential research proposes a
new research method based on inferential knowledge that has its application for studies in media, specifically in the
area of advertising and propaganda. Thus, we consider the possibility of constructing knowledge through inferential
toolbox and wonders about its role in the construction of scientific knowledge. The scientific method is important in the
process of knowledge construction to be responsible for guiding the steps that the researcher must follow when
conducting their investigations, without this leading to the immobilization of the research, instead allowing the
researcher to concentrate efforts in their analysis and not in the development of mid-toolbox. In the construction of this
paper it presents the first definitions and ramifications of the theory of knowledge and truth definitions and inferential
knowledge, the following discusses the theory of justification and its main rationalist strands and empiricists so that
finally the proposed method is presented. This method has the intention to capture the particularities of the research on
advertising that accurately possess its own operating style. The proximity or degree inseparability between subject and
object, theory and practice is one of the possible impressions about the researchers in this area of interest. Another
peculiar characteristic of this area are analyses based on the internalization of the phenomenon, the juxtaposition
between the modern objective and subjective division and the inevitable presence of strong beliefs and worldview on the
subjective conclusions. Leaving, then these features is proposed a protocol that addresses the methodological
peculiarities academic to research and advertising and to be able to produce valid knowledge from the researcher's
inferences.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
All theoretical debate lacks foundation so that it can develop. For this test the reviewed revised literature will visit the
necessary conceptualizations for theory of knowledge, inferential knowledge construction and the truth. After this is the
presented positioning of the author and discussions.
2.1 Theory of knowledge
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Theory of knowledge (TC) is the meaning commonly attributed to epistemology and is defined as the branch of
philosophy interested in the investigation of the nature, sources and validity of knowledge. Among the main issues that
the TC tries to answer are, according to Grayling (1996), which is known, as is achieved and how to build the means to
defend it against the skeptical challenge. To Dutra (2010), theories of research must be addressed in the theory of
knowledge. However, if in fact to investigate is not by its own epistemologists, there remains a valuable clue towards
what these people do: they are concerned with propositional knowledge, i.e., people create declarative sentences that
are meant to describe the state of things. So with this done, epistemology is not concerned with how they created the
declarative sentences, but worries about its justification, explaining propositional knowledge. Regardless of its source,
and this is an arrangement extremely important given the inability to define the origin of ideas, a belief must be
justified to become knowledge. Means to justify the opinions and statements of support not only convincing but immune
to reasonable criticism, because for Oliva (2011), knowledge is derived from belief that should be justified under certain
logic and reside in three types of learning:
 For aptitude. It is when knowledge is used in the sense of knowing how to do (know-how). This knowledge enables
the realization of something competent dispensing justification to be acquired (or innate);
 For contact. It is derived from direct contact. In this case, Russell (2005) believes to be the greater certainty of the
subject to build beliefs or propositions;
 Propositional. It is knowledge by description and about on which is applied the definition of knowledge as justified
true belief. It is knowing what conditions are necessary and sufficient to determine the phenomenon.
A crucial concept to discuss propositional knowledge is the concept of truth and its production. This knowledge is
capable of producing truths, however, for this to occur several conceptual criteria must be respected. For completeness
and because it is a term of wide colloquial use it is important to present your academic definition. This is the subject of
the next topic.
2.2 Definition of Truth
Truth and falsehood are two other concepts most used in any scientific study, but whose definitions are certainly, with
rare phenomenoms, by the assumption that concepts are already known to all (in fact not always). The true objective or
subjective obeys rules, as observed in Dutra (2010), which make it true or false. Russell (2005) raises three points
necessary for the understanding of the truth:
• The theory of truth must be such as to admit its opposite, falsehood;
• Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements;
• The truth or falsehood of a belief always depends on something outside the belief itself, i.e., they are properties
dependent upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any internal quality of the beliefs.
In truth, Russell (2005), consists of a form of correspondence between belief and fact, therefore, in a way, both external
and also the reality; however, also consistent with the facts, is firm in relation between them. It is known that reality
and truth are different things and what makes correspondences is the concept of coherence. From this angle, it is that in
many scientific questions are often two or more hypotheses that explain all the known facts on some subject, and
although in such cases scientists endeavor to find facts which will rule out all the hypotheses except one, there is no
reason to always be successful (RUSSELL, 2005). In philosophy it seems uncommon for two rival hypotheses to be
both able to explain all the facts. Thus, there will never be a guarantee that you know the world as it really is, one can
only say that the truth is compatible with what is perceived and it is based on a method. The truth, then, is a belief
justified and what is called belief or judgment is nothing unless and relation of believing or judging, which relates a
mind to several things other than itself. An act of belief or judgment is the occurrence between certain terms at a
particular time of the relation of believing or judging. In every act of judgment there is a mind that judges and the
terms upon which it judges (RUSSELL, 2005). For clarity, it is assumed that the objects of belief are two terms and a
relationship where such terms are arranged in a certain order for the sense of believing. Thus, if the two terms in order
are united by respect, the belief is true, if not, it is false. The beliefs are the result of these minds and depend for their
existence (with no connection to reality or knowledge), but do not depend on the beliefs of the mind to be true (it
depends exclusively on external factors, the perception of reality and their relationships, as pure rationalism is not
enough). As you can see, the mind does not create truth or falsity: it creates beliefs; but once these are created, the mind
cannot make them true or false, except in the special case where they concern future things which are within the power
of the person believing. What makes a belief true is a fact and this fact does not involve in any way (except in
exceptional cases), the mind of the person who has the belief (Russell, 2005). Thus if kept the intuitive notion of truth
as a kind of agreement between belief and an external instance (facts), then you can have true opinions of whose truth
we do not know, as is the case where a person has an original true belief but because it was not justified must still
assume the doubt (Dutra, 2010). Contrary to primary data, everything that builds beliefs are not truths. About all those
that can be affirmed, all of those are false. Already on the truths that were built on data without rigorous methods, it is
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not fair that they are given as false, but cannot have them as nothing more than beliefs, it should not be confused with
inference method.Thus, reflecting on this issue is that the present theoretical justification for the next topic introduces
the concept of inferential knowledge.
2.3 Inferential Knowledge
There are, for Oliva (2011), two ways to arrive at a knowledge: through logical constructions or through inference. In
comparison, the inference is a simpler process knowledge, since the use of logic requires some intellectual effort, while
the inference is knowledge of something only by the sense and the judgment (conscious or not). When considering an
inference from a psychological point of view, what is at issue is the content of the propositions involved, their
meanings, and not the logical form of the argument that results in putting such propositions regarding which is the
concern of logic. To infer an object from another is then assumed that certain information or data testify to the
existence of the inferred object (Dutra, 2010). Making an inference is to assume the existence of an object from little
information. How inferences can be wrong, we seek a subjective and personal criterion to accept certain inferential
knowledge or simply replace it with another, using the argument to be a better explanation. The error of inference is
common. In fact, by the intervention of the senses comes the analyses mistakes that lead to knowledge which does not
correspond to reality. For this reason, Russell (1994, p.149) states that "where possible, logical constructions are to be
put in place for inferred entities." The strategy of building logic objects, when it is possible, it is advantageous to
represent an evasive output to the problem of distinguishing fiction from reality. But not always as logical constructions
are possible, sometimes there is no way of increasing knowledge except through inferences. In this case, the problem of
the criterion to separate fact from fiction remains and epistemology must also deal with it. The inferential knowledge is
the basis of the types of knowledge on fitness and by contact (Oliva, 2011). As previously stated, these are not academic
knowledge because they cannot be transferred, eliminating the option of spreading via publications or classes. This is
perhaps the reason for the lack of belief in the academia in this non-scientific knowledge.The inferential knowledge can
then be seen as unjustified belief (since beliefs do not need to have their known sources). However, for the belief to
become knowledge, it must go through a process of justification, and that is the subject of the next topic.
2.4 Theory of justification
Epistemology involves logic. Above any epistemological position is the fact that justification must obey logical criteria,
not inferential; so to have an empirical or rational solution the observation of the rules is needed. To conclude that a
subject believes that a proposition is true there are some logical steps that can be followed. There is also indirect
justification, according Getter (1963) when there is an initial proposition that is not justified by another proposition that
there is no empirical evidence (experience) of the former. The flaw here is that if the proposition used to justify it are
wrong the first proposition also loses validity, such a fact would require the researcher was always in search of seminal
truths, and unfortunately this path will never have an end, since the more basic original truths such as the origin of the
universe can never be observed by the senses. Thus, there is no guarantee of finding the truth from epistemic logic.
Also to Russell (2005), the truth is not necessarily knowledge, therefore it is clear that it can be deduced from a false
belief, even if the subject has faith. Another error is the logical fallacy where no knowledge is generated, because even
if the premises are true, the fault in the logic, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. So, for there to be
knowledge, assumptions must be true and the logic must be correct. Given this limitation pointed out by Gettier (1963),
there was a need to reformulate the theory of justification and from there it is assumed that for a proposition to be true,
just that the logic is correct, ignoring the origin of the premises because there is no way to be sure that these are correct,
even if verified by scientific methods. The fact of ignoring the premises was not an arbitrary solution. Russell (2005)
demonstrated that this weakness comes from the fact that the whole premise is a belief developed from rational thought
or through the senses, stuck in an experience associable with uncertain operations. Thus, in principle it is assumed that
the rational construction is imperfect and always there will remain doubts about its veracity because of the very
argument of Gettier (1963). Already the experiential construction, alternative to the reason, is also considered
inaccurate due to known limitations of the senses that can easily take unreal events as real ones. Thus, Russel (2005)
assumes the inability to give by variety the basic premises of any logical construction and calls these beliefs uncertain
as probable opinions, which are obviously of marked inferential. But when individual views are likely to be mutually
coherent, they become more likely than each would be individually. This is how many hypotheses acquire some
credibility. They are organized in a coherent system of probable opinions and thus become more likely than they would
be alone (Russell, 2005). Although it is automatic to think of experiences when speaking of justification, that position
has been questioned especially by Descartes (2006), for whom knowledge was a rational exercise, exclusive of the
intellect and not the sensory organs. Rationalism is to make certain assumptions as true knowledge and, from them,
proving theorems, i.e., truths derived using a safe procedure or preserver of truth. In the modern view, rationalism
began with Descartes emphasizing rigorous rational thought, he and others wanted to apply the rationalist philosophy
(Dutra, 2010), in which the statements are made by means of the axiomatic method and depend on the prior acceptance
of the primitive notions. Rationalism is thus explicitly, the project of finding these first truths, and from them, through
a rigorous deductive axiomatic method or derive other truths, basing it completely human knowledge. Descartes (2006)
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overlooked the external and sought solution to everything inside, in what is now called reason, but to him it was the
soul. The reason is not only a source of fundamental truths, but also something endowed with faculties or capacities,
ultimately sense. The reform of knowing that both rationalist and empiricist (later) undertook, was, according to Dutra
(2010), the opposition to the metaphysics of modern science and reasoning. It was understood that it was successful in
the sciences that the human intellect showed full capacity. Empiricism was a very important philosophical British
school consolidating a new way of thinking about the world. The most prominent author of this course, that really has
profoundly marked the history of modern epistemology, was David Hume, an empiricist who launched the biggest
challenge to epistemology: being a venture aimed at the grounds of empirical knowledge in general, including the one
that was in natural sciences. A major focus of the empirical epistemological thinking is critical to the doctrine of the
innate ideas of Descartes, in particular, to the metaphysical ideas, such as substance and essence, even the idea of God.
The overall goal of the empiricists was to show that all ideas originate in experience and that the understanding has
means by which one can combine them. For empiricists, ideas arise from sensation, i.e., the external sense which lets
you interact with the world. The great innovation of the empiricist school was reversing the flow of rational ideas
making them flow from outside to inside. Hume (2003) challenged the ability of understanding the world and his
argument allows the mechanisms of empirical research to be used in the justification of propositions. The data collected
in the field are empirical fragments that can be internalized, feeding, for example, the association of ideas proposed by
Hume (2003). Thus, noted the importance of epistemological experience, the rational basis and the criteria of
justification and determination of the truth, the next section discusses the role of inferential knowledge in synthetic and
analytical perspectives.
3. DISCUSSION
It has long been discussed which rigors are necessary to postulate a fact or not, it is sometimes possible that any
justification effort is simply overlooked and facts are solemnly replaced by factoids, unintentionally or not. However,
this is already beyond our intervening ability that has the senses as well as the main contributor of the suspect (in)
success of inferences. The great contribution of the empiricist school was to reverse the flow of ideas, which for these
rationalists should come from the inside out, and empiricists, in the first instance, from outside to inside. However, to
not lose the whole argument of Descartes (2006) and the rationalist school, some of their considerations as how to
combine ideas and ubiquitous axiomatic method (source Euclidean) are still valid and widely used. It is true that
thinking in a free science of experience is not worthy of attention in the current scenario. Even if we consider
experiences the same way as Descartes (2006). What the empirical school did was not only propose which experiences
actually contribute (much) to the formation of our ideas, they, in fact, investigated a little deeper, and even discuss how
they are organized, grouped, as the reasoning part of the process and how it is possible to have rational ideas (not pure).
The knowledge is then built even from surveys with low or no methodological rigor, inferences which may exist with
excellent ability to produce insights, but if there is no scientific method that supports the study there is a good chance of
not being accepted for publication in renowned scientific journals. Undoubtedly an author relevant in his area is free to
post beliefs as if they were truths and they become as such for all practical purposes, because propositional knowledge
is built on the ability of justification of beliefs, each successful justification takes the true name (without observing the
rigors of classical logical postulation of truth). The truth can be justified by two methods, the analytical and synthetic.
There is a crack between the fundamental truths which are analytic (founded in meaning regardless of the facts) and
synthetic (based on facts) (Quines, 1951). Although one could argue that reducing any analytical argument will end up
in a synthetic premise, there is still a more classical separation, basically synthetic for experiences and analytical for
meanings that emerged from these experiences, but through logical deductions. To say that the flame burns after you
put your hand on the fire is a true synthetic, but nothing can be said about something as hot as the fire even that which
is not a flame can also burn, even without imagining what this object may be, is a rationalization with more analytical
power than synthetic. And this kind of analytic truth is what dominates in several academic researches. But not in a
purely analytic way, since logic always observes the rigors of justification theory. By the need for the researcher to
exemplify, it is normal to postulate any analytic truth if use examples necessarily referring to experiences, and
sometimes just that is used to justify the belief. To say that the data collection should not succeed conclusion is
unnecessary, but what is interesting is that this primary fact had no analytic function! It was used only to illustrate
something that was already assumed by the author as true. In most jobs, in fact, it is completely unnecessary and
appears as a mere illustration. But it is quite plausible that the argument has been constructed from the author's
experience with the object and that for some reason or another this fact is omitted in the verbatim record and what was
true synthetic becomes analytic. The omission is not careless or an attempt to show more intellectual than it is, it seems
more like a new style of justification of beliefs. There are researchers who are in contact with their objects of study in
the day-to-day and do not get to at least separate an observation of scientific unpretentious records from memory, in the
end, overexposure to various media is already enough material for analysis. Hypocrisy would reserve a scientific
method of observation for an object that had contact several times previously. It is reinforced that it is not, then, an
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analytic truth. It is synthetic, or would be, since there was no rigorous method. We cannot even call this method set of
daily experiences without any scientific rigor. So in fact there is a formation of ideas from experiences and to justify
this idea rests on a theoretical basis, but it comes to academic acceptance as analytical. Thus, a false analysis. You can
then suggest the name of a false analytic because its genesis is actually synthetic. And there is no scientific rigor. Such
is the case with most research that even without rigorous data extraction convinced that their primary truths require no
further explanation, even if it sometimes resembles more the epiphanies than that of the scientific studies.
3.1 Proposition of false analytical research
Although it is believed that such a proposal is to be innovative, it is not intended to be disruption. What is proposed
here is an appropriate methodology that brings the epistemology effect the result of a way to produce knowledge that
has always been within the paradigm notwithstanding the margin methodologies. As to whether the false analytical
research is descriptive, in the end, it intends to identify and present aspects, dimensions, variables, and relational
propositions. It does not conform in some degree to the explanatory rigors to be classified as such and from genesis has
no exploratory intention. Its most striking feature is the relative phase of data collection, this phase is internalized
occurring in part or in whole from memories and experiences of the researcher. If the absence of free collected data is a
contention of weakness in scientific research, it is on this point that the false analytical research should pay more
attention. After determining the research question, the researcher will initiate the method where there will not
necessarily be a collection of data in the field or literature, which does not mean that there is no data collection. In fact,
the process should be done using up the memory in an organized manner so that the reader is able to judge whether the
analysis is credit worthy or not. The first step then is the presentation of inferences, the researcher must present the
inferences judged to be truths and present them assertively. The aim is to clarify to readers what truths are being
discussed in the research, regardless of the origin of inferences, it is important that they are presented individually so
that they facilitate understanding of what is to come. Following this presentation of inferences, the researcher must
justify the reason freely of his belief. It is this free writing by the fact that each situation will require a different
recurrence, examples may be helpful if needed, however research also admits false analytical rational explanations or
theoretical associations where the researcher can demonstrate the reason for his belief in the inferential truth. In this
step it is implied that the researcher cannot avail themselves of valid justification research that is not complete, but the
validity is still standard. The next step, the third, is where the researcher will seek in his memoirs reasons that explain
the motive by which he believes in his own justification for the inference. It is expected here the reports of past
experiences by which the researcher believes has been influenced. All information is valid at this point, any trait that is
part of the experience of the researcher, since his values, people he knew, places he lived, beliefs, academic background
and any other factor considered important. There will always be more sources of influence with readiness to write them,
so the researcher must make an intellectual effort to present their best explanations to which they do understand.
Table 1: Stages of false analytical research.
The research includes false analytical logical-rational justifications by individual perception, so there is no need to
provide external reasons, i.e., there is no way to separate the object from the mental representation that the researcher
will make of it. It is knownthat this can be an epistemological or methodological problem, but the reason the research
exists is not necessarily the present findings, it is possible that the inferences are of such intellectual capacity to awaken
insights for further testing at the academia, and then accepted as inferences if they are declared. Another reason for
using a false analytic research is the possibility that the reader must know beyond assertions and also must know their
reasons, and especially the personal influences that led this researcher to publish them. Thus, when the reasons or
influences are not worthy of credibility the reader will be able to stand firm. It is therefore a fair way to balance the
inferential knowledge of low and high relevance.
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References
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