RPAS Access to
Controlled Airspace
Project CLAIRE
01.00.00
1
Contents
Project CLAIRE Overview
ATM safety assurance of exercises: ATC
Procedures
Simulation exercises
Live flights planning
Challenge of un-segregated integration
Temporary Danger Areas
Air Navigation Order Exemption
Findings: ATM Safety Impact
Findings: ATM Capacity Impact
Recommendations
Conclusions
01.00.00
2
Project Overview
CLAIRE: Civil Airspace Integration of
RPAS in Europe
Objective: fly RPAS in controlled and
non-segregated airspace. Comparable
treatment with manned aviation
Vehicle: Watchkeeper WK450
› Mass: 450 Kg
› Wingspan: 10 m
› Endurance: 20 hours
Incremental demonstrations:
› ATC & RPAS expert assessments
› Fast-time simulations
› Real-time simulations
– Airport
– Airspace
› Live flights
01.00.00
3
ATM safety assurance of
exercises: ATC Procedures
Standard ATC procedures supplemented
with Temporary Operating Instructions
Developed during workshops
Information provided:
› Air vehicle performance
› Not compliance with rules of the air
› Contingency behaviour
› Comms back-up by telephone
› Air vehicle contingency behaviour
› Lost Link Routes & Emergency Recovery
Locations update as flight progresses
› Requirement to remain in controlled or
segregated airspace
Tested in simulators
Approved after ATC Procedures Safety
Analysis
01.00.00
4
Simulation exercises
› Airport & TMA – NLR
› En-route – NATS
Inform ATC Procedures
Normal operations
Emergency and contingency
› Loss of link with RPAS
› RPAS Comms failure
› RPAS SSR transponder
failure
› RPAS engine problems
› RPAS control problems
› Weather/Traffic related
issues
01.00.00
5
Live flights planning
Test facility in West Wales run by NATS
› Military Test Area
› Routine integration of RPAS and manned
aircraft
Small incremental steps to safely push
the boundary of RPAS operations
› Access into non-segregated airspace
› Impact of workload on ATC
› Assess the procedures and processes
3 flight scenarios:
1. En-route: Range Control to London ATC
2. Approach: As above plus Cardiff
Approach
3. Aerodrome: As above plus Cardiff Tower
01.00.00
6
Challenge of
un-segregated
airspace integration
To provide safety assurance
To bridge lack of equivalency between RPAS and
manned aviation
› Temporary Danger Areas to mitigate lack of Detect
and Avoid function
› Exemption to Air Navigation Order due to
navigation equipage
01.00.00
7
Temporary Danger Areas
CAA requirement due to no Detect &
Avoid capability
Provision of deconfliction service in
uncontrolled airspace
Link between bottom of the airway and
existing Danger Areas
Allows flight trials in non-sterilised
environment
Engine failure resulting in the platform
descent into uncontrolled airspace
Published in AIC (Y011/2015)
01.00.00
8
Air Navigation Order
Exemption
Exemption to Air Navigation Order,
Schedule 5 “Radio Communication and
Radio Navigation Equipment to be
carried in Aircraft”
Air Traffic Service Units in NATS
assessed the vertical and horizontal
navigation capability
The air vehicle’s performance is
acceptable for the intended flights
01.00.00
9
Findings:
ATM Safety Impact
Premise: safety shall not be
compromised nor impacted in any way
Temporary Danger Areas
Slow speeds description in the Temporary
Operating Instructions
› Misjudgement of RPAS performance
– Mitigated by ATC briefing
› More time to react
› Increased workload
› Vehicle spends more time in sectors
01.00.00
10
Findings:
ATM Capacity Impact
Additional traffic movements
Increase in complexity and controller
workload
› Differential performance characteristics
and mission types
› Sector occupancy increments
› Non-conventional flight patterns
01.00.00
11
Recommendations
RPAS pilots entering CAS should be familiar
with R/T phraseology
› Avoid R/T channel overload
› European-wide license
Unusual Climb and Descent performance
› Stepped climbs recommended
› Clearance to level above current airspace
base
GCS-GCS transfers:
› Transparent to ATC
› Away from ATC sector boundaries
20 minutes comms check
Check filtering rules of radar speed gates
Additional safety layer in comms loss
› Ground lines
› Increased complexity for ATC
01.00.00
12
Conclusions
› Temporary Danger Areas and exemptions
to Air Navigation Order are not
acceptable for routine operations
› No issues identified indicating an impact
on safety
› Capacity issues should be further
assessed
› Standard process to validate lost link
routes
› Further work required to assess
Emergency Recovery Locations and Lost
Link Routes sharing with ATC and
commonality amongst them
01.00.00
13
Many thanks
01.00.00
14