S t u d e n t
H a n d o u t
1 4 A
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Decision A: Whether to Build an Atomic Bomb
In August 1939. Albert Einstein, a brilliant and wellknown physicist, sent President Franklin D. Roosevelt a
letter. In it, Einstein explained recent scien~ificdevelop
men& that might mean an atomic bvmb could be created
He went on to urge Roosevelt to investigate that possibility. He also suggested that Germany might already !E
building an atomic bomb. The following is an excerpt
from Einstein's leller:
"In the course of the last four months ir has heerr
ma& probable-fhmugh the work of Jolier irl
France ns well as Fermi and Szilnrd in Americathat if may be possible to set up a nuclear chain
reuulion in a large mass of rrrunium [one of the
min~rnlsessential to the ronstruction of nn nton~ic
bomb], by which v a r t amaunts of power #ld large
gumtities of new mdium-like elements would hc
generated. .Vow if appears n l m s t certain that this
could be achieved in the immediate furure.
"This new phtvwnenon would al.rcl lead to
the construction of bombs, and ir is conceivablethough rnuc*/tless certain-thnt ~rtremelypowc f i t
bombs of n new r y l w may thus be constructed. A
single bomb of this type, carried by bout and
exploded in u purr, rnighr v c v weld destroy ihe
whole pori rogerher wirh some offhe surmurrding
territory. However; such bombs might very well
pmve ro be roo heavv fur trnsporiation by ail:
" I understand that Germany hnr nctunlly
stopped t h sale
~ of uranium from the Czechoslovuticln mines which she has taken over; Thm she
should have taken such early action might perhaps
be undPrstood un the ground rho1 the son of the
G e m n Under-Secretav of Srute, von Weizsiicker.
is atrachrd to the Kaiser- Wilhelm-lnszihc~in Berlin
where some of fhc American work on uranium is
now heing repenred."
O Teachers' Curriculum Instilute
When Einstein wrote ~s letter to Roosevelt, the
United States had not yet entered into war with Germany.
However. the president took immediate interest in the
scientific deveiopments Einstein described. The bomb
would not only be the mosl powerful weapon an earth,
i t would transform warfare by making it possible to kill
more people with much less effort.
In thc 1 8 months after Einscein sent his Icttcr. the
Roosevelt administration debated what action to take to
counter the German threat. Some officials wondered
how serious thc threat really was. In addition, not all
scientists agreed with Einstein, and some wondered
whether the bomb could be developed so quickly.
Critical Thlnking Question A
You are an advisor to President Roosevelt. Which of
thc following do you advise the president to do? Be
prepared to defend your answer.
a. Ignore scientific developments and do not build an
atomic bomb; concentrate U.S. efforts on building
conventional weapons, such as faster planes and
more powerful m k s .
b. Vigornudy pursue the consmction of an atomic
bomb because the United States is in a race against
G e m n y.
c. Postpone the development of an atomic bomb and
send spies into Germany lo determine the accuracy
of Einstein's letter.
d . Do not develop an atomic bomb. Instead, monitor
the consmction of new German weapons facilities
and then send American bombers to destroy hem.
e.
Denounce the developmer~rof an atomic bomb as
k i n g immoral. Only evil could come from the
development of such a destructive weapon.
Assessing the Decision to Build and Use the Atomic Bomb
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S t u d e n t
H a n d o u t
1 4 A
Decision B: Whether to Drop an Atomic Bomb
Vice President Harry S. Truman took over the presidency after Roosevelt unexpectedly died in Apnl t 945.
Three months later, while he was attending the Allied
conference in Potsdarn, Germany, Truman received a
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telegram stating that testing of the atomic bomb had
been successful. By this time in the war, the Allies had
utterly defeated Germany. However, Japan had vowed to
fight on, despite the Ailies' demand at Potsdm of an
unconditional surrender.
The Japanese felt that an unconditional surrender
would jeopardize the position of their emperor, whom
they considered divine. In addition, they viewed surrender as dishonorable. They therefore fought with intense
resistance. Believing it was more honorable to commit
suicide lhan to surrender to enemy forces, Japanese
kamikaze pilots strapped thrmselves into planes loaded
with cxp1osives and crashed them into American naval
vessels. They managed to destroy 34 ships and damage
hundreds of ochers.
Dcspite these desperate attacks, by July 1945 the
Japanese were nearly defeated.Three factors worked
against them. Firsr, Allied bombing runs over Japan
had lulled tens of thousands of civilians and military
personnel. Second, an Abed naval blockade made it
impossible for Japan to import the g o d s necessary ro
continue fighting. It also prevented more than 1 million
Japanese troops stationed in China from returning to
their hornelaod. Third, [he massive Soviet Red Army
was poised to enter the war and assist the United States
The United States had hoped to end h e Pacific
War by invading Japan. However, given the determination of the Japanese, President Truman worried that such
an invasion would cost
of American lives.
. thousands
.
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Activity 14
In light of this fear, some of his advisors r e c m e n d e d
ending the war quickly by dropping an atomic bomb
withaut warning on a large Japanese city.
The undersecretary of the Navy, Rdph Bard, disagreed. He told Truman that dropping the bomb without
a specific warning would jeopardize "the position of the
United States as a great humanitarian nation." A group
of Manhattan Project scientists suggested an alternate
plan-that the United States drop Ihc bomb in a remote,
unpopulated location to show the bomb's power and
convincc Japan to surrender.
Ctitical Thlnking Question B
You are a close advisor to President Truman. Which of
the following do you advise the p ~ s i d e n to
t do? Be
prtparrd to defend your answa.
a.
wming* *p'
an
Japanese c i ~ yas soon as possible.
On
a
b. Drop rn atomic bomb on an unpopulated a r m to
demonstrate its destructive capabilides.
c. Warn the Japanese hat the United States possesses
atomic weapons and is willing to use them if the
Japanese don't surrender by a specified time. If they
don't surrender, then drop an atomic bomb.
d. Reject the use of atomic weapons and continue the
naval blockade and conventional bombing. If the
measures do not produce a Japanese surrender, then
invade Jauan.
e. Reject the use of atomic weapons and negotiate an
end to World War 11, allowing the Japanese to surrender and their emperor to k o r n e part of the postwar government.
8 Teachen' Curriculum Institute
plane. Why not give a demonstration to show its p e r ? Your advisers
tell you that if the showdetonation is a dud, the japanfie resistance
will harden.
Modem history has presented this pair of options- the Big Invasion
versus the Bomb -as Truman's choice."It was a choice Truman inherited w i h the Oval Office. President Roosevelt had responded to Albert
Einstein's 1939 warning-a warning Eiastein later regretted-of he
patentid d m atomic bomb by ordering resarch hat became the d m
hattan Project in 1942. Known to only a handful of men, Truman not
among them, the projtxt was a $2 billion (in pre-inflation 1
W
sdollars)
effort to construct an atomic weapon. Working at Los Alamos, New
.
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,.. ,
~~jhe~ni$d~tatastwetodr~~~n~:b~mb~on
H i M i a and Nagasah?
0ka4, Mr. President Here> the situation. You're about to invade
]ap& main islands. Your best generals say hitting thse beaches will
mean halfa million American casualties. Other estimates go as high as
a million. General MacArthur tells you that the Japanesewill continue
guerrilla-style r~isiancefor ten yean. Bared on horrific battle erperience- from Guadalcanal to Okinawa-you believe the J;ipanese will
fight to the death. They have 6 million battlehardened bmps who
have shown complete willingness to fight to the death for their home
land-a samurai tradition of complete devotion to the divine emperor
that is incomprehensible to Americans. Japenew civilians have jumpcd
off cli6 to prevent capturr by Americans, and here are reports that
mainland Japanese civilians are being armed with sharpened barnboo spears. But you also remember Pearl Harbor and the Rataan
~ i a t hMarch and other wartime atrocities committed by Japanese.
Vengeance, in the midst of a cruel war, is not incomprehensible.
N& you have P bomb with ihc dcstruc:ive paver of 20,000 tons of
TNT. It worked in a test, but it may not work when you drop it out of a
~ i i c u.under
,
the direction of 1. R Q ~ R
Oppenheimcr (190447),
atomic scientists, many ofthem refugees'from Hitlcr's Europe, thought
they were racing against Germans developing a "Nazi bomb." That
ei301-twas later p r o d to be far short of success. The first atomic bomb
was exploded at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16,194 5. Truman
wu alerted to the success of the test at a meeting with Churchdl and
Stalin at Potsdarn, a city in defeatd Germany.
Before the test detonation, there were already deep misgivings
among both the scientific and military cornmuniti~about the morality
of the bomb's destructive power. Many of its creators did not want it to
k used, and lobbied to share itp xcreb with the rest of h e wodd to prevent its use. Truman ignored that advice. With Churchill and China's
Chiang Kai-shek; he issued the Potsdam Declaration, warning Japanto
accept a complete and uriconditional surrender or risk *prompt and
utter destruction." Although specific mention of-thebrnb's nature was
considered, this vague warning was the only one isaued.
When the Japanesefirst failed to respond 'to, and then rejected,
his ultimatum, Truman ordered the fateful go-ahead. It was a selfprpekuating order that tmk on a life of its own. After Hiroshima,
nobody said, "Don't drop another one," m the inen proceeded under
the orders they had been given.
Airnod since the day the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima,
critics have secorid-guessed Truman's decision and motives. A generation of historians has defended or repudiated the need for unleashing
the atomic weapon. The historical'iustification was that a full-scale
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Boom to Bust to Big Boom
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invasion of Japan would have mt frightiul numben of American and
Japanese lives.
Many critics ha.w dismissed those &mates as implausibly high,
and say that the Japanesewere already nearing their decision to submit
when the bombs were dropped. A study made after the war by a U.S.
government survey team reached that very conclusion. But coming as
it did a year after the war was wer, that judgment didn't help Trumn
make his decision.
Other historians who support the Hiroshima drop dispute that criticism. Instead, they pint to the fact hat some of the shngest militarists
in Japan were planning a coup to topple a pmurrcnder government
Even after the Japanese surrender, Japanese oficen were planning
kamikaze strikes at the battleship on which the surrender documents
would be signed. The view that accepts "atomic necessitf offers as evidence the actual Pacific fighting as it moved closer to lapan. And it is a
corivincing exhibit. Gch successive island that the Americans invaded
was defended fanatically, at immense cost on both sides. T h e Japanese
military d e , centuries old and steeped in the samurai tradition,
showed no tolerance for surrender. tndeed, even in Hiroshima itself,
thek was anger that the emperor had capitulated.
But were ihe bomb and an invasion the only options? Or w a there
another reality? A top-secret study made during the period and revealed
in the late 1980s says there was, and destroys much of the accepted jus
tification for the Hiroshima bombing. According to these Army studies,
the crucial factor in the Japanese decision to surrender was not.the
dropping of the bombs but the entry ofthe Soviet Union into the war
against Japan. These documents and other recently revealed evidence
suggest .that Truman knew at Potsdam that Stalin would declare war
/Japan early in August. Nearly two months before-Hiroshima,
again%
Army hief of StaffGeorge C. Marshall had advised the president that
the Soviet declaration of war would force Japan to surrender, making
the need for an American invasion unnecessary. It was a fact with
which Truman seemed to agree.
So if the estimates of an inmion's costs and ending the war quickly
were not the only considerations, why did the United States use these
terrible weapons?
What history has confirmed is that the men who made the bomb
really didn't understand how homfying its capabilities were. Of course
h y under&
the deshctive power of the bomb,but radiation'sclaw .
gem were h r Ies understood. k author Peter Wyden tells it in Doy
One, his compelling account ofthc making and dropping ofthe bomb,
scientists involved in creating what they called "the gadget" believed
that anyone who might be killed by radiation would die from falling
bricks first.
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But apart from this scientific shortfall, was there another strategic
element to the decision? Many modern hi6rians unhesitatingly;
answer yes. By late lW5 it was clear to Truman and other American
leaders that victory over Germany and Japan would not mean p a c e .
Stalin's intention to create a buffer of Socialist states surrounding the
Soviet Union and under the control of the Red Army was already
apparent Atomic muscle-flexing may haw been the overriding m s i d eration in Truman's decision.
The age of nuclear saber rattling did not begn with the dropping of
the bomb on Hiroshima, but with the Potsdam meeting, where Stalin
and Truman began the deadly dance around the issue of atomic
weaponry. ~rurnanwas unaware that Stalin, through the efforts of scientist-spy Klaus Fuchs, who was working at h Alamos and passing
secreis to the Soviets, knew as much about the atomic bomb as the
president himself- if not inore.
Some historians have pointed to the second attack on Nagasaki as
further proof of this atomic "big stick" theory. Having demonstrated the
thirteen-kiloton bomb at Hiroshima, Truman still wanted to show oHa
large bomb u d against Nagasaki to wnd a clear message to the Soviets: We have it end we're not afraid to use it.
If Tnrman viewed these bombs as a rn-ge to the .Sovietp, that
message, and the frightful nuclear buildup on both sides in the postwar
years, dictated American and Soviet policies in the coming decades of
Cold War confrontation.
Must Read: TRe Making ofthe Atomic Bomb by Richard Rhoda;
Truman by David McCullough.
S t u d e n t
H a n d o u t
1 4 A
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Decision C: Whether Truman Made the Right Decision
Immediately after the United Stares dropped the atomic
bombs on Japan, the majorily of Americans felt that the
right decision had k e n made. Surveys conducted by
F u m e magazine in the fall of 1945 revealed that more
than 50 percenr of Americans believed the United States
"should have used the two bombs on cities just as we
d~d."Another 22.7 percent felt the United States "should
have quickly used many more (bombs] before Japan had
the c hate to surrender."
Many 1J.S.soldiers supported Truman's decision
as well. One young soldier stated, "When the bombs
were dropped and news began to circulate that [the invasion of Japan] would not, after all, take place, that we
would not be obliged to run up the bcaches near Tokyo
assault-firing while being mnrtared and shelled . . . we
cried with relief and joy. W e were going to live. We were
going to grow up to adulthood after all."
Many officials in the top ranks of the military and
the government supported Truman's decision to drop the
bombs. However. others expressed doubts. Admiral William D. Leahy stated, "It is my opinion that the use of
this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was
of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The
Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender
because of the effective sea blockade and the successful
bombing with conventional weapons. . . . My own feeling was that in k i n g the firs1 to use [the atomic bomb],
we had adopted an ethical standard common to the
barbarians of the Dark Ages."
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a general with enormous
prestige who would become the next president. maintained the reaction he had had to the fmt testing of the
atomic bomb. At that time, he had expressed the hope
that the United States would never have to use such a
weapon. Eisenhower continued to dislike seeing the
0 Teachers-Curriculum Institute
country, as he put it. "initiate the use of anything [so]
horrible and destructive."
Some historians have severeIy criticized Truman's
decision, arguing that in August 1945 the Japanese were
already defeated. They believe that the atomic bombs
were used primarily as a waming to the Soviet Union.
Although the two nations were aliies during World War
11, the United States and the Soviet Union held very
different visions of the postwar world. The Soviets
wanted to &lain
conuol over Eastern Europe. The
United States, on the other hand, wanted the Soviets to
allow Eastern European countries to become independent.
Historians critical of Truman's decision argue that
his main reason for authorizing the use of the atomic
bombs was to scare the Soviets out of Eastern Empt:
and away from Asia. These historians believe that, in
essence. the United States sacrificed the citizens of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a high-stakes poker game
between the two superpowers. Other historians counter
that i~ was the military pressures Truman facd at the
close of World War rI that played the most important
role in his decision.
Critical Thinking Question C
Truman's decision to use atomic weapons against Japan
is one of the most controversial choices made in history.
In retrospect, do you think that Truman made the right
decision when he a u h o r i z . the use of atomic
weapons? Be prepared to defend your answer.
a. Truman did not make the right decision when he
aulhorized the use of atomic weapns
b. Truman made the right decision when he authorized
the use of atomic weapons.
Assessing the Decisiun to Build and Use the Atomic Bomb
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