The Puzzle of Structural Fragility in Madagascar: A Political Economy Approach
Mireille Razafindrakoto (IRD-DIAL), François Roubaud (IRD-DIAL), Jean-Michel Wachsberger
(Lille 3 University, DIAL)
January 2015
Abstract
The classical and more recent theories on development all fail to explain Madagascar’s long-running
economic underperformance. This paper proposes a reinterpretation of Malagasy history based on the
political economy frameworks. Our analyses point to the fact that, despite deep-rooted blockages,
Madagascar has shown an unexpected capacity to transform and modernise: economic transition (with the
emergence of a new entrepreneurial class) and political transition (with democratic alternation of power);
the setting up of sound institutions that characterise “modern” societies; control of violence; and the
Malagasy people’s expression of their economic and civic aspirations. However, three structural
constraints hinder the country’s development. Firstly, social fragmentation, an atomised population and
the atrophy of intermediary bodies foster a high concentration of power in the hands of a few elites who
are neither compelled nor encouraged to develop a medium- or long-term vision and take the interests of
the vast majority into consideration. Secondly, although the Malagasy people lay claim to democratic
principles, they remain torn between the demands of democratic and meritocratic nature and the
traditional values that impose respect for the real and symbolic hierarchies they have inherited from the
past. Finally, although the policies promoted and sometimes imposed by international donors may have
had some positive effects, they have also had a hugely negative impact on the State’s capacity to regulate
society.
1
Madagascar’s long-term economic trajectory is a true puzzle that goes beyond this specific case
and raises broader questions about what drives the divergences observed in global development
processes. Not only has Madagascar’s GDP per capita been declining steadily since independence
in 1960, but each time the country has embarked on a path to growth, this has been stopped in
its tracks by some socio-political crisis, shattering the hopes it had raised. The purpose of this
study is thus to propose some explanations for this unique development pattern. It aims to
provide an interpretive framework for Madagascar’s long-term trajectory by tracing the core
factors structuring the country’s political economy. The study follows two innovative lines of
enquiry. First, it conducts a critical review of existing research, which is examined in the light of
recent political economy theories, and attempts to establish a more systematic linkage between
two histories – economic and political – that often unfold separately. It then seeks to optimise
the use of existing empirical evidence on social actors, more specifically the public at large and
the elites. There is a twofold advantage to this original use of first-hand statistical surveys, most
of which were undertaken by the authors. First, unlike the aggregated data, these surveys are
more representative and reliable. Secondly, they allow the data to be disaggregated and analysed
in finer detail; in short, to look at the “flesh and blood” actors who are ultimately the real agents
hidden behind the concepts of institutions, organisations and so on. The surveys are thus able to
go beyond the usual framework of stylized and inevitably approximate facts (which are
sometimes erroneous) that characterize many political economy studies.
The first section presents the Malagasy puzzle and, with the help of both classical and modern
economic theories on long-term growth, seeks to identify the causes of this enigma. This initial
review not only fails to provide satisfactory answers to our research question, but even serves to
deepen the puzzle of Madagascar’s trajectory. This prompts us to examine political economy
explanations that could provide potential answers. The second section proposes a
reinterpretation of Madagascar’s political and economic history since pre-colonial times, drawing
on the analytical categories of the most recent political economy theories (North et al., 2009,
2012; Khan, 2010) and applying their conceptual frameworks they have defined (such as
institutions, social orders, organisations and coalitions, and the control of rents) to Madagascar.
In the third and the final sections, we attempt to fit the jigsaw pieces together again so as to
throw light on the way Madagascar functions and on its underlying institutional arrangements.
The third section analyse Madagascar structural assets, while the section four is dedicated at
examining its main blocking factors. Elaborating on the most recent trends, we conclude by
drawing two alternative paths for the future.
I.- The Malagasy puzzle and theories of growth and economic development
The facts: the enigma and the paradox
Madagascar’s economic trajectory is first characterised by an enigma in the form of a downward
trend that has persisted since independence over half a century ago. Long time-series compiled
by Maddison (2011) and his team indicate that the Great Island saw its GDP per capita decline by
a third between 1950 and 2010, whereas in sub-Saharan Africa, whose performance is far from
outstanding, it has almost tripled (see Appendix, Figure A1.1). The enigma is also a paradox,
because the country seems to have repeatedly embarked on a growth cycle and yet, each time it
showed the first signs of an economic take-off, this was reversed a few years later by a major
political crisis(Figure 1.1). Although the reliability of figures on growth and living standards in
international databases could be queried (Devarajan, 2013; Jerven, 2013), this dual diagnosis has
been confirmed by multiple sources, such as consumer survey data and national accounts data
(see Appendix, Figure A1.2). In other words, the drop in Madagascar’s standard of living since
independence, on the one hand, and the repeatedly interrupted spates of growth, on the other,
2
are not simply statistical artefacts (Ravelosoa & Roubaud, 1998; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud,
2002b, 2020a).
Figure 1.1 The Malagasy paradox: growth and socio-political crises 1960-2010
150
50%
45%
40%
130
Political crisis 1972
35%
Political crisis 1991
110
30%
Political crisis 2001‐02
Political crisis Dec. 2008 ‐
25%
20%
90
15%
10%
70
5%
0%
50
‐5%
‐10%
30
‐15%
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
GDP per capita (1984=100)
GDP growth (real ; right‐hand scale)
Source: INSTAT (2012); authors’ calculations. Note: GDP per capita in constant 1984 MGFs.
Current theories at a loss to explain Madagascar’s trajectory
Geography and history – do they help to explain the situation?
Firstly, Madagascar’s economic underperformance appears to be at odds with the country’s
favourable “circumstances”: natural borders, a wealth of arable land and mineral and timber
resources, cultural and linguistic unity1 and limited anthropogenic pressure, as well as many
structural advantages (agro-climatic, human and political) that could well be the envy of many
poor countries (especially those in the Sudano-Sahelian region).
In addition, at independence in 1960, Madagascar had all the advantages required for a successful
economic take-off. Before colonisation, the country was already on the path of homegrown
political unification. The expanding Merina2 state had much in common with states in Asian
countries (state centralisation, bureaucracy, irrigation works, taxation, etc.). At the time,
Madagascar seemed to absorb the elements of societal transformation brought in by the first
incursions of Western powers (especially on the economic, educational and religious fronts) with
1
2
3
Some authors (Beaujard, 1991; Ottino, 1998; Galibert, 2004; Andrianjafy-Andriamanindrisoa, 2004) have pointed
up similarities between various socio-political practices and values of the different ethnic groups (a holistic and
hierarchical vision of society, ancestors referred to as progenitors and the wellspring of identity, attachment to
ancestral lands, etc.). See also Ramamonjisoa (2002).
The Merina are an ethnic group from the Central Highlands. The political unification of the country began during
the eighteenth century with the territorial expansion of the Merina kingdom.
no major upheaval.3 For example, schooling became compulsory in 1876 (Raison-Jourde &
Randrianja, 2002), five years ahead of France, and was a key policy for building up the country’s
human capital.4 During the 1895–1960 colonial period, Madagascar, one of the jewels of France’s
colonial empire,5 continued its economic transformation. As a result, after independence, the
country’s productive and socio-political fabric was in a more buoyant condition than that of most
other former French colonies.
Neither can the choice of economic policy elucidate the Malagasy trajectory. Madagascar has
successively explored most policy options (import substitution, structural change,foreign
investment and export driven growth, poverty reduction) without any lasting success. The
‘Malagasy-style socialism’ promoted by D. Ratsiraka during the 1970s was neither ruthless nor
radical from an economic and political perspective and other countries that embarked on the
same path – but more lastingly and profoundly – were able to carry through their conversion far
more effectively (Ghana, Benin). For the most part, Madagascar has followed the
recommendations of donors, including the adoption of ‘good policies’), with no major deviations
compared to other developing countries (particularly in Africa).
Governance. Neither is the explanation for Madagascar’s economic failure to be found in the
poor quality of its institutions and governance, at least as measured by the current official
indicators. At independence, its institutions were in somewhat better state than those in other
comparable developing countries. Moreover, in the large international governance databases,6
Madagascar’s relative ranking in the community of nations is on average better than that of subSaharan Africa, which in turn ranks higher than South-East Asia.7
So could ethnic diversity be a key to understanding Madagascar’s difficulties – an argument put
forward by many studies in line with Easterly and Levine (1997) to explain underperformance on
the African continent? A number of studies consider the divide between the Merina and the côtiers8
as pivotal to interpreting Madagascar’s history, whatever the period, from pre-colonial times
through colonisation to the post-independence period. Yet, even though there is a high degree of
ethnic fragmentation in Madagascar, this does not necessarily imply that ethnicity can explain its
political, social or economic dynamics. The Afrobarometer9 surveys enabled us to put this all too
common assumption to the test… and to disprove it (see Figure 1.2 below and Figure A1.3 in the
Appendix). The ethnic dimension in Madagascar’s political and social life is among the least (if
not the least) pronounced of all African countries. The Malagasy people are by far the least likely
Without refuting the trauma created by colonisation, which was an iniquitous and repressive force that created
turmoil, the rupture in Madagascar was much less than that experienced in other countries.
4 Many studies have focussed on the increase in schooling from the colonial period onwards (Hugon, 1976;
Ratrimoarivony-Rakotoanosy, 1986; Goguel, 2006).
5 The allure of Madagascar can be measured by the high number of settlers (about 30,000, mostly French, which is
equivalent to French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa figures combined, as shown by the empire’s
accounts reported by the Afristory programme). This point deserves particular mention, as some studies have
adopted the rate of colonialist settlement as a key determinant of the nature of the (more or less extractive)
institutions set up at the time, with critical implications not only for today’s institutions, but also for long-term
development potential (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
6 In particular, we drew on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which are probably the
most comprehensive current source of data on governance (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2008).
7 This finding confirms the fact that the large international databases on governance find it difficult to reflect the
dynamics or problems in sub-Saharan Africa. This observation has already been underlined in several studies
(Arndt & Oman, 2006; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010a).
8 The term “côtiers” (coastal people) has been used since colonial times to describe members of ethnic groups that are
not from the central highlands (unlike the Merina and Betsileo), despite the fact that some of côtiers have no access to
the sea.
9 The Afrobarometer surveys are conducted every three years on a representative sample of the adult population in
more than twenty African countries. They therefore enable temporal and spatial (cross-country) comparisons to be
made.
3
4
to believe that certain ethnic groups are discriminated against. The large majority of Malagasy also
responded that their ethnic group had neither more nor less political influence than the other
groups. Moreover, the systematic failure of politicians’ repeated attempts to mobilise people
along ethnic lines clearly shows that ethnicity is not a convincing explanatory factor in
Madagascar.
Figure 1.2 Low prevalence of ethnic issues in Madagascar
Discrimination based on ethnicity
in different African countries
% decalre that his/her ethnic group traited unfairly
Linguistic fractionalization
1,0
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
Madagascar
0,1
0,0
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
Ethnic fractionalization
1,0
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
NIG
UGA
KEN
NAM
CVE
SAF
GHA
ZIM
MOZ
TOT
MWI
BEN
ZAM
BUR
LIB
TAN
LES
MALI
BOT
SEN
MAD
Ethnic and Linguistic fractionalization
in Sub-Saharan Africa
Often
Sometimes
Never
Sources: Fearon (2003); Afrobarometer Survey, 2008; Coef-Ressources/DIAL (for Madagascar); authors’ calculations.
An incursion into political economy
This first sweep through the factors that are frequently cited in the literature and yet seemingly
unable to explain Madagascar’s economic underperformance merely demonstrates the limits of
the economic approach that prevailed until recently in the field of development policy. What has
been neglected is the interaction between political and economic changes. However, the country’s
latest crisis has made more obvious not only the intermingling of political and economic cycles,
but also the Malagasy paradox. A promising conceptual framework has been proposed by North
and his co-authors (2009, 2012; hereafter referred to as NWW) to describe the characteristics of
natural states or limited access orders (LAOs, where access to political and economic power is
limited and under the control of a dominant coalition)10 . The analytical framework they propose
breaks the stranglehold of methodological individualism and gives back to the social actors
(organisations, structured groups, etc.) a central space for intervention in the economic dynamics
at work in society. In this context, a key role is played by the elites (powerful groups) and the
coalitions they form among themselves to share economic rents and control violence. The
extreme personalisation of institutions and their hijacking by elite groups to their own advantage
means that even the formal organisations imported from the “North” operate very differently
from their northern counterparts and fail to produce the same results as they do in open access
orders. In Madagascar, the conjunction of periods of economic expansion with political crises
leads to the supposition that a major source of the difficulties encountered might well be the
10
5
In the NWW conceptual framework, societies are distinguished according to their fundamental social order. They
specifically differentiate between natural states, described as “limited access orders” (LAOs, which can be “fragile”,
“basic” or “mature”), and “open access orders” (OAOs). Natural states use the political system to regulate
economic competition and generate rents, which in turn structure social relationships, curb violence and establish
social cooperation. Open access societies regulate economic competition by using market entry and political
competition to structure social relationships.
country’s weak capacity to establish a stable political consensus on wealth accumulation and
distribution processes.11
It should be emphasised from the outset that, although we retain the main concepts and
analytical elements developed by NWW (control of violence, social orders, rent capture,
organisations, institutions, elites, etc.), our use of the framework is not without qualification. For
instance, we do not endorse all of their general conclusions on the types of social orders and on
the transition from one to another. In an attempt to operationalise NWW’s theoretical
framework and test the validity of the transitional (doorstep) conditions for the move from a
natural state (or a limited access order) to an open access order, a recent study (Gollwitzer,
Franke & Quintyn, 2012) clearly reveals the limits of their analyses. According to NWW (2012),
three conditions are determining: 1) a rule of law for elites, 2) the existence of durable elite
organisations and 3) political control of the use of violence. However, an analysis drawing on
different international databases shows that, despite its chronic political instability, Madagascar is
no different from the African average on any of the three conditions, and even appears to be
relatively more advanced regarding the durability of its institutions .
II.- Reinterpreting Madagascar’s history from a political economy perspective
Broadly speaking, although Madagascar has experienced successive crises over a long stretch of
time, its history can be summed up in two words: constancy and continuity. Certainly, constancy
is visible in the forms of power, the modes of governance despite the rotation of power and the
changes of regime, which boils down to a personalisation of power mainly, if not exclusively, to
the benefit of a small group connected to the highest echelons of the state. This modus operandi
has been permitted and encouraged by the fact that Malagasy society is compartmentalised into
deeply hierarchical statutory groups – a system inherited from pre-colonial times that has
continued to operate despite the formal abolition of castes12 in the early twentieth century
(Rajaonah, 1996). The corollary of this is the historical continuity of the status and influence
possessed by a number of groups of actors who, over time, have remained within or closely
linked to the ruling class. The rise to power of new individuals and their subsequent fall, often
temporary or partial, have not changed the overall configuration: the only real losers, whatever
the period, have invariably been the bulk of the population (including the middle class). Yet,
despite the resulting inequalities and crises, the conception of society that always seems to prevail
is that of harmony created by an organised system in which each person has an assigned role and
place at a specific level determined by his or her descent – a system that ultimately allows a
minority to dominate the masses.
The influence and role of groups of actors
Before European colonisation (1895-1960)
the Merina “big families” at the highest levels of the state dominated the political and economic
spheres. The Merina kingdom had extended over the territory since the end of the XVIIIth
century by establishing a real empire. In this empire, social order distinguished several statutory
groups sometimes called castes. At the top of this hierarchy were situated Andriana (noble
persons), relatives of king, down Hova (white commoners) who supplied the kingdom military
Since the onset of the 2009 financial crisis, there is an abundant literature on Madagascar that explicitly or
implicitly adopts this framework (Morisset, 2010; World Bank, 2010b; Jütersonke & Kartas, 2010; Urfer, 2012a).
12 Merina society was organised into pseudo-castes (Condominas, 1961) or hierarchical status groups. At the top of
this hierarchy were the Andriana castes (nobles), relatives of the king. Below this were the Hova castes (white
freemen), then the Mainty (black freemen) and, at the bottom of the social hierarchy, the slaves (Andevo).
11
6
and administrative supervision, then mainty ( black commoners) and, at the bottom of the social
hierarchy, slaves ( andevo ). The Andriana derived their political power from the legitimacy they
enjoyed due to their royal descent (Bloch, 1983). The settlement of British missions which
benefited the Merina kingdom through education, the development of trade and the
institutionalisation of the state in the 19th century brought with them a new administrative,
military and trade oligarchy made up of the Hova “big families”, who were in charge of the
kingdom’s conquests and administration. Rents at the time were tied to feudal-style levies on
agricultural and livestock products and the trade of these products with foreign merchants. The
broad majority of the population remained not only excluded from the wealth sharing but, either
in slavery, or subjected to military recruitment or forced labor pressure.
Colonisation (and the First Republic, which ensued from1960 to 1972 somewhat altered the
power structure of the Malagasy society. It ended the Merina political hegemony, pre-empting
central power and granting a degree of power to the ‘coastal’ elites (côtiers)by implementing the
“politique des races” and a system of indirect rule (Boetsch & Savarese, 2000). The colonial
administration (and subsequently that of the First Republic) nonetheless continued to rely heavily
on a Merina administrative elite both in Tananarive and in the coastal regions as this group
possessed the academic and other skills required. In the First Republic, the ruling côtière elites
nonetheless sought to limit Merina power and P. Tsiranana13 tried to extend his control over
society through the extension of his party, the PSD (Razafimbelo, 1997; Raison-Jourde & Roy,
2010). The economic policies resulted in the constitution of an “économie de traite”14 (trading
economy). The agriculture knew only late productivity gains and the livestock farming remained
in good part "contemplative". Almost all of the industries was left to the hands of foreigners, the
distribution sector continued to be controlled by three big companies of import-export and the
majority of key positions in banks and the private companies remained detained by Europeans
(Archer, 1976). On the whole period, the economic growth just maintained the wealth per capita
level and still widened the gap between the rural majority (more than 80 % of the population) and
a nevertheless heterogeneous urban world. This standard of living degradation in rural areas was
all the more badly felt as the fiscal pressure, by means of the direct taxes (the IMF, the tax of the
fiscal minimum had replaced the tax of capitation), continued to press heavily on their
inhabitants.
The period from 1972 including the Second Republic (1972-1991) was characterised by the
“Malgachisation” of the economy and society. Although there was a strong political will to create a
new social order under the socialist regime (with land reforms and decentralisation, neither of
which came to anything), the political apparatus remained highly centralised and personalised, as
had been the case under the preceding regimes. The political control was also stressed by the
implementation of the decentralized local authorities conceived in a treated on a hierarchical and
pyramidal way, and controlled by the AREMA (Avant-garde of the Malagasy Revolution), the
new presidential party.
The liberal shift adopted in the mid-1980s also failed to improve the economic status of the vast
majority of the population, who were also the main victims of the structural adjustment policies
and the drive for “less state” imposed by the international institutions (Hugon, 1989; Ravelosoa
& Roubaud, 1998). Between 1975 and 1991, a new clan-based leadership group formed around
the president and his party, while the former elites lost their quasi-monopoly but nonetheless
retained a privileged position in the spheres of economic and political power. In the whole period
Vice-President of Madagascar’s central government in 1958, he became the first President of the Republic of
Madagascar in 1960.
14 Literally : Trading economy. Specific expression which concerns particularly the African economies before and
after the independences. The colonial system was often based on the commercialization of tropical products
(ensured by a system of crops and forced labor) in exchange for manufactured goods.
13
7
the " state rent " (Galibert, 2011) extended. First the increase of public sector and the
multiplication of administrative posts in the new regions, then the privatizations, established as
much opportunities of taking on the produced wealth (Fanomezantsoa, 1993).
In the period following the movement of 1991 (1991-2002) came the ebb and flow of
democratic opening along with the failure to establish a parliamentary system. The State’s new
political structure should have put an end to the extreme concentration and personalisation of
power (Cadoux, 1993). Yet, in a context that witnessed the proliferation of political parties
representing individual interests rather than social groups or political beliefs (Pierre Bernard et al.,
1998. Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, 2005), it instead led to the weakening of a government
marked by its mismanagement of economic policy. This backdrop of intense political and
economic flux led to the return to power of D. Ratsiraka,15 who immediately pushed through a
constitution that once again extended presidential powers. The creation of autonomous
provinces in 1998 under the pretext of a drive towards greater devolution of powers simply
aimed to secure firm control over the political apparatus for the presidential AREMA party
(Rakotoarisoa, 2002).
Economic growth recovered notably because the socio-political context improved with the return
to stability, internal demand increased with the revaluation of wages and tighter control over
inflation, and foreign investment flowed in especially to the export processing zones
(Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2002b). However, this mainly benefited urban areas, further
heightening existing spatial and social inequalities. The vast majority of the population, living in
geographically isolated communities in rural areas with scant access to basic infrastructure, was
left even more abandoned following the withdrawal of the State imposed by the liberalisation
policy. Even in the towns, the rate of growth was not enough to significantly or discernably
improve living conditions for the working classes. Popular discontent was exacerbated by the
increasingly ostentatious displays of wealth and known cases of the meteoric enrichment of a
privileged few within or close to the ruling group.
M. Ravalomanana, a steaming from the rural world entrepreneur and former mayor of
Antananarivo, who embodied outstanding economic success and the dream of social change in a
situation where the politico-economic elites had lost all credit, came to power thanks to popular
support mustered by a powerful communications campaign, the organisational support of his
company in the election – Tiko and its country-wide network of stores, and the backing of the
FJKM,16 who elected him as their vice president. His political agenda promised rapid economic
and above all industrial development but was in fact no different from the previous government’s
agenda. Growth was driven more by public spending largely funded by foreign aid than by the
expansion of the private sector. Private and foreign investments focussed heavily on a small
number of projects, especially those linked to ilmenite and nickel mining. This specialisation in
mining operations gave rise to an enclave economy that created little employment and was
disconnected from the local productive fabric. The result was greater inequality and no visible
reduction in the level of poverty (World Bank, 2010a).
Although the arrival of M. Ravalomanana – who was neither the descendant of a “big family” nor
a representative of the academic elite – marked a decisive change in the way political elites were
elected, it did not break the Malagasy political mould. On the contrary, the autocratic drift of his
government reinforced the system’s persistent traits: political control by a hegemonic party (the
TIM: Tiako i Madagasikara), “presidentialisation” and the clannish seizure of power. This extreme
political concentration also offered the president the means of expanding his economic power.
Appointed President of Madagascar by members of the military directorate in 1975, he was (re-)elected in 1982
and again in 1989, but was forced to relinquish power during the 1991 crisis. However, he was re-elected in 1996.
16 Madagascar’s foremost Protestant church.
15
8
Between 2002 and 2009, the companies in his group (Tiko) attained near-monopoly positions due
to their preferential treatment, and substantially expanded their activities (Randrianja, 2005;
D'Ersu, 2009). The blurring of the dividing line between economic and political power, as well as
the power of the religious apparatus, thus reached an unprecedented level.
The occupation of public and economic arenas by those in power fuelled deep resentment and
discontent in some segments of Malagasy society. The members of the politico-economic
oligarchy and most of relatively powerful Indian, Chinese and French business groups., whose
powers and profits had been eroded, moved gradually towards dissent (Pellerin, 2009). Cleavages
also appeared within the military where, on the one hand, the government was seeking to gain
support by promoting some officers on purely political grounds and assigning government posts
to a representative from each of the armed forces (gendarmerie, police, army and navy). On the
other hand, it had launched a policy of de-politicisation and demilitarisation in 2003 with the
intention of downsizing the army and more generally weakening its power (Ramasy, 2012), hence
fuelling discontent and raising the risk of defections. Finally, the churches, which had seemingly
given Ravalomanana their unanimous backing in 2002, also ended up deeply divided (Galibert,
2009; D’Ersu, 2009; Gingembre, 2011). Religious rivalry and the prominent role of Marc
Ravalomanana in the FJKM created rifts within the Protestant churches and led to conflict
between the head of state and the Catholic Church, which was more deeply involved in civil
society organisations and refused to support his increasingly authoritarian rule. It was these
opposition forces that led to the overthrow of Ravalomanana in 2009. His successor, A.
Rajoelina, who had been elected mayor of Antananarivo less for his personal qualities than as an
anti-government protest, had two assets that were to attract support from a population desirous
of change: he was young and a stranger to the world of politics. Born into a middle-class Merina
family, he had amassed a small fortune first by creating a printing and advertising company.. His
political ascension posed a concrete threat to the president of the Republic, who attempted to
thwart it by all possible means. However, Rajoelina was supported in his fight by some leading
figures and various organised interests including factions of the army who saw an opportunity to
put an end to Ravalomanana’s rule (Randrianja, 2012).
Rajoelina set up and headed the High Transitional Authority (HAT). Although this was only
intended to be a transitional government, it became a fixture in the Malagasy landscape (20092013). Ad hoc institutions were set up, such as the Congress of Transition (CT) and the Superior
Council of Transition (CST), whose membership was organised so as to give the illusion of
national representation. The regime, however, was only able to hold onto power at the price of
several cabinet reshuffles, creating a revolving door of government. The opposition was
organised into “mouvances” (movements) representing former Malagasy presidents and their
accomplices but failed to mobilise the masses and create a truly united front. The military,
cosseted by the new regime, which showered promotions and financial advantages on officers
and non-commissioned officers alike, kept largely to the sidelines.
Until the internationally endorsed roadmap setting out measures for a return to political normalcy
was signed in September 2011, the government’s budget revenues had been in sharp decline, as
most international aid had been suspended. The drying up of international aid encouraged the
authorities to search for new sources of funding: for a time, promoting rosewood exports
(Randriamalala & Liu, 2010), awarding mineral exploration permits to foreign companies (Soalala
iron-ore deposit) or securing financial support from private sector businesses. The lack of
effective control over these operations led to large-scale trafficking, a rise in corruption and
massive embezzlement within the administration. In the end, the halt to public investment and
the slowdown of economic activities were detrimental to growth. Road and healthcare
infrastructure deteriorated, while poverty increased and education declined. Added to this, crime
rose sharply in the towns as well as in some rural areas where dahalo (thieves of oxen) terrorized
the populations and held in check police forces (Banque mondiale, 2013a et b).
9
On one year after the presidential election of December, 2013, it does not seem that this one
ended this decay. The President was very badly elected because he obtained only a little more
than a quarter of the votes of the potential voters and does not seem to manage to federate
enough political and economic actors around him to insure his power. The semi-parliamentary
system reintroduced by the constitutional reform of 2010 has already marked its limits by
pointing the impossibility for the National Assembly to bring out a stable majority. The
constituent, natural traffics of resources of a mafia economy, far from having disappeared, seem
on the contrary to perpetuate and the State shows itself always powerless to control the violence
and the insecurity bound to the thefts of zebu (Pellerin, 2014).
This brief review of history shows that behind the rhetoric and declared ideologies that have
varied over time, the system and practises at the highest levels of State have barely changed.
Neither the post-independence “Malgachisation” period, the socialist years, the structural
adjustment and liberalisation period, nor the coming to power of a self-made man from the rural
world – and even less the last phase of transition marked by the State’s decline– has been able to
uphold the principle of equity and reduce inequalities between the hereditary elites and the lower
classes, between the different regions (especially between the highlands and coastal areas) and
between urban and rural areas. Whether individuals have inherited their position on the social
chessboard due to their social background or acquired it through merit in the rare cases of social
advancement, they have mainly used their position to implement short-term strategies in order to
manage and increase their own economic and political power. Changes in the composition of the
elites and the factional constituencies they mobilized did not result in any significant change in
growth strategies. Malagasy ruling coalitions were, up to there, very unstable and could not take a
long-term view.
Rents in the hands of the hereditary elites and/or accessible to a small group of insiders
Economic rents in Madagascar have never been on a large scale, limited in nature or for want of a
strategy to expand them.17 However, for a country where poverty is preponderant and rents are
distributed among a very small number of actors, hereditary elites or insiders, these revenues
constitute both a windfall and a source of major inequalities. The rents include those from the
ownership of land and other real estate. The économie de traite (coffee, vanilla, cloves, tea) for that
developed at the time of colonisation (Randrianja & Ellis, 2009) flourished for a time before
stagnating or even declining in the 1980s and 1990s due to the absence of adapted support
policies (export crops were taxed via the implementation of economic stabilization fund insuring
the financing of the State) and to international competition. On the other hand, the
nationalisation of foreign companies (in the 1970s) and subsequent privatisations (in the 1980s
and 1990s) fostered the emergence of a small number of local entrepreneurs, as well as
entrepreneurs from the Karana, Zanatany18and other minorities. During this period, those closest
to the centre of power and thus better informed also sought to take advantage of the
opportunities offered by free trade, possible exemptions, subsidies and large-scale public
investments that were more or less legally appropriated. Even though the domestic market is
limited in size, the distribution of consumer goods is also a lucrative sector, in which the Karana
are very present. Since the late 1990s, the development of the export processing zones has
attracted mainly foreign investors (Cling et al., 2005). There are very few nationals in this sector,
Since colonisation, the country’s economic and social structure has allowed only a limited increase in productive
activities, with investments concentrated in activities involving the circulation of goods and services (the service
sector, mainly trade) (Jacob & Keorner, 1972).
18 The Karana (term derived from “Koran”) are the Indo-Pakistanis who arrived in the country in the late
seventeenth century. The Zanatany are Europeans whose families have been settled in the country for many
years/generations.
17
10
as access to the highly competitive international market is difficult and restricted to those with
overseas networks. But the most easily accessible rents are those from foreign aid, which can be
captured through public procurement contracts (public works, support form various
organisations, etc. (World Bank, 2010a) The appearance of new mining rents, along with those
from the illegal trade in precious woods, could constitute a turning point in the 2000s given the
significant amounts of new rents these activities involved. They could potentially be a source of
destabilisation or major conflict.
In short, rents in Madagascar have mainly materialised out of opportunities or benefits gained on
a one-off basis (or over short periods) from inherited or acquired privileged positions either
inside or connected to the circles of power. In fact, these rents are inaccessible to people outside
the sphere of power. Moreover, the access to and control of rents is managed by individuals or
families and not stable formal or informal organisations of interests cutting across the political
and economic spheres. And, as the country systematically fails to achieve a stable balance among
factional interests, no elite faction can realistically expect stability to persist and thus behaves in a
way (short termism, clientelism & predation) that feeds instability.
Genesis of the crises: the intermingling of politics and economics
Reinterpreting history also shows that the “Malagasy paradox” (or in a nutshell: the fact that each
phase of growth ends in a socio-political upheaval that overturns the regime in power) becomes
more intelligible if we look beyond the purely economic field and integrate the political and
governance dimension. Invariably, the events leading to the downfall of the regime in power have
been symptomatic not only of the absence of a viable inter-elite coalition and also the gradual
loss of grassroots support for the regime. The systemic inability of the successive political
settlements to address people’s expectations gives way to outbursts of frustration at times of
greater expectations. Temporary coalitions of discontents have then no difficulty to topple the
regime. Interestingly in several instances, incumbents themselves did not really try to resist, as if
they did not believe in their chances to remain in power, and as if the interests supporting them
the day before had already found their way through the emerging arrangement to get something
from it. As soon as a new regime is in place, the coalition dissolves again in particularistic
fragmented rent-seeking strategies.
The background of the different crises underlines the types of popular uprisings that have been
involved:
- in 1972, the inequalities and the non-inclusive nature of the development process that were
denounced by the marginalised populations in the South and students unable to find
employment. Added to this were political reasons: 1968, neo-colonialism, third-world ideologies,
the outcry against the French political and economic stranglehold (Althabe, 1978; Raison-Jourde
& Roy, 2010);
- in 1991, a gradual political liberalisation gave rise to protests and mass expression of
frustration, especially among the middle classes. The country embarked on a path of economic
growth but the failure to fulfil democratic aspirations triggered popular uprisings;
- in 2002, the economic situation had never been so good, but the population’s perception of
corruption and electoral fraud, at a time when their aspirations for democratic governance were
high (associated with the emergence of a “new man”), led to a popular uprising (Razafindrakoto
& Roubaud, 2002a);
- in 2009, the scenario mirrored that of 2002 with excesses related to poor governance and
corruption. The economic climate was relatively positive (at least at the macro level) but the
economic model was less inclusive as it was largely based on mining rents and official
development assistance, both of which have much weaker multiplier effects. The macroeconomic
11
dynamic did not translate into an improvement of the situation in terms of inequality and
poverty.
III.- How does Madagascar function? The structural assets
The assertions above lead to a rather pessimistic diagnosis of Madagascar’s trajectory. However,
this diagnosis needs to be qualified. Although the country suffers from major blocking factors, it
seems or has seemed in many respects capable of rivalling more mature limited access orders.
This is what we will show in this section, indicating firstly the strengths that the country can rely
on and secondly the countervailing blocking factors.
Control of violence
The NWW analysis gives a central place to the control of violence. Stabilising the social order is
considered to be a society’s primary objective, since violence is a resource utilised by elite groups
to control or to access rents. In this perspective, it is the fragile natural states that are not able to
fully control violence. At the other of the spectrum, open access orders enjoy peaceful social
relations, and the legitimate and controlled use of force is a monopoly of the political authorities.
This theory raises a number of issues concerning the analysis of how Malagasy society has
functioned over the long term.
The taboo of political violence. There seems to have been remarkably little political violence in
the history of Madagascar since independence.19 Conflicts – a term whose appropriateness here
may well be queried – have been quite low-intensity and have not escalated into large-scale
killings. Moreover, in times of unrest the military have tended to remain in the background and
sometimes even acted as mediators and peacemakers. While violence is nevertheless present in
Malagasy society, it is largely internalised and, when it surfaces, it tends to take the form of infrapolitical eruptions expressing a discontent that does not clearly pinpoint the causes or directly
designate those responsible. Some political forces have certainly tried to use this discontent to
bolster their cause. Yet, in reality, these outbreaks of violence have always overwhelmed the
political forces that wish to exploit them but are unable to control them. It is thus as if violence
was not or could not be a legitimate strategic resource in Malagasy politics, and it is often the use
of violence by the ruling power that has precipitated its downfall (P. Tsiranana in 1972,
D. Ratsiraka in 1991 and 2001, and M. Ravalomanana in 2009).
A comparative analysis of household survey data conducted in some twenty African countries
suggests and/or confirms the relatively low level of violence in Madagascar, whether it be
political violence or not (see Figures 3.1 below and A3.1 in the Appendix). The Island ranks
among the two or three countries in which a large majority of the population states that political
competition does not (or very rarely) give rise to violent conflict. Madagascar also stands out with
respect to the low level of physical violence experienced by citizens in their everyday life, with a
very small percentage of victims of physical assault or burglaries at home compared with other
countries in 2008. It therefore seems paradoxical that, while the percentage of victims is quite
low, a significant percentage of the population has a feeling of insecurity. In fact, this fear of
violence, which is at odds with the real exposure to insecurity, demonstrates the Malagasy
population’s specific relationship with violence. The population’s tendency to exaggerate the
risk, impact or magnitude of violence can certainly be explained by their particular aversion to
violence.
19
The bloody suppression of the nationalist uprising in 1947 by the French colonial power, which is certainly the
most violent episode in Madagascar’s twentieth-century history (Tronchon, 1974, Koerner, 1994), was perpetrated
by actors external to the society.
12
Figure 3.1: Experience and feeling of insecurity
Victim of physical aggression
Feeling vs. experience of insecurity
Feeling insecure vs. experience
Physically attacked
40%
Something stolen from house
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
MAD
TAN
MALI
SEN
MWI
MOZ
GHA
BEN
LES
CVE
BOT
ZAM
TOT
BUR
KEN
ZIM
SAF
NAM
LIB
UGA
NIG
0%
Several times
Just once or twice
UGA
LIB
MOZ ZIM
NIG
SAF
ZAM
KEN
TOTBUR
BOT
NAM GHA
MWI
BEN
LESTAN
MALI
CVE
SEN
MAD
Feared crime from home
Never
Source: Afrobarometer Survey, Coef Ressources/DIAL (for Madagascar), 2008.
The capacity to found institutions
In the NWW analyses, institutions embody a set of rules that regulate how societies function.
Fragile natural states rely on a basic institutional structure that does not ensure political stability
over time. In contrast, mature LAOs and OAOs are characterised by the robustness and
effectiveness of their institutions. Madagascar’s recurring socio-political crises and the situation
that has prevailed since 2009 – each day the country is in danger of becoming a “failed state” –
seem to place it automatically in the first category. Yet, the situation seems somewhat more
complex. During some periods, Madagascar has evidenced its institutional capacities and
achievements, in the three areas (economic, bureaucratic and political) highlighted by Khan
(2010). And these could place it at a much “more advanced” stage of natural states. This
observation can be illustrated by three examples: the success of the export processing zones,
significant results in the fight against bureaucratic corruption and the process of democratic
transition. Ultimately, its seems that a determining factor is the country’s failure to strengthen and
consolidate its institutions lastingly rather than the possibility of (locally) achieving certain levels
of results characteristic of OAOs.
An outstanding African success: the export processing zones. If there is one economic
sector where the requirements for achieving competitiveness and growth are drastic and hardly
compatible with a social order built on the extraction of unproductive rents, it is that of export
processing zones. Companies are competing with the most successful global companies and need
to have access to an adequately developed institutional environment. Madagascar has met this
challenge, which is a feat unparalleled in Africa or in countries at a similar level of development
(Cling et al., 2005). The success of the Malagasy free zones clearly shows that the country is
capable of engaging in a dynamic of wealth creation, generated by real value creation (jobs,
revenue) and driven by a new class of entrepreneurs (both nationals and foreigners), thus
boosting development (see Appendix, Figure A3.2).
Significant results in the fight against bureaucratic corruption. Widespread corruption is
seen as one of the structural and constituent features of developing countries such as Madagascar
(Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Olivier de Sardan, 1999). The weakness of institutions and associated
13
organisations makes it virtually impossible to reduce corruption to any great extent, and examples
of policies that have had a positive and lasting impact are extremely rare. This supposed intrinsic
difficulty in fighting corruption is reinforced by the presumption that the level of everyday
corruption in Africa is all the higher because it is a socially accepted phenomenon, based on
fundamentally different values and beliefs from those applicable to OAOs. In Madagascar’s case,
these assumptions are not backed up by empirical data derived from a series of surveys repeated
over some fifteen years (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2003; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010a,
2010b). With regard to the dynamics of corruption, the results instead indicate a significant and
continuous reduction in the incidence of petty corruption from 1995 to 2001 (see Appendix,
Figure A3.3). Although the serious political and institutional crisis in Madagascar in 2001
immediately led to a dramatic rise in corruption (double the incidence in just one year), the return
to order as from 2002, the stabilisation of institutions, the renewed growth of public sector wages
and the active anti-corruption policies had the opposite effect, with a halving of the incidence of
corruption between 2002 and 2004 and a decrease in its burden on household budgets.
Dual democratic transition and consolidation: the 1990s case. This last example is drawn
unequivocally from the political domain to show that certain features of the Malagasy social order
can have the characteristics of OAOs. In their definition of natural states, NWW (2009) identify
the presence of “polities without the generalized consent of the governed” as one of the three
founding characteristics. Moreover, in the transition from one order to another, the authors
consider that many formal rules and institutions imported from the “North” would only exist on
paper, since the values and beliefs underpinning their “normal” functioning in their countries of
origin are vastly different from those in the developing countries. Madagascar’s electoral and
democratic experience shows that this reading not so clear-cut. The sequence of elections in the
1990s is broadly in line with the stylised democratic functioning of an OAO. If democratic
transition is defined as the shift from an authoritarian regime to the institutionalisation of liberal
procedures of government (open political competition, a multiparty system, universal suffrage,
freedom to vote, election transparency and freedom of the press), it may be deemed that this
phase actually occurred with the 1992 election (Roubaud, 2000, 2001). Even using the most
restrictive and widely recognised yardstick whereby power needs to rotate twice in two successive
free elections, Madagascar has joined the exclusive club of African countries that have met this
criterion since the 1990s (cf. 1993 and 1996 presidential elections).
Of course, this is not about indulging in a blissful interpretation of Madagascar’s history. None of
the examples cited have resulted in lasting success: the free zone dynamic has been interrupted by
external and, above all, internal factors; petty bureaucratic corruption has declined substantially,
but a priori this improvement has not had an impact on grand corruption; and the democratic
transition has indeed taken place, but the move to democratic consolidation has not happened.
These examples do, however, attest to the country’s capacity to establish consensual and effective
institutions. Crises and political instability (in 1991, 2002 and 2009) have certainly led to a halt or
even reversal of these developments, but the stoppage (at least regarding the fight against
corruption and the development of free zones) seems to be no more than the collateral damage
caused by the crises rather than the consequence of a challenge by social actors to these rules of
functioning.
Expressions of civic aspirations: the population matters
NWW’s analyses suggest that inLAOs, the population cannot really be an autonomous factor of
social change as their role is barely mentioned. In khan’s work, when popular aspirations far
outrun the capacity of formal politics to deliver, the population is mobilised by the elites to
whom they are attached through patron-client relationships. Our analysis shows that, even in a
country with deeply entrenched power imbalances and where ordinary citizens enjoy very little
14
empowerment (education, information, representation, voice, etc.) in the way their counterparts
in developed countries do, the population counts and played a prominent and direct role. In our
view, this even constitutes a specificity that is essential for any explanation of the Malagasy
paradox. The role of civic aspirations is clearly present in the economic dynamics and especially
in triggering crises. A review of the data that we collected over the last ten years reveals that,
despite the favourable economic conditions of 2001 and 2008, aspirations grew faster than
concrete results (see Appendix, Figure A3.4). This gap is a direct source of popular discontent
and dissatisfaction, and thus a fertile ground for crises. This escalation of economic aspirations is
a major wellspring of potential discontent: the consequence of growth is that long-contained
aspirations are released, which creates in a mismatch between ambitions and concrete
achievements. Yet perhaps even more than economic aspirations, aspirations to democratic
governance that remain unfulfilled seem to be a key driver of popular frustration (see Appendix,
Figure A3.5). Our figures indeed show a deterioration of the indicators that assess the
administration’s effectiveness and an increase in the perception of corruption at the end of the
1990s (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2003). The period before the 2009 crisis, which was
underpinned by empirical data to a much greater extent, reinforces this diagnosis (Razafindrakoto
et al., 2009). From 2004-2005, all of the indicators (freedom of expression, equal treatment under
the law, trust in the administration, satisfaction with the way democracy is functioning) trend
downwards. Thus, regardless of the economic performance, which was presented as a success
story both inside the country and to the outside world, the popular discontent that had been
visible since 2008 crystallised the portents of the crisis to come. What we earlier referred to as the
“Malagasy paradox” can therefore be partly explained by the shortcomings in democratic
governance. Expression of the population’s dissatisfaction through popular, even eruptive,
movements has so far not brought about the lasting establishment of a more inclusive and more
democratic society. The Malagasy people are not silent but until now their voice has not been
heard. They have, however, always constituted a corrective force preventing the autocratic
excesses of the governments in office. In this respect, their role appears to be highly positive.
How does Madagascar function? Major blocking factors
Despite its structural advantages, Madagascar is up against some major blocking factors: its social
fragmentation, which leads to long-term social inertia and political instability, and external factors
that have a lasting negative impact on its social organisation.
Social fragmentation
The primacy of the social order and the pervasiveness of a hierarchical system.
Historically, Malagasy society is extremely hierarchical, with an endless stratification and ranking
of individuals according to an inherited and unequal system whose symbolism has persisted over
the centuries despite the country’s political and social transformations. These principles of
differentiation and hierarchical ranking may be more important than the respect for the
traditional values and norms of fihavanana.20
These principles are very pervasive even among the elites (the Andriana themselves are divided
into variously ranked groups), which might explain why there are more families, sometimes
expanded into clans, than formal organisations.
20
Fihavanana is a term that encompasses the Malagasy concept of brotherhood, harmony and solidarity.
15
The caste systems are deeply rooted in bodies and minds, conferring unequal value on
individuals. Moreover, this hidden symbolic hierarchy which very simplistically distinguishes
between a large majority of Mainty21 and a small minority of Fotsy, translates into a real hierarchy
insofar as it determines behaviours, the Mainty being “confined to the social reproduction of
poverty”22 (Galy, 2009). Seen from this angle, social relationships can be described as resting on a
symbolic violence that, over time, maintains the domination of the vast majority of the
population by a small group of individuals.
Maintaining such a system clearly presupposes that these principles of differentiation that grant
unequal value to individuals are in some way accepted. 23 Besides, we can wonder if the Fanjakana
(the State power), the only structure which links (innervates) the whole country, does not draw its
legitimacy from the fact that etymologically Fanjakana refers to the royal power. In this case,
culturally, the Fanjakana is supposed above all to serve the ruling power (the president) and not
the people (nor development). This mindset is what often leads politicians to believe that they
can do as they please without being accountable to anyone. In the last crises, it is also what allows
some descendants of high-ranking families to appoint themselves to the status of raiamandreny24
and, as such, to intervene in the political debate.
Added to this social fragmentation is the atomisation of the population, which plays a
determining role in the functioning of Malagasy society. The Malagasy peasantry has not in fact
been truly “captured”25 by either the political system – even though they a priori recognise (at least
outwardly) the legitimacy26 of the individual holding Fanjakana – or by the economic system.
The fact that there is no real structural pressure on land or on the means of subsistence enables
them to remain on their territory. The low population density, physical geography (Imerina’s
Plateaux) the large distances separating rural villages, the lack of infrastructure, a limited rural
exodus and, more generally, a structurally low internal migration (migrants are mainly educated
people from secondary towns who move to the capital) are all features specific to Madagascar.27
These elements lead to a major cleavage between the elites and the population. Certainly, the
fundamental inequality in Malagasy society allows political leaders to act without attributing much
importance to their constituencies. Without the political will to reduce the divide between the
(basically urban) elites and the rest of the population, it is hard to imagine that this gap can close
up with time. Eliminating it is even more difficult as it is accentuated by geographical distances
(due to the size of the big island) and by the enormous disparities between urban and rural living
standards and conditions. On top of these economic considerations, some indicators (education,
road infrastructure) show that urban dwellers enjoy very favourable advantages – which could
The social distinction between the Whites (Fotsy) and Blacks (Mainty) exists throughout the country. In the midseventeenth century, for example, Flacourt, a representative of the French East India Company in Fort Dauphin
(South-East Madagascar), describes it as structuring the social relationships that he observed (Randrianja & Ellis,
2009). The terms fotsy and mainty are not simply symbolic designations but also refer to differences of skin colour
and origin (Austronesian vs African); cf. Razafindralambo (2005a and 2005b) and Ramamonjisoa (1984). [OK
BUT PB OF PLACE]
22 Original French: “confinés dans la reproduction sociale de la pauvreté” (Translator’s translation).
23 This mindset, which are fundamentally anti-democratic beliefs, is what NWW would consider as evidence of
discrepancy between informal social norms and formal democratic institutions.
24 Parents or elder sons, who are acting for the good of their descendants and to whom respect and obedience are
due.
25 In his book on Tanzanian socialism, G. Hyden (1980) shows that the peasantry was not then “captured” by the
capitalistic market economy and the State and that it retained its exit option by withdrawing into a subsistence
economy.
26 See Fauroux (1999); Raison-Jourde and Roy (2010).
27 Even if these features are recognized in economics as explaining low economic dynamism of societies (limited
capacity to invest in infrastructure, lower compulsions on workers to engage in high intensity factory work at low
wages, etc.), its impact is not only economic ones.
21
16
rank Madagascar among the top performing African countries – a situation that makes inequality
between the urban and rural areas all the more pronounced and problematic. In the large towns, a
tiny group of privileged individuals enjoy living conditions close to those of citizens in the
developed world ("globalised elites"), whilst the vast majority of the population continue to live
at subsistence level, caught up in poverty traps.28 An example that clearly illustrates this divide
between the towns and countryside (and an even sharper divide between the capital and rural
areas) involves the citizens’ interest in public affairs (see Appendix, Figure A3.6). The figures
reveal a feeling of exclusion (or self-exclusion) among rural populations that certainly has an
impact on political participation.
Long-term social inertia and political instability
Taken together these elements explain the long-term social inertia and the political instability.
Long-term social inertia can be explained by Madagascar’s social structure (Figure 3.2). At the top
of the pyramid are the elites, who are broadly in favour of the status quo. Their fear is that any
disruption of the established order would put an end to their privileges and lower their socioprofessional status.29 Neither does the middle class represent a force capable of encouraging
mobilisation. Made up in part of urban dwellers from the (private and public) formal sectors, it
also has much to lose. Moreover, its economic situation has already worsened due to the ongoing
economic downturn. At the bottom end of the ladder, in urban areas, those in the informal sector
are marginalised by their status, with each person caught up in the struggle for his or her day-today survival. As for the rural areas, the vast numbers of peasants are geographically isolated,
atomised, excluded and disconnected from public affairs, which makes them even less likely to
self-organise and have their voices heard.
The distance is geographic, social, educational, economic but also cultural with a strong sense by the elite of its
cultural ‘distinction’
29 There is an objective class interest to preserve those privileges. But the fact that their status has never been really
questioned by political forces explains that they do not need to transform this interest into strong organisations.
28
17
Figure 3.2: Social structure and inertia-inducing factors in Madagascar
A few dozen
people
The President & close affiliates
Economic downturn blocks aspirations
Elites
7,9%
14%
Middle
class
Informal Urban sector
Elites (far above the population): fear of losing socio‐professional status, disruption of established order, get by nonetheless with no need to organise themselves. Middle class (civil servants, private operators…): downgraded status, fewer in number (impacted by the Washington Consensus), demoralised (hopes repeatedly dashed)
(Not captured)
Informal urban sector: marginalised, caught up in a daily struggle for survival
78% of the total population
Rural class
(Not captured)
Rural world: isolated, atomised, excluded, totally disconnected from public affairs
AVERSE TO VIOLENCE
(Pacifism, patience, passivity)
0,1%
The population’s weak capacity to mobilise makes it easier for the ruling elites to ignore their
citizen’s aspirations, especially since the Malagasy (compared to citizens from other African
countries) have seemingly not really assimilated the idea that the State should be accountable for
its actions. The survey data in fact reveal that the prevailing attitudes tend towards respect for
authority or towards the recognition of their leaders’ raiamandreny status (someone who thus
ensures the people’s welfare) (see Appendix, Figure A3.7). The plebiscitary referendums that are
regularly held by the various heads of State often confirm this fact. Insofar as the broader and
mainly rural masses have no representatives from their own class and adhere to this political
theology (Kantorowicz, 1989), they feel that the leader who successfully takes on this traditional
dimension is able to represent them and thus give him massive support at the ballot box.
Yet, at the same time, the Malagasy are shown to be the most convinced of the role that they
should play as citizens in ensuring that the President and their representatives at the National
Assembly fulfil their functions effectively (Afrobarometer, 2008). This contradiction points up the
difficulties of the Malagasy people in finding their place in the ongoing process: mid-way between
tradition and modernity, the population is torn between the past (respect of the Fanjakana) and
its democratic aspirations (demand for the citizens’ power or oversight).
Yet, paradoxically, political instability is also a consequence of this fragmentation. In the case of
LAOs, the NWW framework attributes a pivotal role to elite organisations and coalitions of
organisations. However, Madagascar is characterised by the absence of stable coalitions. The
pattern proposed by NWW, which posits the existence of vertical organisations mainly structured
into patronage networks enabling an informal redistribution of the wealth from rents, is not
entirely applicable to Madagascar. The elites are very much built around individuals and rarely
form organisations, which also means that it is rarer still for such organisations to engage in
lasting coalitions. To some extent, since independence, the elites feel no need to organise
themselves as long as there are no clearly identified enemy [or even challenging] groups from
18
outside or inside the country. When conflict erupts, there are of course temporary arrangements,
flexible alliances of convenience (Forces Vives coalition, Trois mouvances,30etc.), but these result from
negotiations that are only binding on individuals: they are not inclusive and do not involve the
construction of lasting organisations with roots and branches across the society. This weakness
partly explains the country’s instability. As access to political power constitutes, as we have seen,
the most important gateway to rents, it is particularly coveted. Given the weakness of these
organisations, it is relatively easy for an individual who has certain advantages (traditional
leadership, charisma, wealth, connections in the army, etc.) to conquer political power. In fact, as
no group or organisation (formal or informal) has the monopoly on violence, or is able to
command a capacity for violence that is strong enough to constitute coercive forces (the army as
an organisation is marked by its weakness and fragmentation), it is easy to destabilise the
government with demonstrations and the sacrifice of a few lives.
This instability is further exacerbated by the atrophy of formal and informal intermediary
bodies, the missing vertical link between the president and the population. Our analyses
very clearly show the specificity of Madagascar on this account. As regards formal intermediary
bodies, neither local authorities, political parties, nor civil society organisations have any real
power. They have no authority over the population and given their small size and influence, their
constituencies seldom feel the need to solicit them (see Figures 3.3 below and A3.8 in the
Appendix). In parallel, given their limited influence, traditional leaders have been discredited in
much the same way as the formal authorities.
Figure 3.3: Absence or weakness of formal and informal intermediary bodies
Formal: associations & groups
Informal: traditional leaders
Influence of traditional leaders in
governing local community
0,8
0,7
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
MAD
TAN
SAF
BEN
SEN
UGA
NAM
KEN
Mean
BUR
NIG
MALI
MOZ
LIB
GHA
LES
BOT
MWI
Madagascar
Cape verde
Swaziland
Mozambique
Liberia
Namibia
Burkina Faso
SSA
South Africa
Senegal
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Rwanda
Ghana
Mali
Kenya
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Malawi
0,0
Clubs & associations (2010)
Some/ A Great Deal
None / A Small Amount
Don’t Know
Sources: Afrobarometer Survey, 2008, Coef-Ressources and DIAL (for Madagascar); The Indices of Social Development
(ISS, 2010); authors’ calculations.
Due to this personalisation of power and excessive presidentialisation, the President is “alone” in
dealing with population. This phenomenon is accentuated by the still pervasive traditional belief
in the exceptional nature of the Fanjakana (the State) and the raiamandreny status (the duly
respected father and mother of one’s subjects). However, as the political leaders pay scant
attention to the population, the level of popular support that they enjoy is in fact relatively low.
30
The three political factions of the three former presidents, Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy.
19
Their power rests on a symbolic dimension (one who possesses hasina31, the raiamandreny, the
Father of Independence, the providential man, etc.) and/or constraint (the presidential party’s
networks within the administration rather than on real and effective patron-client relationships.32
This explains why massive anti-government demonstrations can break out immediately after an
apparent election victory.
External factors
External factors and the donors’ ambiguous role. The lack of economic development and the
recurrent political and economic crises appear to be largely endogenous. Yet, some external
factors also play an important role in the country’s trajectory. The NWW framework considers
outside interventions to be exogenous (no interaction with internal dynamics) and temporary.
However, in a country such as Madagascar, external factors are not limited to shocks but also
include persistent elements with long-term repercussions: the arrival of foreign firms with the
onset of globalisation, the influence of donors who have a permanent presence in the country
and the political choices they impose.33 These outside interventions may have perverse effects
with outcomes that are sometimes more negative than positive. For example, the donors’
effective and ongoing actions, which have tended to weaken the State (and not just shrink it)
since the early 1980s, have been disastrous (Jütersonke & Kartas, 2010; Urfer, 2012). Structural
adjustment programmes (SAPs) were the cornerstone of all the economic policies implemented
in Madagascar for nearly twenty years. Not only were their results less than poor in terms of
growth, but their most damaging long-term impact – for economic, financial and ideological
reasons – was the destabilisation and loss of credibility of state institutions and public action, and
of the civil servants in charge of implementation (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2001). In the end,
two waves of privatisation (1980s and 1990s) led to the former state monopolies being
transferred most often to those well-connected to the successive governments, while none of the
benefits expected from reform materialised in any decisive way.
Beyond the content of donor-recommended policies, the main intervention arrangements and
their implementation modalities set too much store by the principles governing the allocation of
official development assistance (ODA). On this count, the international community’s forbearance
towards D. Ratsiraka from 1997 to 2001 and M. Ravalomanana from 2006 to 2009 epitomises the
growth premium that characterised aid selectivity. In view of the increases in growth, a blind eye
was turned to corruption in high government spheres in the former case, and to the weakening of
democratic and market-based principles in the latter. In the end, the international institutions’
modus operandi had the opposite effect to the one officially pursued by development policy: the
personalisation of power rather than greater institution-building, on the one hand, and the setting
up of monopolies to the detriment of a more open and competitive productive fabric, on the
other. Conversely, the ODA selectivity principle adopted by the donors from the end of the
1990s only exacerbated their inability to capitalise on their own experiences. ODA can be highly
productive and play a decisive role in helping to avoid the collapse of fragile states. It should
In popular belief, this is an invisible source of power possessed by Malagasy monarchs, which they could transmit
to their descendants and which confers on them their political legitimacy (Bloch, 1983).
32 It can be said that the civil service, the presidential party, the army have in a certain way served to support patronclient relationships or networks (and maybe with the Fanjakana as an enabling supportive institution). But these
relationships were not deep-rooted, extensive, effective, nor organised. They are very temporaryI so in particular
they did not allow elites to build country-wide stable developmental coalitions.
33 External factors have always played a role (the arrival of foreign firms followed and benefitted from that of the
Church and actually dates back to the 19th century) but if the ambiguous role of the colonisation in the past has
been stressed (Brocheux & Hemery, 1995), the ambiguous role of aid and donors is nowadays underestimated.
31
20
therefore be maintained or even increased rather than reduced, as a reduction may well hasten a
tipping point in the case of failed States, with lasting harmful effects (Andriamihaja et al., 2011).
This analysis is, in our view, highly relevant to Madagascar, where aid has been put on hold since
the 2009 coup. New intervention modalities must now be implemented mainly through non-state
actors or targeted programmes aimed at maintaining the State’s institutional capacity.
The continuous pressure from donors, which tends to weaken the State apparatus, together with
the population’s disempowerment, which prevents them from demanding accountability, has
helped to bring on the gradual deterioration and loss of legitimacy of institutions (mainly
state institutions). We have seen that Madagascar had demonstrated its capacity to create sound
and consensual institutions when a real political will existed and when adequate resources were
available to run them. Today, however, the overall failure of the country’s institutions is clear to
see. Statistical survey data for the population reveal that the “Malagasy exception” does indeed
exist: among the countries where the same questions were asked, Madagascar is the country
where the legitimacy of institutions appears to be the weakest (see Figures 3.4 and A3.9 and
A3.10 in the Appendix). This result is not so much due to structural causes as to a progressive
degradation over time.34 This particularly worrying situation reveals the scale of social
deterioration. This is even more problematic since, unlike other African countries where vertical
patronage relationships are organised around structuring factors such as ethnicity, in Madagascar
the Fanjakana has traditionally been the mainstay of patronage at national level and cemented
together the different tiers of the social hierarchy.35 [ And the Fanjakana has not been replaced by
an alternative organic principle able to contain the pressure (anarchy, anomy) towards growing
social entropy.
Figure 3.4: Opinion of and trust in institutions
Gradual failing perception of institutions
Legitimacy of institutions (justice)
80
‐10
70
‐15
60
‐20
50
‐25
40
‐30
30
‐35
20
‐40
10
‐45
0
2008 : Courts make decisions that people
have to abide by
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
MAD
BEN
KEN
CVE
MALI
BUR
SEN
SAF
LIB
MOZ
GHA
NIG
MWI
UGA
TAN
BOT
NAM
LES
Mean
‐50
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Trust in administration
Satisfaction with democracy
Administration efficiency (balance of opinion)
Don’t Know
Neither Agree or Disagree
Strongly Disagree/Disagree
Strongly Agree/Agree
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Antananarivo, 1995 to 2010, Madio Project, INSTAT and DIAL; Afrobarometer Surveys, 2008,
Coef-Ressources and DIAL (for Madagascar); authors’ calculations.
It cannot be totally excluded that the legitimacy of institutions is structurally very low in Madagascar but given the
importance still attached by the population to the Fanjakana in spite of its decay, it seems that there was a loss of
legitimacy for a certain number of state institutions.
35 The Fanjakana is the only structure which covers the whole country through the administrative system, the
education and health service managed by the State.
34
21
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS
Our approach has been to reinterpret Malagasy history in the light of political economy and also
to conduct empirical analyses of original data to identify the blocking factors and the potential
levers able to engage the country in a sustainable positive dynamic. Madagascar’s long-running
economic underperformance (the enigma and paradox) is not due to those factors most often
advanced by classical and recent development theories. Neither the accumulation of factors of
production (capital, labour), nor geography (remoteness, climate, natural resources, etc.) and
history can be convincingly mustered to explain this anomaly, quite the opposite. The indicators
normally used to characterise social fragmentation, inequality and the quality of institutions prove
ineffectual when it comes to unlocking the puzzle of the country’s past trajectory. The NWW
conceptual framework proposes an alternative approach to describing the way developing
societies function, as it highlights the roles of elites who manipulate to their own advantage,
capture rents and are not development-oriented. We have shown that overall this framework
seems thought-provoking and provides several keys for understanding the case of Madagascar.
Our analysis reveals that the country has all the defining characteristics of a fragile LAO.
However, a number of core specifics ultimately set the country outside the framework proposed
by these authors. Some specific features of Madagascar make it look, in certain respects, like a
mature LAO, and above all, in spite of its fragility, violence is extremely limited as opposed to the
majority of fragile LAOs.
Our analysis of Madagascar’s functioning has led us to foreground three main structural obstacles
to the country’s development. First, there is a high degree of social fragmentation caused by the
fundamentally hereditary and hierarchical social structure that has persisted since the time of the
monarchies and by the many cleavages (towns vs countryside, capital vs the rest of the territory,
elites vs ordinary citizens, the President and his clan vs the rest of the population) that have
appeared over time. Added to this is the atomisation of the population due to the island’s
geography and the atrophy of both formal and informal intermediary bodies. This setting, which
is not conducive to the formation of stable coalitions, enables enormous power to be
concentrated in the hands of a small number of elites that are neither forced nor encouraged to
adopt a medium or long-term vision or take the interests of the vast majority into consideration.
More specifically, the alliances at the top are constantly changing, fragile and confined to those in
the president’s orbit, thus excluding and frustrating potentially influential elite groups who have
the power to destabilise such fragile coalitions. Given that the institutions and organisations,
including the military, are generally weak and that no one faction (formal or informal) has the
monopoly on violence, or even the capacity to mobilise substantial violence, it is easy to overturn
the ruling power with meagre financial and human resources). Secondly, although they lay claim
to democratic principles, citizens are torn between aspirations for democracy and meritocracy
and the traditional values that demand respect for the real and symbolic hierarchies inherited
from the past. Finally, external factors have had a major impact on the country’s trajectory. While
it is impossible to reach an overall positive or negative conclusion about the country’s trajectory,
it is clear that the policies promoted, and even imposed, by the donors (policy content and
implementation modalities) have had disastrous and lasting consequences for the country. This is
particularly the case for the State’s weakened capacity to regulate society.
Yet despite these deep-rooted blockages, Madagascar has evidenced a surprisingly modern
capacity to change. Firstly, although the reproduction of the elites through birthright and their
capacity to mobilise networks chiefly aims to ensure and secure their control of power and
capture of rents to the detriment of the rest of the population, the system is not totally failsafe.
This is evidenced by the dual transition: economic (with the emergence of a class of new
entrepreneurs in the export-processing zone for example) and political (with democratic changes
in government), even if the latter still needs to be consolidated. Secondly, from an institutional
perspective, the country has distinguished itself by setting up mature LAO-type organisations,
22
albeit only local and temporary, on three fronts: economic, bureaucratic and political. These
achievements belie the notion of a “structural” inability of developing countries to make such
institutions work without misusing them. Thirdly, despite the recurring political crises,
Madagascar is characterised by a limited recourse to political violence, due to the deep-rooted
social condemnation of any form of violence, which is regarded as taboo. To conclude and above
all, our analyses emphasise the fact that the mass of ordinary citizens do count, and not just the
elites. Our results show that citizens play a central role in events and in the country’s trajectory.
They enjoy a form of autonomy and are not simply ‘manipulated’. In all of the crises, popular
discontent has been one of the underlying drivers of protest movements. Although citizens are
attached to social stability, they nonetheless voice their demands, be it in regard to improved
welfare or transparency and participation, which are the very stuff of democratic citizenship, and
they seek ways to ensure their voices are heard. There is a general lesson to be learnt from these
results. The role played by the population, and notably by its aspirations (a role singularly
neglected by the NWW analytical framework), must be taken into account, even in the most
fragile States.
As we have seen, the characterisation of the prevailing social order is not immutable, and a
number of new elements (already operative or having future impact) are likely to change the
situation sooner or later. Three elements deserve to be mentioned: the emergence of new rents,
the decline of political theology and, to a lesser extent, ecological developments.
In the past, “economic” rents were not highly concentrated (even if they did not benefit the great
majority) and involved only limited amounts. The discovery of new and rare non-renewable
resources (linked to the boom in commodity prices) tends, however, to introduce a new factor
that is propitious for the country (given the extent of the resources in question) but also risky
(due to the possible tensions generated by rent-seeking behaviour). Already, the ilmenite (QMM)
and nickel-cobalt (Sherrit) mining operations have attracted a huge influx of foreign investment
since 2007 (DG Trésor, 2011). The stepping-up of bauxite extraction (Rio Tinto-Alcan) and, in
the longer term (and less certainly), oil production at Bemolanga (Total) could further increase
the value of these mineral rents in the future. From this point of view, Madagascar, which has
thus far been spared, could be adversely impacted by the same ills that have affected the most
resource-rich countries (Dutch disease and the natural resource curse), notably in sub-Saharan
Africa and South America. At the same level, but in a different domain, large-scale land grabbing
constitutes a real threat. The growing worldwide need for farmland that calls into play
institutional actors and corporations from Asia (China, South Korea, Japan and India) and the
Middle East (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia) could give rise to a destabilising pressure on
land if ever a government were to embark on the sale or transfer of large swathes of land (the
project to rent to the Korean firm Daewoo for 99 years farming land covering an area large as
Belgium). This is what Mr Ravalomamana allegedly tried to do in 2009, opening the way to
accusation of “alienating the land of ancestors” and this attempt was a key factor in his loss of
legitimacy.
The long-term social stability of Malagasy society depends on a political theology that makes the
use of violence taboo and insists on respect for leaders and the hierarchical order as a basic tenet.
This political theology is however tending to wane with time. The taboo of violence changed
somewhat with the 2009 crisis, which was accompanied by new phenomena involving
interpersonal violence, looting and challenges to the social hierarchy (Vivier, 2010; Galibert,
2009). Since this latest crisis, the country has experienced a sharp increase in social violence both
in urban areas, where insecurity has reached alarming levels in the eyes of the population, and in
the rural areas of the South, where the activities of the dahalo36 have reached an unprecedented
36
The dahalo are organised gangs that steal zebu in rural areas.
23
scale37 (Razafindrakoto et al., 2013). Added to this increase in common violence is the risk of a
pathogenic spreading of State violence. Historically confined to background and relatively
legalistic, the army is showing disturbing signs of disintegration as shown by the attempted
mutinies, which are admittedly on a small scale but increasing sharply.
The arrival of vast windfall rents from natural resources coupled with the proliferation of formal
and informal violent organisations that may be impossible to control are likely to tip Madagascar
into a deeper cycle of institutional failure, economic downturn and greater poverty for its citizens.
This kind of scenario which seems already at work in a context of expanding predatory elites’ role
and recurrent open conflicts characteristic of many of the continent’s failed states. This disaster
scenario could be fed by future ecological changes, which constitute an additional destabilising
factor. In fact, climate disturbances tend to weigh heavily on Madagascar, which is already one of
the African countries most vulnerable to natural shocks (particularly cyclones), as a quarter of the
population (that is, 5 million people) live in disaster-prone areas (GAR, 2009).
More generally, according to the terminology of the NNW framework, Madagascar would rank
more among the “fragile LAOs”. Yet, it also presents certain characteristics of more “mature
LAOs" or even OAOs. Two paths then open up. The first follows the pattern of social
transformation implicitly advanced by the NNW framework (2012), with Madagascar shifting to a
basic LAO in order to restore stability. The elites would then organise themselves into factions in
order to establish their power with some points of support at grassroots level based mainly on a
more organised top-down patronage system. The elite factions would ensure the stability of their
power by threatening violence. This scenario would allow a stable social order to gradually
become established, but would also mean abandoning the democratic process.
On the other hand, the second scenario involves consolidating the country’s institutions and
fostering the creation of intermediary bodies that could forge the missing link between state
leadership and the grassroots. This dynamic would give more voice to citizens as it could take
advantage of the absence of strong pro-elite organisations likely to block access to economic and
political power. The consolidation of democracy would be achieved through an inclusive social,
political and economic dynamic. This path would aim to move Madagascar from its status as a
fragile natural state to that of a “mature” LAO, which allows all the societal stakeholders to
participate and play their role in the development process. This second path is, we believe,
possible and obviously more desirable, but also more difficult to navigate and above all it would
need time. It requires the introduction of a new social contract between all the actors on the
Malagasy scene.
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enquêtes statistiques », in Cling J.-P., M. Razafindrakoto and F. Roubaud (eds), Les nouvelles stratégies
internationales de lutte contre la pauvreté, 2nd edition, Economica/IRD, Paris, pp.141-165.
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est-elle possible ?”, Afrique contemporaine, No. 202/203, April-September, pp.75-92.
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in Raffinot M. and F. Roubaud (eds), Les fonctionnaires du Sud : sacrifiés ou protégés ?, Autrepart, No.20,
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Lahiniriko, L. Razafimamonjy, D. Razafindrazaka), Paris.
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Razafindralambo, L.N. (2005a), “Construction d’identité et relations de dépendance : descendants
d’anciens maîtres et descendants d’anciens ‘esclaves’ en Imerina”, Taloha, No.14-15.
Razafindralambo, L.N. (2005b), “Inégalité, exclusion, représentations sur les Hautes Terres centrales de
Madagascar”, Cahiers d’Etudes africaines, XLV (3-4), pp.879-903.
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C. Toulabor (eds), L’Afrique Politique 2001 : réformes des Etats africains, Karthala, Paris, pp.85-98.
Roubaud, F. (2000), Identités et transition démocratique : l’exception malgache ?, l’Harmattan/Tsipika, Paris.
Tronchon, J. (1974), L’insurrection malgache de 1947 : essai d’interprétation historique, Maspero, Paris.
Urfer, S. (2012a), Madagascar, une culture en péril? Tananarive: No comment@éditions, Antananarivo.
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28
APPENDIX
Figure A1.1 The Malagasy puzzle: an inexorable economic decline
GDP per capita 1960-2010 (current US$)
GDP per capita 1950-2010 (1990 intl. GK$*)
5000
2 500
4000
2 000
3000
1 500
2000
1 000
1000
500
0
0
Madagascar
Sub‐Saharan Africa (developing only)
East Asia & Pacific (developing only)
Madagascar
1200
300
1000
250
800
200
600
150
400
100
200
50
0
0
Sub‐Saharan Africa
Madagascar
Sub‐Saharan Africa
Madagascar
Sub‐Saharan Africa
Cote d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Cote d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Source: Maddison (2011), WDI (2012); author’s calculations.
Figure A1.2 The paradox confirmed
GDP per capita and consumption 1960-2010
Poverty rate 1960-2010
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
GDP/cap
Urban GDP/Urban pop
Consumption/cap (Tana)
Consumption/cap (Urban)
P0 urban
P0 rural
P0 national
Source: INSTAT, MADIO, DIAL, national accounts and different household surveys; author’s calculations.
29
Figure A1.3: Low prevalence of ethnic issues in Madagascar
National identity vs ethnic identity
Comparative political influence of
the different ethnic groups
100%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
National ID before ethnic
EthnicIDbeforenational
10%
0%
UGA
BEN
TAN
LIB
KEN
SEN
CVE
MWI
GHA
MOZ
TOT
ZIM
NIG
MALI
BUR
NAM
SAF
ZAM
LES
BOT
MAD
ZAM
UGA
LIB
GHA
LES
NIG
NAM
ZIM
BUR
MOZ
BOT
TOT
KEN
BEN
MALI
SEN
MWI
SAF
CVE
MAD
TAN
20%
National&ethnicIDequal
ND
More
Same
Less
Source: Afrobarometer Survey, 2008, Coef-Ressources/DIAL (for Madagascar); author’s calculations.
Note: The ethnic group of the respondent has more/same/less political influence than other ethnic groups
Table A2.1: Opinion of the elites about the different periods of Malagasy history
Very or rather positive (in %)
Monarchies (pre-colonisation)
very positive
Colonial period
very positive
Period under P. Tsiranana
Period under G. Ramanantsoa
very positive
very positive
Period under D. Ratsiraka 1 (1975-1991)
very positive
Period under A. Zafy
very positive
Period under D. Ratsiraka 2 (1997-2001)
very positive
Period under M. Ravalomanana 1 (2001-2005)
very positive
Period under M. Ravalomanana 2 (2006-2008)
very positive
Period under A. Rajoelina
very positive
Political
sphere
Economic
sphere
Public
institutions
Other
Total
72.0
11.9
47.1
7.7
83.1
20.4
50.0
6.0
34.1
2.9
32.1
3.6
45.3
7.1
75.7
20.1
39.8
5.7
27.1
2.4
81.7
13.5
58.8
4.6
86.8
17.1
48.8
5.7
22.9
2.3
19.4
1.6
41.9
2.3
88.5
20.8
40.5
3.8
19.1
0.8
90.6
9.4
50.8
4.8
87.5
18.8
60.3
6.4
29.7
6.3
25.4
1.6
39.7
1.6
85.9
26.6
50.0
15.6
18.8
3.1
80.0
8.0
46.2
3.9
73.1
23.1
61.5
7.7
29.6
3.7
18.5
0.0
37.0
3.7
81.5
22.2
59.3
14.8
14.8
0.0
78.9
11.8
51.5
5.9
84.4
19.2
52.1
6.1
29.3
3.3
25.8
2.3
42.7
4.4
82.1
21.5
43.5
7.5
22.2
1.8
Source: ELIMAD Survey, 2012, Coef-Ressources and DIAL; authors calculations. (Number of respondents: 400)
Notes: The sample size for this survey was increased. Similarly, the same questions were asked in surveys on a
representative sample of the total population. The results are currently being analysed.
For a definition of the elites and their classification in the different spheres of power, see the working document by
Razafindrakoto et al. (2013).
30
Figure A3.1: Conflicts and violence
Violent conflicts due to competition between political parties
Party competition leads to violent conflict
Something stolen from house
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
Always
Often
Rarely
Never
0%
MAD
CVE
MALI
LES
TAN
BEN
NAM
MWI
GHA
BOT
TOT
BUR
KEN
ZAM
SAF
NIG
SEN
ZIM
MOZ
UGA
LIB
BOT
MAD
BEN
GHA
ZAM
TAN
MALI
CVE
MWI
BUR
MOZ
TOT
NAM
SAF
SEN
LIB
UGA
LES
NIG
KEN
ZIM
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Victim of home burglary
Several times
Just once or twice
Never
Source: Afrobarometer Survey, 2008, Coef-Ressources/DIAL (for Madagascar); author’s calculations.
Figure A3.2: Dynamic of formal employment inside and outside the Free Zone: 1995-2010
450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 ‐
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2006 2010
EPZ
Formal private sector (excl. EPZ)
Total
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1995-2010, MADIO, DIAL/INSTAT, authors’ calculations.
31
Figure A3.3: Civil service wages, crisis and level of corruption in Madagascar 1995-2006
45
180
Political crisis
40
30
140
25
120
Active anti‐
corruption policy
20
15
100
10
Base 100=1995
160
35
80
5
0
60
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Corruption
2001
2002
2004
2006
2010
Civil servants real wage
Sources: Razafindrakoto & Roubaud (2003) and 1-2-3 Surveys, 1995-2004, MADIO, DIAL/INSTAT, authors’
calculations.
Note: the corruption “module” was not included in 1996, 1997 and 1999. For corruption, an objective indicator is
used (% of the population affected by bureaucratic corruption over the year).
Figure A3.4: Changes in GDP, household income and aspirations
140
130
Political crisis
Political crisis
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mean Income/capita (1998=100)
MIQ = aspirations (100=average income 98) GDP per capita (100=1998)
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1995 to 2010, Madio Project, INSTAT and DIAL, authors’ calculations.
32
Figure A3.5: Changes in GDP and some governance indicators
90
70
Political Crisis 2008‐09
Political Crisis 2001‐02
GDP per capita
110
90
50
30
70
10
50
‐10
30
‐30
‐50
10
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Administration efficiency (balance of opinion)
Evolution of grand corruption (balance of opinion)
Equal treatment under the law (bal. Op * AB urban)
GDP per capita (100=1998) (right scale)
Evolution of petty corruption (balance of opinion)
Freedom of expression (bal. opinion* AB urban)
Trust in administration
Satisfaction with democracy
Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1995 to 2010, Antananarivo, Madio Project, INSTAT and DIAL; Afrobarometer Surveys (AB), 2005 and
2008, authors’ calculations.
Note: the AB curves are for the urban population.
Figure A3.6: Gap between urban and rural interest in public affairs
Interest in public affairs
100%
15
90%
10
80%
70%
5
60%
50%
0
40%
-5
30%
20%
-10
10%
0%
Very interested
Not very interested
"Interested" Gap urban-rural (scale on left)
Somewhat interested
Not at all interested
Sources: Afrobarometer Survey, Coef-Ressources/DIAL (for Madagascar), 2008; author’s calculations.
33
TAN
BUR
KEN
MALI
BOT
GHA
BEN
MOZ
SEN
LES
TOT
ZIM
MWI
ZAM
UGA
NAM
MAD
NIG
SAF
CVE
LIB
-15
Figure A3.7: Respect for authority and the leaders’ raiamandreny status
Controlling the actions of leaders or
respect for authority
Leaders accountable for their actions
or acting like parents
2005 Citizens should:
A. Be more active in questioning the leaders
B. show more respect to authority
2008 Gouvernment are :
A. Like employees, population employer
B. like parents
100%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Agree strongly with A
Agree with A
Agree with B
Agree strongly with B
Neither A nor B
DNK
0%
Cap vert
liberia
madagascar
nigeria
mozambique
ghana
mali
S. africa
benin
namibia
botswana
uganda
Burkina
senegal
zambia
malawi
tanzania
kenya
zimbabwe
lesotho
Total
namibia
madagascar
cap vert
mali
mozambique
South africa
uganda
senegal
nigeria
botswana
lesotho
zambia
ghana
benin
tanzania
kenya
malawi
Total
10%
Agree strongly with A
Agree with B
Neither A nor B
Agree with A
Agree strongly with B
DNK
Sources: Afrobarometer Surveys, 2005 and 2008, Coef-Ressources/DIAL (for Madagascar); author’s calculations.
Figure A3.8: Absence or weakness of formal and informal intermediary bodies
Contact with local councillors
Feels close to a party
Never
34
Only once
A few times
Often
BEN
LIB
NIG
MAD
ZIM
BUR
SEN
LES
ZAM
TOT
GHA
CVE
SAF
NAM
UGA
KEN
MALI
MWI
MOZ
BOT
TAN
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
MAD
MWI
NAM
MOZ
SEN
NIG
CVE
BUR
BEN
TOT
SAF
ZAM
LIB
TAN
LES
MALI
GHA
BOT
KEN
ZIM
UGA
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Yes, feels close to a party
No, not close to any party
Traditional leaders try their best to listen to
what people have to say
Member of an association or community group
Not a Member
Inactive Member
Active Member
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
TAN
MAD
SAF
LIB
BEN
NIG
SEN
MOZ
Mean
NAM
GHA
UGA
LES
KEN
MWI
BUR
BOT
MALI
MAD
BOT
ZIM
MOZ
CVE
NAM
SAF
ZAM
MWI
TOT
TAN
LES
UGA
GHA
NIG
BUR
BEN
SEN
KEN
LIB
MALI
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Often / Always
Never / Only Sometimes
Don't Know
Sources: Afrobarometer Survey, 2008, Coef-Ressources/DIAL (for Madagascar); author’s calculations.
Figure A3.9: Legitimacy of institutions (police, tax authorities)
2008: Tax department has the right to make
people pay taxes
2008: Police have the right to make people
obey the law
MAD
CVE
NIG
SAF
BUR
KEN
MWI
BEN
TAN
MOZ
MALI
UGA
LIB
NAM
BOT
SEN
GHA
LES
Mean
Strongly Agree/Agree
Strongly Disagree/Disagree
Neither Agree or Disagree
Don’t Know
BUR
MAD
CVE
BEN
SAF
LES
SEN
NIG
KEN
MWI
NAM
UGA
MOZ
TAN
MALI
BOT
LIB
GHA
Mean
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Strongly Agree/Agree
Strongly Disagree/Disagree
Sources: Afrobarometer Survey, 2008, Coef-Ressources/DIAL (for Madagascar); author’s calculations.
35
Neither Agree or Disagree
Don’t Know
Figure A3.10: Less trust in institutions
Trust police
Trust courts law
100%
100%
90%
Not at all
80%
90%
80%
70%
Just a little
60%
50%
Not at all
70%
60%
50%
40%
A lot /
Somewhat
30%
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0%
Just a little
40%
A lot /
Somewhat
0%
2005 2008
2005 2008
2005 2008
Urban
Rural
Total
2005 2008
Urban
2005 2008
2005 2008
Rural
Total
Sources: Afrobarometer Surveys, 2005 and 2008, Madagascar, Coef-Ressources/DIAL; author’s calculations.
36