Rhetoric and Practice of the Local Ownership Principle in EU-Supported
SSR
Filip Ejdus, SPAIS, University of Bristol
Paper prepared for the 41st BISA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 15-17 June 2016.
Please don't cite without permission.
Introduction
The end of the Cold War removed from the international security agenda bipolar rivalry
and put front and centre issues of development, democracy and governance. As a result of
this, the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) emerged in the late 1990s linking
democratic governance, human rights, development and security into a single agenda
(Brzoska 2003). The very term SSR was pioneered by the UK government in 1999 before
being endorsed by a number of European countries, OECD and other international
organisations and NGOs involved in peace, security and development issues. While majority
of national and international development donors accepted the rhetoric of SSR, practical
operationalisation and adaptation to local contexts proved much harder to achieve (Chanaa
2002, Sedra 2013).
One of the key lessons learned from the first generation of SSR, which focused on
building institutional and legislative frameworks, was that externally imposed reforms are
unsustainable because they are not supported by a genuine commitment of local stakeholders
(Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002). In order to successfully accomplish the second
generation, which concerns the consolidation of new practices and the establishment of
effective institutions of democratic security governance, reforms needed to “be driven from
within the local context” (Edmunds 2002, 23). In order to respond to this challenge, the
development donor community translated the concept of local ownership from the field of
development into a guiding principle of SSR. According to the OECD-DAC guidelines which
has been a key influence for vast majority of SSR practitioners “(e)xperience shows that
reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of
those undertaking reforms” (OECD 2005, 13). The rhetoric of local ownership was also
endorsed by regional organizations, major aid agencies, countless NGOs and research
institutes the world over. The local ownership became “the gold standard of successful peace
and statebuilding” (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012, 251).
1
Since the late 1990s, the EU has been at the forefront of international support for SSR.1 In
addition to the bilateral assistance provided by its member states, the EU has been supporting
reforms in the security sectors of non-member states across all three pillars (Hänggi and
Tanner 2005, 29).2 In 1998, the EU launched the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). From the very outset, the
policy has had a strong SSR component, which is also reflected in the European Security
Strategy from 2003 (EU 2003c).3 That same year, the EU launched its first ESDP operation EUPM Bosnia, tasked to reform the Bosnian police. Since then, the EU has launched
altogether 35 operations out of which 27 with a mandate to support SSR. In fifteen out of
eighteen currently deployed CSDP operations across Europe, Africa and Asia, the EU has
been assisting local authorities to reform their police, military or judiciary to provide more
effectively human and national security within the framework of democratic governance.4
In addition to this, the European Commission has been supporting reforms in the field of
law enforcement, border management, justice reform, disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration (DDR), civil management and civil oversight through enlargement,
development, neighbourhood and justice and home affairs policies in more than 100 countries
in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Over the period 2001-2009 the European
Commission donated €1bn for SSR in 105 partner countries. This figure excludes the EC
support to SSR-related activities in the countries covered by Enlargement Policy (Particip
2011, 7). If we add to this number thirteen countries that joined the EU since then and seven
current candidate or potential candidate states we come to a number of 125 countries in
which the Commission has supported SSR. When combined with the number of countries
that received support through CSDP, it turns out that the EU has been transforming security
sectors in more than 2/3 of UN member states.
According to EU policy documents, one of the core principles underpinning all EU
actions in support for SSR is local ownership. In fact, the EU policy discourse is replete with
references to this principle. While the issue of ownership in wider peacebuilding activities
has attracted some scholarly attention in recent years, so far no single study has ventured into
1
In fact, the very concept of SSR was borne out of the post-Cold War reorganization of the European security
The three pillars of the European Union, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 were the European
Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. The pillars-structure was
abolished by the Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force in 2009.
3
The Lisbon Treaty (2009) renamed the policy into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
4
For an update overview of completed and on-going CSDP operations please visit:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/
2
2
the way it has been conceived and practiced in the context of the EU. In this paper, I aim to
fill this gap by investigating how the EU narrates the local ownership principle in its support
for SSR across different policy and geographic areas and how it has operationalised the
principle in practice. To this end I rely on policy documents, internal evaluations as well as
independent scholarly literature and make two inter-related arguments. First, I show that local
ownership has been conceived in the EU discourse as a government-centric gradual transfer
of responsibility for liberal security governance whose scope and pace should depend on the
context. Second, I demonstrate that in practice the EU has faced significant obstacles in living
up to the principle not only in CSDP missions and operations but also in EC-supported
reforms. In the conclusion, I discuss some reasons behind this implementation gap.
The structure of the paper is as following. In the first section the existing academic
literature on local ownership in EU-supported SSR is reviewed. The second section analyses
how local ownership has been narrated in EU policy discourse on SSR. In the final section I
scrutinise whether the EU has lived up to its own hype on ownership in practice.
1. Local ownership in SSR activities of the EU: a literature review
In the most general sense, local ownership is a principle based on the assumption that
international involvement in domestic processes is only viable if it relies on local capacities
and leadership. The language of ownership was introduced into the development jargon in the
OECD document which stated: “For development to succeed, the people of the countries
concerned must be the ‘owners’ of their development policies and programmes” (OECD
1995, 2). In the following years, as the fields of development and security increasingly
merged (Duffield 2001, Duffield 2007) the local ownership principle was translated into an
idiom of peacebuilding (Brahimi 2000, UN 2001, ICISS 2001, OECD 2007a, b, 2005, UN
2008a, UN 2008b, UNDP 2015). For the UN, local ownership “is not something that is
merely desirable or politically correct; it is an imperative, an absolute essential, if
peacebuilding is to take root” (UN 2010, 5).
The issue of local ownership in peacebuilding in general and SSR in particular has been a
subject of growing scholarly interest (Scheye and Peake 2005, Donais 2009, 2008,
Chesterman 2007, Brinkerhoff 2007, Nathan 2008, 2007, Wilén 2009, Narten 2008, Bøås and
Stig 2010, Oosterveld and Galand 2012, Hellmüller 2012, 2014, Richmond 2012, Gordon
2014, Grøner Krogstad 2014, Lee and Özerdem 2015). In contrast to the enthusiasm about
3
the local ownership principle expressed in policy statements, the academic literature has been
much more cautious. Simon Chesterman, for example, has depicted local ownership as a
“motherhood statement” that is “used to imply varying degrees of local control that are
typically not realized” (Chesterman 2007, 20). While it is beyond the scope of this article to
make a thorough review of this fast growing and diverse body of knowledge I will focus in
this section on three important debates that clearly stand out.5
The first debate is about to the very concept of local ownership and three distinct
perspectives have crystallised over the years. From the liberal point of view, local ownership
should be an end-goal of SSR. In order to achieve it, international actors need to gradually
transfer responsibility to local authorities by ensuring their buy-in for predefined international
standards of liberal security governance. This is, for example, how Boughton and Mourmouras
see the local ownership principle: “For a government to own a set of policies does not require
that officials think up the policies by themselves, nor that the policies be independent of
conditionality. What it does require is for the owner to appreciate the benefits of the policies
and to accept responsibility for them” (Boughton and Mourmouras 2002, 3).
While this approach has been widespread among policy makers, it has often been criticised
by scholars. Such an understanding of local ownership, as Astri Suhrke has pointed out,
“accentuates the external origin of the programs; local ownership clearly means ‘their
ownership of ‘our ideas”, rather than the other way round” (Suhrke 2007, 1292). From an
alternative, communitarian perspective, local ownership should be seen not as an end but as a
means of SSR. The communitarian approach construes ownership not as an end but as a means
of establishing bottom-up, participatory, legitimate and domestically legitimate peace.
Ownership is not a mere buy in, but an authorship of peacebuilding (Donais 2012, 32). In order
to achieve it, local actors need to have an authorship over SSR in all of its phases, from design
until implementation (Nathan 2008, De Carvalho, De Coning, and Connolly 2014).
Several
authors
have
advocated
the
middle
ground
between
liberalism
and
communitarianism (Scheye and Peake 2005, Donais 2012). Timothy Donais, for instance, has
criticized both approaches as “incomplete strategies for building stable sustainable peace”
(Donais 2012, 13). In his view, durable settlements require resources of both outsiders and
insiders as well as a process of consensus building between locals and internationals but also
among the locals that will lead to a “negotiated hybridity” (Donais 2012, 37).
5
For a thorough review see Bendix and Stanley (2008), Donais (2012).
4
The second debate in the literature has revolved around the question of who the local
owners of SSR ought to be, and positions fall along the minimalist-maximalist continuum
(Donais 2008, 9). The minimalist approach narrows down ownership to governmental elites
and possibly other state actors such as parliaments or judiciary (Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr
1998, 87). The exclusive focus on elites in the government, a preferred modus operandi of
most international donors, has been fiercely critiqued by scholars (Africa 2008, Thiessen
2015, Richmond 2012, Donais 2015, 2012). Such a narrow approach, in the words of Eleanor
Gordon, has “negative consequences for capability, responsiveness, legitimacy and
accountability of the security sector and undermines the principle of democratic governance
that underpins SSR” (Gordon 2014, 129). As an alternative to that, the maximalists advocate
the inclusion of civil-society actors (Ismail 2008), grassroots organizations (Nilsson 2015)
and even the entire citizenry (Martin and Wilson 2008). Only if the wider group of
stakeholders partake in the design, implementation and monitoring of reforms and remain
committed to them, i.e. only if there is a genuine societal ownership of reforms, can they be
fully legitimate and sustainable.
The third debate in the literature has revolved around the implementation of local ownership
in SSR. A vast majority of empirical studies have identified serious obstacles in this respect.6 In
fact, operationalizing local ownership in practice has been, as Mark Downes and Rory Keane
have put it, “one the most complex challenges” facing international assistance to peace and
security (Keane and Downes 2012, 2). In order to provide an account why this is so, majority of
studies have focused on the features of (post) conflict contexts where SSR is taking place such
as divisions among the locals (Donais 2015, 39, Thiessen 2015), activities of paramilitary
forces and informal decision makers (Scheye and Peake 2005), lack of local capacity
(Chesterman 2007, Hansen 2008, Joseph 2007, Khan and Sharma 2003), political will (Gordon
2014, 128) and responsible leadership (Mackenzie-Smith 2015) necessary for a genuine
ownership. Other studies have found the root cause of the rhetoric-practice gap in local
ownership at the international side of the equation, including donor’s domestic constraints
(Oosterveld and Galand 2012, 201), their underlying assumptions (Sending 2009, De Coning
6
Implementation problems in local ownership were identified in Afghanistan (Sedra 2006, Giustozzi 2008,
Jackson 2011, Oosterveld and Galand 2012, Sky 2007, Thiessen 2015), Belize (Scheye and Peake 2005), Bosnia
(Knaus and Martin 2003, Merlingen 2013, Perdan 2008, Perry and Keil 2013, Kappler and Lemay-Hébert
2015), Cambodia (Lee and Park 2015), East Timor (Oosterveld and Galand 2012, Lemay‐Hebert 2011), Haiti
(Gauthier and Moita 2011), Kosovo (Blease and Qehaja 2013, Kappler and Lemay-Hébert 2015, KFOS 2015,
Lemay‐Hebert 2011), Liberia (Bendix and Stanley 2008, Bøås and Stig 2010, Ebo 2007, Pietz and von
Carlowitz 2011), Palestine (Friedrich and Luethold 2008), Sierra Leone (Jackson 2011), Somalia (De Coning
2013a), Sri Lanka (Mohamed 2015), South Sudan (Mackenzie-Smith 2015) and Sudan (Shinoda 2015).
5
2013b), poor mutual coordination (Sky 2007), preoccupation with stability (Billerbeck 2015,
Blease and Qehaja 2013, Brinkerhoff 2007, Hansen and Wiharta 2007) and high-politics
(Leonardsson and Rudd 2015, Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, Roberts 2011).
In recent years, a special niche of interest for EU support for SSR has grown within a wider
field of EU foreign policy studies (Perdan 2008, Altwicker and Wieczorek 2015, DursunOzkanca and Vandemoortele 2012, Faleg 2012, Larivé 2012, Simons 2012, Tholens 2012,
Freire and Simão 2013, Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012, Bossong and Benner
2010, Bloching and Gya 2011, Moore 2014, Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011, CollantesCelador et al. 2011). This literature is replete with examples of poor implementation of the local
ownership principle, some of which will be discussed below. However, while these studies
have offered valuable insights into the challenges within particular CSDP operations or in
particular EC-supported programs, they have stopped short of providing a comprehensive
analysis.
How is local ownership in SSR narrated across different policies of the EU? Is there any
difference in the way this principle has been construed by different EU institutions? Has there
been a gap between EU rhetoric of local ownership and its practice of SSR? What are the key
challenges in the practical implementation of this principle? These questions have so far been
mostly overlooked in the extant literature and it is to them that I turn in the remainder of this
paper.
2. The Rhetoric of the Local Ownership Principle in EU’s Support for SSR
Since the late 1990s, the language of local ownership has permeated policy discourses of
the EU. To begin with, it has been declared as one of the key principles of the EU
development policy. According to the European Consensus on Development, local ownership
means that “Developing countries have the primary responsibility for creating an enabling
domestic environment for mobilising their own resources, including conducting coherent and
effective policies” while together with the EU they “share responsibility and accountability
for their joint efforts in partnership” (EU 2006d, 14). The local ownership principle has also
been adopted as the core principle of EU’s approach to conflict prevention. Thus for example,
the EC states in 2001 that “it is now well recognised that ownership is a condition for
success, allowing for consideration of countries’ own situation, history and culture” (EU
6
2001, 10). Consequently, the EU has integrated the principle of ownership into its regional
approaches. For example, in Africa the EU has promoted the concept of “African ownership”
but also in the Western Balkans where it has strongly encouraged countries to take over
responsibility for regional cooperation (Warleigh-Lack, Robinson, and Rosamond 2011). The
principle of local ownership has also shaped the EU policy rhetoric on SSR.
The EU has codified its approach to SSR in a number of documents. The two most
important ones in that respect are: “EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR” (EU 2005) and
“A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform” (EU 2006a). The
approaches spelled out in those two documents, one by Council and the other by the
Commission, were integrated into a single framework in “Draft Council Conclusions on a
Policy Framework for Security” (EU 2006b). In addition to these three documents, the EU
has adopted numerous other documents that have further articulated EU’s approach to SSR.7
All these documents draw on the OECD-DAC Guidelines and construe SSR as a process
that should be driven by liberal norms such as human rights, rule of law, transparency and
democracy (OECD 2005). Moreover, these documents have also adopted a holistic
understanding of the security sector composed of the core security sector actors, security
management and oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement agencies and non-statutory
actors (EU 2005, 5, 2006a, 5). For both bodies, SSR is seen as a tool of conflict prevention,
post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable development (EU 2006a, 3, 2005, 5-8, 2008, 8).
For the Council, whose concept of SSR is tailored for the purpose of crisis management, the
focus is on capacity building: “Security sector reform seeks to increase the ability of a state to
meet the range of both internal and external security needs in a manner consistent with
democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and
the rule of law” (EU 2005, 9). In contrast to this, the lion share of the Commission’s support
to SSR is meant to take place in stabilizing and stable contexts. Consequently, in its
understanding of SSR the Commission has emphasised transformation:
Security system reform means transforming the security system, which includes all these
7
Official documents: Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP
missions (EU 2014); EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (EU 2006c)
Basic Guidelines for Crisis Management Missions in the Field of Civilian Administration (EU 2002); Handbook
for Police Officers deploying to EU Police Missions (EU 2003b); Security Sector Reform – draft document on
deployable European expert teams (EU 2009); Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council: Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework for Supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR) (EU
2015). Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons learned and best practices in civilian ESDP
missions (EU 2008); EU Comprehensive Concept for Strengthening of Local Police Missions (EU 2003a);
Training Requirements relevant to ESDP - Review 2007 (EU 2007).
7
actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together to manage and operate the
system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good
governance (EU 2006a, 6).
Across the EU documents, SSR has been construed as a long-term process (EU 2006a, 3,
2005, 9). However, for the council, SSR is primarily an “instrument to prevent conflict in
fragile states. It is also a core task in countries emerging from conflict” but can also be used
as “a central element of the broader institution-building and reform efforts in countries in a
more stable environment” (EU 2005, 8). CSDP missions are conceived as instruments that
can foster this linear process of stabilisation. They too are foreseen to progress in phases such
as activation; development and consolidation in case of the rule of law missions (EU 2003a,
12-13) or initial, stabilisation and final phase in police missions with a mandate to substitute
local authorities (EU 2003b, 7). In contrast to this, the Commission has tailored its concept
for reforms “in relatively stable environments” and “in countries undergoing transition and
long-term democratisation processes” but also “in countries in immediate post-conflict and in
longer-term postconflict peace building and reconstruction processes” (EU 2006a, 6).
One of the mainstays of EU’s support to SSR, upon which most of these documents have
insisted, is that reforms need to be locally owned. One document has described local
ownership as a principle “inherent to European approach to international relations” (2008: 3).
Nevertheless, the principle of local ownership is rarely elaborated. The most detailed
discussion on ownership (half a page) is contained in the Council’s 2005 document. It has
defined ownership as a hybrid process that is negotiated between internationals and locals.
For the Council, local ownership is:
the appropriation by the local authorities of the commonly agreed objectives and principles.
This includes the commitment of the local authorities to actions on the ground, including their
active support of the implementation of the SSR mission’s mandate; implementation and
sustainability of SSR are their responsibility” (EU 2005: 11).
On a closer reading of this and other EU documents, a slightly more complex narrative
emerges. In fact, the understanding of ownership that permeates EU documents depends on
the context in which SSR is to be undertaken. In the conflict or immediate conflict scenario
(EU 2005, 12), but also in the activation phase of crisis management operations (EU 2003a,
4) and other “exceptional situations”, the EU is expected to “assume the role of local
authority” (EU 2006c, 20) and “pave the way for long-term country owned SSR reforms
8
based on a participatory and democratic process” (EU 2005, 4). As the situation stabilizes
and/or the mission on the ground consolidates, local stakeholders are expected to assume a
greater degree of ownership. In a stable scenario (EU 2005, 13), or in a consolidation phase
of an EU operation, the aim is to achieve a “full local ownership” which “should be the aim
and a basis for the exit strategy of the mission […]”(EU 2003a, 4). In the final stage of police
missions with an executive mandate, a new-born local police is expected to assume full
responsibilities (EU 2003b, 8).
Several EU documents have acknowledged a potential tension between the liberal norms
underpinning SSR, labelled as the European norms” (EU 2014) on the one hand and the
principle of local ownership on the other. The EU narrative alleviates the tension in two
moves. First, by explicitly stating that insistence on these norms by the EU does not
contravene ownership because: “Inviting the EU to assist in these efforts implies acceptance
of the above mentioned values and the will of the local authorities to enforce them” (EU
2014, 11). Second, even if local stakeholders don't have the capacity or the will to comply
with the “European norms” now, they are expected to gradually buy into them. The Council,
for example, states: “Although these standards might not be fully applied by the partner state
concerned at the time when the EU is considering to bring support a commitment to fully
apply them should be sought by the EU” (EU 2005, 10).
With respect to the question “who the local owners are”, the EU documents have
advocated a holistic but flexible approach. It is holistic because it includes various sectors of
governance but also flexible as it calls for adjustment “to circumstances on the ground” (EU
2006a, 10). This, among other things, means that the EU doesn’t work only with statutory
bodies and civil-society but also with non-statutory defence and police forces (EU 2005, 1314). The choice of partners, at least when the policy discourse is concerned, needs to be
adapted to the context as well. In a conflict or immediate post-conflict scenario the EU
documents have mostly recognized local authorities as those with whom the EU should
negotiate and agree the future course of reforms. Thus, for example, the Council document
which deals with SSR within CSDP operations only mentions local and national authorities
(EU 2005, 7). In contrast to this, the Commission has identified a much broader set of actors
who should buy-into the process that should encompasses different “national and regional
stakeholders” and in particular “civil society and other non-state structures of governance”
(EU 2006a, 7). Finally, across the EU documents, the agency of identifying stakeholders in
any particular context implicitly seems to remain the sole purview of the EU. “Identifying all
relevant and legitimate national, regional and local partners” according to the Council “is a
9
delicate but important requirement” (EU 2014, 11).
In various documents, the EU has stressed the importance of getting the local context
right. Before launching rule of law missions, for example, the EU foresees dispatching of fact
finding missions (EU 2002, 8). Their goal is to accurately assess local situation, legal system
and practices as well as lessons learned in previous international assistance (8-9). The
composition of these missions is another tell-tale aspect of EU’s approach to SSR. According
to these guidelines for civilian missions, fact-finding mission require “a wide variety of rule
of law expertise, including judges, prosecutors, correctional officers and defence lawyers”
while “Experience from participation in previous missions will be an advantage” (p. 9). The
document doesn’t mention area study experts. This clearly suggests that the EU makes its
context assessment through functionalist lenses and benchmarks that are relevant from the
European but not necessarily from the local vintage point.
The privileging of the sectoral and functionalist knowledge over the contextual one, is
present in other documents too (EU 2005, 18, 2007).8 According to a comprehensive list of
training requirements for EU crisis management operations, EU decision-makers, both
civilians and military, are to receive mission specific knowledge such as cultural awareness,
terrorist threats, human rights and language, only at the tactical level. Nevertheless, strategic
and operational levels of training don’t require context-specific knowledge. Instead, training
at these levels relies exclusively on the knowledge about the EU itself such as CFSP, CSDP,
EU instruments, capabilities and financial aspects or about different aspects of liberal security
sector governance (EU 2007, 20).
In sum, the EU documents have construed SSR as a long-term, linear and phasic process of
security sector transformation driven by liberal norms that is meant to foster democracy,
support development, prevent conflict and help in post-conflict reconstruction. According to
the EU policy jargon, local ownership should be one of the key principles of SSR. In conflict
affected or unstable environments, local ownership is portrayed as a gradual transfer of
responsibility for SSR from external actors to local authorities. In stable contexts, when
locals fully accept the normative bedrock of SSR and have the minimum of necessary
capacities to comply, ownership is construed as locally driven and inclusive process while the
EU continues to pay and monitor further consolidation of reforms.
3.
The Practice of the Local Ownership Principle in EU’s Support for SSR
8
This has been one of the prevalent features of peacebuilding practices more widely (Sending 2009).
10
In this section I analyze practical implementation of the local ownership principle in EU
supported SSR. In particular, I investigate how the principle has been operationalized in
different policy contexts and various geographical areas. Unsurprisingly, in its official
statements, the EU has often taken pride that its support to SSR has been fully in line with the
local ownership principle. CSDP mission factsheets, internet presentations and reports are
full of words of self-praise how the EU actions have been “based on democratic participation
and local ownership” (ICO 2012, 40).
In contrast to this, independent assessments have identified serious implementation
problems. Some CSDP operations have indeed managed to respect local ownership rather
successfully such as AMM Aceh (Tholens 2012). Others like EULEX have raised high-hopes
in terms overcoming imposition that had characterised the mission that preceded it (UNMIK)
but failed to fully meet the expectations (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011). The reverse
seems to have been the case in EUPOL COPPS, where local ownership over the process has
significantly increased over time (Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2013, 386). A few
operations, like those in Congo for example, have utterly failed to achieve local ownership
(Rayroux and Wilén 2014, Grevi, Helly, and Keohane 2009, EU 2011).
As a result, the EU’s rhetorical insistence on local ownership has been criticized as a mere
cover for what is a practice of imposition. At best, the EU’s approach to local ownership has
been described as a mere buy-in where Brussels decides the goals and the parameters of
reforms while the locals take the responsibility for implementation. Instead of a genuine
ownership over reforms (in Bosnia) the EU approach, according to Vandermoortele, “was to
initiate the reform and to define its parameters and then to delegate the implementation
process” (Vandemoortele 2012, 207). At worst, the EU rhetoric of local ownership has been
described as a cover for imperial ambitions. For David Chandler, “it is clear that the
promotion of ownership is being pushed by the EU itself and does not involve any real
equality of input over policy guidelines” (Chandler 2006, 104, Merlingen 2007, Merlingen
and Ostrauskaite 2005b, a).
The implementation record of the local ownership principle is undoubtedly
underwhelming and six problems stand out. First, the EU has had particular challenges in
achieving local ownership in volatile and unstable environments. In contrast to stable
situations where the EU was able to afford time and resources to focus on democracy and
development, in unstable contexts it has prioritized stability and its own public image. With
11
an average duration of 3.6 years, CSDP operations that have a mandate to support SSR often
don’t have sufficient time to build comprehensive partnerships with the widest range of local
stakeholders.9 The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is an example of a mission
where concerns about stability and a fear from being seen as a failure have hampered a
greater degree of local ownership. As Keukeleire, Kalaja and Çollaku have written, the
reluctance of EULEX to give a larger role to the Kosovan actors and consequently to
implement the ownership principle is inspired by what we can call the “success paradigm”
and “stability paradigm” (Keukeleire, Kalaja, and Çollaku 2011, 195). It has indeed gradually
ceded control to local authorities, but the entire process was designed, steered and imposed
from the outside while the wider society was excluded from the process (Bossong and Benner
2010, Blease and Qehaja 2013, KFOS 2015).
Second, an important impediment to the local ownership principle in CSDP interventions
has been the executive mandate in certain operations.10 As Ginsberg and Penksa have rightly
observed, “crisis management operations with an executive mandate are carried out with a
‘power over’ approach rather than through collaborative partnerships” (Ginsberg and Penksa
2012, 112). It is unsurprising that EULEX, which is the only civilian mission with an
executive mandate and also the biggest CSDP intervention ever, has often been criticized for
imposition and poor local ownership (Kappler and Lemay-Hébert 2015, KFOS 2015,
Collantes-Celador et al. 2011, Bossong and Benner 2010).11 While the mission proudly
boasts on its website that all of its activities are “fully in line with the principle of local
ownership” independent assessments have shown that the reality is starkly different. In
addition to the executive mandate that EULEX still has in the North, the EU wields enormous
influence over domestic affairs, sometimes directly undermining the ownership principle
9
The average duration was calculated based on 11 missions with a mandate to support SSR that were completed
as of June 2016: EUPM Bosnia, EUPAT Macedonia, AMM Aceh, EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUJUST Lex Iraq,
EUJUST Themis Georgia, EU AMIS Sudan, EUPOL RD Congo, EUPOL Proxima, EUPOL Kinshasa and
EUSSR Guinea Bissau.
10
All CSDP interventions can either have an executive or non-executive mandate. While an executive mandate
implies actions in replacement of the host nation, in a non-executive mandate, the EU is supporting the host
nation in an advisory role. All civilian CSDP interventions are called missions, regardless of their mandate.
Military interventions can either have an executive mandate, and in this case they are called operations, or nonexecutive mandate when they are called missions. So far there have been eight military operations (EUFOR
Althea, EUNAVFOR Sophia, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUFOR Tchad, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR RCA,
Artemis Congo, Concordia FYROM) and one civilian mission with an executive mandate (EULEX). In
common parlance, all CSDP interventions are sometimes called “operations”.
11
EULEX was launched in 2008. Up until 2012, in addition to its role to Monitor, Mentor, and Advise (MMA)
the Kosovan police, judiciary and custom EULEX also had executive mandate in the field of organized crime
and war crimes. Since 2012, EULEX has significantly reduced its executive mandate which is confined to the
North and has focused solely on MMA activities. The new mandate due to start in June 2016 is expected to
further reduce or abolish executive functions of EULEX.
12
(Blease and Qehaja 2013).
Third, across CSDP missions and operations, the EU has invested efforts into ensuring a
buy-in of the top brass of the executive power while stopping short of including wider circle
of state and non-state actors. For starters, CSDP police missions have been following the topdown approach in which senior EU police officials have been co-located with their opposite
numbers in national institutions. The failure to ensure trust and buy-in of lower levels of
police authority has been one of the reasons behind persistent implementation problems in
civilian CSDP missions (Moore 2014). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that CSDP have
failed to engage wider civil-society. In Bosnia, for instance, the EUPM hasn’t reached out to
civil-society. This mistake was partially alleviated in EULEX Kosovo although the mission
has only been consulting civil society on an ad hoc basis (Ginsberg and Penksa 2012). The
evidence on the degree of local ownership in other CSDP missions and operations is scant.
However, it is safe to assume that if societal ownership of SSR is in short supply in Bosnia
and Kosovo, two countries where the EU has the longest and the most comprehensive
presence, the situation in Africa or Middle East may only be worse. As Ginsberg and Penksa
conclude: “CSDP personnel need to find appropriate entry points with domestic authorities,
parliaments, and civil society […] (Ginsberg and Penksa 2012, 116).
The weak societal ownership has been one of the major shortcomings of SSR programs
supported by the EC as well. According to an impact assessment study that covered the entire
support to SSR in 2001-2009,12 the EC has aligned its programs with “partner governments’
priorities though these were not necessarily responsive to the preferences and needs of
citizens and other interest groups” (Particip 2011, ii). Moreover, the EC sought input by
partner state bodies in all phases of project cycle “but involvement of civil society
representatives remained limited.” (27). Finally, the lion share of EC support to SSR has been
invested in state institution-building while a meagre 3% of total support has addressed
civilian oversight of the security sector (37). The low participation of civil-society in EUsupported SSR has been attributed to the weakness of civil society as was the case in some
sub-Saharan countries or reluctance of governments to include non-state actors as was the
case in Nicaragua, Syria or Tunisia (30).
Fourth, the EU support to SSR has often been unadjusted to local contexts both in CSDP
and EC-supported actions. This is particularly emphasized in CSDP missions and operations
12
Excluding the action supported by DG Enlargement
13
in which there is often a problem of understaffing (Bloching and Gya 2011, 16) and high rate
of staff turnover (EU 2011, 22).13 Seconded civil servants spend a little time in the field,
sometimes as short as six months, which is clearly not enough to be properly familiarized
with the local political context, let alone with its culture and society. In case of Somalia, the
EU has been operating for years from Uganda and Kenya without a proper presence in the
country. “This means” one report concludes “that local knowledge, and expertise on local and
country settings, is scarce or absent” (EU 2013, 19). Reforms of the security sector supported
by the European Commission too have suffered from the lack of local input and overreliance
on external consultants (Particip 2011, 41). These programs have often been overly focused
on capacity building while neglecting the needs of the local population. According to an
internal review of EC support to justice and the rule of law, “this has also sometimes
encouraged transplants of foreign legal frameworks and institutional setups, which might not
be appropriate in all contexts” (EU 2012, 7).
Fifth, centralization of decision-making in Brussels has hampered autonomy of the mission
on the ground. When all decisions are made in Brussels, the mission has less leeway to adapt
to the fast changing context on the ground (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012, 148).
Slow decision making in Brussels, and no feedback-loop, curb operational autonomy, as it
has been illustrated well in the case of EUPOL Afghanistan (Larivé 2012, 194). The
Commission-backed SSR programs haven’t been spared from this problem either. Slow and
inflexible decision-making in the EC have negatively impacted service delivery of various
SSR programs. As one internal assessment concluded:
The very long and bureaucratic Commission project formulation and approval process often
worked against national ownership […] When eventually a Decision was made the situation
on the ground had often changed and it was difficult to adapt projects and in this way secure
buy-in by local actors (Particip 2011, 28).
It should be noted, however, that the degree of domestic involvement and responsibility has
proved to be higher in countries where the European Commission used the modality of sector
budget support. In contrast to project budget support, where donors wield significant control
over the project design, management and implementation, in sector budget support objectives
and performance indicators of the reforms are jointly agreed and implementation is fully a
13
This problem has been noted in EULEX (KFOS 2015, 15), EUJUST Themis (Simons 2012, 282), EUPOL
Proxima and EUPAT (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane 2009, 194), EUPOL Afghanistan (Bloching and Gya 2011,
194).
14
responsibility of local authorities (Particip 2011, 29).
Incoherence in the EU has also hindered the implementation of the local ownership
principle. This first and foremost concerns the institutional coherence between the Council
and the Commission. In Bosnia, for example, as Merlingen has put it, “bad blood between the
Althea and EUPM leadership, with the latter complaining that the ‘executive’ approach of the
military undermined its capacity-building approach based on local ownership” (Grevi, Helly,
and Keohane 2009, 164). The rivalry between the Council and the Commission led to an
incoherence between interventionism and local ownership as a persistent feature of the EU
approach in Bosnia (Tolksdorf 2014). But vertical incoherence, between member states and
the EU, has in some cases hampered local ownership too. This was the case, for example, in
Kosovo which has been recognized as an independent state by 25 out 28 EU member states.
However, because five of them haven’t recognized Kosovo and because Serbia has been
fiercely objecting the move, EULEX mission has from the very start been committed,
rhetorically at least, to neutral policy. Consequently, the transfer of authority to local
institutions have been politically complicated and slowed down (KFOS 2015, 19).
Finally, in some cases it is local actors who simply resisted cooperating or taking
ownership. Rayroux and Wilen have argued that this was the case in DRC, where EU SSR
efforts have been hampered by the ability of local actors to resist reforms (Rayroux and
Wilén 2014). A similar problem has been observed in EUPOL Afghanistan. As former Head
of Mission Nigel Thomas has put it: Afghans were ”quite happy to sit in the background and
let everything be pushed for them rather than grasping it and pushing it forward themselves
and taking ownership for a lot of the issues” (HoL 2011: 15). The objectives set for SSR by
the EU have often not been the priority of political elites in Kosovo and Bosnia either. Faced
with domestic resistance to reforms, the EU had to use heavy hand and impose solutions
either through conditionality policy or simply by decree (Collantes-Celador et al. 2011, 149).
Conclusion
In the past two decades or so, the EU has supported SSR in two thirds of the UN member
states. In doing so, the EU has been the main engine behind post-cold war efforts to
democratise security governance in conflict affected and developing countries. Working on
15
the assumption that the SSR is a useful tool of conflict prevention and peace building, the EU
has been investing considerable efforts to change national security “software” in fragile and
developing countries on the global scale. One of the key principles of its support to SSR has
been that reforms need to be locally owned. In the EU policy jargon, the principle entails am
elite buy-into the liberal reforms of the security sector and in case of conflict affected
countries a gradual transfer of responsibility for these reforms, from the EU to local
authorities.
In reality, however, the local ownership principle has proven to be the most challenging
aspect of EU supported SSR. Expectedly, the degree of control that domestic political actors
have wielded over EU-supported reforms has been greater, albeit far from desirable, in stable
environments than amidst conflict or in its immediate aftermath. Consequently, local
ownership has been considerably more difficult to achieve within CSDP missions, which by
default operate in conflict-affected countries and have far less time or local capacities at the
disposal. The challenge of establishing local ownership in CSDP missions is further
compounded if they have an executive mandate that is by default antithetical to ownership.
Why this has been the case? One reason behind the disappointing results might be
unrealistic expectations. The academic culture of criticism had indeed made “autopsying
failure”, as Scheye and Peake have noted, “sexier than diagnosing success” (Scheye and
Peake 2005, 255). However, this is not the whole story and an important factor behind the
implementation gap in EU support to SSR has to do with flaws in the EU policy.
Brusselisation of decision-making and lack of horizontal and vertical coherence have
undoubtedly hampered the EU to live up to its own standards and ambitions in the past. The
long awaited EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform which is due in mid2016 may remove some of the flaws in EU SSR policy but will note make them all disappear.
Some of those flaws stem from the very nature of the EU as a supranational organisation and
will hardly be overcome with a mere policy adjustment. Finally, the implementation gap is
certainly also the result of “a fundamental tension between the idea of local ownership and
shared values underlying SSR” (Jackson 2011, 1809). Closer theoretical and empirical
investigation of how these obstacles play out in different empirical settings of the EU action
is a promising avenue for future research.
16
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