An Analysis of Diplomacy in the War on Terror
By Patrick Blannin and Stuart Murray
Introduction
The War on Terror (WoT) has been the dominant global security issue of the
twenty-first century.1 Since the attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon on September
9, 2001, the world has witnessed two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and numerous
Intel., covert or ‘black’ operations. The WoT have proved costly. A 2014 Congressional
Research Service report chronicled the WoT as the most expensive in war in U.S. history
– totalling somewhere between $4 and $6 trillion” (Belasco, 2014; McInnis, 2016).2 A
terror industry has been spawned to fight the war. In the United States (U.S.) 267 new
departments, such as Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Centre and the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence have been created. Many government’s
counter-terrorism (CT) budgets have doubled and doubled again. In the UK, for example,
annual funding on the security services has increased from £1 bn in 2001 to
approximately £11.7 bn in 2015, with global national security expenditure exceeding
US$ 117 bn.3 In terms of human life the cost has also been exorbitant. The death toll for
Coalitional Forces personnel involved in WoT operations to date (April 2015) is
1
The term Global War on Terror was coined by President Ronald Reagan in 1984 and was adopted by
st
President Bush on the 21 September 2001. The Obama administration sought to distance itself from the
phrase, labelling the fight as the ‘War on Terror (WoT) and more recently the ‘war’ or the fight against (insert
name of group here) or overseas contingency operations. The phrase WoT continues to be widely used by
academia and the media. Therefore, this paper will refer to the fight against international terrorism as the
WoT.
2
From the 9/11 attacks through FY2014, between US$ 3.7 trillion and US$4.4 trillion has been provided for
war operations, diplomatic operations and foreign aid and for medical care for Iraq and Afghan war veterans.
3
The Home Office's Response to Terrorist Attacks - Home Affairs Committee. Section 4, Funding and CounterTerrorism Focus http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmhaff/117/11707.htm; UK
Government Sending Review and Autumn Statement 2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spending-review-and-autumn-statement-2015-documents;
2015 Global Terrorism Index. Institute for Economics and Peace.
approximately 15,249, while over 41,862 Iraqi and Afghan police and security force
members have been killed since 2003.4 The civilian casualties number between 184,500
- 212,500 people and the Watson Institute estimates the Afghan, Iraq, and Pakistan
theatres alone account for the deaths of over 100,000 opposition fighters. Despite the
deaths of so many combatants from the battlefield, the enemy has proliferated. During
the past fifteen years Al Qa’ida has gone from a relative unknown group of hard-line
fundamentalists into a global terror brand, demonstrating a level of criminal
sophistication and strategic nuance previously unknown. Al Qa’ida franchises now take
advantage of political instability in an arc that stretches from the west coast of Africa to
South-East Asia, co-existing in a dark political space with groups including Boko Haram,
ISIL, Lashkar e-Taiba and Abu Sayyaf Group.
The WoT is now firmly embedded in the post-modern international relations
system. Images screened around the world of attacks in Madrid, London, Sousse BeachTunisia, Paris & Brussels are seared into the collective memory of a generation. And
worryingly, the War between ‘us’ and ‘them’ shows no sign of abating. Research from
the Institute Economics & Peace and START at the University of Maryland indicates a
recent surge in attacks. Conservative estimates suggest a ninefold increase since the
year 2000 with 32,658 people killed in 2014 alone; the highest annual total in recorded
history (GTI, 2015: 2; START, 2015). In 2001, when George W. Bush declared that the
War “will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped
and defeated,” few realised the Global War would turn into the Long War. Former CIA
4
Costs of War. Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, Brown University.
http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/War%20Related%20Casualties%20Afghani
stan%20and%20Pakistan%202001-2014%20FIN%20%288%29.pdf; International Physicians for the Prevention
of Nuclear War. (2015). Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the War on Terror, Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. First international edition (March 2015).
http://www.ippnw.de/commonFiles/pdfs/Frieden/Body_Count_first_international_edition_2015_final.pdf; 2
iCasualties: http://icasualties.org/OEF/index.aspx; Department of Defense Casualty Report:
http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf
Deputy Director Michael Morrel agrees, stating that although “there has been a
reduction of the threat from the original al Qa’ida…it is safe to say Islamic extremism is
likely to be with us for generations” (2015: 1). Former Pentagon chief Leon Panetta
(2014) and former CIA/NSA Director General Michael Hayden (2015) confirm this dire
trend: each predicts a thirty-year battle against the current generation of jihadi
terrorists.
Despite wars, expanding budgets, and a general global condemnation of
terrorism, the U.S. and its Western allies appear to have reached an “indefinite
stalemate” in their battle against international terrorism (Deos & Pigman, 2010: 151;
Bunker, 2016).5 If the “goodies”, to use former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abott’s
phrase, are to stand any chance of winning a war “against an abstract entity,” (Hoffman,
2009: 20; Schmid & Singh, 2009: 40) then more intellectual resources need to be
devoted to understanding, engaging and, ultimately, defeating the growing threat of
terrorism. So far, however, the analysis of CT strategies and tactics have been examined
somewhat parochially, via International Relations (IR) mainstays of Strategic Studies,
Political Science, Foreign Policy Analysis, Social Movement Theory (a.k.a. the
deradicalization model), and Social Network Analysis. One perspective, which has
operated at the front and centre of the WoT, has been conspicuous in its absence:
diplomacy. This paper seeks to address this deficiency.
Whether thinking of summit, defence, or intelligence diplomacy, or newer
iterations such as public, digital or cultural diplomacy, the “business of peace” has been
of vital importance in the fight against terrorism (Murray, 2009: 119). Traditional state
actors and “unconventional diplomatic actors” (Berridge, 1994; Murray, 2009: 117;
5
Bunker prefers to label the stalemate as a “strategic pause,” but one which shows no sign of turning to the
Western coalitions favour. p. 1.
Torrosy, 2014) such as the United Nations, prominent civil society organisations (CSOs),
large, western hotel chains (so often the targets), multi-national corporations (MNC’s)
and private security providers, all form part of a global network whose goal remains
unchanged – to defeat the terrorists, deny them sanctuary, diminish their capacity to
recruit and defend the homeland from further terrorist attacks (National Strategy for
Counter Terrorism, 2003: 15). And putting aside the unhelpful over-simplification of
terrorist organisations (TOs) as medieval “barbarians”, a label produced and reproduced by governments and media organisations the world over, we argue somewhat
controversially that groups such as Al Qa’ida or ISIL also practice crude forms of
diplomacy. Like or loathe such opinion, they too communicate, negotiate and represent
a ‘moral’ struggle to disenfranchised individuals and groups the world over.
As yet, no diplomatic analysis of the most pressing security issue of our time has
been forthcoming. This paper seeks to fill this proverbial ‘gap’ in the canon of diplomatic
studies, in other words. Primarily, it argues that any analysis of the WoT - whether
seeking to understand or counter ‘new’ terrorism - is incomplete without mapping and
reviewing the role of diplomacy in the War. Related, and second, we argue that if
theorists and practitioners are to entertain any hope of winning the war then diplomacy,
not the military, must be the vanguard “default responder” to terrorism (Quadrennial
Defence Review, 2006: 86). Should the military remain as the key responder the war
will continue in perpetuity. To entertain any hope of winning the war more theoretical
and practical consideration of diplomacy is vital.
In terms of structure, the paper is divided into three main sections: traditional
diplomacy, networked diplomacy (with an emphasis on peaceful non-state actors
PNSAs), and the diplomacy of terror, that is, the diplomacy of violent non-state actors
(VNSAs). The paper concludes by suggesting a number of recommendations for
theorists and policy makers interested in better understanding the role diplomacy has
played, and can play, in making strategic gains in the WoT.
This paper has three, broad aims. Its initial purpose is to provide the first
diplomatic perspective on the biggest War of the 21st century. To do so, and second, the
paper maps and reviews diplomacy in the WOT from three perspectives: traditional,
non-traditional and radical. The result of this survey, third, and it is hoped, will instigate
greater discussion between diplomatic and terrorism studies theorists and practitioners
on how to better understand and, ergo, utilise diplomacy as the vanguard institution in
the WOT.
Finally, this paper also has three main parameters. Due to the scope, extent and
complexity of the War it would be impossible to examine and theorise on every actor,
incident, policy and case. Therefore this paper provides a grand, abstract or meta
review of diplomacy’s role in the WoT. Second, the paper focusses on U.S. diplomacy,
counter-terrorism and policy. It does so because the U.S. has been the prime victim and
aggressor in the WoT. Where it leads, others have followed, meaning the lessons that
can be learned of U.S. diplomacy are applicable to other Western liberal democracies
participating in the War. We do not, third, seek to provide a final analysis of diplomacy’s
role in the War. To do so would be to deny the purpose of theory, which Hayek (1967:
32) notes is to “merely describe a range of possibilities.” Rather than offer a set of
terminal theoretical assumptions this paper seeks to stimulate, generate and direct the
further development of knowledge on diplomacy’s scope and utility in the WoT.
1. Traditional Diplomacy and the WoT
This section begins by contextualising the WoT and defining traditional
diplomacy. It then describes four sub-categories of traditional diplomacy most
prevalent in the WOT from a theoretical perspective and briefly validates each one in
practice. As noted in the introduction, the paper employs the U.S. as its chief case study.
It does so because the ‘indispensable nation’ is a victim, primary aggressor, and leader
of the fight in the WoT. The U.S. also leads the world in many aspects of CT. U.S. WoT
strategy and tactics are often replicated to some extent by its allied partners such as the
U.K, Canada and Australia.
The September 11 attacks “triggered the most rapid and dramatic change in the
history of U.S. foreign policy” (Walt, 2001; Boyle, 2008). After nine days of concerted
national introspection as well as drafting Public Law 107–49-Authorisation for Use of
Military Force Act, President George W. Bush (20th Sept 2001) introduced the American
people and the world to the ‘war on terror’ when he declared,
“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there…We will
direct every resource at our command…every means of diplomacy, every
tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial
influence, and every necessary weapon of war…to the destruction and to
the defeat of the global terror network…We will make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor
them...Every nation has a choice to make...In this conflict, there is no neutral
ground...You're either with us or you are with the terrorists.”
Practically, the U.S. aimed at “denying sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to
terrorists” and “diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit”
(Bush, 2001, 2006). To achieve these goals, the U.S developed an offensive, Whole-of Government strategy (JCS 3-26 Counterterrorism, 2014: viii) which was to be led by the
military and law enforcement agencies (Posen, 2003; Adams, et al, 2011). 6 Since the
official U.S military response to 9/11 began on October 7, 2001, with Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, the U.S. has led an international coalition in
numerous CT/counter-insurgency (CI) operations around the world in various efforts to
oust the Taliban regime, find Usama bin Laden and destroy the al Qa’ida terrorist
network. The mission resulted in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, multi-national Special
Forces operations in Yemen, North Africa, and the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region,
as well as extraordinary rendition programs operated by coalition intelligence agencies
in various clandestine locations throughout the world (Council of Europe, 2007; UNODC,
2009).
Theoretically, U.S. CT strategies and tactics have been developed and
subsequently analysed using International Relations mainstays such as Strategic Studies,
Political Science and Foreign Policy Analysis, as well as behavioural-based analyses such
as electronic/human profiling case studies and Social Network Analysis that are enemycentric evaluations (Krebs, 2008; Blum, 2010; Jaeger & Siddique, 2011; Byman, 2013;
Walsh & Schulzke, 2015). A body of population-centric analysis, which focuses on aid,
development initiatives (Moss, et al, 2005; Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006;
Bergin & Hately, 2010; Bandyopadhyay, et al, 2011; Choi, 2015) has emerged, as well
the radicalization process using concepts such as Social Movement Theory (DalgaardNeilsen, 2008; Schurman-Kauflin, 2013). To date however, one crucial analytical
perspective has been missing: diplomacy, which informs every aspect of CT in the WoT.
To understand diplomacy’s omnipotence it is important to first describe its
‘essence’, to borrow from the title of Jönsson and Hall’s 2005 book. Since the
6
The military priority is the protection of the state whereas law enforcement prioritizes protection of the
population.
Renaissance, states have been the custodians of diplomacy which is why diplomatic
scholars affix familiar labels to state-qua-state relations: “statist”, “state-centric”,
“rationalist” or “traditional” (Murray, 2009; 118). 7 This article prefers the label
traditional diplomacy; the tradition being that each generation of theorists and
practitioners relies on, develops and expresses admiration for the work of their
predecessors. Echoing Wicquefort, Callieres and Satow, for example, the great
practitioner-theorist Sir Harold Nicolson (1950: 15) defines diplomacy as “the
management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these
relations are adjusted by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the
diplomatist.” Bull expresses the purpose of diplomacy through five key functions –
communication, negotiation, information gathering and dissemination, the minimisation
of friction and symbolism (1977: 163-166). Symbolism is better understood as the more
common term of representation which Sharp identifies as “a slippery concept but one
which we cannot entirely do without … with its emphasis on symbols of power, wealth,
and the grandeur of the state” (1998: 105).8 In short, diplomacy is not only means to a
state end (most commonly a foreign policy end) it is also a civil and civilising institution.
The “engine room of international affairs” (Cohen, 1998: 1), diplomacy is vitally
important to a world divided into hundreds of states and “agents with official standing”
(Mattingly, 1955: 71) in international affairs.
In a general sense, U.S. diplomacy during the WoT has been extremely active. For
example, the Department of State (hereafter referred to as State), regularly organises
bilateral, minilateral and multilateral summit meetings - at institutionalised, networked
7
Lacher, H. (2003). Putting the State in Its Place: The Critique of State-Centrism and Its Limits. Review of
International Studies, 29(4), 521–541. Lacher deconstructs the ‘state-centrism’ in a critique of IR and IPE which
prioritizes the concept of globalism. The term ‘traditional’ relates to the ‘accepted’ concept of modern
diplomacy with the sovereign state as the referent actor.
8
After offering a definition, Sharp states, while academics may wish to take the idea of representation further
than diplomats; they seem to be no clearer about what that involves. p. 105
and ad hoc levels - with domestic partners and international interlocutors. State has
also reinforced and restructured its relationship with Defence and the intelligence
community, supporting military to military relations as well as maintaining the vital
functions of intelligence management, covert operations, and secret diplomacy. Public
and digital diplomacy initiatives have been developed and remain central to U.S. CT
policy. To support these programs, State has incorporated many new front-line services,
establishing the Bureau of Counterterrorism to forge partnerships with non-state actors,
multilateral organizations, and foreign governments in the struggle against the threat of
terrorism at home and abroad. State has also created the Centre for Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) under the direction of the Under Secretary of
Public Diplomacy, a potent mechanism by which State aims to counter anti-American
messages across the digital spectrum. Finally State continues to invest in technologies
which enable it to influence and potentially control both physical and virtual territory.
To allude to the omnipotence, scope and complexity of traditional diplomacy in the WoT
State’s general diplomatic practices can be further distilled into four specific subcategories: summit diplomacy, defence diplomacy, secret diplomacy and public
diplomacy. Each of these is briefly elaborated on below.
Summit Diplomacy
The summit has been one of the main venues for traditional diplomacy during
the WoT. A brief summary of summitry since 2001 demonstrates the pervasive nature
of contemporary diplomacy. Melissen (2003: 3) defines summit diplomacy as “meetings
between incumbent heads of government and/or state, or political leaders.” Summit
diplomacy has often taken centre stage during the WoT when political leaders to centre
stage in a variety of ad hoc and institutionalised forum’s to address this dominant global
security concern (Cohen, 1987; Constantinou, 1996; Langhorne, 1997; Melissen, 2003).
A brief summary of summitry since 2001 is instructive as it demonstrates the pervasive
nature of contemporary diplomacy.
Since its inception in 1947 and more so since 9/11, the United Nations has led
international response to terrorism. To consolidate and enhance its CT efforts, in 2006
the General Assembly entered a new phase of institutionalised CT by agreeing on a
global strategy to counter terrorism. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy seeks
to reduce “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; to prevent and combat
terrorism; to take measures to build state capacity; to strengthen the role of the United
Nations in combating terrorism; and to ensure the respect of human rights while
countering terrorism” (A/RES/60/288). Moving from global to regional CT summitry,
the Eighth ASEAN Summit in November 2002 in Phnom Penh issued a Declaration on
Terrorism, a timely statement given the terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia and in the
cities of Zamboanga and Quezon in the Philippines earlier in 2002. There were several
‘spinoff’ summits generated from the Phnom Penh leaders meeting such as the InterSessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT–TC) in early
2003 as well as the establishment of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre in Malaysia,
which is a key piece a counter-terrorism infrastructure (ASEAN security Outlook, 2015).
Focusing on the U.S., in February 2015 President Obama assembled sixty world
leaders in Washington D.C., for the ‘Summit on Countering Violent Extremism’ attended
by members of the coalition against ISIL. This was the first of number of CVE
conferences held around the world in 2015 (Australia-June, Spain-July, New York-Sept).
At the conclusion of the summit, President Obama announced a three-phase strategy to
combat violent extremism (CVE), two of which are under the auspices of State and are
diplomacy orientated. Obama declared “we all recognize the need for more dialogues
across countries and cultures. But what’s most needed today, perhaps, are more
dialogues within countries -- not just across faiths, but also within faiths…we need to
build and bolster bridges of communication and trust.”9 The brief examples presented
above demonstrate the ubiquitous nature of the summit as a mechanism for generating
trust and cooperation between the actors and trust in the process itself, further
legitimizing diplomacy’s role in the WoT.
Defence Diplomacy
A second subcategory of diplomacy undertaken by State is defence diplomacy.
Tan & Singh (2012: 221) define defence diplomacy as “the collective application of
pacific and/or cooperative initiatives by national defense establishments and military
practitioners for confidence building, trust creation, conflict prevention, and/or conflict
resolution.” The UK MoD define it as “[T]he peaceful application by a state of resources
from across the spectrum of defence, for the purpose of achieving positive outcomes in
the development of bilateral and multilateral relationships … using defence assets to
support diplomatic objectives and further defence interests” (UK Defence Doctrine,
2014: 12). The objective of defence diplomacy is to deploy a state’s military apparatus
as a nonviolent tool of statecraft to shape the regional environment, establishing trust
as well as influencing the conditions effecting the achievement of foreign policy goals.
U.S. foreign policy has ‘always’ been pursued through a closely aligned
military/diplomatic apparatus from the Munroe doctrine beginning in the nineteenth
century. Since then, its goal has been to counter the spread of communism in the
9
Office of the Press Secretary. ‘Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism’, The
White House, February 19, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/19/remarkspresident-summit-countering-violent-extremism-february-19-2015 . The summits 3 phase recommendations
for CVE are: firstly, a continuation of the program to train allies to fight terrorists, secondly to create a counternarrative using technology and people-to-people dialogue to cross cultures and thirdly, initiate development
programs that focus on individual economic empowerment and improving education.
twentieth century, and fight the War on Terror in the twenty-first century. The strategic
engagement of defence diplomacy affords the U.S. the ability to leverage its global
leadership in military strategy, intra-allied cohesion and trust, burden-sharing and
credibility to form ad-hoc, threat specific groupings (Hallams & Schreer, 2012: 324-5).
U.S. scholars’ and policy makers have re-emphasized defence diplomacy, during the
WoT specifically and as a tool of conflict prevention more generally, as it proves to be an
effective mechanism to mitigate a range of national security issues (Cottey & Forster,
2004: 28; SECDEF Carter, 2016).10
Secret Diplomacy
A third, opaque sub-category is the curious business of secret diplomacy.
Corneliu Bjola (2013: 85) defines secret diplomacy as “the method of conducting
international negotiations without public scrutiny,” while Eytan Gilboa characterised it
as “the total isolation and exclusion of the media and the public from negotiations and
related policy making” (1998: 213). The most recognisable element of secrecy is
intelligence which is used to improve a state’s knowledge of the capabilities and
intentions of its competitors. Intelligence gathering is an “ethically neutral” tactic
however the air of neutrality is eroded when intelligence is absorbed under the label of
secrecy (Sims, 2013: 247; State, 2011). Thus, secrecy and diplomacy are inextricably
linked, with the art of intelligence, deception, and covert action being employed by
representatives of the state to “gain competitive advantages over adversaries in both
peacetime and in war” (Sims, 2013: 244).
10
Cottey & Forster claim tensions between China, Japan and South Korea as well as the issue of newly integrated
NATO states from the former Soviet Union could be mitigated by defence diplomacy initiatives. In April 2016,
SECDEF Carter listed five “evolving major immediate challenges involving Russia, China, the DPRK, Iran and ISIL, all of
which would be tackled through multilateral engagement.”
M. E. Bowman (1998) notes that clandestine, coercive and persuasive executive
action, as mechanisms for influencing behaviours have a long history in U.S. foreign
policy from the Secret Intelligence Bureau (SIB) created by Secretary of State Lansing in
1916 to the various levels of integration of U.S. Military Intelligence Divisions, the
Diplomatic Security Service and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with State.11
Unsurprisingly then, U.S. military intelligence as well as its foreign and domestic
intelligence community have played a central role in the WoT. Secret diplomacy has
been active through covert programs of extraordinary renditions and global ‘black sites,’
suspicionless surveillance and warrantless arrest and detention as well as the vital
interstate capacity building, consensus generating and operational unity required to
conduct global counter-terror operations. In an era of openness and free information
the clandestine nature of secret diplomacy could be viewed as archaic and
unrepresentative of contemporary liberal society. Intelligence, covert operations and
back-channel negotiation are essential strategic assets in the WoT (Sims, 2013: 249).
Public Diplomacy
As a compliment to the ‘hard’ instruments of diplomacy, State has also invested
heavily in new, soft and innovative forms of diplomacy. Two of the more prominent
11
U.S. Secretary of State Lansing established the Secret Intelligence Bureau (Bureau of Diplomatic Security) in
1916. The Bureau provided the Secretary with daily intelligence updates obtained from the “war and Navy
intelligence offices, the Secret Service, and other U.S.G agencies as well as allied intelligence agents” and the
clandestine surveillance, including the interception of telegraph and telephone communications of foreign
embassies in Washington D.C.” p. 7
The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence and the National
Security Council but the most significant aspect of the act, according to Bowman, was that it “officially and
publically recognised intelligence gathering as a legitimate foreign policy process.” The SID conducted
surveillance of German diplomatic missions whilst also deploying domestic agents to monitor so called
‘radicals’ from a variety of ideological and religious groups. The collaboration between State and the Army
intelligence Division also led to the creation of the Black Chamber project which was established to collect all
incoming and outgoing cable traffic in the CONUS. President Hoover's new Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson
refused to continue its funding with the now-famous comment, "Gentlemen do not read other people's mail."
American Big Brother: A Century of Political Surveillance and Repression. Cato Institute.
http://www.cato.org/american-big-brother; Yardley, H. (1981). The American Black Chamber. Indianapolis, The
Bobbs-Merrill Company.
categories are public and digital diplomacy. Hans Tuch defined public diplomacy (PD) as
“a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring
about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well
as its national goals and policies” (1990: 3). Actors engaged in PD are essentially
promoting “positive images of their own countries and the values in which they believe”
(Sharp, 2009; Berridge, 2012). For van Ham (2003: 426) the key word is values, the
element of PD that “sets it apart from classical diplomacy” which is overwhelmingly
concerned with issues and interests. PD uses a variety of credible mediums to advocate
States policies to foreign audiences, building durable relationships based on a sound
understanding of its people, institutions, culture and ideals.12 This process has been
described as “retail politics on a global scale” (Smith, 1998: 91).
Advances in ICT have enabled governments to connect with foreign publics in an
unprecedented battle for ‘hearts and minds’ in the WoT. From print to radio, to
television and the internet-of-things, states and non-state actors alike have used PD to
inform and respond to demands of a target audience. As a result, PD is no longer an
exercise in state promotion and has moved towards an essential form of “diplomatic
engagement” (Melissen, 2011: 21; Murray, 2015: 134-38). While U.S. PD efforts in the
WoT are significant and highlight the potential of the mechanism, its limits are clear
when the message conveyed is inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy or military actions.
Melissen (2005: 7) suggested that “U.S. policies towards the Middle East or its military
presence in Iraq, for instance, undermine the credibility of public diplomacy.” More
recently, the 2015 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy urged the Obama
administration to continue to integrate PD with policy-making in Washington,
12
Sir John Kerr, former Brinish Ambassador to Washington, insisted that it “is probably the modern
ambassador’s principle function, to be on television, to be on radio, to accept all platforms” Berridge, 2010:
186.
reinforcing the premise that PD “adds a more sophisticated approach to the military
method of ‘winning’ the war on terrorism” (van Ham, 2003: 442).
Digital/Cyber Diplomacy
PD is a broad term and there are many different means to it, such as culture,
sports, education, alumni and/or music, however this paper will isolate and examine the
new facilitator of PD: digital diplomacy. It has been suggested, “the growth in public
diplomacy coupled with the digital ICT revolution has created ideal conditions for the
emergence of digital diplomacy” (Murray, 2015: 130). Digital diplomacy has been
defined as “the use of the internet and information communications technology in order
to carry out diplomatic objectives, or solve foreign policy problems” (Hanson, 2015: 35;
Digital Strategy, FCO, 2012). Hocking & Melissen (2015: 12) suggest the term ‘”cyber
diplomacy’ has become a synonym for digital diplomacy’ e-diplomacy, 21st century
statecraft as well as referring to the development of a cyberspace regime which ensures
Internet freedom, ‘net neutrality’ and Internet governance.” Holmes definition is more
succinct, referring to digital diplomacy “as a strategy of managing change through
digital tools and virtual collaboration” (2013: 4). Regardless of the terminology the ICT
revolution has enhanced traditional ‘analogue’ diplomacy in a number of ways. Westcott
(2008: 2) claims it multiplies and amplifies the number of voices and interests involved
in international policy-making, it accelerates and frees the dissemination of information,
and it enables traditional diplomatic services to be delivered faster and more costeffectively.
From the outset of the WoT, information dissemination has been prioritized by
the U.S. and the Office of e-Diplomacy established by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
in 2002, to improve State’s use of information, has “been responsible for some terrific
innovations” which relate directly to the WoT (Murray, 2015: 132-33). The U.S.
attempted to get ahead of the Internet curve when Hilary Clinton introduced State to
21st Century Statecraft in 2009 as a strategy for engaging multiple audiences in a
decentralized struggle for power and relevance (U.S. Dept. State 2009; Ross, 2012; Faris,
2013; Hayden, 2013).13 The strategy lead to the creation of proactive programs ‘Engage
America’ and ‘Hometown Diplomat’ which encourage communication between
professional and ‘civilian’ diplomats.14 In 2015, State created a “mutli-disciplinary hub”
to improve resource management, increase knowledge sharing, and provide greater
accountability for development initiatives.15 The coalition partners of the U.S. have
created their own online presence with varying degrees of success and social media
platforms have been incorporated into many MFA’s and IGO’s.16
A 2015 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy report
identified “digital-first public diplomacy” for a number of departments including the
Center for Strategic Counter-Terrorism Communications (CSCC). The adaptability and
dynamic capacity of cyber which makes it so appealing equips policy makers, academics
and practitioners with powerful tools to enhance the levers of national power (Nolan,
2009: xi; Riordan, 2016). State’s embrace of digital as well as its online presence is
increasing its effectiveness and the Foreign Service has access to the latest technology
13
The idea of 21st Century Statecraft is based on an expansive, polylateral view of diplomacy, where a
multitude of non-state actors are enabled by network technologies. p. 26; Senior advisor to former Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, Alec Ross, describes 21st Century Statecraft as an “agenda” that “complements
traditional foreign policy tools with newly innovated and adapted instruments that fully leverage the networks,
technologies, and demographics of our networked world.”
14
U.S. Department of State and U.S. AID. ‘Executive Summary.’ op. cit. State will increase funding for
diplomatic staff recruitment and training to “modernize” and “diversify” the Foreign Service. pp. 13-14
Governments in the post-modern age wield few economising axes more deeply than in respect of the
management of their overseas representation where the process of modernising has tended to also mean
minimising. All of these initiatives are examples of State attempting overcome a problem that is inherent with
the concept of State. It is the ‘Department of State’, it’s designed, oriented and obligated to deal with states
and its primary function is to deal with sovereign entities.
15
U.S. Department of State and U.S. AID. ‘Executive Summary.’ op. cit. The hub will incorporate “analytics,
data science, strategy and knowledge management.” p. 10
16
The G7 released its ICT Communique in May 2016 which emphasized the important multistakeholder
capacity of cyber to enhance the lives of a global population. G7 Leaders Communique. (2016). Charter for the
nd
Digitally Connected World. 2 May 2016, Japan. pp. 1-5.
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000416957.pdf
to compete for the ‘hearts and minds’ as it pursues its WoT policy objectives. Although
the medium may have changed, and the access to affordable technology has increased
competition for a target audience, the political philosophy behind state outreach
remains the same.17
This section has demonstrated that diplomacy matters in the battle against
international terrorism. It is the common denominator to the more visible high-profile
kinetic military and/or law enforcement aspects of the WoT. Without it, none of these
strategies would be possible. The theory and practice of traditional diplomacy has been
given a boost by the WoT. As Kleiner (2008:337) argues “the fight against terrorism has
strengthened state authority” as populations turn to their governments in times of crisis.
Melissen also recognises that “the state is more resilient than is sometimes suggested
and one should not underestimate the innovative capacity of state-based diplomacy”
(2011: 3; Lawson, 2012).18 Foreign ministries, the custodians of state-centric traditional
diplomacy, have incorporated many new front-line services to combat the global
terrorism threat. Old and new diplomatic instruments of State have been used to
understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour, to build and strengthen existing
relationships, and to influence and mobilize actions to advance their interests and
values. Diplomacy, in this respect, has been an invaluable tool of CT. Diplomacy has also
been invigorated by PD as well as digital diplomacy, both of which complement the
more traditional bilateral and multilateral instruments of diplomacy such as summit,
defence and secret diplomacy. Clearly traditional diplomacy has been vital, active and
seminal in the WoT.
17
There are approximately 25 billion devices connected to the Internet of Things and some project that
number may grow to an incredible 50 trillion by the year 2045. EMC2. (2014). ‘The Digital Universe of
Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internet of Things.’
18
Lawson states the current interconnected transnational system is actually “transforming rather than
superseding the state.” p. 14
2. Networked diplomacy, PNSAs and the WoT
Further analysis of diplomacy in the WoT reveals that states aren’t the only
actors involved. Non-state actors are every bit as prominent. Old and new media
organisations disseminate imagery, information and government briefings on a regular
basis. Doctors and nurses from Médecins Sans Frontières risk their lives in front-line
theatres from Mogadishu to Aleppo.19 Individuals such as Julian Assange and Ed
Snowden have surrendered certain freedoms in their quest for government
transparency, and businesses such as BAE, Rapiscan and L-3 Systems have made a
fortune from providing the latest CT technology at airports the world over.20 All of these
actors loom large in the WoT yet little is known about their diplomatic character or the
relations they share with each other and, above, the state. Once more, diplomacy is the
glue that holds this plural network of horizontal and vertical relationships together.
This section changes its key referent object from the state to the non-state actor.
Only one, broad sub-category is required to understand this type of twenty-first century
19
Human Rights Watch. (2015). Attacks on Health: Global Report. Safeguarding Health in Conflict, Human
Rights Watch: 1-24; U.S. Central Command. (2016). Summary of the Airstrike on the MSF Trauma Center in
Kunduz, Afghanistan on October 3, 2015. pp. 726 https://info.publicintelligence.net/CENTCOMKunduzHospitalAttack.pdf ; Investigation and Follow-on Actions In May 2016 the U.N. Security Council issued a
resolution condemning attacks on hospitals. The International Committee of the Red Cross documented 2,400
cases of attacks in 11 conflict zones on medical personnel, facilities and patients in the past three years.
According to the president of Médecins Sans Frontières, “four out of five permanent members of the Security
Council have to varying degrees been associated with coalitions associated [with] attacks on medical facilities.”
th
U.N. Security Council Condemns Attacks on Health Workers in War Zones. New York Times, 4 May, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/world/un-security-council-hospitalattacks.html?ct=t(Today_s_Headlines_and_Commentary11_3_2015)&_r=0 . Some claim “the resolution also
raised an awkward question: Can the world’s most powerful countries be expected to enforce the rules when
they and their allies are accused of flouting them?”
20
In November 2001, President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act into law requiring
screening conducted by federal officials, 100 percent checked baggage screening, expansion of the Federal Air
Marshal Service and reinforced cockpit doors. The Transportation Security Authority is created to oversee
security in all modes of transportation with the CONUS; Mowery, K, et al. (2014). Security Analysis of a FullBody Scanner. Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium, August 2014.
https://radsec.org/secure1000-sec14.pdf ; Aaron Sarkin. (2014).New study proves just how worthless TSA
airport body scanners really are. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/tsa-rapiscan-body-scanner-study/; Marcus
Baram. ( 2010). Fear Pays: Chertoff, Ex-Security Officials Slammed For Cashing In On Government Experience
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/23/fear_pays_chertoff_n_787711.html
diplomacy: that of networked diplomacy. Once this term has been introduced, defined
and situated in both theory and practice, the paper concentrates on the most crucial
actor in the network: peaceful non-state actors (PNSAs). It argues, simply, that
recognition of the valuable diplomatic role PNSAs play in combatting terrorism is vital
to developing a widened view of diplomacy, more effective CT strategies and, therefore,
any hope of ‘winning’ the WoT.
Such unconventional diplomatic analysis is not as implausible as may first
appear. For centuries, conventional diplomatic studies were dominated by state-centric
theories of diplomacy that focussed on the ministry of foreign affairs, its overseas
missions, embassies and consulates, and the professional diplomatic staff within. The
canon of diplomatic studies was dominated by positivist theoretical works, manuals for
novices entering the profession and memoirs by former diplomats. Since the end of the
Cold War, however, post-positivist theories of diplomacy have flooded the field of
studies. These theories “begin by relaxing the assumption that our understanding of
diplomacy must be grounded in the relations of sovereign, territorial states” (Sharp,
2013: 63). The result is a widened understanding of the ‘business of peace’, which
reminds the observer that the state does not have a monopoly on diplomacy.
Paradiplomatic actors such as the Scottish Parliament, large multinational corporations
such as Google, and prominent celebrity diplomats such as Angelina Jolie or Leo Messi,
all practice basic diplomatic functions once reserved for the state.
For Paul Sharp and James Der Derian (1987), it is therefore more meaningful to
construct definitions based on what diplomacy does rather than what it is. Sharp’s
(2009: 13) definition of diplomacy as “first and last, a set of assumptions, institutions
and practices for handling certain kinds of relations between human beings” is popular
when trying to conceive of diplomacy, twenty-first century style. As is Der Derian’s
seminal work On Diplomacy (1988) where he argued that diplomacy is the mediation of
estrangement between representatives of distinct groups. Such understandings of
diplomacy as a plural affair are much better suited for the post-modern, digital era than
traditional theories with their singular focus on the state. Post-positivist theories
describe and account for inter-connectivity associated with globalization as well as the
emergence of new, civil society players who have progressively increased their
influence, power, legitimacy, and credibility. Quite rightly, Grant and Melissen label this
deepening of international relations as “the democratization of diplomacy” (2005: 1-40;
2011: 2).
The term ‘networked diplomacy’ brings together the old and new theoretical
approaches described above.21 Networked diplomacy can be defined simply as a
combination of “two fundamental diplomatic strategies: bilateral and multilateral
modes of action and influence” (Hocking, 2008: 65). For Metzl (2001: 77-78) it is best
conceived of as “sets of interconnected individuals who occupy analogous positions in
institutional or social structures and create new community relationships that build
upon, democratize, and magnify existing social frameworks.” Network diplomacy not
only reflects the deeper range of modern diplomatic actors but also “draws attention to
the different interests, cultures and identities represented by states and non-state
actors” (Hocking & Lee 2005: 67). In nature, these networks are dynamic, adaptable,
informal and collaborative (Gregory, 2015), and support a “range of public and private
actors (sans) agreed rules and norms of (traditional) diplomatic engagement” (Hocking
& Lee, 2005: 7).
21
Network diplomacy goes by a number of different names: National Diplomatic System (Hocking & Spence,
2005; Hocking & Smith, 2010), Multistakeholder Diplomacy (Hocking, 1998), Paradiplomacy (Aguirre, 1999;
Criekemans, 2008) and Polylateralism (Wiseman, 1999, 2004) however all of these approaches bring together
otherwise estranged entities into a transformative process.
Networked diplomacy best describes the theory and practice of modern
diplomacy, as well as the challenges it faces. The WoT is a complex, plural and diverse
conflict involving many different entities with many different influences and goals.
Social, cultural and ideological differences manifest as intense power, brutal and often
bloody power struggles between violent and benign state and non-state actors.
Traditional diplomatic theory and/or practice will not help win or end the war. As
Langhorne notes, the WoT – an irregular conflict involving state and non-state
belligerents, private enterprises, insurgents, militias, and terrorists - cannot be won “by
the existing machinery” (2009: 99). The WoT is a networked war between military and
security forces as well as non-state actors such as NGO’s, IGO’s and regional institutions,
the private sector, the media, traditional and religious leaders as well as the armed
actors actively participating in the violence. Numerous academics contend that a
growing number of non-state actors involved in both intra-state and supra-state
struggles deem it necessary to increase the level of non-state actor involvement in the
management and resolution of those conflicts (Begoyan, 2006; Lamb, 2006; Specker,
2009; Pesto, 2010). A networked, diplomatic solution is vital to any chance of success in
the WoT, in other words.
In the context and purpose of this paper – to topographically and theoretically
map the role of diplomacy in the WoT – the most active, useful and visible non-state
actor in modern, CT diplomatic networks are peaceful non-state actors (PNSAs).
PNSAs22 are now part of the lexicon of international relations and can be easily defined
as “an organized political actor not directly connected to the state but pursing aims that
affect vital state interests” (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012: 3). During the WoT,
PSNAs have established a role for themselves in a process of de-radicalisation, conflict
22
Or NGOs, or CSOs, on NSAs
resolution, and peacebuilding by prioritising inclusiveness and partnership. For
Hocking, PSNAs are no longer mere “consumers of diplomacy” but proactive “producers
of diplomatic outcomes” (2006: 17).
Most of the larger PNSAs have a rudimentary political structure and have
“adopted basic diplomatic functions such as negotiation skills, visible representation,
effective communication, filtered information and political reporting and symbolism”
(Murray, 2009: 125). International PNSA’s such as World Vision, the Aga Khan
Foundation, CARE and InterAction also have flags, policy goals, constitutions, charters
and political representatives (Bashan, 2004: Ohanyan, 2008; Donini, 2009; Baxter, 2011;
Black, 2013). And some also exhibit varying levels of political legitimacy, limited forms
of moral sovereignty, and institutionalized and ad hoc consultative status with large
IGO’s such as the UN.
PNSAs have been extremely active in the WoT. Consider the continuous
diplomatic representation, communication and negotiation undertaken by PNSA’s in the
WoT from aid, to medical support or to the reporting of information from war zones
such as the Syrian Observatory on Human Rights (Murray & Pigman: 2; Human Rights
Watch, 2016). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, also
has the benefit of years of involvement in conflict situations to have one of the most
effective, yet almost invisible, roles in contemporary conflict resolution (1997: 9-10).
Since the U.S. led coalition began operations in Afghanistan in October 2001 the ICRC,
which played a vital neutral intermediary role between the Soviets and the Afghan
resistance movements, provides protection and assistance to refugees, returnees,
internally displaced persons, as well as co-opting members of the Taliban into demining activities in Kandahar. Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, the PNSA “gold rush”
(Stoddard, 2003: 7) supported the humanitarian aspect of the international coalition’s
political objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn. Oxfam,
Norwegian People’s Aid, QANDIL and Christian Aid are among those involved in
bridging the gap between the military and the Iraqi people, serving as a conduit for the
delivery of assistance whilst transmitting the messages of peace from the George W.
Bush administration by establishing confidence and clarity (Nicholls & Bjøreng, 2003,
Smillie & Minear, 2003; Kent, 2008).
In the broader War, the Permanent Peace Movement (PPM) and Geneva Call have
been extremely active in direct and indirect negotiation with opening direct channels of
cooperation and dialogue with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in
Gaza, VNSA’s on both sides of the conflict in Yemen, non-Shabab militants in Somalia
(2012 Conference Joint Report). Since its foundation in 1989, the Lebanese based NGO
PPM has undertaken peaceful/nonviolent means for conflict resolution in local, national
and international communities, striving to empower individuals and institutions in the
peacebuilding process. Geneva Call engages directly with VNSAs in armed conflicts and
other situations of violence, seeking to increase awareness of international
humanitarian norms. Geneva Call’s objective is to reduce the impact of direct violence
against civilian populations, generate apolitical access to humanitarian assistance whilst
also exposing VNSA’s to the rights, obligations and mechanisms of legitimate political
actors. This type of engagement has augmented the participation of NGO’s and civil
society actors in both Hamas governed Gaza and AQAP and Houthis controlled areas of
Yemen.
PNSAs continue to fulfil important diplomatic functions. The flexible conflict
resolution services and outreach of organisations like the ICRC, Red Crescent Society,
PPM and Geneva Call, create parallel diplomatic networks where peaceful norms are
replicated and potentially accepted by the aggressor, facilitating the transition from
violent to non-violent actor (Sharp, 2009; Papa, et al, 2010; Powell, 2014). Gordenker
and Weiss add that PSNAs also “establish new and essential lines of communication to
introduce ideas, train individuals and help create alternate institutions” (1997: 452-3).
Nor are PNSA’s constrained by international treaties, or other political considerations
such as rigid formalized diplomatic practices (Hofmann & Schneckner, 2011; Pearlman
& Cunningham, 2012).
For states, this additional help is often a vital and most welcome addition to
sustainable CT because it creates opportunities for VNSAs to turn away from violence
(Schmid & Singh, 2009; Altier, et al, 2014). In the U.S. context, former Secretary of State
Powell (2001) labelled PSNAs a “force multiplier” in the War on Terror. They can be
found on the frontline not only dispensing aid and medical assistance serving as a vital
conduit for information flows both in and out of the combat zone imparting region
specific information and social concerns, both foreign and domestic, into CT policy
debate.
3. The Diplomacy of Terror
This third section continues with the non-state theme by posing a controversial
but intriguing question: can VNSAs such as ISIL be considered diplomatic? Theorizing
on the relationship between diplomacy and terror is not new. A diplomatic lens has
previously been applied to VNSA’s such as Paul Sharp’s (2003) assessment of Taliban
diplomacy form 1996-2001, Deos and Pigman’s (2010) analysis of the Good Friday
process in Northern Ireland and more recently Schneider (2015), Yarchi (2016) and
Gartenstein-Ross et al (2016) have examined the PD of Hamas, Hizballah, al Qa’ida and
ISIL.
Thinking about VNSAs in diplomatic terms is important. A diplomatic lens
immediately deepens the general and incorrect understanding that terrorist
organisations (TO) as little more than medieval, uncouth and violent ‘barbarians.’
Thinking diplomatically is also very important in terms of effective CT. In terms of
communication, for example, post-modern TO’s are masters of online propaganda (for
recruitment purposes, disseminating of core messages, mission statements and
successful attacks). If the West hopes to win the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ then
recognising, accepting and countering TOs advanced communication abilities is vital to
understanding and countering their anti-diplomatic message(s). Furthermore, while
states may insist that they do not negotiate with terrorists, more often than not, they do.
History illustrates that ‘wars on terror’ have concluded with a negotiated settlement
between the state and the T.O. While it is true that many TOs are brutal, in terms of
diplomacy, representation and communication, they’re also sophisticated, advanced and
smart.
For centuries, individuals or groups have used terrorism, violence, fear and
intimidation as means to political ends and goals. From the Sicarii Zealots in first
century Palestine, to the Shia Nizari assassins in Middle Age’s Persia through to the
anarchist movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth century which inspired
attacks in Europe, Russia and the U.S. The examples are commonly referred to as ‘old’
terrorism which was characterized by clearly identifiable organisations, specific issues
or causes, and the careful selection of targets using conventional weaponry (Crenshaw,
1985, 2007; Moghadam, et al, 2014). The targets were often combatants and, in order to
maximise public support, innocent civilians were not intentionally targeted. As Jenkins
(2006: 118) comments, old terrorist organisations “wanted a lot of people watching, not
a lot of people dead.” Old terrorism was also often framed by the notion of ‘liberation’ or
of a moral struggle where violence was a civic duty, all of which helped establish and
this was used to establish broad support networks by groups claiming to representing
the politically, economically or socially repressed (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Coolsaet, 2005;
Cronin, 2006; Crenshaw, 2014).
’Old’ terrorism died with the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on the 11th of
September 2001. Nineteen individuals from the Al Qa’ida group carried out an
audacious strike on the most powerful nation on earth by targeting symbols of U.S.
wealth and power: the Twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City and the
Pentagon in Washington D.C. The attack by al Qa’ida spawned a number of new TOs
(Rapaport, 2002) whose violent acts would transform the international security
environment in subsequent years (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Matusitz, 2013). 9/11
introduced a global audience to ‘new terrorism’ performed by international ‘jihadist’
movements, such as al Qa’ida and ISIL, their franchises, and the lone wolves who claim
to act on their behalf, often citing and drawing inspiration from a violent Islam based
doctrine (Aslan, 2009; Feldman, 2012; Stern & Berger, 2015). ‘New’ terrorism’s violence
is strategically brutal and their use of new media technology allows them to spread
their core message, of removing the infidel from Muslim lands and re-establishing the
caliphate, to a global audience (De Derian, 2005; Hoffman; 2009; Crenshaw, 2014; Stern
& Berger, 2015).
At first glance TOs seem anything but diplomatic. They intentionally target both
combatant and non-combatants, they practice illegitimate violence (that is-violence not
sanctioned by the state), they’re not sovereign, their actions are criminal and outlawed
by many judiciaries and demonstrate an abject indifference to international norms,
treaties, conventions and laws). As Schneckner (2009: 8) notes, VNSA’s are “willing and
capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives,” directly or indirectly challenging
the state by using or threatening illegitimate violence. Of course we accept that TOs are
brutal and must be defeated however parochially labelling then as crude, medieval and
barbaric is unhelpful in terms of sustainable and effective CT. To defeat them, however,
is to examine one means beyond terror that they employ on a daily basis to achieve
their ends: their diplomacy. While pursuing a political agenda, all TO’s represent a
constituency, negotiate to secure and maintain power, communicate to an internal and
external audience and establish diplomatic networks to mobilize popular support.
TO’s select and train certain individuals to represent their interests and, just like
a state, these individuals participate in legitimate if somewhat nefarious international
forums. The Taliban, for example, have several representatives based in its office in
Doha, Qatar and send representatives to regionally brokered, and internationally
supported, multilateral meetings. The Al Qa’ida linked Al Nusra Front, which is a central
protagonist in Syrian Civil War, is currently represented in the Turkish based Syrian
Islamic Council, the Syrian Revolution General Commission, the Supreme Military
Council Command and the High Negotiation Committee, which is the primary
representative body for the Syrian opposition involved in the Geneva Peace Talks.
Another core function of diplomacy is negotiation, which some TOs are effective
at. Some are adept at extracting concessions, ceding concessions with great drama on
non-core issues in direct, and/or indirect backchannel discussions with states as well as
negotiating strategic and operational terms with local tribal leaders and other militants.
There are multiple examples whereby negotiation has been central to the de-escalation
of violent conflicts involving VNSA’s throughout the twentieth century. The various
Declarations of Peace in Northern Ireland during the 1990’s and the cease-fire
Agreement with the Basque separatists ETA in 2011 followed decades of negotiations
between states and TOs. The formal discussions and conditional cease-fire agreements
between the FARC and the Colombian government may lead to the end of a sixty year
cycle of violence.
In the context of the WoT, the Taliban provide an example of the capacity of
VNSA’s to actively pursue their vital policy interests through negotiation. In 1994, for
instance, the Taliban negotiated a mutually beneficial arrangement with bin Laden’s al
Qa’ida core (Sharp, 2003, 2005; Curtis, 2010; Lister, 2015). 23 The Taliban engaged in
regular communications with the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Countries
(OIC) and senior officials from the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and
China as well as with Pakistan, the Saudi’s and the UAE until just days before 9/11
(Sharp, 2003: 484-85).24 In the aftermath of the 9/11attacks, Mullah Zaeef, the Taliban’s
Ambassador to the world, and Abdul Hakim Mujahid, the Taliban Envoy to the UN,
sought ways to keep the diplomatic process functioning, “staging open air press
conferences” as the global media focused on the only credible link between the
terrorists and their victims (Sharp, 2003: 493). 25 However the negotiations were
unsuccessful, due in part to the Taliban’s unwillingness to deliver bin Laden in breach of
UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1333 (Sharp, 2003; Kleiner, 2008; Comras,
2014). Regardless, the Taliban and other examples described above confirms that TOs
are active negotiators.
Communication has been central to the operations of TO’s since the Sicarii.
Terrorism is by definition the communication of a political message through violence
and the growth of global televisual media and the ICT revolution has presented TO’s
with an economical, reliable and oblique vehicle to carry its messages of terror. The last
fifty years is replete with examples of this; from the live broadcast of the PLFP blowing
23
Whilst in Afghanistan al Qa’ida also worked to forge alliances with other radical groups. In February 1998,
bin Laden announced an alliance of terrorist organizations—the "International Islamic Front for Jihad Against
the Jews and Crusaders"—that included the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the
Harakat ul-Ansar, and other groups.
24
Sharp claims that the United States offered the Taliban government 1.5 million US dollars to compensate
farmers following the Taliban’s crack down of poppy cultivation.
25
Sharp insists that the Taliban diplomats were effective in controlling the media to suit their purposes.
up three El Al jetliners on Dawson’s Field, Jordan in 1970 and the Munich Olympic
Games operation in 1972 through to the strikes on the Twin Towers in Manhattan in
2001 and the more recent videos of ISIL brutality disseminated across multiple
platforms. These messages are directed at different audiences and the same piece of TO
propaganda can simultaneously terrify, revile, placate and inspire information
consumers across a spectrum spanning the state, the potential victim to the prospective
perpetrator of the next attack itself. Although the potency of ‘social media’ in terms of
enhanced recruitment for al Qa’ida and ISIL has been oversimplified and over-rated, Twitter,
YouTube, Telegram and even the benign Sony PS4 are capability extenders, providing TO’s
with an unobstructed means to expand its recruitment base to create a virtual global
battlefield (Schbley, 2004; Der Derian, 2001; Piazza, 2006; Aly, Macdonald, et al, 2016;
Schneider, 2016). Der Derian articulates what many researchers have discovered, that
international terrorism has become carefully stage-managed “as a televisual strategic
simulation choreographed by violence and staged for fearful captive global audience”
(1992: 68).
In terms of political organization many ‘new’ VNSA’s have adopted a ‘networked’
structure over a traditional, hierarchical, or ‘hub and spoke’ structure (Arquilla &
Ronfeldt, 2001; Brams, et al, 2006; Kilberg, 2012; Perliger, 2014). The private sector
were the pioneers of the network structure as business management specialists
recognized the benefits of sharing responsibility, decision making and more importantly
information across a more horizontal plane rather than the typical hierarchical
structure of top down direction. The military adopted this network approach and
developed Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) during the 1990’s assisted by the advances
in ICT. The result was a fully integrated modern fighting force capable of combating
traditional and asymmetric combatants. The key unifier in the business, military and
VNSA networks is connectivity and access to information. The network structure
directly effects the TO‘s diplomatic capabilities as the broad, inclusiveness of a
networked TO allow it to engage in diplomacy on multiple levels. Through the various
nodes of their network, TO’s can access specialists to represent, communicate and
negotiate with tribal leaders, local governments as well as formal representatives of the
state.
While the network structure presents challenges for CT practitioners it also
provides opportunities for diplomacy to disrupt ‘nodes’ and fragment TO’s. Multiple
studies have examined escalatory ‘‘outbidding’’ among and within groups supporting
the same overarching struggle (Bloom 2004; Gergez, 2006; Rivinius, 2015) or the ways
in which states can conjure and manipulate conflicts between ‘‘moderates’’ and
‘’radicals’(Kydd and Walter 2002; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Glassman, 2008; Inbar &
Shamir, 2014; Atteridge, 2016). Such research sheds light on organisational behaviour
of TO’s identifying areas of exploitation either through direct or indirect diplomacy or
through the dissemination of effective counter-narratives (Pearlman & Cunningham,
2012).
Der Derian infers that generally in order “to gain official entry into the terrorist
debate one must check their critical weapons at the door, and join in a chorus of
condemnation-or risk suspicion for having sympathy with the terrorist devil” (1992:
84). To counter this generality, this section took on the role of an ‘agent provocateur,’
and demonstrating that TO’s consciously use diplomacy in to achieve their objectives
and secure their interests. TO’s represent themselves and others in various
international meetings and negotiate with actors ranging from the state to local mayor
or tribal leader. TO’s are also masters of verbal and non-verbal communication to
stimulate responses and capture the attention of politician’s and the public. Similarly,
effective communication of core messages is central to the TO’s raison d’etre.
4. Recommendations for Theorists and Policy Makers
Having established diplomacy as important, active and multifaceted in the WoT
this paper concludes by presenting a number of recommendations. These are made for
theorists and practitioners interested in boosting a diplomatic perspective of the WoT,
conducive to enhancing the “goodies” chances of success.
First, we contend that far more theoretical attention on diplomacy’s role in the
WoT would be positive, particularly in terms of effective CT. So far diplomatic
scholarship has been overshadowed by the growth in Security Studies funding, degree
programs and publications, while Strategic Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis
dominates Diplomatic Studies in U.S. International Relations disciplines (Barkawi &
Laffey, 2006; Adams, et al, 2011; Sheehan, 2012; Silke, 2015). Institutionalised research
programs and think-tanks, which had occasionally debated terrorism prior to 9/11,
have had unprecedented access to the policymakers developing the U.S. whole-ofgovernment strategy. This situation influences academia, the subsequent research
filling a plethora of terrorism related journals (Silke, 2008; Buzan & Hansen, 2009;
Sheehan, 2012).
The same cannot be said for diplomatic scholarship on terrorism related issues,
an attitude that is difficult to fathom. There has been several noteworthy application of
a diplomatic perspective to CT which serves as a starting point for this type of research
(Der Derian, 1987, 1992, 2005; Armstrong, 1999; Sharp, 2003, 2009; Pigman, 2010;
Kleiner, 2010; Deos & Pigman, 2010; Hocking, et al, 2012, Hoffman, et al, 2015). These
respected scholars have introduced concepts which provide researches with the tools to
formulate in depth analyses of global challenges across the security spectrum.
Diplomacy is after all, the business of peace’ and seeks to minimise not maximise
friction in relations between disparate groups. An enhanced diplomatic perspective on
the WoT would therefore generate solutions and not further division. Given the chance
(and the funding), there is no problem in the world that willing and able diplomats
cannot solve through compromise and negotiation.
Arguably, hard power has its limitations, particularly when fighting a ‘shadow.’
Diplomacy is therefore cheaper and more effective at combatting terrorism than hard,
military solutions. Time and time again, diplomacy has been central to the de-escalation
of violent conflicts involving VNSA’s, from the Maoists’ in Nepal, to the Umkhonto we
Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the militant wing of the African National Congress (ANC) in
South Africa, and the PLO in Palestine/Israel. The paper builds a case which supports
the argument that diplomacy should replace the military as “the default responder” in
the WoT. Research has demonstrated that the best weapon against terrorism is either
politicization-choosing a political path, and/or effective and sustainable CT (Weinberg,
1991, 2012; Jones & Libicki, 2008; Cronin, 2009; Adams, et al, 2011; Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2014; Martin, 2015). This paper asserts that diplomacy is central to both
processes and therefore, its vital role must be recognised and studied to maximise its
potential for good.
This paper emphasises the need to establish sustainable networks in CT as
networks synchronize the skills, resources and expertise to create an enhanced level of
situational awareness and response (proactive and reactive). As Hocking notes, “the
challenge for national governments (and PSNAs) is knowing how to connect to them,
build alliances and utilize these networks to exercise advocacy in support of policy
objectives” (2008: 73-74). A diplomacy centred network would facilitate participation,
and therefore information, from states, NGO’s, IGO’s and regional institutions, the
private sector, the media, traditional and religious leaders as well as other key
stakeholders. Multi-actor diplomacy networks are an ideal structure to manage the
collaborations within a state’s whole-of-government CT strategy.
As discussed, the military is currently perceived as the 'default responder' in the
battle against international terrorism but as we attempt to address this problem we
must be careful not to over-compensate and undervalue the military's contribution. The
military must be part of a whole-of-government strategy to combat terrorism. The
military's role in defence diplomacy programs aimed at capacity building, influencing
worldviews and institutionalizing norms of behaviour is critical to a networked
counter-terrorism approach. Military responses remain a key component CT as an
instrument of rapid response to an imminent threat based on sound intelligence.
Military operations prioritize certainty, designing strategic planning doctrine such as
Effects-Based Operations (EBO) to ensure that A leads to B leads to C. However CT and
irregular warfare is an unquantifiable, dynamic and complex environment. A multiactor diplomacy centred network overcomes uncertainty by increasing access to
information.
The ‘victory’ mentality associated with a military oriented doctrine distracts
academics and policy makers. Unilateral counter-narratives simply create 'white noise'
and are counter-productive. Through unity of effort, clearly articulated intent and
carefully crafted parameters, diplomacy oriented CT networks focus the various
elements of state and non-state power to deliver tactical and operational flexibility.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dunford stated in late April 2016 “at the very
minimum, I want to enhance our collaboration and cooperation from a common
understanding and then move towards a better integration of our efforts, because I
believe, given the breadth and scope of the challenge, integrating our capabilities is the
best way to succeed.”26 A diplomacy centred network achieves the General’s goal by
synchronizing the various elements of state power in a focused, united and effective
manner.
In practice, a comprehensive unified network which strategically combines
connectivity and access to information to facilitate cooperation and integration could
simultaneously target the tactic and the concept of terrorism by coordinating proactive
and reactive responses to terrorist groups whilst delegitimizing the choice of terrorism
by current and future opponents. General Mark A. Welsh, Chief of Staff of the U.S. AF,
emphasized recently that ‘numbers matter in our business (safeguarding the U.S.), the
coolest ship in the world can’t be in the Gulf and the South China Sea at the same time’
(CoFR Panel, 3rd May 2016). One way network diplomacy would address the quality
versus quantity balance is through its inherent capacity building effect which reduces
terrorism transference by unifying or at least ‘moving in the same direction’ in terms of
CT (Sandler & Lapan, 1988; Sandler & Siqueira, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Jensen,
2016). A diplomacy centred network increase both the quality and quantity of the
outcomes produced.
Kerr and Wiseman assert that “more and more global actors are demanding that
diplomacy, rather than military force, be used to settle differences” (2013: 7). This
paper is an attempt to formulate an objective and defensible response to that demand.
An analysis of diplomacy in the WoT achieves this by looking at state-centred traditional
diplomacy, the non-traditional diplomacy of PNSA’s as well as the diplomacy of terror
(how VNSAs use diplomacy). Finally the paper recommends further research in the field,
26
th
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Media Activity, 26 April, 2016.http://www.defense.gov/News-ArticleView/Article/743160/dunford-explores-ways-to-better-integrate-counter-extremism-efforts
as well as presenting a network oriented diplomacy model which binds the ‘good’ guys
together in innovative ways to beat the ‘bad’ guys. Of course there will always be
terrorism but with the benefit of sound diplomacy, it is possible to effectively
discourage and diminish its impact, transforming international terrorism “from a grave
strategic threat to a dangerous nuisance” that is isolated and manageable (Byman, 2007:
127). The WoT is in its fifteenth year, and despite all the money and scholarship, it
shows no sign of ending soon. While we don’t argue that diplomacy is a panacea/silver
bullet, it does play a vitally important role in the WoT; to neglect it in theory and
practice is anathema to any hope of understanding the conflict and the means and
motivations of all concerned.
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