THE
NAVAL
REVIEW
TO PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT A N D SPREADING WITHIN
THE SERVICE OF KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THE HIGHER
ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.
Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who had
formed a Naval Society:
Captain H. W. Richmond R.N.
Commander K. G. B. Dewar R.N.
Commander the Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett R.N.
Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N.
Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N.
Lieutenant H. G . Thursfield R.N.
Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A.
Admiral W. H . Henderson (Honorary Editor)
I t is only by the possession of a trained and
developed mind that the fullest capacity can,
as a rule, be obtained. There are, of course,
exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts
which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are
indeed rare. We are coming more and more to
recognise that the best specialist can be produced
only after a long training in general learning. The
grasp of principle which makes detail easy can
only come when innate capacity has been evoked
and moulded by high training.
Lord Haldane
Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance
with the Regulation printed herein, which should be
carefully studied.
Copyright under Act of 191 1
Vol. 70
No. 4
OCTOBER 1982
Contents
Page
EDITORIAL
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243
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ARTICLES:
T H E FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN: S O M E ACADEMIC T H O U G H T S
LESSONS FROM T H E FALKLANDS CRISIS
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SOUTH ATLANTIC ISLAND
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LOGISTIC S U P P O R T FOR OPERATION C O R P O R A T E
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T H E STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE O F T H E FALKLAND ISLANDS
A LETTER FROM AUSTRALIA-XI1
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A SCHOOL FOR T H E SONS O F SEAFARERS
THOSE DEFENCE CUTS AGAIN
DEFENCE O F TRADE-IS
NAVAL
BRIGADES
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I T NECESSARY?
IN
INDIA
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1857
AND
CORRESPONDENCE . . . . . .
1858 .
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LESSONS FROM T H E FALKLAND ISLANDS -- T H E DEFENCE REVIEW . . . A N D
SPECTRES BEHIND NAVY SPENDING
ANOTHER T H I N G .
HMS EREBUS 1926-32
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HMS
VALIANT
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SUPPORT
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ANONYMITY
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FOR SEA POWER
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NAVAL C H A P L A I N S
REVIEWS .
I: NAVAL
PERIODICALS A N D OTHERS
REVIEWS -- 11: BOOKS . . . . . .
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NEW MEMBERS
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335
Editorial
S I WRITE this editorial HMS Invincible
A is about to return to Portsmouth after
her deployment of 166 days to the
Falklands. Without doubt her arrival will
be an event celebrated not only by the
residents of Portsmouth, but by many
people throughout the land who wish to
give expression to their feeling of relief and
joy following the successful outcome of the
Falklands campaign. The presence of Her
Majesty the Queen and Prince Andrew, as
one of the ship's company, will add a
further dimension to the occasion.
Several of the articles in this issue are
directly concerned with the Falklands. They
deal with broader issues that the war
brought clearly into view, such as the
strategic importance of the islands, the
problems of logistic supply at a range of
8,000 miles and the need for balanced and
flexible forces. I hope the January issue will
take us forward to the battle for the
Falklands as witnessed by some of those
who took part.
Operation Corporate
It will be some time before the analysis of
the performance of our forces during the
Falklands campaign becomes generally
available. In the meantime the Director of
Naval Warfare has produced a brief
pamphlet that summarises many of the
salient facts including the number of ships
and aircraft that took part, and their
armaments, the activities of the Fleet Air
Arm, the success of the Support Services
and much else besides. I recommend the
pamphlet, that can be obtained from the
Ministry of Defence, to all those who wish
t o , quote authoritative data while putting
across the Navy's successes in a positive
manner.
Maritime con-trick
The First Sea Lord spoke out recently
against Mr Nott's earlier claims that the
Royal Navy would be better equipped in the
years ahead as a result of current
government plans. The simple facts are that
when the present Government took office
there were a total of 98 major warships
(that is frigates and above and submarines
other than Polaris). By April 1982 this
figure was down to 86 and current plans
show a further decline in the years ahead.
The main lesson from the Falklands, in
future programme terms, is the need to be
able to cope with unexpected situations.
The rapid naval deployment t o the
Falklands was possible because we are
currently living on pre 1981 Defence Review
numbers of ships and personnel. Even so
ships had to be brought forward from
reserve and some others forward from the
disposal list. By the mid 1980s this scale of
deployment will not be possible, afloat
support will have been seriously reduced.
The General Council of British Shipping
report that '. . . fifty ships were needed in
the Falklands and we were able to put it
together in a very short time. Next year, or
the year after, we may find it difficult,
perhaps impossible to provide enough ships
of the right type under the British flag with
British crews.' There is clearly an urgent
need to reassess the likely shipping needs of
our country in times of war as well as peace.
The government should also consider
equipping ships for defence and for using
them for support of the Fleet on long-term
charter to the Royal Navy. If we disregard
these matters it will be to our peril.
Jane's Naval Review
The publishers of Jane's Fighting Ships will
publish a Naval Review annually in October,
starting this year. It will be similar in content
to the Naval Annual that was published last
year. I hope that our members will not be
confused or misled by the appearance of a
publication with a name somewhat similar to
The Naval Review.
Naval Maritime Museum
An exhibition to mark the 200th anniversary
of the sinking of the HMS Royal George
244
EDITORIAL
is being held in the Queens House at
Greenwich. The story is a fascinating one.
Why did this fine ship, undergoing a
normal, routine servicing process, keel over
in calm seas on a sunny August morning in
1782 and take to their deaths hundreds of
people - sailors, dockyard workers,
pedlars, tradesmen, women and children?
No one knows accurately how many people
were on board - perhaps 1,200 - nor even
how many were lost - perhaps 900 souls.
The story of the ship's subsequent
investigation by divers, and the development of diving techniques as time passed,
is of great interest and is also told. The
words of the survivors themselves, accounts
of the court-martial (which absolved all
from blame and held the ship to be
unseaworthy - but was she?) and reports
on the diving on and the eventual blowingup of the vessel's remains as a hazard to
shipping in the main approaches to
Portsmouth Harbour are used tc tell the
story.
The exhibition is open until the end of the
year and admission is free.
Tailpiece
The Editor is empowered to award a prize
of £100 for the best article submitted bv a
serving officer of Lieutenant's rank or
below. Articles sent in before 7 December
1982 will be eligible for this year's prize.
The Falkland Islands Campaign:
Some Academic Thoughts
T IS TOO early for anyone, even, or
I perhaps particularly, those closest to the
planning and conduct of the Falklands
campaign, to assess its long-term
significance; what then can an academic
contribute, writing while the Franks and
departmental inquiries are still under way?
When Lord Franks does report, a
Parliamentary and media battle will break
out during which a great deal of heat will be
generated. Before this happens perhaps it
may be useful to point out the underlying
issues which can already be seen and which
will have to be thrashed out if the campaign
is to be understood in all its dimensions and
its experience correctly interpreted for
future guidance. The first prerequisite for a
sound understanding is to put the campaign
into perspective and outline its context
within the history of war and the
complexities of the political situation, both
national and international. It is also
possible to identify at least some of the
main questions which are bound to be
raised and to which the political,
diplomatic, and military professionals must
find answers.
The failure to anticipate and party politics
The failure to anticipate the Argentinian
military landings on South Georgia and the
Falklands will undoubtedly be the most
important political controversy, and rightly
so. It has already led to angry
Parliamentary debates and the resignation
of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington,
and other Foreign Office ministers, thus
depriving the government of one of its most
effective and internationally respected
members. It gives the Parliamentary
Opposition a strong platform from which
to attack a government which appears to
have failed in its primary duty of
safeguarding the national territory. In a
preliminary move to prevent itself from
having to shoulder all the blame, the
government insisted that the Franks inquiry
should examine the conduct of previous
administrations in dealings with Argentina.
This may not necessarily be to its advantage
because Mr Callaghan and Dr Owen have
already claimed that similar Argentinian
aggressive intentions were identified during
their term of office in 1977, and deterred by
the precautionary naval moves which they
authorised. Their case is not clear-cut. The
naval precautions were taken but there is no
evidence available to show that the
Argentinian government were aware of
them o r to establish that there was a firm
decision to invade.
It is clearly the constitutional duty of the
Opposition to make such attacks on the
Government's
conduct, a s was
demonstrated and recognised by Lord
Carrington's resignation a n d Mrs
Thatcher's agreement to the setting-up of
an inquiry with terms of reference discussed
with the Leader of the Opposition. It must
also be accepted that because the party
system is essential to the working of the
British political system, party feelings are
bound to feature in parliamentary debates.
All the opposition parties were bound to
make the most of an unexpected
opportunity to attack a government which
was already in their eyes unfit to continue in
office because of its failure to solve the
country's economic problems, and was now
apparently guilty of a further failure in the
very areas which have always been claimed
as Conservative priorities, foreign and
defence policies. The duty of the
Opposition is to expose and criticise
governmental incompetence. As the
situation developed and war seemed more
likely, it was also the duty of the
Opposition to point out the dangers of
military operations and the advantages of a
negotiated settlement through the
mediation of either the United States, the
United Nations, o r Peru. At the same time
246
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN: SOME ACADEMIC THOUGHTS
of course the Opposition were also fully
aware of the great boost which a military
victory would give to the Government's
popularity.
Once fighting had
started, the
Opposition's task became more difficult.
They had to continue to criticise without
appearing to be letting down the armed
services or going against the tide of
widespread
public support of the
Government's decision to use force. It is
only being politically realistic to point out
that the difficult task of the Labour
leadership in persuading the bulk of their
Parliamentary supporters to support
military action was made easier by the
nature of the enemy. It was right-wing
militaristic, and white and was clearly
identifiable as an aggressor. Had the
Argentinian regime been popular and
liberal, it would have been much more
difficult.
It must also be accepted that the minority
of Labour MPs (and a solitary
Conservative), led by Mr Benn who
denounced the operation throughout, had
every political and constitutional right to
argue that it might end in a humiliating
failure or even achieve success at the
expense of casualties higher than the cause
deserved. Even complete military victory
would not solve the long-term political issue
- the achievement of a stable relationship
between Argentina and the Falklands. Mr
Benn too had to avoid the danger of being
accused of attacking the armed forces and
took care to picture them as being uselessly
sacrificed in order to remedy the failures of
an inept government. At the party political
level there is of course no doubt that Mr
Benn and his supporters welcomed an
opportunity to attack and label as dupes of
the government the right wing of their own
party, which they hope to weaken as part of
a programme to produce a radically
reformed Britain.
It is idle to suppose that such party and
intra-party politics will not feature in future
arguments about the causes and conduct of
the campaign, any more that it is reasonable
to expect the media to refrain from
comment and criticism, some of it bound to
be unfair to those who bore responsibility
either at home or in the combat zone. Such
attitudes and activities are inseparable from
our political system and, granted an
informed and judicious public opinion, are
sources of strength and not weakness. A
political leadership, knowing that it will
have to deal with such scrutiny and criticism
and knowing that it can be driven from
office if it fails, is more likely to act
intelligently and responsibly than one which
claims a monopoly of wisdom and power
and the right to stifle all dissent. Churchill
recognised this and drew strength from it. It
is reasonable to assume that Mrs Thatcher
also benefited from it and that this was at
least partly responsible for the skilled and
successful political conduct of the whole
affair by the Prime Minister and her Inner
Cabinet. After all it was the Argentinian
junta (and also Hitler) who lost.
Obviously any worthwhile judgement on
the failure to anticipate Argentina's
intentions or to take adequate and timely
measures to deter them must await the
outcome of the Franks inquiry. It is to be
hoped that popular and Parliamentary
pressures will be sufficient to ensure the
fullest possible publication of its findings
and that, if culpable failures there were,
those responsible will be identified. After
all despite the great skill with which the
fighting was conducted there were 256
British dead, and there are 105 widows and
110 fatherless children, in addition to the
hundreds of seriously wounded and
permanently maimed. But even before the
inquiry's report it is possible to indicate the
major questions. Were there political or
military statements and actions by the
Argentine government which should have
been recognised as preludes to military
aggression? If there were such indicators,
were they simply not seen, or if seen, were
they wrongly interpreted? Or, if they were
both detected and correctly interpreted,
were they communicated quickly and
forcefully enough to those who should have
taken action, and if they were so
communicated, why was no action taken?
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPA.IGN: SOME ACADEMIC THOUGHTS
It would however be nai've to assume that
simple and clear answers can necessarily be
provided to such questions. History shows
the frequency of such failures to anticipate.
In 1973 Israel, despite its highly efficient
intelligence organisation, failed to foresee
Egypt's attack. In 1941 Stalin refused to
accept all the evidence of the growing
likelihood of the German invasion. And,
most famous and most deeply investigated
of all, was the failure to anticipate the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. In his
recently published The Other Ultra
(Hutchinson) Ronald Lewin brilliantly
reinforces the most authoritative American
verdicts that the failure did not come from
lack of information, even less from a
political plot by Roosevelt to let the attack
take place in order to convince public
opinion that America must go to war. The
root cause was that of 'noise'; a complex
phenomenon the centre of which was the
immense difficulty of picking out amongst
a plethora of information those signals
which hindsight showed to be the crucial
ones. T o this was added a series of
presuppositions inbuilt over a period of
years that the enemy simply would not act
in that particular way, and a less easily
definable attitude leading to a strong hope
that he would not so act. This last led in
turn to a subconscious barrier to picking
out and accepting information to the
contrary. It seems likely that similar factors
were at work in the assessment of
Argentina's likely behaviour. After all, her
claim to the Falklands was of long standing.
Threats to assert it by force had been
frequently made and as frequently
abandoned in response to Britain's
willingness t o continue negotiations. The
rising unpopularity of the junta because of
its domestic tyranny and economic failures
seemed bound to make it seek a diversion in
nationalistic and military rhetoric, but
previous regimes in a similar situation had
taken no action; why should this time be
any different?
On the other hand, granted a British
Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence to
whom the Falkland Islands were a marginal
247
concern and the possibility of having to
fight f o r them both distracting from much
more vital interests and also extremely
hazardous, could there not have been an
inbuilt tendency to reject the warning signs
as illusory? In politics there are always
problems which are of relatively minor
significance and incapable of satisfactory
solution and so tend to be put aside at the
bottom of the 'too difficult' tray. The
Falkland Islands could well have met this
fate, especially with the recognition of the
impossibility of reconciling Argentina's
claim to sovereignty with the British
principle that the wishes of the islanders
must be paramount. If there were
departmental blockages of this kind then
ministers must have failed to identify and
remove them; theirs is the ultimate
responsibility.
But if the British government and its
agencies failed to foresee the Argentine
move, even more so did Argentina fail t o
anticipate Britain's response. She too
misread the signals, but perhaps with more
justification. The readiness of successive
British governments, including Mrs
Thatcher's own, to seek ways of meeting
Argentina's claims to sovereignty; the
ambiguity in every recent British nationality
legislation about the status of some of the
islanders, hardly pointed to resolute
military action to overturn a fait accornpli.
Add to these Britain's economic difficulties
leading to defence economies and the recent
decision to reduce naval capabilities, given
relevant point by the decision to withdraw
Endurance from the Antarctic, was it not
reasonable to assume that she would
content herself with verbal protests or at the
worst economic sanctions of no serious
consequence? All this was presumably
supplemented by assumptions that Britain's
allies, in the Commonwealth, NATO, and
the EEC would give preference to their
individual political and economic interests
above any feeling of obligation to support
Britain, especially in any military
operations. H e r e of course t h e
misappreciation of the United States'
attitude was to be crucial, but even here,
248
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN: SOME ACADEMIC THOUGHTS
President Reagan's initial reactions, until
he recognised the strength of American
public opinion against any failure to
support one of her most loyal allies, could
be interpreted as being against any military
intervention by Britain. It is hard to give
much credence to the view that an
additional reason for the junta not
believing that Britain would fight was that
she was ruled by a woman. Surely even they
must have heard of Mrs Ghandi and Mrs
Meir.
Aims and strategy
Even at this short distance from the event it
is possible to identify the political and
strategic factors which led to Britain's
success. It is important to remember that
success was far from inevitable. Political
nerve might have failed. Operational
mistakes could have led to unacceptable
losses. Allied support, especially that of the
United States, might not have been strong
enough. The Soviet Union might have
intervened, as she did at Suez, instead of
contenting herself with relatively mild
denunciations. None of these things
actually happened and Britain had two
fundamentals of success, a clear and
practicable aim and the resources, human
and material, to achieve it. The
Government quickly arrived at its political
aim and stuck constantly to it: the removal
of Argentinian forces and the return of the
islands to British administration. It made
clear in the United Nations and to those
trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement
that nothing less was acceptable and that if
negotiations failed adequate force was
available and would be used. It was an aim
moreover which could and did win wide
international moral support, as it was
directed to remedying an unjustified
aggression against a small community by a
military dictatorship which, if not reversed,
could lead to similar aggression elsewhere in
the world. The right of self-defence
embodied in the United Nations Charter
and the Security Council Resolution calling
for Argentinian withdrawal, gave valuable
legal justification. Paradoxically one of the
geographical realities which made the
military task most difficult, the 8,000 miles
distance between Britain and the Falkland
Islands, was also a great diplomatic
advantage, in that it enabled Britain to
continue negotiations during the Task
Force's voyage out and to continue to
present Argentina to international opinion
as responsible for the failure to achieve a
peaceful settlement. Geography also
dictated that if force had to be used it could
only take the form of a limited maritime
war. By a happy coincidence this was
precisely what was required to achieve the
political aim.
The concept of limited war
This concept of course well pre-dates the
nuclear age. Its application to maritime war
was first developed by Sir Julian Corbett in
his Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
(1911). The Falklands campaign has both
demonstrated the continuing value of the
basic concept and the modifications in its
application necessitated
by changed
political and technological conditions.
Corbett contrasts limited war with the
absolute war which dominated the thinking
of continental strategists, particularly
Clausevitz and Jomini. In their view
absolute war arose over an issue seen to be
so vital that the antagonists were not
prepared to accept compromise; militarily it
necessitated
the destruction of an
opponent's will and capacity to resist
through the defeat of his army and the
occupation of his metropolitan territory.
Both the continental thinkers had admitted
the possibility of a more restricted dispute
which could be resolved by taking and
holding a limited objective, not in itself
important enough to provoke an opponent
to respond by unlimited war. The objective
could then either be retained or used as a
bargaining counter to gain some other end.
Corbett insisted that such limited wars
could never have great significance in
continental warfare but could produce
highly important results in maritime war. A
nation able to command the sea could
project power to seize enemy territory,
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPA IGN: SOhlE ACADEMIC THOUGHTS
isolate the theatre of operations, and hold
on to the objective after its capture by its
continuing control of sea communications.
Britain's conquest of Canada in the Seven
Years War was an outstanding example and
of course had been achieved without the
necessity of destroying France's main
military forces or occupying her
metropolitan territory.
The Falklands campaign was clearly an
example of this form of warfare. It was
limited in political objective, not being
aimed at the overthrow of the Argentinian
regime, although that did in fact result. It
was strategically limited, not being based on
attacking the Argentinian mainland. It was
operationally executed by the use of sea
power for the attack on the limited
objective through first isolating it by the
declaration and enforcement of the Total
Exclusion Zone and then by landing and
supporting the ground forces needed to
gain local military victory. The logistic
problems were overcome by invoking other
attributes of maritime power which had
been particularly stressed by Corbett's
predecessor as a prophet of sea power,
Mahan; the possession of a base, Ascension
Island, approximately midway between the
United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands
and the mobilisation of merchant ships and
their crews to carry out tasks beyond the
capacity of the Royal Navy. There were
three main elements in the execution of the
limited war strategy not envisaged by
Corbett. The vastly different international
system necessitated obtaining the support
of another and greater maritime power, the
United States. Success depended on air and
submarine capabilities as well as on surface
ships, and finally total operations were
controlled by the political leadership at
home to a degree never before experienced
by British commanders.
Command and control
Historically one of the most difficult tasks
in the conduct of war has been to establish
effective relations between the political and
military authorities at home and between
the latter and the operational commanders.
249
In any state not a military dictatorship, the
political leadership must retain ultimate
control of operations, particularly to ensure
that the war is not fought in such a way as
to hinder the achievement of the aims for
which it was started. In the past the
problem was simplified, although not
necessarily satisfactorily, by the inability of
governments to communicate quickly
enough with their commanders to exercise
control. The advent of wireless telegraphy
changed that but produced new problems
by tempting governments and central staffs
to inhibit the strategic and even the tactical
freedom of the man on the spot. This
possibility has been strengthened in our
own day by the growing international
interdependence and the production of
almost instantaneous long-distance
communications systems. In the particular
circumstances of the Falklands operations
when Task Force movements in the early
stages were part of a complex diplomatic
process, it was essential for the government
to maintain close control. Even after
fighting had started, the government's
public position was that it remained tight.
Although such a degree of control has been
theoretically accepted as necessary this was
the first instance of its application to the
practical test of war. It was a factor
probably of more significance than any of
the other 'firsts' which characterised the
campaign.
As far as the facts are yet known, success
was achieved through efficient organisation
and good working relationships. The
organisation was headed by a small Inner
Cabinet composed of the Prime Minister
and her most senior ministers meeting
frequently with its chief military adviser,
the Chief of the Defence Staff. The latter,
with his position strengthened and clarified
by recent decisions, was able to assert a
right to overall direction of what was
essentially a Combined Operation - a most
important precedent for the future. There
must inevitably have been inter-service
differences, but the single service chiefs
were not deprived of their right to give
individual advice on the most important
250
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN: SOME ACADEMIC THOUGHTS
issues, with the result that the Inner Cabinet
were left in no doubt of the implications of
the various military options upon which
they had to make political decisions. This
cannot always have been easy but the
eventual results seem to show that a
workmanlike relationship was achieved,
both on the personal level and on the
balancing of political and military
imperatives. Central to success must have
been agreement on the rules of engagement
under which the Task Force was to operate.
It seems that these functioned efficiently in
their first use in war. Although there must
have been difficulties which figured largely
in the thoughts and emotion of those
fighting the battle, rules which permitted,
for example, the sinking of the Belgrano,
an action which produced much political
and public criticism at home, d o indicate an
overall success. No evidence has yet
emerged to suggest that the men on the spot
were seriously inhibited by Whitehall or
Northwood control. This says much not
only for the machinery and organisation
available but also for the principal actors'
skill in performing under the new
conditions.
Particular difficulties of the campaign
As the Argentinian invasion had seized the
advantage of surprise, the first difficulty
e n c o u n t e r e d was t h a t of rapid
improvisation to produce a credible
maritime force. Credibility demanded not
only fighting capability against enemy
forces but also the ability to keep the seas
and maintain operational efficiency far
from the home base in some of the world's
stormiest waters and at the worst time of
year. This required close and quick
c o - o p e r a t i o n between g o v e r n m e n t
departments and with the shipping and
associated industries. The degree of success
throughout the campaign was gratifying as
it was surprising.
The facts of geography also dictated that
the Task Force would be operating
outside the range of shore-based aircover
against an enemy with a formidable air
force. All the experience of the last war
and all British strategic assumptions since
then had stressed this as something to be
avoided. It was the most dangerous element
of the operation and presumably was
pointed out to the Cabinet before it decided
to use force. Other doubts must have
figured largely in the military advisers'
minds. What would happen if the
Argentinians spun out the negotiations?
How long could the Task Force be
maintained and supplied? Would the ships
and their equipment and their young and
untried crews stand up to the strain? How
long could the embarked land forces
maintain their fitness and morale? Would
the Cabinet realise that there was a limit to
the length of negotiations and, if they did
decide to use force, would they and public
opinion be able to tolerate the losses of
men, ships, and aircraft which would
inevitably ensue? It is now clear that as
events turned out there were no grounds for
these doubts. But there is no knowing what
the political and popular reaction would
have been to greater and more dramatic
losses than actually occurred. There
appeared to be contradictory demands for
quick victory, low losses, and the use of
minimum force against the enemy.
Another range of difficulties arose from
the fact that much of the naval equipment
crucial to success had not been subjected to
the test of battle. This applied not only to
sensors and missiles but also to the Harrier
aircraft, some of which were embarked on a
vessel, the Invincible, designed for an
entirely different role. If there were to be
failures in performance or usage would not
Admiral Woodward be in the position of
Jellicoe at Jutland, the man who could lose
the war in an afternoon?
Evaluating the experience
The nation as a whole has learned that it
has the will, the political system, and the
armed forces needed for successful military
action in a cause in which it believes. In a
time of economic failure and social strains
this has produced a renewed nationaj selfconfidence which will be a great asset in
future international crises. It is hard
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN: SOME ACADEMIC THOUGHTS
however to see any relevance to the solution
of domestic problems. NATO has seen one
of its principal members displaying its
military capabilities 'for real' not just in
exercises and has had a clear demonstration
of the value of maritime power in out-ofarea operations.
A new generation of weapons systems
have been put to the test of war and a force
of traditionally designed surface ships,
whatever their other shortcomings, have
remained effective during prolonged
operations in appalling conditions. A new
and largely untried generation of fighting
men and commanders have risen to the
challenge of war and have conclusively
demonstrated the value of professionalism
based on sound training and leadership.
What has not emerged, and no one with any
understanding of the nature of modern war
would have expected it to, is a simple
answer to the question of the significance of
the vulnerability of surface ships to air and
missile attack. Those who previously were
convinced of the decreasing utility of such
vessels will point to the number of ships lost
and the devastating effect of a single
missile. Those who believe the contrary will
point out that in what was essentially a war
of attrition, the Task Force defeated the
Argentinian Air Force and preserved
enough of its ships to carry out all the
traditional naval functions in a combined
operation. What must be remembered is
that geography and topography imposed
limitations on both sides. Argentinian
aircraft were operating at the end of their
endurance and the Task Force was
operating in confined waters. The 'lessons
learned' would have reduced relevance to
any future operations in the open sea and
more easily within range of land-based
aircraft.
On the positive side the combat
effectiveness of the Harrier has been
convincingly demonstrated to a degree
251
sufficient to inspire more confidence that
surface forces carrying, we hope, more
advanced types of VSTOL aircraft,
supplemented by AEW, would have more
expectation of survival in a hostile
environment than critics usually allow. Just
as claims that technological advances and
recent fighting experience, particularly in
the Arab-Israeli war foreshadow the
obsolescence of the tank and the manned
aircraft have proved to be groundless so the
Falklands campaign has not demonstrated
the early demise of the surface ship. What it
has reinforced is the age-long lesson of
history; the need for balanced forces made
up of specialised components for each
specific requirement, both within land, air,
and sea forces and in the relationships
between the three services as a whole.
Although this article has concentrated on
sea and air matters, it must not be forgotten
that in the end the Falklands were liberated
on land by men moving on their feet.
What the whole business has shown is
that in today's and tomorrow's world it
would be useless for Britain and her Allies
to content themselves with completely
Euro-centred defence policies. The threat
there will remain and must still be
countered, but not to the exclusion of other
areas where political instability and
economic rivalry are likely to lead to a
breakdown of international order. It has
also shown the folly of Britain basing her
maritime policy on one scenario, such as
Atlantic reinforcement and one operational
capability such as ASW. What gives
maritime forces their unique value is their
flexibility and versatility, qualities which
will be greatly needed in an uncertain
future. It is on this, demonstrated so clearly
by the Falklands campaign that the Navy
should make its case for its proper share of
Britain's defence resources.
BRYANRANET
Lessons from the Falklands Crisis
I
1
1
I
I
The unexpected
N PRINCIPLE, there are no new lessons
from the Falklands. It remains another
twelve-inches-to-the-foot example of the
political utility of seapower. That it
happened to the British suddenly and out of
a clear sky at about the same time as the
1981 Defence Review is coincidental, but it
does not materially affect the truths of
maritime strategy, truths which the United
Kingdom will continue to ignore at its
peril.
There are those who will say that the
Falkland Islands crisis was so unusual that
no defence policy conclusions should be
drawn. It was highly atypical; the venue of
operations was some blockadable islands
just so far from a hostile mainland and
well outside friendly land-based air power,
with a small and homogenous friendly
population,' little built-up area, a tactical
situation that was just containable and,
finally, well isolated from third parties and
maritime trade routes. This particular
scenario is unlikely to repeat itself; certainly
another Argentine invasion will require
such strength that the intelligence indicators
should be unmistakable to the alerted. But
the point is that an incredible situation
became within days all too credible and a
Falklands war was added to some fifteen
other ongoing wars on this multipolar
planet. With NATO countries looking more
and more outside the NATO area, what
other incredible scenarios still lie in wait for
a maritime country dependent upon
external trade and bound by alliances: USA
and allies suppressing Libya? oil-dependent
Europeans with USA and Bahrain against
Iran? in support of the Oman and the UAE
versus Iran? NATO in support of ASEAN
verus the dominoes? support of Pakistan,
guarantees for Baluchistan?
Belize?
against Soviet adventurism south of
Cancer? with Saudi Arabia against the
PDRY? Kuwait again? with the USA,
France, and Martinique against Cuba? All
quite incredible, of course.
I
25
Practical lessons
From the material point of view, some of
the lessons which do not need relearning are
as follows:
(a) only ships can carry heavy weights long
distances across water;
(b) outside shore-based air-cover, a
maritime force requires organic air power
including AEW;
(c) shore-based air forces can only operate a
certain distance from their bases;
(6) nuclear submarines present a severe
threat to surface forces, but cannot conduct
air defence nor naval gunfire support;
(e) it is always more expensive to restore
deterrence than to maintain it.
In the absence of the facts there is no
point in commenting further on weapon
system effectiveness. Analysis will reveal
the truth about the media-vaunted
ineffectiveness of Sea Dart, for example,
and expose how this system also denied
airspace.
And the much-advertised
'vulnerability of surface ships' (no different
from the Spanish Armada, Jutland,
Guadalcanal, and Taranto, by the way) will
be set in a proper context. Cost-constrained
over-specialisation in design was the
problem, resulting on too much emphasis
on DOAE-type and tactical floor analyses
and insufficient recognition of the need for
the flexibility to deal with 'non-standard'
situations. This led to a lack of close-in
heavy metal and deficiencies in rapid
translation from visual sighting to valid fire
control solutions. Nothing that was not
known here; choices have had to be made.
Victory
It was a famous victory. And it was won by
the surface ships of the Royal Navy. Or,
put in another less partisan way, the
operation would not have been possible at
all without the surface ships of the Royal
'How strong would public support have been if the
Falkland Islanders had had black servants and
swimming pools?
LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS CRISIS
Navy. While our nuclear submarines
fended off the Argentine fleet, our surface
ships, under t h e most difficult
circumstances of weather and geography,
wrote off a medium power's gallant air
force in a matter of days and a mere four
hundred miles from their bases, allowing a
very considerable amphibious operation to
take place with minimal casualties to the
landing force. As at Waterloo, it was a
damned nice thing, the nearest run thing
you ever saw in your life, and there was no
officer nor description of troops that did
not behave well. But, given the reported
number of rounds per British gun
remaining forward at the timely Port
Stanley surrender, considerable value must
be attached to the contributions made by
the naval blockade and the softening effects
of naval bombardment.
From the larger perspective, the recipe
for a successful war might be stated as
follows:
(a) a limited objective in furtherance of a
sound political aim,
(b) domestic solidarity,
(c) sufficient political preparation,
(4 adherence to the war aim and maintenance of control, and
(e) sufficient force.
These conditions were fulfilled. However,
had the crisis occurred next year, or,
perhaps, given recent progress with
Seawolf, the Sea Harrier programme, and
software, last year, the final ingredient
would have been lacking.
Defeat
Suppose that this close-run thing had ended
in defeat? Suppose that the loss of a carrier,
a troop-ship, more escorts, and a repulsed
landing had persuaded the Chiefs of Staff
to advise the Cabinet that the operation was
no longer possible? A battered Task Force
would have trailed self-consciously home to
an embarrassed nation, rust stains no
longer a badge of honour. A triumphant
Argentina, readily affording magnanimity
to British prisoners of war, would hold the
Falklands in a glare of flag-waving
253
publicity. What Went Wrong would feature
in every newspaper, I Told You So from
every television talking head, witch-hunts
and enquiries would abound. The second
NATO maritime power would have been
defeated in a mad adventure far outside the
area of major threat, by military forces
considerably less capable than the Warsaw
Pact. What this would have done to the
spirit of the Royal Navy does not bear
thinking about; the redundancy programme
would cease to be a problem as people left
in droves for undefeated organisations.
It is possible to speculate with some
degree of realism about the downstream
political effects. American support during
the crisis would have been seen to be highly
damaging to their own self-interest; the
ruination of their South American policy in
support of the European half of the NATO
Alliance, would now further be shown to be
all talk and no fight. Given Conservative
Party unvovularitv on economic grounds.
it is brobable that the Government would
have fallen. The subsequent general
election might well have returned a
fissiparous Commons with a majority for
cancellation of the Trident programme, for
a British withdrawal from NATO Theatre
Nuclear Force Modernisation, and for the
withdrawal of American nuclear forces
from British soil. In these circumstances the
likelihood of German and Italian public
opinion continuing to support T N F modernisation in Europe (Dutch and Belgian
agonising having been decided for them)
seems small. It is not fanciful to foresee a
subsequent resurgence of Mansfieldism in
the USA ('our boys in Europe confronting
a nuclear power unprotected'), followed by
a call to withdraw American troops because
of the severe knock to the credibility of the
reinforcement bridge. Decoupling would
become a fact, and European tendencies to
find their own little accommodations with
the Soviet Union would gather pace. Not
even the accession of a Gibraltar-obsessed
Spain to NATO, if continued, would
counterbalance this all-too-likely strategic
shift. Britain itself would perceive military
methods as less useful in protecting national
254
LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS CRISIS
interests and a new government, committed
to higher deficit spending elsewhere, would
have few qualms in instituting a coastal
defence policy o n the Swedish model at
savagely reduced budgetary levels. National
shame would run high and would affect
national postures in all international fora
despite, no doubt, loudly expressed
sympathy from such nations as the French.
Heart-stopping political risks indeed,
fortunately averted by the professionalism
and expertise of all three services. Truly, as
the Spectator has said, recent British
governments have again been shown to
have much better armed forces than they
deserve. But gratitude not being an element
much in evidence in politics, we had better
proceed forward o n a basis of realism. The
lesson that the nation should have learnt is
that in a dangerous and imponderable
world it is well to be prepared for the worst;
dramatic changes to a political map can be
caused by slow economic and social trends,
but where military matters are concerned,
governments are always only days away
from a crisis.
Diplomacy
The Falklands crisis provided a vivid
example of the interrelation between
military and economic sanctions and the
diplomatic process. The liberal press and
the 'air ways' were thick with cries adjuring
the Government to 'seek a diplomatic
solution' rather than use armed force, even
going so far as to imply that the Government was driven by bloodthirstiness. Some
of these protesters were being disingenuous
for political purposes, for it must have
rapidly become obvious that the only purely
'diplomatic' sanction available t o a country
is to withdraw its ambassador. This has a
marginal effect on the cash flow of the little
shops around the embassy, but little else. In
an international crisis, diplomacy consists
of the manipulation of available sanctions,
without which nothing can be achieved.
Never was a 'diplomatic
solution'
conceivable as an alternative to sanctions;
those who proposed such a path must have
been considering yielding to Argentina,
although it was remarkable how rarely they
were pressed by spokesmen and
interviewers to elaborate on the details of
this proposed 'diplomatic solution'. It is
not denied, however, that one of the duties
of the diplomat is to muster international
support, for 'world opinion' can sometimes
be an effective lever. Whether this can be
done depends more upon the justice of the
case than upon diplomatic skill.
A realist would have assessed that the
intransigence of the Argentine position
made conflict almost inevitable from the
date of sailing of the Task Force and that
distance, weather, and logistic factors
placed the operation upon a critical path
between sailing and surrender which could
hardly be shortened or lengthened. Realism
did begin to seep through eventually as
British concessions were refused and the
Argentines remained inflexible. Attacks on
the government shifted to such straw men
as the exact method of negotiation, the
involvement of third parties, refusals to
support an attack on the mainland or a full
frontal attack on Port Stanley, neither of
these last two being militarily feasible in any
case.
One hopes that these events and those in
the Lebanon will not have damaged the
status of the United Nations forum.
The Media
While there have been many expressions of
dissatisfaction about the media handling of
the crisis, in general the public have been
well served. There will be, as in other areas,
much post hoc analysis of the relationships
between the BBC and the Ministry of
Defence for there is no doubt that there
were shortcomings. The Ministry of
D e f e n c e policy c o n t a i n e d s o m e
irreconcilables: their clear priorities were
firstly, the protection of the secrecy of
operations, secondly, the best possible
handling of information for next-of-kin,
and thirdly, feeding the media maw; but
certain factors served to confuse these clear
priorities. The claims of the Argentines
called for early refutation or, in some cases,
confirmation before, ideally, the British
LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS CRISIS
would have liked, especially where
casualties were in fact sustained. While it is
hard to say it, the informing of next-of-kin
is militarily insecure, particularly where
ships are concerned, thus the need speedily
to inform next-of-kin carries with it the
need also to expose effects on the order of
battle. Even a denial of an Argentine claim
could have assisted the enemy in clarifying
post-strike debriefings.
Some media-generated incidents may
turn out not to have been trivial. It does
seem odd that we should have revealed
when we did that Argentine bombs did not
go off, or have speculated in public about
the advance on Goose Green. Future policy
will have to recognise that ambitious
newsmen have a burning professional desire
to transmit news and that, as they control
what is printed, they will print their
discontents, however ill-founded. Some of
these discontents really were frivolous,
including the accusations of 'news
management' and such incidents as the
deployment of the Superb where the
newspapers led themselves into inaccuracy,
subsequently accusing the MOD of
misinformation. Sensibly, MOD policy is
never to reveal submarine movements for it
can readily be seen that a sequential process
of speculation and denial would in time
reveal the order of battle. Less easy to
control were surface ship movements, but,
as interest waned after the first televised
departures, it must have been less and
less easy for the Argentines to count
hulls.
One has nothing but admiration for the
conduct of the war correspondents in the
field and their presence was essential for the
maintenance of the support of the nation,
as well as providing unbiased verification of
the British reputation for accuracy in news
announcements.
At home, however, things were less
satisfactory. At the outset of the operation
the preponderance of Argentine film on
television, all of a high news value, led the
public to formulate a yawp of discontent
against the BBC on the grounds of bias
towards Argentina, while forgetting the
255
effect of technical factors such as satellite
availablity, steaming distance, and pressure
on communications channels. In fact, this
discontent was more the result of a feeling
that they were being subtly got at in a
manner hard to rationalise unless one was
to sit in front of the set with a notebook and
a strong dose of paranoia. Typically
annoying was the early tendency of the
BBC t o sit in judgement de haut en bas and
talk 'even-handedly' about, for example,
the Argentine and British invasions. It was
interesting to observe a definite change of
language after the resignation of Robert
Kee, the 'British invasion' becoming
'reoccupation by our troops'. But clevercleverism and smartness persisted; latterly
the Secretary of State for Defence was,
during a Dimbleby interview, properly
contemptuous of a ten-minute film about
'intelligence' which seemed to have the
multiple aims of compromising our
relationship with our greatest ally,
breaching security, and impugning the
neutral status of Chile.2 Perhaps the BBC
should spend a little more licence money on
research and thought and a little less on
emotive, gee-whiz, Star War graphics.
Another tiny but illustrative incident;
both TV channels carried Colonel Ricketts
of the Welsh Guards briefing his men
before embarkation. BBC chose to transmit
the moment when it was suggested that they
would all learn Spanish on the voyage while
ITN selected the reading out of the fine
valedictory message from the Prince of
Wales. Why not the other way round?
Could it be that the BBC is against the
nobler British traditions? Surely not.
The MOD spokesman was accused of
pedantic delivery: one establishing shot
would have shown why - the room was
full of newsmen unable to take shorthand
and who often got it wrong anyway.
l I have it on very good authority that the sequences in
this film which dealt with the research programme of a
well-known electronics company were in part shot
without permission, and the fact that these sequences
would be used to imply, entirely incorrectly, that their
product had been clandestinely inserted into Chile or
Argentina was not mentioned to the company.
256
LESSONS FROM THE FALKLANDS CRISIS
Effects
Sadly, the warriors will return to a country
already immersed in other things,
backbiting and rail strikes. The operation
will be mouthed over from all points of
view and many meals will be made of the
few things that inevitably went wrong. Even
as this article is being written in early July,
the casual remarks of a 'Royal Marines
Major' have been elevated to the status of
an article in The Times wherein the courage
of the Task Force Commander is doubted
and the support given by the Navy to the
land forces is questioned. If this Major
really exists, which seems doubtful, he
evidently needs a refresher at JWW Latimer
if it survives the Defence Review. There will
be those in the Ministry of Defence who will
try to portray the operation as a naval
defeat. The historical perspective will
enlarge the essential inconsequentiality
of this unfortunate war and minimise the
fine motives which inspired the British
response.
One can but tell the warriors to take
heart; intramurally they are admired and
respected. By sound staffwork and by
taking a moderate and realistic view of the
lessons, the Navy must continue forcefully
to explain the facts of maritime life. If
anyone ever doubted it, the equipment we
procure and the drills we practice actually
have a purpose. One of the more
encouraging facts to emerge is that in a
crisis the niggling bureaucratic procedures
can be swept away; we are not so sapped by
peacetime thinking and civil service
machinery that things cannot be done in a
hurry when they are needed. We must
preserve this attitude of mind; it is the
'uniformed branch' that actually does the
fighting and upon whom the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office depends when the
chips are down. Let not any Naval Staff
Desk Officer feel inhibited in his daily
confrontations in future. But, in taking a
robust line, we must try and guard against
inter-service bickering. We must not allow
the bureaucracy to tarnish the excellent cooperation achieved by all arms, including
many MOD civilians, at the sharp end. If
the RAF can argue for much-needed
maritime force improvements on the
strength of the crisis, well, good luck to
them. We must d o likewise.
Finally, how splendid to see the Royal
Family in the front line. ('What did the
Hon. Member's family do in the Falklands
War. . .?' (cheers, laughter).)
BYSTANDER
South Atlantic Island
Y FAMILY had just finished telling me
that my frustration at not being in the
Falklands Task Force was making me
irritable when the phone rang. My appointer
wondered whether I would be happy to take
charge of our Forces on a South Atlantic
Island. 'When?', I asked. 'As soon as
possible,' he replied. 'Does the name of the
Island begin "A"?' I asked, ever mindful of
security. He affirmed that it did and I
assured him that I was on my way.
'Briefings tomorrow and fly out as soon as
you can after that,' he added. He
congratulated me on being so amenable and
I told him that I remembered being an
appointer myself and giving an officer a
pierhead jump to an Indian Ocean Island. I
was sympathetic to his problem and
extremely keen to go.
The meeting in MOD reached two
conclusions, neither of which stood the test
of time. The first was that the tri-service
numbers on the island would not be more
than about two hundred, and the second
that I should have the power of veto on
anyone sent there. Commander-in-Chief
said that he was happy that I was going to
look after what was an important staging
post and gave me some wise advice not to
send any angry signals!
A quick return home to collect the efforts
of the cottage industry which had been set
up to deal with my white uniforms, a visit to
the local naval air station to pick up some
invaluable khaki uniform, and I was on my
way to RAF Lyneham, a C130 Hercules and
Ascension Island.
Ascension Island
Ascension lies at 7' 56's and 14" 25'W, 7
miles long, 7 miles wide and is a 34 square
mile outcrop of volcanic rock with no
indigenous population. The people
normally resident there number about 1,000
and are employed by Cable and Wireless,
BBC, NASA, USAF, PANAM, CSO,
South Atlantic Cable Co., and the FCO.
Wideawake Airfield was built in 1942. The
first aircraft to land on it was a Fairy
Swordfish from HMS Archer; it became an
important staging post in World War 11, and
in 1966 the runway was extended to 10,000
feet as part of the expansion needed by the
island's role in the USAF Eastern Test
Range. The airfield has a large dispersal
capable of taking up to 24 large fixed-wing
aircraft and on one occasion 36 helicopters.
It is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel
USAF and managed on contract by
PANAM. This specifies that the airfield
shall be manned to provide up to 285
aircraft movements per year!
The climate is pleasant, not unbearably
hot and usually a south-easterly gets up
during the day, sometimes as high as 30 - 5
knots. The anchorage in Clarence Bay is
affected by a long heavy groundswell which
often renders the landing jetty unusable and
makes swimming from the beaches
dangerous. The volcanic dust is pervasive
and the volcanic rock wears out shoes and
tyres at a remarkable rate. The highest point
of the island, Green Mountain, is 2,817 feet
high and is covered by a small bamboo
forest. When I had first visited the island in
1957 in H M Yacht Britannia, I had not been
on watch ashore but Prince Philip and his
party had come back and described how
they had gone through a long dark tunnel
and come out into fairyland. This was u p
Green Mountain and I was to discover
exactly what they meant.
The island is administered by the Resident
Administrator, who was to prove a great
source of support. It has 2 civilian doctors, a
small 14-bed hospital, 1 dentist, 1 school
and 2 shops. Communications are weekly by
USAF aircraft, and 6 times a year by a small
supply ship (UK - Ascension - S t
Helena - South Africa). Everything has to
be flown or shipped in to the island. There
are no pubs, restaurants, or hotels. There is
no television or ready-made entertainment.
Aim
This was to be the base for the forward
258
SOUTH ATLPLNTICISLAND
logistic support of British Forces on
Operation Corporate. There were two more
or less distinct parts to our task. First, the
support of ships in the South Atlantic
involved the transhipment of people,
stores, ammunition, and helicopters from
Support Command, and chartered
transport aircraft by helicopter and lighter
to ships passing the island. Second, the
RAF operations mounted from the island
had to be supported and the defence of the
island had to be secured. Fitness and
weapon training had to be provided for
troops in ships which stopped over at the
island.
Constraints
It was obvious to the simplest of sailors on
the island but not always back in the UK
that the rate of build-up of our base in
terms of numbers of people was heavily
dependent o n overcoming some fairly basic
constraints. Since this was the most
fundamental part of my task and has readacross to other parts of the world including
the Falkland Islands, it is worth detailing
the main constraints and how they were
overcome.
Water
We were always very conscious that the
greatest show-stopper to large increases of
people on the island was the supply of fresh
water. Luckily, the two distillation plants,
one at BBC and the other on the American
base, had some spare capacity for normal
maintenance, and by delaying this until it
was possible to enhance both plants by
flying in small reverse osmosis equipments
(of different voltages of course), potential
shortages were averted. Water rationing
was applied to some servicemen in particular areas under particular circumstances.
Aviation fuel
This is supplied to the island by US Sealift
Command tankers which anchor off and
discharge their fuel through a floating
pipeline to a fuel farm in Georgetown some
three miles from the airfield. It is shipped
by bowser to ready-use tanks on the
airfield. The critical link in this chain,
assuming a steady supply of US tankers
which we got, was the speed at which
bowsers could be loaded and driven from
Georgetown to Wideawake. Even the buildup of twelve additional RAF bowsers to the
five operated by PANAM did not solve the
problem since only one could be loaded at a
time. The Royal Engineers came to the
rescue and in the remarkably short time of a
few days, a pipeline was flown in,
assembled, and operating. The efficiency
and dedication of the sappers was most
impressive. By the time I left Ascension we
had used 5% million US gallons of fuel.
Accommodation
Paradoxically, this was one of the easiest
and at the time most difficult of our
problems. In 'management' terms it was a
- an
unpredictable
non-starter
requirement with varying standards chasing
non-existing resources. At one end of the
requirement, the Royal Marines of X and Y
Company professed themselves pleasurably
satisfied with a flat piece of volcanic ground
where they could 'bivvy' - why I ever gave
the C O of Y Company a cabin when he was
my OCRM 1'11 never know! At the other
end, RAF aircrew some of whom were
flying sorties of over twenty-four hours,
required air-conditioned, undisturbed rest,
and preferably furniture to keep their
clothes in, and a refrigerator to keep the
beer cold. Need to be close to the airfield
played a part and those in transit were
generally less well accommodated.
Accommodation impinged on other
constraints - water, food, sanitation, and
transport. Numbers and ranks were never
known until the transport aircraft arrived.
One of my first decisions was to open the
'Lunar Bay Holiday Camp'. At the other
end of the island at English Bay, this was a
tented camp based round some huts which
had a few showers and heads and a field
kitchen. Ideally suited for those who were
familiar with Club Mediterranee and
enjoyed good food, open air living, and a
certain amount of volcanic dust, it became
a way of life from which some were
reluctant to be dislodged, although I have
to admit that one Chinaman did attempt
SOUTH ATLAlVTlC ISLAND
suicide there, more in anticipation of war
service than in rebellion against his
environment, I like to think. The flexibility
provided by tents was considerable.
On the American base, the authorities
were extremely generous in allowing an
initial degree of overcrowding which was to
cause problems in the medium term. This
was exacerbated by some RAF aircrew,
each successive wave of whom saw it as
their main aim to move beds, furniture, and
fridges to suit the whim or pecking order of
their particular crew. This infuriated the
tidy mind of the PANAM administrator
and led to a recurring argument every few
days. Meanwhile, an Army Captain and his
Warrant Officer took possession of a
disused
urinal,
reserved
their
accommodation during a temporary
abscence, and were finally given formal
notice to quit as the quarters were required
for their original purpose.
There was only one thing to do and I did
it. A Regulating Lieutenant, a Fleet Masterat-Arms, and four Regulators arrived posthaste, accommodated themselves in the old
disused local Police Station (two Leading
Regulators to a cell), and took charge of
accommodation,
movements, and
discipline, to my and their complete
satisfaction.
Material aid was also at hand. After a
certain amount of prolonged and not
altogether satisfactory negotiation between
too many authorities, 4449 Mobile Support
Squadron USAF arrived in a phased
succession of C141s with thirty-one
expandable accommodation modules, each
capable of sleeping twelve people, bunks,
bed linen, and ashtrays provided, airconditioned or heated to choice. Washing
and heads facilities were also in the
package. The Regulating Branch preferred
to call this accommodation Victory Village
and named each module after famous
Admirals. The rest of us called it
Concertina City. It provided a step jump
improvement in our capability, and if the
generators were a bit noisy, then as Milton
Friedman would say: 'There's no such thing
as a free lunch.'
259
Meanwhile, elsewhere on the island, two
teams of people were bringing every
suitable disused building back into service.
The redoubtable Sappers formed one team
and Cable and Wireless had a gang who, if
not helping the war effort by loading
lighters, were rapidly installing showers and
heads. Accommodation for over two
hundred people was provided in previously
disused buildings. Empty bungalows were
lent by Cable and Wireless and CSO and
even the old zymotic hospital was
renovated. At our peak we accommodated
1,463 people.
Victualling
I travelled out on the same day as the first
field kitchen, and I knew all was going to be
well when I asked the RAF Sergeant in
charge of it if I could have breakfast from
his kitchen on arrival. 'No ye canna have
breakfast but we'll give you lunch' was his
reply - realistic and willing. An unlikely
but extremely successful partnership
between Lieutenant (S) RN, a Chief
Caterer, and the same RAF Sergeant
provided a tri-service catering team second
to none. On one occasion we did get down
to one day's supply of rations, but the daily
C130s and the careful planning of our
resupply from back home created great
confidence. In the early days, menus were
restricted to whatever imaginative creation
could be made from compo but latterly the
three field kitchens were producing
excellent multi-choice meals with fresh
vegetables; 'better than we got back home'
was a general opinion. Throughout, the
cheerful, patient St Helenians in the US
commissary produced meals for a large
percentage of us and surpassed even their
normal high standard with special meals for
survivors from South Georgia, HMS
Sheffild, and the Atlantic Conveyor.
Supplying the ships
This main task was the responsibility of N P
1222, commanded by an exceptionally
dedicated and hardworking Commander
(SD) (AE). Stores were unloaded from
the transport aircraft by three RAF MAMS
teams working twelve hours on and
260
SOUTH ATLA NTIC ISLAND
twenty-four off. They were then sorted and movements, Wideawake was the busiest
moved into dumps by ship name by an airfield in the world, having taken over
assorted team of DGST(N) fork-lift truck from Chicago O'Hare. For the most
drivers, naval supply ratings, and soldiers. obvious reasons, flight safety became the
Luckilj. there was considerable space to the concern of everyone and in over 13,000
south and to the east of the dispersal movements there was only one incident in
because the stores dumps became very dispersal when a carelessly left VC 10 ladder
was blown against a 707. The USAF
large.
In the early days eighteen helicopters Colonel was persuaded by the PANAM
were reassembled and flown on to passing Manager, myself, and all the RN that
ships. Many a startled Fleet Air Arm helicopter hot refuelling was safe, but I
maintainer was greeted off the transport confess that I was highly embarrassed when
aircraft with a tool kit and the message that he quietly asked if we usually left so much
he could have a bed when that Wessex 5 or live ordnance around our fields back home.
Lynx had been rebuilt. The response was An ammunition dump was constructed in
magnificent and the 'time to rebuild' got the next few days.
faster and faster. What is more the aircraft
The ability to squeeze a quart out of a
all worked.
pint pot in terms of airfield operations was
Our helicopter force on the island varied a highlight and was achieved with great cobut usually consisted of two Wessex Ss, one operation and flight safety discipline. I do
Sea King and one Chinook. This provided a
not believe that it could have worked with
most flexible and powerful lift capability,
any other organisation than a small,
with the Wessex and the Sea King doing the
main day-to-day running and the Chinook efficient, dedicated team like PANAM.
Sometimes for a ship without a helo deck
being particularly useful when a heavy lift
was required over a long distance. We ran or for very large and bulky loads, it
short of RN Sea Kings and an RAF Mark 3 was more effective to load by lighter. The
was sent to assist. The difference in stores/people were then moved to
manning was the subject of some comment Georgetown, craned on to large lighters
(RN 2 aircrew plus 8 maintainers, RAF 4 operated with great skill by Cable and
aircrew plus 10 maintainers), but inter- Wireless St Helenian Coxswains and taken
service co-operation reached an all-time out to the ship at anchor in Clarence
high when the RAF Warrant Loadmaster Bay.
Once everyone realised that Ascension
offered to fly in the RN Wessex 5s to ease
the load on the RN crewmen. Interestingly Island was not a stores depot but only a
enough, a Chinook load was too large for transhipment point and that we had no
the average ship to stow quickly enough to control over what was or was not loaded on
allow a steady flow pattern. The best to transport aircraft in UK, the operation
vertreps were those with the ships just off went remarkably smoothly. The only
the end of the runway and night vertreps, hitches occurred when stores were not
although conducted many times, were less properly addressed and the sight of a
effective than those by day because they forlorn Commander (S) wandering down
the lines of stores, looking for 'that special
were slower.
The high tempo required by the item' was not unusual. All stores were
integration of helicopter and fixed-wing Priority One and there was no way that we
operations took a lot of people by surprise could give any other priority except to
but developed into a fine art. The PANAM getting them all south as fast as was
air traffic controllers, of whom there were possible. It is difficult to be precise about
only two for the first month, were the numbers of people this task needed but
magnificent. They estimated that, on ,'total RN numbers varied between eighty
18 April, when we had over five hundred and a hundred, and even including the
SOUTH ATLAlVTIC ISLAND
helicopter groundcrew I don't suppose
there were more than a total of about 120.
Defence of the island
It was known from the outset that the
Argentinians had the capability of getting a
Boeing 707 or an in-flight refuelled C130 to
Ascension and that they could land small
parties of special forces from say merchant
ships. My assessment of the likelihood of
such an event remained low throughout
because I believed that with the large US
presence on the island any 'Argentine'
attack would be the equivalent of a
Lusitania or a Pearl Harbour, and therefore
counter-productive. There were some
indications back in UK that the possibility
of an attack existed and it was decided to
defend the island. After a 'recce' by two
Army officers, a detachment of about forty
RAF Regiment were sent to guard our key
points and four RAF Phantoms with twelve
aircrew and sixty-four groundcrew
provided air defence. Although expensive
in people this provided a sensible insurance.
Plans to establish a Terminal Control Area
or an Air Defence Identification Zone
appeared to peter out short of an
International Notice to Airmen. A daily
Nimrod surveillance sortie was flown which
usually established the position of
Primorye, the USSR AGI as within ten
miles of the island. The aim of providing a
frigate as guardship did not last long due to
shortage of ships further south, and the
Leeds and Dumbarton Castle filled this
breach as best as they could. A surveillance
radar was installed at the top of Green
Mountain with nineteen people to man,
operate, and maintain it.
RAF operations
These were divided into air defence,
Nimrod surveillance, Victor air-to-air
refuelling, Vulcan attack, and VC 10 and
Hercules transport operations. Chinook
and Sea King operations have already been
described.
The four Phantoms provided one aircraft
at Alert Five twenty-four hours a day and
flew usually one other sortie per day to keep
26 1
aircrew current. As well as the one island
surveillance mission, the Nimrods usually
flew a long-range surveillance sortie down
south every twenty-four hours. The range
of these sorties was increased latterly with
air-to-air refuelling. Other sorties were
flown
to
support
Vulcan - Victor
rendezvous. The average population of
Nimrod aircraft was four but there was
considerable coming and going of aircraft
and crews. An average of about seventyfive aircrew and about 150 groundcrew
manned this effort.
At the beginning Victors carried out
some
mutually
refuelled
radar
reconnaissance missions down to South
Georgia, but very soon the Victor force
built up to fifteen to support the Vulcan
and later Nimrod and Hercules. The air
force had gone to considerable trouble to
get the most professionally qualified Group
Captain to take charge of these very
complicated missions - to the extent of
having three senior RAF officers within a
fortnight. The first two missions were to
bomb Stanley airfield runway with direct
action delayed fuse bombs. An Air Vice
Marshal flew out to take responsibility for
the first which, by chance, was
programmed to happen just in time for the
Bomber Command dinner. It subsequently
became clear that only one bomb of the
forty dropped on these two missions had hit
the runway. What is not generally realised is
that this sort of accuracy is about what
might have been expected from high level
free-fall radar bombing.
The Air Support Command operations
with VC 10 and C130 Hercules aircraft were
carried out with great professionalism and
dedication. Flow control was applied early
in the operation and worked well. It quickly
became clear that there was insufficient
suitable aircrew accommodation for stopovers and these took place at Dakar.
Whether it was the thought of the topless
female French tourists in Dakar that kept
unserviceabilities to an incredible minimum
or not, the regularity, dependability, and
cheerfulness shown by all the 'truckies'
were most commendable. Chartered
262
SOUTH ATLA NTIC ISLAND
Belfasts were needed for the very large
loads; their arrival was usually unpredicted
because of the length of time they took to
get down the route.
Another most valuable operation was the
long-range air drops by Hercules aircraft.
I'hese were flown with great determination
in the face of very changeable weather and
the knowledge that the Argentinians were
also flying C130s over our ships! One
frigate did imply that it would have been
nice to know that people were going to be
dropped as well as stores!
Fitness and weapon training
The 3rd Commando Brigade stayed in their
ships off Ascension for about eleven days.
Their main task during this time was to
restow the ships to the required mounting
plan, but it was also very necessary to get as
many troops ashore as possible for fitness
and weapon training. Seven different live
ranges were set up so that even the Scorpion
armoured vehicles could zero their guns. As
five of these were within the airfield area,
careful control was needed and the epitome
of this was when two Sea Harriers joined in
battle formation, firing stopped as they
broke downwind and restarted when they
turned on to finals.
A very satisfactory routine was
established. Troops would land by
helicopter from their ships practising a helo
assault, march to the ranges, fire their
weapons, march six miles to English Bay, a
quick dip since there was a safety boat, and
then recover back to their ship by LCU.
A plan for the 5th Infantry Brigade to be
based on Ascension for some weeks never
came to fruition and they sailed past in QE
2 with whom we conducted a covert longrange vertrep.
Relationships with the locals
Two choices were open: t o disregard what
the locals might feel or to carry them with
us. I chose the second and was very lucky
that the main dramatis personae were
totally supportive and co-operative. The
help received from the Administrator, the
USAF Colonel, and the PANAM Manager
was beyond measure. A series of weekly
meetings with the managers of Cable and
Wireless, BBC, NASA, CSO, and South
Atlantic Cable Co. was instituted in order
that rumour could be countered and all
could feel that they were being kept in the
picture. Initially, the novelty of the
'invasion', patriotism, and support for the
cause meant that the civilian population
opened their hearts and doors to us. After
the Falkland Islands had been retaken a
realisation that the island way of life was
being adversely affected led to criticisms of
those members of the forces who appeared
to have time on their hands and whose
behaviour was offensive. There were
surprisingly few incidents, mainly because
long working hours gave the forces limited
time or energy for leisure activities.
There is a credibility gap between the
impedimenta of British urban life and the
simple leisurely, but more creative, pursuits
of an island community. This is a factor
which is being given deserved attention in the
Falklands and one in which personalities at
all levels play an important part.
People policy
For reasons which I hope are by now clear,
I determined that I would endeavour to
restrict numbers of servicemen on the island
to such levels as were strictly necessary.
Manning would be such as to require men
to work a twelve- to fourteen-hour day, and
leisure time would be such as to discourage
boredom. Physical leisure activities, such as
sport, and walking up Green Mountain,
were strongly encouraged.
This policy met with unanimous support
on the island. Overmanned detachments
volunteered to reduce their numbers;
individuals felt needed and enjoyed the
satisfaction of a hard purposeful job well
done. Unfortunately, it was not always
understood in UK, and I cannot think what
the aircraftman who made the sixteen-hour
journey to and from Ascension four times
must have thought. His local Group
Captain considered that we needed him, the
senior RAF officer on the island, a Group
Captain, was certain that we did not!
SOUTH ATLANTIC ISLAND
Differences between services
It is generally considered to be unfair play
to draw comparisons between single
services on a joint service operation.
However, two factors were so striking that
it would be dishonest not to mention them.
First, there was some difference in
resource and manning levels. The fact that
RAF numbers on the island very quickly
rose to eight hundred compared to one
hundred each for the other two services was
not entirely dictated by different
requirements. Where overmanning existed,
it was in a light blue uniform. I believe this
to be due to the fact that the RAF are
manned in five watches at peacetime levels.
While there is much to commend the idea
that everyone should have their leave when
they want it in peacetime without the unit
closing down, this leads to superfluous
people in war. At no stage did economy of
effort, either with people or other
resources, appear to feature in the light blue
staff manual.
Second, the air force appears to be
managed in a different way from the other
services. Authority is not delegated, control
is divided amongst many authorities, and
the decision-taking machinery is not clearcut. T o justify this comment, I can d o no
better than to quote the following extract of
a conversation on the Air Staff
Management Aid, two computer terminals
of which sat incongruously in the corner of
our Command tent.
Serial 043. FM 18 GP: Following high level
discussion Air Cdr. may decide to send
plus one C O pilot plus one crewman
for Chinook detachment. Your views
well known. Unable to disclose Air
Staff reasoning.
263
Serial 045. For SRAFO FM COS 18 GP:
Concerned that Chinook detachment
aircrew element undermanned. 38 G P
and ODIHAM support view that it
should be increased by one co-pilot
and one crewman. Your agreement
required.
Serial 046. From SRAFO YR 045: Since I
am not privy to the reasons leading to
the conclusion at your end that
Chinook detachment is undermanned,
I can only listen to the advice of O C
detachment. As you know, he
considers that he is adequately crewed.
From my own observations, I have
come to the same conclusion. If there
is some reason which dictates a radical
increase in current Chinook task, then
additional aircrew will be required but
I am not aware of any such increase.
The discerning reader will have gleaned that
at least six different authorities have now
expressed an opinion on the putative need
for two more aircrew. I wish I could say
that my example is exceptional rather than
typical.
Conclusion
Except for the factors instanced above, I
was totally impressed with co-operation,
ingenuity, determination,
and good
humour of all the servicemen I met. I was
privileged to meet many brave men. All
were completely convinced that our action
in retaking the Falklands was morally
correct, and this was a cause which all of us
were proud to serve. It was certainly a
different way of spending one's gardening
leave.
V o x NON INCERTA
Logistic Support for Operation Corporate
(The following article is the result of a
number of contributions from the staff of
the Chief of Fleet Support-Editor.)
Introduction
T HAS BEEN said that logisticians are a
sad embittered race of men, very much
in demand in war, but sinking into resentful
obscurity in peace. Before that decline
develops in the aftermath of the Falkland
Islands campaign (Operation Corporate), it
is appropriate to review the part logistics
played in the operation. T o most people
logistics sounds dull and is thought of in
terms of fuel, food, and stores. There is,
however, much more including maintenance and repair, ammunition supply,
transport (land, sea, and air), and medical
services. In war logistics is far from dull and
is the very lifeline of operations; indeed
logistic constraints may well determine the
conduct of operations.
The Falkland crisis brought with it
special problems logistically. It was first
and foremost an operation quite different
from any envisaged in the North Atlantic.
As it turned out it was also the largest
operation for the Royal Navy since the
Second World War. Speed of reaction was
of the highest importance, which
necessitated a heavy reliance on existing
stocks and long and dedicated hours from
all those connected with the Naval Service.
Support of such a Task Force over 8,000
miles required large resources over and
above those of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary
(RFA), and the British Merchant Fleet was
heavily drawn upon. The distance, and thus
deployment times, also made major
demands on material endurance and
maintenance, and the provision of urgent
spares necessitated the establishment of an
'air bridge'. Finally the prospect of
casualties, both afloat and in the landing
force ashore, gave rise to the need for
hospital ships, a facility not used for many
years. As will be apparent from what
follows every aspect of logistic was tested,
and tested vigorously.
I
The initial phase
MOD Staffs went to 24-hour watchkeeping
at the outset and when decisions were
announced about the deployment and
disposition of the initial task force and
landing forces the entire logistic
organisation from respective HQs through
the depots and bases followed suit. The first
task was to make ready and sail the
warships a n d
supporting vessels
immediately available in the UK. This was
the first major test of the Navy's supply
organisation since the Suez campaign and
in those first 3 to 4 days a total of 13 major
warships were stored to war endurance in
the naval bases and sailed, followed very
quickly by their supporting RFAs.
In parallel with storing the Task Force
the movements and logistics requirements
of the assigned land forces committed had
to be co-ordinated. Land Forces
comprising 40 and 45 RM Cdos, 2nd and
3rd Paras, 5 Brigade and their supporting
elements meant that the sea-lift resources
available in the HM ships and RFAs were
clearly insufficient. At an early stage,
therefore, the two major liners Canberra
and QE 2 were requisitioned together with
further vessels for the transport of the land
forces' weapons, ammunition, vehicles,
ordnance, stores and equipment, the
majority of which came from army sources,
were outloaded through the dockyards and
Southampton.
Initial supply involved a tremendous
increase in the number of demands placed
upon the system and special action was
taken to reduce the volume of low-priority
demands, thus ensuring that the high
priority demands could be handled in the
required timescale. The pressures of those
first few days are well illustrated by the
activity at the bases, the problems of
converting ships taken up from trade
(STUFT), and the medical preparations.
In the bases
The Base Supply Officers' staffs on the
waterfront were involved from the outset
LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CORPORATE
with the frantic rush to sail the major units
of the Task Force. Ships, dockyards, and
supply depots swung into action. The Base
Supply teams played their normal role in
support, but at twice normal speed,
hastening, monitoring, and 'robbing'
urgent stores required for OPDEF
rectification; organising emergency reliefs
for key personnel and providing stores
parties (courtesy of RNDQs, amongst
others!). The list goes on; the jobs were
done and the first wave of ships sailed on
time. That was the easy part.
It came as something of a surprise when
BSO Portsmouth was asked at 23.00 one
evening to begin organising the stores
required for the SS Canberra and MV Elk.
Where was he to begin? However, a hurried
conference the next day soon sent various
members of BSO's organisation scurrying
off to fix the first essentials: a ship's office
'kit'; BRs; CBs; cash; postage stamps; life
jackets; anti-flash, etc., etc. A dedicated
storing team was set up in Portsmouth to
back up those on the ground in
Southampton and so began round-theclock activity to prepare these ships for
service with the Task Force. Similar activity
was taking place at Devonport.
Ship Managers and Stores Teams were to
play a major part in translating
requirements from all quarters into
hardware for the ships. There was a host of
authorities involved in modifying the ships
for their new roles and their requirements
grew by the hour. Many requests tested the
experience, professionalism, and ingenuity
of the teams: 'something to cover portholes
for darken ship'; 'a complete swimmer of
the watch outfit' and 'everything we need to
do an RAS'. Each had to be reduced to
individual items, identified, and demanded.
The response from PSTO(N)s and stores
depots was of the highest order. Corners
were cut and many stores were instantly
supplied on the strength of a telephone call.
In addition to the stores organised through
the Base Supply Team the ships were being
loaded with vast quantities of military
hardware, food, liquid refreshment, and,
finally, troops. The jetties and adjacent
265
dock areas were crammed with vehicles and
stores. Somehow it all found its way
onboard and the ships departed, ready for
war.
Conversion of ships taken up from trade
The part played by merchant ships in the
Falklands campaign has been well
publicised. Not so well publicised has been
the fascinating story of how some 60 ships
were converted for war. In some cases the
conversion was minimal with the fitting of
extra communications equipment and
replenishment at sea (RAS) rigs, as was the
case with many tankers and dry stores
ships, which essentially continued their
peacetime role. Where the role was
changed, however, conversion was more
complex and this work was done almost
entirely in the Royal Dockyards.
The work of selecting ships to be taken
up was a major exercise in itself. As the
requirements became more or less clear,
suitable candidates were identified, visited,
and vetted. Dockyard and other officers
were flown to Portugal, helicopted into the
North Sea, and found themselves meeting
Channel Ferries at unsocial hours with only
the shortest time to d o the survey before the
ship was off again.
The requirements varied from troop
ships and hospital ships to aircraft
transporters and mooring vessels, from
repair ships and minesweeper support ships
to despatch ships and munitions carriers.
The one thing they had in common was that
the time available to d o the work was
unbelievably short. At the beginning of the
operation attempts were made to carry out
major conversion work in a commercial
yard, but the volume of labour and skilled
resources required swamped the available
facilities and the ship was moved t o a
dockyard. Fortunately the requirements did
not arise simultaneously and with ships
being converted on average in 4 days (and
nights) a considerable throughput was
possible. Nevertheless at one stage 7 ships
were being converted concurrently and at
the peak over 500 men were working round
the clock in the Royal Yards.
266
LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CORPORATE
In Gibraltar the SS Uganda, fresh from,
her interrupted Mediterranean cruise, was
converted in 2% days to a hospital ship.
The work included the manufacture of a
helicopter pad and the provision of
operating theatres and casualty gangways,
in addition to bringing the ship up to
Geneva standards (hull and superstructure
painted white with large red crosses and
extensive external lighting).
In Rosyth 5 deep-sea trawlers were
converted t o minesweepers.
The
conversions were under way before the fish
had been removed from the holds. An
oceangoing tug was also converted for duty
in the South Atlantic and early in this
project major hull cracks were found. A
decision was taken that it was quicker to
repair these by some very unusual welding
than to start looking for another suitable
ship. A diving ship was converted to act as a
despatch vessel. Like most of the
conversions the work included additional
fresh water make-up and in nearly every
case this took the form of reverse osmosis
(RO) plants.
The major conversion work was done at
P o r t s m o u t h a n d Devonport. T h e
13,000-ton ferry Norland was the biggest
task at Portsmouth. She was converted to a
troop ship and fitted with 2 helicopter pads,
flight and communications facilities, extra
fresh water make-up and RAS gear. The
work was completed in just under 4 days.
The Nordic Ferry and Baltic Ferry (roll-on
roll-off passenger and cargo vessels) were
converted to troop and support ships with 2
helicopter pads. Ballast tanks had to be
converted to carry fuel and this involved
major pipework to allow the fuel to be
embarked at sea and transferred for use.
RAS, RO, and communications were fitted.
Geest Port and Saxonia (9,000-ton cargo
ships) were converted as solid support
ships. These were fitted with vertical
replenishment pads, allowing helicopters to
transfer stores without landing, and
additional accommodation. Ballast tasks
were converted for fresh water storage.
The St Helena, which normally plies
between St Helena and the UK, was
converted to a minesweeper support ship
and left in that role bristling with as many
guns as the yard could fit on her light
superstructure. The passengers' sun deck
extended nicely as a helicopter pad. Extra
fuel storage and the obligatory RAS and
RO completed the picture. The Post Office
cable ship Iris was converted as a despatch
vessel and prison ship, but perhaps the most
unusual ship to be worked on at
Portsmouth was the Stena Seaspread. This
ship is designed as a 9,000-ton multi-purpose
North Sea oil rig support ship. Her new role
was as a forward repair ship and to achieve
this she was fitted with workshops,
machinery, a mobile crane on deck, extra
generators, air compressors, a n d
considerable stores and materials.
Additional accommodation was added for
the Fleet Maintenance personnel who were
added to her ship's company, together with
messing facilities for 500 people. Two
helicopter pads were fitted and perhaps not
surprisingly, 100 tons of extra ballast were
installed. She came from the North Sea and
such was the speed of the operation she still
had divers in the decompression chamber on
arrival in Portsmouth.
The big ships were converted at
Devonport. One after another 4 large (up to
27,000 tons) container ships were converted
to aircraft transporters. First was Atlantic
Conveyor (15,000 tons and longer than
HMS Hermes). Much of the work was
planned aboard and in Bath during her 2-day
trip to Devonport. There, in 5 days, she was
converted to a Harrier and helicopter
transporter. The main work was the clearing
of all obstructions from the upper deck and
strengthening of hatch covers, provision of
protection for the aircraft on deck, 2
helicopter landing areas, accommodation
for 100 additional people, and RAS and RO.
The vast amount of space below decks was
crammed with general support and military
equipment with the intention that this beoffloaded in the South Atlantic via the stern
doors. These had been specially
strengthened to allow them to be opened at
sea and utilised as platforms for helicopter
LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CORPORATE
Three further ships, the Atlantic
Causeway (identical to the first), the
Contender Bezant (18,500 tons) and the
Astronomer (28,000 tons) were converted in
the same way, but with increasingly
sophisticated facilities, including a hangar,
workshops, and even fuel stowage. As was
said at the time, provision of a ski jump and
full operating facilities were starting to look
perfectly feasible!
As the incredible was achieved in
successive ships the excitement grew and the
team spirit within the yards and between
headquarters and yards was immensely
satisfving
- - to ex~erience.
Medical support
In planning logistic support for Operation
Corporate consideration was given to the
likely injuries, casualty estimates, and the
distance involved in resupplying the Task
Force to meet the medical priorities to
provide early surgery, replace blood loss,
and to give specialised burns care.
These requirements were met from naval
hospitals and establishments for medical
personnel support, and from the Medical
Supply Directorate, Medical Stores
Organisation and hospital pharmacists for
logistic back-up. In the event 103 medical
officers, 15 dental officers, 15 nursing
officers, 8 medical service officers 220
medical branch ratings, 38 medical
technicians, and 26 naval nurses were
deployed.
The Medical Supply Directorate coordinated medical procurement and, with
MDG(N)'s and CINCFLEET's guidance,
drew up new emergency scales of drugs,
dressings, and equipment for supply to the
Medical Support of the Task Forces both
ashore and afloat. Such was the urgency of
the situation that in the very early stages of
the operation only 48 hours was available to
define, procure, pack, and issue new
emergency scales. This process of supplying
new scales continued since the extreme
distances involved meant that resupply
packs needed to be embarked en route
for the South Atlantic before hostilities
began.
267
From the start it was obvious that a fully
equipped hospital ship would be needed,
and a total hospital package was agreed.
Based on a 200-bed field hospital unit it was
brought to a full state of readiness and
delivered for onward shipping to Gibraltar
in less than 48 hours. This massive effort
relied heavily upon civilian staff working
over the Easter bank holiday. Many
medical officers and specialists arranged for
their own equipment to be transported
from their hospitals to Gibraltar to
supplement these basic stores. This left the
hospital pharmacists with the added
problem o f resupplying the base hospitals.
The field hospital medical package weighed
90 tons, and together with the additional
stores and equipment made a total package
of 300 tons which was transported to
Gibraltar.
As the first British hospital ship for 29
years Uganda spent 113 days at sea. Her
Naval complement was 135 officers and
ratings most of whom were medical, and
included 41 members of the QARNNS. A
helo pad was fitted and a ramp was installed
to allow rapid transfer of patients to the
main hospital area on the promenade deck.
All the public rooms were converted to set
up the hospital and because of the wide
expertise and the specialist equipment
brought on board most hospital facilities
were available. They included an operating
theatre, wards, intensive care unit, burns
unit, X-ray department, ophthalmic
department, dental surgery, dispensary,
and a pathology laboratory which occupied
pride of place in the cocktail bar. Two
special de-salination plants were supplied.
In addition to Uganda three survey ships
were designated ambulance ships; these
were HMSs Hydra, Herald and Hecla and
they were staffed and stored accordingly.
Sustaining the force
Getting the Task Force away was one thing,
sustaining it on task was another. At the
height of the operation a total of 26
warships and 54 STUFTS were deployed in
the operational area involving a total of
25,000 men. All supplies, both solids and
268
LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CORPORATE
fuel, had to come from UK and be passed
down the 8,000 mile chain, maintenance
had to be on station and considerable
medical support was required.
Supply a n d distribution of solids
Supply and distribution of armaments,
food, and stores (comprising general naval
stores, electronic, avionic and weapon
system spares; ship's hull, engine and
auxiliary equipment spares; uniforms and
protective clothing) over ranges in excess of
900,000 separately identifiable line items
involved:
(a) replenishment at sea via the afloat
support provided by the solid support ships
(RFA and STUFT); and
(6) use of the Ascension Island logistic
facility with urgent items being airfreighted
via RAF Lvneham and Brize Norton.
Replenishment at Sea (RAS) from front line
AFS(H)s provided the facility to top-up
ships on passage to the Falklands and
provide logistic support whilst the ships
were on station in the Total Exclusion
Zone. One RAS by an RFA lasted for 26%
hours involving a number of H M ships and
preparation time for the RAS increased the
total elapsed time to 40 hours - a
tremendous feat of skill and endurance.
Other RFAs were also involved in lengthy
periods of preparation and replenishment.
This in turn posed problems with the
increased demands placed on mechanical
handling equipment, slings and cargo nets.
However, our concept of solids support at
the front line in an operational environment
was well proven.
Storing to war endurance of warships
already deployed at the outset provided a
considerable challenge to the supply system
and a forward logistic base was set up at
Ascension Island. Initially this provided an
air link with ships proceeding south
immediately and then later an invaluable
means of rapid delivery of urgent stores,
spares and mail. It was possible to deliver
an urgent item to a ship in 24 hours if it was
within range of Ascension Island and for
those further south airdrops enabled
delivery within 3 to 4 days. This operation
was run by the RAF operating Hercules and
other aircraft from Lyneham and by
Chinook helicopters based in Ascension
Island. During the period 2 April to 4 June
a total of 5,000 helicopters and 975 fixedwing flights were made in and out of
Ascension Island and several thousands of
tons of stores and equipment were moved
forward in this way. Drops took place out
to 3,000 miles from Ascension Island and
all three services were involved in the
allocation of priorities and the movement
forward.
Armaments stores, because of their very
nature, were loaded primarily in the UK
onto the Fort- and Regent-class RFAs
although some urgent items and back-up
requirements were supplied and distributed
via Ascension Island. Production of some
major weapon systems were also stepped up
to match potential usage rates.
The supply of food and general naval
stores posed its own problems because of
the length of the supply chain, period of
deployment and changes in consumption
resulting from operational activity. In
addition to the 100,000 man-months of
general messing items deployed, over 1
million combat rations were deployed in
RFAs and 3 solid support ships from trade,
the Geest Port, Saxonia, and Avalona Star.
These packs were provided not only for the
land forces' campaign in the field but to
provide a contingency feeding arrangement
for prisoners-of-war, if required. In
mounting the food supply chain NAAFI's
role was very important particularly in the
area of their canteen supplies, like beer,
cigarettes, chocolate, etc. A full liaison was
made and their requirements built in to the
loads of the STUFT food ships to match the
level of supply of the standard services food
range.
It was also necessary to provide a
constant flow of stores of a lesser priority
and bulkier nature than could be
LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CORPORATE
airdropped. This was achieved by providing
three despatch vessels (CS Iris, HMS Leeds
Castle, and HMS Dumbarton Castle).
These vessels plied up and down between
the TEZ and Ascension Island, sometimes
diverting via South Georgia, to deliver mail
and essential stores.
The fuel pipeline
The Task Force sailed on 6 April 1982 with
sufficient fuel for its immediate needs. At a
distance of 8,000 miles from our fuel stocks
the solution of the resupply requirement
was vital to the success of the Task Force.
The scale of the problem was twofold: to
procure a sufficient volume of fuel and to
find suitable shipping to transport it. The
market place was to our advantage: there
was a glut of oil which enabled the speedy
purchase of the initial large quantities
needed.
Initially 9 commercial tankers were
needed. Of these 3 had been chartered,
fitted, manned, and sailed by 13 April. A
further 6 sailed in the next 12 days. Later
the number of tankers in the supply chain
increased to 14. One was stationed as a
bunkering vessel at Ascension Island and
another became a depot ship firstly at
South Georgia and subsequently at the
Falkland Islands. Ships were also provided
to deliver water afloat and ashore and to
provide RAF and Army needs on
reoccupation.
As the Task Force had to be fuelled at sea
and as all RFA tankers were committed to
direct fleet support, the commercial tankers
were fitted to receive the RFA tankers
abeam rigs thus allowing replenishment of
the latter. In addition 2 were also equipped
as convoy escort oilers with a capability to
RAS HM ships direct.
All commercial tankers were equipped
with a communications fit operated by
RFA radio officers; and RFA deck and
engineer officers were appointed to manage
RAS operations. Civilian oil fuel depot
staff managed stocks on the depot ships.
RAS routines were thoroughly practised by
269
the merchant crews under RFA direction on
the southward journey and the system
worked very efficiently, even under extreme
weather conditions.
Maintenance and repair
Among the urgent requirements addressed
by the Chief of Fleet Support's department
was the need to provide the Task Force with
maintenance and repair facilities of the sort
they would normally find alongside in a
naval base. There being no suitable facilities
ashore, ships had to be found. With the
close co-operation of the Department of
Trade, three merchant vessels were taken
up and fitted out to fulfil this role,
including the provision of overside services
such as electrical power and fresh water;
they were also equipped for RAS(L) and
VERTREP. Two, MSVs Stena Seaspread
and Stena Inspector, were designated
forward repair ships and the third, RMS St
Helena, an MCMV support ship.
Stena Seaspread, first identified as
potentially suitable by the Admiralty
brokers on 7 April, is a multi-purpose
North Sea oil rig support ship of
considerable endurance and strength, wellequipped with workshops, cranes and,
should it be needed, a comprehensive diving
capability. This vessel came very close to
the Navy's requirement and was duly
requisitioned two days later while on task in
the North Sea. Her conversion has already
been mentioned and the ship deployed on
16 April under the civilian Master with a
Naval party embarked. It soon became
evident that, with any prolongation of
hostilities, Stena Seaspread required a
back-up. Accordingly the Stena Inspector,
which was completing a contract in the Gulf
of Mexico at the time, was chartered in
May.
Hunt-class MCMVs are designed for
support by a mobile forward support unit
which is transportable in container-sized
modules by road, rail, sea, or air. When the
need to deploy MCMVs arose the most
suitable ship available to embark this FSU
with its specialist personnel was the St
Helena, a passenger and general-purpose
270
LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CORPORATE
cargo ship servicing Ascension and
St Helena Islands. While arrangements for
a replacement went ahead, the ship was
chartered towards the end of May and
sailed for fitting out in Portsmouth. In all
16 modules were placed on board providing
workshops and stores, together with other
special equipment: at the same time the
opportunity was taken to enhance certain
ship services, notably the fresh water
distilling capacity. RMS St Helena deployed
on 9 June with a Naval party embarked.
South Georgia was initially chosen as the
repair base for the Task group. On arrival
there teams from the Stena Seaspread were
set to work in the old whaling stations at
Leith and Stromness, which had been
abandoned some twenty years ago. At
Stromness, which had been the repair yard
for the whale catchers, there was a wealth
of ship repairing material and equipment.
The generator station was set to work, the
canteen cleared and galley range restored to
working order and fresh water supplies
surveyed.
However, as the crisis developed it
became apparent that the repair team
would need to be closer to the battle group.
Then the work really started, repairing
battle-damaged ships in uncomfortable and
hazardous conditions of sea and weather.
Despite the difficulties and hardships much
excellent work was achieved. Additionally,
teams were despatched to ships in 'Bomb
Alley'; they carried out on-site repairs and
maintenance while the battle went on about
them. The aim was to return a ship as an
effective fighting unit. If the damage was
too severe for that, repairs were made to
allow the ship to complete the 8,000-mile
journey back to the U K in safety. It would
be impossible to detail all the work that was
done, but there were many ships requiring
some sort of assistance as a result of battle
or weather damage. Some incidents stood
out, such as that of HMS Plymouth.
Having spent 4 days repairing damage
caused by 3 bombs, all of which fortunately
failed to explode (though one set off a
depth charge on deck), Plymouth sailed
back for the battle area capable of 85 per
cent power and with all weapons except her
mortar serviceable. One of the ships
damaged was HMS Glamorgan. Much
effort went into re-establishing the integrity
of the hull, and into restoring 70 per cent of
the main galley. Whilst their own galley was
being renovated, HMS Glamorgan's ship's
company was fed from the Seaspread. It
was no mean feat to feed nearly 700 men
from a galley designed to feed 70.
A typical example of the improvisation
necessary to provide a full repair service
despite logistic difficulties was provided
during the repair of one of Glamorgan's
galley machines. A weld was required in a
piece of stainless steel; although the welding
equipment was suitable, no stainless steel
welding rods were carried. The problem was
overcome by using a pair of stainless steel
dessert spoons to provide the welding filler!
Medical
The first casualties received by Uganda
were from HMS Sheffield on 12 May and
final casualties were received at Port
Stanley on 13 July. In total 730 casualties
were treated including 150 Argentines. Over
500 operations and surgical procedures
were carried out before casualties were
evacuated to the UK.
Supplies were required to give immediate
casualty care in other ships of the Task
Force by ships' own medical officers or
medical branch ratings before evacuating
casualties to larger ships carrying a surgical
support team, for example HMS Hermes or
to Uganda. Ashore, medical support was
provided most effectively by 3rd Cdo Bde
Medical Squadron and 16 Field Ambulance
RAMC, who cared for 450 casualties.
At the beginning of the operation the
army blood supply depot provided a total
of 800 pints of whole blood for the Task
Force; Uganda received 400 pints and 16
Field Ambulance 400 pints. After this,
blood was donated by 1st Welsh Guards
and 3rd Cdo Bde whilst on transit to the
Falkland Islands. A further 350 pints were
taken on board HMS Hermes and
Invincible for the land forces. Later on in
the conflict other blood donor sessions were
held with blood being donated by
LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CORPORATE
servicemen,
crews.
medical
staff, and
ships'
The aftermath
The fighting may be over, but logistic
support is still required. Routine and urgent
supply of all commodities are of course
continuing for the ships on station, and the
requirement for forward maintenance
remains. First the two Stenas, and now the
Stena Inspector have remained on station
carrying out defect rectification. During the
initial period two Royal Navy 'firsts' were
achieved by the Stena Seaspread: the first
controllable pitch propeller blade change
carried out afloat, and the first 'gas turbine
change unit' exchange for a destroyer or
frigate at anchor. Both of these jobs went
as planned and well within the allocated
time schedules.
In the UK the Royal Dockyards have
carried out much battle-damage repair and
on the human, as opposed to the material,
side everything possible was done for the
welfare of survivors from ships lost in the
Falklands campaign on their return to the
UK. For survivors repatriated through
Ascension Island some 5 tonnes of uniform
clothing were sent to the island so that men
could complete their journey properly clad.
Shirts, trousers, jerseys, windproof jackets,
underwear, towels, hosiery, footwear, and
badges were all available (but we forgot the
kit bags). Survivors from HMSs Coventry,
Ardent, and Antelope who returned in the
QE 2 were met closer to home. Three 706
Sqn Sea Kings were used to vertrep 9 loads
of clothing each weighing some % tonnes to
the ship as it steamed up the English
Channel to Southampton.
27 1
The survivors were also offered a number
of other special facilities including a new
cheque book, £150 advance of pay in cash
and a cheque for up to £500 in advance
compensation so that they could replace
their civilian clothing and effects without
waiting for settlement for their claims.
These arrangements ensured that the
survivors could be sent directly on wellearned leave immediately on arrival in UK.
After leave they all returned to their parent
base for full rekitting, before being posted
to new units.
Epilogue
In an operation of this magnitude, however
successful, there are inevitably lessons to be
learned. Detailed evaluation is still
continuing and this includes the field of
logistics. That said, the Falklands operation
showed that our logistics organisation
(across all support areas) was flexible,
responsive, and on the whole soundly
based, and undoubtedly contributed in no
small measure to the success of the
operation.
Speed of reaction was greatly enhanced
by firm decisions being taken early, which
included the provision of finance. This
demonstration of resolve engendered
goodwill and hard work amongst those
intimately involved in the Naval logistic
machine. Thus in this operation the
necessary ingredients existed to achieve
success: firm resolve, adequate finance,
practice in peace, goodwill, hard work,
ingenuity, and luck. But then an element of
luck is often the reward for firm resolve.
SUPPORTER
The Strategic Importance of the
Falkland Islands
EFORE T H E recent campaign in the
Falkland Islands there was little
mention of any strategic value they might
have for the United Kingdom; indeed from
reports of discussions between the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office and their
opposite numbers in the Argentine during
recent years, one would gather that the
British Government placed no value on
the islands at all, and, had their
inhabitants been agreeable, would have
been quite willing to cede sovereignty to
Argentina. Even during the early stages of
hostilities it did not appear that the British
Government ruled out some form of joint
sovereignty or even a United Nations
presence.
Following the resounding military defeat
of Argentina, Her Majesty's Government
have apparently decided that the Falkland
Islands will remain British and that a
sufficient military garrison will be stationed
there to ensure that they do. Furthermore, a
report, which the Government commissioned a team under Lord Shackleton to
prepare in 1976 into the state of the
Falkland Islands' economy (and on which
they took no action), is under immediate
review.
Before the Argentine invasion it is
probable that comparatively few people in
the United Kingdom knew much about the
activities of the Falkland Islanders or about
t h e size, c l i m a t e , t e r r a i n ,
and
communications of the country they
inhabited. Now, as the result of the
publicity from press and television during
the military operations, the people of
England, at any rate, must be far better
acquainted with the Falkland Islands than
they are with the Outer Hebrides.
History
The history of the Falkland Islands is one of
disputes over ownership, and yet also
of 150 years of uninterrupted British
rule. They were apparently first discovered
in 1592 by John Davys, captain of the ship
Desire, when they were completely
uninhabited. He claimed them for his
Sovereign, Queen Elizabeth I, but it does
not appear that his report aroused very
much interest. There are no further records
of further visits during the next hundred
years until they were rediscovered by
Captain John Strong in the Welfare, who
named the channel between the two main
islands Falkland Sound after the third
Viscount Falkland who was Treasurer of
the Navy - a name which was later
extended to the islands themselves. Again,
their existence seems to have aroused little
enthusiasm in England.
The islands remained uninhabited until
sometime in the early eighteenth century,
when sailors from St Malo in Britanny
established a community there to fish and
hunt seals. A French map of the period
called them Iles Malouines, in reference to
the sailors' home town - a name which the
Spaniards altered later to Malvinas. In 1764
Admiral de Bougainville (later in his frigate
Boudeuse to be the first Frenchman to sail
round the world) established the first
official French settlement to form a base, it
was hoped, for penetration into the Pacific.
The small garrison built a fort, about 20
miles north-west of the present Port
Stanley, which they named Port Louis,
after their Sovereign. The Spaniards, who
claimed dominion over the whole of this
area, promptly objected and the French,
anxious to placate their allies, sold Port
Louis to Spain in 1766. The Spaniards
renamed the place Puerto de la Soledad.
In this same year of 1766 Captain John
Byron, unaware of the French settlement
and aware that the islands had been
proclaimed British territory, reasserted
King George 111's sovereignty and left some
hundred settlers at a site in West Falkland
which he named Port Egmont.
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
The Spaniards regarded the Falkland
Islands as part of their territory and decided
to assert their authority by force. In June
1770, therefore, there appeared before Port
Egmont an expeditionary force, despatched
from Buenos Aires and consisting of five
frigates and about 1,600 soldiers. The small
British garrison could offer no resistance to
such superior strength, so, after a few shots
for the honour of the flag, they
surrendered. Thus far events were not
dissimilar to those of 212 years later and the
immediate reactions in England were very
much the same. Indeed, when the news
reached London in the following October,
'It showed by its reception', wrote Captain
Mahan,' 'how much more serious is an
insult than an injury, and how much more
bitterly resented.' The British Minister at
Madrid was ordered to demand the
immediate restoration of the islands, with a
disavowal of the action by the officer who
had ordered the attack. The British
Government did not wait for a reply but
ordered ships into commission, and very
soon had a powerful fleet at Spithead.
Spain, relying on the support of France,
intended to stand firm but the aged King
Louis XV was not disposed to engage in a
war and, at the instance of the King's
mistress who hated Choiseul the War
Minister, the King dismissed him. Left on
her own Spain complied with the British
demands, whilst reserving the question of
sovereignty, and formally handed over Port
Egmont to Captain Scott of the frigate
Juno.
Within a few years the expenses caused
by the troubles in the American Colonies
led to the Government deciding on a
temporary withdrawal of the garrison at
Port Egmont; before he left the governor,
Lieutenant Samuel Clayton, affixed a
plaque to the door of the clockhouse
proclaiming British sovereignty over the
Falkland Islands and the Union Flag was
left flying as visible evidence. The
Spaniards had been allowed to remain at
Puerto de la Soledad and used it as a prison
settlement. After the evacuation of Port
Egmont, governors were appointed to
273
Puerto de la Soledad from Buenos Aires.
In
181 1 Buenos Aires became
independent from Spain, who, with Great
Britain as her ally against Napoleon, took
no further interest in the Falkland Islands.
In 1826 Louis Vernet, an unprincipled
scoundrel of French descent, claimed the
islands for Buenos Aires and established a
settlement, despite British protests at this
violation of sovereignty. In 1831 he
overstepped himself by seizing some
schooners belonging to the United States in
a dispute over fishing. Outraged, the
Americans despatched the warship
Lexington to Puerto de la Soledad, which
arrested six Argentines and destroyed the
defences of the settlement. Buenos Aires
sent an official to replace Vernet, but he
had not been there long before he was
murdered.
In 1832 the sloop Clio sailed from
England for the Falkland Islands to reassert
British sovereignty. She arrived there on 1
January 1833. A Governor was installed,
and the islands have remained British ever
since.
Subsequent claims by Argentina and
disputes with the United Kingdom on the
subject have been too well ventilated
recently in the columns of the newspapers
to require recapitulation here.
The Falkland Islands Dependencies and
British Antarctic Territory
Before considering the strategic value of the
Falkland Islands to the United Kingdom, it
may be as well to remind the reader of the
extent of British interests in the South
Atlantic. At the same time it is worth
pointing out that our recent victory has
invalidated previous arguments that
exploitation of the sea area around the
Falkland Islands can only be carried out
with the agreement of and in co-operation
with Argentina. The situation has changed
vastly to our advantage.
Port Stanley lies 500 miles north-east of
Cape Horn and, with the improvements
'A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon
History (London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co.,
1890). p.335.
274
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE O F THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
now taking place, it will have the only
airfield capable of taking all types of
aircraft within reasonable range of that
important maritime thoroughfare, other
than landing grounds in Chile and
Argentina. Again, the Stanley airfield is
within range of that on Ascension Island,
4,000 miles away, which is half way to, and
again within air range of, the United
Kingdom. Reinforcement and supplies can
therefore arrive very quickly. This
represents a revolutionary improvement in
air communications as compared with the
original Stanley airfield which was only
suitable for short-range aircraft operating
from Argentina.
About 800 miles east-south-east of the
Falkland Islands is the island of South
Georgia, which is roughly the same size as
East or West Falkland, and which has good
ice-free harbours. Some 400 miles further
east-south-east are the Sandwich Islands,
and these, with South Georgia, are included
within the Falkland Islands Dependencies.
The South Orkney Islands, South Shetland
Islands, and the Graham Land Peninsula
were once part of the Falkland Islands
Dependencies, but they were separated
from them by an Order in Council of 1962
and incorporated in the British Antarctic
Territory.
The British Antarctic Territory is subject
to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which came
into force on 23 June 1961. From the point
of view of this article, the main provisions
are that the contracting parties agree not to
establish any military bases in the area or to
carry out military manoeuvres or weapon
testing, and to settle their differences by
peaceful means. The contracting parties are
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Thus, an
effect of the Treaty is to establish a neutral
zone in and around Antarctica.
Soviet maritime expansion. If the ships of
the NATO nations were unable to use this
route the effect could be serious, as 70 per
cent of NATO's strategic material and 80
per cent of its oil comes round the Cape of
Good Hope.
The result of the abandonment of British
bases overseas is painfully apparent. Aden,
capital of the Marxist People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen, is now a Russian base
and was used very effectively in aid to
Ethiopia during its war against the Somali
Republic. There is already a Soviet base in
Mauritius3 and, with their left-wing
government, the Seychelles appear
susceptible to Russian blandishments.
In 1974 the Labour Government in the
United Kingdom cancelled the Simonstown
agreement, though two years previously the
South African Defence Minister had
warned that South Africa could only
defend the sea lanes which run close to its
shore. Then in 1978 the Chief of the South
African Naval Staff admitted that the Navy
could no longer care for the security of the
Cape route and would have to concentrate
on defending the coasts and harbours of
South Africa.
On the eastern shores of the Atlantic
advantage has been taken by Russia of
facilities acquired from the Marxist
republics of western Africa. Their warships
can use the Angolan capital of Luanda; the
little volcanic islands of Sao Tome and
Principe, which comprise the tiny state of
that name; Conakry in Guinea; GuineaBissau; and probably the Cape Verde
Islands. If Walvis Bay were incorporated in
an independent Namibia, that might well be
available to them too.
In the event of a war with the Soviet
Union, it is indeed conceivable that the
Cape route might become virtually
unusable if the Russians expended
sufficient effort to prevent oil supplies from
reaching the West. A switch would then
The Soviet naval threat
British interests in both the South Atlantic
and the important route round the Cape of
Good Hope are increasingly threatened by
'Penelope Tremayne, The Falkland Islands (RUSI &
Brassey's Defence Year Book 1977/78).
'Ibid, p.166.
'Christopher Coker, 'South Africa and the Western
Alliance 1949 - 81 ', Journal of the Royal United
Services Institute, June 1982.
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
presumably have to be made to the
eastabout route and the Panama Canal.
Use of the Panama Canal, however, might
depend on the attitude of the politically
unstable Republic of Panama; and no
doubt the Soviet Union would d o its utmost
to prevent the use of the Canal, either by
sabotage or direct attack. If it were
successful then the only sea route left to the
West would be that round Cape Horn, and
without British possession of the Falkland
Islands its use could well be impracticable.
Indeed, if the Falkland Islands had
remained in Argentine possession, as a
result of their invasion, and if the Soviet
Union had acquired a naval and air base
from a future left-wing government in
Argentina, then the South Atlantic could
become a Russian lake, with command of
the routes round both Capes.
So much for the passive attitude: but a
counter to Soviet attacks on shipping
rounding the Cape of Good Hope and
steaming northwards to NATO ports might
be based on using the Falklands and
Ascension as pivots of operations, with
perhaps forward elements temporarily
based on South Georgia and Tristan d a
Cunha.
Brazil
One tends to forget, perhaps, the enormous
size and potential of Brazil. It has been
calculated that it will have a population of
over 125 million by the end of the 1980s,
and will by then have nuclear weapons. It
will have ambitions, too, to be numbered
amongst the big powers and to be dominant
in the South A t l a n t i ~ .The
~ country is a
dictatorship with a very volatile population
and much poverty and unrest. One does not
know, therefore, whether it could swing in
future towards the Communist camp. This
uncertainty provides another reason for a
presence in the
Islands.
Antarctica
The present situation in Antarctica is
complicated. A number of countries have
claims over parts of the cold continent; they
275
are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France,
New Zealand, Norway, and the United
Kingdom; with Australia claiming nearly
half of the whole territory. However,
neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union recognise any of these claims.
Furthermore, the claims of Argentina,
Chile, and the United Kingdom overlap,
whilst the two former countries have had a
tradition of quarrelling over their mutual
frontiers ever since they achieved
independence from Spain.' It is true that
the Antarctic Treaty stipulates that the area
should be used for peaceful purposes only
and that no new claim to territorial
sovereignty may be asserted while the
Treaty is still in force; but there is an
obvious danger that, when the knowledge
and means to exploit the considerable
resources of Antarctica are available,
conflicting claims could lead to friction and
confrontation between rival countries.
There could be rumours, for instance that
scientists of one nation were in fact soldiers
protecting their equipment and interests.'
(Indeed, such a suspicion was verified in the
case of Argentine personnel who had
landed as scientists in the British Sandwich
Islands.) Oil-drilling machinery and other
equipment would be vulnerable to outside
interference if there were parties opposed to
their use.
From the above considerations it will be
apparent that without possession of the
Falkland Islands it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the United Kingdom to
preserve and protect her interests in a
region so distant from her shores.
The Falkland Islands: exploitation of
resources
Of more immediate interest is the
exploitation of the resources in and around
the Falkland Islands themselves. In this
'David Brondheim, The Strategic Importance of South
America (RUSI & Brassey's Defence Year Book
1977/78).
'Keith D. Suter, 'The Antarctic: a Crisis for the 1980s?',
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, March
1981.
11bid.
"bid.
276
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
connection the Shackleton report into the
economic potential of the islands could
perhaps be divided into:
(a) products which could make the islands
economically viable without assistance
from the United Kingdom, and
(b) products which would be of economic
interest t o the United Kingdom.
Under (a), with which we are not really
concerned in this article, one might list fish,
seaweed (for its chemical yield), wool, and
mutton.
Under
(b) would
come,
specifically, oil reserves. Though these are
at the moment largely conjectural, a report
published by the US Geological Survey
suggested that up to 20,000 million barrels
might be obtained from the Falkland
Islands and British Antarctica - an
amount that is nearly six times Britain's
estimated North Sea reserves, and in a sea
that is mostly relatively shallow. If this
estimate is reasonably correct, it could be of
immense importance when and if these oil
fields are exploited, because it might free
the Western Alliance from much of its
dependence on the Persian Gulf for its oil,
and hence on the Cape of Good Hope
route. This would again, of course, depend
on the Falkland Islands remaining under
British sovereignty.
Conclusions
The strategic importance of the Falkland
Islands to the United Kingdom lies,
therefore, in its use as a military base
to:
(a) prevent the Soviet Union from
prohibiting our use of the route round Cape
Horn;
(6) counter Soviet attacks on shipping
using the Cape of Good Hope route;
(c) prevent Brazil from dominating the
South Atlantic to the detriment of British
interests;
(d) support British interests in Antarctica;
and
(e) protect future oil exploration in the
Falklands area.
Defence
The recent campaign in the Falkland Islands
has brought to light many of the
requirements needed for the effective
defence of the islands, and it is suggested
that, in the light of overseas bases in our
imperial past, they should not be too
difficult to meet. They would presumably
include:
(a) an airfield from which any aircraft can
operate;
(6) early warning aircraft and air defence
fighters based on Stanley airfield;
(c) missile and other defences to prevent
hostile attempts to land on or destroy the
airfield;
(d)sufficient infantry and artillery to
counter any attempted landings by sea or air;
(e) heavy-lift helicopters to move troops
rapidly to any threatened area;
(j)a naval presence sufficient to deal with
hostile ships and to support British interests
t h r o u g h o u t t h e Falkland
Islands
Dependencies and British Antarctica; and
(g) engineer, signal, and logistic support.
Given the capability of rapid reinforcement,
demands on the three Services for a
peacetime establishment should be
comparatively modest. Certainly the cost
should be far less than was expended in the
campaign to remove the Argentines from
our territory.
HUGHROGERS
A Letter from Australia-XI1
Dear Commander M,
FEAR that I have been an unconscionable
time sending this letter, but after your
term in the trackless wastes of the
Procurement Executive and extracting
frigates from the death grip of a Royal
Dockyard, you will have to agree that the
wheels of the Service (Australian or British)
grind exceedingly slowly, if they grind at
all.
We are not to have Invincible. I suspect
that all in the RAN realised that this was
inevitable from the day the first units of the
Falklands Task Force left their home ports.
The prospect for both Hermes and
Invincible with regard to Mrs Thatcher
could be compared to that of two young
legionnaires of the Roman Republic and
their stern mother: 'Come back with your
shields or on them!' Either one or more of
the carriers would be lost or critically
damaged, demonstrating their intrinsic
vulnerability and the wisdom of the
Government's earlier decisions, or they
would prove once and for all that they were
indispensable. Happily, the latter was the
case.
I
The problem for the RAN
Relieved as the Royal Navy may be, the
prospect for Australia is more serious. One
of the major advantages of the Invincible
purchase was that the early transfer date
allowed the RAN to pay Melbourne off
without delay, saving on running costs and
an expensive refit planned for this year to
keep her at sea until 1985. Melbourne went
into 'contingency' reserve on 30 June. The
major point of the refit was to have been
the repair of the catapult and the arrestor
wires, the state of which prevented
Melbourne carrying her A4Gs during her
last deployment. Because this work has not
been done, Melbourne is no longer capable
of operating fixed-wing aircraft and her
role in an emergency would be that of an
ASW helicopter carrier only.
The front-line A4G and S2G Squadrons
have been disbanded and although the
majority of the fighters will continue to fly,
mainly in the Fleet Requirements role; half
the Trackers are being placed in reserve
and the future of the remainder - as with
RAN fixed-wing aviation generally - is in
doubt.
Such a decline would have been
inevitable after
1985, whether
a
replacement carrier was in hand or not, but
the acceleration of the process consequent
upon the early purchase of the Invincible
and the subsequent British decision not to
carry out the agreement when that process
was advanced too far to be reversed has
done much damage.
The unpleasant reality is that the total
ASW helicopter strength of the RAN, even
with two new machines to replace losses, is
no more than eight Sea King Mk 50.
Relying hitherto upon a combination of the
carrier and the ubiquitous Ikara missile, the
RAN was late to follow the other Western
navies in embarking helicopters in frigates
and destroyers. Melbourne's helicopters,
first Wessex 31 and then the Sea Kings,
could provide comprehensive coverage for
the task force and, having viewed the
performance of early match systems such
as Wasp, the RAN was inclined to think
that detached escorts were better off with
Ikara than a single-engined light
helicopter.
O f course, the new generation of
helicopters are far superior to their
predecessors and the abortive DDL and the
new US-built FFG 7 class were designed
specifically to carry such machines.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that
Adelaide and Canberra are in commission
and the remaining two are at advanced
stages of construction, no helicopter has
been selected for them. The project
planners have been doing a great deal of
work, but, no matter what type is
eventually chosen, the first will not go
to sea in an FFG before 1985 at the
278
A LETTER FROM
earliest. There is a short list and Defence
Central is now considering which to pick.
The fact that the utility helicopters operated
by both the RAN and RAAF require
replacement
further complicates the
problem as pundits murmur the advantages
of commonality and possible local
production. Commander H. G. Julian, the
Project Manager, put the difficulty in a
nutshell when he entitled his article in the
Australian RUSI Journal, 'Choose Charily
- Choppers Aren't Cheap! But Choose
Soon - They Won't Get Cheaper'.
In consequence of all this, for at least the
next three years the Royal Australian Navy
will have almost no aircraft or helicopters
of any kind with the Fleet, apart from a few
utility Wessex or Bell Kiowas. The FFGs
and Sea Kings are not a practical
combination unless the frigates receive
extensive modifications.
You in Britain might have laughed at
Melbourne. Nevertheless, she constituted in
her time a sufficiently powerful and flexible
unit to allow the RAN to face most
opponents with a measure of confidence.
Our feelings now are rather like those of a
family of subsistence farmers who wake one
winter morning to find their only milker
lying dead in the field. She may not have
been much, but she was all they had.
Matters are not likely to improve. It
seems that when Mr Fraser generously
announced that he would not stand in Mrs
Thatcher's way should she wish to retain
Invincible, he failed to notice that the RAN
was lying helpless upon the road.
The political climate
There are a number of choices for the
RAN, most of them bad. The political
climate for a carrier purchase on the scale
envisaged before the Invincible proposal
arose is much more unfavourable than it
was twelve months ago, despite the
performance of the British carriers in the
Falkland Islands. The first reason is purely
economic, since the resources boom
anticipated a few years ago has failed to
materialise and Australia is suffering from
the high interest rates, unemployment and
inflation enjoyed by many of the other
nations of the West.
But the Invincible purchase itself was not
well received in many quarters. The basic
problem was twofold. In the first place, the
RAN had talked so much of the advantages
of equipment and operational commonality
in its eagerness to secure the modified IWO
JIMA class carrier that our readiness to
accept the Invincible and gloss over the
difficulties inherent in the scheme seemed
suspicious. Second, the matter of V/STOL
aircraft being so controversial and Sea
Harriers and AV8BS so expensive, meant
that the RAN was willing to leave the
question for Government approval at a
later date in order to ensure approval of the
ship. As a result, the Invincible had to be
justified on the basis of its potential as an
ASW helicopter carrier and command ship,
not as a V/STOL carrier.
This could not be done, particularly as
only a handful of extra Sea Kings were
tentatively included in the project and the
expenditure of £250 million to enable a
single squadron of helicopters to be carried
around was bitterly attacked. Matters were
not improved by the knowledge that
Invincible had become well regarded in the
NATO environment not so much because
of her ASW or command roles, but because
she had the ability to sustain an effective
combat air patrol, rendering her force
immune to shadowers and aerial remote
targeting platforms and vastly improving
the chances against multiple aircraft raids.
The early operations in the Falkland
Islands only underlined the absolute
requirement for carrier fighter aircraft and
raised the further question, even given
sufficient organic V/STOL fighters in a
carrier, as to whether she and her task force
could operate in a hostile air environment
with any measure of confidence without
accompanying AEW aircraft.
A considerable body of opinion is
therefore pressing for a complete reexamination of the entire carrier question
and there is a strong chance that the
Government will accede to this demand. In
view of the fact that the RAN had secured
A LETTER FROM
outright approval in principle from the
Government for a carrier replacement last
year when a variety of designs were still
under discussion, you will appreciate that
this possibility puts the Navy even further
back than Square One.
If such a study came down against shipborne fixed-wing aircraft in particular and
carriers in general, the RAN would have to
recast all its plans for the future. It is to be
hoped that at least a proportion of the
Naval Staff are engaged in doing just this,
for it is axiomatic that a Government which
has just made itself unpopular by cancelling
some long-cherished project will be
inclined, if only for a little while, to
approve new construction which might in
isolation be rejected. (The best example of
this is the approval of two Zwaardvis-class
submarines by the Dutch Government after
the end of their Navy's SSN hopes.) Such
an atmosphere is, however, soon dissipated
and any novelty proposed more than
eighteen months after cancellation of the
previous scheme will be subject to the whole
gamut of Government and Treasury. In the
case of final cancellation of the carrier
project, such proposals as the helicopter
replacement, new oceangoing mine hunters
and missile-armed fast-attack craft could
probably be passed through on the nod.
Half a loaf is clearly better than none at all.
Covering the gap
Should the Government remain persuaded
of the need for a carrier there are quite a
few proposals for the future, some
interrelated and some not. The first group
of these schemes deal with covering the gap
until a new carrier can be put into service,
probably between 1986 and 1989.
Melbourne can be recommissioned. T o
put her to sea as a fixed-wing carrier would
cost in the region of f30m.; as a helicopter
carrier, half that sum. The advantage of
returning the ship to fixed-wing service is
that we have more than enough Trackers
and Sky Hawks for Melbourne to again
function as a really effective CAP-protected
ASW platform. With only eight Sea Kings
available this would not be true of her as a
helicopter carrier.
We might lease another ship. As part of a
new package deal Britain has actually
offered Hermes for the interim period,
together with eight Sea Harriers and eight
Sea Kings. I cannot see this as being
practicable, even if we d o buy British for the
new construction. Hermes does not have
over-much equipment onboard that is
compatible with the RAN and in any case her
hull and machinery are in little better
condition than Melbourne's - a ship whose
problems are at least by now reasonably well
understood by Garden Island Dockyard.
What with flying people over and
adapting the ship for our conditions, the
RAN would probably be better off refitting
Melbourne to the same standards, work
which could in any case be done in
Australia. A 'ski-jumped' Melbourne with
eight Sea Harriers (although many more
would be needed to sustain an effective
force of this size, a point well understood
by Westminster and British Aerospace) and
up to sixteen Sea Kings would be a
sufficiently powerful unit to justify the
expenditure.
A more attractive solution is the leasing
of an L P H from America, an act which
would obviously settle the matter of what
and where the new construction will be.
Since the USN values the Okinawa class
very highly, agreement to such a scheme
would probably have to be obtained at the
highest level and would almost certainly be
contingent upon construction of a new
RAN ship in America and return of the
leased L P H to the USN at the earliest
opportunity.
Replacing the Melbourne
The proposals for new construction are
even m o r e diverse. T h e British
Government, in devising its 'package deal'
as a sop to Australia after reneging on the
Invincible proposal, declared itself willing
to lay down a fourth hull for Australia at
the earliest opportunity. The difficulty is
that the Invincible design is not at all cheap
and with the attendant problems of compatibility, range, and role, the sweeteners of
280
A LETTER FROM
cut price Sea Harrier and Sea Kings and the
lease of Hermes would probably not be
enough.
There appear, however, to be suggestions
that simpler and or smaller vessels can be
built for the same price as the original
Invincible sale, so eager is the British
Government to secure work for its
shipyards. Since the negotiators, who
included the Minister for Defence, have
only just returned from London after
discussing the choices in the wake of
Invincible and are still briefing both the
Defence Department and Cabinet, not
many details are forthcoming. At a guess,
any such proposals would again be tied to
the sale of Sea Harriers and (perhaps) more
Sea Kings to the RAN, since all concerned
in Britain are keen to sell the V/STOL
fighter to Australia.
Such a tie-in could be a difficulty. The
carrier and Sea Harriers cannot (unless
something has greatly changed in Britain)
both be offered at a cut price. An
Australian Government which has only just
approved the purchase of seventy-five F - 18
fighters for the RAAF after much agonising
is unlikely to regard with much enthusiasm
the prospect of buying V/STOL fighters for
the RAN which have a higher unit cost.
The RAN might return to the original
selection, the modified LPH. Rear Admiral
Rourke, Chief of Naval Material, held talks
with the USN on his way back from
London to confirm that the Americans
would be willing to resume the earlier
arrangements for co-operation over design
and construction of the ship. It is no
surprise that they are quite happy to d o so,
but the modified L P H will be very
expensive indeed, probably in the region of
f350m. at 1982 prices. The Government
may not be willing to accept this, although
the staggered payments consequent upon
new construction are likely to cause rather
less strain upon the Defence Budget than
would have the immediate cash before and
on delivery required for the Invincible.
It is just possible that one of the other old
contenders, the Giuseppe Garibaldi or the
Sea Control Ship, may re-enter the picture
with some offer by their parent companies
designed to undercut the LPH by a
sufficient margin. Since the 'hidden' costs
of such ships have a habit of emerging at
the most inopportune moments, the RAN is
unlikely to take such bait.
The CTOL concept has re-entered the
discussion and this is perhaps the most
interesting development of all, reflecting as
it does the dual concern felt over the cost of
V/STOL aircraft and the lack of organic
AEW assets in all but conventional fixedwing carriers.
The point here is that it may actually be
cheaper to build a simple fixed-wing carrier
with one catapult and an angled flight deck
than it is to build a V/STOL carrier cheaper, that is, when the cost and
effectiveness of the embarked air groups are
taken into account. The requirement is
really for a light fleet carrier designed to
Loyds lOOAl + , in essence a 1982 Colossus
or Majestic. Whether this will all come to
much is a moot point, but there is little
doubt that such a design, were it to prove
successful, would be very attractive to a
number of navies other than the RAN.
Finally, the RAN could be forced to use a
converted merchant ship as its major
helicopter and even V/STOL carrier. The
rapid modification of Atlantic Conveyer
created an impression in Australia which
not even her rather more rapid destruction
could dispel. The Navy is not at all keen on
the idea, the view being that mercantile
conversions are useful when a rapid
expansion is required but are not effective
in the core force role.
Disadvantages of the 'single ship'
With the possible exception of the
mercantile conversions, you will note that
the entire discussion has settled upon the
acquisition of a single ship as a replacement
for Melbourne and this is the depressing
aspect of the affair. It is a measure of the
desperation now being felt in some quarters
of the RAN that such a penny-packet
approach is being adopted. Just as with the
'No V/STOL Aircraft for Invincible' line
this is, as a concept, intellectually bankrupt.
A LETTER FROM
Properly utilised maritime air is and
remains one of the decisive elements of sea
power, particularly in the Asian and
Oceanian regions. The British forces in the
Falkland Islands held two aces against the
Argentinians: the SSNs and the carriers. In
a shallow water environment such as is
found to the north of Australia, submarines
are only semi-effective. In view of the
proliferation of SSM armed frigates,
corvettes, and FAC in the same area,
control of the sea could only be exercised
under the umbrella of carriers with
sufficient numbers of well-armed fighters,
attack aircraft, AEW aircraft, and
helicopters.
I emphasise both the plural use of carrier
and the point that sufficient aircraft are
needed. How many more losses would have
been sustained and how much less effective
would the British forces off the Falkland
Islands have been had there been only one
carrier available in the Royal Navy?
As I have reminded you before this, it is
better to engage in purchasing as many
small, well-armed helicopter carrying units
as you can than obtain just a single carrier.
But it is better by far than either alternative
to create a carrier force of sufficient size as
to be able to cope with any conventional
threat. In other words, the RAN should
take the position now that at least two
carriers and at least forty fighter/attack
aircraft have to be purchased over the next
decade. If the Government cannot agree to
this we will have to look for a different way.
Financial restrictions
The other aspect of this argument is that we
have to rid ourselves - and persuade the
other Services to follow suit - of the 'dog
eat dog' attitude consequent upon the
financial restrictions imposed by a defence
budget that is less than 3 per cent of the
Gross National Product. And, for fear of
doing irreparable damage to the structure
of the Navy, we must have carefully
thought out and practicable alternative
plans for the future made up and readily
available.
As to the entire question, we cannot
afford much delay. Many ancillary projects
have been thrown into disarray by the
muddle over the carrier and until the matter
is resolved we can expect little or no
progress in any direction. One by-product
of the cancellation, for example, is the fact
that f50m. scraped together as a down
payment for the Invincible from last year's
Defence Budget at short notice and at the
expense of many other activities has been
returned to Consolidated Revenue because
the Department was unable to reallocate
and spend it before the end of the Financial
Year. I d o not think that we shall see it
again.
Yours sincerely,
MASTERNED
A School for the Sons of Seafarers
N 1694 the Royal Hospital of Greenwich
I was founded by a Charter of William
and Mary as a thank-offering for the
victory of La Hogue in 1692 when the
French Fleet was destroyed. The main
objects of the foundation were to provide
relief and support to seamen disabled in the
service of their country; and also to their
widows and children.
Early in the eighteenth century the
f o u n d a t i o n received g r a n t s f r o m
Parliament and many charitable
endowments. Other sources of revenue
included fines laid upon certain
malefactors, the most famous of whom was
the pirate Captain Kidd whose loot, valued
at &6,471.ls.Od., was handed over to the
hospital. In 1715 the estates in the north of
England of James Radcliffe, Earl of
Derwentwater, who suffered death on
Tower Hill for his part in the first Jacobite
rebellion, were confiscated and given to
Greenwich Hospital, which still owns 8,000
acres of farmland in Northumberland as
well as estates in Greenwich, London, and
East Anglia.
During the first half of the eighteenth
century the buildings now occupied by the
Royal Naval College were built for
Greenwich Hospital to a design of Sir
Christopher Wren. The hospital was used
for the benefit of seamen pensioners on
similar lines to its sister establishment at
Chelsea which had been founded by
Charles I1 in 1681. However in 1869 the
Seaman's Hospital was closed. Meantime a
school for the Greenwich Hospital
pensioners had been established in 1712 for
instruction in 'writing, arithmetic and
navigation'. The school started with about
fifteen pupils and from these modest
beginnings has developed into an
independent civilian comprehensive
boarding school for the sons of seafarers
and has a strong naval tradition. For many
years the school existed in the buildings at
Greenwich now occupied by the National
Maritime Museum. However, in 1921
Mr Gifford Sherman Reade left his estate,
including 900 acres in Suffolk, to
Greenwich Hospital out of gratitude to the
Royal Navy for the protection of his
shipping during World War I. Subsequently
a new school was built on part of this
estate; the foundation stone was laid by
King George VI (then Duke of York) and
the school was opened by King Edward
VIIl (then Prince of Wales) in 1933. The
school was built on lavish lines on a
magnificent site overlooking the estuary of
the River Stour.
So much for history. Today 700 boys, all
the sons of seafarers, are being educated at
the Royal Hospital School at Holbrook
which is the principal beneficiary of the
foundation created nearly 300 years ago.
The boys enjoy the benefits of spacious
buildings including 11 boarding houses, a
beautiful chapel, fine laboratories, a
gymnasium, an indoor swimming pool,
tennis and squash courts, and 35 acres of
playing fields. There is a fleet of boats
which the boys sail on the estuary and the
Alton Reservoir. The School has a strong
musical tradition and a flourishing band.
Whilst the School has a strong naval
tradition it has developed in recent years a
strong academic one as well. All boys
compete for '0' levels or CSE in their fifth
year and many also remain for 'A' levels. In
1981 the 'A' level pass rate was 88 per cent
with 56 per cent of these at grades A, B, C.
At '0' level, whilst the top academic stream
achieved a 94 per cent pass rate the other
two streams taking the same examination
achieved 82 - 3 per cent in the Certificate of
Secondary Education. There were 470
subject entries with 450 passes, over 40 per
cent of which were at grade 1.
Each year there are about 40 sixth-form
leavers and about 75 per cent of these enter
a university to read for a degree course or
begin an equivalent career such as direct
entry to Dartmouth, Manadon, Sandhurst,
or Cranwell. In 1981 23 boys went on to
university. In the past two years an Open
283
A SCHOOL FOR THE SONS OF SEAFARERS
Scholarship and an Open Exhibition have
been obtained at Oxford and Cambridge
respectively. Additionally a number of boys
have entered professional careers including
banking, insurance, law, and commerce. At
lower academic levels most boys undertake
full-time education in Technical Colleges,
enter the Services at apprentice or junior
levels, or take up civilian apprenticeships
coupled with further education. In 1981
about 20 boys entered the Royal Navy,
Royal Marines, or Merchant Navy. There is
a flourishing combined cadet force at the
School which has both a naval and marine
section. It is administered by a retired Naval
Commander assisted by a number of Petty
Officers who give instruction in parade,
seamanship, and leadership. This reflects
the strong naval traditions of the school.
However, boys are entirely free to choose
their own careers and in fact not more than
about 20 per cent of school leavers join one
of the Armed Forces.
?'he school accepts its main entry at the
age of I I years but some boys are allowed
to join at 12 and 13 years of age if they have
reached an acceptable academic standard.
In September 1982 about 130 new boys, all
the sons of seafarers, will join the school.
As usual the majority of these boys are the
sons of men serving in the Royal Navy or
Royal Marines but a number are also the
sons of ex-servicemen; and special
consideration has been given to those boys
who are wholly or partly orphaned. Of the
670 boys now at the school some 440 are the
sons of parents serving in the Navy the
remainder being sons of ex-servicemen or
Merchant Navy personnel. Twenty of the
boys now at school are the sons of Royal
Marines.
A parent who is serving in the Royal
Navy or Royal Marines and entitled to
receive Boarding School Allowance pays
that allowance to Greenwich Hospital,
which then meets all other costs from its
revenues. In 1981 it cost about £3,200 to
keep and educate a boy at Holbrook
throughout the year. Parents who are exservicemen and no longer entitled to the
Services Boarding School Allowance are
charged a fee assessed in accordance with
their family income. In 1981 the average
payment per term worked out at about £350
but many who had a low income were
charged much less. Some parents were able
to obtain assistance in paying their fees
from local authorities.
T o all intents and purposes the Royal
Hospital School at Holbrook is the Navy's
own school. It provides a splendid
education and preserves many of the best
traditional values of this country without
being stuffy and old-fashioned. Its record
speaks for itself.
For
anyone interested,
further
information can be obtained from:
Director of Greenwich Hospital
13 Devonshire Square
London
EC2M 4TQ
The Headmaster
Royal Hospital School
Holbrook
Suffolk
M. G. POWER
Those Defence Cuts Again
E V E N A LIMITED study of the current
p o l ~ t ~ c situat~on
al
and a reading of the
well-argued articles in The Naval Review,
leads inevitably to the view that the world in
general and the Western world in particular
is moving towards a major confrontation.
The shabby Soviet empire is becoming
increasingly discredited, many of its subject
states have pursued its sterile and tyrannical
systems to the point of bankruptcy and the
workers' Utopia promised by the MarxistLeninist dream has turned into a hungry
nightmare. One can only too easily see the
Kremlin, impelled by internal pressures and
quite possibly by the simple demand for
bread, representing the Soviets as the
champions of the Third World against the
rich nations of the West and attempting to
seize those riches by force of arms, while
holding off the USA by threat of nuclear
exchange. What other explanation is there
for the huge build-up of Soviet forces?
'Guns before butter' - the saying has a
horribly familiar ring and, as the Americans
would say, this seems to be one helluva time
to cut down the Fleet.
Politically, and in the real world, Mr Nott
probably had little option. Successive
governments have made poor attempts to
educate the public to the danger; also the
demand for no great increase in public
spending on defence - 'butter before guns'
- at a time of recession and unemployment
was overwhelming, though President
Reagan, happily, does not seem to have
found it so. If anything was untouchable it
was the BOR and the Tactical Air Force in
Europe, both flimsy enough goodness
knows, so the Navy had to bear the brunt.
The history of the Russian people
however, indicates that they are not really
very good at aggression. Defend Mother
Russia? yes, to the death. Convert, subvert,
politick, propagandise, and overawe?
certainly; but foreign military expeditions
are not the Russian way and things are
apparently not too bright for them in
Afghanistan in whose wild mountains they
are not the first to get a bloody nose. They
expand like an amoeba along the line of
least resistance and, as many others in this
Review assert the best defence against them
is offence. This is not to say we must all
rattle our few missiles but it is suggested
that we should adopt a more determinedly
defensive posture.
T o anyone not in close touch with the
Armed Forces trying to envisage the course
of a war in the West is an exercise in Science
Fiction. Not only are the entirely new
weapons and weapon systems untried in
battle but the behaviour of Western people
and populations is difficult to predict after
nearly forty years of peace, comparative
plenty, and universal education. In the
scenario presented in General Hackett's
'Third World War' there would scarcely be
time for a Battle of the Atlantic but the
sixty-four thousand dollar question remains
whether tactical nuclear weapons would be
used, and where, and when, and whether
their use would inevitably escalate into
nuclear exchange. Whatever the answer,
short of abdicating responsibility for our
own defence and largely that of our
European allies together with all influence
in the conduct of that defence, we surely
must retain the nuclear deterrent. Few
people are in a position to judge between
retaining Polaris and buying Trident I or 11,
if indeed there are such options; but if it
must be Trident so be it, though no one will
be so simple as to suppose that the cost will
not have doubled or even trebled by the
time the hardware gets to sea.
Meanwhile the cost of conventional
weapons and systems goes shooting
upwards like one of the missiles they fire
and is now measured in many millions of
pounds sterling and billions of US dollars.
One suspects that the best is often the
enemy of the good, for those old stories of
endless redesign and modification called for
by successive experts leak out from both
sides of the Atlantic. The eternal problem is
on what to spend limited reserves.
THOSE DEFENC'E CUTS AGAIN
Returning to first principles it seems
broadly true that submarines and aircraft
have taken over the find and destroy
function of the battle fleet in sea denial
while helicopters have taken over the A/S
function in convoy protection. In essence it
appears that the chief role of surface ships
is to deploy aircraft whether fixed - or
rotary-winged and, in order to d o this, to
stay afloat. In an age of missiles this latter
may be difficult. Admittedly Admiral
Rickover is very biased but when asked how
long he thought the US Navy's two
projected Nimitz carriers would last in a
future war he replied 'About two days'. It is
to be hoped that the father of nuclear
propulsion was wrong but it does seem that
the surface ship would be more vulnerable
than ever before to both undersea and
aerial torpedoes, and this hardly seems an
argument for reducing their numbers.
However, those who have the good luck
to spend much time at sea cannot help being
impressed by the vast changes which have
been and are taking place in commercial
shipping. Mariner's article in the January
issue touches on this and it is very evident
that the rusty old 'three-islander' bumbling
along at her seven knots has given way to
big, fast, container ships, OBO ships,
supertankers, and a wide variety of
specialized craft fitted with all manner of
equipment chiefly for the oil-drilling and
-exploration business. Impressive too is the
number of Soviet merchant ships each
carrying a veritable bird's nest of radio and
radar antennae. In terms of that oft-quoted
phrase 'establishing' or 'maintaining a
presence' the Soviets d o not clearly
distinguish between war and merchant
ships. If we and our NATO allies no longer
maintain world-ranging fleets for financial
and for political reasons we could surely
take a leaf out of the Soviet book and
establish presences by overtly equipping
and training our merchant fleets for
intelligence gathering and surveillance, for
NATO ships of all types to report the
presence or the position, course, and speed
of all Soviet ships en clair for example,
should be entirely unnecessary; but the
285
people of Penang or Mombasa probably
don't know that, nor d o the people of
Boston and San Francisco who believe,
with some reason, that Europe is not really
trying. Call it counter-propaganda, but at
least our side would be heard, if not seen, to
be doing something and not just in
European waters.
Those going about the sea on their lawful
occasion also note the increased role played
by our own RFA and replenishment ships
generally in sea operations and cannot help
wondering if enormously expensive and
sophisticated warship hulls are really
needed to carry outfits of missiles and
communications equipment. No doubt for
certain roles they are but there seems no
obvious reason why, for example, a SAM
developed for both army and navy use
should not be tailored into a semicontainerised weapon system complete with
its power supplies, communications, even a
module for accommodating its crew, and be
'bolted-on' to merchant ship hulls of cheap
and standard design. If SAMs why not
SSMs, Cruise-missile launchers, and other
weapons and detection equipment. Perhaps
such ships could be capable of accepting a
variety of 'bolt-ons', the weapon-fit being
installed, removed, changed, and replaced
like the frigate's helicopter which is, after
all, part of her weapon-fit.
These ships used to augment the meagre
numbers of the surface escort fleet left to us
by the Defence Review would be born of
the same conception as the Corvettes of
WWII. Another WWII infant, by necessity
out of desperation, was the MAC ship and
it is impossible to encounter a supertanker
at sea without thinking what a platform for
helicopter and VSTOL operations that
immense expanse of deck would make.
Those who have tried it will also remember
how very difficult it is to sink a large
tanker, which may be a pertinent
consideration. In this case there might be
no need to buy or build special ships. The
required strengthening and adaptation of
the decks of suitable vessels could be
carried out openly in peacetime and the
aircraft, containerised communications,
286
THOSE DEFENCE CUTS AGAIN
accommodation, and power supplies
embarked when needed.
What seems certain is that we cannot
hope to have enough surface ships if we
continue to rely on conventional warships.
At current and projected costs we shall have
to ask the opposition to play seven-a-side
unless we find some way of increasing the
numbers cheaply, and quickly, and soon,
for the need may be at its most pressing
within weeks or even days of the whistle.
We have gone a long way already with the
RFAs in integrating specialised commercial
type ships into operations. There seems a
strong argument for turning to merchant
ship-builders and to the modern and
sophisticated merchant fleets to help
counter the threat to our way of life, which,
of its very nature, and for the second time
this century, prevents us from building the
fleets which are needed. We are the leading
maritime power among the European allies
and it is to us they look if reinforcement and
replenishment of the European base by sea
is required, so it is up to us to do a bit of the
innovative thinking and to inaugurate the
changes which the Broadsheet '81 warns us
will be necessary. Apparently the first of
these will be the sack for highly and
expensively trained officers and men. Once
again, from West Germany this time, we
hear talk of detente, a concept like the
dirigible, having too much gas and too
feeble a structure ever to have a chance of
success.
Some policy change other than constant
cuts and economies would certainly
encourage the United States to believe that
her European allies are not uninterested in
their own defence and might inject a new
stimulus into the maritime affairs of NATO.
YACHTIE
Defence of Trade - Is it Necessary?
ET ME FIRST declare an interest. My
current job is to run the Maritime
Trade Faculty of the School of Maritime
Operations, where we teach Naval Control
of Shipping, that is, of Merchant shipping.
The Faculty is also the focal point outside
the MOD for liaison with the Merchant
Navy. As a result of doing this job, my
professional thinking has once again been
concentrated on our trade, and our ability
to defend it. And I am a worried man: not
because of our inability, with or without
NATO and our other potential allies, to
protect our trade, but because so many
people seem to think that it will not be
necessary.
1 recently attended a conference in
Washington at which it was 'proved' that
the Soviets could not, and would not,
attack our shipping in the North Atlantic.
We were told, quite correctly, that we must
try to put ourselves in the place of the
Soviet planner and remember that where we
might see opportunities for him, he might
only see the risks. Mathematical sums were
done with Orders of Battle and torpedo
loads which showed that, after allowing for
submarines in refit and transit, there would
only be sufficient torpedoes deployed in the
North Atlantic to sink a very small
proportion of NATO flag merchant ships.
The main point was that the Soviets would
be far too concerned with watching,
tracking, and countering NATO naval
forces to bother about attacking trade.
At another teach-in I went to recently on
this side of the Atlantic, the majority of
those present decided that the Soviets
would not attack our trade and
reinforcement shipping in the North Sea,
largely on the grounds that their submarines
would not operate in such shallow waters
(tell that to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Swedish Navy) and that their aircraft would
be far too busy attacking the UK. And, in
any case, they said, the Soviets put
attacking trade down at the bottom of their
list of priorities.
This last factor, common to both the
above gatherings, is something that features
in the standard 'threat' lecture given on
both sides of the Atlantic. No doubt it is
based on all sorts of assessments and
analyses of Soviet writings and actions. It is
perfectly true that, if one sits in Moscow,
one sees the world in a totally different light
to the view of it from the Eastern Atlantic.
It is also true that the Russian is essentially
a land animal, without any great maritime
history, nor is Russia dependent on the sea
for its existence, nor for its ability to
prosecute war, if war should be a necessary
part of its policy. So, maybe their Navy is
only defensive, designed to counter the
West's threat to Mother Russia.
But, as I understand it, Russia's
underlying policy, openly stated, is
aggressive. It is to spread communism
worldwide. It is more than that, because the
Soviets d o not like independent communist
states. What is being sought is world
hegemony. I am not a 'Reds under every
bed' man, and I have no doubt that such an
idea would be denied by 99 per cent of
Russians in the street. But it is the 1 per cent
(or less) who are in power who matter.
And, quite clearly, someone in Moscow
sees their Navy as a tool of an aggressive
policy rather than a defensive one only.
Why else build the fleet that they have, and
employ it as they have? If that is so, what
may be the target of their aggression? There
are all sorts of answers to that, but as naval
officers we have had it hammered into us
that this country, and the NATO alliance,
depends on trade for its economic strength
and on its sea lanes for its supplies. If I were
a Soviet planner, I would look long and
hard at those lanes, because, or so it seems
to me, they offer a cheap and easy way to
strangle the West. There would be no need
to bombard us into submission (and the
1940 blitz, the Allies' air offensive against
Germany 1942 - 5, and more recently, the
Israeli bombardment of West Beirut show
that bombardment by itself is not a
288
DEFENCE OF TRADE
particularly effective way of breaking the
will of a determined opponent).
Is there a threat to trade?
It seems to me that too many of us see the
threat in terms of our own speciality: the
USN sees it in terms of SSBNs and SSNs
and Carrier Battle Groups. At the
Washington conference, there was present a
small
but
persistent
Lieutenant
Commander who popped up every so often
saying, 'What about the mining threat?' (he
was an MCM expert), and all the big guns
said 'Down, Fido' and went on to talk of
something else.) The teach-in on this side of
the Atlantic, to which I referred earlier, was
run by air defence men, both dark and
light blue, who saw the war largely in
terms of missiles and aircraft. And I freely
admit that I am in danger of being just as
blin kered.
Lest it be thought that the slant of my
discourse is unfair to those who d o not see it
my way, I must say that they all
acknowledge our dependence on trade and
shipping. The problem as I see it is that they
are burying their collective heads in the sand
in assuming that either the Russians d o not
see this dependence, or that if they do, they
have not the means to do any thing about it,
or that if they try to d o something about it,
our defences will force unacceptable losses
-
IS IT NECESSARY?
on them. I know that the Russians are not
ten feet tall: the mathematicians have
proved that Soviet forces cannot, from their
present bases attack our North Atlantic
trade, except possibly by air at this end of
the Atlantic, or else they have proved that
what forces may be deployed cannot d o
significant harm. But trade is world-wide.
What about sallies by Soviet ships and
aircraft from friendly bases in Africa and
the Indian Ocean, to think of just one
example?
1 have no intention of going on to write a
long paper on this subject, although I know
that there is much more to discuss than I
have touched on here: what I have written
is, I am afraid, a gut reaction on my part. I
am quite prepared to admit that times do
change, and that what applied twenty and
more years ago may, only may, not apply
today. 1 concede that mathematics and the
laws of probability d o have a place in
decision-making. All I ask is that we
consider how vulnerable ourselves and
NATO are to an attack on our sea lanes in
any conventional conflict, and that we
beware of deluding ourselves that our
potential enemy cannot d o this or that:
peacetime theories have a habit of being
disproved in time of war, as we ourselves
have just shown once again.
A.J.W.W.
Naval Brigades in India 1857 and 1858
The Indian Mutiny begins
HEN THE Indian Mutiny broke out at
Meerut on 10 May 1857 the Royal
Navy was embroiled with the Chinese on
the Canton River. HMS Shannon,
commanded by Captain William Peel, VC,
RN, was on passage to China carrying Lord
Elgin to assume control there. HMS
Shannon had just arrived at Hong Kong
when the news of the mutiny was received
there and HMS Pearl was also in harbour.
Lord Elgin decided that he should give what
help he could in India and re-embarked in
HMS Shannon for Calcutta to confer with
the Governor General. A Provisional
Battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry
of 400 was embarked in HMS Shannon and
HMS Pearl who sailed in company for
Calcutta and arrived off the mouths of the
Ganges on 6 August, after picking up
further reinforcements at Singapore.
The situation in India was now very
grave. A small force of British Gurkhas,
and loyal Indians were on the ridge facing
Delhi and, with inadequate numbers and
armament, particularly heavy artillery,
were attempting to besiege and capture the
city. The Residency at Lucknow was under
siege by the mutineers; Cawnpore had
fallen to the Nana Sahib with massacre and
subsequent atrocity and though retaken was
only tenuously held as the base for the relief
of Lucknow.
The British strategy was firstly to capture
Delhi, next to relieve the siege of the
Residency in Lucknow, and finally to
destroy the remnants of rebellion.
Concurrently it was necessary to secure the
lines of communication, to prevent as far as
possible the spread of rebellion, and to
preserve the lives of Europeans anywhere
and at any time. Indeed this last objective
was often the overriding factor so that,
whilst men were desperately needed in front
of Delhi, it had also been necessary to
concentrate a force to relieve Cawnpore
(where it arrived too late) and then to
march on to Lucknow. This force had
broken through to the Residency but it was
not strong enough to fight its way out with
the besieged and had to remain as a
reinforcement of the garrison and wait for
further relief.
Even in Calcutta, the seat of government,
the home of the Governor General of India,
and the port through which all
reinforcements and sea-borne supplies must
come, there was apprehension at the
possibility of a rising of the native
population. The Royal Marine Battalion
brought by HMS Shannon and HMS Pearl
occupied the fort and HMS Pearl was
berthed so as to cover the city with her guns
and overawe the natives.
The formation of Naval Brigades
Captain Peel, meanwhile, formed a Naval
Brigade from HMS Shannon and on
14 August set out with ten 8-inch guns, two
brass 'field pieces', and some rocket tubes
to join the force at Delhi to provide heavy
artillery support. The Brigade was to
proceed by river transport as far as
Allahabad. Captain Peel and his officers
embarked in the river steamer Chunar with
his 450 men in one 'flat' and with the guns,
ammunition, clothing, and medical
comforts in a second. The launch and cutter
from HMS Shannon were also taken. These
flats were large dumb-lighters of great beam
but very shallow draught with a thatched
canopy; they were used on the Ganges at all
seasons. While the flats were adequate for
the seven-week river trip, the engines of
the Chunar were in poor condition and
after one day's steaming she was replaced.
Her replacement was of too great a draught
to go above Dinapore and a third steamer
had to be found to complete the
trip.
Lieutenant Vaughan, First Lieutenant of
HMS Shannon, had remained in Calcutta
with the strange duty of recruiting from the
assembled merchant shipping, training, and
bringing forward when ready a further rifle
company to add to the Naval Brigade. He
290
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
raised nearly a hundred men and on 18
September his party embarked for the trip
to Allahabad where they arrived on
20 October. Meanwhile Captain Sotheby
of HMS Pearl had, at the request of the
Governor General, also formed a Naval
Brigade and on 12 September started for
the interior to be followed on 12 October by
a second party which also included a large
number of merchant seamen.
Delhi fell t o the besieging forces with
bitter street fighting between 14 and
20 September, but Generals Havelock and
Outram, having fought their way into the
Residency at Lucknow, remained besieged
there. The new Commander in Chief,
General Sir Colin Campbell, who had
recently arrived in India, began the
redeployment of his forces and the
concentration of an army at Cawnpore for
the next attempt to relieve Lucknow.
Shannon's Brigade took over the garrison
at Allahabad and Pearl's
Brigade
garrisoned Buxar. Shannon's Brigade was
to join the forces at Cawnpore for the relief
of Lucknow. Pearl's Brigade was to operate
to the east of the River Gogra charged with
the control of North West Bengal,
safeguarding the provinces of Gorukhpore
and Fyzabad.
Brigade organisation
Shannon's Brigade was organised as an
artillery unit and two rifle companies. The
mountings of the 8-inch guns brought up
from the ship were unsuitable for use on
land and at Allahabad they were exchanged
for six 24pdr guns acquired from the Bengal
Artillery. Each gun was drawn by a team of
thirteen span of oxen and followed by an
ammunition cart drawn by three span with
ready-use ammunition. An ammunition
train followed the whole battery. When the
24pdr guns were received it was found that,
in accordance with local practice, they were
not fitted with sights. Under Captain Peel's
direction the three Engineer Officers with
the Brigade made and fitted sights to the
guns. With these it was Peel's boast that the
guns were more accurate than any rifle.
Peel made a further innovation. He trained
his Brigade in the use of drag ropes so that,
in action, the guns could be manhandled
about, sited, and fired in the same way as, if
a little more slowly than, light horsed
artillery.
Captain Sotheby's training problems
were very different. His Brigade was
organised into infantry and a horsed battery
of 'light field pieces' - four 12pdr brass
guns. The Brigade was combed for men
who had experience of horses and they were
given plenty
of riding practice.
Astonishingly quickly the sailors learnt to
ride and gallop the guns about with the
panache, if not the skill, of horse artillery.
For the remainder of the Brigade it was a
case of drill and musketry, literally
musketry, for, though the Marines were
armed with Mini6 rifles, the sailors carried
old muskets.
Brigade uniform and equipment
Throughout their campaigns the two Naval
Brigades wore Naval uniform and kept
Naval customs. The officers wore caps
(with a neck flap attached) or a type of topi
purchased privately, undress coats, white
trousers, and black shoes, sometimes with
spurs, for all the officers bought horses or
ponies. The ratings wore loose-fitting,
large-collared blue shirts open at the neck,
their loose blue trousers, sennet hats, widebrimmed and decorated with a narrow
black hat ribbon on which some, at any
rate, had embroidered their ship's name. By
Captain Peel's orders the men of Shannon's
Brigade continued to shave and had to
polish their boots each day. In Pearl's
Brigade shaving was generally discontinued. Before leaving Calcutta the
Naval Brigades drew much equipment from
the Army. Tents and bedding, waterbottles,
haversacks, waterproof clothing, and even
boots were supplied.
Each officer had a tent to himself,
square, with a single pole, double-roofed,
and lined with blue cotton. On opposite
sides the upper roof spread into large eaves
under one of which the native servants
slept. There were flap doors in the other two
sides and chicks closed the openings. There
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
were carpets for flooring and charpoys for
beds. Similar but less well-appointed tents
were provided for the ratings on a scale of
six men to a tent. In the field the tents were
carried by elephant; the baggage in ox carts
or by camel.
There was no lack of native servants.
Each officer engaged a personal retinue,
usually a bearer who acted as personal
servant and head of household, a waterboy,
a groom, and a grass cutter for each horse
that he owned. Each of the ratings' tents
had its two or three servants and there were
cooks and barbers as well. When in camp
the officers were woken with a cup of
coffee and enjoyed the luxury of being
shaved in bed, sometimes whilst still asleep!
This was the usual routine for the Army in
India - and the Naval Brigade enjoyed this
part of the routine.
Rations were drawn from the Army.
Fresh beef or mutton, fresh vegetables,
rice, bread, biscuit, or flour, and tea,
coffee, and sugar were usual but, when
circumstances dictated, salt beef and biscuit
were all that was issued. The basic diet
could be supplemented with fruit and fresh
vegetables, and anything else that fancy and
depth of pocket would allow, purchased
from the native bazaar which accompanied
the Army wherever it went. Each morning
young girls drove herds of goats through
the camp, selling milk straight from the
udder to anyone who wished to buy. Of
course there was rum! 'Up spirits' was
piped daily and though the tot was often
local arrack it was still swallowed with
avidity. The officers enjoyed an occasional
bottle of brandy, bought, when obtainable,
from the bazaar.
Naval eccentricities
The Inen of the Naval Brigades showed in
full measure the sailors' partiality for pets
and in short order dogs, cats, monkeys,
parrots, guinea pigs, mongooses, pigs,
goats, and chickens were acquired. The
goats and chickens were certainly required
to earn their keep and supply fresh milk
and eggs, but whether the pigs ended as
roast pork is not known. However these
29 1
pets certainly added to the singularity
of the Naval Brigade in camp and on the
march.
Shannon's Brigade on the march were
a strange and unmilitary spectacle. Led by
the ship's band and fiddlers, with mounted
officers riding up and down the column,
they rolled along singing sea shanties. First
a rifle company, then the rum cart under
guard, then their heavy guns drawn by
elephants or oxen and the ammunition
carts with pets everywhere on the guns
and limbers and running under foot,
then the native followers, baggage
camels and assorted livestock, and finally
another rifle company bringing up the
rear.
Relations with the Army
The Army took a great interest in these men
'four feet tall, four feet wide with long hair
and dragging heavy guns' as a future Field
Marshal described them and once they had
been in action together had the greatest
admiration for the sailors. In camp it was a
popular diversion to watch Shannon's
Brigade at gun drill and in action nothing
pleased the soldiers more than to have the
Brigade with them. Regimental Bands often
paid the Brigade the compliment of playing
them into camp at the end of the day's
march. When it could the Brigade returned
the compliment and on one occasion a
famous Highland Regiment was led into
camp by six fiddlers from Shannon with a
'stamp and go'.
The Brigades were provided with very
necessary assistance in coping with the
difficulties of campaigning in India. Each
Brigade was allocated two Ammy Officers,
one to act as Interpreter and the other as
Baggage Master. These officers can have
had no easy task and must have required
much tact and lively senses of humour.
Certainly there are nothing but laudatory
references to their services.
Both Shannon's and Pearl's Brigades
began their active participation in
field operations at the end of October
1857. They were never to campaign
together so each has a separate history. As
292
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
Shannon's Brigade took part in the main
campaign their story will be told first.
HMS SHANNON'S
NAVAL BRIGADE
The advance to Lucknow
On 24 October 1857 the first detachment of
the Naval Brigade of 100 men under
Lieutenant Vaughan (the First Lieutenant)
marched with the guns from Allahabad for
Cawnpore, followed four days later by
Captain Peel with the second company,
leaving in garrison a party of 150, including
the sick and the band. The second
detachment joined a convoy under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Pownell
of the 53rd Regiment marching up the
Grand Trunk Road and on 31 October had
camped after a march of twelve miles. In
the afternoon intelligence came in that
a rebel force was in the vicinity with the
intention of either attacking Futtehpore or
crossing ahead of the convoy to join the
rebel forces around Lucknow. Camp was
immediately broken up and the whole
convoy marched on to Futtehpore arriving
at midnight.
The enemy were reported to be about
twenty-four miles away near the village of
Khujwa. Colonel Pownell decided to attack
and a force of just over 500, including 100
men of the Naval Brigade and two 9pdr
guns of the Bengal Artillery, marched out
at dawn. At about 14.00 the force was
advancing u p the road with the advance
guard in skirmishing order followed by the
rest of the force in column when the enemy
were seen positioned on either side of the
road down which three guns were sited to
fire, two well u p and the third further back
covering a bridge. Colonel Pownell
extended his force to the right and attacked,
Pownell himself leading the charge at the
two forward guns, to die as they were
taken. Captain Peel succeeded to the
command, having led a successful attack on
the enemy positions in front of the Naval
Brigade. Leaving them to hold the ground
they had won and to secure that flank
Captain Peel collected all the fresh men he
could and led an attack which broke the
enemy line, then wheeled and drove them
successively from their positions. The rebels
broke and ran leaving Captain Peel's force
to occupy their camp. The exhaustion of
the force precluded pursuit; so, after
collecting his dead and wounded and
destroying the enemy camp, Captain Peel
marched back towards Futtehpore and
bivouacked for the night. For the loss of
ninety-five men killed and wounded, two
guns had been captured, three hundred out
of the four thousand rebels killed, and the
remainder dispersed. T o make the victory
complete the third enemy gun was found
abandoned and brought in next day.
With raised morale Captain Peel's force
marched on to Cawnpore where, with the
arrival of Sir Colin Campbell on
3 November, the final dispositions for the
relief of Lucknow were made. Sir Colin
found that a large force of rebels from
Gwalior were threatening Cawnpore but
decided that Lucknow must be relieved. He
left General Windham with 500 men,
including two guns of the Naval Brigade, to
defend that city and the essential bridge of
boats over the Ganges. The capture or
destruction of the bridge would cut the lines
of communication and trap Sir Colin
between Cawnpore and Lucknow.
The relief of Lucknow
With the remainder of his force Sir
Colin advanced on Lucknow and on
12 November reached the Alambagh on the
outskirts of the city. Here he was met by Mr
Kavanagh, a civilian, who earned a VC by
making his way in disguise from the
Residency and through the rebel lines with a
despatch from General Outram suggesting
that, in the light of his own and General
Havelock's experiences, the best line of
approach to the Residency was to avoid the
narrow streets of the city and circle round
to come in from the south-east through a
series of palaces and large buildings
interlinked by parks and open ground. This
suggestion was adopted and Sir Colin issued
his orders accordingly. On 13 November Sir
Colin held an inspection of his forces; this
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
was his first chance to see his assembled
army and, for most of the men he was to
lead into action, their first chance to see
their new Commander in Chief.
At 09.00 on 14 November Sir Colin
ordered the advance on the first of the
palaces with a forward wave of his arm and
the order 'There is your bed - take and lie
in it'. As the troops approached the walls of
the Dilkusha they came under fire from a
battery of six guns and from matchlock and
musketry fire. The guns of the Naval
Brigade were brought into action and
quickly the enemy retreated to the next
large building, the Martiniere. The attack
was carried forward but again when the
rebels opened fire the artillery, including
the guns of the Naval Brigade, were rushed
into action and when the infantry resumed
their advance the rebels evacuated their
positions and retreated to the next
stronghold, the Sikanderbagh, a stronger
building than either that had so far fallen.
Sir Colin called a halt to the advance and
spent the rest of the day securing his
position. The 15 November was spent
bringing up the heavy baggage of the Army
from Alambagh while the poachers and
butchers in the Army were kept busy for the
camp was in a park swarming with deer dinner that night was venison or peacock or
even parrot!
The night of the 15/16th was noisy with
the Naval Brigade, as a deception, firing off
to the left along an approach which the
rebels expected to be used. At daybreak
after a canteen of tea and carrying three
pounds of salt beef and twelve biscuits a
man as three days' rations, the Army
moved off towards the Sikanderbagh.
Helped by an early morning mist and the
success of the deception, the Army passed
over two natural defensive positions
unopposed and marched on until fired
upon from the outer works of the
Sikanderbagh. The artillery, including the
Naval Brigade, were brought up to breech
the walls while some of the infantry moved
round to seal off the escape routes. After
about an hour and a half a small breech in
the wall was made and in a bloody assault
293
this was forced and the Sikanderbagh was
taken in even bloodier hand-to-hand
fighting. Over 1,800 dead rebels were found
within the walls.
The next objective, about half a mile
further on, was the Shah Nujeef, a mosque
surrounded by a garden and enclosed
within a very strong wall, the whole most
artfully prepared for defence. Although it
was now early afternoon Sir Colin
determined that it must be taken that day
and moved against it.
At first the artillery could make little
impression on the walls. Captain Peel
therefore ordered the Naval Brigade
forward and manning drag ropes the guns
were moved up to within about twenty
yards of the walls, according to Sir Colin's
despatch 'very much as if he had been
laying the Shannon alongside an enemy's
frigate'. Here the Naval Brigade remained
for three hours covered by musketry fire
from the 93rd Regiment. At this close range
they maintained a steady and accurate fire
but the shot pierced the walls too cleanly
and no practicable breech was made. At
dusk, when all assaults on the walls had
been beaten off, Sir Colin was about to
abandon the assault for the day. T o provide
cover for the withdrawal Captain Peel
brought his two rocket tubes into action. At
this moment a Sergeant of the 93rd
Regiment discovered a small, concealed,
and undefended breech. Led by a small
party of the 93rd, infantry rushed the
breech to find that the rebels who had been
terrified by the rockets were fleeing the
defences. The Shah Nujeef was taken and
the Army bivouacked for the night where
they stood. Captain Peel was knighted and
two officers and two ratings of the Naval
Brigade were awarded the Victoria Cross
for their work that afternoon.
Only two fortified positions now
remained between Sir Colin's forces and
the defences of the Residency. On
17 November the guns of the Naval Brigade
were brought forward and at about 15.00,
after a long bombardment had silenced the
fire of the defenders, the first objective was
rushed and taken. The attacking troops
I
294
I
I
NAVAL BRIGADE IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
then charged on to the second building
where they were stopped by the walls. The
Engineers were brought forward to blow a
breech, the rebels fled, and the Residency
was relieved.
Evacuation of women and children from
Lucknow
Sir Colin held a very narrow corridor
between the Alambagh and the Residency
threatened on both sides by superior
numbers of rebels and knew that his
communications with Cawnpore were also
threatened. There could be n o question of
holding the Residency and clearing
Lucknow of rebels with the forces at his
disposal. He determined to evacuate, leave
an advance force encamped at the
Alambagh to hold this invaluable
springboard for the final clearance of
Lucknow and to contain the rebel forces
there. After a day of preparation the
evacuation began on 19 November when
the women and children were brought out
and continued until the night of the 22nd,
when under cover of diversionary fire from
the Naval Brigade, which lasted for fortyeight hours, the Union Flag was struck and
the garrison marched out unopposed.
Leaving General Outram with a force of
4,000 men, 25 guns, and 10 mortars to hold
the Alambagh, Sir Colin, with some 3,000
to guard the 2,000 women, children, sick,
and wounded, set out for Cawnpore on 27
November. That night Sir Colin learnt that
heavy firing had been heard from
Cawnpore and ordered a forced march next
day. On the march at about 12.00 a message
was received that all was not well at
Cawnpore. Leaving the infantry with the
convoy, the cavalry and artillery pushed on
and Sir Colin with his escort galloped on to
find that though the bridge of boats over
the Ganges was intact the city of Cawnpore
had fallen to a rebel force and General
Windham was holding an entrenched
position covering the end of the bridge.
The battle at Cawnpore
Windham had been defeated by the
Gwalior contingent of 25,000 rebels.
During the battle the Cawnpore detachment
of the Naval Brigade had been heavily
engaged and came close to disaster. Their
two guns had been brought into the firing
line to engage the advancing rebels at close
range. There was considerable confusion,
the guns were left without infantry support
and, there being insufficient time to harness
up the bullock teams, the guns were
overrun by rebels. The gun teams and the
infantry rallied, charged back, and retook
the guns. With the help of the infantry who
improvised traces from their rifle slings the
guns were got away. Later, during the
general retreat through the city to the
entrenchment, one gun overturned at the
corner of a narrow street and had to be
abandoned. However in the early hours of
the morning the gun team set out, found the
gun, demolished the obstruction, righted
the gun, and brought it safely back without
a shot being fired.
Sir Colin now faced the problem of
passing his force, together with the women,
children, sick, and wounded from Lucknow
over the bridge of boats to the
entrenchment at Cawnpore. He placed the
guns and rockets of the Naval Brigade
under Captain Peel in position on the river
bank with orders to dominate the rebel
artillery and, to protect the crossing
supported by the crossfire from the
entrenchment. The rebel guns were silenced
by the accurate fire brought upon them and
their infantry much distracted by the
rockets. The column made its way across
the bridge without loss and was
concentrated in a position based on
Windham's entrenchment.
It took four days to arrange for the
evacuation of the women and children to
Allahabad en route for Calcutta and it was
a great relief both to the evacuees and the
Commander in Chief when the column
marched out. During these four days
reinforcements (including a further
contingent of the Naval Brigade brought up
from Allahabad) reached Cawnpore. Sir
Colin, by 6 December when he attacked the
rebels in Cawnpore, had a force of about
10,000 as against the 25,000 rebels.
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
The rebel position was centred on the city
of Cawnpore, their left flank resting on the
Ganges, with their right covered by a canal
and holding their only bridge which
stretched out into the plain. If the right
wing could be broken one of the two
available lines of retreat might be cut.
Having examined the rebel positions Sir
Colin planned to attack the right in force
after bombarding the centre and left in an
attempt to convince the rebels that this
would be his point of attack.
After a two-hour cannonade the attack
was launched. Captain Peel brought
forward his 24pdr guns into the skirmishing
line at the canal bridge, rushed one across
and opened fire to cover the infantry
crossing. With the infantry across and
redeployed the advance continued and the
rebels broke and fled. In his despatch Sir
Colin reported
The canal bridge was quickly passed, Captain
Peel leading over it with a heavy gun . . . I must
here draw attention to the manner in which the
heavy 24pdr guns were impelled and managed by
Captain Peel and his gallant sailors. Through the
extraordinary energy with which the latter have
been worked, their guns have been constantly in
advance throughout our late operations, from
the relief of Lucknow till now, as if they were
light field pieces, and the service rendered by
them in clearing our front has been incalculable.
On this occasion there was the sight beheld of
24pdr guns advancing with the first line of
skirmishers.
The broken rebel force was pursued for
about ten miles, their camp was taken
intact, and seventeen guns and the
ammunition train were captured.
That night the British troops bivouacked
where they were and having outrun the
commissariat
had
no provisions.
Fortunately the battalion lying next to the
Naval Brigade had had the forethought to
carry with them a supply of rum which,
next morning, they shared with the sailors.
Not to be outdone the sailors cut out and
slaughtered oxen from their gun teams.
Crudely butchered the beef was roasted
over campfires and shared so that, at least,
the friendly battalion and the Naval Brigade
breakfasted well.
295
The occupation of Fatehgarh
Sir Colin's next move on 24 December was
to march on Fatehgarh, the only town
between Cawnpore and Delhi still held by
the rebels and through which a large convoy
of ammunition and stores must come. The
rebels concentrated to meet him at the
bridge at Kali Nadi which they attempted to
destroy but only damaged. On 1 January
1858 a small force was thrown across the
river to secure a bridgehead. Working
through the night the bridge was repaired
ready for a further advance. On the
morning of 2 January the rebels attacked
the bridgehead and were held on its
perimeter by rifle fire supported by the guns
of the Naval Brigade. A rebel gun was
making very good practice on the bridge.
Peel ordered forward one gun and
requested his First Lieutenant to destroy it.
Laying his gun himself Lieutenant Vaughan
hit- his target with his third shot-and
destroyed the gun's limber with his fifth. Sir
Colin brought forward the main body of
troops over the bridge. The infantry quickly
broke the rebel forces who were pursued
for about seven miles towards Fatehgarh.
At nightfall the pursuit was called off and
the victors enjoyed another cold and
supperless bivouac.
Fatehgarh was occupied without
opposition next day. This town had been
the principle manufactory of artillery gun
carriages in India and the factory and its
stock of seasoned timber was found intact.
Captain Peel, knowing that there would be
a pause in the campaign, turned a part of
the Naval Brigade to the construction of
field carriages for the six 8-inch guns left
at Allahabad. The dismounted guns were to
be floated up-river from Allahabad to
Cawnpore, the carriages taken there from
Fatehgarh, and they would be married.
The bridge at Ramgunga
The rebels were concentrated at Ramgunga
about eight miles from Fatehgarh, where
they had destroyed the bridge. With the
twin objectives of pinning this rebel force in
position and threatening an advance
towards Bareilly (a rebel stronghold)
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NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
Sir Colin sent a force, including a
detachment of the Naval Brigade, to face
them and to see whether the bridge could be
repaired. For a month this confrontation
continued, broken only by occasional
artillery duels. The bridge was found to be
beyond repair with the resources available.
Captain Peel's restless activity drove on the
detachment of the Naval Brigade. Using a
boat they found they rigged an endless whip
from bank to bank and built a raft large
enough to carry fifty men or a field gun
across the river. Though their activity may
have helped deceive the rebels it was
otherwise wasted for neither were used.
The retaking of Lucknow
At the beginning of February Sir Colin
moved his forces back to Cawnpore to
concentrate for the final retaking of
Lucknow. By 11 February all detachments
of the Naval Brigade were together at
Cawnpore and next day moved into camp
at Onao, about fifteen miles towards
Lucknow. Daily they drilled with their
'new' 8-inch guns and on Sunday 15
February held an athletics meeting for their
own, and the Army's amusement. There
were horse, pony, foot, and sack races, and
the finale was a team buffalo race with two
sailors mounted and six pushing, pulling,
encouraging, and steering their beast to the
finishing line. Captain Peel took a leading
part and was roundly cheered when he fell
from his horse.
Lucknow was now the major centre of
the revolt and was defended by a force of
rebels conservatively estimated at 100,000.
Sir Colin's army numbered 20,000 and a
force of 9,000 Gurkhas of the Royal
Nepalese Army were moving down from
Nepal to join as allies in the taking of
Lucknow. The British army moved slowly
towards Lucknow and halted to wait for the
Gurkhas when a day's march short of
General Outram's
position at the
Alambagh. It was here that Captain Peel
heard of his KCB.
Sir Colin planned a partial encirclement
of Lucknow, passing a Division, under
General Outram, to the northern bank of
the Goomti to cut the rebels main line of
retreat and to provide a diversionary attack.
H e would lead the main attack through a
line of defended palaces and houses, which
he had skirted during his relief of the
Residency, heading for the Kaiser Bagh, the
main citadel of the rebels. These two
attacks would be mutually supporting. The
Naval Brigade with its heavy guns and
rockets formed a part of Sir Colin's force.
By 8 March the dispositions of the force
were complete and next day the operations
began.
Early in the morning the guns opened fire
to breach the walls of the Martiniere, the
first of the fortified and defended
buildings. Although the guns of the Naval
Brigade, as usual, were extremely effective,
the rockets because of age and prolonged
exposure to the heat were so inaccurate as
to be useless. While the bombardment was
in progress Peel was ordered to open a
further breech. He brought up and himself
sited two of the guns well within musket
shot of the walls. When satisfied with the
position Peel moved to an exposed spot on
a small knoll about fifty yards to the left to
observe the fire. Here he remained,
oblivious to the musket fire aimed at him,
until he was hit and seriously wounded in
the thigh. He was carried from the field and
the command of the Naval Brigade passed
t o Vaughan
(recently p r o m o t e d
Commander).
At about 14.00 the breeches were ready
and an assault was ordered. The Martinikre
was captured with only slight resistance, the
bulk of the rebels having retired in the force
of the bombardment. They occupied a line
of earthworks to the rear but retired under
the flanking fire from General Outram's
batteries to the next fortified buildings,
Bank's House and the Begum Kothi, which
commanded the line of advance.
On the morning of 10 March the Naval
Brigade guns were sited to breech the walls
of Bank's House and, when this task was
accomplished and a successful assault
mounted, the guns were brought forward
and sited for the attack on Begum Kothi.
The field of fire was obstructed by a large
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
tree. Commander Vaughan and a carpenter
from Shannon went forward and, under
heavy fire from the walls, felled it. When the
breeches in the outer wall were nearly
practicable Commander Vaughan was
ordered forward to breech two inner
defence walls and then the wall of an
adjacent serai. He brought forward two
guns and a party of picked rifle shots. The
riflemen kept the breech clear and kept
down the fire from the loopholed walls of
the serai. It was thought that it would take
some time to breech three walls in
succession but the first two or three shots
showed that at 100 yards' range the 8-inch
balls penetrated all three. One gun became
unserviceable with trunnion trouble but the
other made excellent practice and all three
walls were quickly breeched. As the 93rd
Highlanders and 4th Punjab Rifles
assaulted the Begum Kothi and Gurkhas the
serai, the Naval Brigade rushed a gun
forward onto the road between the two
buildings to engage and silence a rebel
battery firing on the advancing troops.
Sir Colin now halted the main advance
while he consolidated his position and
reorganised his forces consequent on the
arrival of the Maharajah Jung Bahadur
with his Gurkha Army. By the evening of
13 March he was ready to attack the
Imambara, the last building before the
Kaiser Bagh. The Naval Brigade guns were
positioned within thirty yards of its walls
and began a destructive bombardment
which lasted all night; the thick masonry
walls, two or three in succession, being
pierced by every shot. At 09.00 on the 14th
the Imambara quickly fell to the assault; the
rebel garrison, hotly pursued, fled to shelter
in the Kaiser Bagh. Well up with the pursuit
was Lieutenant Hay with a party of sailors.
They took a rebel gun, turned it on its
previous owners, and opened a rapid and
destructive fire.
It had been Sir Colin's intention to halt
his advance after securing the Imambara
expecting that the Kaiser Bagh would be the
most difficult fortification to take.
However the rapidity of the pursuit from
the Imambara carried the British forces into
297
its outworks. Sir Colin pushed on and the
elan of his men carried them into the Kaiser
Bagh. This was a rectangular enclosure
containing a number of interlinked
courtyards and gardens in which were small
buildings and pavilions. The clearing of
these was difficult and dangerous.
Lieutenant Stirling, RMLI, leading
Shannon's Marine Detachment, earned the
praise of the army for their part in this
work.
The death of Captain Peel
Fighting in and around Lucknow was to
continue for another five days though the
Naval Brigade was not seriously engaged.
In fact their active part in the campaign was
finished. On 1 April, having handed over
their guns to the Army, they began their
march back to Calcutta. When about halfway back they were halted and, in the face
of a rebel threat went into garrison to
dominate the area. They remained in this
employment until August when they were
released once more and continued their
march to Calcutta. After a rapturous
reception here the Naval Brigade rejoined
HMS Shannon and sailed for England on
15 September. However they were not
commanded by Captain Sir William Peel,
VC, KCB, for while recovering from his
wound he had contracted smallpox from
which he died at Cawnpore on 27 April.
One of his officers wrote 'We d o not
consider ourselves as the Naval Brigade nor
as Shannon's Brigade but as Peel's
Brigade.' The following posthumous tribute
written by a fellow Captain who served as a
volunteer with the Naval Brigade seems
aptly t o describe the leader and honour him
and his men. 'Brave but humane, daring but
forethoughtful, he so perfected the means at
his disposal that when they were brought
into the field they were irresistible and did
as much as men and material could do.'
HMS PEARL'S NAVAL BRIGADE
Encampment at Myrwah
O n 7 November 1857 the first and second
contingents of Pearl's Brigade were
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NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
united at Siwan, a village in the middle of
the district of Saran which was the
triangular area formed by the junction of
the rivers Gogra and Gandak. On
10 November, leaving a small force of six
officers and forty-four ratings at Siwan,
Captain Sotheby moved to Myrwah and
encamped there, to be joined by the
Ramdal Regiment of Gurkhas of the Royal
Nepalese Army.
The Brigade remained in camp at
Myrwah for about a month, carrying out
daily drills and exercises in preparation for
a future campaign; as yet the force was not
strong enough to take offensive action.
Indeed intelligence indicated that the
scattered rebel forces were concentrating
and it was thought wise to entrench the
camp. No attack came though there were a
series of spy scares, arrests, and summary
executions - arrest, trial, sentence,
execution, and internment usually followed
each other within a few hours. On
27 November Colonel Rowcroft, who had
commanded the 8th Native Infantry which
had mutinied at Dinapore, arrived to
command the 'Saran Field Force' which
now consisted of the Naval Brigade, the
Ramdal Regiment of Gurkhas, and a
detachment of fifty Sikhs.
Skirmishing on the River Gogra
On the evening of 12 December news
arrived of a rebel raid on the magazine at
Guthnee on the north bank of the Gogra.
Half the force marched towards the enemy;
however, they retreated across the river
before contact could be made. Meanwhile
the camp had been struck and everything
prepared for a rapid move. Eventually the
tents were repitched and for a week the
force settled back into a routine of daily
drills and exercises.
Intelligence was received on 19 December
that a rebel force was advancing from the
north-east. Leaving only four officers and
twenty-one men in his camp at Myrwah,
Colonel Rowcroft moved towards the
enemy line of advance and camped in a
defensible position on higher ground. Here
the force was busy until Christmas
entrenching the encampment. To deceive
the enemy dummy guns were sited, these
and the four guns of the Naval Brigade were
kept covered. On 24 December the enemy
were reported to be approaching the camp
and the force stood to under arms eagerly
awaiting the attack. To everyone's
disappointment there was no sign of the
enemy apart from reconnoitring cavalry
patrols and the force stood down. Next
morning the Goruknath Regiment of the
Royal Nepalese Army joined the force, but
needed a day of rest after their march. The
enemy made no move so Christmas Day
passed peacefully.
At 08.00 on 26 December Colonel
Rowcroft marched out to attack. The
enemy were found at about 10.00
positioned across the road about six miles
from the camp. The force deployed into
line behind a screen of skirmishers of Royal
Marines and sailors and halted when their
guns were within range. For about two
hours the guns kept up a steady fire on the
enemy positions and made excellent
practice; one shot (lucky or aimed?) was
acclaimed as knocking a Rajah off his
elephant. An attempt to outflank the force
was broken up by shrapnel as was a cavalry
attack on the skirmishing line. Then the
general advance was sounded and the force
moved on, pushing the rebels before them
until the partially entrenched enemy camp
was reached. An immediate charge drove
the enemy out of his defences and into
retreat abandoning his tented camp, two
guns, and all his provisions and stores.
Rowcroft halted whilst the booty was
secured and the tents burnt and then set out
in pursuit. At about 16.00 the force came
up with the enemy rearguard at a river
crossing near Mujhowlee. Rifle fire from
the Royal Marine detachment hastened the
retreat and secured the capture of another
gun, its limber, and two tumbrils full of
ammunition. The enemy was estimated at
6,000, including 1,200 regular sepoys and
150 cavalry.
That night the force bivouacked on the
outskirts of Mujhowlee. Next day half of
the force with two guns crossed the river to
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
burn the nearby houses of two prominent
rebels. Meanwhile the tents and baggage
were brought forward from Myrwah and
the whole force went into camp at
Mujhowlee. Next day, 28 December, was a
grizzly and perhaps unique occasion for the
Royal Navy. A sepoy of the 10th Regiment
of Native Infantry who had been captured
after the engagement was executed was
blown from the muzzle of one of the guns.
Routine training
After this engagement the rebels evacuated
the area; life for the force became a routine
of marching, resting in camp, and minor
punitive actions burning the property of
known rebels. Despite the fatigue of
marching and daily training the Naval
Brigade enjoyed the interlude and they
enjoyed sport of a kind. Musket bullets
were melted down into lead shot and using
their muskets as shot guns they hunted
snipe and peafowl. The junior officers also
risked their necks practising 'pig sticking'
with pariah dogs as the quarry.
On 6 February 1858 the Naval Brigade
exchanged their muskets for Enfield rifles.
Daily thereafter they practised the new
loading drill, and also judging distance
because the new weapons had adjustable
sights accurate to 900 yards.
The bridge of boats at Gai Ghat
Jung Bahadur had marched 9,000 Gurkhas
of the Royal Nepalese Army into India as
an allied force to assist Sir Colin Campbell
in the retaking of Lucknow which was now
the major centre of rebel resistance. T o
rendezvous with Sir Colin the Gurkha army
had to cross the river Gogra. Colonel
Rowcroft was ordered to build a bridge of
boats for the crossing at Gai Ghat about
fifty miles upstream where the Gurkhas
were encamped. About 150 river craft were
collected and the river steamer Jumna was
requisitioned, armed, and readied for the
passage upriver which was likely to be
opposed since the south bank was in rebel
hands with strong forts in dominating
positions. There was also a rebel force of
5,000 encamped opposite Gai Ghat which
299
would threaten the bridge-building.
Captain Sotheby with 160 officers and
men of the Naval Brigade embarked in the
Jumna and the river craft and proceeded
up-river with the remainder of the force
marching on the north bank. It was a
difficult trip - without a pilot, into the
current, a strong head wind, and through a
sandstorm - but averaging twelve miles
daily they were close to the first fort on 17
February. Captain Sotheby landed the
Naval Brigade, Gurkhas were brought over
the river, and the fort was attacked. The
initial attack failed but when the Jumna
bombarded the fort and the Gurkhas were
seen to be working round to surround the
fort the rebels panicked and bolted. The
force pushed on and two days later were
within four miles of Gai Ghat. That evening
the second fort was found to be abandoned
and was burnt. Next day the force marched
out to attack the rebels in the open nearby.
In a sharp engagement during which the
Royal Marines captured and turned a gun,
which they then used to great effect, the
rebel force of 2,500 was driven off. Two
more guns were captured and the area was
cleared of rebels. The bridge of boats was
quickly constructed without opposition.
Victorious engagements at Amorah
Leaving Jung Bahadur to cross the Gogra
for Lucknow and taking with him the
Ramdal Regiment, Colonel Rowcroft
moved the remainder of his force forward
towards Fyzabad on the north bank and
reached the town of Amorah on 2 March.
Here they were joined by the Bengal
Yeomanry Cavalry, 250 mounted European
volunteers drawn from planters and
unemployed officers from disbanded o r
mutinous sepoy regiments. The Naval
Brigade cheered them into camp, more
delighted perhaps after four months to
greet fellow Europeans than at the
accretion of strength, important though
this was.
The road to Fyzabad was dominated by a
strong fort at Belwah and on the afternoon
of 2 March Colonel Rowcroft attempted to
surprise and seize it. The guns of the Naval
300
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
Brigade were not heavy enough to breech
the walls, even when brought up to 'grape
shot range' and after two hours, as
darkness fell, the force withdrew and
bivouacked for the night. Next day they
returned to camp at Amorah. Aware that
the rebels from Fyzabad were advancing in
strength they began to dig an entrenchment.
Throughout the 4 March Colonel
Rowcroft received reports that an attack
was imminent. At 01.00 on the 5th he got
his force under arms, struck camp and at
07.30 marched out and disposed his forces
about a mile from the camp. The infantry
were drawn up in a line one deep across the
road with cavalry on each flank and the
guns in a battery in the centre of the line.
The rebels advanced down the road and
at 09.00 opened fire with an 18pdr gun
which outranged the guns of the Naval
Brigade. The whole force, therefore,
advanced until their guns were within range
of the enemy. For about an hour the rival
artillery fought a duel and the skirmishers
disputed the ground between the forces.
The rebels now attempted to outflank the
force o n the right. Colonel Rowcroft
changed front, two of the Naval Brigade
guns limbered u p and galloped to the
support of the right-hand squadron of the
Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry who charged,
took the rebels in flank, and forced them to
retreat. Colonel Rowcroft now reformed
his infantry two deep, advanced on the
rebels, and when within range engaged
them with volley fire from the prone
position. The rebels countered with an
outflanking movement on the left aimed at
the camp. The left-hand squadron of the
Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry supported by the
other two guns of the Naval Brigade and
the Royal Marines broke up this attack.
The rebels began to retire, a bayonet charge
turned the retirement into a rout, and the
whole force pursued the rebels for about
five miles capturing seven guns. By 14.00
simple exhaustion brought the pursuit to an
end and the rebels drew off under desultory
fire from the Naval Brigade guns. Colonel
Rowcroft with 1,700 infantry, 250 cavalry
and 4 guns had defeated a rebel force of
10,000, about half being trained sepoys
with 10 guns. One officer of the Naval
Brigade had been killed and 9 men
wounded.
The force returned to the camp site at
Amorah and pitched camp. Here they were
to remain until 26 April busy training and
strengthening the entrenchments. False
alarms of rebel advances were frequent each alarm meaning 'an excursion without'.
On 26 March a further reinforcement of
three companies of the 13th Regiment
commanded by Major Cox arrived. On
17 April there was a sharp engagement with
a party of rebels which had ventured too
close to Amorah and a gun was captured.
The temperature at noon now reached
110°F and Colonel Rowcroft made
preparations to pass the hot weather at
Amorah. Huts were being built and the
daily drills and exercises were relaxed and
took place in the evenings only. But in six
days everything changed.
On 25 April intelligence came in that the
rebels were advancing in three columns to
attack the camp. Colonel Rowcroft as
always moved out to meet these attacks. He
split his force in two, the left wing under
Captain Sotheby and Major Cox,
commanding the right wing himself. The
left wing was first in action against the
centre column of rebels which was pushed
back after a sharp engagement and
followed for about two miles. Captain
Sotheby then retired and swinging left
engaged the left-hand column of rebels,
being joined by Brigadier Rowcroft (news
of whose promotion had just been received)
but only for a short while. The right-hand
column of rebels was moving to attack the
camp and Brigadier Rowcroft moved off to
attack them. Having driven off the lefthand column Captain Sotheby marched
towards the sound of firing on his right.
The intervention of the Naval Brigade's
rockets assisted in routing the rebels.
Recapture of Bustee
Next morning, 26 April, intelligence was
received that a rebel force had attacked and
been beaten off by the small garrison at the
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
town of Bustee some twenty-two miles in
the rear of the force, that considerable
numbers of rebels were moving towards
that town, and that in the face of this threat
the garrison was retiring towards Brigadier
Rowcroft's position. The force spent that
day destroying the entrenchment, burst
all their captured guns, struck camp, and at
22.00 started on a night march to join the
troops retiring from Bustee at Captangang.
After a nine-hour march the forces met and
went into camp. On 28 April a report was
received that 1,000 rebels had occupied the
fort of Nuggar some seven miles away.
Brigadier Rowcroft sent Major Cox with a
mixed detachment of 500 men, including
ninety of the Naval Brigade with two guns
and rockets to deal with them. After some
sharp fighting the rebels were defeated and
bundled out of the fort. They dispersed.
Until 6 May the force remained in camp
at Captangang; then they marched on
Bustee to prevent the rebels occupying it.
The rebels withdrew and the force settled
their headquarters there for the hot weather
and monsoon seasons building a hutted
camp as a base from which flying columns
marched out to attack rebel forces reported
in Gorukpore and Fyzabad districts and
from which the detachments scattered to
dominate the area were relieved in rotation.
Two days after the arrival at Bustee Jung
Bahadar with his Gurkha army passed
through on his return from the taking of
Lucknow. The Goruknath Regiment now
returned to Nepalese command and
marched home.
Apart from the alarms and excursions of
the flying columns with which detachments
of the Naval Brigade played a distinguished
part in seven engagements the depleted
force settled into an easy routine. The
Naval Brigade expected to be recalled to
their ship but made the best of the
opportunities for rest and relaxation. The
Chaplain organised and established a
library and reading room and the other
officers organised cricket matches, athletic
competitions, and race meetings. In the
evenings there were 'theatricals'.
As the monsoon season ended hard
training for field service was resumed.
301
The force had been reinforced by a further
wing of the 13th Light Infantry under Lord
Mark Kerr and the Ferozepore Regiment of
Sikhs under the redoubtable Lieutenant
Colonel Brasyer, VC, whose name was in
time to be incorporated in the title of the
Regiment. The force was readied for the
final campaign of the Indian Mutiny.
The final campaign
The one remaining rebel army, commanded
by Bala Rao the Nana Sahib's brother,
occupied the country to the north and east
of Lucknow in the Himalayan foothills.
The broken and disorganised remains of
other rebel armies were slowly making
attempts to join him. The Commander in
Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, planned a threepronged attack to clear the area and destroy
the rebels. With his main force he would
march in from the west; from the south
General Sir Hope Grant would advance
with a large cavalry force; and from the
south-east would come Brigadier Rowcroft
with his field force. T o shorten operations
the scattered forts and strongholds in rebel
hands would have to be subdued quickly
and to this end a part of the siege train was
to be brought up from Lucknow to be
worked by the Naval Brigade.
On 16 November the force left its
quarters at Bustee and advanced to
Captangang where it halted and waited for
the scattered detachments to rejoin. On
23 November the force marched off,
heading for Doomereaganj where they
intended to cross the Rapti river. Whilst on
the march the force was joined by a light
field battery of Madras artillery which
brought the first installment of the siege
train, two 5%-inch mortars.
On 25 November the advance guard came
upon enemy pickets at about 09.00. The
13th Light Infantry, a squadron of the
Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry, and two of the
light field pieces made an immediate attack.
This developed into a running fight which
drove the enemy back for four miles into
and over the Rapti. There was no ford so a
great many of the rebels were drowned.
That evening two of the Naval Brigade guns
302
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 A N D 1858
were sited on the river bank to cover the
building of a bridge of boats.
On 2 December an enemy force of some
3,000 men and 6 guns was reported in camp
about nine miles away and about to attempt
to cross the river to join Bala Rao. On
3 December a detachment of 350 of the
13th, 200 Sikhs, 70 Bengal Yeomanry, and
4 guns (2 from the Naval Brigade) attacked.
The rebels stood their ground in their
trenches in the face of the artillery for
nearly two hours while the infantry worked
round the flanks. Under this threat the
rebels broke, ran into the protection of the
surrounding forest and dispersed. By 15.00
the action was over and the detachment
rejoined the main force.
Next day the work on the bridge was
finished. The whole force crossed the river
and marched on to Intwa where it pitched
camp to await the arrival of the siege train.
This arrived on 18 December. The Naval
Brigade was immediately reorganised into
an artillery unit. Besides, the 4 12pdr guns
with which they had started the seamen
manned 1 8-inch mortar, 2 18pdr guns and
their 2 rocket tubes; the Royal Marine
detachment manned 2 8-inch mortars and 2
5 %-inch mortars.
There was little time to exercise with the
new weapons. The force was held in camp
by heavy rain and waterlogged ground on
19 December but marched out next day.
After two days marching it was in touch
with the other two columns and in contact
with a rebel army of 20,000 with 20 guns
drawn up in a position based on the strong
fort at Tulispore and with its flanks resting
on fortified villages.
At 03.00 on 23 December the 700-strong
53rd Regiment joined the force from Sir
Hope Grant. At 09.00 the whole force
struck camp, crossed the Rapti river and
formed up in line, field artillery in the
centre, cavalry on the flanks and the siege
train in the rear. With a strong force of
skirmishers to the front the advance began
at 12.00 and at 12.30 the first shot was
fired. Despite the difficulties of the ground
Captain Sotheby with the four 12pdrs and
the rockets managed to keep close up with
the skirmishers and for the next two hours
maintained a heavy fire on the enemy line.
This drove the rebels back into a line of
trenches. Brigadier Rowcroft ordered his
cavalry to turn the flanks with infantry
support and brought forward the siege train
by elephant to fire upon the fort and the
fortified villages. By 16.00 these had been
taken by assault and the rebels broke and
ran. A three-hour pursuit ended at nightfall
and the force bivouacked near the fort.
Heavy rain fell during the night, the
countryside was swamped and the whole
force spent Christmas Eve in the bivouack.
On Christmas Day they marched back to
camp and settled in, expecting to enjoy the
Christmas Dinner which by noon was
prepared and cooking. Sir Hope Grant was
no Father Christmas. At noon he galloped
into camp and incontinently despatched the
force in pursuit of the rebels who were
believed to be escaping eastward.
The siege train was moved with great
difficulty across roadless country cut up by
dykes and nullahs and Brigadier Rowcroft
led a forced march sleeping rough in the
open each night. His route circled back to
Intra where he joined Hope Grant on
27 December. The siege train had proved to
be a hindrance and was ordered back to
Doomereaganj. On 29 December after the
men and animals had rested for a day Hope
Grant began the last mad chase after the
fugitive sepoys who were scattering and
hiding in the forest. For three days the
exhausting marches continued, quite
fruitlessly; they were finally called off on
31 December.
The return home
On 1 January 1859 hostilities were officially
brought to an end, but the Naval Brigade
was allowed no rest. On 2 January it
received its orders to return to HMS Pearl.
The guns were hastily transferred to units in
Hope Grant's force and on 3 January they
set off, marching light. Allahabad was
reached after ten days' marching (with
Sunday rests) with the proud claim that on
one day they covered twenty-six miles and
on another eighteen. At Allahabad the
NAVAL BRIGADES IN INDIA 1857 AND 1858
Viceroy, Lord Canning, welcomed them
with a laudatory General Order.
At last the Naval Brigade was able to
enjoy a well-earned rest. They embarked on
a river steamer and flats and sailed down
303
river to reach Calcutta on 2 February.
Eleven days later, after the feting and
banqueting, HMS Pearl sailed for home
where just ten days after arrival she paid off.
A. L. BLEBY
Correspondence
LESSONS FROM THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS
Sir,-At the risk of being thought a timeexpired old fuddy-duddy of the bow and
arrow days I begin to wonder whether a
Baby Carrier filled with the modern
equivalent of a Stringbag would not have
been most acceptable to our land forces in
the Falklands. I understand that the
Argentinians were able to use their airfields
for some time after the long-range aircraft
staggered there from England. I d o not
think it could have taken a Swordfish
Squadron long to write them off.
That thought brings back memories of
the two raids on the oil refinery at
Palembang during the last War: one by
long-range aircraft from Ceylon which was
virtually abortive, and the second by carrier
aircraft which just about flattened it.
HANKROTHERHAM
Sir,-The corridors of Whitehall are no
doubt abuzz with 'the lessons learnt from
the Falklands'. It will be tragic if the wrong
conclusions are drawn from the evidence,
particularly in the area of damage
resistance.
In my view, the evidence shows quite
clearly that a warship that is hit by a
contemporary missile is most unlikely to
survive as a fighting unit, no matter what
improved equipment is provided for firefighting or damage control. The saving of
human life or the ability of the hull to
remain afloat are secondary considerations.
It is therefore important that our slender
financial resource is concentrated on the
sensors, weapons, and decoys which
prevent the enemy ordnance from hitting
the target. If this means using aluminium or
other light materials for superstructures,
and accepting total hull loss and high
mortality in case of a hit then so be it.
Such a view is consistent with Mr Nott's
('Spend the money on the weapons systems,
not the platform') and with my own
opinion expressed some years ago in your
columns ('Back to the Drawing Board'). It
would be unfortunate if it were confounded
by Director General Ships' natural desire to
react to adverse criticism of platform
damage resistance.
SNIPE
Sir,-In
the January 1981 issue of The
Naval Review, you published a letter of
mine in which I expressed concern at the
prevailing complacency towards the threat
of guided missiles, fired from aircraft,
surface ships, or submarines to surface
warships. I said that the situation reminded
me of the late 1930s when everyone knew
that aircraft were a menace to ships, but no
one did anything effective to deal with the
matter. The results of the war came as a
shock to the complacent. In 1981, I was
thinking mainly of a confrontation with
some minor power like Syria, Libya, Iran,
or Iraq; I did not consider the Argentines. I
received an unofficial reply to the effect
that all was well and that equipment to deal
with missiles was available. I relaxed,
mistakenly, for 1 should have been
suspicious of the words 'financial
stringency' in the tail of the letter.
When the Task Force sailed for the
Falkland Islands there were only two ships
fitted with the anti-missile weapon Sea
Wolf, about which there had been so much
publicity. I have no idea whether active
ECM was available, but judging from
results I doubt it. The Task Force was
sent to sea almost defenceless against
guided missile attack as the sinking of
the Sheffield,
and other incidents,
showed.
I write in no critical spirit of the Navy of
today which performed so brilliantly in the
South Atlantic despite its shortcomings in
weapons. I am very worried however by the
inability of the Naval Staff and the MOD
generally to get priorities right. It is easy in
the light of hindsight to see that it would
have been better, if the money was short, to
cut the ship-building programme and use
the savings to install the right weapons and
devices.
When I was on the Board in the early
1960s, as far as I remember we never had a
general discusion on the state of the Navy.
The agenda was too full. Perhaps a general
discussion by the Boards in the 1970s might
have alerted people to the real threat posed
by modern munitions which was crystal
clear from a variety of incidents ranging
from the Arab-Israeli to the IndianPakistani wars. Then the Falkland Islands
Task Force might have sailed fully equiped.
It would be interesting to hear other
members views.
PETERGRETTON
..
THE DEFENCE REVIEW.
A N D ANOTHER THING
Sir,-Drumbeat
in his letter (July 1982)
makes a large number of points. I should
like to deal with two minor ones: 'There
was a time when officers not employed at
sea went on half pay. It cannot have been a
pleasant decision then, nor would it be
now, but it should be considered. In a
broadly similar situation in 1847 two
hundred Captains were given flag rank to
soften the blow so why not in 1982?'
'Two hundred' - what is the source of
information for this? The quarterly Navy
Lists of 1846, 1847 and 1848 d o not bear
this out.
'Half pay' - it is probably more accurate
to state that in those days all officers were
on half pay unless they were on full pay (at
sea or ashore). It would be too tedious to
check, but of the mid-1846 Captains' List
(about 730 in number) I suspect that less
than 15 per cent were employed (at sea and
ashore) and so on full pay. Incidentally half
pay was still in use in the 1930s.
On this question I doubt if any 'broadly
similar situation' exists between the present
day and the 1800s, as the system of
promotion in those days differed very
considerably from the present one.
Up to 1846 all flag officers were on half
pay, unless employed, and each remained
on the Flag List until he died. The
promotion of a Captain to Rear Admiral of
the Blue (usually in batches, say once a
year) was strictly by seniority. Hence every
Captain was promoted to Rear Admiral
unless he failed to reach the top section of
the Captains' List, due to death or other
causes.
On 23 November 1841 the 40 Captains
then at the top of their list (seniorities 1806
and 1807) were promoted to Rear Admiral
of the Blue.
For the next five years not a single
Captain was promoted to Rear Admiral.
The one who by December 1841 had
become the senior Captain, John Clavell,
remained top of the list until he died in
January 1846.
By 1846 it must have been clear that very
drastic action was needed. An Order-inCouncil (London Gazette, 1 September
1846) resulted in action being taken which
affected the upper part (317 in number) of
the Captains' List. Half pay rates per day of
Captains were: top 100, 14s. 6d.; next 150,
12s. 6d.; the remainder, 10s. 6d.
The steps taken (3 November 1846) were:
(a) 130 were selected (throughout the
seniority range 1808 to 1826) to remain on
half pay (active list), but see later.
( 6 ) 181 were retired in the following
manner:
(i) The senior 54 (seniority 1809 to 1813,
all on the 14s. 6d. rate) were promoted
to a new rank of 'Retired Rear
Admiral' - seniority 1 October 1846,
pay f 1 5s. per day.
(ii) The remaining 127 were each made a
'Retired Captain' - retaining original
seniority, pay 7s. 6d. a day additional
to their 12s. 6d. or 10s. 6d. rate. This
was a new rank for those from the
Captains' List, but had been used for
some Commanders (but with pay as a
Commander!) on retirement.
(c) 4 became a 'Captain of Greenwich
Hospital' and 2 died September to
November 1846.
Then on 9 November 1846 the 20
Captains now at the top of the list
(seniorities 1808, 1809, and 1810) were
promoted to 'Rear Admiral of the Blue' on
306
CORRESPONDENCE
half pay of £1 5s. per day. Of these 20, 7
had ended their last active duty between
1809 and 1815. Incidentally one of those
promoted to Retired Rear Admiral (senior
to the junior Rear Admiral of the Blue) had
been employed continuously since 1829!
The junior Admiral was one of the 7
mentioned.
From 1849 those on the Retired
Captains'
List were promoted to
'Additional Retired Rear Admiral' (but
with their Captains' pay) when a Captain on
the Active List originally junior to him was
promoted to a Rear Admiral of the Blue.
The action taken in 1846 did not achieve
the desired results for the Active List, so
another Order-in-Council, initiated further
schemes in 1851. Another story.
M. CRAIG WALLER
Sir,-Drumbeat's
letter ('And Another
Thing', The Naval Review, July 1982)
requires comment. Whilst having sympathy
with his basic contention that the MOD in
London has too many policy-makers (I
would add the rider 'One star and above'),
thus crippling the decision-making process,
I would contend that, in all fairness to these
same men, they are hamstrung by a lack of
sufficient sound advice. This poor
foundation has, I believe, two causes.
Firstly, far from employing too many
people, we d o not employ enough of the
right sort at working level. Secondly, those
employed continue largely to be wellmeaning amateurs.
A comparative glance through the MOD
Directory will demonstrate that, for
example, both the Army and RAF OR
Staffs are not only disproportionately
larger than ours, thus allowing greater
specialisation and attention to detail, but
are also more logically structured. Greater
use is made of the Desk Officer at 2% level
reporting to his Half-Colonel or Wing
Commander superior. Were DNOR to
adopt a similar approach with each
Commander having two Lieutenant
Commanders (one 'E', one 'X') working
for him, not only would greater expertise be
established and continuity be more readily
maintained by staggered appointing, but
also a pool of 'trained' personnel could
slowly be established such that the
Commander who later returned to DNOR
could well d o so with the benefit of
previous experience. At the moment he is
likely to be hot from an eighteen-month
'drive' having spent most of his earlier
career in naive and blissful ignorance of the
petty politicking of the MOD. He is then
pitched unprepared and headlong into a
maelstrom of tasks after a minimal
turnover.
My second point in this area is that the
Staff Course is resolutely viewed as a 'nice
to have' rather than as a virtual prerequisite
for Staff appointments or for promotion.
Why is it so difficult for officers with
'marked aptitude for Staff work' and
several S206 recommends for Staff Course
to obtain a place whilst some with neither
wish nor inclination are sent? We can reap
no better than we sow.
What we d o reap is a Naval Staff that is
ever susceptible to confusion by Drumbeat's
DGS and DGW 'experts' scrambling to get
their pet projects into ships and, dare I be
base enough to say it, their own prowess
recognised and their own promotion prospects thereby enhanced. (Such cynicism,
after only a brief spell in the PE too.)
The point about Bath being too far from
the sea and a move to Portland Bill doing
'very nicely' must surely be allegorical? It is
not my experience that DUWP(N) actually
fares any better than organisations less
exposed to the grey drab obfuscation of the
Portland weather. The manager of one of
our newer sonar projects (living in the Base,
not at the Bill) did not even get to see the
equipment until he had been in the job for
several years. The rush to AUTEC is as
much symptomatic of the desire simply to
become acquainted as it is with the climate,
the location, the natives or even the trials
requirement. Ships that pass through
FOST's tender mercies seldom welcome the
inquisitive hordes of the P E legions - and
quite rightly too.
Essentially the Naval case goes by default
because we put the wrong people into the
CORRRES
wrong jobs, generally for the wrong length
of time. Sheer numbers of NOS within the
PE are not as important as identifying the
influential jobs in Projects, SWSE, and HQ
organisations, and then putting into them
men with suitable seagoing experience for
periods of three, four, or five years rather
than two or two and a half. (The career
'profile' would have to be reviewed of
course.)
My belief is that the majority of civilians
within the PE have broadly the same
objective as the uniformed members - the
wellbeing of the Fleet - but they lack the
necessary background and, most of all, the
direction. That direction should come
mainly from the Naval Staff. My great
doubt is that in the formulation of NSTs
and NSRs the overworked Desk Officer is
too much at the mercy of the ASWE/
AUWE/MSDS/etc. men, from whom he
takes dictation, without the time or the
support available for the proper
questioning and evaluation of the carefully
phrased statements and optimistic forecasts
that must be part of the development of a
good NSR.
Finally, it does sometimes seem that we
are more concerned with the protection of
jobs than with the enhancement of the
operational Fleet. However, those jobs too
often seem to be at Neston or Templecombe
than in the Main Building. Marc Plessaranti
are here to provide us with what we need.
We are not here to keep those firms out of
the hands of the Official Receiver. Let us
cease our embarrassment over the fact that
we have a Naval Staff. A strong Naval Staff
is our best investment for the future. Let it
be fed and nurtured and loudly proclaimed
an asset.
ORLOP
SPECTRES BEHIND NAVY
SPENDING
Sir,-'Unusually
in our history we now
have our forces already deployed in the
right place'. Thus Mr Nott in his article,
'After the Falklands, let's not go overboard
on Navy spending' (The Times, 27 July
1982).
The sentiment comes a little oddly from
the man specifically responsible for
the absence of 'forces' in the South Atlantic
when trouble threatened earlier this
year.
But Mr Nott is of course referring to the
central front: he goes on to say, 'the
forward defence of Germany is the forward
defence of Great Britain itself'. One
suspects that the doctrine 'Maginot rules
OK' is operating not only on the ground but
in the mind: the forward defence of Great
Britain involves also the forward defence of
North Norway, and that in the Barents Sea,
not only at the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap,
1,000 miles west.
One obvious lesson to be drawn from
military success in the Falkland Islands is
surely the importance to that success of
non-military events and achievements:
Resolution 502 in the Security Council, help
from the Commonwealth, the European
Community and the United States, in
closing political, economic and financial
doors to Argentina, etc, etc. Military
success in the Falklands did not occur in an
indifferent vacuum and neither will the
success of the defence policy Mr Nott is
now developing.
Two 'contexts' to that policy MOD seems
to be ignoring: one is the disarmament
context as it affects the Trident
programme, the other is the overall
maritime policy context of the Navy.
As a force, Trident is too big to be left
out of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START) for long; but also, it consists of
too few operational units (four boats, no
more than one boat always on station) to be
reducible. This means that when the time
comes, Britain will be faced with the choice
of holding up START or giving up its
independent nuclear deterrent. The
Government has to think again about
Trident.
Again, naval policy must be considered
in the context of Britain's overall maritime
policy. We have none: Mrs Thatcher
abolished what, under Mr Callaghan, had
308
CORRESPO
been the Peart Committee in which the Lord
Privy Seal (Lord Peart) had at last begun to
oversee and co-ordinate maritime policy.
Today the merchant fleet shrinks, the
fishing fleet shrinks, the number of
experienced seafarers shrinks . . . If we are
t o deter war on the central front, we must be
able to deter both a short nuclear war and a
long 'conventional' war; and that means
merchant ships and seamen and the ability
to reinforce from across the Atlantic.
We cannot deter what we are unable to
fight. This is the argument for improving
conventional forces 'in being' on the central
front and it applies with exactly the same
force to improving conventional forces 'in
being' on the, as it happens, maritime,
nothern front. Maginot avaunt!
ELIZABETH
YOUNG
ANONYMITY
Sir,-May I suggest that the general practice
of anonymity of contributors to The Naval
Review has outlived its usefulness.
Regulation No. 1 at the back of this
magazine concludes that contributions may
be anonymous. In practice it has become the
rule rather than the exception.
I imagine there are many members, with
much to read, who skim through the Review
and read bits of it. Long articles with
obscure titles such as 'The Uncertain
Trumpet' or 'Away Seaboot' by unknown
authors d o not immediately grab the
attention that perhaps they deserve.
But if the author was stated to be
'Admiral X' or 'Midshipman Y', there
would, in both cases, be a strong incentive
to read on. In the first case one might
reasonably respect his authority and
experience and therefore be particularly
interested in his views. In the second, one
might be intrigued to learn the viewpoint of
a newcomer to the scene.
I doubt if junior officers are now as
diffident as once they were required to be in
putting forward their views. It is also
doubtful whether the name of a senior
officer at the end of an article nowadays will
significantly inhibit subsequent debate.
T o go further, I would suggest an
altogether more open and compelling
format. Not only the author's name (unless
specifically wished otherwise) could be
printed boldly underneath the title, but also
a sentence or two outlining the subject
matter; perhaps even a photograph and
potted biography of the author.
A vivid and informative style of
presentation need not be undignified.
Moreover it ought to be a triumph for
Midshipman Y to achieve publication and
see his name in print. Admiral X will not
I'm sure be a faintheart in this respect.
ANON
HMS EREBUS 1926-32
COMMEMORATIVE DIRECTORY 1982
Sir,-The
appearance of this privately
subscribed and circulated Commemorative
Directory to mark the fiftieth anniversary of
the paying off of the Erebus, after her first
commission as a Cadet Training Ship,
should not go unnoticed. This carefully
compiled booklet was produced by
C o m m a n d e r Engledue, himself an
Albermarle Paymaster Cadet in 1931, with
the help of many of those 574 cadets listed,
and it will no doubt become a collector's
item and a useful record for some.
New records of the Special Direct and
Paymaster Entries are rare and this one adds
to our knowledge of these Entries. There
were two earlier books on the Special Entry.
The first was the very rare one on the first
nine entries The Public Schools and the
Navy 1914-18 written in 1918 by the
Reverend S. J. Childs-Clarke, the Chaplain
to the RN College, Keyham. The second one
was an expanded version of this on the first
eleven entries, written by one of the Keyham
staff, Lieutenant W. S. Galpin in 1919. This
was called The Public School to Navy and
there are a fair number of copies in
circulation. In the early days the terms were
simply numbered.
This new Directory covers numerically
the nineteenth to thirty-second Special
Entry Terms out of the total of ninety-five
between 1913 and 1955, as well as the
associated Paymaster Entries. These terms
were not numbered in Erebus but known
CORRESI'ONDENCE
by the various term names, Blake,
Collingwood, Drake, Greyville, and
Albermarle. Direct Entries in their
preliminary term were Nelsons, and
Cochranes were the two Chinese entries who
gave such a lot of fun to Commander C. A.
Jenkins as recorded in his delightful book
Days of a Dogsbody. We can also see the
Paymaster term names, Exmouth, St
Vincent, Barham, and Effingham used up
until September 1929 when the Paymasters
joined up with the Special Entry Terms; this
was one of the many steps made gradually in
the 1930s and 1940s on the road to the
Common Special Entry.
Amongst the thirty-five illustrations are
group photos, now scarce, of most of the
terms, Erebus, and her tender Carstairs;
these must evoke many memories of that
period. After the Labour Chairman of the
Admiralty Committee for reviewing
methods of cadet entry, Sir Ernest Bennett,
MP for Central Cardiff, visited Erebus in
November 1930, he remarked to Captain
Hamilton on the very small quarters the
cadets had. This drew the response that
there was plenty of room and they were
better than the cadets would get at sea for
the next twenty years.
The list, which is not exhaustive, of the
133 schools from which the RN Cadets came
differs very little from the 1913 - 19 lists and
shows relatively few secondary school boys.
They did not start to appear in larger
numbers till later in the 1930s when the
Special Entry became numerically the main
entry. However, the first Erebus period was
the time of the Depression which had drastic
consequences for nearly everyone. In the
November 1929 entry, the smallest Special
Entry ever, only six Executive Cadetships
were given. With such a low number of
places only nineteen boys tried for these.
The illustrations enable us to see almost
the last time the Special Entry Chief and
Cadet Captains wore the distinctive badges
on their cuffs, for Cadet Captains were
abolished after a few weeks in HMS
Frobisher in 1933.
It is possible to see from the carefully
tabulated term lists that 62 of 529 RN cadets
309
entered were lost in World War 11, but the
survivors went on to include 43 Admirals
including 1 Admiral of the Fleet. In the
matter of decorations and honours there
were 143 of each, a remarkable record
which included:
Decorations 2 VCs, 23 DSOs, 117 DSCs,
I GM
Honours
2 GCBs, 2 GBEs, 1 P C
8 KCBs, 5 KBEs, 1 KCMG,
1 KCVO, 32 CBs, 17 CBEs,
1 CVO, 1 CSI, 1 CIE,
61 OBEs, 9 MBE, 1 MVO
One wonders whether career prospects today
will offer such opportunities; perhaps they
will?
A copy of the Directory has been
deposited with the MOD Naval History
Library, the Imperial War Museum, RNC
Dartmouth, RNEC Manadon, RN Supply
School, and at the RN Museum which will
also have, when collated, the documents and
other photos contributed by the subscribers
to the Directory.
J. H. BEATTIE
H M S VALIANT
Sir,-Your
correspondent in The Naval
Review, January 1982, asks what were the
findings of the Enquiry which was held in
Colombo into the collapse of the floating
dock with Valiant partially docked: it seems
unlikely that the full evidence and findings
will be brought forward, so perhaps the
following account will be of some interest
to him.
At that time I was Chief Staff Officer to
Vice Admiral Eastern Fleet (Arthur John
Power) in Renown, based on Trincomalee.
The progress of the floating dock down the
coast of India and around to Trincomalee
had been of great interest as there were no
docking facilities for the large ships of the
Eastern Fleet in the theatre; cruisers and
above went to South Africa for docking
and major repairs.
The chain of responsibility for the logistic
requirements of all three Services started
with Commander-in-Chief Ceylon and
then, for the Navy, through Flag Officer
3 10
CORRESPONDENCE
Ceylon, Commodore Trincomalee, and
Captain Superintendent Trincomalee
Dockyard. Responsibility
for the
programme of docking was held by
Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet (James
Somerville) in consultation with the Vice
Admiral Eastern Fleet.
The DNC Admiralty was represented in
Ceylon by an Assistant DNC (a Senior
Naval Constructor, name not recollected,
but referred to below as Mr 'X') who was
the adviser to FO Ceylon and Commanderin-Chief Eastern Fleet. He was responsible
for technical advice on the operation of the
floating dock by the Dockmaster (Mr 'Y').
On arrival at Trincomalee the floating
dock was towed through the gate of the
boom and moored, bows on and close up to
the jungle-covered north coast of Sober
Island. This berth was in sight of the
cruisers, and within a few cables of
Renown.
When the dock had been moored, with
the assistance of the Boom Defence Officer,
it was flooded down and a fleet tanker was
docked to give experience to the
Dockmaster and his Asiatic crew. This trial
docking was under the supervision of the
Constructor Officer Mr 'X', or so it was
understood by the Vice Admiral Eastern
Fleet on whom he had not called.
One or two days after the tanker had
been undocked, Valiant was positioned in
the dock, and the pumps to raise the dock
were started at about noon. By sunset it
appeared that the operation had been
completed satisfactorily.
During dinner in the cuddy a signal was
brought to the Admiral. It was from
Valiant (Captain G. E. M. O'Donnell) and
reported 'Docking blocks awash. Further
operations suspended until daylight.'
At the time I was suffering severe prickly
heat and had retired to my cabin
immediately after dinner but was roused
later by the Admiral 'Wake up, Cos! The
dock is breaking up. Take the blue motorboat and keep all boats clear of Valiant's
stern, it looks as if she will plunge out stern
first.'
Ten minutes later the situation,
illuminated by the many searchlights of
ships in the vicinity, was clearer. The
superstructure of the dock had crumpled
like a concertina about abreast Valiant's 'Y'
turret. The stern of
Valiant was
waterborne, the water level about three feet
below the quarterdeck. The bows of Valiant
were in darkness but the bows of the dock
seemed to be above water and a number of
Asians of the dock's crew were yelling and
trying to make their way onto Sober Island.
there was considerable water turbulence
and air escaping in the vicinity of the break.
Valiant had no appreciable list.
A large number of ships' boats were lying
off and were ordered to keep clear.
Admiral Power arrived in his barge and
stepped onto the quarterdeck of Valiant.
He spent half an hour on board and by the
time he returned on deck the water-level
had reached the foot of the ensign staff.
On his return to Renown the Admiral
said that the Dockmaster was trying to
flood the forepart of the dock. Valiant's
hull was undamaged as far as it could be
examined. The electrical power failure had
been mitigated by the emergency lighting.
He was very satisfied with the damagecontrol organisation. There was nothing
more that could be done until daylight and
by that time
Valiant should be fully
waterborne. The angle of pitch had been
recorded as seven degrees, bows up.
The next day Valiant was towed stern
first out of the wreckage of the dock.
Divers reported that her forefoot had stove
in the fore compartments of the dock; the
propellers and rudder (?) had pierced the
after compartments. The propellers had
been damaged.
Eventually, after trials had shown that
the ship could not be handled sufficiently
well to go through the Suez Canal, Valiant
returned to the UK via the Cape.
The Vice Admiral Eastern Fleet
submitted a brief
report
to the
C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f E a s t Indies
expressing surprise that the docking of
Valiant had been left to the Dockmaster
alone and had not been under the
supervision of a Constructor Officer. An
CORRESPONDENCE
Enquiry was held at Colombo but no
officers from Renown were involved and
the Vice Admiral Eastern Fleet was not told
of the outcome.
Many months later when Admiral A. J.
Power was Commander-in-Chief East
India, as his Chief of Staff I was given the
task of presenting the Admiralty verdict to
Mr 'X' at NHQ Colombo. It is believed Mr
'X' returned to the UK within a few days.
The sequence of events as surmised at the
time by- myself
in Renown were:
-
(a) The water in the compartments under
the docking blocks which were to support
Valiant was expelled.
(b) The water in the after compartments,
which were not to be under any load, was
partially expelled. The sighting poles on the
superstructure of the dock would indicate
that there was no longitudinal distortion of
the dock. but the fore and aft draught
marks of ;he dock were not checked. 1f ;he
draught marks had been compared, they
would have shown that the dock was
slightly bows up.
(c) By 18.30 it was dark. The docking
blocks forward could be seen to be awash.
The Dockmaster decided it would be
prudent to suspend further action until
daylight, and possibly to seek advice from
Colombo (he would have to go ashore to
telephone).
(d) Later on the Dockmaster either
changed his mind, or was instructed from
Colombo to proceed with the docking. He
expelled water from the after compartments
of the dock. The bottom of the dock split
laterally and the dock collapsed.
M. W. ST LEGERSEARLE
SUPPORT FOR SEAPOWER
Sir,-I have very much appreciated the
skilful way in which you have made The
Naval Review an authoritative source of
reference on the current debate concerning
government allocation of funds for
defence.
This understandable concern for the
31 1
future of the Navy however lacks an
important strategic element. If the
Falklands conflict taught us one thing it is
surely that the Royal Navy and the other
armed services would have been unablc t o
achieve their objective without the essential
support of ships of the Merchant Navy.
So while the defence debate continues I
think that it should be more widely known
that The Nautical Institute makes a special
point of encouraging a dialogue and cooperation between serving officers in the
Royal and Merchant Navies and would
welcome enquiries concerning membership.
We are also putting out a call for papers
on practical measures to enforce law and
order at sea with a view to holding an
international conference in November
1983. Full details will be provided on
request.
C. J. PARKER
The Secretary,
The Nautical Institute,
202 Lambeth Road,
London SE I 7LQ.
NAVAL CHAPLAINS
Sir,-May I thank those members who so
generously responded to my letter on
'Christian Worship'.
It has occurred to me that with the
continually declining manpower of the
Service, the uneven distribution of the
chaplains amongst the Fleet of mostly small
ships is becoming apparent.
Has any thought been given to
introducing t h e style of n o n denominational chaplain which exists in an
effective manner in the US Navy? It has
many advantages over our rigid system
which is a left-over from a 'large ship' era.
The present system practically eliminates
the representation of the smaller
denominations except in the Training
Establishments.
What was the representation in the
Falklands Task Force I wonder?
A. M. BROWN
Reviews-I:
Naval Periodicals and Others
UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
T IS NOT quite too soon to see in the
of the Proceedings the first
reflection of USN reactions to the
momentous events in the South Atlantic
which have so occupied our thoughts over
the last few months. Several tentative
references (including at least two
substantial misconceptions) crept into the
July 1982 number. But it is with a sense of
sharpened appetite that one can savour the
prospect of the debate to come, which will
almost certainly be lively; and if we run the
risk of that self-confessed American sin of
'over-intellectualizing' the issue, who
knows but that such an approach may come
as a welcome change from more turgid and
prosaic processes elsewhere, a
consummation devoutly to be wished?
What, however, we must hope is that
sufficient useful and authoritative material
will in due course have been made available
to permit informed discussion among the
wide range of contributors to the journal,
from those who address the technical levels
to those who question at the strategic. This
presupposes that somebody on our side has
managed to d o better in putting across the
UK view of the story than Kipling's
archetypal English -
I pages
'For undemocratic reasons, and for motives
not o f state,
They arrive at their conclusions, largely
inarticulate . . .
In the circumstances it was ironic that the
March 1982 number should be devoted to
'International Navies', among them of
course both the Argentinian and the RN.
The piece on the former opened with the
statement that 'the immediate concern for
the Argentinian navy continues to be the
territorial dispute with Chile . . .', for which
the author might be forgiven. Of the cuts in
the RN it was said the reason appeared to
be that 'the analyses made as part of the
'Defence Review' discredited the type of
warfare which the navy's surface ships were
designed to fight', for which nobody can be
forgiven. There is a sympathetic strain, in
editorial evocation of Mahan's reference to
'those far distant, storm-beaten ships' of St
Vincent's, in the treatment of papers on the
'storm-beaten' RN since World War 11, and
similarly on the Royal Marines. Yet it is not
hard to see from the details of ships and
weapons in this number, and from a rather
more specific paper on the ship-borne
missile capabilities of certain narrow-seas
navies ('Strait Shooting', June 1982) how
easy it can be for third world nations,
armed with a grievance and sufficient
political conviction, to conclude that they
can afford the risk of taking on distant,
apparently declining and disinterested,
western democracies, let alone each other.
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
Brunei between them dispose of over 100
Exocet or Gabriel missiles afloat.) There
was a certain cool and classically Gallic
timeliness about the appearance, all
amongst the 'International Navies', of a
paper by a French officer called 'Some
Hope Against Incoming Missiles', which
described in compelling detail the Dagaie
system, ordered for the French navy, of
electro-magnetic and infra-red decoy
dispensers.
The mixture as before - Nukes and all that
A recurrent theme, but a particularly
challenging one at present going strong, is
that of nuclear war at sea. The Proceedings
goes round this buoy - don't we all? - but
two contributions in the last few months
have served to focus attention on areas
which have not been so directly addressed
before. In 'The Role of the US Surface
Navy in Nuclear War' (January 1982) the
authors discuss the graphic contradiction in
the current 'nuclear condition' of the US
surface fleet, between on one hand the
capital investment in nuclear weapons, and
REVIEWS - 1
on the other the absence of doctrine,
tactics, or strategy for their use; what is
more, 'there is almost no effort devoted
either to understanding Soviet nuclear war
intentions or strategy . . .'. There follows a
discussion of options ranging from
wholesale adoption of the nuclear
warfighting dimension, via splitting the
fleet in various ways between nuclearcapable teams and those confined to
conventional war (for example carriers,
unlikely to survive, stay conventional;
destroyers and submarines go nuclear), to a
surface navy explicitly and exclusively
armed with conventional weapons. The
latter has some good 'deterrent' arguments
in its favour. In coming to no clear
conclusion - except that it is not just a
naval problem - the paper begs that spark
of a response, which it has so far largely
failed to achieve. A supporting letter (May
1982) drives home the fallaciousness of
widely held assumptions about the
unlikeliness of nuclear war at sea, pointing
out the significant shift of advantage
towards the Soviets if it happens, the
illogicality of the view that in that event it
must transfer ashore, and the shortsightedness of viewing nuclear war as too
terrible ever to contemplate, when the
Soviets do so in detail and all the time.
The Tomahawk dimension
A newly challenging aspect of the same
debate is illuminated in the 1982 Prize Essay
'Tomahawk: The Implications of a
Strategic/Tactical
Mix' (April 1982).
Starting from the quandary of verification
in the context of 'SALT/START And All
That', the paper sharply points up the
problem of the 'grey area' weapon like
Tomahawk, with its multifarious
possibilities as either a conventional or
nuclear weapon - and who can tell? launched from surface ships or submarines,
or in due course from aircraft. When is a
nuclear threat not a nuclear threat? There is
food for much thought in the author's view
that Tomahawk 'pushes us where we may
not want to go'; and the steps he
recommends, like those options for the US
313
surface fleet in the earlier paper, essentially
involve creating a distinction between the
nuclear and conventional purposes,
recognisable by an enemy. The nuclear
land-attack version should go only to ships
having a mission of deterrence of nuclear
war, like SSBNs; the conventional variants,
anti-shipping as well as land-attack, should
be deployed in large numbers in attack
submarines, and in the surface fleet
including of course the battleships (detailed
proposals for which are a new growth
industry among contributors to the
Proceedings). The ideas in these two papers
are novel, and prompt the reflection that
there seems to be some dearth of original
thinking in the RN on this compelling topic.
Cloud nine
At an even loftier level, the continuing
strategic debate was given a new twist in
January 1982 by a Doctor of Political
Science who, quoting successive USN
defeats in past battles over resources (a not
unfamiliar theme), asked 'Should Naval
Officers Be Strategists?'. He didn't say yes,
and he didn't say no, although he suggests
an answer by quoting some expert who
wrote 'the choice among weapon projects is
the choice among defence strategies'; but he
painted a gloomy picture of intellectual
take-over bidding by the unofficial
generation of a 'Corps of Naval Strategists'
operating among the think-tanks and the
'beltway bandits' round Washington. There
was, of course, somebody waiting to spring
to the latter's defence, specifically arguing
the potential value of the newly reorganised
Centre for Naval Warfare Studies, sited at
the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode
Island, with direct links to the college's wargaming facilities (access to which might
indeed be of significant use to NATO
nations and commanders). Nevertheless, in
straining to keep up with the constant and
very American serve-and-volley exchanges
about large aircraft-carriers, one is tempted
to agree that only some guru from the
beltway is ever likely to resolve the
differences in fundamental strategic baselines between what Admiral Zumwalt
314
REVIEIWS-I
characterised as the US Navy's three
separate unions - aviators, submariners,
and surface sailors. 'Sitting Ducks' (June
1982) by the outgoing CNO, Admiral
Hayward, and 'CVNs for Ever! For Ever?'
(July 1982) by a retired carrier captain are
poles apart; and that tells a story . . .
Another strong claim for the uniformed
strategist is represented by one of the regular
injections of thoughtful correspondence on
'Thinking Offensively' (February 1982),
nicely pointed up by a quote from the CNO
himself in an advertisement for Aegis: '1 am
tired of talking about what the threat is. Let
us be the threat. I want to read about how
Admiral Gorchkov stays awake nights
worrying about our threat to his navy . . . .'
The Caribbean connection
But two powerful papers from senior
serving officers are perhaps the best answers
to' the original question. One such, by a
USMC Brigadier, appeared under the
somewhat , misleading title of 'Cuba:
Moscow's Marionette' (July 1982). Sadly its
conclusions drift away on a raft of standard
nondescript rhetoric; but before that it
derives some provocative ideas from the
view that Soviet sea power is required for the
three purposes of supporting conquest of
non-communist nations, of enforcing
compliance with Moscow's will among its
satellites, and of interdicting interference by
other major powers. The latter typically
experience political
difficulties in
distinguishing exactly where their vital
national interests lie with respect to newly
independent states; and are ill-attuned to the
frustrating business of waging a protracted
struggle against communist expansion. Such
thoughts surely precisely reflect the heart of
a dilemma in the Western democracies,
incomprehension of which threatens to
engulf maritime strategies. Whitehall, art
thou sleeping..aere below? But of greater
concern is the particular choice which in the
author's view will in due course confront the
US. As Soviet sponsorship of such nations
as Vietnam, South Korea, Libya, and Cuba,
the possibilities of favourable advance in
Latin America, and their own increasing
naval power impose growing pressure on
Washington's strategies, the US will be
forced to choose between a defensive stance
in Western Europe and beyond, and PanAmerica. Here is a sombre message indeed
for Europeans.
Of rather wider scope is a paper by
Admiral Sir James Eberle ('Strategic Choice
and Maritime Capabilities', April 1982)
which argues the thesis that the world
balance of military power is in real terms
swinging in favour of the Warsaw Pact; that
there is therefore a need to seek a definition
of balance in terms of equivalence of effect,
rather than sheer comparative numbers; and
that at the conventional level a mobile
strategy could by increasing both the
military and political utility of our forces
raise their deterrent value and thus the
nuclear threshold. It will be interesting to
see whether this clear and powerful message
strikes a more responsive chord on the other
side of the Atlantic than have similar
arguments on this.
This is where we came in
In developing his theme Admiral Eberle
takes a hefty swipe at a number of cows
recently classified as more or less sacred, like
Maginot-type barrier concepts, the fruitless
short war/long war controversy, and the
relevance of convoys. And he is remarkably
prescient in reminding us that 'we have no
recent experience of war . . . and we should
be particularly careful before we discard
previous hard learned lessons of war such as
the risk of operating surface ships in a
hostile air environment, (and) the threat
presented by conventionally powered
submarines, particularly in shallow water
. . .' Which of course brings us back to
where we started. Yet while we can look
forward with relish to what the Proceedings
will make of the many lessons to be learned
from the Falklands campaign, we need
perhaps to look in particular for reflections
of their primordial relevance to Admiral
Eberle's basic theme, and consider the
urgency of building on them a maritime
strategy which cannot be stigmatised by
Professor Erikson as 'the spurts of western
REVIE WS-I
anger and bouts of moral outrage which
pass for policy'.
P.M.S.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
(issues to April 1982)
Hindsight is a fascinating attribute, and it is
interesting how relevance to recent
significant events in the South Atlantic can
be found in what might seem to be the most
unrelated topic or article. Perhaps this is
evidence that principles d o not change and
that we have learnt little from history;
perhaps it is no more than an association of
ideas which can occur in almost any area of
interest.
A glance through recent editions of the
Naval War College Review will provide
several examples of articles which seemed to
have no special significance six months ago
but are now suddenly taking on a new
dimension. There is, for example, a very
readable and well-argued piece in the
January/February 1982 edition, 'A Carrier
for Gorshkov'. The following are quotes
from the article: 'Four KIEVs will not
guarantee Soviet air power at sea - they
lack adequate fighters, early warning and
electronic warfare aircraft.' There is
something there which suddenly takes on a
very real meaning for the RN. Another
article in the same edition, 'Protecting the
Carrier', is of considerable interest to the
maritime tactician, and highlights the
enormous effort needed to defend the
aircraft carrier (I submit you can defend you cannot protect) from the all-pervasive
submarine threat and the tactical
constraints the mere threat imposes.
Although in the event they achieved no
material success the existence of
Argentinian submarines undoubtedly
imposed very considerable constraints on
Admiral Woodward's movements, tactics,
and deployment in the Task Force. Many
people in messes and bars have been heard
to say of the South Atlantic campaign, 'If
only we had the Ark Royal . . .'. I cannot
help wondering how many Argentinian
Naval officers said, 'If only we had a few
SSNs . . .', and I wonder what the results
315
would have been if either or both sides had
fairy godmothers who granted those wishes!
In the March/April 1982 edition there is a
splendid article outlining the history of
British Combined Operations 1940-1.
After the great successes - not without
setbacks - in the Falkland Islands it is
interesting to look at how badly some of
our early operations went in World War I1
and how much we learned and sometimes
failed to learn about modern amphibious
warfare. The article describes how out of
the experience of Gallipoli operations, the
Iceland invasion, and even Dunkirk, a
typically Churchillian directive arose 'We
should immediately set to work to organise
raiding forces on those coasts where the
population is friendly . . .'. As in the recent
operations, the influence of the Prime
Minister of the day was clearly all pervasive
in those early years of World War 11.
Churchill took a great personal interest in
combined operations and having read of
the near disasters that occurred in those
early years I can see how irritated and
frustrated he must have become at times.
The article describes a whole range of raids,
some quite incredible, from the fiasco in the
Channel Islands to the successful Lofoten
raid; Dakar and others in the
Mediterranean which have been very
sparsely documented in widely available
books in the past get good coverage. It is
fair to say that many of the landings were
ill-conceived and poorly executed,
culminating in the near disaster at Dieppe.
As the article points out, the most
important military lesson to be learned
from commando raids in 1940 and 1941 was
how not to invade enemy-occupied Europe!
At least the lessons from these events,
which led to the replacement of Admiral Sir
Roger Keyes by Lord Louis Mountbatten as
DCO, were well taken and have not, after
all it seems, been forgotten.
In the light of the tremendous and highly
successful logistic effort in the Falklands
campaign a quote from Malcolm
Muggeridge (Affairs of the Heart) which
is mentioned in the March/April 1982
review, might amuse readers. Entitled
'Remarks on Operations and Logistics' it
reads
I have always been deeply interested in the
administrative side of love, which I find more
absorbing than its purely erotic aspects. What
Lady Chatterley and her gamekeeper did in the
woods is, to me, of only passing interest,
compared with how they got there, what
arrangements were made for shelter in the case of
inclement weather, and for refreshments, how
they accounted for their absence, whether either
party could recover incidental expenses, and if so
how. This attitude is, after all, not so
unreasonable. Most great generals have admitted
that planning campaigns and winning victories in
the field is relatively easy compared with
arranging transport and supplies. An army,
Napoleon said, in one of his most celebrated
remarks, marches on its stomach. So do lovers.
If the administrative arrangements are faulty, the
campaign which follows cannot but be laborious,
and even victory brings little satisfaction.
The Naval War College Review continues
to provide a nice mix of articles for those
concerned with maritime affairs, and the
list of professional reading contained in
each edition is, in itself, of considerable
value to the student of these matters.
Inevitably some articles are on very
parochial USN matters, some - indeed
most - are of real concern to her allies,
others are very broad, covering strategy,
nuclear, and tactical concepts. There is the
occasional 'Gung Ho' piece; one such piece
'Tarnished Brass' (by a Captain USCG) is
most entertaining 'we are over managed
and under led . . .' which raises again the
old chestnut of leadership versus
management and how each fits in to naval
needs. I tend to the view that I know a good
leader when I see one and that leadership is
a corporate quality!
Any naval reader will be able to find a
well-presented article of interest in each
edition of this excellent magazine. That is
not to say it is without flaws, and one rather
too often tends to get a feeling of dejd vu
and a slight smugness which comes from the
pen of the armchair strategist after the long
years of peace. However, even this criticism
may be a little unfair since such articles
nonetheless stimulate thinking and debate,
which is to our advantage.
R.H.N.
MARITIME STRATEGY
A seminar organised by the Nautical
Institute, Navy International and the Royal
United Services Institute, October 1981
The stated purpose of the Seminar was to
'provide up-to-date material for general
debate concerning the importance of
maritime power in relation to world
stability'. It was of course set up well before
the appearance of the White Paper 'The
United Kingdom Defence Programme: the
Way Forward" but took place after that
event, inevitably in its shadow.
In the circumstances it cannot have been
easy to defocus from the problems of the
British maritime scene and take a broad
view. Yet the principal speakers seem in
general to have done this admirably, in spite
of the Royal Naval origins of most of them.
This is not to say that the seminar's
structure was particularly finely integrated:
as is often the case with such affairs,
participants chose different points of
departure. It was a suite not a symphony.
But the mood remained throughout one of
civilised inquiry and discussion, not of
narrow recrimination.
The opening address of Admiral Sir
James Eberle was wide-ranging and
expressed in terms that will be familiar to
readers of the Naval Review. His emphasis
was on mobility, on the need for NATO
nations (though not the NATO alliance as
such) to meet an increasingly global
challenge, and on the vulnerability of the
merchant ships that are of such key
importance to the maritime aspects of
strategy. From these strategic precepts he
moved to some of the new challenges with
which modern weapon systems confront the
maritime strategist - and then returned to
some of the oldest lessons of all: '. . . the
importance of the traditional qualities of
the successful commander in battle initiative, boldness, ingenuity and that
unquenchable spirit that prevails to have
just one more go . . .'. Prophetic stuff.
He was followed by a Gallic interlude
from Contre-Amiral
Sevaistre, a
distinguished French naval thinker and
'Cmnd 8288.
editor of the Revue de Defense Nationale.
He began with an essay in geopolitics, not a
familiar discipline to most Englishmen
perhaps because they have practised it
without being aware of it. It shifted,
however, to the more familiar ground of
what we have come to call the Economic
Flank, and here there was some splendid
stuff: '. . . No zones in the ocean can be
considered to be the same as the national
territory . . . at sea there can only be
"interests". These interests are multiple
and cross-cutting, and some may be vital to
a nation if its population cannot live
without them.' Oh yes. After some rather
conventional discussion of limited naval
force, Admiral Sevaistre concluded with
some ideas about nuclear weapons at sea
that owed a lot to Ailleret and Beaufre, and
consequently were quite stimulating to a
British eye.
Next came Sir Ronald Swayne, Chairman
of Overseas Containers, speaking on 'Trade
by Sea: International Pressures and
Problems'. From such a source this was
bound to be a superbly documented,
rationally a r g u e d , a n d trenchant
contribution, and it was. I am reminded of
a Chairman of P & 0 , long ago, shaking
Sub-Lieutenants at Greenwich with the
opening statement: 'Any fool can run a
ship: it takes a man to run a ship at a
profit.' Sir Ronald is far too urbane for
such hyperbole, but he is just as tough, and
his description of the competition and
constraints that are building up against
Western shipping pulled no punches. One
may dispute some of his contentions - I
am not, myself, comvinced by his
arguments in favour of 'good' flags of
convenience - but one had better have
good reasons for doing so. It is not easy to
sum up Sir Ronald's address, which in
many ways was the centre-piece of the
Seminar: what came out of it, for me, was
the sense of a very worthy and important
industry in great need of help (and market
forces will not be enough) and confidence
(and empty words will not be enough).
There followed a detailed and interesting
talk by Air Vice Marshal Chesworth
outlining maritime air operations in the
north-east Atlantic in peace, tension, and
war. There are three illuminating
illustrations showing the thickening-up of
sorties that might be expected as tension
mounts. The account was factual,
structured, and entirely NATO-orientated.
One could scarcely have a better illustration
of the difference in outlook between the
rather freewheeling, broad-view naval
approach and the precise procedures of the
current application of air power. I d o not
mean by this that one is better than the
other. We had better learn to recognise our
differences and work together with due
allowance for them, that is all.
Finally among the speakers, Rear
Admiral Gueritz - clearly running out of
time - made some points that needed more
emphasis: the care of merchant ships;
international maritime co-operation in less
structured ways than NATO's; the need to
maintain maximum freedom of action; and
hence the need for numbers, if necessary
improvising to provide them. He ended
with a broader theme: 'a co-ordinated
approach to national security, including
such things as the BBC overseas
service. . .'. One wishes he had had time to
develop this.
The concluding remarks by Admiral of
the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton were written
during the seminar itself and they spring off
the page: one can hear him speaking. They
are, therefore, vigorous and full of hard
sense. He touched first on the difference
between the defence/offence equations on
land (1:3) and at sea (3:l and more). Her
Majesty's Government, he said, don't
understand it. He then made the crucial
point that
. . . if anybody here believes today that there is
some discrete thing called maritime strategy, you
are living in a dream world - there is not - nor
do I believe there is a sensible choice facing this
country . . . between a maritime and a land/air
strategy. I think that one of the blunders which
our government has made in the recent Defence
Review is to suppose that there is a choice to be
made, and indeed they have made it, and made it
wrong.
318
REVIEWS - I
This theme was developed with the idea
that deterrence was largely a matter of
having sufficient strategic choices to
convince the opposition that it had no way
through: as Lord Hill-Norton concluded,
'the indivisibility of strategy and the
indivisibility of deterrence'.
But just to the eastward of the RUSI, no
doubt, no one listened much; they were too
busy doing their accountants' sums. And in
Buenos Aires, the planners were just getting
down to work.
Reviews-11:
MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE
NUCLEAR AGE
by GEOFFREY
T I L Land others
(Macmillan-£20)
SAILOR -SCHOLAR
Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871 -1946
by BARRYD. HUNT
(Wilfrid Laurier University Press)
These books are related: the author of the
second is a contributor to the first, and his
subject, our founder, looms large in it. It is
inconceivable that members will not wish to
read both: each has much to offer and they
are best read in quick succession. In this
case, the last shall be first.
Hunt's is a compact and readable book.
It has no illustrations, says little about
Richmond's private life and is not a
biography in the fuller sense of the word.
But as a study of a career it is very good. It
gives the impression of having been written
some time before it was published: there
are, for example, no references where they
might reasonably be expected to Roskill's
full life of Beatty, or to the Navy Records
Society's three volumes of Keyes's papers.
No matter: the development of Richmond's
personality and career is well drawn, and set
in a generally well sketched context,
although not everyone would agree that the
General Strike was 'anti-climactic' or gave
way t o 'a new mood of reconciliation which
made it increasingly difficult to distinguish
the dividing lines between Conservative and
Labour policy'. And English readers may
blink slightly at phrases such as 'personality
dynamics' and 'semi-schizoidal pulls in his
personality'.
RICHARD
HILL
Books
As Hunt says in Till's book, Richmond
demonstrated a total commitment to
reform throughout his career. 'Through the
combination of an outstanding intellect, an
uncompromising personality and a deep
grasp of naval realities, he challenged the
cliches that passed for thought among his
naval contemporaries.'
They, alas,
experienced discomfort in working at a
purely theoretical level, which was hard on
them and bad for the service and for the
country. Yet Richmond's influence on them
was 'limited significantly by defects in his
personality - he was arrogant towards his
superiors, impatient with less gifted men
and was driven by a sense of scholarly
integrity which often made him seem rigid.'
The controversy which in effect ended
Richmond's first career was typical of the
conflicts within the man: his intervention in
the smaller ship controversy was 'an act of
conscience' made necessary by his
passionate belief that the First Sea Lord was
failing to protect the interests of the Navy
and of the country, a belief which rested on
his perception of the need for clearer
thinking about strategic needs. Material
views dominated strategic thinking. It was
all wrong. But the legacy of Jutland
prevailed: his was the only audible voice
raised against a traditional building
programme and as Roskill says 'very
unpopular he made himself with the naval
hierarchy'.
Hence, despite his early promotion to
Captain, his chances while at the
Admiralty, and his appointments as
Admiral President at Greenwich and as the
first Commandant of the IDC, there
followed the premature termination of a
potentially great career, the failure to
exercise a major command-in-chief, and
that early retirement, so sagaciously seized
upon by the University of Cambridge. It is a
pleasure to recognise that there, in a second
career, 'the less appealing feature of his
ambitions as an Admiral gave way to the
wisdom, kindliness and personal warmth
his friends had always known'. Hunt does
not make the point that Richmond's wife's
brother-in-law, Sir Charles Trevelyan, was
not only a member of the Cabinet at the
time of Richmond's retirement, but was
also brother of G. M. Trevelyan, which
may well have paved Richmond's way at
Cambridge.
As a historian, Richmond made himself a
career of which any academic might be
proud, and though it owed something to his
professional naval expertise, it was
independent of it. The major books and the
lesser, successful but more ephemeral,
works, would all have come from his pen
whether he had had a distinguished naval
career or not: it is interesting to
contemplate only how far that helped. His
aim, he said, as a naval historian was 'to
indicate the policy, the causes affecting the
strategy and the influences governing the
tactics employed by the commanders and to
bring out the many circumstances of
weather, of supplies, of health and material
which played so large a part in campaigns'.
He saw the need to ask the right questions.
This is evidenced by his views on Sinmpore:
in 1924 he was asking Haldane to 'ask €hem
what they intend to d o once they get to
Singapore', for 'to spend millions on
Singapore and take no precautions for
securing it if war breaks out is pure
madness'.
Richmond's role in the creation of our
Naval Society - how easy it is for us to
forget that he had more in mind than the
quarterly publication of this journal - is
one of the most interesting aspects of this
book, and is well recounted. This reviewer
must record his astonishment at being
named four times in the text (if only thrice
in the index) as the custodian of some
relevant papers. It is true that he holds
some, which were made available to the
author of a historical note on our
foundation, published in our fiftieth
anniversary edition, but he has no
recollection of even having been consulted
about their existence, their content, or their
value by the author who might, perhaps,
have verified the reference before making
it.
The saddest thing about Richmond was
that while he appreciated the need t o walk
gently, like Agay, he could not d o so and
his consequential successes and failures
have been very fairly assessed and presented
in this study.
Professor Hunt has six pages on
Richmond in Dr Till's larger work, which is
of ingenious construction:
seven
contemporary experts have contributed
sections of various length, one in turn
acknowledging his obligation to seventeen
others. The result is a very rich mix and a
most valuable contribution to the literature.
Again, there is a sense of delay in its
appearance, and the preface is dated July
1980. The author has been ill-served by his
typesetters and his copy-editor, and the last
eight pages of the bibliography leave much
to be desired in consistency. But the
references are well displayed, and the text is
invaluable to anyone and everyone
interested in what our society and the
existence of this journal are all about.
The author aims to refine contemporary
naval doctrine, asking how different the
naval present is to the naval past, and
testing Neville Brown's view that too much
current writing is derived from 'the axioms
of yesterday', by defining them and
applying them to the current scene. The
book is disarmingly said to be 'an aid to
thought, not a purveyor of illusory
conclusions about the universal truths of
maritime strategy. But since the right
answers to particular problems at particular
times depend upon the right questions being
asked in the first place, this limited objective
seems necessary and worthwhile.' This
approach is unimpeachable: so is the initial
320
I
I
1
'
REVIE
doubt that there may be 'too many
variables in the equation for the universal
verities to rise above the level of platitude',
a sentence typical of the best in the book
which as a whole reveals much research,
distillation of thought, and analysis. Others
that stay in the mind are, for example,
'Command of the sea is about the use of the
sea, not its posssession'; 'strategy derives its
meaning in the relation of the use of force
to national goals'; 'strategic contemplation
has various purposes. It may help explain
past experience; it may help prepare for the
future. Either way, with half-digested
thought and woolly labels it (does) more
harm than good'; 'the shortage of food in
Germany, so often ascribed to the activities
of the Royal Navy, was due as much to the
neglect of agriculture caused by the flow of
men to the trenches'; and 'trade protection
seems almost as dangerous and difficult a
business to write about in peacetime as it is
to carry out in war'. Each of these
memorable remarks distinguishes the
section of the book from which it is quoted.
The introduction and comprehensive
review of the literature occupy the first
third of the b o o t . A new light is cast upon
Mahan (did any of us know that he called
his dog Jomini after the great Swiss
strategist?), who is seen as 'not so much the
prophet of seapower as a weathervane for a
philosophical outlook whose time had
come'. The third chapter is a short but
useful analysis of the sources and elements
of seapower 'which warns us of the dangers
and difficulties of trying to study the
abstract principles of maritime strategy in
isolation from the real world'. There follow
two related chapters, on the concept of the
decisive battle throughout naval history and
on alternative routes to the final goal,
command of the sea, either by the fleet-inbeing or by blockade: the author then
turns, for his last hundred pages, to a
consideration of the exercise of that
command, however attained. He examines
the new environment for navies, with
particular reference to the legal background
and the new technology; considers both old
and new tasks for new navies, and starts his
last chapter by asking 'how well ancient
theory
suits modern
practice.
Unfortunately, this must rely for breadth
on a naval review of 1979 and for depth on
a brief survey of the naval aspects of the
Arab-Israeli war of 1973.' The author
claims that these support three tentative
conclusions - that they confirm rather
than deny traditional ideas about the
importance of the sea to the security and
prosperity of most countries, that neither
seapower nor the ability to command the
sea are absolute, but merely relative
questions of degree, and that 'worthwhile
parallels can still be drawn between past
and present maritime experience'. A study
of past doctrines is still valuable 'not so
much for the answers they supply . . . but
because they help to identify the questions
that need asking'. Richmond would be glad
to know that this mentality is his monument
at Greenwich.
Apart from the name of Mahan's dog, it
is interesting to see the first recorded use of
the phrase 'a fleet-in-being', attributed to
Torrington in 1690, and to find that the old
cry, 'the speed of the convoy is the speed of
the slowest ship', is fallacious, and has been
known to be so since 1794 when it was laid
down that while 'the degree of progress
which the whole fleet will make will be
regulated by that of the worst-going ships',
these 'however are to be abandoned when
found to cause too great a loss of time, for
sometimes it is better to risk a small loss
than to expose the whole by delay'.
Inevitably the book will read against the
Falklands campaign. An early page in the
introduction asserts that 'in the
contemporary scene the historical utility of
seapower in the gaining and keeping of
colonies would seem to be a wasted asset'.
One can see this being set, followed by that
cryptic rubric 'Discuss', in Staff College
examinations before long.
The finding that 'the role of the sea in the
defeat of land operations was as clearly
demonstrated in this campaign as was its
value in their support' is as true of the
Falklands campaign as it is of that of which
it was written - the Peloponnesian war.
REVIEWS - I1
321
Colomb's arguments that smooth-water Army officer have joined the General's
anchorages would meet naval needs more staff. Thanks to them the book includes a
than was after assumed, and that 'the fascinating account of Soviet policy-making
mounting of attacks on hostile shores was and of Soviet forces in action, including a
so hazardous that it was essential for the description of the role of the KGB in war invaders to secure command of the sea an aspect of the Soviet military machine
which must be new t o many British readers.
first', are born out.
The plot of this serious yet immensely
Some readers may finish the book with a
feeling of faint disappointment, a suspicion readable novel is well constructed. The
that they had been better prepared by the history of the war described in The Third
analyses in its first part than they were
World War is here enlarged by making use
served by their later application. But this of the vast amount of new material which
will not be the opinion of all, and it is more became available during the six months
likely that there will be more agreement following its
This material
about the value of the book as that aid to includes declassified NATO intelligence
thought which was its author's aim. Less and debriefing reports, personal accounts
than might be expected from the title is said of the fighting from participants on both
about the nuclear age: the basic lesson is sides, and remarkable evidence from
cited 'that when faced with the decision to defectors and others of Soviet fighting
start a nuclear war, almost any other methods and techniques. Other material
alternative looked better, and it is too risky previously unavailable has been drawn
to serve as the foundation for a preferred upon to cover contemporary events in
Central America, the Middle and Far East,
strategy'.
A. B. SAINSBURYthe transformation of Ireland from neutral
to combatant, and the involvement of
THE THIRD WORLD WAR
Sweden on the side of the Allies. As a result
The Untold Story
The Untold Story is a much longer book
by GENERAL
SIRJOHNHACKETT
than its parent. Once again the text is
accompanied by an extensive and varied
(Sidgwick & Jackson-£9.95)
General Sir John Hackett and his collection of action photographs of the
imaginative team have done it again. weapons and equipment of both sides, and
Encouraged by the phenomenal success of at its comparatively modest price, which no
The Third World War (three million copies doubt reflects the commercial success of its
sold in ten languages since its publication in parent, The Untold Story is indeed excellent
1978) Sir John has now produced what the value.
The method so successfully employed in
dust jacket describes as an even more
authoritative and vivid picture of what a the first book of mixing facts and
Third World War could be like. This comments on world events, strategy, and
description is fully justified. Indeed so combat methods with fictional accounts of
plausible are the accounts of the origins of the actual fighting is once again repeated
the war between the West and the Soviet with equal effect, although the sequence of
Union which broke out in August 1985, and chapters is somewhat confusing. Indeed, to
so realistic the descriptions of the fighting reap the full benefit of the book it is
and of the performance of weapons that the necessary to refresh the memory by
reader has constantly to remind himself that glancing again at the campaign narratives in
he is reading a work of fiction and not one The Third World War.
of historical fact. The reclassification of the
In the more detailed accounts of the
editorial team as collaborators rather than fighting which are now available the land
as co-authors in no way diminishes the campaign on the Central Front in Europe is
quality of the work, especially as a well- given the largest coverage, as it was in the
known Soviet dissident and a former Red first book. This is not surprising when the
322
REVIE
Editor and architect of the whole project is
a former Commander-in-Chief of Britain's
Rhine Army with decided views on how
such a campaign might be fought. Our
former editor contributes an excellent
chapter on 'The War at Sea' which will give
Naval Review readers much cause for
thought and which in the light of naval
events during the summer of 1982 includes a
prophetic comment that in reflecting upon
the outcome of the fighting at sea, it can be
said that the greatest Allied shortcoming
was the lack of sufficient anti-missile
missiles, as well as countermeasures to the
various types of guidance and homing used
in the missiles of the enemy.
Sir John Hackett is our foremost military
intellectual. Well-known not only for his
writings but also through his frequent
appearances on television his views
command attention and respect. But does
not the publication of these novels by such
an authoritative author and their
distribution throughout the countries of the
Western Alliance create a danger and a risk
that they may be taken too seriously?
The source of the danger lies in the
substantial slice of wishful thinking on
which the plots of the books are based. The
outcome of the war so imaginatively
described is not only total victory for the
NATO Alliance but also the collapse of the
Soviet Empire and the favourable (for the
West) conclusion of almost every political
problem now confronting the Western
world. Would it really all turn out so well
and be concluded so quickly?
The risk is that the reputation of the chief
editor and his professional standing as a
military man may cause these works of
fiction to be read in the defence ministries
of the NATO countries (especially in
Whitehall) not as a holiday diversion but as
providing justification for current strategic
doctrines and defence planning, as Liddell
Hart or Clausewitz rather than as H . G.
Wells or Erskine Childers.
But this is not to belittle a remarkable
literary achievement. A quotation from the
Foreword will fittingly conclude this review
and explain Sir John's objective.
We had at the same time to avoid a nuclear war if
we possibly could. We could best do so by being
fully prepared for a conventional one. We were
not willing, in the seventies and early eighties, to
meet the full cost of building up an adequate
level of non-nuclear defence and cut it fine. In
the event we just got by. Some would say this was
more by good luck than good management, that
we did too little too late and hardly deserved to
survive at all. Those who say this could well be
right.
M. G. C.
TIDE OF EMPIRES
Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise
of the West
Vol. 11. 1654-1763
by PETERPADFIELD
(Routledge & Kegan Paul-f 12.50)
Peter Padfield seems to improve with every
book. In this latest, second, volume of his
series Tide of Empires, he has produced a
fascinating account of sea warfare and its
impact on affairs which starts in 1654 with
the Second Dutch War and ends in 1763
with the capture of Quebec and then the
battle of Qiberon Bay.
At the beginning of the book, Britain's
chief enemy was Holland and the Dutch
Empire, a well-organised foe, backed by
strong financial and commercial resources.
The Royal Navy however had little support
from an impoverished Exchequer and a
primitive economy. T o quote from an early
page The history of the West, hence of the modern
world, has been written by the sea powers; it was
their market acquisitive system that encircled and
dominated the globe, opening up new lands for
new cash crops and commodities, sinking mines,
building foundries and mills and stimulating
technological change; it was their wealth and art
which inspired admiration and envy admiration led to copying, envy to attack, and it
was in countering attack that the sea powers
manipulated the territorial balance itself ... The
system persists. If the model conforms to reality,
the sea powers of today control the future.
The book is worth reading for one
feature alone - the explanation of the
drive for wealth which dominated the
motives of the powers. Wealth could be
REVIE
gained by trade and by a well-managed
economy or by conquest, and the book
shows how trade was the better and more
certain way of gaining the goal. During the
hundred or so years covered in the book,
Britain progressed from an ill-organised
economy to a sound system, backed by
banks, commercial institutions, and a
flourishing trade. Conquest played its part
in the spread of the British Empire, the
dominating factor of which was, of course,
sea power.
The author is a keen exponent of free
enterprise and pours scorn on the planned
economy fashioned by Colbert in France.
He shows that the methods of the Dutch
and then the English, which were
encouraged rather than directed by the
Government, were best.
To one whose memories of the period
under review are dominated by Professor
Callender's Sea Kings of Britain, the book
opens new vistas. It becomes easier to
understand those confusing a n d
interminable wars with the Dutch, wars
which were followed quickly by a Dutch
alliance against France. It is also made clear
that there were other battles and other wars
in which the British did not take part, which
I found most interesting.
The story of the Dutch descent on the
Medway is well told and it is clear why it
happened. The sailors and soldiers had
been treated abominably - 'The cause of
our defeat is not paying our husbands'
wrote a naval wife at the time.
The genius of the Dutch statesmen and
admirals is brought out: they had the de
Witts, Ruyter, and Tromp, there were few
names to remember on the British side. The
sea battles are well described and well
illustrated - the author is a seaman who
understands the difficulties of controlling a
vast fleet of clumsy sailing ships in the face
of weather and tide. Casualties were very
high, though the tradition of fighting the
ship to the last man had not emerged.
In the Third Dutch War, the French were
uneasy allies, and confidence was lacking.
Battles were followed by recrimination and
the transition from ally to enemy was an
easy one when William of Orange arrived
on the scene. There is a good chapter on the
efforts of Colbert to organise the French
economy and to set up a French Navy ready
to fight Britain at the end of the century.
The new British admirals, men like Russell,
Torrington, Shovell, and Leake, were not
in the same class as their successors but
their activities are clearly and fairly
depicted.
As to wider matters, the importance of
the American Colonies is explained and the
spread to the Caribbean, India, and the Far
East is shown in its economic context.
The book is well written and illustrated. I
would have liked more dates, as I found it
difficult, when 'dipping into it', to discover
which year I was reading about. It is
strongly recommended to members. I end
with a delightful quotation from the report
of an infantry officer after the campaign in
Martinique in 1762 You may fancy you know the spirit of these
fellows; but to see them in action exceeds any
idea that can be formed of them. A hundred of
them with ropes and pulleys will do more than all
your dray horses in London. Let but their tackle
hold, and they will draw you a cannon or a
mortar on its proper carriage to any height . . .
We had a thousand of these brave fellows sent
to our assistance by the Admiral, and the service
they did us both on shore and on the water is
incredible . . .
One knows that the same spirit motivates
our sailors today.
PETERGRETTON
THE THIRD WORLD IN SOVIET
MILITARY THOUGHT
by MARKN. KATZ
(Croom Helm-f 10.95)
This book has the strengths and the
weaknesses of the written-up Ph.D. thesis it
resembles. It tackles a particularly abstruse
subject, namely the evolution of military
thinking in post-war Russia about a number
of interconnected issues relating to the
Soviet Union and the Third World. It is not
an analysis of Soviet military or political
policy towards the Third World. Certain
points about Soviet objectives and methods
and about their likely threat to the West d o
emerge, but these are incidental to the main
thrust of the text. The book is certainly not
an easy read, being careful to the point of
pedantry, repetitive, and chock-full with
close and frankly rather wearying analysis of
subtle and intricate Soviet discussions which
are not in any case remarkable for their
clarity, felicity of expression, or general
appeal. In short, neither the original Soviet
texts, nor this analysis of them are the sort of
thing one has to struggle to put down.
Nevertheless, the findings of this
meticulous piece of research are interesting
and their implications are important for the
West. Professor Katz shows quite
persuasively that significant evolutions in
Soviet military doctrine follow rather than
precede successful politico-military actions
in the Third World. If circumstances force
them to try something (like invading
Afghanistan) and it works, then Soviet
military writers will tinker with existing
doctrine so that it authorises such actions.
For this reason, says Professor Katz with
disarming candour, it is dangerous to try to
predict what the Russians will d o from what
their doctrine says. In his view, military
doctrine often rationalises performance
rather than explains it. Since so many
Western analyses of Soviet military thought
depend heavily on doctrinal analysis, it is a
pity that Professor Katz does not explore
this issue further.
The author identifies six main themes in
his subject. Firstly, he shows that over the
past generation o r so, Soviet military
thought has become less obviously
ideological in its attitudes to the Third
World. This development has largely been
the result of a growing divergence between
the world as it is and the world as MarxistLeninists thought it would be. The
occurrence of war inside and between
Socialist countries (Afghanistan, and China
v. Vietnam, respectively) has driven a coach
and horse through early classifications of
types of war in the Third World, something
which Soviet military writers have plainly
found very unsettling.
Secondly and thirdly, although Soviet
military writers still argue strongly for
peaceful coexistence with the West, their
reasons for doing so are now somewhat
different from what they used to be. Once
peaceful coexistence was mainly seen as a
way of preventing the holocaust; now it is
much more a question of providing
conditions in which the Soviet Union can
cautiously advance its interests. Fourthly,
the disheartening tendency of radical Third
Worlders to be seduced from the straight
and narrow by Western material superiority
has made Soviet military writers much more
pessimistic about the prospect of local
armies or guerrilla forces of a currently
socialist persuasion ushering in their own
revolutions. Fifthly and sixthly, Soviet
military writers have been increasingly
dispassionate in their treatment of Western
interventions in the Third World - and
often in terms which suggest the Soviet
Union might follow the same path, only
more successfully of course, since she is a
good Marxist-Leninist country rather than
a bad Imperialist one. The fact that 'local
war' is now thought much less likely to lead
to 'general war' also suggests a greater
readiness in the future to become involved
in the turbulences of the Third World.
In truth, this increased readiness to
meddle is one of Professor Katz's most
important findings, although he makes the
point that the Soviet Union will probably
d o this more in a spirit of pessimistic
defensiveness (as in Afghanistan) than in
one of gung-ho Marxist-Leninism. What is
at stake are Soviet national interests (such
as containing the Islamic threat to the
southern parts of the Soviet eastern empire
- shades of Sarajevo) and more
dangerously still, the Marxist-Leninist view
of history. A deeply committed ideologydominated state like the Soviet Union
simply cannot stand idly by and watch the
world revolution get cancelled through lack
of interest. Either of these fundamental
Soviet concerns could lead her into a
situation where she menaces Western
interests, albeit helplessly, and is therefore a
contingency for which the West should
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prepare with resolve but without hysteria.
Professor Katz also makes the point that
Soviet military writers see their Navy as a
particularly suitable vehicle for this
reluctant interventionism. At a time when
so many people in this country seem to be
hypnotised by the balance of forces on the
North German plain, these are conclusions
worth thinking about.
GEOFFREY
TILL
JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS,
1982 - 1983
(Jane's-£ 50)
Jane's Fighting Ships is a standard work of
reference in its eighty-fifth year of issue. Its
format has been unchanged for years and is
familiar to readers and dippers-in the world
over. Captain John Moore's Foreword, the
only self-standing piece of prose in the
book, occupies six pages of print (in a
900-page production) and is of just over
10,000 words. Yet on publication day the
BBC carried a long item on the new edition
of Jane's and this was followed by extensive
media coverage lasting a week and more.
It is not professional jealousy that
prompts me to wonder why this should be.
There seem to be several reasons. First,
there is quite naturally a heightened interest
in matters naval at this time when the Royal
Navy has just won a splendid if far from
costless victory, and is nevertheless still
under threat from an accountant's solution
of singular short-sightedness. Second, John
Moore has been editor for many years now,
and his reputation has steadily grown with
that of this publication, his other books and
lectures, and his appearances on the media.
Third, that reputation has always included
a name for producing provocative,
stimulating, and above all newsworthy
ideas. Fourth, it is backed by a corpus of
fact so comprehensive, so carefully
researched and so stylishly put together that
as a basis for argument it is virtually
unassailable. Finally, of course they have a
good blurb writer and the press release was
a first-class bit of work; but a good press
release must have some platform to work
from.
It is, then, well worth looking closely at
the more forthright parts of John Moore's
Foreword. They are not slow in coming, at
the second paragraph to be precise. The
Falklands is the scene, of course:
The failure to provide an adequate counter to the
sea-skimming missiles, despite several warnings
over the past ten years, had disastrous results for
several ships. These might have been mitigated if
lessons of the dangers inherent in lightweight
aluminium/magnesium based internal superstructures had been applied. Over the last few
years several suggestions concerning modified
hull-forms which would reduce the topweight
problem have been made, all meeting with the
name negative response.
There are of course several strands in this
argument (and more are introduced later)
but John Moore is quite right to intertwine
them, because Life Itself (as I believe the
Russians frequently say) does that. But one
does wonder whether all the strands are laid
up in the same direction, or whether some
of them run counter to each other.
For example, there are in many places the first is two paragraphs down from the
passage just quoted - pleas for greater
simplicity in medium-sized surface ships.
Can this be reconciled with the need for an
'adequate
counter to sea-skimming
missiles'? So far, attempts to provide such a
counter have resulted in Sea Wolf, which is
immensely costly in terms both of money
and of topweight. All right, so perhaps we
should have gone for vertical launch (but I
believe this was rejected because of even
higher development costs) and for the
Hollandse-Signaal fire control radar in Ka
Band which was available some years ago
(but I have a feeling some influential Critish
industrialists put the mockers on that). But
even then, without AEW and a secure realtime down-link to every surface ship in the
force, would defence against sea-skimmers
have been effective? We are deep into
complex problems here, and from the
procurement point of view the most
difficult problem is complexity itself:
complexity not only of threats and the
physical and tactical conundrums they pose,
but of competing claims in methods of
326
REVIEWS - I1
solving them. The Foreword's thesis, as I
read it, is that Whitehall's (and particularly
the Navy Department's) inability to grasp
the essentials of each problem, and to
decide quickly and accurately on solutions,
has wasted both money and time, with two
major results: surface ships are not so
effective o r economical as they could and
should be; and cuts in their numbers have
thus appealed particularly to politicians,
singularly so to the accountant. Neither of
these propositions can be proved, any more
than can the suggestion - inherent in the
early pages of the Foreword - that a
vertical-launch Seawolf VM 40 from a
Laurent Giles Osprey hull would have
withstood Argentine air assaults more
effectively.
This does not detract one bit from the
service the Foreword is doing. Indeed, if it
put forward indictments and alternatives
that were incontrovertibly correct, it would
be too depressing for us to survive. What it
does, o r should do, is to make us question
the course of our surface ship development,
from role through task to capability and
protection. If we are not too stiff-necked,
we shall d o so. Like Cromwell before
Dunbar, John Moore is beseeching us to
think it possible we may be mistaken. I
shall return to this point at the end of the
review.
Much of the Foreword, and of course by
far the greater part of the book proper, is
not concerned with British problems. There
is a long passage on the Soviet Navy, with
some interesting speculations on the roles of
the Kirov and other new surface
construction: '. . . only one out of four new
classes has (specialised ASW) capability'.
This could stem, as the author implies, from
particular emphasis on ASW in the past, so
that escorts for the surface units are already
built. It is suggested that confrontations
may be contemplated 'in operations of
lower intensity'. It will be interesting to see
what the MccGwire school of Kremlinwatchers have to say about that. There is
not much in this issue's Foreword about the
Soviet submarine force; perhaps the Editor
is allowing the monstrous silhouettes in the
body of the book to speak for themselves.
Just one figure about the Typhoon class
caught my eye: 'This class could have a
separation of 13 -15 feet between the outer
and inner hulls.'
T o reinforce concern, the section on the
United States Navy is none too
encouraging. Cost rises are quoted that
make the famous six per cent multiplier look
moderate, and constructional and labour
problems are outlined. (These are in the
open, of course, while Soviet problems d o
not always swim across even Jane's ken).
There are some more hopeful passages: a
robust and realistic assessment of the need
for and fighting capacity of the US aircraft
carrier force, and a welcome for the
reinstated battleships of the Iowa class. In
the US Navy section of the book there is a
wealth of detailed information on this and
all other subjects, and it is clear from the
acknowledgements that a very large team in
the United States now helps Jane's to
produce this most important and impressive
part of the publication.
All other navies of any significance get at
least a mention in the Foreword. It is
noticeable at once - though this will not be
new to those who follow the technical press
- how much better most European shipbuilders are doing in export markets than
the British. The Foreword does not labour
this point, perhaps because it is obvious,
perhaps because it is tedious t o d o so year
on year.
Probably the same considerations have
applied to discussion of Soviet clients
further afield. There is certainly no undue
alarmism in the style; the language is
deliberately laconic: '. . . with Aden and
Socotra on one side of the Straits of Bab-elMandeb and the Dahlaks on the other the
Soviet Navy is well placed to seal off the
southern entrance to the Red Sea'. This
seems to me to be objectively true. I am not
quite so sure about an earlier statement in
the Foreword about the Falklands: 'Had the
USSR chosen to interpose a few nuclear
submarines, as they might be expected to do
in what they chose to classify as a "war of
national liberation" . . .' Here, the lack of
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any reference to countervailing US presence
does point to a weakness in the logic.
Soviet clients or not, however, the navies
of the world get a fair crack of the whip
both in the Foreword and in the body of the
book. This is one of the greatest virtues of
Jane's: it is identifiably a British work but it
is absolutely just in its allocation of space
and material between all the nations of the
world. It is on that painstakingly gathered,
detailed, impartial, accurate, constantly
absorbing corpus of data that the authority
of the book rests and on which the lessons it
seeks to draw for its parent country need to
be judged.
That brings us back to Britain. John
Moore has hard things to say, not only
about the Government but about the
management of naval affairs and
particularly of the formation and execution
of operational requirements over the past
twenty years. We can accept, most of us,
that the principles underlying his criticisms
are correct. Yet, we should think through
what our Navy is for, what jobs each type or
class of ship should be optimised to do, how
to fill gaps so that all necessary jobs can be
done and are not unnecessarily duplicated.
Within this framework we ought to be
receptive to new ideas wherever they come
from, if they show promise. We ought to be
decisive enough to choose quickly and
wisely, then stick to our choices so that
development can be brisk and efficient. It is
all, of course, easier said than done, as the
procurement establishment will be quick to
point out. What we have been, and what we
used to be for, govern what we are and
affect what we will be - affect, even, what
we want to be. Nevertheless there is a case to
answer, and John Moore has put it.
We do need some humility and vision: the
sort of spirit, perhaps, that a century and a
half ago set up the trial between AIecto and
Rattler and ushered in the era of screw
propulsion. I am sure there were a lot of
vested interests and technical passions
engaged in that business, but they were set
aside in the interests of objective truth and
progress. Dare one suggest that in matters
like the beamy versus the slim hull, or the
Seawolf VM 40 versus the GWS 25, more of
the same spirit might be much to this
country's advantage?
RICHARD HILL
ROYAL MARINE COMMANDO
by JAMES D. LADD
(Hamlyn-£6.95)
It is peculiarly fitting that this book should
have been published at the very time that
the Royal Marines were 'writing' in the
Falkland Islands perhaps the most brilliant
episode in their long and brilliant history.
In format and illustrations this is a
volume that is worthy of its subject, and it
is good that (in what must have been a very
last-minute amendment) the author has
been able to link the captions of two of his
illustrations to events in the Falklands
campaign.
Though described as history, James
Ladd's book is really, as LieutenantGeneral Sir Steuart Pringle has so well
described it in his Foreword, a 'pastiche of
events great and small, battles and
skirmishes, the strategy of campaigns and
the heroism of individual men'. The author
has achieved this by giving detailed
attention to a number of incidents setting
them against the general background of the
Royal Marines' history. The incidents
which he has chosen are the capture of
Gibraltar, Belle Isle in 1761, Bunker Hill in
the American War of Independence,
Trafalgar, Santander in the Peninsular
campaign, Pensacola in 1814, China in
1841, Baltic and Black Sea during the
Crimean War, China around 1857,
Methuen's column in the Boer War, the
Jutland, Zeebrugge,
Dardanelles,
Passchendaele, Dieppe, the Normandy
landings, the Rhine crossing and Wesel,
and the 'confrontation' in Borneo. As a
method of presenting a picture of the Royal
Marines, this is very effective, and it is
assisted by a magnificent collection of
illustrations - paintings in colour,
photographs, and drawings.
The book should appeal to a wider
readership than that of past and present
Royal Marines, for there are several
328
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infantry regiments of the Line whose
histories record the actions in which they
fought as Marines before the present Corps
was formed in 1755.
As a book for the general public, it
suffers to some extent by assuming a greater
knowledge of military history than many
potential readers may possess, and it does
not help them by providing maps. Indeed
the only map to illustrate a land campaign
described in the text is that of the battle of
Bunker Hill, and this has no scale or points
of the compass, and the symbols used to
denote the movement of troops are very
difficult to relate to the narrative.
The use of metric measurements
throughout is of dubious wisdom, because
most people in the United Kingdom reckon
in miles rather than kilometres (vide road
signs and speed restrictions) and to use the
latter in connection with campaigns in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
particularly,
is something of a n
anachronism.
There is a surprising slip in describing the
London Trained Bands as Militia raised by
the City of London as a defence against the
Parliamentary forces, because of course the
London Trained Bands were the best
infantry in the Parliamentary Army at the
start of the Civil War, and they formed half
of the army commanded by the Earl of
Essex at the first battle of Newbury.
These criticisms apart, however,
James Ladd has produced a book which is a
joy to handle, to browse over, and to read.
HUGHROGERS
RCN IN RETROSPECT
1910 - 1968
Edited by JAMESA. BOUTILIER
(The University of British Columbia
Press-$28)
Professor Jim Boutilier, who is an associate
professor of history at the Royal Roads
Military College in Victoria BC, tells us he
organised a conference there in March
1980, the seventieth anniversary of the
RCN, with four objectives; to encourage
historians to undertake research on the
RCN; to encourage ex-RCN personnel to
record their exeriences; to bring these two
groups together in dialogue; and, by way of
this book, to reintroduce Canadians to their
naval heritage. The result is this
magnificent tribute to a proud service part
of whose history from 1910 to 1968 is
related by nineteen different authors. This
is a story of many Canadians and the few
who fought to keep the RCN alive and
independent and strove in vain to prevent
its demise.
Seven chapters mainly cover the
formative period of 1910 - 39, with
Professor Gough, Admiral Brodeur,
Admiral Brock, Professor Hunt, Admiral
Pullen, Admiral Leir, and Captain Knox
making the contributions. The RCN's huge
contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic
and its trials and tribulations in the war are
mainly covered in six chapters by
Commander McKee, Commander Lund
Joseph Milner, Lieutenant-Commander
Beesly, Commander Douglas, Jurgen
Rohwer, and Captain Knox. The post-war
period 1945-68, including the Korean
War, is covered mainly in six chapters by
Commander Audette, Captain Bovey,
Lieutenant - Commander Soward,
Commander Leeming, Captain Hadley,
and Captain Cameron. The whole book is
beautifully produced with a Preface and
Introduction by Professor Boutilier with
many detailed notes on each chapter and on
each of the contributors. This is a large
book of 342 pages with no less than 109
illustrations and is a worthy addition to
UBC's expanding maritime publications.
Regrettably there is no index.
It is impossible to review all the wellwritten short stories in this very interesting
book which would make good reading
ashore or afloat. For those interested in
officer entry Lrock tells us of the RN
College of Canada and its first British
Commanding Officer, Commander Nixon,
whose two sons first survived the Halifax
explosion and later served in the RCN.
Leir's chapter is certainly one of the best
accounts so far of the daunting experience
of joining and serving in an RN battleship,
The Prince of Wales, as a midshipman in
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World War 11. He now thinks this method
of early training of RCN officers had
become archaic by 1939. The chapter on the
Lower Deck and the Mainguy Report of
1949 by Audette, a QC, and one of the
three Commissioners of that Naval Inquiry,
seems to confirm this. However, I can
recall, as Sub-Lieutenant of what was
effectively a Commonwealth gunroom of
five nations, at that time, how bewildered
the four Canadians were when the report
arrived. This chapter sheds much light on a
largely forgotten episode but in covering
the many incidents at that time excludes the
one in 1945.
The chapters on the Battle of the Atlantic
by those distinguished authors, Beesly and
Rohwe, who are ably helped by newcomers
Milner and Douglas, are very striking and
the exacting analysis reveals a great deal
about the Convoy Battles SC42, SC107 and
ONS - 5.
Two first-class chapter by Knox cover the
important topic of RCN engineering. In
fact no aspect of interest is really excluded.
The rise and fall of Canadian Naval
Aviation 1915 -69 is also well covered by
Soward.
This great tribute, or is it a lament, ends
with a final chapter on the RCN and the
'Unification Crisis'. Figures like Admiral
Brock and others unmentioned, and
Landymore in particular, loom large in
what is still a puzzling period for us to
understand. Anyway when he and his lady
were driven slowly through Halifax
dockyard on hauling down his flag, after
being relieved of his command, HMC ships
alongside flew the signal 'BZ' and ship's
companies manned their ships. Apparently
the RCN, which had survived the long and
fiercest Battle of the Atlantic was rapidly
overwhelmed by the forces of nationalism
in what is seen by some as an act of political
folly.
As we have seen recently, a naval heritage
and a navy are vital to maritime power. It
can take years to build up a naval heritage
and Dr Boutilier is to be congratulated on
reintroducing this to Canadians and others.
J. H. BEATTIE
329
TYPHOON: THE OTHER ENEMY
The Third Fleet and the Pacific Storm of
December 1944
by CAPTAIN
C. RAYMOND
CALHOUN,
US Navy (Ret'd)
(US Naval Institute Press)
At the close of the Falkland Islands
campaign, fought in an inhospitable ocean
climate in which weather must have been a
significant factor in the considerations of
the Task Force Commander, it has been
particularly thought-provoking to read this
first-class book. It tells how the
Commander of the US Third Fleet,
Admiral William F. Halsey, engaged in
support of the invasion of the Philippines,
suffered in a typhoon what his
Commander-in-Chief called 'the greatest
loss that we have taken in the Pacific
without compensating return since the First
Battle of Savo'. Three destroyers capsized
and sank with practically all hands; serious
damage was sustained by 7 carriers of
various sizes and by other ships; some 146
aircraft were lost or damaged by fire, by
being smashed up, or by being swept
overboard; 778 men were lost. The author
commanded one of the destroyers which
survived, and his story is full of lessons
about those enduring truths which only
experience of wind and weather - not just
of fighting, still less of computer-controlled
war games - can bring to the keenest
professional captain of war at sea.
On his first day at sea in USS Dewey, in
September 1944, the author was struck by
her sluggish handling and slow recovery
from roll in turns. This Farragut-class ship,
built ten years earlier at a designed
displacement of 1,500 tons, had like all
her contemporaries been additionally
loaded throughout three years of war with
everything from radars to ice-cream
machines, and the Bureau of Ships' limit
was now 2,255 tons. From then on, through
reports of his concern to higher authority,
news of a 'satisfactory' inclining test on a
sister ship, and his account of work-up with
other ships of the squadron, there run the
classic threads of a destroyer commander's
unease; the stability of his ship, anxiety
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REVIEWS - I1
about weather in the operational area,
awareness of the inexperience of those
about him in both ship and squadron. He
and three of his fellow COs had graduated
from Annapolis only six years earlier.
The tale of the coming of the storm
during replenishment operations between
strikes on Luzon, of the indicators which
were there and ignored, or muddled, by
those who should have known better, of
wisdom and courage and failure before its
awesome ferocity, and of the Dewey's epic
survival, must rank among the best sea
stories I have ever read. It is told with a
simplicity and an intensity which make
quite hideous the climax in which two
Farraguts, HUN and Monaghan, and one
Fletcher, the Spence, had in the course of
one forenoon sunk unnoticed in wind
strengths around 100 knots before the Fleet
Commander had acknowledged the
existence of a typhoon, as such, in the area.
Yet how thankfully can anyone who has
known anxiety about escorts low on fuel,
about endurance and readiness in ships'
companies, about whether unpractised COs
will avoid damage rather than stick to their
stations; how thankfully can we say 'There,
but for the grace of God . . .'
The disaster was swiftly followed by a
court o f inquiry,
appointed by
CINCPACFLT, Admiral Nimitz, on
Christmas Day, and completing its business
on 3 January 1945. The author has two
prime concerns in telling this part of his
tale. The first - also of course that of the
court - is the attribution of responsibility.
Here the blame was laid fairly and squarely
on the Third Fleet Commander, a view
which was endorsed at every stage and
finally acknowledged by Secretary Forrestal
almost a year later. Yet the author does not
seriously dispute what will certainly be the
judgement of history on an outstanding
fighting admiral, whose dominant aim was,
as it had to be, prosecution of the war.
Despite the court's 84 findings and 63
'opinions' and despite further damage to
his fleet in another typhoon in June 1945
for which Halsey was also held responsible,
his stature as a national hero protected him
from further action.
T h e second, sadder strand is
compounded of evasion and duplicity; of
failure by the court of inquiry to express,
and subsequent refusal by the Bureau of
Ships to acknowledge, the obvious truth
that the Farraguts were disastrously
unstable. Bureaucratic ineptitude and
obstruction are not unfamiliar targets of
those in the front line; but they make sorry
reading. By the end of 1945, however, all
these sturdy little ships had been paid off.
This is a good book, and a worthy
addition to any seaman's library.
SPLITCANE
THE STORY OF THE MARY ROSE
by ERNLE BRADFORD
(Hamish Hamilton, in association with the
Mary Rose Trust-£9.95)
On 19 July 1545 the 700-ton Mary Rose
sailed into action from Portsmouth
harbour against a French invasion fleet off
the Isle of Wight. Suddenly the thirty-yearold ship heeled over and sank a mile south
of Southsea Castle under the eyes of King
Henry VIII. Of the 700 men on board seamen and soldiers - all but thirty-five
perished including Vice Admiral Sir George
Carew, second-in-command of the English
Fleet, and Roger Grenville, her Captain and
the father of Sir Richard. By the time these
words are in print, the half of her hull
which remains will, if all goes well, have
been raised from the sea-bed and taken
ashore to No. 3 dock in Portsmouth Naval
Base.
This book tells of the circumstances
surrounding her loss, the immediate
attempts to salvage her with the help of
Venetian experts, her discovery in 1836
when a number of her guns were brought
up, and her rediscovery by Mr Alexander
McKee in 1967 after years of perseverance
and detective work. There follows the
enthralling story of the early struggles of
the Mary Rose enthusiasts and of the
eventual recovery and conservation of some
17,000 artefacts from the wreck, including
the earliest example of an English compass
and over 3,000 arrows - until now only
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one genuine Tudor arrow was known to
have survived the centuries. This storehouse
of treasure is not only revealing much of the
life of the Tudor seaman but will also add
greatly to our knowledge of day-to-day life
in Tudor England.
Published in association with The Mary
Rose Trust of which our member, the
Prince of Wales, is President, this book
contains over 130 illustrations ranging from
the only known contemporary painting of
the Mary Rose to the plans for her raising
on 28 September 1982. Regrettably the text
shows signs of having been put together in a
hurry and lacks the thoroughpess and
polish to be expected from the author's
earlier books. Perhaps the need for
publication to coincide with the raising of
the ship prevented proper revision.
Nevertheless it gives a vivid and readable
account of probably the most ambitious
underwater archaeological venture yet
undertaken anywhere in the world, and
with its wealth of illustrations will make an
attractive and, it is to be hoped, a topical
Christmas present.
C.H.H.O.
SUNK!
HOW THE GREAT BATTLESHIPS
WERE LOST
by DAVID WOODWARD
(Allen and Unwin, London, 1982-£8.95)
With the loss of Sheffield, Coventry, and
the other ships in the Falklands Task Force
fresh in our minds there could hardly be a
better time for the publication of
Mr Woodward's lively account of the
destruction of some of the great battleships.
According to his calculations 545 batteships
were built between 1860 and 1945 of which
130 were sunk in peace and war.
Many of the losses which Mr Woodward
selects for re-examination are thoroughly
familiar - Hood and Bismarck, the Italian
ships at Taranto and US ships at Pearl
Harbour, Prince of Wales and Repulse;
others are much less so. Thus there was the
sinking of the 3,500-ton Blanco Encalado
during the Chilean civil war in 1891, which
was the first real success for the torpedo,
33 1
and this was followed up by the destruction
of Aquidaban during the Brazilian civil war
three years later, also by a torpedo. Mr
Woodward then goes on to describe the
successful British torpedo attacks on the
Soviet fleet after the Russian revolution in
1917. These led to the sinking of the cruiser
OIeg and of the battleships Petropavlovsk
and Andrei Pervosvanni.
Some of the author's accounts are of the
destruction
of battleships through
peacetime misadventures. Politically the
most important was the sinking of the US
ship Maine of 15 February 1898. The ship
blew up in Havana harbour and the
American belief that it was sabotaged by
Spaniards helped to cause the outbreak of
t h e Spanish-American W a r . T h e
probability, the author concludes, was that
the ship was destroyed by the spontaneous
combustion of coal in the ship's bunkers
alongside t h e magazine. Equally
devastating was the explosion in the French
battleship Zena whilst it was in dry dock in
1907. On that occasion it was the
spontaneous combustion of the notorious
Poudre B in the magazine which led to the
destruction of the ship and the deaths of
117 men. The battleship LibertP was
destroyed in the same way in Toulon
harbour in 1911.
Mr Woodward's earliest and most
farcical example is the battle of Lissa in
1866. The new Italian fleet under Admiral
Persano was trying to capture the town of
Lissa on the Adriatic. Persano was
thwarted by his own cowardice and
incompetence and by the Austrian Admiral,
Tegetthoff, whose ship rammed and sank
the Italian flagship, Re d'ltalia - o r what
would have been the flagship had Persano
not had himself transferred to another ship
as soon as the battle began without telling
any of his subordinates. Tegetthoff's
example was followed by the Kaiser which
rammed the Re de Portogallo but since
Kaiser was wooden and the Italian vessel
was an ironclad the results were less
impressive. Nevertheless the battle
gave another forty-year's life to the
ram.
332
REVIE
Mr Woodward's accounts are most
moving when he describes events from the
point of view of the individuals involved in
the confusion and chaos which is often the
immediate result of unexpected events.
Thus we have the messenger spreading the
good news round the Yamato that, before it
sailed for certain destruction at Okinawa,
ail would be served with red bean soup. We
have Commander Wainwright of the Maine
calmly collecting the very few men who had
survived the explosion in the ship and
placing them in the boats. We have SubLieutenant Nepveu of the Zena describing
how he groped his way out of the doomed
ship in semi-darkness knowing that at any
moment the other magazine might explode,
and we have Lestin the Chief Gunner on the
Libertd going to his death in a third vain
attempt to flood the magazines and to
prevent further explosions. On this level
Mr Woodward's book is a simple and
moving account of human heroism.
PHILIP TOWLE
ARCTIC DESTROYERS
The 17th Flotilla
by G. G. CONNELL
(Kimber-£9.95)
Between 21 August 1941 and the end of the
war, 75 convoys fought their way to and
from Russia through appalling weather
conditions and attack from aircraft,
U-boats, and surface forces. One hundred
merchant ships and 19 escorts were sunk
while enemy losses were 37 naval vessels,
including 30 U-Boats, and a large number
of aircraft. The 17th Flotilla of '0' class
destroyers sailed as covering forces or close
escort to 44 of these convoys and were
involved in the Vaagso raid, the sinking of
the Scharnhorst and PQ 17. They also saw
action in the Mediterranean, the Battle of
the Atlantic and during the D-Day
operations. All survived the war which they
ended escorting King Haakon back to
Norway and acting as guard ships in the
newly surrendered German ports. Such
a n odyssey deserves a book which does
justice to its epic theme. Sadly, this
is not it.
The author, an RNVR officer, only
joined Obedient as No. 1 for the last few
months of the war. His account is therefore
a mixture of historical fact culled from
other sources and reminiscences, often
from ex-ratings, gleaned forty years later.
As no indication is given of which is which,
it is only as each particularly unlikely
anecdote is recounted that the reader
gradually loses faith in the whole.
The names of the COs and First
Lieutenants of this remarkable Flotilla are a
roll call of officers who were famous at the
time or became so later, yet they are
described with character sketches more
suited to a gossip column. It is offensive to
read about the amorous propensities of one
well-known name or that another was
'tormented by religious doubts'. Apart
from the tinge of malice, those who actually
knew the officers concerned will resent such
second-hand allegations as totally
unfounded.
The author claims that during the Vaagso
raid two specially embarked Naval
Intelligence officers in the Flotilla made a
'capture beyond price' of not one but two
Enigma machines. In fact, the official
'British Intelligence in the Second World
War' which describes in detail the
acquisition of all such equipment not only
makes no mention of such an event but
stresses that, by the time of the raid, Naval
Intelligence were 'apprehensive that even
fortuitous capture' of further machines
might alarm the enemy and compromise the
success of our code breaking activities.
If this story is unlikely, even more so are
some of the convoy incidents. For instance,
one destroyer has time to race across 'the
whole front of the convoy' to engage
aircraft seen approaching the starboard
side; another 'tears at full speed into a long
low-flying line of HE 115s and completely
breaks the concentration of astounded
airmen'.
It is difficult to read the book as a whole
because the grammar and punctuation
sometimes verge on the illiterate. This can
have amusing results. After listing Offa's
wardroom of nine members, the author
REVIEWS - I1
tells us that 'four of these officers were
eventually to become Admirals and all to
become knights'. It must certainly be, as he
adds, 'a rare distinction for such a small
group'. But, sentences without verbs,
sentences which make no sense, lack of
punctuation, irritating habits of writing
('Battleship Anson sailed with destroyer
Fury'), names spelt wrongly, and poor
proof-reading, all combine to spoil the little
pleasure to be derived from a book which is
basically a collection of collated action
reports interspersed with hearsay
anecdotes.
The last few pages, with the liberation of
Norway and the occupation of Germany,
suddenly come to life when the author is
describing what he knew from his own
experience but by then it is too late.
C.C.A.
THE UNCERTAIN ALLY
by MICHAELCHICHESTERand
JOHNWILKINSON
(Gower Publishing Company-£ 15.00)
This book is a valiant attempt, by two
public-spirited and experienced writers of
Conservative persuasion, to determine what
is wrong with British defence policy and
make constructive proposals for putting it
right. One of the authors, Commander
Chichester, Royal Navy, has been a
member of The Naval Review since early in
his active service career, from which he
retired in 1961. The other, John Wilkinson
MP, served in the RAF as a flying
instructor before entering politics.
In a 'stop-press' Introduction the authors
write: 'the imposition of martial law and
the subsequent events in Poland tragically
emphasise the totalitarian nature of the
Communist system and reinforce, rather
than weaken the case we make for strong
national defence on the part of the United
Kingdom, and extra resolution on the part
of the Western Alliance.' Unfortunately
this assertion does not quite square with the
main theme of the book:
Having extended the threat (to NATO) to a
global dimension, the wider choice of strategic
options now available to Soviet Russia has
333
reduced the likelihood of a frontal attack on
Europe despite the material superiority of the
Warsaw Pact forces in this theatre. Once this
fundamental strategic change is accepted then
the question of striking the right balance in
resource allocation between the NATO area and
external threats to vital Western interests
becomes easier to answer.
But does it? It remains a fact that
preponderant Warsaw Pact forces could
advance and seize the Baltic exits within a
few hours, if not opposed by effective
forces in place; and a few days might suffice
for Soviet forces t o gain control of the
Turkish Straits, given a not impossible turn
of political events in that region. Thus
would Peter the Great's Marxist-Leninist
successors give effect to his dying
injunction:
I strongly believe that the State of Russia will be
able to take the whole of Europe under its
sovereignty . . . you must always expand towards
the Baltic and the Black Sea. You must try to
approach Istanbul and India as far forward as
possible. You must seek to dominate the Black
Sea and be the owner of the Baltic. These actions
are most important in order to achieve our future
aims. You must also do your best to ensure the
collapse of Persia as soon as possible and
envisage opening a route through the Persian
Gulf.
It could be argued that NATO's failure to
keep enough conventional forces on the
Central Front has enabled the Soviet
Union, under pretence of fearing a NATO
advance eastwards, to use her military
might elsewhere, for example in
Afghanistan. For NATO reliance o n the
possible first use of nuclear weapons cannot
be other than defensive, whereas strong
NATO conventional forces might be
capable of coming t o the aid of the Soviet
satellite populations when eventually, as in
Poland, the desire for freedom and
independence once again grows strong. It is
therefore hard to accept the proposal t o
reduce the strength of Britain's 'continental
commitment' by half, in order t o provide
for a stronger RN and RAF, given the
fighting qualities which BAOR possesses,
together with its Tactical Air Force.
Furthermore, the political implications of
such a policy would be grave.
334
REVlEIWS - I1
But the undoubted power of the modern
Soviet Navy to support Soviet 'state
interests' around the world must be
acknowledged. What might be done, in
terms of British defence policy, to counter
it? The authors of The Uncertain Ally
reject,
for sound
reasons,
the
reintroduction of conscription as a means
of reducing the almost crippling costs of
voluntary manpower and its support; and,
in any case, because the army can make use
of conscripts to a far greater extent than the
navy and the air force, the savings which
would accrue from reducing BAOR by half
would not be enough for the support of the
larger naval and air forces envisaged, which
would still require a large proportion of
regulars. The solution proposed is to make
much more use of reserves of various
categories in all three services. The scheme
is well worked out, and merits close
attention. As to coping with 'the global
threat', it may be that Britain and her
European maritime allies, should make a
much more determined and concerted
effort to enter into closer and more equal
relationships with the many countries some in the Commonwealth, some not for whom freedom of movement of
shipping, freedom from interference with
maritime aspects of their sovereignty, and
respect for international order, are as
important as they are to Britain and her
allies and friends. The naval and air forces
of such nations, and the facilities which, in
their own interests, they could offer in
certain circumstances, could be of critical
importance to our cause. As we have seen
recently in the Falklands operations, the
whole question of power to use, or deny the
use of, the sea for any purpose can be
crucially affected by the local balance of
forces. The cost of modern warships and
military aircraft is such that it is extremely
doubtful whether, by reducing BAOR by
half, Britain's sea and air forces could be so
increased as to make her independent of
regional allies, outside the NATO area. Nor
can an exact identity of interest with the
United States invariably be counted upon,
outside NATO.
IANMCGEOCH
THE UNDERWATER WAR 1939 - 1945
by RICHARD
COMPTON-HALL
(Blandford Press, Dorset-X8.95)
Commander Compton-Hall MBE, Royal
Navy, retired from active service in the
1960s and is now Director of the Submarine
Museum at HMS Dolphin. He has a flair
for writing and his present post has enabled
him to compile a comprehensive, accurate,
and well-illustrated account of the
operations of the submarines of all the
belligerents in the Second World War.
Having himself commanded three submarines, including an X-craft, ComptonHall's capacity to select, out of a mountain
of material, what is needed to provide a
balanced and reliable account, is manifest.
There is little to add, in reviewing this wellproduced and reasonably priced book,
other than 'Buy it!'
IANMCGEOCH
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