This article was downloaded by: [Virginia Tech Libraries] On: 24 October 2013, At: 20:28 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Review of International Political Economy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrip20 Keynes, capital mobility and the crisis of embedded liberalism Jonathan Kirshner Published online: 08 Feb 2011. To cite this article: Jonathan Kirshner (1999) Keynes, capital mobility and the crisis of embedded liberalism, Review of International Political Economy, 6:3, 313-337, DOI: 10.1080/096922999347209 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/096922999347209 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. 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Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions Review of International Political Economy 6:3 Autumn 1999: 313–337 Keynes, capital mobility and the crisis of embedded liberalism Jonathan Kirshner Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 Department of Government, Cornell University A BS T R A C T This article argues that in an era characterized by increased practical and analytical concern for the domestic consequences of international market forces, through the study of Keynes’ own writing we can better understand the signicance of the contemporary challenges to the compromise of embedded liberalism and the consequences of the possible unraveling of that order. A Keynesian interpretation of the Asian nancial crisis illustrates both the application of Keynes’ philosophy of political economy and its continuing relevance. K E Y WO R D S Keynes; capital mobility; embedded liberalism; nancial crisis; middle way; political economy. it will be the role of this country to develop a middle way of economic life which will preserve the liberty, the initiative and (what we are so rich in) the idiosyncrasy of the individual in a framework serving the public good and seeking equality of contentment amongst all. (Keynes, 1944e: 369) In the past decade, the world has witnessed a movement in the direction of unregulated market forces. While many hail these developments as the ultimate triumph of capitalism, others raise concerns about the erosion of social-democratic bargains which emerged after World War II, that were designed to insulate the majority of the population of industrial states – the middle and working classes – from the rougher edges of the capitalist system. To better understand the political and economic consequences of these recent developments, there could be no more appropriate time to revisit the writings of John Maynard Keynes, who © 1999 Routledge 0969–2290 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY had a profound inuence on the shape of those postwar arrangements, and whose work speaks directly to these issues.1 Keynes campaigned against unregulated capitalism. He argued that it would lead to suboptimal economic outcomes, and that it would elicit political responses that would compound those difculties. While Keynes is most famous for The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936a), his fundamental challenge to ‘classical’ economic theory, Keynes offered much more than a voice of dissent.2 His broader writings illustrate how, dissatised with the existing alternatives to unregulated capitalism, Keynes articulated another choice: the ‘middle way’, a capitalist economy in which some market forces would be managed and contained. A fundamental challenge to the practice of the middle way was the existence of market forces that were beyond the control of the sovereign state – especially international market forces. For the middle way to be sustained, such forces must be mediated as well. Ideally this would be done through international institutions or other forms of cooperation designed to insure that the international economy would not disrupt states’ pursuit of the middle way. From this perspective, then, increasingly powerful and untethered international capitalism is a problem in that it tends to undermine the middle way, and consequently will yield profoundly negative economic and political outcomes. An example of this is the contemporary Asian nancial crisis, which is considered from a Keynesian perspective in the rst part of this article. I argue that this interpretation of the crisis ows naturally from a coherent general philosophy of political economy that can be derived from Keynes’ writings. It also illustrates the continuing relevance of Keynes’ thought in contemporary political economy. The following section establishes the foundations of this philosophy, the middle way. It will then show how Keynes recognized that even if he could convince a nation of the benets of the middle way, the policies associated with his approach might not be sustainable in the face of international market forces. It is Keynes, not Polanyi, who can claim title to the philosophy of embedded liberalism, the compromise of market forces and social contract which characterized the post-World War II international economic order. The following section reviews how the postwar international economic order was designed to accommodate the middle way, and shows how recent changes undermine that accommodation. The challenges to the middle way in the contemporary system – the international pressures and their domestic manifestations – are very similar to those addressed by Keynes in the interwar period. In an era characterized by increased concern for the domestic consequences of international market forces, it is through Keynes that we can understand the signicance of these challenges, and of the possible unraveling of embedded liberalism. 314 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 K E Y NE S A ND C O NT E MP O R A R Y PO L IT IC A L EC O N O MY The contemporary relevance of Keynes is well illustrated by the distinct internationalist explanation Keynes’ perspective offers for the Asian nancial crisis. Most orthodox explanations, on the other hand, have stressed the proximate domestic origins of the crisis. But these internal factors, while certainly present, are much clearer in retrospect than they were just a few months before the crisis. In November 1996, for example, the IMF touted ‘ASEAN’s Sound Fundamentals Bode Well for Sustained Growth’ in a banner headline of its newsletter. In May 1997, IMF Managing Director Michael Camdessus stated that the international economic environment justied an atmosphere of ‘rational exuberance’. The IMF reported further that ‘overheating pressures have abated in many emerging market economies, especially in Asia – where growth has stayed strong for several years’ (IMF, 1996a: 377; 1997b: 129–30). Not only are the internal sources of the crisis largely evident in hindsight, they do not address the underlying structural cause of the crisis, which, from a Keynesian perspective, derives from the functioning of the international nancial system. As one of the principal architects of the IMF and the post-World War II nancial system (about which more below), Keynes favored capital controls, especially over short-term capital movements. While he favored an open international economy that facilitated foreign investment, Keynes drew a sharp distinction between mobile capital and completely unregulated capital. As a result, the rules of the IMF were written to explicitly accommodate capital controls. From a Keynesian perspective, there are three reasons why completely unregulated nancial capital is unwise. The movement of short-term capital falls into a class of economic activity central to Keynes’ approach: where the sum of individual actors responding rationally to incentives does not result in collective efciency. Such spheres need to be identied, and are the appropriate targets of government intervention. Especially today, with technology that combines very large nancial markets with very low transactions costs, the result is ‘too much’ movement of short-term capital. This is because capital mobility can impose costs to society that are not borne by its producers, and thus, like other negative externalities, tends to be overproduced. There are three principal reasons why completely unregulated capital is an example of such a market failure. First, the movement of huge amounts of capital in and out of states can alter dramatically, and literally overnight, the value of crucial assets such as national currencies and local equities. Macroeconomic variables such as interest rates and ination can also be subject to sudden variation. Pure capital mobility thus heightens uncertainty, which Keynes 315 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1936a: 148) considered to be a fundamental detriment to business condence and economic activity. Second, to an important extent, nancial assets are worth what people think that they are worth. Keynes’ (ibid.: 156) famous allegory is to a beauty contest, where the goal of each competing judge is not to pick ‘the faces which he himself nds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view’. In uncertain nancial markets, fears regarding what other people are thinking can cause herding behavior, unleashing nancial stampedes with economic consequences that veer far from the path suggested by any reading of the economic ‘fundamentals’. Finally, it is a fallacy to think that every country should pursue the same macroeconomic policies. This concern was a consistent theme throughout Keynes’ writings, although he suggested different remedies in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, as international conditions and his own thought evolved. States face diverse economic conditions, and need to tailor their economic policies accordingly. The problem is that investors, scanning the globe for the best rates of return, create pressures for conformity across countries’ macro policies. Nations that deviate from the international norm, even when pursuing policies appropriate for local needs, are ‘punished’ by capital ight. Thus a Keynesian perspective would focus on the international origins of the Asian nancial crisis: capital deregulation that resulted in inefciently high levels of short-term capital ows.3 The current conventional wisdom, it should be noted, runs in the opposite direction.4 In September 1996, the IMF asserted that ‘international capital markets appear to have become more resilient and are less likely to be a source of disturbances’ (IMF, 1996b: 294).5 Following this assumption, the Fund embarked upon a fundamental revision of its charter, and in May 1997 announced plans to amend its constitution – the Articles of Agreement – ‘to make the promotion of capital account liberalization a specic purpose of the IMF and give it jurisdiction over capital movements’ (IMF, 1997b: 131–2). This is of course the opposite of what Keynes and the other founding fathers of the IMF intended. They thought that capital controls were necessary to assure the smooth functioning of an open international economy, and the Bretton Woods era, the ‘golden age of capitalism’, was a period of ubiquitous capital control. Now, however, the IMF has declared explicitly that ‘Forces of globalization must be embraced’. Its new policy has been repeatedly characterized as a proposition ‘to make unrestricted capital ows a condition of membership in the global economy’ (IMF, 1997a: 131–2; McDermott and Lopez, 1998; Goad, 1998). From a Keynesian perspective, this will probably lead to additional crises and lower global growth. 316 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 K EY N ES A N D T H E ‘ MI DD L E WA Y ’ This interpretation of the Asian crisis derives from a more comprehensive philosophy of political economy that was developed by Keynes: the middle way, which is facilitated at the international level by an embedded liberalism. It was Ruggie (1982: 393) who coined the term ‘the compromise of embedded liberalism’, which he dened as states’ consensus that ‘multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism’. This meant that postwar institutions would support an internationalist, market-oriented order, but would allow for mechanisms, safeguards and escape clauses through which states would not be forced to sacrice domestic social policies in order to maintain international equilibria. In contemporary politics, one can observe evidence for the unraveling of this compromise (Schwartz, 1994; Helleiner, 1994; Hall, 1986). This may have profound consequences that will be unanticipated by those who are unaware of the extent to which the compromise of embedded liberalism was designed to allow for the practice of the middle way – and in so doing, to avoid the economic horrors of the interwar years. Ruggie attributed the concept of market embeddedness to Polanyi, and his book, The Great Transformation (1944). Polanyi argued that the breakdown of the international order was a consequence of the nineteenth-century laissez-faire economic system, which was unsustainable because, unlike other periods in human history, ‘Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system’ (Polanyi, 1944: 57). But while Polanyi did call attention to the relationship between state and society, it would be wrong to associate him with embedded liberalism, and an even greater mistake to consider him a founding father of that philosophy.6 While Polanyi criticized laissez-faire capitalism, he was not a reformer, and in fact was skeptical of the prospects for the types of reforms that would be associated with embedded liberalism. Additionally, despite the obvious merits of the book, Polanyi did not offer a clear course of action.7 Finally, by the time Polanyi wrote in 1944, Keynes had already presented a clearly articulated and well-known argument in favor of what could be called embedded liberalism: the need to accommodate the middle way.8 What was Keynes’ middle way? It was his conception of the economic structure and organization of society, designed as an alternative to the existing approaches of the day, laissez-faire liberalism and Marxism. Neither of these nineteenth-century philosophies was capable of sustaining economic progress in the twentieth century. While Keynes spent a good portion of his career elaborating the middle way, there are three or four works in particular which represent the core of the philosophy: ‘Am I a Liberal?’ (1925b); ‘The end of laissez-faire’ (1926); ‘Poverty 317 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY in plenty: is the economic system self adjusting?’ (1934b); and Book VI of The General Theory (1936a). 9 From these four documents, the essence of the middle way can be derived. ‘The end of laissez-faire’ provides a theoretical foundation to justify deviations from laissez-faire economics by tracing the historical and philosophical roots of the doctrine, and demonstrating that even within the temple there exists ample support for various forms of intervention. ‘Am I a Liberal?’, on the other hand, shows Keynes exploring the practical politics of the middle way, as he rejects the platforms of both the Labour and Conservative parties, and throws his lot in with the Liberals, despite his dissatisfaction with many of their policies as well. Here the strong (and daring) libertarian aspects of Keynes’ philosophy are also displayed. ‘Poverty in plenty’ emphasizes the distinctness of the middle way, with its argument that there is a fundamental qualitative difference between those who believe that the market system is essentially self-adjusting and those who do not. Finally, Book VI of The General Theory, ‘Short notes suggested by the general theory’ (almost 20 percent of the volume), broadens the scope of discussion beyond the framework of the theory itself. It includes, among other things, Keynes’ discussion of the mercantilists,10 and other themes of particular interest for present purposes, especially in Chapter 24, ‘Concluding notes on the social philosophy towards which the general theory might lead’. Taken together, four common themes of the middle way emerge. The rst is dissatisfaction with unregulated capitalism. The second is the signicance of the distribution of income, which is of positive, normative and practical signicance. Third is a strong respect for the market mechanism, a consequence of its obvious efciencies, Keynes’ grave reservations regarding collectivist economic policies, and his passionate individualism. Finally, an anti-economistic philosophy rounds out the characteristics of the middle way. Dissatisfaction with unregulated capitalism The rst step on the road to the middle way was, for Keynes, the break with laissez-faire economics, which he had previously mastered and taught. In ‘The end of laissez-faire’, he declared: ‘The World is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide’ (1926: 287–8).11 In The General Theory, Keynes was more specic: ‘The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes’ (1936a: 372). But dissent was not sufcient. Keynes knew what the problem was: unregulated capitalism ‘is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous – and it doesn’t deliver the goods’; but he also recognized that ‘when we wonder what 318 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM to put in its place, we are extremely perplexed’ (1933c: 239). Thus dissatisfaction with unregulated capitalism was but a rst step. But toward what? There was no justication for proceeding further without providing a viable alternative, and it was this to which Keynes devoted much of his career. Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 Signicance of income distribution One aspect of the break with orthodoxy was greater attention to the question of income distribution. Keynes was not a crude leveler of incomes. In fact he found ‘justication for signicant inequalities of incomes and wealth’ (though he quickly added, ‘not for such large disparities as exist today’) (Keynes, 1936a: 374). Some inequality, with its inherent incentive structures, was necessary for the market-based economic system to function. But great disparities in income were to be avoided, by government intervention if necessary, for three reasons. First, from a purely positive economic perspective, Keynes argued that a highly skewed or increasingly unequal distribution of income would yield insufcient aggregate demand and as a result reduce economic growth and facilitate below full employment equilibria. Second, from a normative perspective, unregulated market forces tended to distribute wealth and income arbitrarily and unjustly, and rewarded those who already had means. There was no philosophical justication for such a mechanism of distribution.12 Finally, from a practical perspective, the perception of injustice would lead to political upheaval, or at least elicit a political response with potentially disastrous economic consequences. Thus one good reason to reform the economic system was that in the absence of reform, there might be a stronger reaction against the capitalist system, which would be even less appealing.13 Respect for market mechanisms What makes Keynes’ approach a middle way is the importance of the market mechanism. This is embedded liberalism, with an emphasis on the latter, which is sharply distinct from Polanyi’s concept of an economy embedded within a social structure. Keynes’ concerns focused on the aws inherent in the macroeconomy. Microeconomic questions – what is produced, how it is produced, and how it is distributed – are best left to the market system. This certainly circumscribed the role of government in Keynes’ vision.14 Whatever the imperfections in this system, they would not be overcome by centralized decision making. Indeed, the ‘advantage to efciency of the decentralization of decisions and of individual responsibilities is even greater, perhaps, than the nineteenth century supposed’. Just as importantly, decentralized individualism 319 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY encourages vital experimentation, assures liberty of choice, and protects society from totalitarianism (Keynes, 1936a: 379–80). Market forces should be managed and contained, but not eliminated: ‘Whatever may be the best remedy for poverty in plenty, we must reject all those alleged remedies which consist, in substance, of getting rid of plenty’ (Keynes, 1934b: 486).15 Abandoning market forces would throw the baby out with the bathwater. This was certainly Keynes’ interpretation of Marxism, socialism and other forms of collective economic planning. Socialism, he said quite plainly, ‘offers no middle course’. In fact, one reason laissez-faire had managed to endure was the unattractive nature of the alternatives, among which he counted protectionism and Marxism. His distaste for the latter was particularly profound (Keynes, 1925b: 304; 1926: 285). Regarding Das Kapital, he wrote: I know that it is historically important and I know that many people, not all of whom are idiots, nd it a sort of Rock of Ages containing inspiration. Yet when I look into it, it is for me inexplicable that it can have this effect. Its dreary, out-of-date, academic controversialising seems so extraordinarily unsuitable as material for the purpose. (Keynes, 1934a: 38)16 Keynes’ dissatisfaction with collectivist economic philosophies was not simply the result of their economic incoherence. Such approaches also cut against the philosophy of the middle way, which stressed the individual. Keynes was, in Harrod’s words, ‘an individualist to the nger tips’ (Harrod, 1951: 191). This was the Keynes who could write to Hayek that The Road to Serfdom was ‘a grand book’: ‘morally and philosophically I nd myself in agreement with virtually the whole of it; and not only in agreement with it, but in a deeply moved agreement’ (Keynes, 1944c: 385). Philosophy and economism Rounding out the essence of Keynes’ middle way is his anti-economism. This characteristic is less central to the practice of the middle way, but a sensitivity to it does help clarify the underlying coherence of Keynes’ system. To what end was the middle way directed? Keynes envisioned that the role of the economist was to solve the economic problem: the struggle for comfort and the necessities of life. Liberated from economic fear, individuals would be free to pursue their goals. These would differ from one individual to the next, but they were unlikely to be found solely in the pursuit of wealth, which was a means, not an end. Keynes repeatedly critiqued the crude economism of both of the ‘nineteenth century orthodoxies’, classical liberalism and Marxism. 320 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM He wrote that it was the ‘escape from Bentham, joined with the unsurpassable individualism of our philosophy, which has served to protect us from the nal reductio ad absurdum of Benthamism known as Marxism’ (Keynes, 1949b: 445).17 In sum, the political economy of the middle way was that of the market nested in a system of domestic management that contained those aspects of the market process which led to inferior economic, social and political outcomes. The market plays a central role in this story: it is too efcient to be discarded, and it safeguards individual liberty. Yet unfettered, it will lead to suboptimal economic outcomes, and will generate injustice, which is both inherently unappealing and politically dangerous. But the tools for that management are those of ‘coarse tuning’ – ensuring that there is adequate investment and aggregate demand – through the manipulation of incentives to invest and the propensity to consume. Philosophically, the goal is to achieve adequate social justice (which would fall far short of ‘perfect’ equality) without sacricing economic efciency or individual liberty. This is the challenge of the middle way: Liberals are in a more difcult position. They are inclined to sympathise with Labour about what is just, but to suspect that in the ignorant blind striving after justice labour may destroy what is at least as important and is a necessary condition for any social process at all – namely efciency. (Keynes, 1927: 638)18 TH E I NT E R N A T IO N A L E C O NO M Y A N D T H E M ID D LE W A Y Keynes faced a dual problem in his time, which has resurfaced in the contemporary era. First, a domestic consensus must be achieved on the need for a middle way: the view that unfettered markets would lead to suboptimal economic outcomes. While this could come about from a shared normative perspective, Keynes, as seen above, rooted his arguments in both positive economic and practical political foundations: such a system could not sustain itself indenitely and would, as a consequence, probably elicit a dangerous political reaction. However, even if the rst problem could be solved – achieving domestic consensus – there remained the international problem. Market forces spill across sovereign boundaries. Thus even if a particular state attempted to contain the market in its domestic economy, it might be undermined by international forces. For the middle way to work, the international economy also had to be managed to insure that international market forces did not disrupt domestic management. The middle way requires embedded liberalism. Disembedded liberalism – unltered 321 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY international market forces – poses a threat to the middle way. Somewhat surprisingly, these threats did not usually emanate from the real side of the economy, i.e. from international trade. Trade in general played a relatively small part in Keynes’ analyses. Keynes’ views on international trade, however, are worthy of exploration because they highlight a number of features of Keynes’ style of analysis and of the middle way in general. It should be noted, rst of all, that for most of his life, from his earliest days as a Cambridge undergraduate through 1930, by which time he had lived more than three-quarters of his days, Keynes was an ardent free trader of the most passionate kind.19 In 1930 and early 1931, however, Keynes began to experiment, much to the horror of many of his colleagues, with the concept of a revenue tariff. He did this reluctantly and half-heartedly. He saw it as the least unpalatable technique for taking pressure off Britain’s international economic position, given the commitment of the government to the gold standard, which he was careful not to criticize publicly once it had been restored. The revenue tariff could not be considered a shift to protection, and Keynes pitched the proposal in a highly qualied way. With the suspension of the gold standard and the devaluation of the pound, Keynes wrote that the question of a revenue tariff should as a result be put on the back burner (1931f, 1931c).20 Keynes’ willingness to consider any form of protectionism in his fortyeighth year, after a life-long commitment to free trade, is a demonstration of his remarkable pragmatism, his willingness to look the facts uninchingly in the eye and let the chips fall where they may. While in this case that pragmatism may also have served his iconoclastic spirit and growing disenchantment with laissez-faire in general, this admirable open-mindedness was noticeable across a number of issue areas.21 However, Keynes’ support for and later retreat from a revenue tariff cannot simply be dismissed as pragmatism sharpened by desperate hours. Keynes became increasingly disenchanted with international trade in the 1930s, although he still recognized the underlying logic of the traditional arguments for free trade and always couched his proposals in a clearly qualied fashion. He was under few illusions and was not a crude protectionist. Keynes’ disillusionment with trade can be traced to his concern for the viability of the middle way in the context of international market forces unltered by international cooperation. Keynes never made a pauper labor argument, recognized that interference with trade would be economically inefcient, and understood that if protectionism would in fact increase British employment, it would do so at the expense of employment in foreign countries and the world as a whole (Keynes 1932d: 103; also 1932b: 204, 207, 210).22 Yet Keynes did irt with some protectionism in the 1930s.23 He did so on now-familiar grounds: that the unqualied economistic philosophy 322 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM might erode other aspects of the quality of life that are left undercounted by the market’s abacus, and that unltered market forces might make it difcult for states to pursue varied and experimental economic policies at home (Keynes, 1933c: esp. 242–4). However, even this must be further qualied, for Keynes renewed his enthusiasm for international trade once the prospects for international cooperation and thus embedded liberalism appeared more likely.24 Further, trade was never the true focus of Keynes’ concern. Much of Keynes’ preoccupation with trade centered on the persistent and structural pressures on Britain’s trade balance (Keynes, 1943: 259). Such pressures could easily manifest themselves in chronic balance of payments crises which would force the same types of contractionary policies once used to defend the gold standard. This underscores the extent to which the international threat to the middle way almost always ultimately emanated from the monetary side of the economy. In Keynes’ time, the principal challenge to the middle way did come from the monetary side. This should not be surprising, given the emphasis on money in Keynes’ career. On the question of the middle way, he wrote: ‘It is not an accident that the opening stage in this political struggle, which will last long and take many different forms, should centre about monetary policy’ (Keynes, 1925b: 306). It was Keynes’ view that an unregulated international monetary system would impose a contractionary bias on all domestic economies, particularly by imposing higher than optimal interest rate policies and affecting the overall level of investment. The international monetary system presents immediate problems for all states, since, except under circumstances of happy coincidence, they must choose between stability in the domestic or in the international price level. If the external price level is stable, e.g. if the exchange rate is xed, then states lose control over their domestic price levels. Fixed exchange rates serve as efcient conductors of monetary phenomena. Flexible exchange rates, on the other hand, allow for deviations between states’ domestic price levels, since those can be mediated by movements in exchange rates. Throughout his career, when forced to choose, Keynes’ preference was to retain control over the domestic price level. Stability in exchange rates was desirable, and if international monetary cooperation could assure this, then so much the better. But if such international coordination was not possible, then, when push came to shove, domestic price stability should take precedence over exchange rate stability.25 The essential problem of monetary cooperation – which practically by denition involves efforts to inuence exchange rates – is that it involves a sacrice of national monetary policy autonomy. Under a gold standard, for example, ‘bankers are not even trying to preserve the stability of prices and of employment’, because their policies are ‘necessarily 323 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY governed by the policies of all the other central banks’ (Keynes, 1930b: 199, 255). This phenomenon was at the heart of Keynes’ criticisms of the interwar gold standard system, which, Keynes argued, perpetuated the Great Depression and, more specically for our purposes, made it impossible to introduce policies that would be associated with the middle way. With a gold standard, if any country’s macroeconomic policies depart from the average policies of the other participants, there will be movements of gold. If a country attempts to expand its economy, under conditions of perfect capital mobility, the resulting gold outow will threaten its ability to remain on the gold standard. Either the policy or the commitment to gold must give way. Essentially, interest rates must be uniform throughout the system. However, the optimal domestic interest rate for a given state may deviate from the one established by the average of all states (Keynes, 1930b: 271).26 This problem became signicant in the interwar period. Keynes opposed Britain’s return to the gold standard on the grounds that the Bank of England would be forced to take measures which ‘necessarily involves intensifying unemployment’ in Britain (1925c: 220).27 Indeed, this was at the heart of Keynes’ critique of the interwar gold standard. Given the need to stem outows of gold that threatened convertibility, the gold standard essentially ‘involved a competitive campaign of deation’, which ‘intensied unemployment and business losses to an unendurable pitch’ (Keynes, 1931b: 248). This was compounded by the inherent fragility of the international nancial system which was never properly reconstructed after World War I, and was essentially a tangle of untested currency restorations, debt payments, and reparations quivering in the winds of political contestation and discord.28 Under such conditions, central banks were particularly conservative in the management of their reserves – but it is the ow of reserves that ultimately allows an international monetary system to function. Not only were central banks overly cautious: given the perceived scarcity of international reserves, they each attempted to assure an adequate supply, resulting in rounds of competitive tightening of credit. Even states that were secure in their gold holdings, such as the United States, could exacerbate this problem if they pursued tight monetary policies for domestic reasons. In either case, such policies draw gold from the rest of the world and force responsive credit contractions elsewhere.29 Leaving the gold standard was necessary for the practice of the middle way. As Keynes noted in his famous phrase, ‘There are few Englishmen who do not rejoice at the breaking of our golden fetters’ (1931b: 245). Adherence to the standard had meant that ‘the objective of maintaining a domestic rate of interest consistent with full employment was wholly ruled out’, and now Britain had ‘at last a free hand to do what is sensible’ (Keynes, 1936a: 339). 324 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM But while breaking with gold was necessary, it was not sufcient to assure recovery. Depreciation was helpful in that it stimulated economic recovery, and caused output, employment, investment and exports to rise more quickly than in states that remained on the gold standard. But depreciation was not the remedy in itself: rather, it was signicant in that it liberated scal and monetary policies from the constraints imposed by the gold standard. Keynes felt vindicated by the positive benets associated with the end of the gold standard, but he argued that Britain could have taken even greater advantage of the opportunities that it presented (Keynes, 1932e: 41; 1933b; see also Eichengreen, 1992: 21, 293). Additionally, breaking with gold and reating, however welcome, especially given the economic conditions of the time, do not end the story. The problems of the international monetary system don’t simply disappear with the overthrow of King Midas. Keynes’ legacy includes a broader theoretical argument about the international monetary system in general: his argument was that such a system, left unregulated, imparts a deationary bias onto the international economy, which is most visible under a gold standard system but to some extent is always present. Fixed exchange rate systems are problematic because they force the main burden of adjustment onto debtor countries.30 ‘The process of adjustment is compulsory for the debtor and voluntary for the creditor’. With greater pressure on debtors to deate than there is on creditors to reate, there is an obvious deationary bias at work. Additionally, since debtors are typically small they are also forced to make proportionally large adjustments in prices and wages to restore equilibrium to their international accounts – and this without even considering the fact that ‘the social strain of an adjustment downwards is much greater than that of an adjustment upwards’ (Keynes, 1941b: 27–8). Thus the international monetary system tends to promote deation and has a tendency to political instability. Keynes spent much of his career searching for ways to mitigate this deationary bias. In the 1930s, he explored marginal reforms, such as increasing the ‘gold points’ – the spread between the price at which central banks would buy and sell gold in exchange for their currencies. Such spreads would provide some room for macroeconomic policy autonomy. He also considered the possibility of a transactions tax to mitigate speculative ows. In this era Keynes also raised the possibility of supernational management, but recognized that such an outcome was highly unlikely (Keynes, 1930b: 291, 357; 1936a: 160). But with World War II, the USA and Britain began to explicitly prepare for the construction of the postwar international economic order – and supernational management suddenly became feasible. Keynes, again at the British Treasury for the war, saw the opportunity to resolve the problem of the deationary bias in the international 325 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY economy. His proposed Clearing Union was designed to provide ‘the substitution of an expansionist, in the place of a contractionist, pressure on world trade’, and to ‘require the chief initiative from the creditor countries, whilst maintaining enough discipline’ on debtor states. In such a system, ‘Nothing is more certain than that the movement of capital funds must be regulated’. This was not designed to discourage international lending – quite the contrary. But it was designed to allow states to insure productive capital ows while retaining some discretion to contain speculative ones (Keynes, 1941b: 31; 1941a: 46; 1942: 149). Successive drafts of Keynes’ Clearing Union proposal formed the basis of the British negotiating positions, and Keynes led the British delegations to the USA to discuss these matters. The nal outcome – the Bretton Woods institutions, including the International Monetary Fund – were much closer to the vision of the USA and Harry White than of Britain and Keynes.31 Still, and most importantly, they certainly did represent an embedded liberalism: the promotion of an open, market-based, outwardly oriented international economy, but one which was embedded in an institutional structure designed to preserve domestic autonomy, ease pressure on debtors, control the ow of capital, and provide adequate safeguards and escape clauses. Thus domestic economic preferences would not have to be sacriced on the altar of economic adjustment. If not Keynes’ vision, they would sufce, and he fought hard for the set of Anglo-American agreements. D IS EM B ED D ED LI BE R A LIS M A ND IT S C O NS EQ U E N C ES The postwar international economic order was, as Ruggie argued, designed around the principle of embedded liberalism. International trade and monetary arrangements were designed to prevent international market forces from forcing governments to abandon policies associated with the middle way. Over time, however, international liberalism has become increasingly disembedded, especially, and crucially, with regard to money and nance.32 One of the reasons that this has happened is that the lessons of the interwar period, upon which the international economic order was constructed, have faded from memory, along with the teachings of Keynes. Forgetting Keynes means that a set of theories regarding the consequences of unregulated capitalism have also been forgotten. Those consequences include a tendency for decreasing income equality and a deationary bias in the international monetary system. Keynes held that domestic government policies were required to manage aggregate demand, and assure adequate investment; and that the international economy must be mediated to assure that global market 326 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 forces did not prevent governments from introducing the policies of the middle way. Keynes justied the middle way on three foundations: normative, positive and political. With the passage of time, the normative arguments have tended to obscure the positive and the political. This may have actually facilitated the retreat from the middle way, by diverting attention from the potential costs of such an evolution. But Keynes identied the economic and political costs of unregulated capitalism, and held those costs to be signicant. These issues remain relevant in contemporary politics. The tendency of unregulated capitalism to generate inequality Keynes argued that unregulated capitalism tends to generate increasing disparities of income and wealth.33 While Keynes and others have stressed this as important in and of itself, that is, as a dependent variable, Keynes devoted much greater attention to the consequences of inequality as an independent variable: the idea that great inequality of income would undermine economic performance.34 He argued in particular that great inequality would not generate sufcient aggregate demand. Further, once aggregate demand was decient, there may be natural forces which magnify the resulting negative consequences. One example of this is a collective action problem faced by rms in a recession. Each might contract its employment to restore protability. But the consequence of many rms taking that same action would be to reduce aggregate purchasing power even more and further weaken the economy (Keynes, 1930c: 130; 1933d: 149). Thus, downward pressure on wages could unintentionally reinforce economic contraction, and, contrary to conventional wisdom, greater income equality can be associated with superior economic performance (Keynes, 1936a: 372–3).35 Keynes was also concerned with income distribution from a political perspective: inequality might generate a political reaction that would almost certainly throw out both baby and bathwater. ‘The maintenance of prosperity and civil peace’, he argued, are ‘absolutely dependent . . . [on] more equal distribution of incomes’. He continued: If capitalist society rejects a more equal distribution of incomes and the forces of banking and nance succeed in maintaining the rate of interest somewhere near the gure ruled on average during the nineteenth century (which was, by the way, a little lower than the rate of interest which rules today), then a chronic tendency towards the underemployment of resources must in the end sap and destroy that form of society. (Keynes, 1937c: 132; see also Keynes, 1919: 13; 1923a: 24) 327 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 The tendency for the international monetary system to be deationary International market pressures which affect income distribution take on greater signicance in light of the view that increasing income equality undermines economic performance. Once again, as demonstrated by the quote above, these pressures emanate from the monetary side of the international economy. Disembedded liberalism imparts a deationary bias on the international economy, and prevents states from pursuing the middle way. In theory, exible exchange rates offer states greater autonomy than do xed rates, but given the expansion of capital mobility in recent years, oating rates have provided much less insulation than expected.36 International nancial ows are a double-edged sword: not only do they undermine states’ ability to pursue policies of the middle way, but they exert their own pressures on income distribution. Conservative monetary policies, reinforced by international market forces, have significant domestic distributional consequences. Keynes was sensitive to the political consequences of domestic monetary policy, yet another lesson which has retreated from salience in recent years.37 Keynes proposed reforms designed to mitigate these problems (beyond those of his Clearing Union), which have largely been overlooked by contemporary scholars. Recent arguments in favor of an international transactions tax do have a Keynesian avor (Tobin, 1978; Eichengreen et al., 1995). But with regard to other issues, such as optimal contracts for central bankers, recent debates have not considered Keynes’ contribution (Walsh, 1995; Waller, 1992; Lohman, 1992). Once again, Keynes pointed towards the middle way. On the one hand, he argued that central bankers’ contracts should be explicit, and should be designed to insure that the interests of the nancial community are not privileged over the aggregate national interest. But on the other hand, ‘The less direct the democratic control and the more remote the opportunities for parliamentary interference with banking policy the better it will be’ (Keynes, 1932c: 131; see also Keynes, 1930b: 243). The method remains consistent: a recognition of the power and efciency of market forces, coupled with the need to insure that those forces are operating for the benet of society. C ON C L U S IO N: T HE M ID D LE WA Y I N T H EO R Y A N D HI ST O R Y Unregulated capitalism is tough stuff. Many of the recent changes in economic relations across and within nations have expanded the role of the market. In many, if not most, of these instances, these changes might prove appropriate. But the work of Keynes suggests that unfettered 328 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM market forces, within states and between them, will lead to suboptimal economic and political outcomes. The contemporary Asian nancial crisis, fueled by unregulated international capital and contained only by severe domestic contraction, is a clear illustration of this.38 The problem of unregulated capitalism may be observed more generally in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. When Keynes wrote that ‘The treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe – nothing to make the defeated Central empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new states of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia’ (Keynes, 1919: 143), one can nd parallels to the consequences of the end of the Cold War.39 More than that, it should be remembered that the triumph of capitalism in the postwar era is not the triumph of laissezfaire, it is the triumph of the middle way and embedded liberalism. The postwar ‘golden age of capitalism’ featured an embedded liberalism which accommodated domestic social policy, built on the lessons of the past and the failures of unregulated capitalism earlier in the century. Forgetting history – the lessons of history and the theorists of history – risks cultivating the conditions which contributed to the economic and political upheavals of another age. N OT E S I thank Rawi Abdelal, Richard Bensel, Tom Christensen, John Ikenberry, Peter Katzenstein, Charles Kindleberger, Karl Mueller, Jonas Pontusson, Gustav Schachter, Martin Shefter, two anonymous referees, and the participants in the Political Economy Research Colloquium at Cornell University for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 1 John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) lived a remarkably rich life that dees quick summary. Editor of the Economic Journal for over thirty years, prominent pamphleteer and private advisor to the British government, his books include The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923a) and A Treatise on Money (1930a, 1930b). Keynes also maintained an active interest in the arts, which provides insight into aspects of his general philosophy. He founded and managed a theater in Cambridge in 1935, and was later a member of the board of trustees for the National Gallery and chair of the Committee for the Encouragement of Music and Arts. During World War II Keynes represented the British government in negotiations that shaped Lend-Lease, Bretton Woods and the postwar British loan. The literature on Keynes is enormous. I would call attention to three biographies: Harrod (1951) which has the distinct perspective that only a contemporary could provide; Moggridge (1992) written by the principal editor of Keynes’ Collected Writings; and Skidelsky (1983, 1994) (third volume forthcoming). 2 A frustrating aspect of The General Theory is that it is the most famous yet among the least clearly written of Keynes’ works, which is particularly distressing since Keynes usually wrote beautifully. Some of the book’s main 329 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 3 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 4 5 6 7 8 9 themes can be found in other writings which were directed at a more popular audience: see Keynes and Henderson (1929); Keynes (1930c, 1933d, 1932a). It should also be noted that history has tended to ignore Keynes’ attention to the management of excessive demand. Keynes (1940a) addressed this issue most comprehensively. Three years earlier, Keynes (1937d: 388) also wrote: ‘Just as it was advisable for the Government to incur debt during the slump, so for the same reasons is it now advisable that they should incline to the opposite policy . . . The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury.’ The data suggest that 80 percent of all foreign exchange transactions involve round trips that take place in less than a week, and more than half of those in under two days (ul Haq et al., 1996: 3). In the wake of the crisis, however, there has been some backlash against the consensus on capital deregulation. See Bhagwati (1998) and Rodrik (1998). Under the headline ‘International Capital Markets Charting a Steadier Course’, the Fund also noted that ‘Although the scale of nancial activity continues to grow, market participants – including high-risk high-return investment funds – are more disciplined, cautious, and sensitive to market fundamentals’ (IMF, 1996b: 293). Ruggie does not make this mistake, noting both that ‘Polanyi’s prediction of the end of the capitalist internationalism does not stand up well’ and that ‘Some of Polanyi’s thoughts about the future had already been entertained by the individuals who would come to be directly responsible for negotiating the monetary component of the postwar international economic order’ (Ruggie, 1982: 388, 387). But the second point is a dramatic understatement, and it is too easy for the reader to come away from Ruggie’s paper associating Polanyi with embedded liberalism. It should also be noted that the postwar practice of economic intervention in the domestic sphere looked much more like the ‘middle way’ described below (macroeconomic management but with circumscribed micro controls) than it does Ruggie’s interpretation of embedded liberalism. See Nau (1990: 72–4); also Brinkley (1995: 266–8). I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention. On Polanyi’s skepticism about reform, see for example Polanyi (1944: 130), where he argues that the ‘countermovement checking the expansion’ of the market, which was ‘vital . . . for the protection of society, in the last analysis was incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and thus with the market system itself’. It was Keynes, undercast in Ruggie’s play, who inuenced those who contemplated the postwar order. See for example the Economist (1941: 222), which declared the postwar problem to be ‘combining a New Deal in world trade with New Deals in domestic and social policy’; also Hansen and Kindleberger (1942). It also quite likely that Polanyi’s (1944) emphasis on the international monetary system as an important transmitter of destabilizing international market forces (see for example Chapter 16, ‘Market and productive organization’, pp. 192–200, 205, 219) was inuenced by Keynes’ earlier arguments in this vein; see pp. 322–323 below. ‘Am I a Liberal?’ was rst given as an address and subsequently published in two parts in The Nation and Athenaeum, 8 and 15 August 1925. It was reprinted by Keynes in Essays in Persuasion. ‘The end of laissez-faire’, also originally a lecture, was published as a pamphlet by Hogarth Press in July 1926. The pamphlet was excerpted in Essays in Persuasion, and the Collective Writings (CW) version (vol. IX) reprints the full pamphlet. (Page numbers here and elsewhere in this article refer to CW versions.) ‘Poverty in plenty’, 330 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 originally a radio broadcast, was published in The Listener in November 1934 and in a revised form in The New Republic. Care should be taken in using this source, since Keynes refused to allow ‘the informal talk’ to be published in a volume which collected similar broadcasts (CW: XIII, 485). Keynes’ attempt to rehabilitate some mercantilist theories was highly controversial at the time and is too easily misunderstood. Keynes did not nd mercantilist theories of trade appealing, and suffered no illusions regarding the zero-sum consequences of mercantilist international policies, of which he was not in favor. (On Keynes and trade, see pp. 322–323, below.) Rather, Keynes found ‘an element of scientic truth in mercantilist doctrine’, which had to do with its recognition of the need to insure adequate liquidity. Keynes was attempting to demonstrate historical precedent in economic thought for the idea that the market system might not be self-adjusting, especially with regard to the interest rate, and for the importance of the concept of effective demand. See Keynes (1936a: 335, also 336–8, 341; 1933a: esp. 88). The break with laissez-faire was a watershed event for Keynes, and this was a recurrent theme in his correspondence. Regarding the evolution of economics in the light of the innovations of the interwar years, Keynes (1937a: 165) wrote to D. H. Robertson: ‘You are, so to speak, bent on creeping back into your mother’s womb; whilst I am shaking myself like a dog on dry land.’ Skidelsky (1994) is more cautious about the importance of Keynes’ views on distribution from the perspective of his moral philosophy. See especially pp. 62, 223. But see also p. 233 for strong evidence to the contrary. It is safe to say that Keynes’ ideal society would place great emphasis on equality of economic opportunity, but that such a society would not ‘level individuals’, and would still feature marked inequalities of income and wealth. As Keynes (1944c: 387) wrote to Hayek, ‘Your greatest danger ahead is the probable practical failure of the application of your philosophy in the U.S. in a fairly extreme form.’ ‘The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all’ (Keynes, 1926: 291). Keynes added: ‘A large part of the established body of economic doctrine I cannot but accept as broadly correct. I do not doubt it’ (1934b: 487). He also spoke out against excessive taxation of business and emphasized that measures to support labor and efforts at redistribution should not undermine business incentives. See for example, Keynes (1930h: 12, 14; 1940b). See also Keynes (1926: 290–1; 1925a: 258). Keynes (1944a: 467) opposed largescale nationalization on the ground that industries ‘to be run solely or primarily on commercial considerations’ should be left in private hands. This point merits some elaboration: It can be no part of this memoir for me to try to explain why it was such a big advantage for us to have escaped from the Benthamite tradition. But I do now regard that as the worm which has been gnawing at the insides of modern civilization and is responsible for its present moral decay. We used to regard the Christians as the enemy, because they appeared as the representatives of tradition, convention, and hocus-pocus. In truth it was the Benthamite calculus, based on an overvaluation of the economic criterion, which was destroying the quality of the popular ideal (Keynes, 1949b: 445). 331 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 18 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 As Skidelsky (1983: 133) notes, ‘My early beliefs’ is ‘a key document for understanding his life’s work’. Similar themes are also explored in Keynes (1933c: 242). On the similarities between Marxism and laissez-faire in this regard, see Keynes (1934b: 488). On the philosophical poverty of economism, see Keynes (1926: 293; 1925a: 267). On the role of economists in solving the economic problem, see Keynes (1930d: esp. 332). Keynes also noted: ‘If society had always been strictly just, I am not sure that we might not still be monkeys in a forest.’ On these themes of the middle way, see also Keynes (1927: 640; 1926: 294); and on the ‘true destiny of New Liberalism’ (1925b: 305). Representative of Keynes’ view at this time was his characterization of protection as ‘a disastrous and deceptive prescription’, while free trade was ‘a necessary and essential defense against a crushing poverty’ (Keynes, 1922: 2). See also his passionate support for free trade (Keynes, 1923b: 147). Keynes (1931g: 231) subsequently wrote that he made the proposals ‘somewhat in desperation’; see also (1931e: 12). Note as well the highly qualied nature of these proposals raised by Keynes in various forums Keynes (1930e; 1930g: esp. 120, 123, 125; 1930f). On the retreat from the revenue tariff, see Keynes (1931a: 243). This occasionally led to charges of inconsistency, which once provided Keynes the opportunity to respond to a heckler: ‘The difference between me and some other people is that I oppose Mr. Lloyd George when he is wrong and support him when he is right’ (Harrod, 1951: 396). More impressively, Keynes, who ardently supported a policy of unilateral disarmament and pacism in the 1920s, in the 1930s supported a vigorous rearmament policy and emerged as a strong critic of British appeasement policies. On disarmament and pacism, see Keynes (1923d: 451; 1925b: 301). On the 1930s, see Keynes (1936c, 1937b, 1938). Even in the latter, Keynes’ strongest protectionist statement, he notes that ‘Nine times out of ten [the free trader] is speaking forth the words of wisdom and simple truth’ (1932b: 204). Moggridge (1992: 575) makes the important point that Keynes’ support of protection was highly qualied, and that ‘those who have been inclined to cite Keynes in support of their protectionist views should do so with caution’. However, in my view Moggridge under-emphasizes the extent to which Keynes was willing to entertain such measures. See for example his speech before the House of Lords, 16 May 1944, where Keynes argued ‘The expansion of our export industries which is so vital to us would be much easier if obstacles to trade can be diminished or done away with all together’ (Keynes, 1944d: 4; see also 1944b: 316). ‘[T]here does seem to be in almost every case a presumption in favour of the stability of prices’ (Keynes, 1923a: 125). For a quick summary of the principal themes maintained by Keynes regarding international monetary relations, see Keynes (1936c: 500). In 1923 Keynes (1923a: 139–40) argued that given the distribution of the world’s gold, a restoration of the gold standard would ‘surrender the regulation of our price level and the handling of the credit cycle to the Federal Reserve Board of the United States’. Even if this untested institution was able to overcome domestic pressures on its autonomy, it was not certain, ‘apart from weakness or mistakes, that the simultaneous application of the same policy will always be in the interests of both countries’. 332 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM 27 Keynes (1923c: 100) raised this criticism as early as 1923, in his opposition to an interest rate hike: ‘There is no necessary reason why disturbances on the continent need cause a million or two Englishmen to stand idle.’ 28 On the fragility of the international nancial system, see Eichengreen (1992). This important book not only surveys the nancial terrain, but develops, in many cases more fully and systematically than Keynes did, the argument that the interwar gold standard transmitted deationary shocks that elicited responses which magnied their consequences and prevented states from introducing compensatory measures, and that the key to recovery lay in abandonment of the gold standard to pursue domestic expansion. On the politicization of the interwar international monetary system and its consequences, see Kirshner (1995: 175–92). 29 ‘A further consequence of the very dear money in the United States was to exercise a drag on the gold of the rest of the world and hence to cause a credit contraction elsewhere’ (Keynes, 1931d: 350; see also Keynes, 1929). 30 These problems are less acute in a system of oating rates. However, as discussed below (p. 328), they can still be signicant. 31 Gardner (1980), emphasizes the differences in the US and British proposals; Ikenberry (1992) emphasizes the similarities. The successive versions of Keynes’ proposals, with other drafts, and related documents and correspondence are in CW, vol. XXV and the rst part of volume XXVI. 32 Cohen (1996); Goodman and Pauly (1993); Cosh et al. (1992). It can be argued that nancial markets were highly integrated in earlier periods of history (Neal, 1990; Zevin, 1992) but this does not affect the argument regarding trends and consequences in the postwar period. 33 Again, this was most visible in the nancial side of the economy: ‘The powers of uninterrupted usury are too great. If the accretions of vested interest were to grow without mitigation for many generations, half the population would be no more than slaves to the other half’ (Keynes, 1923a: 56). 34 It should be recalled (as noted above, p. 319) that Keynes held that there was both philosophical and economic justication for signicant income inequality. He also placed a greater priority on assuring adequate investment. 35 As Keynes (1936d: 16) wrote to Hawtrey ‘I favour a scheme of direct taxation in order to redistribute incomes in such a way as to increase the propensity to consume.’ Recent studies lend support to the view that income equality and economic growth are positively correlated. See Persson and Tabellini (1994); Chang (1994); Corry and Glyn (1994). Note that the focus here is on developed states and not intended to contradict Kuznets’ argument regarding changes in income equality over the course of economic development. 36 Exchange rate exibility gives states some breathing room, but does not eliminate the international constraint unless states are completely indifferent to their exchange rates. Few states, if any, have this luxury, and the dramatic increases in the speed and scale of capital mobility have reduced the time it takes for states to reach the limits of their capability to tolerate exchange uctuations. 37 The idea that price changes do not work their way uniformly through the economy is, I believe, one of the most signicant and underappreciated aspects of Keynes’ economics. See Keynes (1930a: 82, 244; 1923a: 1). 38 More subtly, unregulated capital may contribute to a chronic condition of slower growth and increased political contestation in the advanced industrial states. See Kirshner (1998). 333 REVIEW OF INTERNA TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 39 For more by Keynes on the peace conference, see the exquisitely written ‘Dr. Melchior: a defeated enemy’ (Keynes, 1949a). Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 R E F E R EN C E S Bhagwati, Jagdish (1998) ‘The capital myth’, Foreign Affairs 77: 7–12. Brinkley, Alan (1995) The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chang, Roberto (1994) ‘Income inequality and economic growth: evidence and recent theories’, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 79: 1–10. Cohen, Benjamin (1996) ‘Phoenix risen: the resurrection of global nance’, World Politics 48: 268–96. Corry, D. and Glyn, A. (1994) ‘The macroeconomics of equality, stability, and growth’, in A. Glyn and D. Miliband (eds) Paying for Inequality, London: Rivers Oram Press. Cosh, A. D., Hughes, A. and Singh, A. (1992) ‘Openness, nancial innovation, changing patterns of ownership, and the structure of nancial markets’, in Tariq Banuri and Juliet B. Schor (eds) Financial Openness and National Autonomy: Opportunities and Constraints, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Economist (1941) ‘The freedom to trade’, 23 August. Eichengreen, Barry (1992) Golden Fetters: the Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919–39, New York: Oxford University Press. Eichengreen, Barry, Tobin, J. and Wyplosz, C. (1995) ‘Two cases for sand in the wheels of international nance’, The Economic Journal 105: 162–72. Gardner, Richard N. (1980) Sterling–Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, New York: Columbia University Press. Goad, G. Pierre (1998) ‘Acceptance of capital controls is spreading’, Asian Wall Street Journal, 2 September. Goodman, J. and Pauly, L. (1993) ‘The obsolescence of capital controls? Economic management in an age of global markets’, World Politics 46: 50–82. 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Reprinted in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, eds Donald Moggridge and Elizabeth Johnson, London: Macmillan, 1971–89 (hereafter CW) (CW: II). –––– (1922) ‘Notes from a speech at the 95 Club’, Manchester, 25 October (CW: XIX, 1–6). –––– (1923a) A Tract on Monetary Reform, London: Macmillan (CW: IV). 334 Downloaded by [Virginia Tech Libraries] at 20:28 24 October 2013 KIRSH NER: KEYNES AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM –––– (1923b) ‘Free trade’, The Nation and Athenaeum, 24 November, 1 December (CW: XIX, 147–57). –––– (1923c) ‘Bank rate at four percent’, The Nation and Athenaeum, 14 July (CW: XIX, 100–3). –––– (1923d) ‘The underlying principles’, Manchester Guardian Commercial, 4 January (CW: XVII, 448-54). –––– (1925a) A Short View of Russia, London: Hogarth Press (originally in The Nation and Athenaeum 10, 17, 25 October 1925), reprinted in Essays in Persuasion (CW: IX, 253–71). –––– (1925b) ‘Am I a Liberal?’, The Nation and Athenaeum, 8 and 15 August; reprinted in Essays in Persuasion (CW: IX, 295–306). –––– (1925c) The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill, London: Hogarth Press (originally a series of articles, ‘Unemployment and monetary policy’, The Evening Standard, 22, 23 and 24 July), reprinted in Essays in Persuasion (CW: IX, 207–30). –––– (1926) ‘The end of laissez-faire’, London: Hogarth Press, reprinted in Essays in Persuasion (CW: IX, 272–94). –––– (1927) ‘Liberalism and industry’, speech delivered at the National Liberal Club, 5 January (CW: XIX, 638–48). –––– (1929) ‘Is there enough gold? 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