Tense and aspect in swing conditionals
Fabienne Martin
Universität Stuttgart/ Université Paris 8
DGFS Meeting, Workshop Modelling conditionality
Universität Leipzig
March 5, 2015
1
Introduction
◦ This paper focuses on past subjunctive conditionals (PSCs) in French.1
◦ Palmer (1986), Iatridou (2000) and subsequent authors have observed that in many languages,
PSCs are built by using one (and sometimes two) additional layer(s) of tense morphology on
top of the regular tense morphology locating the event in time.
◦ In French, the first additional layer of past tense is generally2 realized (a.o.) with the imperfective aspect. This explains the presence, in the antecedent of the PSC (1), of the plus que
parfait, combining imperfective morphology to a layer of perfect used to locate the hypothetical event in time in (2), and of the ‘conditionnel’ morphology in the consequent, which is the
morphological spell-out of the imperfective plus the future (Iatridou (2000)).
(1)
Si on avait
réfléchi, on n’ aurait
pas signé.
If we have-PRST thought, we NEG have-COND NEG signed
‘If we ‘have thought’ about it, we wouldn’t have signed.’
(2)
S’ ils ont
réfléchi, ils n’ ont pas signé.
If they have-PRST thought, they NEG have- NEG signed
‘If they ‘have thought’ about it, they ‘have not’ signed.’
◦ Tenses without imperfective morphology, i.a. the passé composé (that has both simple past
and present perfect uses), are said to be banned in standard PSCs, as confirmed by the unacceptability of (3).
(3)
* Si on a réfléchi, on
n’ aurait pas
signé.
If we have-PRST thought, we NEG have-COND NEG signed
‘If we ‘have thought’ about it, we wouldn’t have signed.’
1 This
work is part of the B5 project of the Collaborative Research Center 732 hosted by the University of
Stuttgart. I would like to thank the reviewers and audiences of CLS 49, LSRL 43 and Amsterdam Colloquium 19
for their feedback. None of them is responsible for my mistakes.
2 There are exceptions to this. If the corresponding indicative clause is a stative sentence with an imperfective,
the additional layer of past tense is a perfect.
1
◦ Observation: this empirical picture should be refined. One finds relevant occurrences of
conditionals with a conditionnel 2 in the consequent and a passé composé in the antecedent in
corpora, cf. e.g. (4)-(9), all taken from the internet and found with Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff
et al. (2014)). Taken out of their context, these sentences give rise to heterogeneous judgments
among native speakers (some accept them all, others reject all or some of them only).
(4)
Si un missile sol-air
a effectivement été utilisé, il aurait
été tiré
If a missile ground-air has indeed
been used, it have-COND been launched
à partir d’ un bateau au large de Long Island.
from
a boat at the coast of Long Island
‘If a surface-to-air missile ‘has indeed been’ used, it would have been launched from
a boat off the Long Island coast.’
(5)
Si cette femme a réellement menti, elle aurait
sali
l’image des
if this woman has really
lied she have-COND dishonoured the image of the
femmes africaines!
women african
‘If this woman really ‘has lied’, she would have dishonoured the image of African
women!’
(6)
Si Dieu a tout
créé, Il aurait
donc aussi créé le mal!
if God has everything created He have-COND then too created the evil
If God ‘has created’ everything, then he would have also created the evil!’
(7)
Ta machine est de 1993, si ta courroie n’a
pas été changée, elle
your machine is from 1993 if your belt
NEG has NEG been changed it
aurait
eu 20 ans ce qui fait beaucoup nan?
have-COND been 20 years PRN that makes a lot
nope
‘Your machine is from 1993, if your belt ‘hasn’t been changed’, it would have been
20 years old, which is a lot, right?’
(8)
Si l’ancien
proprio a tapé [le moyeu], il
aurait ruiné
la
jante
If the previous owner has hit [the
hub], he
have-COND destroyed the
et
il l’ aurait donc
changée, il y a
un
truc que je ne
wheel and he it
have-COND therefore changed, there is a thing that I
comprends pas.
NEG
understand NEG
‘If the previous owner ‘has hit’ the hub, he would have destroyed the wheel and he
would have therefore changed it, there is something I don’t understand.’
(9)
Si le chef d’ état-major a réellement tenu les propos
rapportés par la presse,
If the Chief of Staff
has really
made the comments reported by the press,
il aurait
commis un acte grave.
he have-COND committed a act serious
‘If the Chief of Staff really ‘has made’ the comments reported by the press, he would
have committed a gross misconduct.’
◦ The context of uses of these examples (often found in the press) suggests that these nonstandard conditionals are produced by fully competent native French speakers, even if they are
banished by some prescriptive grammars. Since conditionals like (4)-(9) mix the morphologies
typical of PSCs and past indicative conditionals (PICs), I call them ‘swing’ PSCs.
2
◦ I translate the passé composé in the antecedent of swing PSCs with an English present perfect instead of the expected simple past in order for the reader to keep track more easily of
the difference between standard and non-standard (swing) PSCs. I am aware though that such
translations sound completely ungrammatical in English.
◦ Note that as already observed by Caudal and Roussarie (2005), the French passé simple (the
French simple past) cannot be used in the antecedent of any kind of past subjunctive conditionals.3
◦ The talk is organized as follows:
• How swing PSCs differ from standard PSCs? (section 2)
• How swing PSCs differ from PICs? (section 3)
• Similarities and differences with factual conditionals (Iatridou (1991)) and premise-conditionals
(Haegeman (2003)) (section 4)
• How tense/aspect morphology contributes to the interpretation of swing PSCs? (section
5)
2
Swing PSCs vs. standard PSCs
◦ Swing PSCs differ from standard PSCs in at least four properties.
Difference 1. swing PSCs are systematically odd if the antecedent p or ¬p follows from the
context C (the set of worlds currently taken to be epistemically accessible by all participants,
cf. Stalnaker (1978)): they require p to be undecided relative to C.
◦ This suffices to explain the problem of (3) repeated below, since there, C most probably
entails either p or ¬p:
(10)
* Si on a
réfléchi, on n’ aurait
pas signé.
If we have-PRST thought, we NEG have-COND NEG signed
‘If we ‘have thought’ about it, we wouldn’t have signed.’
Also, if the examples in (4)-(9) are preceded by an assertion of ¬p, they become odd:
(11)
Elle n’ a pas dit cela! #Si elle a réellement dit cela, elle aurait
she NEG has NEG said this if she has really
said this she have-COND
commis une faute
grave.
committed a misconduct gross
3 Potential
counterexamples to this claim like the sentence below can easily be reanalysed as cases where
the antecedent contains a past subjunctive (which is formally identical to the passé simple for the singular third
person):
(1)
Si elle fut
restée, je
serais resté. (Barbey d’Aurevilly)
if she be-PAST. SUBJ .stayed I
be-COND . stayed
‘If she had stayed, I would have stayed.’
As reported e.g. in Iatridou (2000), the past subjunctive was formerly used in PSCs in French.
3
‘She ‘hasn’t said’ this! If she really ‘has said’ this, she would have committed a gross
misconduct.’
◦ By contrast, standard PSCs are, of course, unproblematic in a context where the antecedent
p is taken to be counterfactual, since standard PSCs regularly presuppose their antecedent as
false:4
Difference 2. swing PSCs are typically used when p is contextually salient but not yet accepted nor rejected in the context C — p is on the Table/at issue (Farkas and Bruce (2010)).
An evidence for this is the frequent presence in corpora of anaphorical adverbials like effectivement/vraiment ‘indeed/really’ in their antecedent. (On this they also resemble factual/ premise
conditionals, cf. section 3 below).
Difference 3. While standard PSCs are acceptable in a context where the negation of the
consequent q is taken for granted, swing PSCs are often less good (and even often out) in a
context where the consequent q is overtly contrary to facts. The more one is certain about the
falsity of q, the less they are acceptable, cf. the following contrast:
(12)
a. Si elle a vraiment déménagé, elle aurait
certainement prévenu
if she has really
moved
she have-COND certainly
informed
quelqu’un!
somebody
‘If she really ‘has moved’, she would certainly have informed somebody!’
a. # Si elle a
vraiment déménagé, elle
m’aurait prévenu!
if she has really moved she
have-COND informed me
‘If she really ‘has moved’, she would have informed me!’
That said, one does find examples in corpora obviously written from native speakers where q is
counterfactual, see the example below (but they are less acceptable, at least to my ears):
(13)
Tyson a rétorqué que si le procureur a voulu agir, il l’aurait
fait
Tyson has retorted that if the Attorney has wanted to act he it have-COND . done
depuis longtemps.
since a long time
Tyson replied that if the Attorney ‘has wanted’ to act, he would have done it a long time
ago.’
In any case, swing PSCs systematically present q as (very) unlikely.
I will call ‘past less vivid’ the reading under which the hypothetical event in the past is presented as (very) uncertain/unlikely, but not as plainly contrary to facts.
4 The ‘subjunctive inference’ of counterfactual antecedent falsity has been analysed as a presupposition (e.g.
by Lakoff (1970)), an implicature (e.g. by Biezma et al. (2013)), or an antipresupposition (Leahy (2011)). I follow
here Ippolito (2013)’s observation that the counterfactual antecedent falsity is cancellable in some cases, but not
others (more on the difference below).
4
Difference 4. While standard PSCs can be about future hypothetical events (cf. Ippolito
(2003, 2013) a.o.), swing PSCs cannot: future adverbials are impossible in these non-standard
variant of PSCs.
(14)
3
a. S’ils avaient joué la dernière partie demain, ils auraient
gagné.
if they have-IMP played the last
game tomorrow they have-COND won
‘If they had played the last game tomorrow, they would have won.’
a. *S’ils ont joué la dernière partie demain, ils auraient
gagné.
if they have played the last
game tomorrow they have-COND won
‘If they ‘have played’ the last game tomorrow, they would have won.’
Swing PSCs vs. past indicative conditionals
◦ Swing PSCs also differ from PICs in three respects.
Difference 1. PICs can sometimes be used as a rhetorical device when p follows from C, as
observed by e.g. Dancygier (1998), cf. (15). This is not possible with swing PSCs, cf. (16).
(15)
Il a plu. S’il a plu, le match a été annulé.
It has rained. If it has rained, the match has been cancelled
‘It ‘has rained’. If it ‘has rained’, the match ‘has been’ cancelled.’
(16)
# Il a plu. S’il a plu, le match aurait
été annulé.
It has rained. If it has rained, the match have-COND been cancelled
‘It ‘has rained’. If it ‘has rained’, the match would have been cancelled.’
Difference 2. Another difference concerns past conditionals à la Anderson (Anderson (1951)).
Andersonian PSCs are illustrated in (17). They are used to argue for the truth of p. As Anderson
emphasizes, the existence of such conditionals shows that PSCs do not systematically presuppose that their antecedent is false.
(17)
If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he
does in fact show. [So, it is likely that he took arsenic.]
◦ It It is well-known that Andersonian PICs (e.g. (18)) are odd (cf. von Fintel (1998) for an
account in terms of uninformativeness). This is also true in French, cf. (19):
(18)
# If Jones took arsenic, he shows exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.
(19)
# Si John a pris de l’arsenic, il a montré exactement les symptômes qu’il
If John has taken of-the arsenic, he has shown exactly
the symptoms that he
a maintenant.
has now
‘If John ‘has taken’ arsenic, he ‘has shown’ exactly the symptoms that he has now.’
◦ By contrast, Andersonian swing PSCs are natural, as shown by the acceptability of (20). We
can account for it the same way von Fintel 1998 explains the acceptability of the subjunctive in
5
(17) if we admit that swing PSCs are a subvariant of PSCs.5
(20)
Si John a effectivement pris de l’arsenic, il aurait
montré exactement
If John has indeed
taken of-the arsenic, he have-COND shown exactly
les symptômes qu’il a maintenant.
the symptoms that he has now
‘If John indeed ‘has taken’ arsenic, he would have shown exactly the symptoms that
he has now.’
Difference 3. Another difference between PICs and swing PSCs is that except in Andersonian
cases, the latter tend to convey that q is unlikely in C. This is not the case of PICs.
◦ Table 1 summarizes the differences between the three types of past conditionals reviewed in
this section (Andersonian cases are ignored here).
Input context
C|= ¬p
C|= p
C|= ¬q
swing PSC
#
#
#/ (OK?)
Standard PSC
OK
#
OK
PIC
#
OK
#
Table 1: Restrictions on the ‘input’ context of past conditionals
◦ Conclusion: swing PSCs require a context where the truth value of p and q is not settled yet,
and present q as unlikely (past less vivid reading) rather than counterfactual.
4
Comparison with factual and premise conditionals
◦ I proposed that asserting a swing PSC is a way to address the issue p.
◦ However, the speaker who utters a swing PSC is not neutral wrt p: one typically uses swing
PSCs to indicate that one is reluctant to endorse the view that p is possible to the participant
who puts p on the Table.
◦ This is a first property that swing PSCs share with ‘premise conditionals’ (Haegeman (2003)),
cf. (21), and ‘factual conditionals’ (Iatridou (1991)), cf. (22).
(21)
If Mr Murdoch knows that Brian MacArthur is considering retirement (and I somewhat
doubt it), he has played the same role in his replacement as in every other decision of
mine to appoint or remove columnists [...] — absolutely none. (Haegeman (2003, 328))
(22)
You shouldn’t remain quiet if you’re so unhappy. (Iatridou (1991, 65)).
5 I adopt here von Fintel (1998)’s view according to which the difference between PSCs and PICs mainly lies in
the kind of domain (D(w)) the conditional quantifies over. According to von Fintel and others, the natural default
pragmatic constraint on quantification over worlds performed by conditionals is that D(w) is entirely in C. The
indicative being unmarked, it does not signal anything against this constraint D(w)⊆C. The subjunctive is marked
and indicates a violation: SCs presuppose that D(w) is partly outside C (D(w) C).
6
◦ Iatridou (1991, 60-61): ‘the characteristic of the FC IF-clause is that somebody must believe
its content to be true. [...] [This person] [...] cannot be the speaker.’
◦ Haegeman (2003, 328): ‘The use of if [in a premise conditional] to introduce the contextual
premise makes it manifest that the speaker does not necessarily endorse the premise. He is entertaining it ‘for the sake of the argument’, to draw the inference in the associated clause.’
◦ The same is true of our swing PSCs, except that the speaker entertains p to show that p leads
to an unlikely conclusion (and therefore suggests, by doing so, that p should be rejected rather
than adopted).
◦ A second property shared with premise/factual conditionals is that the if -clause is always
interpreted outside the negation (note that (24) is slightly strange, requires a prosodic pause
just before the if -clause and is much better if the if-clause is sentence initial, which confirms
the point).
(23)
a. You shouldn’t remain quiet if you are so unhappy. (Iatridou 1991)
b. 6= You should remain quiet but not if you are so unhappy.
(24)
a. (?)Pierre n’aurait pas
commis de faute
grave si il a
Pierre NEG
have-COND committed IND misconduct gross if he has
réellement tenu ces propos.
really
made these comments
‘Pierre wouldn’t have committed a gross misconduct if he really ‘has made’ these
comments.’
b. 6=He would have committed a gross misconduct not if he made these comments,
but if....
Thirdly, the if -clause of swing conditionals cannot be denied, like the if -clause of factual
conditionals:
(25)
A. If I may be honest you’re looking awful.
B. That’s not true. # I look aawful if you may be deceitful. (Iatridou (1991, 53))
(26)
A. S’il a réellement tenu ces propos, Pierre aurait
commis une
If he has really
made these comments Pierre have-COND committed a
faute
grave.
misconduct gross
‘If he really ‘has made’ these comments, Pierre would have made a gross misconduct.’
B. Ca n’est pas vrai. # Il en faut beaucoup plus pour commettre une faute grave.
‘That’s not true. One has to do much more in order to commit a gross misconduct.’
→ The if -clause of swing conditionals seems to stay outside of the assertion, as Iatridou (1991)
proposes for factual conditionals (and as Haegeman 2003 argues for premise conditionals).
◦ However, the subtype of swing conditionals we are looking at here differ from premise/
factual conditionals on different points:
7
i. Factual and premise conditionals do not specify the circumstances under which the consequent is true. Rather, their antecedent gives the condition under which the speech act
produced by the utterance of the consequent is appropriate. Our examples of swing PSCs
express a relation of truth between the antecedent and the consequent.
ii. The consequent of factual and premise conditionals can be used in an independent clause
without change in meaning. This is not the case of the swing PSCs under study here.
iii. ‘The choice of tense in the premise-conditional is determined by the factors that determine the choice of tense in an independent clause’. (Haegeman (2003, 321)). The choice
of tense is more constrained in ‘truly hypothetical’ swing conditionals.
5
From the morphology to the semantics of swing PSCs
5.1
Past-as-past approaches of standard PSCs
5.1.1
Introduction
◦ I adopt what Schulz (2012) calls ‘past-as-past’ approaches of standard PSCs (Dudman 1983,
Dahl (1997), Ippolito (2003, 2013), Arregui (2005), Romero (2014)):
• the ‘fake’ layer(s) of past we find in PSCs express(es) temporal precedence like in the
‘regular’ use of the past.
• However, this morphology is not interpreted within the ‘bare’ conditional (the structure
consisting of the modal operator, the if -clause acting as its restriction and the consequent
acting as its nuclear scope), but rather outside the if -clause and contributes to the
interpretation of the modal.
◦ Among these approches, I will adopt a modified version of Ippolito’s approach for at least
two reasons:
• it covers SCs about hypothetical events in the past and the future
• it explicitly differentiates between cancellable counterfactuality and non-cancellable (‘strong’)
counterfactuality.
5.1.2
One vs. two layers of fake pasts
Ippolito (2002, 2003, 2006, 2013): a conditional is a ‘bare’ modal structure embedded under a temporal structure, and which temporal structure embeds the bare conditional determines the kind of conditional that results:
• Indicative conditionals are bare modal structures embedded under present tense;
• ‘One fake past’ SCs are modal structures embedded under a present perfect [for us: an
imperfective]
• ‘Two fake pasts’ SCs are modal structures embedded under a past perfect.
◦ This gives us the following LF skeleton for SCs (‘real’ tenses locating the hypothetical events
are in bold):
8
(27)
a. LF for ‘one fake past’ subjunctive conditionals about the present/future
PAST1 [MODAL [PRES p] [PRES q]]]
would
b. LF for ‘one fake past’ subjunctive conditionals about the past
PAST1 [MODAL [PAST2 p] [PAST2 q]]]
would have
c. LF for ‘two fake pasts’ subjunctive conditionals about the present/future
PAST1 [PAST2 [MODAL [PRES p] [PRES q]]]]
would have
d. LF for ‘two fake pasts’ subjunctive conditionals about the past
PAST1 [PAST2 [MODAL [PAST3 p] [PAST3 q]]]]
would have
◦ The role of the temporal operator embedding the temporal structure manipulates the time
argument of the accessibility function (and therefore affects the truth-conditions and the requirements on the projection of their presuppositions).
◦ Which of these structures is instantiated by would have SC? [In French: conditionals with a
conditionnel 2 in the consequent]
◦ 1. If the would have SC is about a hypothetical event in the future, we can (almost safely)
conclude that we deal with a ‘two fake pasts’ SC (structure (27c)), since none of the two layers
of past locates the hypothetical event in time.6
◦ 2. Things are more complex when the would have SC is about a hypothetical event in the
past, because French (like English), has no form that expresses three pasts within the same
clause.
◦ We therefore assume like Ippolito (2013, 97) does for English that both structures (27b) and
(27c) will be expressed by the same surface form (cf. also Iatridou (2000, 252), fn. 26, who
analyses this as a case of haplology.)
5.1.3
More fake pasts means ‘stronger’ counterfactuality
◦ Ippolito (2013)’s observation:
• ‘One fake past’ SCs convey cancellable counterfactuality;
• ‘two fake past’ SCs convey strong (noncancellable) counterfactuality.
◦ Ippolito’s evidence 1: would have SC about hypothetical events in the future necessarily instantiate the structure (27c), with two layers of fake past. And interestingly, they resist
Anderson-like attempts to cancel the counterfactuality of the antecedent, cf. Ippolito’s example below:
6 Except
when the perfect used in the consequent is used to locate the future hypothetical event before another
future hypothetical event. In this case, we do not have two layers of fake pasts, but only one. For instance, the
following example instantiates the structure (1b).
(1)
a. Si un missile atteignait le navire demain 18.00, ils l’auraient
dans ce cas déjà lancé
if a missile reach-IMP. the ship tomorrow 18.00 they it have-COND . in this case yet launched
quand la bombe explose.
when the bomb explode-PRST.
‘If a missile reached the ship tomorrow at 18.00, they would have already launched it when the bomb
explodes’
b. PAST[MODAL[PRES p] [PRES [PERFq ]]]]
9
(28)
# If Charlie had gone to Boston by train tomorrow, Lucy would have found in his pocket
the ticket that she in fact found. So, he must be going to Boston by train tomorrow.
◦ Ippolito’s evidence 2 (2013:98) comes from SCs about the past hypothetical events in
some American and British dialects discussed a.o. by Dancygier and Sweetser (2005), where
an extra auxiliary head occurs.
Since we have three layers of past in total, we know for sure that we have two layers of fake
past (structure (27d)).
(29)
a. If I hadd-a known you were coming, I would-a stayed home.
b. If I hadn’t a-been ill, I’d a-got him away all right...
Dancygier and Sweetser write ‘these -a forms seem necessarily to convey the speaker’s belief
that the described situation does not hold’.
→ Ippolito concludes that again, the structure with two layers of fake past conveys strong (noncancellable) counterfactuality.
◦ Independently from Ippolito (2013) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005), Biezma et al. (2013)
report the same observation about ‘non-standard’ dialects of English.
◦ Ippolito (2013, 88-92) argues that the strong counterfactuality of two fake pasts SCs can be
derived as an antipresupposition.
Note: as Ippolito (2013) observes in a fn (p. 145), Leahy (2011) also offers an account of subjunctive conditionals
in terms of antipresuppositions, but does not distinguish between strong (noncancellable) counterfactuality and
cancellable counterfactuality.
◦Our hypothesis 1: swing PSCs contain one fake past only (that is, wysiwyg: two layers of
past, one fake, one real, cf. structure (27b)). This contributes to explain why swing PSCs
• cannot be about future hypothetical events (PSCs with two layers of past about the
future alway contain two fake pasts);
• do not express strong (noncancellable) counterfactuality.
◦ We still need to explain
• why swing PSCs antecedent p has to be an open possibility at UT;
• why swing PSCs do not even trigger the (defeasible) inference that their consequent is
false (but rather present q as unlikely).
◦ In order to do this, we have to investigate the properties of the fake past in swing PSCs into
more detail.
5.1.4
Properties of the fake past in PSCs as defined by Ippolito
◦ Ippolito (2006, 2013) argues that ‘one fake past’ SCs are bare modals embedded under a
universal present perfect, while ‘two fake pasts’ SCs are bare modals under a universal past
perfect:
10
(30)
a. PRES[PERF[∀⊆ [WOLL[SIM[HIST p]][q]]]]
b. PAST[PERF[∀⊆ [WOLL[SIM[HIST p]][q]]]]
◦ In both cases, combined with ∀, PERF gives a ‘perfect interval’ t’, such that for all subintervals
t” of t’, the conditional proposition (i.e. the bare modal structure) is true at t”.
◦ The right boundary of the perfect interval is the utterance time for would SCs, and is a
contextually salient past time for would have SCs.
See the (simplified) truth conditions (31b) for (31a) and (32b) for (32a). In both cases, the bare
modal structure must be true at each subinterval of the perfect interval.
(31)
a. If John ran the Boston Marathon next spring, he would win.
b. true if ∃t 0 such that the right boundary of t’=UT, and ∀t 00 ⊆ t 0 , it is the case that
all possible worlds historically accessible from the actual world at t” maximally
similar to the actual world and where John will run the Boston marathon next spring
are worlds where he will win.
(32)
a. If John had run the Boston Marathon next spring, he would have won.
b. true if ∃t 0 such that the right boundary of t’ is a salient past time, and ∀t 00 ⊆ t 0 , it is
the case that all possible worlds historically accessible from the actual world at t”
maximally similar to the actual world and where John will run the Boston marathon
next spring are worlds where he will win.
◦ (The structure of ‘one fake past’ SC includes a first past component because the perfect interval extends before UT; the structure of ‘two fake pasts’ have a second past component that
shifts this right boundary to a past time.)
◦ Ippolito crucial assumption: the No Empty Restriction requirement7 accompanying the
modal (the universal quantifier over worlds) is not a semantic presupposition but only a pragmatic constraint designed to avoid vacuously true assertions.
◦ This means, in practise, that it is not required that there be historically accessible antecedent worlds at each subinterval in the perfect interval t’. It is only required that there be
some subinterval of t’ when some antecedent worlds were accessible.
◦ With ‘one fake past’ SCs, this subinterval when p-words are accessible can be the UT, but
does not have too.
→ The antecedent of simple past SCs can be counterfactual.
5.1.5
Problems
◦ Problem 1: it is somehow counterintuitive that t’ includes by definition the UT. It does not
fit well with the idea that the fake past expresses distance from the actual index UT. Other approaches (e.g. Romero (2014)) posit that the first fake past gives an interval < UT.
◦ Problem 2: as Ippolito (2013, 52) herself recognizes, languages like Italian (and French) that
have SCs do not have a present perfect in the English sense (whose right boundary is given by
7 This
requirement says that the restriction of a quantifier cannot be empty.
11
UT).
◦ But she crucially needs the perfect interval to include UT with would SCs because she
assumes that semantic presuppositions have to be true at each point of this interval, which
allows her to explain the oddity of this kind of examples:
(33)
John died. # If he wrote a book, it would be a success.
◦ However, for French at least, it is not clear that the semantic presuppositions of simple past
SCs have to be true at UT:
(34)
5.2
5.2.1
Si [Agatha Christie] écrivait un roman policier aujourd’hui, elle ferait
la
if Agatha Christie write-IMP a novel detective today
she make-COND the
place aux possibilités criminelles offertes par les nouvelles technologies. (Internet)
room to possibilities criminal offered by the new
technologies
‘If Agatha Christie wrote a detective novel today, she would make room to criminal
possibilities offered by the new technologies.’
Proposal
The first fake past is an imperfective
◦ Hyp. 2: ‘one fake past’ SCs are bare modals embedded under an imperfective rather than a
present perfect (Ippolito’s analysis is kept otherwise).
◦ In order to be true, one fake past SCs require that in a past imperfective interval, there be
some subinterval when some antecedent worlds were historically accessible.
◦ Hyp. 2 has several advantages.
1. It solves the problems of Ippolito’s approach just mentioned.
2. It explains Iatridou (2000, 2010)’s observation that many languages use IMP in SCs.
3. It explains how IMP contributes to achieve counterfactuality and why counterfactuality as
expressed in ‘one fake past’ SC is defeasible, as Ippolito notes. Let us see why.
◦ Let us assume that the combination of IMP to the bare modal structure outputs a (past) imperfective stative sentence.
◦ In languages like English, past tensed stative sentences usually trigger what has been called
a cessation implicature, (35c), cf. Altshuler and Schwarzschild (2012). This is also true of
imperfective past tensed stative sentences in languages like French, where past tensed stative
sentences can also be built with a perfect or a perfective. For instance, (35a) triggers the (defeasible) implicature (35b).
(35)
[context: a little boy named Scotty has just been brought to the hospital. Dr. Spock is
talking to him, when the nurse walks in and ask: "How is he doing?"]
Comment est-ce qu’il va?
How is he doing?
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a. Il était
anxieux.
he be-IMP. anxious
‘He was anxious.’
b. ; He is not anxious anymore.
c. Cessation implicature: when the utterance of a past tensed sentence implicates that
no state of the kind described currently holds. (Altshuler and Schwarzschild (2012))
Turning to conditionals again, we can reanalyze the (cancellable) counterfactuality inference
of ‘one fake past’ SCs as a subtype of the cessation implicature generally triggered when IMP
applies to a stative predicate.
→ The (fake) IMP in conditionals has the same property as in other contexts.
5.2.2
Swing PSCs have the same semantics as ‘one fake past’ PSCs
◦ Background: tense/aspect morphology in standard PSCs on top of the morphology locating
the hypothetical event in time has been analysed as a case of (sequence of tense) agreement
with the higher fake past tense(s).
◦ On this view, swing PSCs are cases where agreement with the higher past fails to hold in the
antecedent – the passé composé in the antecedent is a non-agreeing form.
Our hypothesis 3: By uttering a swing PSC, the speaker asserts a ‘one fake past’ PSC. The
imperfective morphology is not realized in the antecedent but is nevertheless interpreted.
◦ Therefore, the assertion of a swing PSC (true iff there is an (imperfective) past interval t’
such that the bare conditional is true at each subinterval of t’) does only commit the speaker
to the view that they were historically accessible p-worlds (at some subinterval t” of t’)8 . The
speaker is not overtly committed to the view that they are historically accessible p-worlds at
UT.
◦ But by choosing not to realize the CF marker (the IMP) in the antecedent (and thereby making
the antecedent formally identical to the if -clause of a PIC), the speaker also implicates/makes
the supposition (‘for the sake of the argument’) that the bare conditional is true at UT, and
therefore is indirectly committed to the view that p-worlds are historically accessible at UT.
◦ Technically, we could say that the tense embedding the modal is interpreted twice, a bit
like in double access readings. More specifically, we could say that tense is interpreted once as
in ‘one fake past’ SCs (for the assertion) and once as in indicative conditionals, where the
bare modal structure is embedded under the present (for the implicature/supposition). So we
would have something like the following:
(36)
Structure for swing PSCs:
a. IMP[∀⊆ [WOLL[SIM[HIST p]]][q]]
b. PRST[∀⊆ [WOLL[SIM[HIST p]]][q]]
8 Given
(assertion)
(implicature/supposition)
the ’No empty restriction requirement’ associated with the modal, cf. section 5.1.4. above.
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On this view, the hybridity of tense/aspect morphology of swing PSCs reflects their semantic
hybridity.
◦ Let us additionally assume, which seems reasonable, that the content of the assertion and the
content of the implicature/supposition have to be compatible.
We could then explain why swing PSCs do not present p/q as counterfactual (even weakly) but
rather as ‘past less vivid’ as follows: the counterfactual inference routinely conveyed by ‘one
fake past’ SCs cannot be triggered by swing PSCs, because it would clash with their implicature/supposition (36b).
Nevertheless, swing PSCs still convey past less vividness because of the fake past involved in
the assertive content.
What can we contribute to explain this way?
1. The assertive content of swing PSCs is not different from the assertive content of standard
‘one fake past’ PSCs.
2 Contrary to standard ‘one fake past’ PSC, swing PSCs cannot express defeasible counterfactuality [because this would clash with their implicature (36b)], but only past less vividness.
3. The passé composé can be used in the antecedent of swing PSCs because it can host the formally absent but nevertheless interpreted imperfective morphology. The passé simple is banned
here because it cannot host an imperfective.
4. The if -clause of swing PSCs stays outside of the negation (it is part of the implicated component).
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