Catherine CHAUVIN
Université de Lorraine – 54015 Nancy
[email protected]
Degree and its many forms : definition(s), parameters, and
a few questions.
The aim of this presentation, which is based on the programme for the Agrégation 2014 & 2015, will
be to come back upon the use(s) of the notion of degree, and go over some facts that may be discussed
in relation to it. “Degree” can actually be used in the analysis of a large number of data, ranging from
the use of adjectives to that of adverbs, comparatives/ superlatives, etc; degree can also be present
without the use of any overt linguistic marking, and there are roundabout ways of expressing degree,
too. Besides, the term itself can be used in combination (or opposition?) with other notions, such as
scale/ scalarity; intensity/ intensification; gradability/ grading/ gradience; are they to be considered
synonyms/ para-synonyms, or do they seek to illustrate different aspects of the question? There also
may be sub-“types” of degree, or at least different ways in which the notion can be applied. The
questions raised will therefore have to do with the possible definition(s) of degree; one of the things
we will come back upon, too, is the level at which degree is constructed or “expressed” (cf. possible
role of pragmatics and discourse). We will start by coming back on what the difficulties may be (1);
then we will deal with the possible definition(s) of degree, try and see how/ whether degree can be
defined synthetically, coming back upon some aspects having to do with the use of terminology
(degree, scale/ scalarity, grading, etc.) (2); then we will focus on various sub-types of data that can be
analyzed in terms of degree to see what they can illustrate of the general questions (3). We will finally
try and give a few provisional conclusions (4).
1. What is the problem? Dealing with the notion of ‘degree’: advantages and difficulties
Analysing the expression of degree in language is crucial, as it leads one to examine a large
number of markers and data. But it is also complicated for reasons which we will try and review now.
1.1.
The presence of degree marking and scalarity in language.
Degree is often expressed in discourse, and it is not surprising: there is a need to express
nuances and to judge the extent to which something is the case and to quantify assessments; this might
not just be a linguistics issue, but a more general question, too. It is also something that is to be found
across languages: Sapir (1944) pointed out that there were markers of degree in languages in general,
and more specifically markers of comparison:
Natural languages reflect this fact: all languages have syntactic categories that express gradable
concepts, and all languages have designated comparative constructions, which are used to
express orderings between two objects with respect to the degree or amount to which they
possess some property (Sapir 1944; our bold characters).
In linguistics, the expression of degree has given rise to a number of studies, some now being
classical, like Sapir’s and Bolinger’s (Sapir 1944; Bolinger 1972); there is also a renewed interest in
the role that scalarity plays in language (Kennedy 2006, etc.; Hadermann, Pierrard & van Raemdonck
2010; Hadermann P., Inkova O., Pierrard M., Van Raemdonck D. (eds) 2010, etc.). A recent issue of
the journal Langue française (2013/1) was also devoted to “L’intensification’. This shows how central
the question of degree-marking is to language studies, but it is also clear that there are a number of
difficulties, one, in particular, is the question of how to define and circumscribe the domain.
1.2.
What are the difficulties?
J.-C. Anscombre and I. Tamba (2013) start their introduction on “L’intensification” by stating
that:
[Depuis une dizaine d’années, se multiplient les études linguistiques touchant à l’intensité. Mais] il est
difficile de circonscrire ce domaine de recherche en raison de l’hétérogénéité des phénomènes qui y
sont rattachés ainsi que du flou qui entoure sa définition. (Anscombre & Tamba 2013 :3 ; our
emphasis).
Although degree might not be exactly the same as intensity (see below), the problem exists for degree,
too. The difficulties may be said to arise from different types of problems.
1.2.1.
The multiple facts.
The first difficulty has to do with the range of facts that can be analyzed in terms of degree.
These facts can be found in a number of traditional “chapters” of grammar, classically the
categorization of adjectives, the use of adverbs, etc., but many other chapters can turn out to be
relevant, too. It is possible to wonder if there are clear limits out of which degree is no longer relevant,
if there are, indeed, types of markers that cannot “express degree”. The kinds of linguistic elements, in
terms of nature, or word classes, that have to do with degree markers do not seem to be clearly limited
– adjectives and adverbs are certainly relevant,
but what else? Prepositions, or maybe rather
prepositional phrases, for instance, can also be said to be graded/ gradable:
(1) A. It’s right in the middle.
B. This was so unlike her (D. Walliams, henceforth DW, Mr Stink, p. 243).
C. It was well into the night on Christmas Eve now. (DW, Mr Stink, p. 246)
There can be degree without the presence of an overt marker of degree, too: the use of an adjective
that is implicitly part of a scale can in itself mean that a value has been chosen, as in “it’s cheap/
expensive” (Kennedy 2006, etc.); and the reference point can be left implicit (e.g; “for a book”, “for a
cup of coffee”, cf., again, Kennedy). It is difficult to make a list of relevant facts, and it might not even
be a good idea to try and make one, since, as will be seen below, there is also the fact that certain ways
of expressing are not lexicalized/ grammaticalized. The organization of certain parts of the lexicon, or
of grammatical markers, in ordered sets/ scales1 means that they can be thought to be relevant to the
study of degree, too, which means that the very organization of certain parts of the lexicon can give
rise to interpretation in terms of degree. The case of epistemic modality, for instance, can be
mentioned, or that of quantifiers: if it can be argued that the English modals (partly?) constitute an
ordered set of markers organized in relation to the degree of certainty involved in the speaker’s
expressed judgment, then the choice of one can imply that a lower/ higher position than another
possible position on the scale is expressed or at least hinted at (see below, again):
[Might] < may < must < [will?]
Fig. 1. A possible scale for epistemic modals?
Quantifiers have also frequently been said to constitute an ordered set:
No < some < alll
1
See below.
Fig. 2. Scalar ordering of quantifiers.
These markers may express degree through implicit comparison with other elements of the
scale rather than directly, but it might also be the case for cases where adjectives are used, too. If
these facts are also taken into account, then virtually all uses of might (vs may, will), or some (vs no,
all), virtually express (some sort of) degree. Besides, as will be mentioned again several times below,
context proves to be central in many cases; even the gradability of adjectives, certainly a central
question in the expression of degree, can be considered to be context-based (cf. Charreyre 1997); a list
of adjectives that are typically gradable can be made, but certain adjectives that are non-gradable can
be used as gradable predicates in certain contexts; for instance:
(2) A. *The Prince of Wales belongs to the very Royal Family2.
B. This was a very royal reaction. (= truly has the qualities of what is expected of a monarch)
The links between degree and quantification, degree and modality… can also be interrogated.
This means that the limitations of what “expressing degree” is, or is not, is already a question (is
degree expressed directly, indirectly; is it degree, among other things…).
1.2.2.
The complicated terminology.
Another difficulty has to do with the complicated terminology. This is not something that is
true of degree only, but it certainly is the case for degree, too. It can be important to try and make
sense of the different terms and not just use them interchangeably without, at least, trying to define
them -- even though it may turn out to be quite difficult. It could be argued that there are at least four
“families” of related words that are used:
 Degree;
 The “grade” family of terms: Grade/ grading/ gradience3/ gradation/ gradable/
gradability;
 The “scale” family of words: Scale/ scalarity/ scalar;
 The “intensity” family of words: Intensity/ intensification/ intensifiers.
2
With very as an intensifier, as very can mean “real”, “true”, too, which maybe makes this utterance slightly
more acceptable. Polysemy should also be taken into account.
3
Note that no mention will be made here of gradience in linguistic categories and/ or as a “metalinguistic”
concept; in this case, reference can be made to whether the linguistic categories themselves, word classes, for
instance, are clear-cut categories or whether belonging to them is a matter of degree, i.e. of gradience (Aarts:
2010). This will be left aside as it is not part of the “expression of degree” as defined in the syllabus. The same is
true of argumentative scales ( “échelles argumentatives”), which will be left aside here as they are not a central
part of the syllabus either.
The fact that there are different terms is not necessary a problem; yet are they just indifferent ways of
dealing with it, or do they emphasize different facets of degree-marking? (see section 2.)
1.2.3.
Semantics/ pragmatics/ discourse -- and other levels, as well?
Another type of difficulty has to do with the “level” at which degree works – i.e. if it is all a
matter of semantics, or if the analysis should also allow for a pragmatic, or even discursive, level, and
maybe even other levels, since, as we shall see, sociolinguistics may be useful, too. This comes from
the fact that degree terms are not a closed list, as was said before, but also, they are often renewed4;
certain uses may even be considered to be punctual or nonce uses of words; they may not always be
listed in the dictionary (at all, or as yet), or do not normally express degree, but they express degree in
one particular context and in the way one speaker, or a group of speakers, has/ have just used it. Top
banana, in (2), might not yet be an official way of expressing degree, but could be emerging (cf. well
with an adjective; “She’s well difficult”), and superbrilliantamazing written in one word could be a
nonce way of expressing degree:
(3) ‘I really want to hear your story. It sounds top banana!” (DW, Mr Stink, p. 115)
(4) Chloe grinned. That was superbrilliantamazing! (DW, Mr Stink, p. 239)
Emphasis sometimes needs novelty, because a frequenlty used marker of intensity can lose some of its
edge. In the words of Bolinger:
Degree words afford a picture of fevered invention and competition that would be hard to come by
elsewhere, for in their nature they are unsettled. They are the chief means of emphasis for speakers for
whom all means of emphasis quickly grow stale and need to be replaced: ‘The process is always going
on, so that new words are in constant requisition, because the old ones are felt to be inadequate to the
expression… of a quality to the very highest degree of which it is capable…” (Stoffel, 2). Or, as Behere
quotes (36) from Agatha Christie, ‘At one period one said things were ‘topping’ and then that they
were ‘too divine’, and then that they were ‘marvelous’, and that one ‘couldn’t agree with you more’ and
that you were ‘madly’ fond of this, that, and the other”. (Bolinger 1972: 18)
Bolinger also notes that:
Intensification involves morphemes many of which – including more and most and the suffixes of
comparison – are truly functional elements, closer to the heart of the grammar than are nouns or
4
See for instance Ito & Tagliamonte (2003) (syllabus; “bibliographie élargie”).
adjectives like spiffed, sozzled, tipsy, outhouse, backhouse, bathroom, powder room. If there are
function words, very is surely one of them, and yet it did not attain its modern sense before the fifteenth
century and has had to compete with rivals like full and right, and lately pretty, not to mention a host of
scarcely grammaticized words like awful(ly), terribly, terrifically, etc. As each newcomer has appeared
on the scene it has elbowed the others aside. The old favorites do not vanish but retreat to islands
bounded by restrictions (for example precious few but no longer precious hot), and the newcomer is
never fully successful and extends its territory only so far. Nothing has quite time to adjust itself and
settle down to a normal kind of neighborliness before the balance is upset again. (Bolinger 1972: 1819)5
This aspect will be taken up again in Section 3 (cf. the fact that pragmatics may sometimes be
involved, and sociolinguistics, too.)
1.2.4. Necessary criteria – but an impossible (full) list
All in all, maybe no complete list of markers can ever be made ; or, at least, the question can
be asked. Although some markers clearly are markers of degree and have to be included in the list,
others are less clearly so, and that, again, raises the question of the levels at which the analysis should
take place. Bolinger has this formulation (in Bolinger: 1972):
Degree words are an antidote to the overconfident description of language as a system. It is a
system, but one fighting for survival, and forced to modify itself at every instant. (Bolinger 1972: 19;
our bold characters)
This might be a slight exaggeration (cf. “at every instant”), but it certainly is a question that can be
raised, and this aspect of the problem has to be taken into account.
These questions lead us to the difficult question of whether it is possible to define degree other
than negatively, by saying for instance that everything that is not binary is a matter of degree.
2. Defining ‘degree’.
2.1. What is “degree”?
5
Also, when he makes a list, he mentions this difficulty: “For a list of adverbs, see the Appendix. Any list has to be viewed
as a sampling rather than a catalog, not because the set of intensifiers is too big to do more than sample, but because it is too
open-ended.” (Bolinger 1972: 23).
A very broad definition might consist in saying that all that is not binary can be said to
indicate degree. Is that enough? There clearly is a traditional opposition that can be made in that way,
for instance, for adjectives, for which there is a classical division that exists between complementaries
vs gradable adjectives:
-
if A and B are complementary terms, they are mutually exclusive: something, X, has to be
either A or B. “Mutually exclusive” means that if something is said to be A, then it is not B,
and vice versa. No comparatives, no superlatives, no adverbs of degree/ intensifiers (very,
more or less, quite…) can be used with them. Often-quoted examples are: true/ false, male/
female, dead/ alive.
-
If A and B are gradable terms, or maybe, degree terms, then it is possible to qualify them in
terms of degree (with adverbs of degree/ intensifiers: very, quite…) and to use them freely
with comparatives and superlatives. E.g. good/ bad, old/ young, etc.
But the oppositions that have to be made may be more precise than that, as will briefly be seen in
Section 3 (cf. That’s very true; Well -- you seem more alive today than you seemed yesterday!, etc.).
Certain contextual uses are always possible which do not conform to the classification that would have
been given to a given adjective outside of a given context.
Defining degree positively can turn out to be quite challenging. There is a clear kinship with
the questions of quantification and qualification::
The kinship between quantity and degree can be seen in :
What it costs to live in the East! (quantity)
How it costs to live in the East! (It costs so, it is so costly, degree) (Bolinger 1972: 192) (our
emphasis)
Which in fact could be more than a kinship, as quantification/ qualification are essential to the
expression of degree. This could lead us to such a provisional formulation as:
Degree is quantification on a scale6
Sapir (1944), again, proposes a basic link with comparison ; the following quotation is used by
Kennedy in his paper on “Modes of comparison”:
6
Quantification that in turn, can be something truly quantitative or qualitative in nature.
The ability to establish orderings among objects and make comparisons between them according
to the amount or degree to which they possess some property is a basic component of human
cognition. (our emphasis)
Degree marking may always have something to do with comparing – comparing quantities, qualities,
of something with those of something else. The scales that are found in the lexicon are based on
relative values; one quality is present only in relation to the higher or lower quality on the scale.
Comparison may then both be one aspect of degree marking (literal marking of comparison, with –er,
more, etc.), or a more general component of, maybe, cognition, that allows one to put all the different
ways of marking together at a very general level7.
2.2. Grade/ grading/ gradience/ gradation/ gradable/ gradability
What is the difference between degree and grade; or is there a (systematic) difference? Sapir’s
(1944) paper is “On Grading”, whereas Bolinger’s (1972) book in on Degree Words, and they are both
about the same type of linguistic markers. Certain papers seem to choose one over the other as a cover
term, cf. Bierwisch’s (1989) paper is entitled “The Semantics of gradation” and Cresswell’s (1977)
study “The semantics of degree”. Although the preferences might be linked to a certain framework
(cf. Montague grammar for the second reference), the choice of a general term does not always seem
to correspond to one clear-cut, unambiguous choice. What the author(s) seem(s) to have in mind when
using one or the other should perhaps therefore be looked at on an individual basis. It should be noted
that Bolinger’s use of “degree words” can in a way be thought to be somewhat paradoxical, as he uses
“degree/ non-degree” for words that are often called “gradable” elsewehere (i.e. words can be graded,
receive, for instance, “degree adverbs”), and he calls “intensifiers” what is sometimes called “degree
7
Another way of dealing with this could be trying to see what other semantic fields are used to mark degree in
language – i.e. where the markers of degree “come from”, etymologically/ diachronically or synchronically.
Bolinger (1972) proposes to make a list, both for “boosters” for nouns (see below), and intensifying adverbs.
Here are the list he proposes: for boosters, size (big, etc.), strength (powerful, etc.), impact (striking, wondrous,
etc.), abandonment (mad, wild, etc.), tangibility/ obviousness for the senses (palpable, remarkable, etc.),
singularity (singular, special, etc.), consistency (solid, impenetrable, etc.); evaluation (bad, awful, etc.),
irremediability (hopeless, abject, etc.), purity and veracity (pure, unalloyed, etc.). For intensifiers: size (vastly,
enormously, etc.), strength (heartily, strongly, etc.), impact (resoundingly, thunderously, etc.), abandonment
(wildly, madly, furiously, etc.), tangibility (palpably, tangibly, blatantly, etc.), consistency (substantially, heftily,
etc.), evaluation (badly, terribly, etc.), irremediability (hopelessly, desperately, etc.), singularity (singularly,
distinctly, etc.), purity and veracity (throroughly, totally, completely, 100%, etc.). (Bolinger 1972, p. 149-50 &
p. 242). This is a remarkable endeavour, and a very interesting list, but in terms of definition, it may still need to
be worked upon because some of these terms are themselves arguably degree (strength, size…), others may be
said to constitute a whole sub-part of degree marking and/ or are very general (evaluation). He also reminds the
reader elsewhere, as was said before, that no list is supposed to be complete. It still is an interesting synthesis of
the main types of semantic source for degree-marking.
adverbs” elsewhere (e.g. very, really, etc.). Huddleston and Pullum (2005)’s chapter on comparsion
and related phenomena (like superlatives) is called “grade and comparison” (ch. 12).
Maybe one common difference that could be brought to the fore has to do with gradability.
The word gradability seems to be very regularly used to refer to a syntactic property, that of being
compatible with intensifiers/ degree terms, when degree, and perhaps even also grading, can be used in
a more clearly semantic sense. Note that gradience was found in particular in Aarts’s (2010) book and
it is used as a metalinguistic concept to describe the nature of word classes; but this does not mean it
cannot be used to account for the use of certain markers, within language, as well.
2.3. Scale/ scalarity/ scalar
What about the difference between “scale, scalarity, scalar”, and “degree”? Again, it may have
an individual dimension, but a few remarks may perhaps be made here. A lot of recent work seems to
have been done under the headline of “scalarity”, rather than “degree” – degree is still used and very
much present, but scalarity has been favoured by many recent authors, such as Kennedy (2006, etc.),
and Haderman et al. (2010). The studies in terms of scalarity concentrate on the presence of scales in
languages – i.e., valued orderings of lexemes/ markers and the impact that this valued ordering has on
the use of certain markers. One central aspect that has been studied in terms of scalarity in the last
decade(s) or so is aspect – so not necessarily lexical “fields” that can be said to be organized as linear
sets of ordered values; events themselves can be considered to be scalar as they can be represented as a
form of gradual evolution, from beginning to (possible) end and (possible) completion (according to
the type of event it is). In such an analysis, aspectual interpretation can been analysed in terms of
scalarity: if an event has a “natural ending”, for instance, it gradually evolves and reaches an end, the
parameter that constitutes the quantification of the gradual evolution being time, and the events can be
conceived of as gradual completion. Gradual completion can be a characteristic of an event in general,
but in the course of the event, one entity in particular can be affected, as it goes from unaffected
(before the event starts, or as it is starting) to gradually affected to (if applicable) totally affected; this
element is called the “incremental theme”, and its gradual evolution is co-temporal with that of the
event itself. For instance, in the case of: <eat/ an apple>, the event of eating an apple starts with
someone having an apple and starting to eat it, and as the eater eats the apple it gradually gets eaten,
bit by bit, until the end, and if the event reaches its “natural” end, the apple has been totally eaten (pips
excluded, perhaps, but it can be argued that there is nothing left to be eaten). The apple in this case is
the incremental theme, and the study of this event from an aspectual point of view can be based on the
idea of scalarity, the event is based on a scale which mixes the passing of time and the gradual
modification of the incremental theme:
(5) Paul has eaten an apple
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beg. Of eating
Gradual passing of time
End of eating
Time0
Time +n + n
Time “1”
Apple: unaffected
Gradual affectedness of the theme
Affected theme
This type of approach may also allow one to clarify how “ degree” can be used in conjunction
with “ scale”. Scale is the actual structure (the “from X to Y” ordering), whereas degree can be
considered to be the value that a certain element/ property has reached on that scale, cf. Kennedy
(2006):
a. Gradable adjectives map their arguments onto abstract representations of measurement, or
DEGREES
b. A set of degrees totally ordered with respect to some DIMENSION (height, cost, etc.)
constitutes a SCALE. (Kennedy: 2006)
We can note that in his (sub-)chapter on litotes, Bolinger uses the phrase “degree scale”, in
which he mixes both terms, as he opposes the “degree scale” to the “litotes scale” then (Bolinger
1972: 118). This could mean that implicitly he does call the general grading apparatus “scale”, and
that degree is ultimately a matter of quantification on the scale; the use of “degree scale” does at least
imply that the two terms are not synonymous.
2.4. Intensity/ intensification
We can now come back upon intensity, which was mentioned earlier. Intensity might be the
most difficult term of all to define, as it may encompass phenomena that are even larger than those that
can be subsumed under “degree” or “scale”. In fact, the term may seem to be much more subjective in
its use, as anything, from the lenghtening of a vowel in a given word (She’s gor::geous), to the
placement of stress, etc.; rhetorical devices of all sorts… may contribute to intensification. The term
may therefore bring together data of very different natures.
There are, nonetheless, interesting questions that the use of the notion may bring to the fore.
To mention him again, Bolinger (1972), does use the term “intensifier” to refer to a type of linguistic
markers, and he proposes a definition of the term “intensification” at one point in his study8:
8
Which includes such rhetorical devices as litotes, etc. Such elements might not find their place as easily in a
study of scalarity. The notion is therefore applied to various types of facts.
Intensification is the linguistic expression of exaggeration and depreciation (Bolinger 1972: 20)
It should be noted, nevertheless, that this definition is followed by a caveat that should not be ignored,
as the full sentence is: Intensification is the linguistic expression of exaggeration and depreciation,
and is just as hard to encompass. But this could mean that intensification can be considered to be a
form of modality – which in turn raises the question of the links between degree and modality, degree
and (enunciative) stance, which pushes the question a bit further, but is an interesting aspect of the
problem. (It should be noted that although they are used together as if they formed an antonymous
pair, exaggeration and depreciation do not quite form such a pair, really: depreciation is the fact of
giving something a negative connotation, and its antonym might be appreciation, for instance, whereas
exaggeration is more of a stance than a type of connotation – it could mean anything that allows a
speaker to express themselves something “more forcefully”9). We can recall the fact that Bolinger uses
the term “intensifier” to refer to what is sometimes also called “markers of degree”, and it should also
be noted that he opposes intensifying to identifying in (several) other instances:
So exhibits the same split as such : it may either identify or intensify. » (Bolinger 1972: 11, also p. 76;
our emphasis)
Intensifying, therefore, could be said to have to do with the stance of a speaker who means to
emphasize something that is being said. It might be better to analyse it in terms of modality, rather
than anything else, and the closeness with a functional analysis of language, recognizing the existence
of an expressive/ poetic, etc. function should be taken into account. Not all markers of intensity could
be markers of degree, then; or in a general sense, only.
2.5. Other terms
Are there other terms that can be used and whose use many need to be clarified? There are a
few, again, in Bolinger (our main source here, for questions of place/ time): he also uses the following
terms.
 Minimizers/ maximizers; booster/ diminisher
He uses boosters and diminishers to refer to adjectives qualifying degree nouns, mostly (partial,
lukewarm, medium, epic..):
9
In which case it becomes very close to a “function” of language, like expressivity/ expressiveness, which itself
gives rise to more interrogations (see Chauvin & Kauffer (dir) (2013), for instance; introduction/ conclusion).
The intensifiers that occupy the lower half of the scale, which can be called diminishers. They
are all synonymous with less, in the same way that the boosters are synonymous with more.
(Bolinger 1972: 152)
when maximizers and minimizers seem to refer to adverbs that bring into focus a positive (maximizer)
or negative (minimizers) degree of a certain quality (cf. very nice vs. slightly nervous). He also uses
specific labels for certain uses of certain terms, for instance:
 Compromising intensifiers.
The compromising intensifiers are not negated at all except in contradictions that echo:
He is rather foolish. -> He’s not rather foolish!
Normally there is no not rather, not fairly, not pretty, not tolerably, not sort of, not somewhat,
etc.:
*I think she is not pretty good-looking. (Bolinger 1972)
This label is therefore used to describe the use of certain forms in certain contructions/ contexts,
therefore, rather than a type of marker as such.
The terminology is therefore intricate, so the way in which the terms are used, and which
terms are used for what, should be probably analysed and checked cautiously. This overview has
allowed us to to bring up some definition issues. We will now come back on different (types of) facts
that have been analysed in terms of degree, which will allow us to continue discussing the uses of the
notion.
3. On some types of degree marking: facts and questions.
3.1. The different levels of analysis for degree marking: semantics, pragmatics, discourse, etc. (?), and
their possible interaction
We will now come back on one of the questions that was raised from the very beginning,
which has to do with the fact that not all degree markers are “lexicalized” or “grammaticized”, and
that there are roundabout ways of expressing degree. There are, therefore, direct ways and indirect
ways of expressing degree, which brings us back to the difficulty or impossibility of making a list, but
also allows us to come back on the question of what “ expressing degree” means.
 The question of lexicalization/ grammaticalization. Direct/ indirect degree.
If we try and make a list of possible degree markers in a given document, then knowing what
to underline turns out to be one of the first problems. Some elements are clearly markers of degree:
what they indicate is degree, they are present in the dictionary and/ or recognized as degree markers,
and they clearly have to be counted in. Other examples may less obvious: for instance, they clearly
indicate degree, but they might not necessarily be in the dictionary or be grammaticized. Other
elements could have an intermediary status: they do seem to indicate “ degree”, but among other
things/ less clearly, and if they exist in the dictionary (they may, or may not), their definition would
not necessarily be linked to degree, at least at first. Here are a few examples (the examples here were
taken from David Williams’s children’s books, which were taken as part of the corpus for this
presentation):
(6) A. Lexicalized elements: e.g. very nice
B. Less lexicalized elements (?): ruddy hilarious (222)/ dead famous (?)
C. Novel uses/ semi-novel uses (?): bum-numbingly boring (119)
The case of (6A) is clear enough: very is a marker of degree and indicates degree explicitly, and
probably, or perhaps (?), indicates degree only. One can assume that it would be counted as a marker
of degree in most dictionaries. The cases in (6B) might not be entirely comparable: dead in dead
famous clearly indicates degree (in the context when it is used it means something like “superfamous”), yet it is clearly less lexicalized than very, and also might be limited to certain uses only –
which raises the question of collocation (to be mentioned again in 3.2.; 3.6.). Dead is compatible with
famous, but seems less compatible with, for instance, dead young, to mean very young. It might not be
listed as being a degree marker in all lists, either, although it is mentioned in Bolinger (1972), again, as
a possible intensifier. Ruddy might still be considered to be an intensifier, but it is much less
conventional even than dead, clearly less conventional than nice, and whether it should be enlisted in
the possible terms in English to express degree or if this can be considered to be more of a creative,
novel use, is a question; it is not entirely novel, but it does feel more creative, more original, than
absolutely hilarious, for instance. Now the case of (6C) can be thought to be more intriguing yet, as
bum-numbingly is probably not a lexicalized adverb of degree which can be found as such in a
dictionary; the following definition seems very unlikely:
Bum-numbingly (adv.): to a high degree
Bum-numbingly does not express degree primarily ; it has a literal meaning which refers to something
else, i.e. the sensation that you can have if you have been sitting for too long. This sensation is
recognizable culturally; people “know” what kind of feeling and what type of situation it refers too.
Now in this context10 it does seem to be used as an intensifier, and something that means “incredibly
boring (so boring that you have this sensation)”. To what extent can it therefore be analyzed as degree,
and is it “the expression of degree”? The problem is that here we may have to deal with something that
is not the expression of degree, but degree is expressed indirectly; it is there as an implication. This
leads us to the fact that degree can be expressed indirectly, and that certain examples could have to be
analysed from a pragmatic point of view rather than/ as well as a semantic point of view.
 Semantics and pragmatics.
The fact is that this example could be an instance of an implicature, i.e. degree is here not expressed,
but implied; not explicit, but understood. The fact that a number of implicatures play on scales and
degrees has been noted in the literature for gradable predicates/ scales, and could be used for this type
of example, too.
 Degree by implicature.
Bum-numbingly evokes a sensation; it is not, literally, a marker of degree. But the implication is here
based on common cultural knowledge: you have to have been sitting for quite a while and not have
been able to move to have that sensation. The implication is that it is really boring, to the point that
you feel that way – it’s been carrying on for too long, and you find it painful. The fact that it expresses
high degree can therefore be considered to be an implicature, i.e. something that arises in context and
that the addressee computes out of what is literally said. Implicatures normally arise in one given
context, and are “defeasible” – i.e., they can be denied and made to disappear, as they are not part of
the explicit content of the sentence (contextual implicatures). If this combination becomes successful,
then it can be conventionalized, and gradually lexicalized, and then become a clear expression of
degree. In this case, it might be on the way of doing that; there are about 60 occurrences of the
combination on the Internet (Google).
 Implicatures and scales.
The fact that scales have an impact on the interpretation of degree in context has already been
analyzed within the field of pragmatics, as arising from the Maxim of Quantity, in the Gricean
10
It is not entirely novel, as it has been found in several cases with boring; so it might become lexicalized
perhaps in one environment, with “boring”, and/or maybe could spread. Certain uses that are novel uses can
remain so; others can become more common. See (1.2.3.), and next paragraph.
framework, or a “Q-implicature”, in Horn’s analysis (see, for instance, Birner: 2013, in particular, ch.
2). Choosing one value on a scale is already an expression of degree, and certain implicatures may also
arise in relation to the fact that the possible other values constitute the background against which the
current utterance is understood. Here are two examples:
(7) She’s good.
is to be understood as a degree of goodness, rather on the positive side, as “good” is somewhere (very)
positive on the scale of “goodness”. Now if “She’s good” is used as an answer in the following
context:
(8) A. She’s brilliant, isn’t it?
B. She’s good.
Then paradoxically the judgment expressed by “She’s good” might be perceived (more) negatively, as
there is a stepdown from “brilliant”, which is situated very high on the scale, and “good”, which is
lower. The difference in degree is then interpreted as a way of “lowering down” the compliment rather
than as an “above-average” degree of niceness.
(4) NICENESS ----------------------------------x-------------------
She’s good. (rather positive)
(5) NICENESS -----------------------------------x-------------------X
She’s brilliant.
-
<---------
+
She’s good. (more negative than preceding)
Fig. 3. Explanation of the interpretation given to “She’s good” in (6) & (7) in terms of scales.
 Explicitness/ implicitness and discourse
Another way in which degree can be more or less explicit can be through comparison (this already is
comparison; but comparison is more “explicit”, although it is not entirely that, in the next example).
Comparison can be explicit, with a comparative structure and an explicit term of comparaison, or more
“implicit”, when two situations are brought together and said to be similar:
(9) Chloe was a hundred times more excited than she had ever been in her life. (DW, Mr Stink, p.
240)
(10)
But Chloe would have watched a hundred of them if they meant not having to spend
the day campaigning with Mother. That was how boring it was going to be. (DW, Mr Stink,
p. 120)
In (10), degree is constructed progressively, through a parallel coupled with some feeling of
exaggeration created by the use of quantification (“a hundred of them”). So this is not just
indirectness, or perhaps not even indirectness at all, but a multiple construction of degree-marking
through the use of various devices, some of which have to be reconstructed by the reader. So this will
lead us to the discursive dimension, where degree is expressed through a series of elements scattered
over a paragraph rather than (just) expressed through the use of one specific “degree” term – the
analysis of all elements is important, but it is also through the combination of factors that degree is
expressed.
 Discourse11.
We will consider this dimension by analysing two excerpts (the first one is taken from David
Walliams’s Billionaire Boy and then the second one from Mr Stink). In both passages, what is being
constructed is “high degree” –the idea that is conveyed is that the character depicted in BB is the most
orange you can imagine, and that Mr Stink’s smell is of the worst possible kind. This is how it is done
in the two extracts:
(11)
Sapphire had fake tan smeared all over every inch of her skin. She was now orange.
As orange as an orange, if not orangier. Think of the orangiest person you’ve ever met, then
times [sic] their orangeness by ten. And if she didn’t look frightful enough already, she was
wearing a lime green mini-dress and clutching a shocking pink handbag. (DW, Billionaire
Boy, p. 146)
(12)
Mr Stink stank. He also stunk. And if it is correct English to say he stinked, then he
stinked as well. He was the stinkiest stinky stinker who ever lived.
11
Let us note that we will not discuss the question of argumentative scales here, for lack of space, and because
they would take us too far from the main point(s) (cf. syllabus).
A stink is the worst type of smell. A stink is worse than a stench. And a stench is worse than a
pong. And a pong is worse than a whiff. And a whiff can be enough to make your nose
wrinkle. (DW, Mr Stink, p. 11)
The way in which reference to a high degree of orangeness (sic)/ stinkiness is constructed in both
passages is very interesting to analyze. There are (the) usual markers: comparative forms (“as orange
as an orange, if not orangier”, “a stink is worse than a stench”, “a stench is worse than a pong”),
superlative forms (“orangiest”, “stinkiest”), “enough” is also used in both passages (Delmas 1983;
Moreau 2005, 2006). Quantification is also means to create intensification, with the use of quantifiers
(“all over every inch of her skin”, and “times their orangeness by ten”, in excerpt (11)). But the author
concurrently uses many devices to create the impression of high degree, which we will focus upon.
One of the things he uses is the words themselves, nomination: he focuses on the naming of
the smell/ colour. He almost explicitly brings to the fore the question of belonging to the notional
domain (“domaine notionnel”); in excerpt (11), he plays with the abstract noun “orangeness”12, and
also creates the adjective “orangy”, by using the comparative/ superlative forms orangier and
orangiest (vs. more orange/ most orange). In (12), he multiplies the forms that could be used for the
word: he makes advantage of the presence of irregular verbs in English and the possible difficulties in
deciding what the ‘correct’ form is: stink, stank, stinked, and says that all forms could be relevant to
describe the bad smell in question. These forms are not just alternate possible forms, but they could, or
should, be used together (cf. ‘also’, ‘as well’) to describe the pungent odour. The process is therefore
based on a form of iconicity -- the plurality of signifiers is supposed to be representative of the high
degree of belonging to the domain.
In (11), he also plays on a lexical scale he perhaps even creates:
stink > stench > pong > whiff
Fig. 4a. An (ad-hoc) scalar ordering of words referring to smells.
Whether a pong, a stink and a stench should actually be ordered in this way is probably partly a
subjective matter – a whiff is definitely more fleeting, but the ordering of the other three could be a
matter of discussion (which means that certain scales can be discourse-based, and not necessarily
12
The word is definitely a possible word in English (-ness is a productive suffix, and the combination of an
adjectival base with –ness is a common process), but it is still a combination that is used partly creatively here,
as the colour is normally simply referred to as ‘orange’, and therefore ‘orangeness’ is not the usual general term
for the colour ; it brings to mind the abstract qualities that could be associated to ‘orange’, or the qualitative
properties of what “orange” may be.
preexisting in the language, again). All in all, it does not really matter the four types of smells are
explicitly compared (“worse”), the ordering is made clear and stink, which he chooses to name his
character, is placed at the top of the list.
In order to reinforce this, he also associates the lower element to a minimal degree on the scale
to a reaction to the smell (i.e., a typical event, rather than an abstract quality): “and a whiff can be
enough to make your nose wrinkle”. Once the scale has been created, of course, this means that at the
minimal level the reaction is not as strong as at the maximal level:
stink > stench > pong > whiff
+---------------------------------------_
Enough to make nose wrinkle
[<----- Much worse <---------------]
Fig. 4b. An (ad-hoc) scalar ordering of words referring to smells.
That, again, is implicated by the presence of the scale, and reinforced by the comparison, and,
probably, the use of enough.
He also emphasizes the high degree of smell/ colour by using devices that may be less easily
strictly classified in linguistic, or even rhetorical, categories. One is easier to deal with: the fact that in
(11), he also uses the mention of an orange (the fruit) as a reference point of what orange can be: he
therefore relies on what could be considered a prototype for the colour, and by bringing it to mind,
also creates what could perhaps alternatively be considered as a link with the attracting centre
(prototypes are then used rhetorically here to reinforce the presence of central characteristics, cf.
centre of the domain, in the reader’s mind). He also plays on a modified cliché: “think of X, and then
multiply it by Y”, which is an idiom that also arguably could also be said to contribute to the creation
of high degree, and makes it more striking by saying that it should be multiplied by ten; although the
number of times can be modified in this cliché, it tends to be “and then double it/ triple it”. Finally, he
tries and create a mental image in the reader’s mind by depicting the orange lady’s clothes and
choosing the highest contrast he can probably think of, using blaring colours that are supposed to
increase the visual shock one is supposed to get when confronted to the appearance of the woman:
lime green/ shocking pink.
What does the analysis of these two short passages show? All these parameters here do not
function individually, but together contribute to construct linguistically a reference to the high degree
of a quality. The discursive dimension, therefore, might not always be easy to leave aside, as here, it is
also the accumulation of devices that helps create a given effect. Some of the elements that are played
upon can be said to belong to the language in a stable manner, others can be created discursively – the
scale for the names of smells raises that question, as it seems to be more of an ad-hoc characterization
than a general classification.
 Sociolinguistics
There is a question of whether the question of degree-marking should not be taken from a
sociolinguistics point of view as well. The fact that degree terms change very often has been linked to
the fact that because they are degree terms, they should be striking, and that they lose their edge when
they are used too often, and therefore, they must be modified regularly; if the new formulation
becomes common, there might be need for change again. This has to do with language change and
grammaticalization; studies of it in relation to the role of expressivity in language have been made 13.
Now certain contexts of use might be more particularly affected by this; it might be the case for
teenage talk, for instance, which has been described as having a constant need for renewal of terms in
that area (very) bad or (very) good (cf. awesome, etc.14). Some ways of expressing degree might be
linked to social usage, too (this is being said with care); for instance, certain cultures might value
understatement more, or, on the contrary, overstatement. In which case, certain markers of average
degree, or perhaps what could be called mitigators, may be used in order to make a statement less
blunt15, or, or the contrary, an intensifier can be used to make the statement stronger and more to the
point. We will leave it at that for this presentation; this will have to be taken up in more detail
elsewhere.
3.2. Degree/ degree plus “something else”
What will be mentioned in this paragraph follows from what was said in the preceding
paragraphs, but one aspect of it will be focused upon in more detail. Again, one of the questions is that
13
See for instance Traugott’s analyses in terms of subjectification. A discussion of this can be found in Chauvin
and Kauffer (eds) (2013), for example.
14
In David Williams’s books, “top banana” is used by one of the young characters and could be considered to be
an example of “young(ish)” talk (“It sounds top banana!”), and “superbrilliantamazing” also seems to belong to
the girl’s inner speech (free indirect thought: Chloe grinned. That was superbrilliantamazing!). (DW, Mr Stink p.
115 & p. 329). As well as being ways of (re-)intensifying something, such formulations could be linked to a
form of register.
15
A remark made by the actor Stephen Fry in the documentary Stephen Fry in America caught our attention in
this regard, as there is a scene in which he exclaims: ‘That’s rather splendid’. The unusual combination of
rather, which is a mitigator, and splendid, which indicates a quality situated very high on the scale, might be
explained by the use of understatement, i.e. when one seeks to mitigate a strong judgement. In this case, degree
is not so much quantification as stance – or a bit of both. And the choice of resorting to understatement or not
can be a situational, rhetorical… choice.
not all degree markers are lexicalized; some might not be as conventional as others. Again, this means
that if certain markers might just be “markers of degree”, others might in fact indicate degree among
other things, or degree, secondarily (cf. degree by implicature). There is a difference between:
(13)
She is very nice.
which, maybe, just indicates a degree of niceness (the original sense of “true” is lost), and other
adverbs that indicate degree, but something else as well. Here are a few examples:
(14)
She knew full well what it was like (16)
(15)
…are just plain idle. (86)
(16)
The smell was especially bad today. (96-97)
(17)
? …looked stiffly immaculate (101)
(18)
It was thrillingly, terrifyingly real (143)
(19)
You must have been dead famous! (147-148)
(20)
… which Chloe thought pretty fitting (149)
(21)
A truly ridiculous voice (161)
(22)
She’s an absolutely fantastic girl (188)…
These adverbs could all the considered to be “markers of degree” (with a question for (17), hence the
question mark), but they definitely indicate degree and “something else”: in (11) she knew full well is
close to she knew very well, but may still (partly) retain the implications that she knows it fully, i.e.
entirely (although this may have been partly lexicalized; we come back upon the question of
collocations just below); in (15), plain idle in a way “means” very idle, absolutely idle, but “plain”
here as well as being a possible marker of degree also seems to indicate that the speaker is speaking
plainly, i.e. it is a modalizer that indicates the stance of the speaker, who says that the label idle
corresponds to what the entity described is, if they speak plainly. Example (16) will be taken up in the
next paragraph, but what especially means is that the degree to which it is bad is high, but also that it
is high in comparaison with something, in this case comparison with other situations where the same
type of event was witnessed (construction of a series of events and comparison of one occurrence vs
all others, with a possible presence of a scanning operation (“parcours”)). (17) may not really be a way
of marking degree, and yet does seem close to it – again, it could be a form of degree by implication,
as, in fact, two separate qualities are hinted at: it’s immaculate, and it’s stiff. Literally, something
cannot really be “immaculate in a stiff way”, as these are two types of qualification that are not of the
same nature. But by turning stiff into stiffly, and making it something that seems to be just a manner
adverb, the two qualities reinforce each other, so that something that is both stiff and immaculate
might really be the epitome of something that has been left untouched and unsoiled (starched and very
clean). It can therefore indicate a form of degree, but it expresses other things, too. Example (18) can
be analysed along similar lines: saying that something is thrillingly, terrifyingly real can be considered
to be a way of emphasizing the degree to which real applies, but the two adverbs remain manner
adverbs and also indicates that the way in which “it” is real isboth thrilling and terrifying, hence,
probably striking as well (but again, it does not just say that). A truly ridiculous voice (example (21))
is a voice whose “ridiculousness” is emphasized, but truly is also a modal adverb that specifies the
way in which the quality can be said to apply to the voice – and therefore, it might be considered as a
marker of “degree”, but it is a modal marker, as well – or, first and foremost. We will take up
examples (19) and (20) in the next paragraph about collocation16.
Markers of degree are therefore not semantically neutral/ interchangeable; they may indicate
the degree to which something is the case, as well as other things, too. The fact that they are not
interchangeable has also given rise to analyses in terms of collocations: certain adverbs “go better”
with certain adjectives, adverbs, etc.; for instance:
The empirical picture is complicated somewhat by the fact that not all modifiers co-occur with all adjectives for
apparently idiosyncratic reasons. (Kennedy 2006; our emphasis)
There might be preferences, but the reason why certain modifiers go better with certain terms may in
fact be semantic and not just “idiosyncratic” (the intensifier and the word that is marked for degree
have, or don’t have compatible meanings); sometimes other cases may be less clear, at least
synchronically: such could be the case of dead famous (example (6B)) and pretty fitting (example
(20)). But the fact that not all modifiers are available for all adjectives, etc. has a series of
implications: it means that the conditions of use of such or such an “intensifier”, to use Bolinger’s
word, might not just be a question of whether the term that it qualifies is gradable or not, but also a
question of semantic compatibility. The tests that are used to check whether something is gradable or
not, therefore, might not yield the exact same results according to what intensifiers are used; trying to
see if something is compatible with the whole gamut of intensifiers might not be the only way to check
whether something is gradable or not; if it is, it then very probably is, if it isn’t, the problems might
16
We can note that, again, degrees of lexicalisation, and in this case, specialization may apply : some of these
adverbs retain their « usual » sense and can become contextual, and partial, markers of degree; others might be
entirely specialized as markers of degree (maybe, again, it is the case of very, although this, too, should be open
to discussion); and others might be somewhere along the continuum – awfully, for instance, is an interesting
case: the meaning of awful is still available synchronously, but as an “intensifier” its negative connotations have
disappeared, or might even have been reversed to mean something positive, as can be the case (cf. terrible in
French, or certain uses of terribly in English); the meaning of awfully is therefore still not entirely unrecoverable,
but its meaning as a marker of degree has specialized to indicate a high level in a certain quality, so that you can
be awfully nice, and that is not “awful”.
both have to do with gradability and with semantic compatibility and/ or perhaps collocation17. It
might be necessary to take into account differences between degree instead of bundling them all
together.
3.3. Comparison and the rest
One of the topics we would like to deal with here has to do with the fact that comparison can both be
taken as a general notion, an operation, as was the case in the general definition mentioned before
(Sapir: 1944), but comparison is also one specific form of degree expression, one in which markers of
comparison are used. We can raise the question of the extent to which the chapter of comparison as a
form of linguistic marking is self-contained or linked to other ways of expressing degree like the use
of intensifiers. (NB. The link between superlatives and comparatives can also be interrogated; they are
usually mentioned together because they share certain formal properties like the way in which –er/ -est
attaches to the base form, vs more/ most, but what they have in common semantically can perhaps also
be called into question, which will not be done here.) The links between comparatives, superlatives
and other forms of intensification are, in fact, not just a theoretical issue: some markers share a use as
comparatives and intensifiers; the link with superlatives is more evident, cf. most, and for many
languages the existence of an “absolute” form of superlatives is recognized (cf. Latin –issimus).
Comparatives/ superlatives are normally compatible with gradable terms (only), as they oppose the
degree to which several elements share a property (in the simpler case, like (23)). Certain uses of
comparatives may express the degree to which a quality is true, too, discursively (cf. preceding
paragraph, examples (11); (12); (10)), or more “directly”. Besides, comparison is not necessarily made
between two entities in relation to one given quality (which might be the case that first comes to
mind): it might of course involve that, i.e. two entities that are compared in relation to some quality
they are thought to have in common (23), but two entities/ two qualities may also be compared (24),
etc.:
(23)
Mary is taller than Jane.
(24)
Mary is kinder than Sophie is nice.
When the comparison is not made between two entities and one property, or two entities/ two
qualities, but between one situation and all other situations of the same type, then comparaison may
become a marker of a very high degree on a scale (the highest, so far):
17
We do not think that these two notions are opposed, or even that they are mutually incompatible. What is
sometimes considered to be a collocation might in fact be semantic compatibility, and not just convention; but
some of the preferred uses are not always transparent; the fact remains that changing an adverb in such a context
might yield less acceptable results.
(25)
You are more beautiful today than you have ever been. (state)
(26)
She gulped louder than she had ever gulped. (DW, Mr Stink p. 141) (event)
The same can be said of (27), which is formally a comparison but can be used to express high degree
of belonging to a property:
(27)
Her face was redder than red with anger. (DW, Mr Stink, p. 186)
And comparison can also be used to express a high position on a scale by showing that the quality
exceeds that of a given category, such as in (28):
(28)
... and my husband will be more than happy to move into the shed. (DW, Mr Stink, p.
257)
in which more than happy means something like very happy. Certain adverbs that have been
mentioned before might both be intensifiers and markers of comparison at the same time; that is the
case of especially, for instance:
(29)
The smell was especially bad today. (Mr Stink, 96-97)
in which an occurrence, Occ1, is compared to either another occurrence or a series of previous
occurrences. There is also interaction between comparison and aspect (cf. possible gloss or compatible
use with “gradually”) in (30):
(30)
They were so angry their voices were becoming louder and louder. (DW, Mr Stink,
p. 201)
On the other hand, comparison can also be expressed discursively, and without a traditional
“comparative form”, cf. again, (10). All of this shows that comparison therefore is not just a selfcontained sub-chapter in the analysis of degree-marking: the interactions between several sub-chapters
are numerous18.
18
This does not deal with all aspects of comparison, as it is about how comparison relates to other markers of
degree, like intensifiers, for instance. Of course, many other things can be evoked: superiority/ inferiority/
similarity as “types” of comparison; modes of comparaison (two elements/ one quality, two qualities/ two
elements… etc.?); differences between analytical (more/ less) and synthetical (-er) modes of expressing
comparison, etc. These questions are left aside here.
3.4. Degree in adjective/ adverbs and degree in aspect (scalarity): the same and/ or different?
Another question that can be brought to the fore briefly here is that of the opposition/ link
between analyses of such “traditional” degree markers as intensifiers and adverbs of degree, and the
analysis of aspect in terms of degree (which is secondary in the syllabus, so this will just be a short
series of remarks). It was said before that certain recent analyses based on scalarity dealt with aspect,
cf. § 2.2.; see Kennedy’s work in general, in particular Kennedy & McNally (1999); also Hadermann
& al. (2010)). What can be pointed at is that the links between grading in adjectives/ adverbs/ nouns 19
and grading in aspect is not a new thing; the fact that Bolinger (1972) also recognizes “degree verbs”
means that he also examines the characteristics of events; and he makes links between adjectives and
verb in a way that shows that aspect is also relevant to adjectives:
To ruin is the completive of to damage, as perfect is the completive of good (Bolinger 1972: 195; our emphasis)
He analyses the compatibility of much and certain past participles by combining aspect and plurality
(therefore, repetition), when he remarks that some of these statements are preferrable to others:
(31)
*The adobe earth was much packed by the workman, preparing it for bricks.
The adobe earth was much packed by the pedestrians.
*The canvases were much smeared by the children for their finger-painting.
The original gloss on these figures was much dimmed by the tourists.
*The auditorium lights were much dimmed by the electricians. (Bolinger 1972)
In certain examples, the acceptable ones, a series of repeated events is constructed, and this is what
allows for the use of much or not (“There are various ways to cut down the muchness [sic] of the
actions to the point that much is no longer appropriate” (Bolinger 1972: 102); also see Kennedy &
McNally (s.a.)). He also points at the relevance of the aspectual classification of verbs (Aktionsart, or
“lexical aspect”):
Turning to nondegree verbs, we find a contrast between those of the event class and those of the
nonevent class on terms of accepting premodifier much. Nonevent nondegree verbs reject it:
*Property is much owned by working-class people in America.
*It is much thought that dissidence leads to trouble. (Bolinger 1972: 205-06; our emphasis)
And he also suggests that:
19
It should be remembered that this is not a closed list. See prepositional phrases in (1).
Verbs of completion, which are highly restricted […] are readily intensified in the negative:
He didn’t much bring thins to a head, did he? (He left them so undecided)
He didn’t much manage to win her over.
The doctors didn’t much cure what was wrong with him, I’m afraid. (Bolinger 1972: 211; our
emphasis)
This shows the possible interaction between the expression of degree and aspect.
3.5. Degree of degree
Another thing that will just be mentioned in passing is that certain intensifiers are not just
markers of degree, but markers of “degree of degree”, so to speak, inasmuch as some intensifiers can
be intensified in their turn. Here are a few examples:
(32)
An even bigger sticker (p. 127)
(33)
A good note posher than even her usual telephone [voice] (p. 162)
(34)
This is way more cool. (p. 214)
(35)
It’s far too late to rope anyone else in now. (p. 223)
(36)
It was so impossibly beautiful. (p. 260)
Comparatives can be themselves graded, as is the case in (32)- (34) – with quantifiers like much, of
which we have no example here, cf. much nicer, or adverbs expressing distance like far (here used
with too), and again, there are other possibilities, as is the case here, cf. “a good note posher”. The
fact that a marker of degree, or perhaps the scale itself, etc. may be intensified was again already noted
by Bolinger (1972):
.
There is a form, noted by Kirchner (48, 51), in which the scale itself is made semantically a part of the
intensification. When we way:
She is nowhere near beautiful.
It is nothing like as nice as it used to be.
We use the prepositions near and like to mark distance from one side of the scale [...]. This becomes a
booster in the opposite direction: nowhere near beautiful means “very unbeautiful”, “very ugly”. (p.
124-125)
The fact that there are several degree markers in the same sentence or in succession does not
necessarily mean that they qualify each other, for instance in:
(37)
She was almost very pretty.
We may wonder if almost qualifies very or if it is a sentence adverb which gives a modal judgment on
the whole predicative relation (the second answer seems preferable; cf. it is possible to say: She almost
was very pretty) 20. But degree of degree is a possibility that should be taken into account, too.
3.6. Types of scales? Ordered sets, open/ closed scales...
We will now end this presentation by coming back in more detail on whether there may be
different types of gradable predicates and, in fine, different types/ forms of scales. It should be
remembered (cf. supra) that uses/ interpretations are context-dependent and therefore ad-hoc
classifications may have to be confronted to contextualized uses; classifications might not always hold
systemically, but be constructed discursively as well. Yet, the type of scale that is implied and the
position of a given adjective (or other words) on the given scale should also be examined, as it can
explain part of their behaviour. It is probably not just a question of opposing gradable vs non-gradable
words, or even scalar vs non-scalar phenomena; it also seems important to try and know what types of
gradable predicates one is dealing with.
In fact, there may be scales and scales, graded fields vs other forms of graded fields. There
might be a difference for instance between talking in terms of a whole semantic/ grammatical “field”
being potentially construable as organized along a scale (cf. epistemic modality, quantification), and a
semantic scale that has to do with the gradation of one quality and is expressed linguistically by a
series of adjectives: is the type of gradation that exists (or may exist) between might < may < must, or
no < some < all of the same type as the one which, say, exists between ugly < ordinary < beautiful?
Maybe, inasmuch as they can both give rise to Q-implicatures (see above), and yet they might not
exactly function in the same way.
We will try and come back on some categories that have been recognized or discussed in the
literature and start a (very) short discussion on them.
We can start with a well-known distinction: the difference between open and closed scales
(cf., for instance, Kennedy (2006)). An open scale has no extremes, and is therefore not bounded,
20
Other examples of the fact that if there are several intensifiers in a row it does not necessarily mean that they are
intensifying each other could be; cf. How very honoured I am. (p. 209): although “how” and “very” also are in succession,
the scope of “how” is probably not just on “very” but on the whole qualification: how [very honoured] I am; i.e. I [[am [very
honoured]] to a high degree], whereas in so impossibly beautiful, so does seem to intensify impossibly and therefore belong
to the AdvP which qualifies “beautiful”, i.e. be a specifier of the degree marker, [[[so [impossibly]] beautiful].
whereas a closed scale is bounded. For instance, if you are outdoors (vs in a room), height has no
extreme point – you can go higher and higher and there is no natural end to height that means that you
have reached the “highest” point and you cannot go any higher --, whereas fullness/ emptiness is
bounded – if something is full, then normally it cannot be fuller; the same thing can be said for
emptiness, if something is empty, you normally cannot make it “more empty”. In fact, a scale can be
open or closed at both ends, but also be open on one side, and closed on the other. This gives rise to
four possibilities (cf. Kennedy 2006):
•
Totally open
•
Lower closed
•
Upper closed
•
Totally closed (Kennedy 2006)
These categories are especially used for adjectives; so we will focus on adjectives for the next
remarks. An adjective that expresses the endpoint on a scale expresses a maximal or a minimal point,
and there is no higher point/ lower point, cf. dry is one such example for a maximal degree of dryness;
it takes just a drop of water or some mist to make something “not dry”. The fact that certain adjectives
express such “absolute” values, or not, can account for certain uses, for instance, their interaction with
negation. The negated form of one adjective referring to one end may entail the positive form of the
adjective referring to the “other” end of the scale, or not:
As shown by the examples in (47), there exist pairs of antonyms such that negation of one form entails
the assertion of the other:
(47) a. The door is not open. => The door is closed.
b. The table is not wet. => The table is dry.
c. The baby is not awake. => The baby is asleep.
The explanation for this is straightforward: both members of the pairs in (47) are absolute adjectives,
but the positive adjectives impose minimum standards while the negative adjectives impose maximum
standards. […]
Relative antonyms do not show the same entailment relations:
(48) a. The door is not large. =X=> The door is small.
b. The table is not expensive. =X=> The table is inexpensive.
c. The baby is not energetic. =X=> The baby is lethargic. (Kennedy 2006)
Comparatives also yield different entailments, according to whether the adjective is absolute or
relative:
(49) a. The floor is wetter than the countertop. => b. The floor is wet.
(50) a. The floor is drier than the countertop. => b. The countertop is not dry.
(49a) is true only if the floor has some degree of wetness: if it had zero wetness, then it could not
possibly have a greater degree of wetness than the countertop. […] Similarly, in order for (50a) to be
true, it must be the case that the countertop is not maximally dry (though the floor might be). If the
standard for dryness is the maximum value on the scale, as stated in (43b), then it follows that the
countertop is not dry. […]
In comparison, a canonical property of comparatives with relative adjectives, is that they do not give
rise to positive or negative entailments in the comparative form, as illustrated by (51)–(52).
(51) a. Rod A is longer than rod B. =X=> b. Rod A/B is (not) long.
(52) a. Rod A is shorter than rod B. =X=> b. Rod A/B is (not) short.
[…] the mere fact that one object exceeds another with respect to some relative property tells us
nothing about how the objects stand in relation to a contextually significant amount of the relevant
property. (Kennedy 2006)
It can also be used to predict the compatibility with certain intensifiers vs others: Kennedy (2006)
suggests that perfectly and slightly are distributed according to what type of scales the adjective is
normally used in or exemplifies21:
(62) Open scales
a. ??perfectly/??slightly {tall, deep, expensive, likely}
b. ??perfectly/??slightly {short, shallow, inexpensive, unlikely}
(63) Lower closed scales
a. ??perfectly/slightly {bent, bumpy, dirty, worried}
b. perfectly/??slightly {straight, flat, clean, unworried}
(64) Upper closed scales
a. perfectly/??slightly {certain, safe, pure, accurate}
b. ??perfectly/slightly {uncertain, dangerous, impure, inaccurate}
(65) Closed scales
a. perfectly/slightly {full, open, opaque}
b. perfectly/slightly {empty, closed, transparent}
Cruse, whom we quote in the next paragraph, proposes to call the adjectives that are at the end of the
scale (like minuscule, enormous) “implicit superlatives”, because (our gloss) they imply that the
21
We are restricting this to these two adverbs as Kennedy (2006) also notes that certain adverbs, although they
should be compatible with maximal (or minimal ?) endpoints, are not, or not always (cf. totally); he also
mentions that there may be “idiosyncrasy” involved. The question is whether a difference is to be made between
those that are compatible with an “absolute” quality, and those that aren’t.
highest possible point on the scale has been reached, which explains why they are not, or not easily,
used with superlatives, (certain?) intensifiers (?? very minuscule), or –ish (?? minusculish)22.
We will now discuss some of the classes that are presented in Cruse (1984) and, more
particularly, Cruse (2004). Cruse proposes elaborate typologies; we will only present what can be
considered to be more directly relevant to this presentation and discuss some aspects briefly. One
opposition made by Cruse (e.g. Cruse 2004) is the opposition between equipollent antonyms, polar
antonyms and overlapping antonyms. He also mentions other ways in which lists of words can
compose what we have called “ordered sets” here: linear structures (bipolar chains, monopolar
chains); and then there also are clusters (centered, non-centered. It can be noted that he also calls
“degrees” one form of “monopolar chains”. We will try and summarize it in a general table, and then
discuss what seems to be directly relevant to this presentation.
polar antonyms
e.g. long/ short, heavy/ light, thick/
Polar antonyms
thin, long/ low
equipollent antonyms
e.g. hot/ cold, sad/ happy
overlapping antonyms
e.g. good/ bad
“basic” case: with e.g.  minuscule < tiny < small <
bipolar chains
Linear structures
implicit
superlatives;
large < huge < gigantic
no  spotless < clean < dirty < filthy
“middle” term
 beautiful < pretty < plain < ugly
 adore < love < like < dislike <
hate < abominate
with “middle” term

freezing < cold < cool <
lukewarm < hot < scorching
actually
monopolar chains
degrees
e.g. fail < pass
designating values < distinction
of a property
not
directly e.g. mound <
designating values hillock < hill <
of a property
stages
mountain
e.g.  primary < secondary <
undergraduate < postgraduate
 infancy < childhood < adulthood
22
This will have to be taken up elsewehere, too. We only focus on what shows that the types of adjectives also
have to be taken into account.
< old age
 egg < larva < pupa < butterfly
measures
e.g.  second < minute < hour <
day < week < month (etc.)
 inch < foot < yard (etc.)
 ounce < pound < stone (etc.)
ranks
e.g. private < corporal < sergeant
sequences
e.g. 
Monday < Tuesday <
Wednesday < Thursday (etc.)
 January < February < March <
April < May (etc.)
 Spring < Summer < Autumn/Fall
< Winter
 morning < afternoon < evening <
night
centered
e.g. die; pass away, pop off, decease,
breathe one’s last, kick the bucket....
Clusters
non-centered
e.g.  rap, tap, knock, twack, bang...
 clink, ring, tinkle, clink, clank,
jingle, jangle, ping...
Table 1: Types of ordered sets/ scales in Cruse (2004): a tentative synthesis
Clusters can be assumed to be outside of the problem of degree, as they do not constitute ordered sets;
they consitute sets, but their elements can be argued to function at the same level, i.e. there is no scale
involved. What about the other cases?
It is interesting to discuss the properties that can be associated to one type vs. another, as this
can turn out to be very interesting to discuss the behaviour of such and such a form. Here is what
Cruse (2004) suggests these properties are (slightly summarized/ synthetized, although a number of
elements are direct quotations from his analysis):
Polar antonyms:
 are “fully gradable, i.e. normally occur with a wide range of degree modifiers”;
 can be used with superlatives/ comparatives, and “even when they are used in the
‘positive’ degree” (i.e. on their own, as in “This is long”/ “It’s large”, etc.) “they
typically need to be interpreted comparatively in relation to some reference value”.
There may be a default interpretation that supposes an implicit difference with an
“average” value: “for instance, a long poem would, out of context, be taken to refer to
a poem that was longer than the average poem” (p. 165). (See Kennedy as well, and
the discussion of “positive degre” in more general terms). Cruse (cf. Kennedy for
“cheap/ expensive”) also indicates that a reference point should normally be drawn
from the context: “’My goodness! Isn’t Tom tall?’ would in all probabibility [mean]
“tall for his age”, “tall since the last time I saw him.” (p. 165);
 they are based on the measure of a progressively evolving property, from low to high,
and this property tends to be that of “some objective, unidimensional physical
property, prototypically one which can be measured in conventional units such as
centimeters, kilograms, miles per hour”. When intensified (used with very, for
instance), one indicates a very high value (very long) and the other a very low value
(very short) (we have here again the definition of a scale, cf. Kennedy’s quotation,
and elements that were mentioned in relation to Bolinger’s remarks, too);
 there are two aspects in which the different types of antonyms behave differently –
negation, and comparison, which can be used as tests.
 Testing what happens with negation consists in trying to see whether the negation
of an utterance using one term entails the negation of the other or not (again, cf.
Kennedy quoted supra in this same paragraph). In the case of polar antonyms, they
are incompatible, but they are not mutually exclusive: “’It’s neither long nor short’ is
not a contradiction, nor ‘It’s either long or short’ a tautology.”
 For comparative forms: (A, B are two nouns, and X and Y are the two polar
antonyms):
-> if A is Xer than B, then B is Yer than A. For instance, A is heavier than B entails
and is entailed by B is lighter than A.
-> Comparative forms are impartial, i.e. “use in the comparative does not presuppose
that the term in the positive is applicable”. This means that Y is longer than X does
not presuppose that Y is long. As will be seen in the next paragraph, this is not true of
equipollent antonyms.
Equipollent antonyms:
If two terms are equipollent antonyms, it means that both terms are “committed”, i.e. the use
of the comparative form presupposes that the “base” form applies: hotter presupposes hot, colder
presupposes cold. So comparatives are not impartial: Y is hotter than X normally presupposes that Y is
hot. Equipollent antonym pairs “typically denote sensations and emotions”, as is the case with hot/
cold used as an example here.
Overlapping antonyms.
Overlapping antonyms are a special case in which one term is “committed” (see preceding
paragraph) and the other is not. It is the case of the pair good/ bad: something that is better than
something else is not necessarily good, whereas something that is worse than something else is
normally bad. This would account for why:
(38)
??
This year’s famine is bad, but it is better than last year’s.
is a strange way of wording things: “only things that are not inherently bad [...] can be described
using better.” (p. 166; our emphasis). It is better to say that they are worse than something else – or
maybe not as bad.
The preceding remarks were a discussion of “antonym pairs”, but there are also larger series of
words that can all be ordered along a scale, and the order is linked to the progressive evolution of a
given property. “Bipolar chains” correspond the most closely to the types of scales we have discussed
before. In “bipolar chains” in general, Cruse says, “there is [a] sense that terms at the ends of the
chains are oriented in opposite directions” (cf. Table 1):
(39)
Minuscule < tiny < small < large < huge < gigantic
When the average term is not lexicalized, the average level is situated somewhere between two
terms that indicate a low positive value and a low negative value, but no average term is avaible. An
opposition is made between:
(37)a. Minuscule < tiny < small < large < huge < gigantic
b. beautiful < pretty < plain < ugly
c. adore < hate < like < dislike < hate < abominate
in which he says there is no middle term, and:
(40)
Hot < warm < lukewarm < cool < cold
For which he says that “lukewarm” is in fact neither positive nor negative, and therefore can be
considered to be a middle term; the average value has been lexicalized23. He also opposes bipolar
chains to “monopolar chains”; in monopolar chains “there is no sense that terms at the end of the
23
But it is possible to wonder to what extent lukewarm is really a « not hot, not cold » value. Could it be not hot
enough if you want something hot, and not cold enough if you want something cold?
chains are oriented in opposite directions”. That is the case of degrees, stages, measures, ranks and
sequences; examples are given in the table above. The link of these linear orderings with the
expression of degree might not be straightforward: the very ordering of these fields is based on some
kind of evolving property/ status, etc. but they might be discrete stages vs gradual evolution, and they
might not really have to do with an evolving property along a scale (cf. ranks, stages, sequences).
There are remaining difficulties; the fact remains that this is an interesting typology that shows how
necessary it is to think about the “type of degree” and “type of scale” is that is being dealt with, before
analysing a given example – not all cases are of the same type, and it can be very important to try and
understand why.
We will put forward two types of conclusions for this section. On the one hand, as was just
said before, it is very important to try and define the kind of scale, of ordered set(s),that is being dealt
with, and where the element being discussed can be placed on it, vs just classify it as” “linked to some
sort of degree”; not all cases are equivalent, and at least a basic reflexion on typology seems
necessary. On the other hand, it should also be remembered that these classifications should not be
considered to be fixed once and for all either, as contextual effects are possible, and the way one
organization is used in one context may not be used in the same way in another – i.e., again, some
effects can be context-dependent. Croft (2004) emphasizes it too when he says that:
These categories should not be taken too seriously; [...] a satisfactory taxonomy [has to be]
found yet: it may be better to think in terms of features which cross-classify. (Croft 2004:
186).
An analysis of the context and the use of such elements within a given context is necessary, as
classifications do always hold generally:
Any meaning relations that are established are established for particular contexts or sets of
contexts, and not for the totality of the language. (Lyons 1968: 80)
4. Conclusions.
To conclude this presentation, we will just come back on a few very general questions:
-
It is important to check the characteristics of a given item, be it an noun, a verb, an adjective,
an adverb, etc.; see how it can fit into a scale, a set, etc., of what type; see what other items
(intensifiers, etc.) it can be compatible with, etc.
-
NB. Not all intensifiers, etc. are equivalent, so their specific characteristics also be taken into
account (very vs absolutely vs totally, etc.; their uses, their possible polysemy mean that one
can get mixed results in a given context);
-
Context-dependent effects should also always be looked for – the effect that can be created in
a given context can be a combination of both general characteristics and specific effects;
-
The question of whether certain effects are semantic, i.e.”openly” expressed, or pragmatic/
discursive, etc., should also be taken into account. The conclusion may be that certain effects
are fully semantic or not, or even, that the distinction is not easy to make, or perhaps even
relevant in a given context, but it seems important at least to include such a question in the
analysis.
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