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The Boundaries of a New South Africa
Richard A Griggs
Introduction
The ‘New South Africa’ has become a global term
of reference yet few are aware of the momentous
boundary changes that have been accompanying
the changed political power structure. As Europe
demonstrates, after three world wars this century
(Cold War included), a redistribution of power
generally results in boundary changes. In the
case of South Africa, these changes include the
award of Walvis Bay to Namibia in February
1994, South Africa's August integration into the
Southern African Development Community
(SADC), the reincorporation of the ten
homelands, the delimitation of nine new
provinces, and the reorganisation of the
municipalities including the outer and inner
boundaries of every metropolitan area. The new
shape and the lines that distribute South Africa's
wealth and power pose new opportunities and new
problems.
State Boundaries
With the award this year of Walvis Bay to
Namibia, South Africa gave up one of the best
deep water ports along the Atlantic coast of
Africa, some 11,264 square kilometers of
mainland area, 12 guano-rich offshore islands, and
strategic assets including a military base and air
field. Territorial waters include another 4,600
square kilometers.
The islands had been annexed by the British in
1866 and the exclave was made part of the British
Cape Colony in 1878. These territories then
passed to the Union of South Africa in 1910 and
later to the Republic of South Africa. Before
Namibia became independent of South Africa in
1990, Walvis Bay was the leading port and
industrial centre (fishing) for the Administration
of South West Africa. Thus, Namibia wasted no
time in declaring Walvis Bay a Free Trade Zone
and a focal point for the development of the newly
independent country.
Namibia's gain is not entirely South Africa's loss.
By acceding the territory South Africa resolved
the only major boundary conflict with its
neighbour and furnished the basis for further
political and economic cooperation. For example,
Namibia is cooperating with both Botswana and
South Africa on a project to build a highway
linking Johannesburg to the port.
Regional Boundaries
South Africa's new membership in the SADC as
of 31 August, 1994 affects boundaries in multiple
ways. First, a new SADC sector on defense and
security issues reveals a blurring of international
boundaries between South Africa and
neighbouring states. South Africa's joint decisionmaking with SADC states to resolve the AugustSeptember 1994 crisis in Lesotho marked a break
with the more autarchic approach to sovereignty
shown by the previous government and initiated a
new era in the regional level organisation of
bounded space. Now up for debate is the
employment of South African expertise and
manpower to create a regional peacekeeping force
(deploying the SADF in Angola is being approved
at this writing). Also under discussion is a plan to
expand the role of Armscor into a regional
weapons procurement organisation.
Secondly, basic energy resources and transport are
becoming areas of cross-boundary cooperation.
In one SADC agreement due to be signed shortly,
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Swaziland, and Lesotho
will be merged into a single energy grid. There is
even discussion of eventually moving beyond
SADC boundaries and establishing a single
African electricity grid from Cape to Cairo that
utilises the electric potential of the Congo River
for all Africans.1
Perhaps less effectively, efforts are also being
made to coordinate policy in transport because of
the array of disorganised cross-border charges for
the shipment of goods between countries. These
charges often escalate as one country slaps
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another with ridiculous retaliatory tariffs.
Moving one small truck of goods across the
borders of Mozambique can cost as much as
US$300. Until the SADC can rationalise these
tariffs and regulations, many exporters and
importers will be unable to compete successfully.
Of longer term significance to boundary issues,
South Africa's integration within the SADC has
encouraged speculation about pan-African unity.
There is a basic and underlying disappointment
with the system of the nation-state in Africa and
regional organisations such as the SADC are seen
by some as links in the chain leading to a unified
Africa. Innumerable papers, articles and
conferences suggest that the ‘New South Africa’
has the technical expertise, finance, and
infrastructure to be the linchpin that can link the
Southern African piece of the puzzle together.
While these goals may be achievable, they are
decades removed. The first major advance to
watch for would be attempts to rationalise the
three regional organisations in Southern Africa
(the SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa, and the South African Customs
Union) in a way that defines the Southern African
states as a single trading bloc.
The opportunities presented by a blurring of
Southern African boundaries can be sources of
potential conflict. There are many who fear that
more integration and open borders will see South
Africa develop into a hegemonic bully within
Southern Africa. It is doubtful, however, that
South Africa benefits from poor and weak trading
partners, many of which are still recovering from
war. While low priced South African goods
might flood neighbouring economies, the
neighbours often return contraband and the
unemployed.
A recent reduction in South African border
controls for economic reasons (e.g., the SAR has
ceased blanket radar monitoring of air activity at
R200 million a year) and humanitarian reasons
(e.g., the electric border fences have been reduced
from fatal to stun) has resulted in a huge influx of
drugs, arms, and economic refugees. For
example, between January and September of
1994, South Africa arrested and repatriated
(mainly by train) 57,333 illegal aliens, of which
43,345 were from Mozambique. South African
cooperation within the SADC is likely to continue
but proposed protocols to allow the free
movement of people across borders awaits the
reconstruction of Southern Africa as a whole
while issues of security and the development of
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energy steam ahead: different than the pattern of
European integration.
Reincorporating the Homelands
In late 1993 the four so-called ‘independent’
homelands of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana,
and Ciskei (the TVBC states) and six nominal
homelands were legally reincorporated into South
Africa. Thus, the quintessential symbol of Grand
Apartheid changed on our maps and legal
documents. However, the ten homeland
administrations have not yet been abolished and
the transition may take some time. The apartheid
system left many of these regions in shambles
with poor infrastructure, rural poverty, inefficient
systems of land use, conflicting legal systems, a
bureaucratic culture (most of the population is
employed in the public sector), and large
populations of dependent female heads of
households because of the legacy of male migrant
workers.
Thus, in place of legal boundaries, there remain
landscapes of poverty and despair that must still
be addressed as a ‘homeland’ problem. This is
complicated by centuries-old ethnic rivalries
marked by cultural faultlines such as the Kei
River that separates the Transkei from the Ciskei.
In this example, the Ciskei is benefiting from the
relocation of the capital of the Eastern Cape at
Bisho rather than Umtata leaving in its wake
resentment about further peripheralisation of the
Transkei.
Provincial Boundaries
Among today's nine provinces, only the Orange
Free State remains from the previous four
provinces established in 1910. Old magisterial
districts from the Cape, Transvaal, and Natal were
chopped and swapped to add eight entirely new
sets of boundaries. Although discussion and
debate lasted from May to November of 1993, the
Commission on the Demarcation and Delimitation
of States, Provinces, or Regions (CDDR) took
only seven weeks (between 8 June and 31 July) to
define the provinces. The approaching April 1994
elections established the rushed timetable.
The boundaries were selected with as much
concern for political party power as for long-term
environmental, economic, and cultural impacts.
For instance, the National Party had high
expectations of winning the Northern Cape (72%
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are Afrikaans speakers) and by political
bargaining with the ANC managed to create a
province with little economic viability (it is twice
the size of any other province but has the lowest
gross domestic product). Interestingly the NP
negotiated a last-minute excision of three
magisterial districts from the North West Province
to increase the argument for the Northern Cape's
economic viability. That modification brought in
enough black voters to swing the provincial vote
to the ANC which won by a narrow margin.
environment, regional planning, and tourism.
Each competency is negotiated between the
province and the appropriate central government
ministry in tug-of-war fashion as most ministries
are reluctant to relinquish powers. The general
lack of experience with local government (or
democratic government for that matter) also
means that South Africans do not fully understand
the process and blame cash-strapped provinces for
not delivering on their promises.
The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act allows for referendums and inter
provincial negotiations to resolve disputed
provincial boundaries and offered the possibility
of ‘self-determination’ for Afrikaners. There have
been attempts to employ the referendum. A
movement to obtain the required 160,000
signatures for a referendum on splitting the
Eastern Cape in half failed by nearly 100,000
signatures. Demands that Namaqualand be moved
from the Northern Cape to the Western Cape also
appear to have faded for lack of enthusiasm. A
stronger case is building to make Umzimkulu,
now an enclave of the Eastern Cape in the
KwaZulu-Natal, a part of the latter province on
cultural and practical grounds.
Urban Boundaries
Another potential change includes making
Pretoria an independent district similar to
Washington, D.C. The Ndebele have also
complained that the administrative boundaries of
Gauteng (formerly the Pretoria-Witwatersrand)
cut across their cultural homeland. Many disputes
are minor and point to the need for modifications
to existing boundaries (e.g. the Bushbuck area
between the Northern and Eastern Transvaal
Provinces). The location of a ‘volkstaat’ is more
problematic: volkstaat support is greatest in
metropolitan suburbia. The political force to
achieve an Afrikaner homeland is also
questionable: nearly every proposal leaves the
Afrikaners a small minority surrounded by a
majority black population. Recently, the
Volkstaters lowered their demands to negotiations
on fourth tier government status.
Overall, it is too early to assess the viability,
stability, and popularity of the provinces. For
many South Africans, the provinces are an
abstract concept since the transfer of powers from
the central to regional powers is far from
complete. Each province has its own legislature
and therefore considerable powers of
administration are to be transferred from Pretoria
in areas that include cultural affairs, education,
Nearly every city, municipality, and community in
South Africa is being subjected to major boundary
changes that must be completed before the
October 1995 national municipal elections date.
This total reorganisation of third tier government
boundaries is premised upon the goal of reducing
the great disparities in income between townships,
informal settlements and wealthy suburbs. Thus,
scores of ‘white’ municipalities are being twinned
with ‘black’ townships and unincorporated areas
or integrated into larger metropolitan areas with
the aim of mixing rich and poor rate payers,
experienced and inexperienced government
officials, and creating racially integrated local
councils.
The outer boundaries of the largest cities were
finalised at the end of October and attention has
turned to the municipalities and the inner
boundaries of metropolitan areas. For instance,
the Western Cape province has rationalised 276
local authorities into 93 Transitional Local
Councils (TLCs). The entire delimitation process
could be repeated again after the October elections
if the democratically-elected leadership questions
the boundaries set by negotiations between old
statutory bodies elected under apartheid
conditions and non-statutory bodies that were not
elected at all (e.g. leaders of civic organisations).
While the new local government boundaries
present opportunities for creating a racially
desegregated South Africa, conflict is also
inherent in these changes. Many local authorities
will vanish altogether and others will become substructures within expanding metropolitan areas.
This has led to acrimonious debate and some
resistance. For instance, the municipality of the
Strand has filed a case with the Supreme Court
opposing its forceful incorporation into the Cape
Town Metropolitan Area (in one poll 97% of the
citizens were opposed to incorporation). Some
400 rate payers opposed to paying for expensive
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litigation then occupied local government office
buildings forcing the council to find private
funding for the court action.
The size of boundaries has also been a key area of
conflict with political actors either arguing for
large boundaries for reasons of resolving
disparities in wealth, or for small boundaries to
provide accessibility, community cohesiveness,
and control over local issues. Generally, the
argument for larger boundaries has been winning.
This has resulted in some unwieldy government
councils such as Greater Cape Town with its 160
councillors. Sometimes expanding the boundaries
of municipalities brought in new voters and new
political actors that altered the complexion of
local government. The National Party stronghold
of Worcester found itself with an ANC mayor
while ANC-dominated areas like Robertson found
themselves with a National Party mayor.
Conclusion
South Africa's new regional, state, provincial, and
urban boundaries provide an excellent illustration
of how boundaries are responses to shifting power
relations. While these new lines and shapes offer
the ‘New South Africa’ an opportunity to carry
out an agenda quite different from the old South
Africa, they also present new conflicts. At the
moment, the average South African is most keenly
aware of how he or she may be affected by
changes at the most local level. In terms of
general awareness, the other shoe has yet to drop:
boundary changes accompanying even larger
shifts in power at the provincial and regional
level. This new distribution of wealth and power
represents dramatic changes that may surprise and
certainly will affect every South African in the
years to come.
1
Hartley, R. (1994) ‘Cape to Cairo Grid
Plan’, Sunday Times, 4 December 4.
Dr Richard A. Griggs is a Lecturer in political
geography at the University of Cape Town, South
Africa.
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin January 1995