FROM DÉTENTE TO THE FALL
OF THE WALL





CARTER, REAGAN AND DÉTENTE
IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND THE
CARTER DOCTRINE
REAGAN AND THE ‘NEW COLD WAR’
GORBACHEV AND REAGAN
WHY DID THE COLD WAR END?
1976: CARTER, REAGAN AND
DETENTE

Wandering without aim" describes the
United States' foreign policy. Angola is
a case in point. We gave just enough
support to one side to encourage it to
fight and die, but too little to give
them a chance of winning. And while
we're disliked by the winner,
distrusted by the loser, and viewed by
the world as weak and unsure. If
detente were the two-way street it's
supposed to be, we could have told
the Soviet Union to stop its troublemaking and leave Angola to the
Angolans. But it didn't work out that
way…

Now, we are told Washington is
dropping the word "detente," but
keeping the policy. But whatever it's
called, the policy is what's at fault.

Reagan, March 1976

Our country is not strong anymore;
we're not respected anymore. We can
only be strong overseas if we're strong
at home; and when I became
president we'll not only be strong in
those areas but also in defense - a
defense capability second to none.
We've lost in our foreign policy, the
character of the American people.
We've uh - ignored or excluded the
American people and the Congress
from participation in the shaping of
our foreign policy. It's been one of
secrecy and exclusion… In addition to
that we've become fearful to compete
with the Soviet Union on an equal
basis. We talk about detente. The
Soviet Union knows what they want in
detente, and they've been getting it.
We have not known what we've
wanted and we've been out-traded in
almost every instance.
Carter October 1976
1
IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND THE
CARTER DOCTRINE



At this time in Iran, 50 Americans
are still held captive, innocent
victims of terrorism and anarchy.
Also at this moment, massive
Soviet troops are attempting to
subjugate the fiercely
independent and deeply religious
people of Afghanistan. These two
acts--one of international
terrorism and one of military
aggression--present a serious
challenge to the United States of
America and indeed to all the
nations of the world.
Let our position be absolutely
clear: An attempt by any outside
force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the
vital interests of the United States
of America, and such an assault
will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military
force.
Carter, January 1980
REAGAN AND THE ‘NEW COLD
WAR’



Yes, let us pray for the salvation
of all of those who live in
totalitarian darkness -- I urge you
to speak out against those who
would place the United States in a
position of military and moral
inferiority.
So, in your discussions of the
nuclear freeze proposals, I urge
you to beware the temptation of
pride -- the temptation of blithely
declaring yourselves above it all
and label both sides equally at
fault, to ignore the facts of
history and the aggressive
impulses of an evil empire, to
simply call the arms race a giant
misunderstanding and thereby
remove yourself from the
struggle between right and wrong
and good and evil.
1983
2
GORBACHEV AND REAGAN


"We must not break faith
with those who are risking
their lives...on every
continent, from
Afghanistan to Nicaragua
... to defy Soviet
aggression and secure
rights which have been
ours from birth. Support
for freedom fighters is selfdefense."
Reagan, February 1985
WHY DID THE COLD WAR END?

TRIUMPH OF CONTAINMENT?

INTERNAL SOVIET POLICIES?

WINNERS AND LOSERS?
3
AND THEN, WHAT?
CHANGING EUROPE
GNP 60s
70S
80S
BUL
5.8
2.8
1.2
CZ
2.9
2.8
1.3
HU
3.4
2.6
1.1
PO
4.2
3.6
0.8
R
5.2
5.3
0
45
40
35
30
EE5
Yugo
Poland
25
20
15
10
5
0
1970
1975
1980
1983
4
1989 IN RETROSPECT
The history of postwar Europe reads almost
like a Hollywood movie of the oldfashioned kind, with all kinds of tensions
and conflict but a strikingly happy
ending….
With regard to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe it is easy to see which
political, social and economic systems
have failed. It is impossible as yet to say
what will succeed them
Walter Laquer, 1992
REVOLUTIONS
5