I
I
RAUPATU IN HAWKE'S BAY
by Joy Hippolite
February 1993
WAIT ANGI TRIBUNAL DIVISION
2
INTRODUCTION
This is the third in a series of reports tracing the Crown's relationship with Maori within the
Wairoa ki Wairarapa area. The previous reports have looked at Crown purchases of Maori land
in Hawke's Bay and the Wairarapa from 1840-1865.
This report examines the confiscation of land within the claimant area following the New
Zealand wars. It provides a background history of the area leading up to the confiscations in
Hawke's Bay from the outbreak of war in Taranaki in 1860.
It examines the following issues:
• N gati Kahungunu's views of the Taranaki war and subsequent events - what policy did
they generally follow, and were they supportive of the Crown or Kingitanga?
• Ngati Kahungunu's involvement in the wars - why did they become involved? What
actions did they take when they were involved that might be interpreted by the Crown as
hostile?
• Whether Ngati Kahungunu could easily be cast as 'rebel' or 'loyal' by the Crown.
• How the Crown came to apply confiscation legislation to the Hawke's Bay district - what
did the legislation say? Did the legislation reflect the situation?
• How confiscation in the Hawke's Bay area worked in practice - were Crown actions in
accord with the confiscation legislation? What was the nature of various 'voluntary
cessions' of land made by Ngati Kahungunu?
• What land did Kahungunu lose as a result of confiscation?
The sources used are mainly official sources, Appendices to the Journals of the House of
Representatives and files in National Archives. Because official sources about Maori reaction are
used, they should be viewed with caution. Nevertheless, they have been useful in providing an
overview ofNgati Kahungunu reaction to the wars, which can then be substantiated or otherwise
·~·12~qIClil11ll1lt:r~l)~Jll"ch
.
These sOffices had been previously seruciIed by the staff of the Waitangi Tribunal fOr
documents relevant to the confiscation of land under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 and
other similar legislation arising from the NeVI Zealand wars of the 1860s and 1870s. Those
records that were found to be the most relevant were compiled into a bank known as the Raupatu
Document Bank. Where a document has been used that appears in the document bank the
original reference is followed by the Raupatu Document Bank (RDB) volume and page number.
As well as AJHRs and files in National Archives, the McLean papers in the Alexander
Turnbull Library were also consulted. The reliance on primary sources was found to be necessary
because, although much has been written on the wars, there has been little written on the
confiscations that followed. Most of the literature has either looked at the causes of the wars, or
concentrated on battles and military strategy. While they may mention the confiscations, they
rarely detail what land was actually involved, or describe the mechanics involved - that is, under
what legislation the land was taken, or how it was subsequently dealt with.
The period covered in this report is from 1860 to 1880. This means that any issues that may
arise after that date - for example, the long term consequences for iwi of the confiscations;
protest from iwi, in particular in the form of petitions; and any commissions of inquiry held will need to be the subject of further research.
3
4
THE NEW ZEALAND WARS OF THE 1860s
The wars of the 1860s began in Taranaki, caused by the Government's decision in 1860 to
enforce the disputed sale of the Waitara block. Warfare spread throughout Taranaki and support
for resistance to Government forces also came from outside the district, including from the King
movement in the Waikato. The King movement was essentially concerned with attempting to
unify opposition to continued land alienation and supporting the assertion of Maori political
rights. G T Wilkinson, a Government native agent, described it in 1884 as 'more a progressive
measure for themselves than as an aggressive one against us' 1 - but few other officials saw it like
that.
The Government's reaction to the King movement was to send its forces into the Waikato in
1863. Warfare then spread to the Bay of Plenty and the east coast. However, the Wars of the
1860s were not a continuous or general conflict, but rather a series of wars followed by largescale confiscations of land.
Because of these confiscations, the wars have traditionally been seen as a struggle for land,2
Recent interpretations, however, have shown that while the causes of the wars need more
investigation, they were essentially struggles for political and economic controL 3 For the colonial
government the wars were the means of imposing British sovereignty on the Maori. The land
became central to this process, for whomever controlled the land held the power. Belich argues
that land was often a measure of sovereignty, as when it was alienated to the colonial
government, the political control of the district was also transferred into their hands~ Maori
opposition to further land alienation was therefore seen as a challenge to the extension of the
colonial government's authority and sovereignty. This was both unacceptable and intolerable to
Pakeha.
The Maori perceptions of the war and what they meant requires more research. During the
~~~=~=~:::cc==~==1'(ll:l;11l~~(;l.!14=\¥l.lilcllt{)~=~l:1l:~=ct1!el"~c:='¥ll~g~l!e11:l1c1):yJJ:lPll:t~cc=~~~(ltc::(lf,t!:\i"~~pPJ:}1:i:4ClI:?44ecc=:===~----­
concems ofthe Khtg movement amongst Mauli. Howevel, MaOIi fought both with and against
Government troops, and many chose to stay neutral. The different reactions to the war extended
not only to iwi and hapu but also \'1ithin h'li. ,A.lliances 'Here not automatic and could change
according to experience, new information or changed perceptions.
There have been numerous suggestions to explain the differing Maori responses to the wars.
These have included past experiences with Government officials, including land purchase
activities; traditional tribal disputes or alliances; concerns about rangatiratanga; possible
1
AJHR, 1884, Session II, G-l, no 5, p 11
2
See for example Keith Sinclair, Origins afthe Maori Wars, Auckland University Press, 1980. 'These
two ministries ... formulated a policy of confiscating huge areas of Maori land, thus blatantly
demonstrating what the war was about', p 257.
3
Belich, The New Zealand Wars; Ward, A Show ofJustice
4
Belich, pp 78, 304-305
5
advantages or setbacks in economic competition and perceptions of the impact of new
institutions and increased white settlement. Any combination of these could powerfully influence
what action Maori felt would serve their own best interest.
N gati Kahungunu appears to have responded with the same varied reactions as elsewhere.
Some went to fight for the King movement; others, while undoubtedly sympathising with the
King movement, attempted to stay neutral. The level of support or opposition for a cause could
change rapidly with changing perceptions. Some hapu who had remained passive during the
Waikato war fought on the side of the Government in later battles on the East Coast in 1865-68.
THE EFFECT OF THE WARS ON HAWKE'S BAY
Settler reaction
The immediate reaction of the settlers in Hawke's' Bay to the outbreak of war in Taranaki in 1860
was to pass a vote of sympathy in the provincial council for the Taranaki settlers. The stronglyworded resolution condemned the 'meddling of disaffected aborigines' and approved entirely of
the governor's policy - a policy the council sincerely believed was 'both suited to and beneficial
for' the province of Hawke's Bay. It was hoped that such a policy would for the future be
'everywhere alike steadily and zealously adhered to'.5
Bishop Selwyn criticised the provincial council for its sentiments, which he felt the Maori did
not deserve in light of their willingness to part with 'millions of acres of land, including all the
best harbours, for very trifling payments'. He emphasised the contribution ofNgati Kahungunu,
whose 'extinction of Native title has been unusually rapid'.6
But despite the rapid acquisition of land, the settlers were still not entirely happy about their
relations with Ngati Kahungunu. Increased white settlement had not yet brought about the
desired result. G S Cooper, a Government land purchase officer in Hawke's Bay since 1854,
-~~~-c ..,-c:-cc-c~,-cc=~~Il1R4t-bn~:4:c14:~tccM~gI~csctillc4ig-:cl1gt-c,(l~}(g()~1~-:clgec=111~:c:!)llPc~l:i()l::c~ir,e~c(lfcctll~-:,~hjt~:l11~11'.,cc()f:c-::-:-:::: ....._._.._-
know their 'proper position'. Instead, they had joined either the King mOveIIIent or the local
runanga and refused 'to obey the laws', as well as attempting to repudiate some land sales.
Cooper, while ackno-wledging the positive actions of the runanga, believed that the Maori were
'only held in check by the ... presence of a body of troops' .7 According to Lambert, as early as
1859 the general Government, at the request of the provincial council, had organised a Napier
Militia and supplied it with 200 stand of arms. 8 Cooper believed that until the white popUlation
considerably outnumbered the Maori, and were trained in the use of arms, the only effective way
5
New Zealand Gazette, 23 April 1860 (RDB 11:3669). By 'policy' they presumably meant the
declaration of martial law and sending the troops in.
6
AlBR, 1860, E-lB (RDB 14:4900)
7
AJHR, 1862, C-l, numbers 66-67
8
Lambert, The Story a/Old Wairoa, p 478
6
of maintaining order was through the maintenance of a number oftroops. 9
The presence of the troops may have reassured the settlers, though it is doubtful that they were
in any danger. In fact, the resident magistrate in Napier reported the Maori were probably more
in dread of the settlers' intentions than vice versa. The occasion of the vote of sympathy for the
Taranaki settlers had led the Maori to believe that the settlers were' desirous for an opportunity
to overcome them, and to seize their land'. Happily though, the resident magistrate could report
that all was 'quiet as regards the Natives in this Province, and at present no cause for
apprehension of a change for the worse' .10
Ngati Kahungunu 's reaction
Ngati Kahungunu's reaction to the wars differed within hapu and changed over time. Generally,
all iwi condemned the Government for its actions in Taranaki. They believed the governor to
have been in the wrong about the title to the Waitara land. The dispute that had commenced the
war at Taranaki appeared to them to be the same kind of unsettled land purchase disputes which
they themselves had with the Government. They were therefore concerned that the Government
might also employ force.against them in order to settle their disputes. Cooper reported that they
were convinced that the Government intended to forcibly take their lands and enslave them. The
'injustice ofthe part taken by Government in the Taranaki war', they considered to be:
the first step towards depriving them of their lands, and believed that the Government had forced
it upon the Maoris as a pretext for importing a strong body of troops for the purpose of
subjugating them; and they therefore looked with extreme anxiety to every movement of the
Government, fearing every day to hear of a further advance towards the seizure of their lands. 11
In April 1861 , Tareha, Te Moananui, Renata, Karaitiana and others wrote to Governor Browne
and the Queen, requesting an investigation into the causes of the Taranaki war. They denied that
they were opposed to the sovereignty of the Queen. The quarrel, they said, was about land. 12
However, saying that they were not opposed to her sovereignty in a letter to the Queen did not
ccc~.:c:c=::cc:c=:::::c=::c::cc1l:l~ClIl,:tl:!~},-=1¥~J:~::::cl~yJllgj:4~ir=(;l\¥11=ll:llll:l~:I:ll~:cGQ¥~fJ1mell~~tit;}tl$:::m;r~~c:~@f-nli:Q~:th~=,=·=ccc::cc=:::c==c=:=:c::::::
right of IIIore senior chiefs w prevent land alienation, an issue that went to the heart of Ngati
Kahungunu's social and political difficulties of the 1850s.13 Williams explains that land was the
material basis for Maori existence:
9
AJHR, 1862, C-l, number 67
10
IAl, 1860/801, 16 April 1860
11
AJHR, 1862, E-7, number 18, report from Cooper (RDB 15:5551); see also Cooper's report four
months earlier, 20 June 1861, AJHR, 1862, C-l, number 74
12
AJHR, 1861, E-IE
13
See J Hippolite, The Hawke's Bay Purchases, February 1992 (A33)
7
If that material basis was taken away then the ideological superstructure - mana and all it implied
- would crumple away. For them and for many of their descendants the wars of the 1860s were
'nga pakanga mo nga whenua' - the' land wars' .14
As long as the war was confmed to Taranaki they did not feel the need to get dragged into it.
In mid April the governor turned his attention to the feasibility of attacking the Waikato. 15
Rumours of Govemment plans to invade that area increased Ngati Kahungunu alarm. They were
never fully enthusiastic supporters of the King movement, preferring the runanga system,16 but
they had used the King's name in connection with the land, believing their land would be more
secure if held in the his name rather than their own. They derived this idea from the English
system of founding all titles upon a grant from the Crown. This, more than anything else,
demonstrated the way in which land and sovereignty (or mana) were inextricably intertwined for
Maori. Cooper believed at this stage N gati Kahungunu would have gone to support the King if
the Waikato had been attacked, if only to protect their own land, reasoning that if the King went
their land would follow. However, he believed this support would only have extended to the
Waikato situation, and that there was no threat to the settlers of Napier.
Wairarapa Maori, who 'some few months ago were loyal and peaceable', were now reported
by C R Carter, the Wairarapa provincial councillor, to be joining the King movement in large
numbers.18 As a body they were not so well off as t4e Hawke's Bay hapu as they had alienated
a large extent of their land, but did not appear to have benefitted by it. Delays had taken place
in surveying their reserves and in the completion of the purchase oflands sold, which kept them
in debt. Before they sold their land they had been courted and could easily obtain money and
credit, now they could obtain neither. They were in 'a state of positive destitution' and placed
in the position of having to rely on the settlers, who outnumbered them two to one. Cooper
consequently described them as being on indifferent terms with the settlers and 'rampant
supporters of the King' .19 While it is difficult to quantify, it does appear that they were more
supportive ofthe King movement than Ngati Kahungunu ki Heretaunga. 2o
n_.cc.c:c:c.ccccccc=c. . . . . . . . ,ccc:l:I~t:l;)~.rtJ¥~d~ll~cc't11~t:~~i@l1t,Jll~gisp;~te5c<ii:¥id~4Jb~~gillic::I<.~ll1lg;t1l111a,1 . W~.<:lp<:L:ci11~twQ="~=:CC::cccccc-classes, the 'Queen's and King's Natives', explaining the support fur the King movement as a
desire for independence and in order to prevent the extension of European settlement and
14
David Williams, 'The Use of Law in the Process of Colonization. An Historical and Comparative
Study, with Particular Reference to Tanzania (Mainland) and to New Zealand', PhD Thesis,
University of Dar Es Salaam, 1983, p 220
15
See despatches from Governor Gore Browne, from 13 April 1861, AJHR, 1862, E-l, pp 16-20
16
See J Hippolite, The Hawke's Bay Purchases (A33 :25)
17
See Cooper's report, AJHR, 1862, E-7, number 18
18
AJHR, 1861, E-ID (ROB 14:5253)
19
AJHR, 1862, E-7, number 18 (RDB 15:5553)
20
See also W N Searancke to McLean, 21 February 1860, AJHR, 1861, C-l, number 61
8
influence. He failed to see any connection between support for the King movement and their land
grievances. However he noticed that support for the 'Queen's' group was qualified and
conditional, hesitating to call that group 'loyal':
as they are more strictly neutral; for although, up to the present time, they have nqt joined the
'King' party, they are not prepared to yield to Her Majesty the obedience of subjects; they are
subjects only of the 'lead, induce, persuade' policy; and I believe many of them refuse to join the
'King's' Runanga, simply because it possesses a coercive authority, while we possess only a
nominal one. 21
The fear of a general uprising sent the representatives of the province of Wellington scurrying
off to Auckland to ask the governor for extra protectiorl~ Maori in the vicinity of Wellington
were preparing for war, they said. An attack upon the Waikato would be regarded as proof that
the Government intended to destroy the King movement and all the Maori, and would be the
signal for a general uprising. Even the most loyal chiefs, they reported, those who had proved
themselves staunch allies of the Government, would feel themselves forced to fight in its
defence. It appears that the Government was achieving what in some cases the tribes themselves
had failed to do, pushing them into making common cause with the Waikato.
Extra troops were requested for Wellington in the event of the Wairarapa Maori rising up and
attacking the unprotected settlers, even though the settlers outnumbered them. In answer to these
fears the Governor replied that the force at Napier would be increased to 300, and strengthened
by additional arms. Ofthe 700 stand of arms newly-arrived in the Auckland harbour, 500 were
to be divided between Wellington, Napier and Wanganui. He also made it clear that he. expected
the settlers to help protect themselvesY
It is unclear how well-founded the settlers concerns were. A letter from Renata to the
Superintendent of Wellington in July 1861 showed how little he at least was committed to the
King movement. He maintained that tribes had felt forced into supporting the King's cause
because of 'the evils arising from the sale of the land of the Maoris' .24 How far the Hawke's Bay
~_~~~~__~____~ha12l.lWould go todefend the :King movement was another issue. Renata advised that the best way
to·puttllc-king·-oo\;vn¥.ZastoicstoicNgati -Kammgooucoooocooc·onlliC--Iano€lUcsuon.Iffucrr
grievances were listened to and the King left alone, he said, the movement would disappear by
itself.
Even Governor Browne did not think there was any immediate danger from the Maori, but he
was determined to enforce the terms of his May proclamation upon the Waikato tribes,
demanding submission to the Queen's sovereignty without reserve and to the authority of the
law. 25 He thought that the settlers should be prepared for war in the event of the Waikato tribes
refusing to submit.
21
AJHR, 1862, E-7, number 14 (RDB 15:5544-5545)
22
AJHR, 1861, E-ID (RDB 14:5253)
23
Ibid
24
AJHR, 1864. E-2, appendix 3, extract from Renata's letter to Dr Featherstone, 23 July 1861, p 16
25
AJHR, 1861, E-lB (RDB 14:5238)
9
Following publication of this proclamation the Wairarapa Maori were reported to have had
'assumed a more thoughtful manner' , and appeared to be trying to bring the King movement into
harmony with the Queen's supremacy. However, Wardell did not believe that they had had a real
change of heart, merely that they were hesitating to commit themselves to any strong opinion
until they were aware of what course the Waikato tribes intended to pursue? Events seemed to
hinge upon how Waikato would react.
Then, late in July 1861, news came from England that Governor Browne was to be replaced
by Sir George Grey.27 All further operations were suspended until his arrival back in New
Zealand in September. On hearing of Grey's reappointment, Karaitiana and other Ahuriri chiefs
wrote to him in August, urging him to investigate the title to Waitara, and determimwho was
in the wrong. Their letter made clear that they held Browne entirely to blame. The colonial
secretary, William Fox, replied on Grey's behalf, in December, that in accordance with the terms
of peace proposed to Te Ati Awa in April 1861 an investigation of the title to Teira's land would
be proceeded with and completed. 28
By October 1861 Cooper reported a change of attitude amongst the Hawke's Bay Ngati
Kahungunu. Their confidence in the Government, he said, was being restored since the cessation
of hostilities at Taranaki, a change in the Ministry and the reappointment of Grey. Relations
between Maori and settlers in Hawke's Bay also seemed to be improving. Cooper now claimed
that they had always been on the best of terms, with 'the utmost cordiality and confidence'
continuing to exist in spite of the war. He was even optimistic that the changes in the
Government would slowly improve relations between the Wairarapa Maori and settlers. 29
With relative peace restored, Fox took the opportunity to visit the different tribes, starting with
the Waikato in December 1861. At the end of February 1862 he proceeded on to Napier. His
travels enabled him to report that there was little anticipation of any outbreak in war. 30 It was also
an opportunity to attempt to weaken relations between the Hawke's Bay and Waikato. tribes. In
October he had commented that Waikato were the backbone of the King movement, and he was
keen to break the support for the Waikato in order to weaken the King movement. He hoped to
exploit those tribes who, while supporting the movement, did not want to submit to any claim
of supremacy of the Waikato tribes. He thought that those tribes who were not fully committed
.lotneKjpgmgj[emppfblli·PciCtwadeCcommonc3fls€'i16'nJtneWaik.atoiiithe·case·ofi..rarcowQ
be easily detached from it by persuasion and argument. Without the threat of further hostilities
these tribes would have difficulty in holding together. 31
Fox arrived in Napier on 27 February in time for Te Moananui's tangi. He reported the tangi
was the occasion of an incident between the Waikato and N gati Kahungunu which had almost
come to blows. A canoe full of tea had been upset by a group ofWaikato jumping into it. The
26
AJHR, 1862, E-7, number 14 (RDB 15:5543)
27
See AJHR, 1861, A-3 (RDB 14:5090)
28
AJHR, 1863, E-13 (RDB 16:6134--6135)
29
AJHR, 1862, E-7, number 18
30
AJHR, 1863, E-13 (RDB 16:6133)
31
See AJHR, 1862, E-2 (RDB 15:5493-5496); AJHR, 1863, E-13 (RDB 16:6129)
10
incident in itself appeared minor but Ngati Kahungunu's reaction to it demonstrated just how
tenuous good relations between the two were. Fox did his best to exploit this.
On 3 March 1862 Fox met with Renata and some of the other chiefs. At the meeting the
question of the Taranaki war naturally came up. Renata again asked for an investigation into the
title to Waitara. Fox replied that an offer had been made during his trip to the Waikato to appoint
a Board ofInquiry consisting of six commissioners - one Pakeha and two Maori to be appointed
by the Governor, and one Pakeha and two Maori to be appointed by the Maori. 32 Wiremu
Tamihana (who the Government recognised as the man behind the King movement) had written
that he was reluctant for an investigation to proceed, as he didnot trust Grey's intentions. The
Governor said he wanted peace but in the meantime was moving his troops to Te la, which is
exactly what Governor Browne had done in Taranaki before war broke out. Until he was sure of
Grey's intentions, Tamihana would not consent to Waitara being investigated~3
Fox noted the effect this had on the Hawke's Bay chiefs. He suspected it might be the means
to shake their adherence to the King party, particularly as there already seemed signs of a rift
between the two. He thought, if nothing untoward happened, that a few months would weaken
the King movement in Napier to the extent that they would give it up. He suggested a follow-up
by Grey to consolidate good relations between them and the Government.
Three days after the meeting Karaitiana and some of the others wrote to Tamihana demanding
an explanation as to why he was delaying the investigation into the Waitara title. They were upset
at being made to look fools for continuing to demand an investigation when he had apparently
refused to have one. They thought perhaps it had been a mistake in the translation of his letter
and he had not really said that.
Fox emphasised to them that it was Tamihana who had caused the delay. He wanted to use
them to overcome the Waikato tribes' opposition to an investigation, but he was also doing his
best to undermine Hawke's Bay support for the King movement, by reiteratingthat Tamihana
was making a fool out of all of them. He asked to be kept informed of whatever reply was
received from Tamihana, and ensured other chiefs around Wellington were aware of Tamihana's
actions and the Hawke's Bay chiefs' reactions He appeared to be trying to· undermine their
support for the King movement as well. 34
·c=:c==··-c ...·.......cc······c::lifJi.ilyFOxwmte··agmrri~rer<fB:fN;aplerc::aSlfing···iIJliefna'll]learcrrromccTamwanaandcc-
wanting to know what he and the Waikato had to say. Renata and Karaitiana replied they had not
yet heard from him, but were going to Waikato to establish for themselves whatwas going on. 35
32
Ibid, P 6127
33
Ibid, P 6136, Tamihana to Fox, 21 January 1862
34
Ibid, pp 6137--6138
35
AJHR, 1863, E-13 (RDB 16:6139)
---- - -- --
11
THE PERlA MEETING
In October a meeting was held at Peri a, Tamihana's village, attended by Karaitiana and 40 others
on behalf of Ngati Kahungunu. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss maintaining a separate
independent Maori territory under the Maori King. 36 The debate focused on the King's right to
make laws for the Maori.
A military road was at this time being steadily advanced from Auckland into the Waikato,
with a bridge to be constructed at Te Ia. At the same time, armed steamers were being built to
run up the Waikato River. Browne's proclamation to the Waikato (back in May 1861) had
insisted that submission to the Queen's sovereignty meant acceptance that roads arid bridges
could be taken through their land whenever the Government required it. The Waikato were
determined to resist this and were demanding recognition of their authority in their own land. The
general consensus of the meeting was that the Mangatawhiri Stream would be the limit to which
the military road would be allowed and that armed steamers were not to be permitted.
The issue ofPakeha living in Maori districts was the next topic of discussion. Wiremu Toatoa
ofNgati Kahungunu objected to any laws which might promote division between the two races,
not wanting to upset the position of Ngati Kahungunu with the settlers at Napier, and 'the
peaceable way in which they lived together'. The meeting declared that troublesome settlers in
the Waikato were to be sent back to Auckland, peaceable Pakeha were to be well treated.
Bishop Selwyn, who also attended the meeting, brought up the subject ofWaitara. The general
opinion supported Tamihana's position, that no arbitration could take place so long as the troops
remained in possession of Waitara. Bishop Selwyn argued strenuously for an investigation. He
was supported by Ngati Kahungunu, who advised the Bishop that having opened the subject, it
was best if he left the matter to them. But even they could not alter the opinion of the majority.
The best that seemed to come out of it was a proposal that the governor should be asked to come
to the Waikato for discussions. If these discussions went well then the King party would agree
to Waitara being investigated.
The question of Qea~~~~~ith tlleJ~urQQy~nsuV\'as £llso rrtised atthe me~1il!g.Th~umaiQritYuwere
- -- ---- ----:oppOge<I--~-llierelie¥iaIorfto8tj]¥tle8--and--lt-;,va5-fOffilaily-announecc{-tllt'tipet'tec---sho friel-be
preserved until the governor should become the aggressor, in which case all acknowledging the
Maori King would rise in anns.
Karaitiana and the rest of the N gati Kahungunu delegation appear to have come away from
the meeting under the impression that the investigation of the Waitara had been agreed to. They
wrote to Fox in November to tell him that the arrangements were being seen to. F D Bell, the
Native Minister, possibly after having ascertained what they wanted, saw no reason to continue
the correspondence:
I always thought it a mistake in the Government appealing to Hawke's Bay natives to assist it in
overcoming the objections of the Waikato tribes to an investigation of the Waitara case. It
appeared to me to be a continuance of the same error which recognised a right in the Waikato
36
AJHR, 1863, E-12 (RDB 16:6098-6120); Ward, p 156; J E Gorst, The Maori King, Capper Press,
Christchurch, 1974, pp 318-320
12
tribes to interfere between the Government and W. King at Waitara. 37
Some preliminary conclusions about Ngati Kahungunu view of the war indicates that at this
stage there was a general sympathy for the concerns of the King movement, rather than for the
policies of the Government, but Ngati Kahungunu were pursuing their own separate policy. They
were not anxious for war but it appears that they would have gone to war if pushed by a clearly
aggressive Crown action against Waikato, if only to protect their own interests.
THE NEW INSTITUTIONS
In the meantime the Government was trying to implement Grey's new system of native
government. By October 1861 Grey had worked out a policy for the administration. of Maori
districts which came to be called the runanga system or, alternatively, the 'new institutions'. The
North Island was to be divided into 20 native districts, each under a civil commissioner. For each
district there was to be a runanga consisting of the civil commissioner and about 12 men. The
runanga would have the power to draw up by-laws for its own district in order to come to grips
with the problems of cattle trespass, fencing, health and sanitation. In addition to this they had
the important task of defining tribal, hapu or individual interests in land and recommending
Crown grants. The runanga were also to be assisted in establishing and maintaining schools with
both European and Maori teachers. Eachdistrict was to be divided into hundreds. Each 'hundred'
of a district would have a resident magistrate and two Maori assessors to hold court for disputes
about debts of money, cattle trespass and all breaches of the by-laws in the district. To enforce
the laws in every hundred there would be a warden and several constables under the power of the
assessors. 38
_~~~~~~_~~~~ '" I~,~~~~~!~(',o~nise~ ft0~_!h~ start tlJ.at the success of the new institutions depended on securing
'the'co-"operalioli-oTThe coJijriisfi£'and'tbe"WjjpXij)'g66d::WilTofn6tD"fac p s'39'TIjis-ji'as"p6ssib1 j""
umealistic, given the delicate race relations in the district at the time. In late 1861 a public
meeting of settlers in Hawke's Bay had requested the governor's interve~tion because of
worsening relations between the races. At the heart of these problems were the related questions
of the occupation of Maori land and governing its owners.
Although the Native Land Purchase Ordinance 1846 prohibited the leasing ofland from Maori
by the settlers, and despite McLean's efforts in the 1850s to prevent it, the system persisted.
Maori appeared to have no redress from settlers who refused to pay rent for leasing Maori land,
or who allowed their cattle to stray over Maori land. In the absence of a strong provincial
37
AJHR, 1863, E-13 (RDB 16:6140). In the event, no agreement could be reached on either the Waitara
or the role of the King movement. Instead, in March 1863, Grey reoccupied Tataraimaka, a block of
Crown land in Taranaki seized by the Ngatirunanui during the war of 186~1. Ngatirunanui,
encouraged by Rewi Maniapoto and other Kingites, retaliated and war in Taranaki resumed.
38
AJHR, 1862, E-2 (RDB 15:5500-5512)
39
Henry Sewell to Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, 3 March 1862, AJHR, 1862, E-9, Sec VI, p 4
13
authority, they continued to assert their own authority. European cattle feeding on Maori land had
been seized by the local runanga and compensation demanded in lieu of rents. The settlers
objected to the runanga taking the matter into its own hands, and armed strife seemed possible.
Crosbie Ward, a politician, was sent to mediate with the Maori, to suggest means of establishing
an official runanga system, based upon recognition of the native runanga, and to try and make
the settlers resolve their land problems through negotiation with the runanga. 40
Ward's assessment had been that the majority of Hawke's Bay Maori would agree to the new
institutions and that in fact it was useless to try any other solution: the Maori would not accept
enforcement of a purely English-made law administered by purely English officials, whilst for
the settlers the law was a dead letter. With an official runanga system established, legal
occupation of Maori lands by Pakeha could be arranged. The resident magistrate or civil
commissioner would be empowered, in conjunction with the native assessors, to distribute
licenses to people to depasture cattle on lands within the district. The ultimate ruling in Maori
land matters would be vested in the runanga. 41
It was perhaps unrealistic again to expect settlers who objected to an unofficial runanga to
meekly accept an official one. Straight away the scheme was unpopular amongst the Hawke's
Bay settlers, who objected to having to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of a Maori runanga.
Because of its unpopularity with the settlers, Donald McLean, who by now had settled in
Hawke's Bay, declined the position of civil commissioner, preferring to run for election as
Superintendent of Hawke's Bay province, which he won in 1863.42 Instead, A H Russell, a
prominent local settler who had already secured an enormous run, was appointed civil
commissioner in March 1862.
On trying to introduce the new institutions to the Hawke's Bay Maori in the first half of 1862,
Russell found that they were not particularly well received. The district was divided into three
circuits, the hundred of Waipukurau, of Ngaruroro, and of Wairoa. Responsibility for the
Waipukurau and Ngaruroro hundreds was delegated to Land Purchase Officer Cooper, while
another resident magistrate was to be appointed to head the Wairoa hundred. But the central and
southern Hawke's Bay chiefs showed little enthusiasm for the scheme, preferring to settle
disputes amongst themselves, rather than to submit to the interferencIDf Government officers
..
··ana·crii]rtsnf·lawWarif··sayst1iatffieTmmre·or~COlIrtsjrr·e1irrrer·yeariflo·givffJVfiIDrlrearess············~-c
43
against the settlers generated a distrust that was not easily overcome. Their main concerns
seemed to be the Waitara question and their own disputed land purchases. Russell thought he
would have more success in the north of the province.
He found the districts of Mohaka and Wairoa to be little known and much neglected by
officials. There were some Europeans located on the banks of the Mohaka River, on the land
purchased by the Government in 1851. Most of the land in the Wairoa district, however, was still
in Maori hands, with about 30 squatters renting land on the banks of the Wairoa river. He
reported that the Maori were determined to retain the land and 'as the number of children here
40
Ibid, pp 5-6
41
Richard Hill, The History ofPolicing in New Zealand, vol 1, pp 828-830; AJHR, 1862, E-9, Sec VI,
pp 6-7
42
Ward, A Show ofJustice, p 131
43
Ibid, P 135
......... ~-~-~~~
14
is in much larger proportion than I have generally met with in New Zealand, I think it not
improbable that in a few years they may require it all'. The conduct of some ofthe Europeans
located in those districts, as far as he was concerned, left much to be desired. He found the Maori
more 'civilised' than the Europeans, amongst whom drunkenness was prevalent. The local Maori,
in order to exert some control over their own people at least, had instituted their own system of
law regarding alcoho. In one instance, they closed a public house licensed by the provincial
government but located on Maori land. 44
On the whole Russell found the Maori in the northern districts 'more loyal, straightforward,
and anxious to receive European law' than those in the southern districts. The chiefs of this time
included Ihaka Whaanga, Paora Apatu and Kopu Pitiera from Wairoa, and Paora Rerepu from
Mohaka. They seemed keen to participate in Grey's plan of native government. Russell found
only 'one man of any note calling himself a King's man', Henry Te Apatari ofWairoa, though
he thought Te Apatari could be disarmed by making him an assessor. He recommended a
'careful, active and judicious' officer for restident magistrate for the Wairoa district, preferably
someone not previously mixed up with native affairs. Samuel Locke's name was submitted as
the best qualified to suit the position, he was 'a single man of active habits', with some
knowledge of the language. 45
Russell concluded his report with the observation that he believed the desire and intention of
the Maori of the province was for peace. This seemed an encouraging start, but the potential for
conflict remained as the official runanga system struggled into existence: by June, straying cattle
were still being seized by Maori, and the convening of a general district runanga by Russell had
been delayed by the opposition of some Maori groups. At the same time the settlers resisted state
decrees that they were to subject their designs on the land and its resources to the scrutiny of the
new institutions. Ward maintains that the new institutions were launched at a time when most
of the settlers wanted the Maori subdued by force of arms. 46 Perhaps for this reason, the
Government's own commitment to the scheme appeared half-hearted, and important
opportunities were lost. Wairoa hapu had to wait for over a year after they had agreed to accept
the new institutions before they received their permanent resident magistrate. In the meantime
they were visited by Captain Russell, who wrote to the civil cOl11ffiissioner that, because of!he ~____ _______
- Qela)~,Illaka-,,~afe.portea.tliat-lielioo-w.IficUItYkeeping1li5'people -li'omji,iai'ering-and-lliafhe was reluctant to abolish their own runanga system until he saw the Government's system
established in its place. Russell commented that the Government lost out by not acting more
quickly, 'had this present policy been carried out with spirit from the first mention of it I am of
opinion that much greater progress would have been made' .47
The Government also had to face the fact that no law could be enforced upon the Maori
without the support of their own runanga. In November 1862, just after Karaitiana had returned
from the meeting at Peria, an incident occurred at Clive where a man named Mita was
imprisoned for the theft of a pair of trousers. His relations resisted the policeman and magistrate
and released him from the lockup. The implication was that just as Maori constables could not
44
AJHR, 1862, E-9, Sec VI, pp 19-20
45
AJHR, 1862, E-9, Sec VI, pp 20-21
46
Ward, p 147
47
Ibid, P 155; Russell to Native Minister, 26 January 1863, MA-NA 112
15
arrest Pakeha without a JP present, Pakeha police could not arrest Maori. Karaitiana wrote that
'there is no policeman who has power to take a Maori in charge'. Even supposedly proGovernment Maori were determined to 'insist on sole jurisdiction over their own people, as they
offer to judge this case and all others, committed by Maoris against Europeans, themselves'.
Russell summed up mainstream Pakeha feeling in his statement that while Ngati Kahungunu
'strongly repudiated any wish for war ... it is evident a perseverance in their present course must
lead to it'. 48
Belich has described the new institutions as Grey's 'peace policy' - a peaceful scheme for
weaning Maori away from the King movement by providing an alternative local administration
in which they could participate, but formulated in conjunction with his preparations for an
invasion ofthe Waikato. A cynical viewpoint could see this as an integral part of his preparations
for war. 49 If Maori could be attached to the Government through the scheme it would lessen the
chance of other territories rising up in the event of war and diverting troops away from the
Waikato. Grey acknowledged to the secretary of state that this was a general feature of his policy,
to 'secure all the friends I can, so as to reduce the number of our enemies [and] narrow as far as
possible the territories hostile to us ... in the event of being forced ... to continue the war' .50
INVASION OF THE WAIKATO
Grey was determined to secure the submission of the King movement, by peaceful means if
possible but by war ifnecessary.51 In fact, Belich says an invasion of the Waikato presented itself
as the logical way to go about destroying the King movement's power. 52 Ward maintains that by
July 1863 the governor was not anxious to avoid war, but he needed sufficient justification for
an invasion. 53 Reports of an intended attack upon Auckland by Rewi Maniapoto and other
Kingites provided Grey with the excuse that he needed. No serious attempt to discover if an
~-~--~--~-:::=c===cc::flt:ta&~:::c=:W~:=c~~llbW~cl1'l~=-}:Ly=-Ql:~¥1'.=-(ltl:l~l:Wi~~~¥lQll:l(.L:::ll1:t,v:~ocllJ.Jfldha::t~~~cl=c::=c==c~:::c::=
abandoned his plans and gone off to Taupo rut the intellnent of die bOlles of die Taupo chief Te
Heuheu, who had died the previous year. On 9 July 1863 the governor ordered all Maori living
in the Manakau district and on the Waikato frontier north of the Mangatawhiri, to swear an oath
of allegiance or retire to the south side of the Waikato river, under threat of ejection. This decree
was personally taken around by officers of the Native Office, to the Maori settlements near
48
AJHR, 1863, E-3, enclosure 1 to number 4 (RDB 16:5860)
49
See Belich, The New Zealand Wars, pp 119-120
50
AJHR, 1862, E-1 (RDB 15:5413)
51
See Belich, The New Zealand Wars; Ward, 'The Origins of the Anglo-Maori wars; a reconsideration'
in New Zealand Journal ojHistory, vol 1, 1967; and A Show ojJustice
52
Belich, p 122
53
Ward, p 159; see also Gorst, p 371
16
Auckland. The majority of people chose to join their relatives in the Waikato. 54
The ultimatum was immediately followed on 11 July by a proclamation to the Waikato tribes
stating that because the King movement was 'unable or unwilling' to control its followers, the
Government was compelled to establish military posts in the Waikato in order to ensure the
security of the district. Those who resisted would forfeit the right to their lands:5 The
proclamation, however, was not despatched in time to warn those whom it purported to address.
On 12 July, before Waikato had even received the proclamation, General Cameron crossed the
Mangatawhiri with his battalion, moving on to Koheroa where he attacked the Maori. The
Waikato war had begun. 56
To the Maori, the only possible conclusion was that the Government had begun the war in
order to carry out what they had always intended, but up till now lacked the power to do; to
subjugate them and seize their lands. 57 Hawke's Bay chiefs viewed the war as unjust and held the
Governor to blame for it. Renata and other chiefs wrote to the superintendent of Wellington, Dr
Featherston:
We have been searching in vain to make out why our pakeha friends say that murders were
the cause of the war in Auckland. Not being able to satisfy ourselves, we sent an express
messenger to the seat of war to make enquiries, and he returned last Saturday evening. His report
was that the Governor's war had not been caused by murders as the Pakehas alleged. Murders
could not be heard of. The only grounds that could be alleged were, first, the expUlsion of the
Maoris from Auckland, from their own lands, and the burning of their properties and houses; and
secondly, the crossing of Mangatawhiri. If you know of any other course, we shouid be glad if
you would point it out to us, that we may speedily know it. 58
In a later letter of 19 October 1863, they wrote:
This is what we heard of. Rewi's demand for war, after Aporo had been apprehended and
imprisoned. Rewi proposed then to fight, but it was disapproved by Matutaera, by Tamehana, by
Te Paea, and the Chiefs ofWaikato. In consequence of their strong opposition, Rewi desisted,
and he came to Taupo to the tangi for (the death of) Te Heuheu. On his return, he was met on the
road by the news of the driving away of the Maoris from their land,
of the
of
54
Gorst, pp 380-389; Belich, p 133; AJHR, 1863, E-3A, number 1 (RDB 16:5931); BPP 1864, XLI,
3277 (IUP, vol 13, P 387)
55
New Zealand Gazette, 15 July 1863 (RDB 11 :3764-3765)
56
New Zealand Gazette, 22 July 1863 (RDB 11 :3769). That Waikato were to be given no opportunity
to adhere to the proclamation is testified to by John Gorst. Gorst passed the messenger carrying the
proclamation to the Waikato, on the evening of 14 July, two days after Cameron had crossed the
Mangatawhiri, The Maori King, p 380.
57
See Matutaera's letter to chiefs of Hawke's Bay, 21 August 1863, AJHR, 1863, E-ll, number 1
(RDB 16:6092)
58
Ibid, number 2,7 September 1863
59
Ibid, number 3
17
.... . . . ....
Renata, it must be remembered, had never been fully supportive of the King movement60 but
clearly his sympathies, and those of the other chiefs, lay with the Waikato. But Government
officials did not appear to fully understand this. Major Whitmore, who was now civil
commissioner for the district, reported in early 1864 that he believed the whole tribe could be
kept on the side of the Europeans 'partly through their run leases, partly through their old feuds
with the Waikatos, and partly by fear of losing their land'. Wairoa, where notions of King and
Queen were 'vague', and who had traditionally been enemies of the Waikato, were reported to
all seem willing to obey the Queen's law. Kopu ofWairoa said that he was a 'Queen man', even
'big Henare Te Apatere had recanted' before he died. Renata and Karaitiana were heard to
threaten to kill anyone who jeopardised the peace ofthe district, or else fight on the European's
side. 61
But just because Maori were unwilling to provoke war in their own district, did not necessarily
mean that they whole-heartedly supported the Government. Rather, the decision to send troops
to help the Waikato rested on local considerations. The degree of commitment to the Kingite
cause was certainly one factor, as was the sense of immediacy of the threat presented by the
invasion ofWaikato; but there were others. To despatch warriors to Waikato from afar increased
supply difficulties, multiplied the loss of labour to the tribal economy, and was believed to
expose the tribal homeland to British attack. 62 No doubt any of these influenced the action Ngati
Kahungunu chose to take.
.
Some Ngati Kahungunu did go off to fight. About 20 men from Mangaaruhe, Wairoa, fought
under Te Warn Tamatea and Raharuhi Tamatea at Orakau. 63 This was the common situation with
iwi in general, for a proportion of warriors to set off to fight for the King while the rest remained
at home and fought no one. Besides, there were other ways of contributing to the Waikato war
effort. There were certain advantages for maintaining neutrality at home while sending some
warriors off to fight at the front. John Gorst was one of the few Europeans at the time who
realised this, 'all the tribes of New Zealand either support or sympathize with the Waikatos. That
all have not actually risen in arms against us is no proof to the contrary; for one Maori tribe can
carryon the ~ar bett~r, if0tl1~rtribesre1J:laiI1 nelltra.l,aIld ftlnlis~ s1.lpplies'. 64l!a'Nl<.~' sJ:3a.y:Ngati
m .... uitCliD]tf gl1flll werepuublitellIOnaveH(:pl1ecred£3DDln .so}ienH gnsaUdsenfino UTiiWafo Hafilie H
.
65
time of the Taranaki war.
60
See above p 10
61
AJHR, 1864, E-3, number 17 (RDB 18:6763-6764)
62
Belich, p 129
63
Cowan, The New Zealand Wars, vol 1, P 367; AJHR, 1864, E-l (RDB 17:6331); see also Lambert,
Old Wairoa, p 536, who says about 40 men 'besides an unusually large proportion of women' , went
to Waikato.
64
Gorst, The Maori King, p 281
65
Ibid
18
A NEW KIND OF WAR
By the end of 1864 the Waikato war had ground to a halt, but already a new kind of war was
emerging. Although these wars brought attacks on the settlers and new conflicts with
Government forces, they were not simply between Maori and Pakeha. Oliver and Thomson have
identified them as essentially civil wars between Maori. 66
Local and traditional factors became more important in deciding if a chief or hapu would fight
on the side of the Government. Even amongst those fighting on the Government side the level
of support could vary enormously. Belich shows how the commitment to the British cause was
never complete - rather, Maori fought for their own reasons. For example, Ngati Kahungunu, he
says, would fight anyone who appeared to threaten their economic relationship with the settlers
of Napier. Still others used the opportunity of a Government campaign to gain an advantage over
local rivals. It was a matter of Maori aims converging with British aims,67 though the British
seemed to never fully understand this. The frustration caused to officials by the unreliability of
Maori allies is apparent in some of the official reports.
However, while local factors were important Belich maintains that they can be exaggerated.
He suggests that there were two common causes behind these later conflicts: confiscation and
Pai Marire. 68
THE CONFISCATION SCHEME OF THE 1860s
Confiscation of Maori land was based on the view that those Maori resisting Government forces
were in rebellion and therefore their land was open to confiscation. The plan adopted was based
on the one formulated by Grey in British South Africa. A major feature was to be the
establishment of military settlements on confiscated land. Large bodies of European settlers,
c===::c~&iEfl.J3%:~R~tftfi~f~them:se-l¥eli;=weffi:ci~looare~Hrs:tf:at~i~alJcy:c~looe£hs:ettlements:.:='I'he
land for these mlhfury settlements was to be taken from those tnbes In arms agaInst the Bnhsh
government. It was believed that the introduction of a large armed population on confiscated land
would establish a satisfactory and permanent peace. Not only would it overcome those tribes
presently in 'rebellion', but it would act as a deterrent to other tribes?9 Fox, who was now also
the Native Minister, argued that if New Zealand was to be a British possession, if British
colonisation was to continue, and if Maori were not to maintain themselves in a 'state of isolation
from the European', then the Government must confiscate the land of 'rebels' , as 'an indenmity
66
W H Oliver and Jane M Thomson, Challenge and Response: A Study ofthe Development of the East
Coast Region, The East Coast Development Research Association, 1971
67
Belich, The New Zealand Wars, p 212; Ward,A Show ofJustice, p 171
68
Belich, The New Zealand Wars, p 204
69
AJHR, 1863, A-8, number 1
19
for the past and a material guarantee for the future' .70
The Waikato tribes especially were to suffer a complete and final defeat. Confiscation was to
be the punishment for having opposed the extension of British rule. This would then serve as an
example to all the others and assist in bringing the tribes under the force of British law. But,
having imposed substantive authority upon the tribes, the Government could then afford to be
generous. It was decided that not all their land needed to taken, just enough to ensure their
submission, and 'amply sufficient land' would be left for their 'useful purposes' .71
The confiscation scheme as proposed in 1863 was not only supported by the colonial ministers
and the Governor but was also approved in principle by the imperial authorities. The secretary
of state for the colonies agreed that Maori taking up arms as had been alleged could properly be
punished by the confiscation of a large part of their common property. He had no objection either
to their land being used to meet the expenses of war, or to the establishment of military
settlements which would soon lose their distinctive character as the Maori became 'an
unimportant minority of the inhabitants'. However, he was concerned about the way confiscation
was to be implemented and the possible consequences. He cautioned the colonial government
to ensure that the innocent were distinguished and to limit the confiscations of the guilty to avoid
increasing resistance and prolonging the war.72
Sir William Martin, a former chief justice of New Zealand, also warned of the dangers of
extensive confiscation. He prophetically stated that, ifland was confiscated from Maori who had
not been in rebellion, or if it was taken for any other reasons than those stated, the Government
would be seen as using the war as a pretext for getting land and would be 'sowing the seeds of
fresh troubles' .73
Amongst all this caution though, the general support was still for the principle of confiscation.
Even the Bishop ofWaiapu, William Williams, who earlier had been trying to gaiIjustice for
Ngati Kahungunu land grievances, wrote expressing his support for the policy of confiscation.
He believed it necessary in order to punish the Maori for their rebellion against what was in their
best interests. He spoke of teaching Maori a lesson in much the same way one talks of punishing
a child for their own good. 74 Belich says that as the Maori turned away from conventional
ChristiaI1ity, tht!111i:3sionarieSu1J~canle disillusiolled and deci<ied the Maori needed to ube taught
aUshatpUUresson:7'Vlill1arnUsUtempeFeauliisuopt:ru.on'.IMhUUthgawJii@gtft8,tutft@up@Ii@)To@carriea;ootUU
with Christian principles and moderation.
70
AJHR, 1864, Appendix to E-2, enclosure 3 in number 1, memorandum by the Colonial Secretary on
Sir W Martin's observations
71
AJHR, 1863, A-8 number 1, enclosure 1
72
Despatch of 26 November 1863 from Newcastle to Grey, New Zealand Gazette 1864 (RDB
11 :3897-3898)
73
'Observations on the proposal to take Native lands under an Act of the Parliament.' AJHR 1864"
Appendix to E-2, enclosure 2 in number 1, p 13
74
AJHR, 1864, E-2, pp 76-77
75
Belich, p 328
20
CONFISCATION LEGISLATION
The original legislative basis for confiscation was the New Zealand Settlements Act, passed in
December 1863. 76 It was meant to provide for the implementation of the confiscation scheme
approved in 1863. The preamble confirmed that the intention was to make adequate provision
for the permanent protection and security of the well disposed inhabitants of bqth races, for the
prevention of future insurrection or rebellion, for the establishment and maintenance of Her
Majesty's authority and for law and order throughout the colony. The best means of obtaining
those ends was to be the introduction of a sufficient number of settlers able to protect themselves
and to preserve the peace of the colony.
The Act allowed for the confiscation of land whenever the governor in council was satisfied
that any tribe or section of a tribe had been in rebellion since 1 January 1863. The governor could
proclaim a district under the Act where there was any land owned by those held to be in rebellion
and he could define or vary the boundaries ofthat district as he saw fit (section 2).
Within that district the Governor could set apart sites for settlements for colonisation and the
boundaries of these sites could be defined and varied as he saw fit (section 3). For the purposes
of such settlements the Governor could take any land within such a district, deeming it to be
Crown land. All previous customary title interest or claim to that land was then extinguished
(section 4).
The Act provided for compensation to be paid for the land which was taken. Eligibility for
compensation was determined by two criteria: loyalty to the Crown; and making an application
in writing to the Colonial Secretary within the specified period. This was six months if living in
New Zealand and eighteen months if residing outside the country (section 7). For the purpose of
determining compensation, the Act allowed for the establishment of Compensation Courts
(section 8). Certain persons were deemed to be ineligible for compensation. These included those
who since 1 January 1863:
• were engaged in war against Her Majesty or her forces; or
• ... ~ho•• ai<ie.cI~Cl~si~te4.()rcomf°l1:~daJ1Xsllc~H~~~on~,=o"::,,.r=•••=.= =
• "he eeooselled, advised, indaeed, entieed, pefsaaded, at eatlSpited=with=an, other person
to make war or to join with or assist others in making war (section 5).
Also excepted were those who were the principal or accessory to any outrage against person
or property; or who on being required by proclamation to give up their arms, failed to do so.
The Act also made it lawful for the Governor to call upon any tribes or individuals who had
been engaged in any offences under section 5 of the Act to come in and submit to trial according
to law. Refusal or neglect to do so would render them ineligible for compensation (section 6).
The Act also provided for townships and farms to be laid out for military settlers and, in
addition, for the laying out of further townships and suburban and rural allotments and for the
sale and disposal of such land (sections 16-20).
The Government also passed associated legislation. This included the New Zealand Loan Act
and the Suppression of Rebellion Act, also passed in December 1863. These were meant to
enable the Government to put down rebellion and help fund the wars and confiscation. An
Indemnity Act was passed in 1865, and amended in 1867 and 1868, to indemnify those involved
76
New Zealand Settlements Act, 1863 (RDB 10:3294)
21
in 'suppressing rebellion'.
The Secretary of State, on receiving the Act, was alarmed. The scheme for colonisation now
proposed by the Government greatly enlarged upon the previous scheme, which he had approved
in principle but with reservations. The number of settlers, and consequently the amount of land
needed to be confiscated, had been quadrupled. The Act applied to both loyal and disloyal Maori,
while the right of compensation was limited and denied even to the 'most loyal native if he
refuses to surrender his accustomed right of carrying arms'. More importantly, the Act was not
to be 'exercised exceptionally', but was to be 'permanently embodied in the law of New Zealand;
and to form a standing qualification of the treaty ofWaitangi'.77 He also expressed concern about
the wording of the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863. Some of the provisions were expressed
in 'sweeping terms, capable therefore of great abuse ... and calculated if abused, to frustrate its
own objects'.78
The imperial government felt justified in recommending the disallowance of the Act, but
decided to let it remain in operation subject to certain limitations. It wanted the taking of the land
to be a cession as a condition of pardon. The operation of the Act was to be limited to a period
not exceeding two years, the amount of land to be taken was to be declared at once and specific
pieces of land to be taken were to be declared as soon as possible. No land was to be confiscated
until the Governor was personally satisfied that the confiscation was just and moderate. Extreme
care was to be taken when investigating title of loyal or neutral Maori who were joint owners
with rebels, with just compensation for those persons deprived of their land. The imperial
authorities warned that they would advise disallowance if they were not satisfied on these
points.79
To meet imperial concerns various other settlements and confiscation acts and amendments
followed the 1863 Act. These included the New Zealand Settlements Amendment Act 1864; the
New Zealand Settlements Amendment and Continuance Act 1865; the New Zealand Settlements
Act Amendment Act 1866; the East Coast Land Titles Investigation Act 1866; the Confiscated
Lands Act 1867; the East Coast Land Titles Investigation Act Amendment Act 1867; and the
East Coast Act 1868. Additional acts relevant to particular confiscation areas were also passed,
.f()~eX:<U1lple~h~ J\.1oh~a(lll(IWllikar~[)istric~A.ct 1870.
···TIiese·aiBel1runenfs,even i "'IientIiCy ,\'Cre atteiliptStomeet impefiaIconcems,wereoot aI1'fflj;g
well received by the imperial authorities. 80
In 1864 and 1865 the Government began declaring land in the Waikato, Taranaki and
Tauranga districts confiscated. In 1867 it was the turn of the east coast. The Government's land
confiscations provoked renewed hostilities on both the east and west coasts in 1868.
77
AJHR, 1864, E-2(RDB 17:6684-6687)
78
Ibid
79
Ibid
80
See for example the Secretary of State's view on the New Zealand Amendment and Continuance Act
1865, AJHR, 1866, A-I number 45 (RDB 19:7430-7433)
22
PAlMARIRE
.
.
-~~~~
.
..- ..
~
~
~.
~
Pai Marire had originated in late 1862 in South Taranaki, under the leadership of former
Wesleyan catechist Horopapera Tuwhakararo, who took the name Te Ua Haumene. It had
messianic and millenarian aspects and theologically combined traditional Maori religion and the
Maori versions of Christianity with Te Ua's own innovations. 81 The movement was initially
based on pacifism and peace, Pai Marire meaning 'The Good and Peaceful'. However, Ward says
that by 1864, under the stress of Government military advances and the threat of land
confiscation, it had taken a violent turn and its adherents became known as Hauhau. 82 It was
some apparently barbaric actions that brought it to the attention of the Europeans.
In April 1864 a band of Government troops in Taranaki on a crop destroying expedition were
ambushed by Pai Marire members and decapitated. The head of the captain in charge, Captain
Lloyd, was taken and preserved. This action appeared to be based on an element of the faith that
included a prophecy that after the head of a slain soldier had been carried around the island the
Pakeha would be driven out of New Zealand. The Eurcpeans were horrified, and the movement
was regarded as bloodthirsty and fanatical. Clark, however, argues that the incident could be seen
as retaliation for the active collection by European of Maori heads as specimens. An alternative
explanation is the traditional Maori view of the decapitation of a dead enemy on the battlefield
as a studied insult, symbolising conquest. 83
While its foundation rested on a religious experience, the movement had a political function
as a Maori response to increasing Pakeha domination. The teachings of the movement supported
things Maori and sought to strengthen a separate Maori identity. Like the King movement, it was
opposed to the alienation of land. Also like the King movement, it did not entirely reject
European culture, but rather sought to adapt to western culture and technology on Maori terms.
Pakeha settlers and officials never appreciated this, instead seeing in it a general desire to rid
New Zealand of all Europeans. They were alarmed at the spread of Pai Marire. This concern
increased when the movement won the support of many leading members of the King movement.
. In August(llld
Sent~lIlber
18(j4 Ma1lltaer
Kingiteleaclers._- l11t::tTe 1)_.a in.southTaraIlaki
llandother
--_.- ----_._- - ---- -----_.- - - --_
- ----- -- -- - --_._-- .The Kin-gites adopted the Pai Madre farm of horsmp and e~{6hanged their Christian names fur
non-Christian ones. Matutaera henceforth became Tawhiao. It is sometimes assumed that those
groups which had actively supported the King movement also supported Pai Marire, and after
Tawhiao's conversion there was certainly a strong connection between the two. But the division
was far from clear-cut: Kingites or ex-Kingites fought both for and against Pai Marire. Pai Marire
even began to rival theKing movement as a focus of Maori resistance to Pakeha authority. To
the Government any form of opposition became synonymous with 'hauhauism'.
During 1864 emissaries ofTe Ua were sent to various parts of the North Island. On the East
Coast they quickly made converts. Why this was so needs further research, but Clarke suggests
that the reasons were more political than religious, and prompted by local and individual
....
-~--..
-.---~-
----~-
_...
.~~---
....
~.-
--~---
...
~-_.-
..
---~---.-
....
...............
. ..
81
Paul Clark, Hauhau: The Pai Marire Searchfor Maori Identity, Auckland and Oxford University
Press, 1975
82
Ward, p 167
83
Clark, p 12
23
concerns. There were those who saw in the new religion a means to assert their tribal or chiefly
mana over their rivals. Others, typically younger and less influential men, saw in the new faith
a means of social mobility; a chance to advance themselves at the expense of hereditary chiefs.
Clark claims that Pai Marire as a religious innovation appealed to the innovators in Maori
society.84
In an effort to ascertain the attitude of northern Hawke's Bay Maori towards Pai Marire,
McLean visited the area in 1864. 85 Ihaka Whaanga and other coastal chiefs were becoming
increasing dependent on McLean for support and arms,. and by taking advantage of this McLean
was to secure more land for settlement. Mahia was purchased on 20 October 1864, 16,000 acres
for £2000; the lower Wairoa, on which the township is now based, on 31 October 1864, 3570
acres for £1000; and Upper Wairoa on 2 November, 1000 acres for £1200. Samuel Locke
completed the purchases ofWaihua and Nuhaka: Waihua on 7 March 1865, 21,000 acres for
£1250; and Nuhaka on 16 March 1865, 10,000 acres for £3300. 86 Thomson claims that these land
sales were a demonstration of 'loyalty'. The land sales not only 'opened up' the area for
settlement, but committed the sellers to the Government. According to Thomson, it was this
commitment that McLean sought as much as the land. 87
The arrival of Pai Marire was the catalyst for civil war on the east coast between June 1865
and October 1866. Chiefs who saw in the religion a threat to their power attacked the converts
in an attempt to maintain the status quo. Other chiefssaw opposition to Pai Marire as a means
of increasing their power, or gaining some advantage a local dispute. Still others used the
opportunity to payoff long-standing feuds. A good deal of changing sides and shifting of
alliances went on as Maori tried to gauge what was in their best interest.
In February 1865 Cooper reported that a delegation of Pai Marire from the Waikato had
arrived in Hawke's Bay at the invitation ofTe Hapuku. 88 The chief, however, denied that he had
joined them himself. The decision among the Heretaunga Ngati Kahungunu whether to join the
Pai Marire rested largely on local and personal circumstances. Jealousies between chiefs, and
controversy over land played a major role in their response to Pai Marire. The internecine war
of 1857 had seen the rise of Karaitiana and Renata Kawepo at the expense ofTe Hapuku, and to
a lesserextellt'f(l~(!l1a..'fl1is l1adnotbeenforgott~n()r forgiven. TeHapuku peI1J:litted the Pai
···Maiiretoseft1eatTeHalil(eueC'1'1se:lh€IT prisincesffengffienep lijmagaiPSfbisenehijesI:aIPY
Cooper reported that Tareha and Te Hapuku had buried their differences, temporarily, and made
common cause against the other twO. 89 McLean argued that Tareha and Te Hapuku were:
in
84
Ibid, P 47
85
Lambert, p 486
86
New Zealand Gazette, 1865, p 161; Crown Land Office numbers 157, 140, 139, 151, 147
respectively, DOSLI Wellington; Samuel Locke to McLean, 21 March 1865, McLean Papers, MS
32 Folder 393, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington
87
George Thomson, The Crown and Ngati Pahauwerafrom 1864: Report/or the Wai 1191201 claim
(A29:8, 14)
88
AJHR, 1865, E-4, number 20 (RDB 19:7182)
89
Cooper to Native Minister, 12 May 1.865, MA-NA 112
24
endeavouring to enlist the co-operation ofHauhaus from distant places in order that they may be
in a position to repossess themselves of lands of which, and the jurisdiction over several of their
followers, they consider, they have been unjustly deprived by Karaitiana, who for safety of
himself, and his adherents, finds it necessary to cling to the Government for protection. 90
For the same reasons that Te Hapuku welcomed the Pai Marire emissaries, Karaitiana and
Renata Kawepo opposed their arrival. They were seen as a new, unbalancing element in their
rivalry with Te Hapuku. Alarmed at their opponents' numbers, they announced their loyalty to
the settler government and their rejection of the religion. Cooper reported that they 'condemn the
Hauhaus in the strongest language and call themselves "Pakehas'" .91 Clark argues that the
importance of Pai Marire as a new faith had by this time almost been laid aside in the chiefly
feud. 92
But their rejection of Pai Marire had as much to do with their fear of an increase in the
influence of the Pakeha as ofTe Hapuku. They were anxious to avoid fighting which might lead
to the engagement of European troops in the province. One Pakeha observed that they had 'too
much property to lightly risk it!l~ Ngati Kahungunu ki Heretaunga were reportedly the richest
iwi in New Zealand, in stock, food and money received from rents. Cooper hoped that 'their
ge~eral wealth and prosperity' would act as a sufficient deterrent. 94 As Clark says, 'prosperity
in Hawke's Bay encouraged caution on all sides' .95
Just as important, though, was the threat of confiscation. Cooper maintained:
There is nothing these people dread so much as loss of their lands. And those lands are so
valuable and lie so easily open to Military Occupation, that their owners will think twice before
taking any steps that will jeopardise them. 96
The Pai Marire emissaries themselves insisted that their intentions were peaceful and that
Hawke's Bay was to remain a 'post ofpeace'?7 They were reluctant to take part in any ofTe
Hapuku's private grievances and almost immediately left the district, moving south into the
Wellington Province. However, a number of Te Hapuku's people joined the movement and it
was later claimed that it was his influence which encouraged the Wairarapa Maori to adopt the
llew·~6n:·Pr~~l:isim~farng~~an~1:ribarafntlatiohs·waslfie'TIiCrtha'F:::::C:::::::c~
90
McLean to Colonial Secretary, 5 August 1865, IA1,1865/2052
91
MA-NA 112, 12 May 1865
92
Clark, p 44
93
Ibid, P 42
94
MA-NA 1/2, 12 May 1865
95
Clark, p 43
96
MA-NA 112, 12 May 1865
97
Clark, p 43
.:::
25
Wairarapa had been a major area of Kingite support. 98
That alliances were in a state of flux was demonstrated in 1866. By the middle of that year,
Te Hapuku, after a visit from Grey in March, was reported to be assuring McLean that both he
and Tareha had always held aloof from the King movement and Pai Marire. 99 By this time both
ofthem had taken the oath of allegiance to the Queen. They subsequently fought together against
the Pai Marire at Omaranui.
The settler image of Pai Marire wanting to drive the Europeans into the sea, encouragech
desire amongst them to crush the movement as a final solution to the Maori problem.
Protestations of peaceful intent were ignored. The 'rebels' were to be punished with arms and
land confiscation. But as Cooper admitted, European were in no position to do it without the help
of Maori. 100
The decision for Maori whether to support the Government or Pai Marire was not clear cut.
Both groups wanted to ensure the survival of their land, and the culture which rested on that
possession. It was a question of which would best ensure that. 'Loyalism and Pai Marire', says
Clark, 'were different means to a distinctly Maori end' .101
Those who fought with the Government forces came to be known as 'kupapa' or 'loyalists'.
The word kupapa, however, originally meant neutral. In 1864 the Reverend Leonard Williams
spoke of the Turanga Maori as anxious not to be compromised and wanting to remain neutral.
'They call themselves always "Kupapa", as being partizans [sic] of neither side' .102 However, the
term kupapa came to cover all those people who tended to be loyalist, as it became increasingly
difficult to remain neutral.
-
OUTBREAK OF WAR ON THE EAST COAST
The first armed conflict on the East Coast came in June 1865, when one section of the N gati
Porou tribe attacked another, who had become disciples of the Pai Marire. Those fighting against
~~~~_-dl1~~ii1i~MM¥~~~9:~~~1~~~~en~\l~hc-as:c&~a~Waaawah~loo-:flR4he:cfJ&v:e1'f1ffie~r= ____ .c:••~cc _____-_____c=cc.=
===netp, and a force or about 80 mIlItary settlers was Uespatchedlfom NapIer to WaIapu to aSsIst --them. With the help of colonial troops and arms they were able to overcome their opponents. 103
During one of the attacks Ropata captured a man called Pita Tamatmi, one of the chiefs of the
Aitanga-a-Mahaki. Lieutenant Biggs, on being told who the man was, shot him dead with his
98
Ibid, P 22
99
Ibid, P 44
100 AJHR, 1865, E-4 number 20 (RDB 19:7182)
101 Clark, p 45
102 AJHR, 1864, E-3, enclosure 2 in number 21 (RDB 18:6772); see also AJHR, 1870, A-21 enclosure
in number 82 (RDB 23:9135)
103 Belich, p 208; Cowan, vol II, pp 117-122; AJHR, 1865, A-I number 27 (RDB 18:6910)
26
revolver. 104 The shooting of captured warriors was to have its sequence in the attack on Poverty
Bay in 1868.
Instead of seeing this as a civil war between Ngati Porou in which Government forces were
called in to assist one particular side, the Government interpreted it as a revolt against them and
were determined to crush any opposition. From what was originally support by Government for
a small localised affair, it became a major campaign of pacification.
With the pacification of the northern part of the east coast accomplished, the Government
turned its attention to the Poverty Bay area, where Pai Marire had made converts among a large
portion of the Aitanga-a-Mahaki and Rongowhakaata tribes. At the end of October 1865,
McLean requested the assistance ofNgati Porou against the 'hauhau rebels' ofTuranganui (now
Gisborne). On 9 November McLean arrived at Turanganui and sent messages to the Pai Marire
sections warning them that unless they came in and made submission to the Government they
would be attacked and deprived of their lands and homes. Oliver and Thomson argue that the Pai
Marire section were almost desperate to avoid war, and reports of the Pai Marire defeat in the
Waiapu area did little to encourage them. On 12 November Raharuhi Rukupo wrote to McLean
reporting that the 'hauhau' people were willing to surrender, but they wanted him to come to
them and make peace. This McLean refused to do, as he was determined that they should come
to him. He gave them until midday on 16 Novemberto surrender,and when they did not come
Major Fraser was directed to begin operations against them. 105
Major Fraser described how his force had marched on the 'rebel pa' near the Bishop of
Waiapu's residence at Waeranga-a-hika. They were unmolested until they reached the paddocks
belonging to the Bishop, where they were fired on by the Pai Marire adherents - 'they thus may
be said to have fired the first shots of the war' .106 But Oliver and Thomson have suggested that
'the government undoubtedly took the initiative and forced what they probably justified asa
preventive war upon the ... reluctant and hesitant Hauhaus':107
The Hauhaus, clearly, were not to be allowed to make peace and so remain powerful and capable
of disturbance in the future. Their power was to be broken. IDS
c::=,====~R:~~e~~~warinitmliTq:ttiiec~vere:cbu~~ntmrH:y'1Jvereum?~dc:glT:22:===~
. November they surrendered. Some of the Pai Marire fugitives took refuge in the Wairoa district
of northern Hawke's Bay, where they joined with Te Warn Tamatea, who had fought at Orakau.
Most of the prisoners taken were released, but a number were deported to the Chatham Islands.
Amongst them was a Rongowhakaata man named Te Kooti Rikirangi.
Fraser's report on the attack on Waeranga-a-hikahad finished with the sentence: 'I have made
104 Cowan, vol II, p 122
105 Cowan, vol II, p 125; Oliver and Thomson, pp 93-94; Raharuhi Rukupo to McLean, 12 November;
McLean to Raharuhi, 13 November; McLean to Fraser, 15 November; IA1,1865/3225
106 AJHR, 1866, A-6, number 1, 21 November 1865
107 Oliver and Thomson, p 89
108 Ibid, P 94
27
just now a prisoner of a native called Koti, on suspicion of being a spy'. 109 What may have
appeared at the time as merely a concluding sentence in Fraser's report was to have major
repercussions. Te Kooti had been serving with the forces fighting on the Government side. He
was accused of removing the bullets from his cartridges and firing only blanks at the enemy and
of being in communication with the Pai Marire. He denied the charges and was released but later
was arrested on other charges, and although not convicted or even brought to trial, was
transported to the Chathams. This act of punishment, which was never tested by a court of law,
was to cost the country dearly in terms oflives and moneyYo
Operations now moved to the Wairoa district of the Hawke's Bay, where the Pai Marire
emissaries had had some success in spreading their doctrine amongst a section of the upper
Wairoa Ngati Kahungunu, led by Te Warn. The kupapa forces were led by Kopu Parapara of the
lower Wairoa, Ihaka Whaanga ofNuhaka and Mahia, and aided by Ngati Pahauwera of Mohaka.
Most ofNgati Kahungunu remained neutral. On 25 December 1865 the kupapa, with a European
force of volunteers and Hawke's Bay and Taranaki military settlers, attacked Te Waru at
Omaruhakeke Pa, about 12 miles up the Wairoa river. The kupapa force won, due to colonial and
Ngati Porou help. In the aftermath of the attack Government forces burned ploughs, carts, carved
houses, maize fields, and split up canoes.
The Pai Marire retreated towards Whataroa and then moved up the southern side of Lake
Waikaremoana, where the kupapa forces, reinforced by Ngati Porou under Ropata, engaged them
at Te Kopane on 13 January 1866. That this was essentially an inter-tribal war is demonstrated
by the numbers involved and what subsequently happened. The kupapa force numbered 150
Ngati Porou and 200 Ngati Kahungunu. The Pai Marire force was said to consist of a 'number
of several hundred' of Rongowhakaata men from Poverty Bay, some hapu ofNgati Kahungunu,
Ruapani and Tuhoe. According to Cowan only seven Europeans, including Major Fraser, were
engaged at Te Kopane.l\l
The engagement was sharp and, for the kupapa side, successful. Some 60 Pai Marire were
reportedly killed, while the kupapa lost only 14.112 Those who did not manage to escape to the
north side of the lake were captured and then, according to Fraser, 'the following morning at
_~~~~~~daylightthe Chiefs ... held a "rununga", . Cowan described the event as follows:
Ropata and Hotene proposed to Ngati-Kahungunu that Hauhau members of that tribe captured
should be spared, but that any men of the Ngati-Porou, Urewera, or Rongowhakaata taken should
be killed in order to prevent rebellious assemblages of ttibes from outside districts. The Wahoa
chiefs Kopu and Paora te Apatu, however, demanded also the execution of any Wairoa Maoris
found in the Hauhau band, and accordingly Ropata shot with his revolver the principal prisoner,
Te Tuatini Tamaionarangi, a high chief of the Ngati-Kahungunu. l13
109 AJHR, 1866, A-6, number 1
110 Belich, pp 208-209; Cowan, vol II, pp 125-128
111 Cowan, vol II, pp 129-135; Belich, p 210
112 Cowan, vol II, p 135; Fraser reported 25 'Hauhau' killed and an 'unknown' wounded, while 12
'Friendlies' were killed with 17 wounded. AD1,1866/364, 15 January 1866
113 Cowan, vol II, p 135
28
The Evening Post reported:
Some men and women were captured, and deeply I regret to say that four prisoners, namely,
Hum Hum te Tautene, his nephew, Matenga (a mere lad), together with two men of the Uriwera,
were slaughtered the following day (Saturday) in cold blood with the sanction, it is said, of Major
FraserY4
Later in the article, quoting from the Hawke's Bay Times, the paper went on to say:
There were several chiefs of note killed, the principal of whom was Tuatini Huruhuru, the
greatest chief of the Upper Wairoa, and stands almost equal in rank to Te Hapuku and Tareha. 115
The Government while grateful 'for the good service' they had received from Ngati
Kahungunu and Ngati Porou, was dismayed at the subsequent killings. In a battle for 'law and
order', as they saw it, the 'unlawful' execution of these men was 'repugnant to the feelings and
customs of civilized people'. Fraser was criticised for not having prevented their execution.116
In reply he justified himself by stating that he had no power to prevent it. 117
With the battle over 'the Pai-marire rebellion in the Wairoa district' was broken, says Cowan.
Ngati Porou returned home, 'and remained at peace until they were called upon to take the field
against Te Kooti in 1868'.118
A couple of months later Grey visited the townships of Napier, Wairoa, Turanga, Waiapu, and
Opotiki. In his despatch he reported that on his arrival at Napier in March 1866 the local Maori
availed themselves of the opportunity afforded them of relinquishing their superstition and
voluntarily came forward, made their submission, [and] took the oath of allegiance.
He optimistically reported that the 'disturbances which have for so long a time unhappily
prevailed' were at an end and that the 'existing tranquillity' would not be disturbed againy9
....••.............•.•....•••..••.•..........•. :fi£e4.s~.}3~.s~~¥~t~~shGftcHwd~~1},~1},~4tter~~~Mllfil:~.a<illg~Rt~'t:~gill]~·•..~·~~~~
Hmeuru, a· hapu related to EOfllNgatI Kanungunu ana=Nglffi ItIWharetoa, and who lived
primarily at Te Haroto and Tarawera, travelled into the Napier district. One party settled at
Petane under the leader Te Rangihiroa, while the other 'vvent on to Omaranui, on the Tutaekuri
river, under the prophet Panapa. Their arrival was taken as an intention to attack Napier. McLean
warned them to return to their homes, or else they would be attacked. Panapa replied that both
peace and war were good, which was somewhat obscure to McLean, but under his instructions
114 Evening Post, Tuesday 30 January 1866, p 2
115 Ibid
116 AD1, 1866/364,2 February 1866
117 AD 1, 1866/844, 22 February 1866
118 Cowan, vol II, p 135
119 AJHR, 1866, A-I, number 35 (RDB 19:7364)
29
his people 'remained quiet and refrained from any act of violence'. Despite this their intentions
were still seen as meaning 'mischief and on 12 October Omaranui was attacked and crushed by
Colonel G S Whitmore. Whitmore had been military secretary to General Cameron, had left the
imperial army and was then a settler in Hawke's Bay. He was supported by the Heretaunga chiefs
Tareha and Renata Kawepo, and by Ihaka Whaanga and Kopu Parapara. At the same time as the
attack on Omaranui, Major Fraser attacked the party at Petane. This too was defeated.
Approximately 35 were killed, and most of the prisoners were deported to the Chatham Islands
to join those captured at Waerenga-a-Hika. 120
Grey, in the meantime, tried to use this incident as evidence of outbreaks of 'fresh
disturbances' around the colony, in order to maintain control over the imperial troops. By 1865,
the imperial government had decided that Grey's effort to crush Maori independence could last
forever, and that imperial troops must be withdrawn. 121 Grey was determined to resist the
withdrawal of the troops and a protracted exchange between himself and the colonial office
resulted. The imperial authorities became increasingly exasperated by his procrastination, as
instructions to send the troops home had been received in February 1865, yet by December 1866
none had yet left.122 Finally, in 1867, the imperial authorities had had enough. Grey was
dismissed from office and replaced by Sir G F Bowen. 123
THE EAST COAST LAND TITLES INVESTIGATION ACT
In the aftermath of the wars, J C Richmond, the Native Minister in 1867, wanted to plant colonies
of military settlers or of Ngati Porou and Ngati Kahungunu kupapa among the Pai Marire.
McLean, however, was by now sceptical of the effect of confiscation but agreed to a cession of
land from the Wairoa and Poverty Bay Maori, which amounted to much the same thing. The land
was to be taken under the East Coast Land Titles Investigation Act 1866.
This Act and its Amendment Act 1867, provided for the compulsory investigation of titles to
.................................
£Ill:ct1l~4~~~~J~c:~~~~~~4~Qwt.:A.~*Id,d_
.... ===~
which the court cernned to be the property oT rebels' would Worn the date of the cernncateoe
deemed to be lands ofthe Crown, while individual 'loyal' Maori would be issued a Crown grant
under seetions 4 and 5 of the Act. Provision was made for setting apart lands for the use and
maintenance ofthose who had been in rebellion under section 6 (the New Zealand Settlements
Act had made no provision for rebels); for selling or leasing forfeited lands (s 8); and for the
appropriation of all moneys arising from the sale or disposal of such lands to meet the expenses
incurred in suppressing the rebellion (s 9).
The Act appears to have been passed as part of a long standing dispute between the colonial
ministers and the Governor. The colonial ministers were keen to wrest further power from the
120 AJHR, 1867, A-IA (RDB 20:7590-7601 and 7645-7652); Cowan, vol II, pp 137-142; Belich, p 210
121 Belich, p 211
122 See despatches between Grey and the Secretary of State, AJHR, 1867, A-I, A-IA (RDB 20)
123 AJHR, 1868, A-I (RDB 21)
30
governor, especially in Native affairs, and the wars and confiscations inevitably became part of
this power struggle.
Under the New Zealand Settlements Act, the Governor had the power to decide how much
land was to be confiscated. A particularly bitter dispute developed between ministers and the
governor in 1864 over many of the crucial details of implementation. 124 The imperial government
had advised that the Governor was to personally agree to confiscation and to have the power to
prevent it unless he was satisfied that it was just and moderate. 125 The ministers insisted on their
right to take whatever land they thought was necessary.126 Accordingly, Richmond advised that
the East Coast Land Titles Investigation Act 1866 was passed in order 'to avoid the most
vexatious part of the New Zealand Settlements Act' .127 That is it was to be made directly by the
House of Representatives, as opposed to the Governor,and only in the case of Maori who had
been in rebellion. 128
The Act was also probably passed with an eye to meeting some of the imperial government's
concerns about the Government's implementation of confiscation (see above, pp xxx). It was an
attempt to partly answer this by confining confiscation to such land as was mentioned in the
Schedule.
The Act rested on the assumption that it was possible to identify rebel from loyal. As Williams
says, 'it was one thing to pass the legislation but another thing to implement it1.~9 Biggs, the
local military commander and resident magistrate, reported in January 1867:
The claims of loyal and rebel Natives are so mixed up that it is next to impossible to point out
a single spot that belongs exclusively to either; and when it is remembered that in the war on the
East Coast the nearest relatives were fighting one against the other, it must be evident that the
difficulty of separating loyalist from rebels' land will be very great, if indeed to be accomplished
at all.130
For this purpose a hui was held in Wairoa, in early Apri11867, to discuss the cession. At the
hui, N gati Kahungunu kupapa implored the Government to stop hunting the Pai Marire and cease
pressing for land, arguing that if they were prepared to forgive their hauhau relatives, the
for the war. Tamihana Te Huata pointed out that some of their relatives had either been slain in
cold blood or imprisoned for 'rebellion' , and still their land was being confiscated. Richmond
ignored their pleas and Biggs was instructed to enter into an arrangement (on behalf of the
124 See AJHR, 1864, E2, E2a, E2c, E3; and AJHR, 1865, Al in RDB va Is 17 and 18
125 Despatch from Cardwell to Grey, 26 April 1864, AJHR, 1864, E2 (RDB 17:6686); see above p 32
126 AJHR, 1864, E2 (RDB 17)
127 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1867, p 693
128 Ibid
129 Williams, p 250
130 Williams, p 250; AJHR, 1921-22, G-5, P 14
31
Crown) with the Wairoa Maori.l3l
WAIROA DEED OF CESSION
On 5 April 1867, the 'Chiefs and Natives' of the Wairoa district 'agreed' by a 'deed of cession'
to give up their rights to blocks ofland lying between the Wairoa and Waiau Rivers; between the
Mangapoiki and Kauhauroa Streams; on the left bank of the Wairoa River, with the exception
of a block of approximately 500 acres at Pakowhai; and 20 sections of 50 acres each between the
Kauhouroa and Wairoa rivers. In return, the Crown withdrew its claim to the southern portion
ofthe land covered by the Act. This meant that the block which the Maori 'agreed' to give up
(and was later called the Kauhouroa block) was confiscated as representing the 'rebel' interests
in the whole area, instead of everyone going through Native Land Court hearings to determine
title to all the lands. A payment of £800 was made to theNairoa Maori on liquidation oftheir
claims to that block, and the Government became the sole proprietor of the land asnative title
was completely extinguished (see map). 132
The amount ofland retained by the Government was 42,430 acres, of which 6888 acres were
to be allocated to military settlers or immigrants. The remaining 35,500 acres were to be held by
the Government and be available for sale. In 1876 it was proposed to lay the confiscated block
out in lots of 2000 to 5000 acres and sell them as small sheep runs. 133
The remainder of the land, lying between the Waiau and Wairoa rivers and Ruakituri Stream
and stretching inland to Lake Waikaremoana, was to be divided into blocks and returned with
a Government certificate to the' loyal chiefs'. 134
After signing the agreement it was discovered that certain errors had occurred in the 1866 Act.
In one ofthe clauses the word 'include' was used instead ofthe word 'exclude'. This rendered
the 1866 Act inoperative by admitting the land titles of rebel Maori which it was expressly
intended to exclude. As well, the boundaries described in the schedule were found to be wrong.
,Ottin Poi111b adbeendescribed as Lottery, and two otheylaces, Hauratlg.LandJ~ur~r~r~...gi~~....~~~~
appeared WOOWWiI. l3S AlI arllellmllem Act was passed ill 1867 to tighten up the 1866 Schedule
and to provide for the agreements which the Government had already entered into.
The 1866 Act and its 1867 amendment were subsequently repealed by the East Coast Act of
1868. This Act, while not affecting any agreement entered into under the previous acts, required
the Native Land Court to refuse to order a certificate of title in favour of any person who was
u. . .....uJ
131 Ward, p 225; Wellington Independent, 20 April 1867 and Hawke's Bay Herald, 23 April 1867 in MA
24/26 (ROB 89:34375, 34390)
132 Turton's Deeds, Vol II, p 546; AJHR, 1870, A-16, enclosure 1 in number 9 (ROB 23:9084); AJHR,
1872, C-4, number 23 (ROB 25:10015); Williams, p 251
133 AJHR, 1871, C-4 (ROB 24:9623); AJHR, 1877, C-12 (ROB 28:11050)
134 AJHR, 1870, A-16, enclosure 1 in number 9 (ROB 23:9084); AJHR, 1872, C-4, number 23 (ROB
25: 100 15). The land later became four blocks - Ruakituri, Taramararna, Tukurangi and Waiau.
135 NZPD, 1867, P 924; AJHR, 1867, A-lOD
32
guilty of any offences mentioned in the section 5 of the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863
(ss 2-3). In any claim heard, the Court could order that a certificate be issued stating that land
comprised therein belonged to 'rebels' (s 4(3)). Upon the issue of such a certificate the land
comprised in it was deemed to be Crown land (s 5). It is not clear at this stage if the provisions
of this Act were ever implemented. In any case, this legislation still did not solve the problem
of how to distinguish 'loyal' ihterests in land from 'rebel'.
THE RETURN OF TE KOOTI
However, before the Government could carry out its promise to subdividethe land and decide
on the persons to appear in the grants, Te Kooti and his followers escaped from the Chatham
Islands, where they had been held without trial for two years. Te Kooti had been deported there
in 1866 for allegedly supporting the Hauhau. The prisoners were kept at the Chathams longer
than was originally intended while Biggs, who had been instrumental in Te Kooti's arrest,
attempted to implement the confiscations.
While there, Te Kooti had fostered a new religious movement which later became known as
Ringatu. It was influenced by Te Ua's teachings and intertwined the Old Testament with Maori
tradition. 136 Te Kooti also talked about exacting revenge on the settlers and kupapa .Maori. 137 In
July 1868 he and his followers arrived back, and for the next four years the Government hunted
them in a series of expeditions across northern Hawke's Bay, the Urewera, Taupo, East Cape,
and the Bay of Plenty.
Te Kooti and his force landed at Whareongaonga, about 15 miles south of Poverty Bay, on
10 July. No time was afforded to them to show what their intentions may have been before Biggs
rode out on 13 July with a party to intercept them and demand that they give up their arms and
remain peaceable until the Government sent instructions regarding them. Te Kooti refused to
surrender their weapons, but declared peaceful intentions. Biggs later reported that it was his
.••••..••••••••......................... ~ation ••to~.~~~~.if=they=re~AQ ... ~e=lijL.~.£·JU1l1&:aFl~....
L.=.==~
However, wilen he saw that they not orily outnumbered his own sriililTTorce, but were arso Detter
armed and trained, he 'determined to return and wait for instructions from the Government', in
the meantime acting 'only on the defensive' ys
Having indicated that 'they had no wish to fight unless attacked', Te Kooti and his people
began to march inland. Biggs heard of their departure from Whareongaonga and immediately
dispatched a force of about 80 European and kupapa from Poverty Bay to intercept them. On 18
July he took up position at Paparatu, blocking their route before handing over command to
Captain Westrupp. Biggs then left to arrange supplies and reinforcements. On 20 July the
colonial force sighted Te Kooti and his men. In the engagement that followed, Westrupp's force
suffered two fatalities and several wounded, while Te Kooti suffered no casualties. Defeated and
136 Walton-Jon Woodford, 'Te Kooti and the Attack on Poverty Bay, 1868', MA Thesis, University of
Auckland, 1990, pp 6-8
137 Ward, p 226
138 AJHR, 1869, A-I (RDB 21:8215); see also Cowan, vol II, p 235; and Belich, p 281
33
dispirited, the British force retreated.
The retreating force was met by Colonel Whitmore's advancing column at Te Arai on 21 JUly.
Whitmore attempted to persuade the Poverty Bay men to accompany him to renew the attack on
Te Kooti, but, exhausted by their recent efforts, they refused. Whitmore lost his temper but was
forced to wait for reinforcements from Major Fraser's armed constabulary. In the meantime he
sent out an advance party under Captain Richardson to delay Te Kooti's march. This party made
its attempt on 24 July at Te Koneke, but was also unsuccessful and was forced to retreat, with
the loss of one kupapa and another accidentally wounded.
On 31 July Whitmore, joined by Fraser's constabulary and a reorganised Poverty Bay column,
renewed his advance. However, on reaching the boundary ofthe district the Poverty Bay men
refused to go on any further, informing Whitmore that that was as far as they were liable for
military service. The Poverty Bay kupapa saw no reason to 'remain without their Pakehas' and
returned home. 139 With a reduced force Whitmore pressed on. The engagement came on 8 August
at Ruakituri. Bishop Williams later claimed that the general order given to the force at Ruakituri
was to 'take no prisoners' .140 Maori losses totalled two killed, one mortally wounded, and eight
wounded, including Te Kooti. The British lost eight in alL The result was seen as a terrible defeat
for Whitmore. 'Whitmore came back on Friday last having got what everybody else but he calls
a thrashing' .141 The colonial force, exhausted by the hardship of the winter marching and out of
food, were compelled to abandon the pursuit, while Te Kooti's force escaped to Puketapu.
Whitmore, after blaming the Poverty Bay men for the disaster, left for Wellington and was
presently engaged in reorganising the defences on the West Coast. 142
Te Kooti and his people remained at Puketapu for over two months from mid-August. During
this period the colonial forces suffered a disaster on the west coast and the Government, in order
to free resources for the struggle against Titokowaru,made a serious attempt to come to terms
with Te Kooti. An amnesty for all offences and land for settlement was offered, on condition of
their surrendering and giving up their arms. At the same time McLean was offering his assistance
to prevent war in Hawke's Bay and the east coast. This offer was gratefully accepted by
Richmond, who authorised that McLean was to be given every facility to secure the alliance of
both the loyal and hostile tribes. But the amnesty was not accepted because of what was seen as
missed. As well, although McLean was given the office of general Government agent, relations
between him and the Stafford government, jealous of McLean 's influence on the east coast, were
very strained. When the Government sought to move some Ngati Porou troops to the West Coast
in February 1869, McLean, pleading greater danger in the east, held them at Napier in open
defiance of the Government. In March he was dismissed as general Government agent and his
place taken by a Stafford supporter. 143
139 Biggs to McLean, 18 August 1868, McLean Papers, MS 32 Folder 162, Alexander Turnbull Library,
Wellington
140 Williams to McLean, 14 September 1868, MS 32 Folder 640
141 Biggs to McLean, 18 August 1868, MS 32 Folder 162
142 AJHR, 1869, A-I (RDB 21:8215); Cowan, vol II, pp 235-240; Belich, pp 222-224
143 AJHR, 1869, A~1 & A-4 (RDB 21:8215, 8338); Ward, pp 227-228; Belich, p 225
34
While waiting at Puketapu, Te Kooti attempted to recruit others to his side. His total
numerical support, which he had brought with him from the Chathams, was at the most 298, of
whom 135 were women and children. He had suffered few casualties or injuries, but the battles
had exhausted both his force and their supplies. He desperately needed food and ammunition
from the local tribes, as well as arms and men for a full-scale war against the colonial forces to
reverse the position of the east coast conflicts of 1865-66. He sought the support of the King
movement, as well as the Tuhoe, Rongowhakaata and Ngati Kahungun~ but while considerable
sympathy and passive support was expressed, the material results were disappointing. Only some
of his own people, the Rongowhakaata, joined him. His main support, about 100 in all, came
from the Tuhoe and upper Wairoa Ngati Kahungunu and included the Te Waru brothers.l44
The upper Wairoa people were a small cohesive group of people who had not wanted
European settlement in their area. In 1864, Whitmore, who was then the civil commissioner, had
reported that 'some Europeans had been stopped in the Upper Wairoa by natives, more or less
allied to the Uriweras, but still Ngatikahungunus'. He also reported on the feud between the
upper and lower Wairoa Maori which had been going on for 'some years' .145
Pai Marire wars
and the later east coast wars were an extension of this old feud.
Te Waru Tamatea, of Marumaru, was the leader of the small Ngati Kahungunu contingent
which had joined the Urewera war-party at Orakau in 1864 (see above p xx). In 1865 Te Waru
had fought on the side of the Pai Marire against the kupapa tribes. He and his tribe had
surrendered to the colonial forces in February 1866 and, following the confiscation of their land,
they and the Waiau Maori were allowed to go back to their settlements at Whataroa and the
Waiau Valley (south of the lake), where they remained until Te Kooti's retum.146
Cowan tells how in 1868 Te Waru sent Paora te Wakahoehoe, a chief of Waikare (near
Mohaka), to Te Kooti, bearing a famous greenstone mere called 'Tawatahi', and accompanied
by Te Waru's daughter Te Mauniko:
The
.uc.
. .....................
the understanding was that the acceptance of Te Kooti of the young woman as his wife and
taking the greenstone heirloom would imply an obligation on his part to attack the Gisbome
settlements and so avenge the death of the son of an important chief, Raharuhi Rukupo, who had
bfi\fi\~~n the assaulton.·Pa,.kairomiromk.Waiap...1k.by~~Fr~~~ in 1865. Ho\'.'we*ll~
.. ~~~~~=
=t¥Kooti ci:ff'i'fed Odf1fiS=plll'f oI die compaCf1ire massacle at Matawhero -mtotUy mel waras=
testified. The greenstone weapon mentioned was found in Te Kooti' s hut in the pa. 147
TeWaru was frequently mentioned in the despatches and reports of the time and appears to
have been greatly feared by the colonists. According to Belich, some colonists even believed him
to be the actual leader ofTe Kooti's force, although he was in fact just another loyal subordinate
144 AJHR, 1869, AA (RDB 22:8351); Belich, p 225; Cowan, vol II, p 241; Woodford, pp 27-28
145 AJHR, 1864, E-3, enclosure 1 in number 17 (RDB 18:6763); see also S Deighton to J Rhodes,2
October 1868, 'I begin reluctantly to distrust Te Warn again, 1 can't get him down here, which looks
bad, and 1 know he hates the Wairoa Natives', AJHR, 1869, A-I0 (RDB 22:8405)
146 Cowan, Vol I, p 407
147 Cowan, Vol II, p 440
35
ofTe Kooti's.148
Before joining Te Kooti, some of Te Waru's men had killed four of their kupapa relatives
from the lower Wairoa, two of whom, Karaitiana Roto-a-Tara and Ahitana, had fought against
Te Kooti at Te Konene. 149 This had the effect of strengthening kupapa support for the colonial
forces amongst the Poverty Bay, Wairoa and Napier Maori, some of whom had earlier expressed
sympathy for Te Kooti. But this support was qualified, as noted by the local officials, feeling
being more against Te Kooti's force than for the colonial forces. 'Karaitiana's death has had a
good effect in increasing their anger with the Hauhaus, if not their love for us', the sub-inspector
at Wairoa, Captain Tuke, observed. 150 But he also noted local Maori were more concerned with
protecting their own homes than actively searching out Te Kooti's force.
Another explanation for kupapa support for the colonial forces was that it was a realistic
assessment of what was in their own best interest.
The demonstration of force we are making is having the very best effect, and now that they see
Te Kooti is not likely to be the strongest side after all, they will probably keep with US. ISI
As Belich says, 'these Maoris might have mixed sympathies, but the proximity of colonial forces
to their homes made a kupapa role expedient' .152 The colonial forces were also reinforced by a
group ofNgati Porou under the leadership of Ropata Wahawaha. For men like Ropata, who were
not traditional tribal leaders, kupapa activities created or greatly increased their power withiri the
tribe. 153
What might have been the action ofTe Kooti and his force had they been left alone when they
first arrived back was speculated upon. Governor Bowen, amongst others, considered it
unfortunate that Biggs had not waited for instructions from the central government before he had
marched out to meet Te Kooti, even if it were just a simple challenge to surrender the arms which
had been plundered from the public stores. 154 By mid-October 1868, following the three punitive
expeditions by the Government, Te Kooti's intentions were 'definitely hostile' ,155 and Biggs paid
the penalty for his zeal 'by a cruel and bloody death' .156 On 10 November 1868 the Matawhero
~==~~~~~~~~~~sertte-me-nt~~~verty::Bay~~W'ttS:c:attre~and==lli:~was k411~~ with~ilis~~family,-~~·34~~~·=~=~
148 Belich, p 219
149 Cowan, vol II, p 238; Lambert, p 540
150 AJHR, 1869, A-4A (RDB 22:8352)
151 Ibid, P 8351, J D Ormond to Colonel Haultain, 23 October 1868
152 Belich, p 212
153 Ibid
154 AJHR, 1870, A-lB (RDB 22:8744)
155 Belich, p 225; see also Clark, p 106
156 AJHR, 1870, Governor Bowen, A-lB (ROB 22:8744)
36
Europeans and 20 Maori. 157
To the colonists, the 'Poverty Bay Massacre' and the later cold-blooded killing of prisoners,
who were people ofTe Kooti's own tribe, was an example of the barbaric and savage nature of
Te Kooti and his force. 15s But Te Kooti had been pursued by the Government's forces for
months, and his three early encounters with them had all been on the defensive. He now decided
it was time to take the offensive. The Government forces were too large to attack in the open, and
he had retaliated in the only way open to him, by attacking the houses of armed settlers. Civilians
were killed in the process, but primarily for military reasons: to dislocate the enemy defence.
And, as Belich points out, the killings were no better and no worse than the bloody aftermath of
Orakau. 159 The attack on Matawhero can also be explained in terms of 'Te Kooti's desire for
revenge on those who had unjustly imprisoned him'. Biggs, who Te Kooti held responsible for
his imprisonment, had been sought out and killed early in the action.160
The shock of the surprise attack had the effect of paralysing the Government forces fora
week. During this time, Te Kooti's patrols roamed the district collecting large quantities of
horses, cattle, supplies, and taking some 300 local Maori prisoners. 161 Some of these prisoners,
including Paratene Turangi, were picked out from among their fellows and executed - Paratene
for his part in Te Kooti's exile. Belich, while not excusing Te Kooti, explains his actions as a
reprisal against the colonist executions of captured warriors during the campaigns ofJ865-66.
Other suggested reasons were Te Kooti's resentment of his unjust imprisonment; the failure of
his tribe to aid him in his time of need; his desire to intimidate kupapa enemies into inaction; and
the mysterious dictates of his God. 162 Woodford sums up the reasons for Te Kooti's attack on
Poverty Bay as millenial influence, utu, and military strategy.163
However, he appears to have failed in one of his objectives. Instead of intimidating his kupapa
enemies into inaction, the killings at Poverty Bay had the effect of committing more kupapa to
the pursuit ofTe Kooti. On 19 November, 200 Ngati Kahungunu from the Napier area arrived
at Turanganui under Tareha, Renata, and Te Hapuku to reinforce the 140 already there. They
were joined by about 100 local Rongowhakaata, while McLean appealed for more reinforcements
from the Ngati Porou tribe. 164
Belich maintains that without the help of kupapa, the colonial operations of 1864-68 would
157 Belich, p 228
158 See for example AJHR, 1869, Cooper, A-I (RDB 21 :8215)
159 Belich, p 229
160 Ibid, pp 228-229
161 Ibid, P 228
162 Ibid
163 Woodford, Te Kooti and the Attack on Poverty Bay, 1868, P 3
164
AJHR, 1869 A-4A no 15 (RDB 22:8356); Belich, p 230
165
Belich, p 213
37
says, 'Nineteenth century imperialism, in New Zealand ... triumphed largely because its subject
peoples were divided.' 166 But this did not mean the colonists had to like it. There were frequent
requests to increase the size of the European forces in order not to have to rely on the kupapa.
McLean wrote:
urging upon the Government that a reinforcement of Europeans should be immediately sent here
to co-operate with the Natives now in the field against the enemy. It is humiliating to feel that we
are obliged to rely solely on Native allies in the present emergency; the effect upon the Natives
generally cannot be encouraging. 167
Belich shows that the result of this attitude was to down-play the kupapa role, while extolling
the part of the colonial forces. 168
The combined forces set off on 20 November in pursuit ofTe Kooti. The result was eventually
a success for the British, in that Te Kooti was severely defeated. However, he was never
captured, managing always to elude the British. At times Te Kooti was aided by the feud between
McLean and the Ministry. While they argued, Te Kooti continued on his way. When McLean's
appeals for reinforcements were answered in the form of Colonel Whitmore, he decided, in the
words of Belich, 'that the cure was worse than the disease' .169 McLean withdrew his support from
the general Government war effort, which cost Whitmore the services of over 700 Ngati
Kahungunu.
The final showdown with Te Kooti came at his stronghold of Ngatapa in January 1869.
Whitmore set off for Ngatapa on Christmas Eve, reinforced by a new Te Arawa constabulary
division. He was joined by Ropata's Ngati Porou kupapa and on 31 December the siege ofth~
pa began. It lasted until on the morning of 5 January, their food and water exhausted, Te Kooti
and his people lowered themselves by ropes down a near-perpendicular cliff and escaped. Ngati
Porou and the Arawa division went in pursuit. Te Kooti and his immediate followers escaped,
but a great many ofthe people, including women and children, weakened by the lack of food and
water, were captured. The male prisoners, some 120 of them, were then ordered killed by Ropata.
~~~,c:c:cc-~_-:==~I~-=ex~~~-:~~c:--,:~-,~- -:~:c::_,-~-_c:_--~=-,_~~~~~
by Ie Afawa armif<fconSfubleS":-All anneaconstabillary scout reported,----~- 'We just stood them on the edge of a cliff and gave them a volley' .170 The cold-blooded killings
vvx:re justified by the eolonists as revenge for Poverty Bay, the irony being that some of these
people were prisoners that Te Kooti had taken from Poverty Bay. As Belich says, 'Poverty Bay
was "'avenged" partly on its victims'.l7l Also killed at this time was Nikora te Whakaunua of
--~~---~---u\:lfl)~fNgatf1'orou;alded
166
Ward, p 169
167
AJHR 1869 A-4A no 16 (RDB 22:8358)
168 Belich, p 232-233
169
Belich, p 263
170
Cowan, vol II, p 281; Hill, vol II, P 26
171
Belich, p 266; Cowan, vol II, pp 270-282
38
Ngati Hineuru, one of the prisoners taken at Omarunui in 1866.172
Following his defeat at Ngatapa, Te Kooti's campaigns in the Hawke's Bay area were over.
He then turned his attention to the Urewera and Bay of Plenty areas. But, before completely
leaving Hawke's Bay, there was one last attack to sustain the Urewera and Bay of Plenty
campaigns. Te Kooti was in need of recruits and ammunition. A large supply of Government
ammunition was known to be stored at Mohaka. This was the home of the Ngati Pahauwera
hapu, who had actively opposed Te Kooti since his landing from the Chatham Islands. Te Kooti
learnt that Mohaka was undefended as most of the fighting men, numbering 80 to 100, under
Hoani te Wainoho, PaoraRerepu, and Iehu te Kupa, had joined an expedition to Waikaremoana
in the belief that he was camped there. Determined both to avenge himself on the Ngati
Pahauwera and obtain the ammunition, Te Kooti attacked Mohaka on 10 April 1869.
Despatching a force under Te Warn to the Wairoa valley to divert and hold the Ngati Kahungunu
force, Te Kooti took the main body of his men and descended on Mohaka. Most of the Ngati
Pahauwera people and settlers in the near vicinity took refuge in two pa. Those in the small outsettlements, who were surprised by the advancing force, were killed. Peita Kotuku, a member of
the war party, said:
It was the Tuhoe men chiefly who killed these people, because they and Ngati Pahauwera were
ancient enemies. I ?3
With most ofNgati Pahauwera's fighting men absent, the defence of the pa rested upon a few
warriors, assisted by some old men, boys, and women. The ones in the pa called Hiruhama
managed to hold out; the second pa, Te Huki, was captured by Te Kooti, by treachery according
to most accounts. Once inside though, it was the occupants that fired first. Nearly all of the
occupants, mostly women and children, were then slaughtered. Some managed to escape by
climbing over the palisade at the rear, sliding down the cliff and swimming across the Mohaka
river. Ropihana, the man reportedly responsible for firing the first shot, was one of them. The
surrounding settlements were then looted and burnt. In all, some 57 Maori and seven Europeans
.... c.. ..... ........mW~~=in=tim=atiaGk:ml=Mghaka)74 ..
As soon as news of the attack was received, relief forces were despatcI1ed. Onll ApnJ, 100
Ngati Kahungunu under Ihaka Whaanga left Wairoa for Mohaka. The popular tradition has been
that the kUpapa forces were under the leadership of the British and that expeditions against Te
Kooti were launched by the British. Thus 'a force of over one hundred Wairoa friendlies' was
said to be under the command of Major Withers. 175 Belich, however, has shown that the kupapa
were more than able to initiate and lead their own expeditions. 176 Withers admitted that Ihaka
Whaanga had left for Mohaka without his knowledge. He hurriedly attempted to catch up with
172
Cowan, vol II, p 281
173
Cowan, vol II, p 328
174
AJHR 1869 A-3C (RDB 21); Belich, pp 276-277; Cowan, vol II, pp 326-334
175
Cowan, vol II, p 330
176
Belich, p 232
39
them on learning that they had started without him. But Te Kooti expected a force from Wairoa
and had set an ambush; Ihaka Whaanga was forced to retreat. Other Government forces fared no
better. They either arrived too late or pursued too cautiously. Te Kooti was able to retreat im
leisurely fashion into the Urewera. 177
Tracked by constabulary, militia, and kupapa forces throughout the Urewera, Taupo, and Bay
of Plenty areas, Te Kooti managed to elude capture for the next three years through support from
Tuhoe, a section of Ngati Tuwharetoa, and sympathy from the King movement. By 1870,
however, active support had dropped away through sheer exhaustion, though Tuhoe continued
to provide tacit assistance. In late 1870 several Tuhoe chiefs made their peace with the
Government and then, in December 1870, Te Waru surrendered. Nearly destroyed by fighting
and illness, Te Waru and what was left of his hapu, about 40 in all, surrendered to Captain Preece
at Horomanga, on the Rangitaiki side of the Urewera country. 178
Following the wars, surrendered 'rebels' were located on reserves under the eye ofkupapa
tribes and forced to remain there. 179 Te Waru and his hapu were exiled by the Government to
Waiotahi, in the Bay of Plenty, and were paid a sum of £300 for all their interests in the Wairoa
lands. In 1878 Preece, who was now the resident magistrate at Opotiki, reported thatTe Warn
and his hapu continued to cultivate their land at Waiotahi and had about 50 acres under crop.
They were also anxious to purchase land and had applied to the Waste Land Board to put a piece
up for sale. 180
In 1883 the Government offered an amnesty to the 'ex-rebels' which entitled them to return
home. This brought a request from the Wairoa hapu that Te Waru and his followers be prevented
from returning to Wairoa. The Government replied that it was 'scarcely probable' that they
would return but, as they had been pardoned, they were fully entitled to, 'under the protection
of the law' .181 In the event, only one of Te Waru' s hapu took advantage of the amnesty to return
to Wairoa. Cowan maintained that neither Te Waru or his brother dared return to Whataora
because they would have been attacked by the relatives of Karaitiana (see above, p xx). Te Waru
died in exile at Waiotahi. 182
While the Ringatu faith was one element in the support for Te Kooti, part of his appeal may
also be explained by the confiscations, as the Te Kooti campaigns were mixed up with the
u:;::;mp1ewt':ntatlon Ofciiiiliscati~ Despatches between the Governor and the Secretary of State in 1869 noted that the
177
AJHR 1869 A-3C no 39 (RDB 21:8309); Belich, p 277
178
AJHR 1871 F-1 (RDB 25:9708); Cowan, vol I, p 407; Belich, pp 277-285
179
Ward, p 230
180
AJHR 1878 G-l no 12 (RDB 29:11274); In 1922 Preece related that he had paid Te Waru a sum
of £400-£500, Cowan vol I, p 407, however a deed dated 6 September 1877 stated that Te Waru
and 28 others were paid £300 in the presence of Preece, Auckland deed 841, DOSLI Wellington
181
Under secretary to Preece, 2 July 1883, MA 4/36
182
Cowan, vol II, p 242
183
see Biggs to McLean, Ms 32 Folder 162
40
confiscation of land was one of the reasons for the continuation of the wars. 184 The Secretary of
State commented:
That the discontent of the Natives does mainly arise from the confiscation of their lands is
manifest. The neighbourhood ofTauranga and other confiscated districts on the East Coast is that
in which Te Kooti maintains himself. In Taranaki your own officer states that 'the larger and
more generally operative incitement to rebellion is the hope of recovering land and status;' while
the restoration of the large extent ofland confiscated in the Waikato is unequivocally put forward
by the advisers of the so-called Maori King as the condition of pacification. 185
The policy of trying to occupy the distant and isolated districts with military settlers appeared
to prove what the Secretary of State, Mr Cardwell, had foretold to Grey in 1866, that
if the proposed new settlements were too far advanced beyond the country already occupied, it
might prove impossible to abandon them without discredit, or to protect them without
disproportionate expense. 186
In October 1869 the Secretary of State advised that, unless a large standing army was to be
maintained, which he was not prepared to do, large concessions in the form of the abandonment
of land and the recognition of Maori authority were necessary for the restoration of peace. He
realised they were 'distasteful remedies' to the colonists, but unavoidable if peace was to be
achieved. 187 But the Fox ministry, of which McLean was a member, was not yet ready to accept
the conditions for peace, preferring instead to chase Te Kooti until, still eluding capture, he
retired into the King Country in 1872. In 1883, he was finally pardoned as part of a Government
attempt to open up the King Country by peaceful means. 18S
SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFISCATED LAND
With peace restored, the Government could now turn its attention to the settlement of the
confIscated land, held over SInce 1867. In 1869 lhaka Whaanga, Paora 'I'e Apatu, and some of
the other Wairoa chiefs had raised the issue of the portion of land in the upper Wairoa to be
returned to them with a Government certificate~89 McLean was in complete agreement that a
184
AJHR 1869 A-I no 25 (RDB 21:8187); AJHR 1870 A-IA no 18 (RDB 22:8695)
185
AJHR 1870 A-IA no 18 (RDB 22:8695)
186
AJHR 1866 A-I no 45 (RDB 19:7431)
187
AJHR 1870 A-IA no 18 (RDB 22:8695)
188
AJHR 1870 A-I enclosure in no 37 (RDB 22:8656-8661); Ward, pp 228-230; Belich, p 286
189
AJHR 1870 A-16 enclosure 1 in no 9 (RDB 23:9084)
41
matter that had stood over for so long should be defInitely settled without delay, as long as doing
so was not prejudiced by any act of the Native Land Court or promise by Biggs.I9o
However, the promise ofthe Government to subdivide the land and decide on the persons to
appear in the grants was not carried out until 1872. On 3 August 1872 Samuel Locke met with
the Maori at Wairoa. Locke had previously ridden over the country and visited Waikaremoana
to ascertain the most suitable boundaries for the blocks which were to be divided and Crowngranted. Rivers and streams or other natural features were used as boundaries in order to save the
expense of survey, as the land was rough sheep country. After lengthy discussion the land was
divided into four blocks and another agreement was signed by the chiefs on behalf of their people
on 6 August. By this agreement the Government kept, besides those blocks in the previous
arrangement, two other blocks of land. One was of approximately 250 acres at Onepoto, the site
of a constabulary post on the Waikaremoana Lake; and the other of 50 acres for a proposed road
at the crossing of the Waikaretaheke Stream. The deed of agreement also included the schedule
of names to be inserted in the Crown grants.
Locke concluded his report by saying that:
The settlement of this long outstanding question will be of great benefit to the Wairoa, as settlers
will now be able to occupy the country as sheep runs, and all feeling of uncertainty existing in
the Native mind removed. 191
However, the question was far from settled. On peace being made with Tuhoe, they submitted
a claim to the land that had been held in conjunction with Ngati Kahungunu, to whom the land
had been returned. Both parties were advised to settle the title to it through the Native Land
COurt. I92 The dispute over the title had the effect of raising bad feelings between the two tribes.
In June 1875 Fredrick Ormond, the resident magistrate at Wairoa, reported that:
Between the Wairoa and Urewera natives there now exists much mistrust and unfavourable
feeling, the chief bone of contention being the division of the confiscated land. 193
On 29 October 1875 a meeting was held at Wairoa to discuss the disputed boundary of the
land between N gati Kahungunu and Tuhoe. The Government wanted to buy the land, but fIrst
wanted the title to it investigated by the Native Land Court. The purpose of the meeting was to
settle the dispute prior to the land being brought before the court. It seems that the Government
had some concern that Tuhoe, who had no experience with the Native Land Court procedure,
might be at a disadvantage, in comparison to Ngati Kahungunu, who had had 'lengthy
intercourse with Europeans', and were well 'conversant with the mode of procedure adopted in
190
ibid, P 9086
191
AJHR 1872 C-4 no 23 (RDB 25:10015-10017); see also AJHR 1873 C-4B (RDB 26:10187)
192
AJHR 1874 G-2 no 14 (RDB 27:10562)
193
AJHR 1875 G-IA no 4 (RDB
27:1~609)
42
the investigation of land titles' .194
Both parties claimed rights to the land on ancestral grounds. Tuhoe claimed that their
boundary in the direction of the Wairoa approached as far as Mangapapa. Locke recited the
boundaries of the land claimed by them as:
Pakaututu, Mohaka, Tuke-o-te-Ngaru, Paewahie, Ngahaha, Rotokakarangu, Tukitukipapa,
Putere, Te Arau, Rotonuihaha, Potikihere, Te Toi, Whirinaki, Waiwhakaata, Puharakeke, Te
Paepae, Tukutapa, Tukurangi, Mangapapa, Wharepapa, Whataroa, Erepeti, Tauwharetoro, Te
Ihu 0 Mangatapere, Te Mapara, Puhinui, Waioeka, Whakamauki, Pukenui-o-Raho. 195
N gati Kahungunu, on the other hand, claimed their boundary extended beyond Mangapapa
across Lake Waikaremoana to the Huiarau Ranges. 196
It appears that the Tuhoe boundaries cited may not have been their exact boundaries, but
Tuhoe had felt forced into defining them as such. Hori Wharerangi, of Tuhoe and Ruapani,
explained that he had defined the boundaries as such because he believed Ngati Kahungunu were
.fast absorbing all their land, in particular the four blocks Tukurangi, Waiau, Ruakituri and
Taramarama.
The meeting deteriorated into a slanging match with each feeling they had to denegrate the
other's claim to assert their own. It brought out all the traditional animosity between the two
tribes. Locke commented that the Government was
endeavouring to amicably settle the long outstanding dispute between these contending tribes that
have been for generations at war.
He also maintained that:
• . • • • • . . • • • •·
••• m .
Had the Goverment acquired and retained this land before the restoration of peace with the
Urewera, no claim of theirs would have ever been heard of to the land in question. The
...mG~~ingJID~si..Qe.£atiooior..Abe Ur!W/€f~~ves in ,sancti~atan .
the investigation 01 thedaim put fOrth by [hem, cOllsidetin:glfie grounds upmnvftith they assrn
their right, being as they were at the time in rebellion when the land was confiscated and dealt
with. 197
No compromise could be reached so the meeting was brought to a close, with the matter to
be placed before the Native Land Court.
The case for Tukurangi, estimated at 37,000 acres, opened on 4 November 1875 at Wairoa
under Judge Rogan, with Tuhoe and Ngati Kahungunu disputing each other's claim. The case
closed the following day with 'no decision to be given till [the] Court has personally viewed the
194
AJHR 1876 G-1A (RDB 28:10760-10761)
195
ibid
196
ibid
197
ibid
43
ground'. The same day the case for Ruakituri, estimated at 52,000 acres, was heard, with the
court finding that 'the two statements made by the claimants and counter claimants were totally
at variance with each other and were exceedingly contradictory' , and the case was closed.1 98
Taramarama and Waiau opened and closed on 6 November, with the two parties stating that
their claims to these blocks were identical to Ruakituri. The court decided that it need not go over
the same evidence again and that owing to the conflicting nature of the evidence a site visit was
necessary. No judgement would be given until a proper survey had been made and a duly
certified plan presented. 199
The court sat again on 12 November, at which time Wi Hau Tarake and Hetaraka te
Whakaunui appeared and, on behalf of Tuhoe, withdrew their claims to the four blocks. They
stated that it was not their intention to come into court again and that Tuhoe had 'arranged' their
dispute with Ngati Kahungunu. Toha Rahurahu, ofNgati Kahungunu, then submitted a list of
names for each of the four blocks. Memorials of ownership were ordered by the court for those
named. 2oo
How it was 'arranged' between Tuhoe and Ngati Kahungunu is unclear, but by a deed dated
12 November 1875 Tuhoe and Ruapani were paid £1250 in relinquishment of their claims over
the blocks ofland. 201 Fredrick Ormond reported that:
The Native Land Court, during its sitting here in November last under Judge Rogan, defined the
boundary between the Ngatikahungunu and Urewera with perfect satisfaction to both parties. 202
Almost immediately following the court hearings Josiah Pratt Hamlin, a land purchase officer
assisted by Locke, purchased the blocks on behalf of the Government for £12,610. The land
involved was estimated at this stage to be 157,000 acres. Hamlin explained the division of the
money. As well as the £1250 already paid to Tuhoe and Ruapani, £9700 was paid on 17
November 1875 to those named in the Native Land Court minutes and given memorials of
ownership. This £9700 comprised of £2350 for the Waiau block, £2350 for Tukurangi, £2600
for Ruakituri, and £2400 for Taramarama. The Ruakituri deed was also signed by Em Kohi Kohi
..... and WilecRama,hus~f1hipeIaAeJ(oo.Hmd Rewai~:te--K~ respe.ctiYely.1bipe~-R~'ll.ai~
....====
were named in the memonruoTownersmp Out nofTheIfIiuso·anas. Eru1C6hI Kohl arso· sIgned me
Taramarama deed, along with Ihipera. This would have been because, under section 86 of the
Nati ve Land Act 1873, a husband had to be a party to the execution of any deed by a married
woman and both signatures were necessary.
A further £160 was paid to some of the leading chiefs of Ngati Kahungunu, Tuhoe, and
Ruapani 'for services performed' in assisting Hamlin to complete the negotiations. As well,a
198
Napier Minute Book 4, p 65ff
199
ibid
200
see NMB 4, pp 94-96. Further research could be carried out by the claimants to determine
whether the lists included both Ngati Kahungunu and Tuhoe.
201
Auckland deed number 841, DOSLI Wellington; see also J P Hamlin to Ormond, 4 December
1875, AJHR 1876 G-5 enclosure in no 5 (RDB 28: 10792)
202
Ormond to under secretary, 15 May 1876, AJHR 1876 G-1 no 36 (RDB 28:10749)
44
sum of £1500 was to be paid to 'the loyal Natives ofWairoa, Mohaka, Nuhaka, and Mahia' as
compensation for their interests in the land given to them by the Government in consideration
for their services during the war, and in accordance with the agreement at Hatepe in 1867. This
was paid on 15 January 1876 to Ihaka Whaanga and 440 others.203
'Ample reserves' were set apart for the three iwi involved. For Ngati Kahungunu they were:
Tukurangi, 3800 acres; Taramarama, 1700 acres; and Ruakituri, 2920 acres. A further reserve
of2500 acres was promised for Tuhoe and Ruapani, making a total of 10,920 acres of reserves?04
The sites for Kahungunu's reserves were fixed almost immediately and a surveyor engaged
straight away to mark them off. Tuhoe's and Ruapani's reserves were to be done later in the
month of December. Further research will be necessary to determine if this was ever done.
The total quantity of land acquired by the Government by this purchase, excluding the
reserves, was given as 146,080 acres, 'a cost of a fraction under Is.8 3/4d. per acre' .205
Fredrick Ormond noted that:
On the strength of the money expected for these lands, nearly every Native ran headlong into
debt. Upon division of the money it was not sufficient to cover much more than half of these
debts; but as some of these people are in receipt of rents, and others are about selling further
blocks, it is to be hoped they will clear them of[.206
The significance of the purchase of these four blocks of land was noted by J D Ormond, the
general Government agent for Napier, to McLean on 9 December:
The purchase is in many respects an important one. It settled a long-standing feud between the
Ngatikahungunu and Urewera tribes, who disputed the ownership of these lands. Both parties
have now disposed of their interests to the Crown. This is, I believe, the first instance of any sale
ofland by the Urewera. 207
McLean, who was now Native Minister, concurred in the opinion expressed by Ormond of
.......... =theimpmtanee.~e,=tme=fur.:settlmgc.±=thrue~...=.=================~
long-standing feud between the Ngatikahungunu and Urewera tribes, who hitherto disputed the
ownership of these lands
by both parties disposing oftheir interest to the Crown. But more importantly perhaps was that
this purchase was the first instance in which Tuhoe had participated in land sales to the
Government. It was accepted by the Government as:
203
AJHR 1876 G-5 no 5 (RDB 28:10792); Auckland deeds 837-841, DOSLI Wellington
204
AJHR 1876 G-5 no 5 & 7 (RDB 28: 10792-10793)
205
ibid, enclosure in no 5
206
AJHR 1876 G-1 no 36 (RDB 28:10749)
207
AJHR 1876 G-5 no 5 (RDB 28: 10792)
45
evidence of a desire, on the part of that tribe, hitherto bitterly opposed to Europeans, to maintain
friendly relations. The fact of their having participated in the purchase money is the best proof
theycan afford of an intention to live on peaceable terms with the colonists.208
The following year, on 22 August 1876, he told the House of Representatives:
I may here mention the great change that has come over Native feeling in the interior of that part
of the country [the upper WairoaJ. The Urewera, a tribe but a few years ago at deadly feud with
us, and who, even after friendly relations were established pertinaciously refused to sell an inch
of their lands, were considerable owners in these blocks. With some hesitation they submitted
to allow these claims to be adjudicated upon by the Native Land Court; their claims were heard,
and they were well satisfied with the result; and yielding to the persuasion of the co-claimants
of other tribes, joined in the sale, and received their share of the money.209
The lands were proclaimed waste lands ofthe Crown on 13 August 1877. 210
Mohaka-Waikare Confiscation
As well as confiscating land in Wairoa under the East Coast Land Titles Investigation Act, the
Government wanted to confiscate land from Ngati Hineuru following the battles at Petane and
Omaranui, despite a large number of them being killed or taken prisoner. This land, however,
was outside of the Schedule to the East Coast Land Titles Investigation Act. Presumably for this
reason, on 7 January 1867 McLean wrote to the Colonial Secretary recommending that
a block of land to the north of Napier lying between Petane and the Waikare river on the sea
coast and extending inland as far as the boundaries of the Province of Hawkes Bay
be confiscated under the New Zealand Settlements Act. He was of the opinion that the
Natives who have so wantonly disturbed the peace ... in this block ... should be made to feel
the consequences of such conduct by the forfeiture of some of their land. 211
As well as being a punishment, the confiscation was to be the means of ensuring the future peace
of the district. McLean also noted that:
208
ibid, no 6
209
AJHR 1876 G-I0 (RDB 28: 10798); New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 1876, p 505
210
AJHR 1878 G-4; New Zealand Gazette, 13 September 187,7 no 78, p 928
211
IAl,1867/566 (RDB 131:50618-50622)
46
The chiefs of Hawke's Bay and all the Natives interested are agreed that the land of the Natives
taken in arms should be confiscated and they urge that this should be done without delay in order
that they may afterward deal with such portions of the land not liable to confiscation as they may
think fit. 212
Accordingly the land was confiscated on 12 January 1867 by order in council under the New
Zealand Settlements Act 1863.213 This order declared that the governor was taking all land within
the district that was not Crown land or held under Crown grant for settlement. It also advised that
no land of any 'loyal inhabitant' would be retained by the Government. At the same time, all
'rebel inhabitants' who came in within areasonable time and made 'submission to the Queen'
would receive sufficient quantity of land for their maintenance.
A further Gazette notice on 14 February 1867 notified that claims for compensation had to be
received by the Compensation Court within a period of six months from 12 January 1867. 214 In
the event no compensation court sat in Hawke's Bay. Instead, McLean met with the Maori
claimants on 8 May 1868. At the meeting an agreement was entered into, whereby the
Government withdrew its claim to a block ofland of approximately 101,000 acres, except for the
Arapaoanui and Moeangiangi blocks of 13,686 acres, which had been previously bought;
Otumatai of 4470 acres, bought on 11 May 1866 for £400215 ; and Tongoio 8,500 acres, which
was 'ceded' by the natives. In return, the Maori withdrew all their rights to the rest of the block,
about 193,000 acres, and the Tongoio block, for £150. 216 However, this did not settle the question
of the confiscated land.
On 25 October 1869 Locke, who was then the resident magistrate in Napier, wrote to J D
Ormond, the agent for the general Government:
At Mohaka I found the Natives hard at work endeavouring to repair, as far as possible, the
fearful damages done by the hauhaus. As the enemy destroyed all their crops, they have nothing
to eat and are obliged to borrow seeds from other tribes for this year's planting ...
I found the state of the native mind satisfactory but owing to the heavy losses sustained by
········mem~€t'ftre-=etI~arr&aU:at{J~mtre=titHtA~smtiy:clapse~~~
... ~.~~~~~~
.. down again quietly to their agricultural pursmts, and the resources of the· dIstrIcts be fully·
developed. 217
The letter was forwarded to McLean, who replied to Ormond on 18 November:
212
ibid
213
New Zealand Gazette, 1867, p 44 (RDB 12:4157)
214 New Zealand Gazette 1867, p 112 (RDB 12:4174)
215
IA1,1867/598 (RDB 133:51218)
216
Mohaka-Waikare no 1, Turton's deeds, p 556
217
AJHR 1870 A-16 enclosure 1 in no 9 (RDB 23:9085)
47
I quite recognise the unsettled state of those who were sufferers by Te Kooti's massacre, but trust
that the gradual improving relations between the races may have the effect of restoring more
confidence, and be the means of inducing a recurrence to industrial pursuits. 218
Against this background McLean wrote to Locke, on the same day, instructing him to effect
a final settlement in relation to the Mohaka-Waikare block:
I have the honour to request that you will carry out the settlement of the Waikare Mohaka
Block.
The Government do not expect or indeed desire to reap any pecuniary or other advantage from
the confiscation of this block, or to incur any loss in connection therewith, but it is most desirable
that all questions connected with it should be finally adjusted and disposed of. You will therefore
endeavour to effect as equitable a settlement with the Natives as possible, taking care that large
reserves are made for their own use.
The chiefTareha, who is becoming dispossessed of most of his landed property, should have
reserves secured upon him within the block.
I need not supply you with more detailed instructions, as you are already acquainted with the·
history of this block, and I feel satisfied that you are fully competent to deal with it in such a just
and equitable manner as will meet the requirements of the case.
You will of course in this as in all other cases confer with his Honour Mr. Ormond who
represents the General Government at Hawke's Bay and act in accordance with his views in the
carrying out of these instructions.219
Acting on these instructions, Locke and Ormond met with the Maori concerned and a deed
of agreement was signed in Napier on 13 June 1870. The extent ofland to be retained by the
Government was more fully spelt out and reduced.
1. The Tongoio North block was now 9050 acres. Excepted from this was 10 acres at Whakaari
which was reserved for the use and occupation of the Maori as a fishing ground, and as a
public reserve and landing place. In 1872 the Tongoio block was transferred to a Mr Towgood
in exchange for land at Poverty Bay.220
Alfred Cox.
3. The Mohaka ferry reserve, 50 acres on the north bank of Mohaka River for a ferryman's
house.
4. Haroto, 1000 acres at the site ofthe redoubt, 500 of which was to be for Paora Hapi and his
people.
5. Tarawera, 2000 acres at the site of the redoubt.
As well, the Government reserved the right to enter any portion of the block to cut and remove
timber for road, telegraph or other purposes.
The rest of the block was to be returned to the 'loyal claimants', subject to certain conditions;
218
ibid, no 10; p 9086
219
MAl,5/13/132, part 1 (RDB 60:22949-22950)
220
This may have been the E Towgood who accompanied Major Fraser to Te Kopane, see Cowan,
vol II, p 135
48
namely the block was to be subdivided into 13 blocks with Crown certificates (Crown grants)
to be issued for those mentioned in the schedule. The whole of the block was to be made
inalienable from sale and mortgage and held in trust in a manner to be determined by the
Government. 221
The. 13 blocks listed in the schedule, with the number of people to whom Crown certificates
were to be issued to, were:
• Tongoio ki te Tongo - 35 people
• Pakuratahi - 13 people
• Arapawanui (Arapaoanui) south - 37 people
• Tutira - 40 people
• Taratara 0 te rauhina - 14 people
• Purahotangihia - 27 people
• * Awa 0 totara - 39 people
• * Waikare - 37 people
• Tataraakina - 22 people
• Tarawera - 24 people
• Kaiweka - Tareha te Moananui only.
• * Heru-a-turei - 36 people
• * Te Kuta - 36 people222
According to a commission of inquiry into the Tarawera and Tataraakina blocks held in 1951,
'the purpose of the agreement of 13th June, 1870, was twofold'.
In the first place it was for the purpose of returning to loyalist Maoris who lived in the district
their interest in the land. In the second place it was intended to reward loyalist Maoris, some of
whom may not previously have lived on the land. 223
.....u
This agreement was subsequently validated by the Mohaka and Waikare District Act 1870.
Although the agreement stated the land was to be inalienable from sale or mortgage, provision
was made under section 5 for the leasing of the land for a term of 21 years. The Act also provided
·that 811:00ihe=laruhetained 13) the G8 •emment hael been eleelared SlWY e) eel in the New Zealand
Gazette, it would be deemed to be vested absolutely in the Crown and could then be sold. On 27
July 1880 the Government gazetted that the land had heen defined and the survey completed224____
In February 1871, McLean authorised a payment of £400 to be made to Tareha and others on
completion of the settlement of the Mohaka-Waikare block. 225 This receipt, which was signed
by 29 Maori, including Tareha, recites that the Government agreed to give to certain claimants
in the block the sum of £400 as a 'full and final settlement' for the block. The receipt
221
Turton's deeds, p 559; Le 1118711141 (RDB 8:2613); LS 60/3 (RDB 96:36620-36621)
222 Le 1118711201, plan accompanying the 1870 agreement; MAl, 5/13/132, part 1 (RDB
60:22937-22948)
223
AJHR 1951 G-7, P 20
224
New Zealand Gazette, 1880, p 1083 (RDB 13:4716)
225
AJHR 1951 G-7, P 13
. ______. __ _
49
m
..
acknowledges payment of the money by Locke.226 The payment may have been in return for
abandoning any interest Tareha and the others may have had in the blocks retained by the
Government. 227 The 1951 commissioners suggested that it may have been intended to be a reward
for kupapa assistance to the Government and as part compensation for those who may not have
had land returned to them. 228
Although some surveys were made and some leases granted, no titles were issued under the
Mohaka and Waikare District Act and in 1878 the Act was repealed by the Repeals Act 1878,
the Government being under the impression that its operations were spent or unnecessary. 229
In 1879 Tareha and 11 others petitioned Parliament to take measures to give effect to the 1870
Act regarding the issue of Crown grants. 230 The petition was reported in their favour 231 but before
it could be acted upon Tareha died in 1880.232 In September 1881 the Native Land Acts
Amendment Act 1881 was passed, providing for the issue of grants in favour of those people
entitled to the land. Section 7 of this Act provided that on the application of the Native Minister,
the Native Land Court could inquire and determine who were the persons entitled to the issue of
grants in their favour. In October Preece, the resident magistrate, wrote to the under secretary
informing him that the Maori were anxious to have the question finally settled and requesting
that an application be made by the native minister. 233
On 23 November 1881 the Acting Minister, Rolleston, applied to the Native Land Court and
a date was set for hearing on 1 May 1882 at Wairoa. 234 This was later adjourned until 1 July, but
by then the weather had made the Wairoa bar too dangerous for boats to cross and the roads
nearly impassable from rain, so it was further adjourned to Napier on 6 July.
At the opening of the hearing under Judge Brookfield, the chief Manaina asked whether any
Maori other than those mentioned in the 1870 agreement would be allowed to forward claims to
the land. According to him, the schedule attached to the agreement contained the names of many
people who had been in 'open rebellion' to the Crown, while the names of others who had always
been 'loyal' had been omitted. Manaina was informed by the judge that the agreement had been
given effect to twice by Acts of Parliament so the court had no jurisdiction to make a fresh
inquiry. The only persons who could be recognised as having an interest in the land were those
named in the agreement, or their successors. Manaina objected to the court proceeding with the
-;mvestigatlo1:lyillJ.i.iliiCliM wassuppQrtP{fby AplTana aM g5rs -Dei anIDlje.lbWl1Qwers tpetj -
226
Turton's deeds, p 561
227
see Ormond to native minister, 4 July 1870, MA1,5113/132 (RDB 60:22929)
228
AJHR 1951 G-7, p 13
229
ibid
230
petition no 34411879, sess 11, MA1,5/13/132 (RDB 60:22897)
231
AJHR 1879, sess 11,1-2
232
AJHR 1951 G-7, p 13
233
MA1,5/131132 (RDB 60:22851)
234
New Zealand Gazette 1881, p 1701 (RDB l3:4792)
50
left the court, refusing to give any information.
Later in the day the court, on the request of Preece (representing the Crown), proceeded to
enquire into who were the persons entitled to the subdivision of the Te Kuta block. Toha
Rahurahu assisted it, stating who of those named in the schedule were dead and who their
successors were, and an order was made accordingly.
Toha's people were subsequently angry with him for helping the court and he was forced to
tell the judge that he could not offer any further assistance. He was informed by the judge that
this course of action would only prevent the court from issuing orders in favour of the successors
of the deceased people. If no successors were given, the original names would be read over and
orders issued in their favour. The successors would then have to apply at a later date for
succession orders, 'entailing much trouble and expense'. Toha replied that his people had made
up their minds and would not assist.
The following day, 10 July, Manaina, Toha and other chiefs appeared in court and protested
against the proceedings. The judge's response was to request them to continue helping him and
then petition Parliament about the matter afterwards. They refused and left the court. The names
in the schedule were read oVt:!r and orders made for certificates of title to issue according to the
original agreement, even in the case of Kaiweka, which was granted only to Tareha, who had
died in 1880. The estate was then antevested from 12 September 1870, the date the MohakaWaikare District Act came into operation. Preece applied for the same antevesting order for Te
Kuta, apparently because a lease had already been signed for this block before the court order
was issued. The court, however, refused because many of the people named in the order had
become entitled as successors after 1870.235
Further research is needed for the history of the block from this date until the present.
CONCLUSION
'GoverniIient -UCUlIlg-=t1Ie-NeWZeruanu wars. By mntiningl1reir reaction ro11re wars fi'oml1re1ifSfoutbreak of war in Taranaki in 1860, this report shows that their support was qualified and for
purely Maori reasons. In--fact, far fl"Olll ttnqualified support for the Government, Ngati
Kahungunu generally sympathised with the King movement, if not supporting it outright. At one
stage it even looked like they would go to war to support the King movement if forced to by a
clearly aggressive action on the part ofthe Government. In the end, the majority did not, but for
their own reasons, rather than because they fully supported the Government's cause.
In the later east coast wars, Maori had their own concerns, which sometimes intersected with
the Government's. Local and personal concerns, such as inter-tribal and chiefly rivalries traditional Maori reasons for war - determined their involvement. In this context, Pai Marire was
a means to an end, as was fighting with the Government troops. This is demonstrated by the fact
that support for Pai Marire came before the outbreak of war on the east coast, and precipitated
warfare rather than following it. Neither were the wars specifically against the settlers, there were
more Maori killed by Maori in these wars than there were European killed. But the Government,
235
MA1,5/13/132 (RDB 60:22791-22796); Wairoa Minute Book 2, pp 87-101
51
instead of seeing the east coast wars as civil war between Maori, interpreted them as opposition
which had to be crushed. This was despite Government officials being aware that local Maori
were manipulating the Pai Marire disciples for their own ends. 236 The Government therefore saw
Maori as either 'rebel' or 'loyal' rather than seeing Maori as fighting for their own reasons
against other Maori.
By showing that the wars in that area were largely civil wars between Maori, it then becomes
apparent that terms such as 'loyal' and 'rebel' are irrelevant in relation to the Governmentparticularly as it has become apparent that in most cases it was either kupapa or Government
troops who instigated battles with the Pai Marire. They were then in the situation of having to
defend their lives, for which they were branded 'rebels', providing the Government with
justification for taking land.
Because there was no clear cut division on the ground between 'rebel' and 'loyal' interest, the
Government could not clearly separate their land and resorted to out of court settlements, outside
the provisions of the legislation that the confiscation was supposedly based on. Having swiftly
acquired the land by 'cession' the Government was by no means as prompt in ensuring a title for
. 'loyalists'. When it finally got around to settling the matter, it ignored the agreements entered
into with the kupapa, and acted on the basis of what was expedient, rather than the policy of
rewarding 'loyal' and punishing 'rebel'. In the end there were complaints that just as many
'loyal' Maori had lost land as 'rebel'.
In the post-war period there must have been many Ngati Kahungunu kupapa who wondered
at the benefits of being 'loyal'. Having fought to preserve their way of life they then found
themselves caught up in the Native Land Court machinery and suffered the consequences.
236
see Cooper to native minister, MA-NA 112
52
Bibliography
A. Primary Sources
1. Unpublished Sources
Alexander Turnbull Library
McLean Papers
Department of Survey and Land Information
Crown Land Office Deeds
National Archives, Wellington
Army Department (AD)
Internal Affairs (IA)
Land and Survey (LS)
Legislative Department Papers (Le)
Maori Affairs, Head Office (MA) and Napier District (MA-NA)
Maori Land Court minutes
2. Published Sources
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR)
British Parliamentary Papers (BPP)
New Zealand Gazette
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD)
Turton, Henry, Maori Deeds orLand Purchase in the North Island orNew Zealand Vol II
The Evening Post, 30 January 1866
B. Secondary Sources
1. Books
Belich, James, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict,
Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1986
Clark, Paul, Hauhau: The Pai Marire Search for Maori Identity, Auckland and Oxford
University Press, Auckland, 1975
Cowan, James, The New Zealand Wars and the Pioneering Period, 2v., Government Printer,
Wellington, first published 1922, reprinted 1983
Gorst, J E, The Maori King, first published 1864, reprint Capper Press, Christchurch, 1974
Hill, Richard, The History of Policing in New Zealand, 2v., (GP Books, Wellington, 1989)
Lambert, T, The Story of Old Wairoa and the East Coast, first published 1925, reprint Capper
Press, Christchurch, 1977
53
Oliver, W H and Thomson, Jane M, Challenge and Response: A study of the development of the
East Coast region, The East Coast Development Research Association, Gisbome, 1971
Sinclair, Keith, The Origins of the Maori Wars~ Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1980
Ward, Alan, A Show of Justice. Racial 'Amalgamation' in Nineteenth Century New Zealand,
Auckland 1978
2. Articles
Binney, Judith, 'Myth and Explanation in the Ringatu Tradition', JPSvol93 (4) Dec 1984
Thomson, George, 'The Crown and Ngati Pahauwera from 1864: Report for the Wai 119/201
claim', Waitangi Tribunal Division, Wellington (Wai 201:A29)
Ward, Alan, 'The Origins of the Anglo-Maori Wars; A reconsideration', NZlH vol 1, no 2, 1967
3. Theses
Williams, David, 'The use oflaw in the process of colonization. An historical and comparative
study, with particular reference to Tanzania (Mainland) and to New Zealand', Phd thesis,
University of Das Es Salaam, 1983
Woodford, Walton-Jon, 'Te Kootiand the attack on Poverty Bay, 1868', MA Thesis, University
of Auckland, 1990