James Paige
The Baltic Security Dilemma: Navigating the Russian Federation’s Aggressive Posturing
IR Review, Opinion Piece Final Draft
Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite recently spoke at the UN General Assembly in
New York City, on 29 September 2015. President Grybauskaite condemned the Putin
Administration’s power-accumulating policies in Europe, simultaneously criticizing the
United Nations’ accommodation of Russian aggression. “[The] Kremlin seeks to rewrite
history and redraw the borders of post-war Europe,” Grybauskaite declared, “The occupied
territories of Ukraine, Georgia, [and] Moldova are full of red lines that we have drawn, but
never acted upon”. 1 President Grybauskaite’s admonishment illustrates an increasingly
pervasive strain of thought in Baltic threat perception, the fear of a Russian military
incursion into the Baltic region. The Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) operate
in a region of vital strategic interest for the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation’s
aggressive bid for regional hegemony in the Post-Soviet Space includes – thus far - the
2008 Russo-Georgian War, the 2014 Crimean Crisis, and a military presence in the
disputed Transnistria region. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – E.U. and NATO member
states since 2004 – should move to reduce irritants with the Russian Federation, in the light
of the insurmountable power disparity that characterizes Russo-Baltic relations; NATO’s
apparent aversion to military confrontation with Russia; the E.U.’s increasingly resourcedraining immigration crisis and Russia’s recent military deployment to Syria.2 The Baltic
1
Grybauskaite, D. (2015, September 29). [Speech]. Retrieved September 30, 2015, from President of the
Republic of Lithuania website: https://www.lrp.lt/en/activities/speeches/
speech-by-president-dalia-grybauskaite-at-the-united-nations-general-assembly-the-united-nations-at-7
0-the-road-ahead-for-peace-security-and-human-rights/6590/23796
2 Grigas, Agnia. Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States. London:
Chatham House, 2012. Print. The Means and Ends of Russian Influence Abroad.
nations should move to placate Russia by refraining from public diatribes against the Putin
Administration and bestowing greater rights on “non-citizen”, ethnic Russian and Russianspeaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia, thus reducing the likelihood of a Russian
military adventure in the region.
The Baltic region enjoyed a period of relative calm in the final months of 2015. In
September, Russia and Estonia effectuated a prisoner exchange of two intelligence officers
at remote border post near the Piusa River.3 In October, the United Kingdom Defense
Secretary Michael Fallon announced the dispatch of 100 British military personnel to the
Baltic region for the purpose of deterring Russian aggression in the eastern flank of
NATO.4 Additionally, Poland recently concluded negotiations with the Baltic nations for
the construction of the Gas Interconnector Poland-Lithuania (GIPL), a 534-kilometer
natural gas pipeline, with project completion slated for December of 2019. GIPL’s
completion will reduce Baltic energy dependence on the Russian Federation.5 These events
unfolded in an uncertain political atmosphere, which has been increasingly volatile since
mid-2000. The heart of this tension and uncertainty lies in Russia’s desire to maintain a
sphere of influence in the Baltic region.
The Russian Federation operates with great military strategic concerns and strong
economic interests in the Baltic region. For instance, The Baltic nations, along with Poland,
straddle Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast exclave, thus geographically isolating the territory
3
"Russia and Estonia 'Exchange Spies' After Kohver Row." BBC News. N.p., 26 Sept. 2015. Web. 3 Nov.
2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34369853>.
4 Perraudin, Frances. "Britain to Station Troops in Baltic Region 'to Deter Russian Aggression.'"
The Guardian. N.p., 8 Oct. 2015. Web. 3 Nov. 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/
2015/oct/08/britain-station-troops-poland-latvia-lithuania-estonia-russian-aggression>.
5 "End of Energy Isolation in the Baltics: How the Gas Interconnector Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) Works."
Review. European Commission Press Release Database. N.p., 15 Oct. 2015. Web. 3 Nov. 2015.
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5845_en.htm>.
from the Russian state. The Kaliningrad Oblast houses Russia’s Baltic Fleet (comprising
fifty-six warships and two submarines), several thousand soldiers, and a number of shortrange ballistic missiles. 6
7
The high concentration of valuable military equipment and
personnel in an exclave territory necessitates clear communications with the military
district’s headquarters. As such, Russia views the Baltic States as possessing a capacity to
sever communications between the Russian Armed Forces’ Western Military District
headquarters in St. Petersburg from its forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast.8 Russia therefore
seeks to maintain heavy influence in the region in order to mitigate any and all threats to
the cohesiveness of its Western Military District.
From an economic perspective, Russia has generally enjoyed an energy monopoly in
the Baltic region, and desires its continuation. For instance, the Russian state-owned gasexporting ministry, Gazprom, owns controlling shares in the major gas companies of each
Baltic state: Eesti Gaas, Latvijas Gaze, and Lietuvos Dujos. However, in the accordance
with the E.U.’s 2009 Third European Energy Package, the Lithuanian government in 2010
attempted to separate of the transmission business of Lietuvos Dujos from the distribution
business, thereby empowering the Lithuanian state to make decisions regarding the
transmission of gas.9 Russia views this bold reduction of Gazprom’s influence in the Baltic
energy markets, along with the 2015 negotiations regarding GIPL, as a deliberate challenge
6
Palet, Laura Secorun. "Kaliningrad: A Foot in the Door." OZY. N.p., 23 Apr. 2014. Web. 3 Nov. 2015.
<http://www.ozy.com/acumen/kaliningrad-a-foot-in-the-door/31124>.
7 "İskender Füzeleri Kaliningrad'da" ["Iskander Missiles in Kaliningrad"]. Rusya'nın Sesi. N.p., 16
Dec. 2013. Web. 3 Nov. 2015. <http://tr.sputniknews.com/rsfmradio.com/2013_12_16/
Rusya-Avrupa-sinirina-fuze-yerlestirdi/>.
8 Frolov, Andrey. "Russian Army in 2014 and Western Military District." Suomen Puolustusministeriö
Etusivu. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2014. Web. 3 Nov. 2015.
<http://www.defmin.fi/files/2840/Andrey_Frolov_Russian_army_SPb_25_04_2014.pdf>.
9 Grigas, Agnia. Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States. London:
Chatham House, 2012. Print. The Means and Ends of Russian Influence Abroad.
to Russia’s economic privileges in the region. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should satiate
Russian ambitions, bearing in mind Russia’s willingness to utilize military methods to
manage their strategic interests, NATO’s aversion to conflict with Russia, the E.U.’s
preoccupation with a massive immigration crisis and the Baltic countries’ abysmal defense
spending, which – as of 2014 – amounted to a combined sum of just under $1.2 billion, in
comparison to Russia’s 2014 defense expenditure of $69.3 billion.10 11 The Baltic states
should continue to find ways to reaffirm their sovereignty (i.e. encouraging the presence
of NATO and US forces in the region), but they must exercise caution. Bombastic rhetoric
against Russia will do the Baltic leaders no good in the coming years. Luckily, the closing
months of 2015 have presented the Baltic nations with a window of opportunity in which
to secure themselves from Russian aggression.
Russian military deployment in the Middle East significantly reduces the likelihood of
further Russian military deployment on another front. As of 21 September 2015, Russia
has been projecting military power into Syria in order to organize an alternative anti-ISIS
coalition.12 For instance, Russia deployed six Su-34 attack aircraft, twelve Su-25 attack
aircraft, dozens of transport helicopters, and two thousand military personnel to Syria.13
Given the likelihood of mission creep, Russian deployment in the Middle East likely
means, for the time being, that Russia will not increase their military expenditure on a
10
Lucas, Edward. The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report. Center for European Policy Analysis.
CEPA, June 2015. Web. 10 Nov. 2015. <http://www.cepa.org//sites/default/files/styles/medium/
Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20%282%29.compressed.pdf>.
11 Keck, Zachary. "Russian Military Spending Soars." The Diplomat. N.p., 8 Apr. 2014. Web. 10 Nov.
2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/russian-military-spending-soars/>.
12 Spaulding, Hugo, et al. "Russian Deployment to Syria: Putin's Middle East Game Changer."
Institute for the Study of War. N.p., 17 Sept. 2015. Web. 3 Nov. 2015.
<http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/
Russian%20Deployment%20to%20Syria%2017%20September%202015%20(1).pdf>.
13 Spaulding, Hugo. "Russian Military Activity: September 2015." Institute for the Study of War. N.p.,
1 Oct. 2015. Web. 3 Nov. 2015. <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/
Russia%20World%20Map%202015-10-01%20Final%20Version.pdf>.
military intervention in Europe. Military deployment drains a state’s financial resources
and generates both domestic discontent and international popular indignation, neither of
which the Putin Administration desires.
On the other hand, the temporal proximity between the 2014 acquisition of Crimea by
Russia and the current day, as well as the subsequent storm of American and EU sanctions,
provides further disincentive for renewed Russian military action in Europe. Russia’s
recent military escapade in Ukraine tested the flexibility of the international system.
Russian foreign policy makers surely recognize that further offensive military aggression
will probably precipitate NATO retaliation. The Baltic countries should immediately begin
reducing the high conflict potential issues of Russo-Baltic relations, starting with the issue
of “non-citizens” in Estonia and Latvia, considering Russia’s current, disadvantaged
standing in the international political landscape.
The resolution of the issues of “non-citizen” Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia
would pacify Russo-Baltic relations in the short run. Vestiges of Estonia and Latvia’s
Soviet past continue to resonate in their demography. Estonia and Latvia respectively house
approximately 93,000 and 280,000 non-citizen minorities, comprising mainly of ethnic
Russians, who continue to experience political disenfranchisement.14 Bearing in mind the
Putin Administration’s drive to preserve the “ethno-cultural identity of the Russian
diaspora and its links with the historical homeland”, as enshrined in the Compatriot Policy,
this issue could serve as justification for intervention, as it did in Crimea and the Donbass
region of Ukraine in 2014.15 As such, resolving the non-citizen issue would drastically
14
Cianetti, Licia. "Granting Local Voting Rights to Non-Citizens in Estonia and Latvia: The Conundrum
of Minority Representation in Two Divided Democracies." Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority
Issues in Europe 13.1 (2014): n. pag. Web. 3 Nov. 2015. <http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/
downloads/publications/JEMIE/2014/Cianetti.pdf>.
15 Smirnova, Tatiana. "State Policy of the Russian Federation in Respect of Compatriots Living Abroad."
reduce the rationality for Russian military maneuvering in the region, especially in light of
Russia’s military engagement in the Syria and their current standing in the international
community. Baltic foreign policy makers must think about their position in the
international political landscape rationally, taking into account their relative weaknesses.
At the moment, the Baltic countries do not necessarily have the support needed to confront
the Russian Federation. As such, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must tread lightly in the
shadow of Russian power.
International Organization For Migration. N.p., n.d. Web. 3 Nov. 2015.
<https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/idm/workshops/
IDM-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference/
Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference-Statement-T-Smirnova.pdf>.