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International Peacekeeping
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UN Peacekeeping and the
International Private Military
and Security Industry
Christopher Spearin
Available online: 22 Mar 2011
To cite this article: Christopher Spearin (2011): UN Peacekeeping and the International
Private Military and Security Industry, International Peacekeeping, 18:2, 196-209
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UN Peacekeeping and the International Private
Military and Security Industry
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CHRISTOPHER SPEARIN
UN peacekeeping continues to confront qualitative and quantitative difficulties. Arguments in favour of using private military and security companies (PMSCs), particularly
those referring to the 1990s-era when Executive Outcomes was operating, have been
aired. The article examines earlier operational arguments for PMSC participation in UN
peacekeeping, which at times have been reintroduced in more recent assertions: (1)
PMSCs have better organization, training, and equipment; (2) they have a heightened willingness to apply force to serve UN mandates; and (3) they enjoy enhanced readiness to
respond. The article argues, however, that it would be difficult for contemporary
PMSCs to respond effectively, quickly, and robustly should the UN turn to them for enforcement operations. State and market pressures have conditioned PMSCs to operate in a
manner dissimilar to that in the 1990s.
In 1998, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, declared that ‘the world may not
be ready to privatize peace’.1 He made this declaration during the first surge in
post-Cold-War peacekeeping operations. This spike exposed the qualitative and
quantitative deficiencies of state-supplied military contingents. As an alternative,
one argument put forward was that ‘private peacekeepers’ would be effective.2
Nevertheless, although discussion of deploying private peacekeepers reached as
high a level as the Security Council, the UN never employed a muscular private
force.
While studies have closely considered the rationales, largely internal to the
UN, that explain the lack of willingness to resort to private peacekeeping at
that time,3 this article seeks to answer a different question: is the contemporary
international private military and security industry ready to keep the peace?
Answering this question is important for two reasons. First, the UN is currently
responding to a second peacekeeping surge and strains are showing. According
to Annan’s successor, Ban Ki-moon, ‘[t]oday we face mounting difficulties in
getting enough troops, the right equipment and adequate logistical support . . .
Supply has not kept pace with demand.’4 Indeed, some of the problems related
to the quality and quantity of state contingents remain evident. Second, there
are arguments for reconsidering the ‘private option’ (in Darfur for example),
which stress the seemingly unrealized potential of private peacekeepers first
espoused in the 1990s.5
In answering this question, the article examines the 1990s operational arguments for PMSC participation in UN peacekeeping, which at times have been
reintroduced in more recent assertions, and it considers the PMSC industry’s
International Peacekeeping, Vol.18, No.2, April 2011, pp.196– 209
ISSN 1353-3312 print/1743-906X online
DOI:10.1080/13533312.2010.546099 # 2011 Taylor & Francis
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THE PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY INDUSTRY
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current dynamics. The contention here is that it would be difficult for PMSCs to
respond effectively, quickly, and robustly should the UN turn to them for enforcement operations today. In other words, while it would not be impossible for
private supply to fulfil demand, state and market pressures have conditioned
PMSCs to operate in a manner dissimilar to that of the 1990s.
The article makes this case by considering the argued advantages of private
peacekeepers continually expressed since the 1990s: (1) better organization, training, and equipment; (2) heightened willingness to apply violence offensively in
order to serve UN mandates; and (3) enhanced readiness to respond. The
article focuses particular attention on a now defunct South African company,
Executive Outcomes (EO).6 Many pro-PMSC arguments, past and present,
feature this firm’s operations in Angola (1993 – 95) and Sierra Leone (1995–
97). The article also examines the role of states both in promoting the PMSC
industry’s ability to operate defensively and in structuring the availability of
PMSC manpower. In this latter regard, the article scrutinizes the possible formative impact of the 2008 Montreux Document on PMSC regulation.
State Difficulties and Private Advantages
The UN practice of multinational peacekeeping, in some ways, impacted negatively on many operations in the 1990s. Although multinationality meant a
broader pool of contributing states, it also entailed substantial difficulties: a
lack of common weaponry, of compatible communications systems, of similar
operational experiences and doctrine, and sometimes of a shared language.
Exacerbating these difficulties are the shifts away from Western states as prominent troop providers, and the commonalities they often offered, and towards
developing world states such as those in South Asia. Unfortunately, the increased
proportion of troops from developing countries increased the likelihood that
peacekeepers would arrive in theatre lacking necessary equipment.7
What is more, different national contingents would often not directly respond
to UN directives; they would first link back to their home capitals for further
direction (as did US forces in Somalia).8 The results were both a lack of shared
goals and ‘negotiated’ orders. The pattern fits well with Geoffrey Till’s description of a divergence in ‘the “interoperability of the mind” that is attributable to
different political perceptions of the situation and what needs to be done about
it’.9 Similarly, Maj.-Gen. Thomas Montgomery, the US deputy commander in
Somalia in the early 1990s, described the divergence in this way: ‘[t]hat’s life in
the U.N . . . You don’t turn to somebody and tell them to go do it. They have
to go to their national authorities and have a discussion about it. It’s a process.
I don’t like it, but it’s a permanent fact of life’.10
Currently, analysts and military personnel contend that these ‘facts of life’
endure. In fact, with approximately 100,000 peacekeepers deployed at the time
of writing, 20,000 more than in 1993, the challenges are arguably more acute
as the UN struggles to respond to crises. For instance, the levels of training and
equipment among peacekeepers remain varied. National contingents still negotiate their rules of engagement and operate under both different chains of
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command and varying national caveats. Despite initiatives undertaken by
developed world states to train and equip developing world militaries to
conduct peacekeeping, challenges remain regarding direction, supply and doctrinal discrepancy.11 Given these persistent difficulties, an official from a PMSC
industry group, the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), could
make the following contention before members of the US House of Representatives: UN peacekeeping depends upon a ‘hodgepodge of militaries, using different
equipment, communications gear, and languages. Military coordination is the
exception not the rule. And, as among NATO contributors in Afghanistan,
mandate interpretation varies dramatically between different nationalities’.12
Correspondingly, many pro-PMSC arguments, past and present, avow that
private peacekeepers would not be subject to the limitations that state-based
peacekeeping often confronts. Peter McIvor observed in 1998 that ‘unified
private companies avoid the difficulties of ad hoc multinational forces:
command is streamlined and integrated (without the need to reconstruct a field
command structure for every operation as is the case with UN operations) . . .
[and] the field force is cohesive (have worked as a unit before)’.13 Similarly,
Jeffrey Howe contended in 1998 that private forces ‘have a clearer chain of
command, more readily compatible military equipment and training, and
greater experience of working together than do ad hoc multinational forces . . .
[and] they can handpick from a pool of proven combat veterans’.14 Additionally,
these personnel have often ‘proven’ themselves through past experience in special
forces – the elite formations within state militaries.15 Such is the private option’s
apparent potency that current advocates, such as Scott Fitzsimmons, assert that a
public/private division of labour may be appropriate:
[W]henever UN members prove unwilling to provide sufficient troops of
sufficient quality to staff a UN operation deemed necessary by the Security
Council, private firms could be assigned to run those unpopular missions.
One or more firms could then deploy personnel and equipment to a conflict
zone, coerce any belligerents to stop fighting, and work to provide sufficiently strong security guarantees to stabilize a conflict to the point where
a traditional volunteer UN force could take over long-term responsibility
for monitoring a stabilized peace agreement.16
In these arguments PMSCs are represented as the antithesis of the sometimes
low-quality troops provided by states; they offer the commonality, coherency,
competency and unified purpose often lacking in UN peacekeeping operations.
In this regard, EO personnel, up to 550 of whom worked in Angola and 350 in
Sierra Leone, had common operational experiences and training, they utilized
similar equipment, they spoke the same language, and they relied upon a
pre-existing rank structure. For the most part, EO derived its personnel from
the former South African Defence Force’s counter-insurgency special operations
forces: the 1-5 Reconnaissance Commandos, the 44th Parachute Brigade, the
paramilitary unit Koevoet and the 32nd Buffalo Battalion. Of these units, the
last was South Africa’s most decorated post-Second-World-War combat unit.
Approximately 70– 75 per cent of EO’s 2,000-strong manpower pool were
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former Buffalo Battalion members. As well, the firm’s founder and chief executive
until July 1997, Eeban Barlow, was the second-in-command of the 32nd in
the mid-1980s. Some of the other main personnel in EO’s hierarchy, Lafras
Luitingh and Nic Van den Bergh, had links, respectively, to the Reconnaissance
Commandos and the 44th Parachute Brigade. Such was EO’s potential vis-à-vis
most state and non-state forces in Africa that British intelligence and South
African intelligence both wondered about the firm’s potential for ‘doing good’
and for instigating destabilization.17
Contemporary Organization and Manpower
While the PMSC industry still values individuals with special forces expertise, its
utilization of these personnel now differs from the earlier EO composition.18
These personnel often hold managerial or training roles or they perform specific
tasks such as close protection and VIP convoying in high-risk environments. To
complete these latter tasks, former special forces personnel often work with
other PMSC personnel that have previous experience only in law enforcement
and the regular armed forces.19 While these PMSC personnel may well share a
common language, they usually do not work together in large numbers, nor
can they necessarily rely upon common understandings and organizational frameworks developed during earlier state security sector employment.
Competition has also introduced cost-cutting trends regarding nationality and
tasking that further increase the industry’s heterogeneity. For example, third
country nationals (TCNs) often receive a tenth of the remuneration that
developed world PMSC personnel do.20 For IPOA’s Doug Brooks, this type of
manpower sourcing reflects the industry’s global character:
There is globalization . . . as the companies simply look for the most costeffective way of doing things . . . You are looking for people who can do
the job wherever you can (find them) and you pay them quite well. So an
American can expect to double their salary working in Iraq and an Indian
or a Bangladeshi to get 10 times their national salary by going to Iraq.21
Personnel from many more countries, from Argentina to Ukraine, have worked
for PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan. TCNs will often conduct activities not
performed by developed world PMSC personnel, which makes some of the
pro-PMSC arguments less persuasive. As described by one Canadian PMSC
manager, ‘[t]here’s no value in having some ex-U.S. special forces guy guard a
front gate . . . So you take a couple of Salvadorans, Colombians, Fijians and put
them at the gate, they do a good job and everybody’s happy’.22 Put differently,
the industry’s multinational character leads firms to put specific jobs into
‘silos’; this makes it difficult to recapture the coherence and commonality of
the EO example.
Certainly, PMSC employment and managerial practices may also affect the
efficacy of the silo approach. On the one hand, PMSCs often prize personnel
with English-language capabilities because of their ability to communicate
easily with PMSC supervisors and with their clients. Similarly, PMSCs sometimes
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seek personnel of certain nationalities because of their perceived skills. Triple
Canopy, for instance, hires many Latin Americans because they are ‘diligent
workers, reliable, professional and, in some instances, specifically requested by
our U.S. government customers’.23
On the other hand, a firm’s laxity regarding personnel capabilities could
hamper efficacy and coherence. In March 2010, the US State Department’s
Middle East Regional Office conducted an audit of Triple Canopy’s contract
to protect the US embassy in Baghdad. The audit discovered severe language
difficulties among PMSC personnel. In some cases Spanish-speaking Peruvian
supervisors could not communicate with their Ugandan staff. Likewise in
September 2009, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) revealed
that two-thirds of the 450 ArmorGroup personnel from Nepal protecting the
US embassy in Kabul lacked sufficient English-language skills. The US Senate
Committee on Homeland Affairs & Governmental Affairs raised similar concerns. Also in 2009, the US Commission on Wartime Contracting and other
bodies concluded that PMSC personnel have sometimes lacked sufficient
resources. In a way not dissimilar to ill-equipped state peacekeepers, some Ugandans protecting US forward operating bases in Iraq and Nepalese working in
Afghanistan have been without the necessary equipment, clothing included.24
Additionally, this trend’s logical culmination, the hiring of locals for PMSC
work, is not ideal for peacekeeping.25 From one standpoint, PMSC reliance on
locals is cheap and cuts down considerably on inter-country transportation
costs. This reliance is evident in US Congressional Research Investigations,
which document the rising Iraqi and Afghan involvement in PMSC work for
US government clients. These studies cast the hiring of locals, also in the thousands, as positive both in terms of domestic employment and of allowing
PMSCs to rely upon local knowledge.26 From another standpoint, however, the
training of indigenous employees is variable. For instance, some Iraqi personnel
may have previously served in the Iraqi security sector. In contrast, some
Afghans lack experience of military-like discipline and training; they possess
only past experience in working for warlords or militias. Further complications
arise when hiring focuses on a particular tribe or political group or when this
employment detracts from efforts to develop responsible and effective indigenous
security sectors. Indeed, in 2010 President Hamid Karzai reflected on how
PMSCs formed a ‘parallel security structure’. They diverted manpower away
from the developing Afghan security sector, which limited the advance of state
authority, and were overly aggressive in carrying out their duties.27
Enforcement and Violence
Most Cold War era peacekeeping operations did not feature the offensive
application of violence serving enforcement mandates. Generally, peacekeepers
applied force minimally, rarely, and then only in self-defence. But after the
Cold War and starting with United Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF), the UN
Security Council increasingly devised mandates, particularly in response to
humanitarian crises, that made the application of violence more likely.28
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However, this shift to ‘muscular’ or ‘third-generation peacekeeping’, or even
‘peacemaking’, poses a conundrum for many troop-contributing states; they do
not want their peacekeepers to undertake risky actions. The 2000 Report of the
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations identified how this missing robustness
impacted negatively on both the UN’s credibility and the efficacy of particular
missions: ‘[t]he United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the
last decade, [that] no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular,
is to succeed’.29 In many contemporary operations, such as those in Sudan and
the Democratic Republic of Congo, this ‘fundamental ability’ is also frequently
missing.
As expressed by proponents, EO seemingly offered this flexibility through its
willingness to apply violence in an offensive manner. In Angola, it conducted
‘classic find, fix, and destroy’ operations against the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).30 By the end of 1994, EO had forced
UNITA out of major urban footholds, from its traditional stronghold of
Huambo, and away from Angola’s resource extraction areas. In Sierra Leone,
EO’s contracted tasks were threefold: to (1) destroy the ‘terrorist enemies of
the state’, (2) restore internal security and (3) facilitate a positive economic
environment open to international investment.31 Between the late spring of
1995 and the autumn of 1996, EO helped to remove the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) from Freetown, it drove the RUF from mining regions, and it
destroyed important RUF bases in the Kangari Hills and Kenema. Because
violence quickly returned to Sierra Leone after EO’s departure in 1997, PMSC
proponents claim that international efforts to stabilize the country would have
been much more successful had EO’s threat of enforcement remained.32
It is, therefore, ironic that as the UN Security Council becomes ‘enforcement
minded’ in its mandates, the PMSC industry is becoming less oriented towards
enforcement. It now stresses self-defence credentials and makes this distinction:
mercenaries apply violence offensively whereas PMSCs operate in a defensive
and reactive manner. Put differently, one can increasingly view EO’s activities
as anomalous. Consider the distinction made by one Chilean PMSC employee
in Iraq: ‘[t]he people were contracted for static work, to help in watch posts,
towers, hotels, and supermarkets . . . We weren’t organized or prepared to
attack’.33 A Fijian employee similarly rejected the mercenary label: ‘[t]hey are
only armed to defend themselves and these are light weapons we are talking
about’.34 In fact, the PMSC ArmorGroup turned down the opportunity to
increase its firepower in Iraq because, ‘as a publicly traded company, they did
not want to be perceived as a mercenary force’.35 As well, in their promotions
and advertisements, many PMSCs highlight their defensive nature. Triple
Canopy’s motto, for instance, is ‘Assess, Avert, Achieve’. Likewise, Erinys, the
PMSC tasked to develop Iraq’s Oil Protection Force, indicated that it did not
conduct ‘offensive, pre-emptive or maneuver operations’.36
States and other actors have also underlined the offensive/defensive distinction between states and PMSCs. For example, the Coalition Provisional Authority
in Iraq, the US Central Command, and the Joint Contracting Command– Iraq/
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Afghanistan have designated combat duties and law enforcement as domains
solely for state forces.37 US officials have also drawn a distinction between
PMSCs and mercenaries.
Accusations that U.S. government-contracted security guards, of whatever
nationality, are mercenaries is inaccurate and demeaning to men and
women who put their lives on the line to protect people and facilities
every day . . . The security guards working for U.S. government contractors
in Iraq and elsewhere protect clearly defined United States government
areas, and their work is defensive in nature.38
In the same way, Canadian officials assert that relying upon defensively oriented
PMSCs permits the Canadian military to concentrate on its area of expertise –
combat-related tasks.39 Additionally, a 2008 Chief of the General Staff report in
the UK concluded that the offensive/defensive delineation offered ‘the value of
freeing soldiers for wider operational tasks, while not relinquishing responsibility
for overall unit/base security’.40 Finally, the text of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, devised by states, NGOs and extractive companies, makes a
similar distinction: ‘[c]onsistent with their function, private security should provide
only preventative and defensive services and should not engage in activities exclusively the responsibility of state military or law enforcement authorities’.41
These actions and approaches, taken by various actors, have an arguably
discursive effect. Certainly, from one standpoint, the application of offensive
violence by PMSCs cannot be entirely discounted. Most weaponry is dual use.
Although current PMSC marketing, directed mainly at serving a developed
world client base, reinforces a defensive approach, any future shift towards developing world clients might see a corresponding shift towards an offensive orientation. Nevertheless, from another standpoint, many developed world states,
the United States included, have become more and more reliant on the PMSC
industry for strategic, political and manpower reasons; this reliance is unlikely
to dissipate quickly. In fact, US officials increasingly espouse the PMSC industry’s
defensive credentials as relevant for numerous types of potential non-state
clients.42 What is more, as the breadth and depth of interaction between states
and PMSCs advance, identities are constructed and arguably even recast. While
states may see their purviews limited by focusing on offensive operations and
leaving some defensive tasks to PMSCs, the actions and expectations of states
and others increasingly box in PMSCs and affect how they view themselves.43
Changes in identity and expectation, therefore, would have to occur before the
PMSC industry became prominent in the offensive application of violence (even
if only) for UN enforcement operations.
Rapidity and Regulation: A Comparison
During the 1990s, the UN emphasized rapid deployments in order to reveal credible international commitment, to stem conflicts, to promote de-escalation and to
enhance prevention. Key UN documents such as the 1992 ‘An Agenda for Peace’
and the 1995 ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace’ highlighted the significance of
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quick responses. Likewise, Canada, the Netherlands, and other states promoted
the development of rapid reaction forces.44 Such proposals drew attention not
only to the availability of forces, but also to excellence in standards and commonality between national contingents. In particular, combined exercising and
interoperable equipment would advance commonality. Last, analysis concluding
that a quick response could have halted the 1994 Rwandan genocide heightened
the impetus for the UN and its member states to develop rapid reaction
capabilities.45
Despite this sense of urgency, effective rapid responses have not always been
forthcoming. This is mostly because states are often unwilling to commit their
military personnel, especially to dangerous environments and/or to handle
conflicts not necessarily of immediate strategic importance. One can, therefore,
view UN-devised standby arrangements in the 1990s not as strong commitments,
but rather as traveller’s cheques: ‘[t]hey can be signed once, but they’re no good
unless they’re signed again’.46 The slow mustering of forces continued into the
2000s; the deployment of UN peacekeepers has taken on average between three
months and a year.47
Even a stronger state-based initiative, the Standby High-Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG), revealed limitations. Operational as of January 2001, SHIRBRIG
featured 11 countries willing to incur the considerable expense of maintaining
a high readiness state. SHIRBRIG’s engagement time was 15 – 30 days upon
authorization. However, SHIRBRIG focused only on ‘traditional’ peacekeeping
mandates that did not stress the application of violence, it stood formally
outside of the UN system, and SHIRBRIG states had to agree to participate in
any particular mission. SHIRBRIG ceased operations in June 2009.
In contrast, EO started operations within a month of signing its first contract
with Angola in May 1993. In Sierra Leone, EO signed a contract in April 1995
and engaged in operations in May. Given this speed, EO officials contended
that the firm could have sent personnel to Rwanda within two weeks to
counter the genocide. A full force of 1,500 personnel could have been in place
within six weeks. In January 2003, the IPOA issued a concept paper detailing
how PMSCs could support the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo with a deployment time from 30 to 90 days.48
Possible Impact of Regulation
Because transactions occur across state borders, states can intervene and attempt
to manage their citizenry’s participation in the PMSC industry. This affects the
availability of PMSC personnel for, and the rapidity of PMSC responses to,
requests. Over the last decade legislators in several states have made efforts to
curtail their population’s participation in the PMSC industry and the potential
exists for further tightening. For example, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Namibia,
Philippines and South Africa all took legal action, which included deporting
recruiters, closing of recruitment offices, fining offenders, developing strict
approval processes, and preventing nationals from working for PMSCs operating
in countries such as Iraq.49
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Should these measures ultimately prove unsuccessful, due to the weakness of
state administrative systems and/or the tenacity of potential PMSC employees,
further efforts may result. James Cockayne, for example, asserts that
[t]he role and regulation of TCNs is the Achilles heel of this industry . . .
States will eventually realize that these multinational service-production
chains are impossible for them to control unilaterally, and move towards
a more sophisticated system of international regulation. That might
involve supranational regulation, or it might just involved [sic] deeper
harmonization of national regulation.50
If states make approval processes more stringent, apply effective domestic monitoring, and assert national prerogatives, then the ready flow of PMSC personnel
may become further constrained. This would affect the speed of PMSC responses.
Similarly, an evolving international regulatory device restrains PMSCs: the
Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good
Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict of 17 September 2008 (hereafter the ‘document’).51
It was signed by Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
Ukraine, the UK and the United States. Since September 2007 Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Chile, Cyprus, Ecuador, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Jordan,
Liechtenstein, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Qatar, Spain, Uganda
and Uruguay have communicated their support for the document. For the
Swiss government and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
the document’s two sponsors, these signatories were important because they
wanted ‘the input of those States most affected by the phenomenon or which
had experience in dealing with it’. The adherent states are expected to embrace
the document’s main assertion that states are not immune from their obligations
under international humanitarian law and human rights law should they choose
to hire PMSCs, have PMSCs operate in their territory, and/or have PMSCs based
within their borders as ‘home’ states.
To help with state compliance, the document refers to 73 non-binding ‘good
practices’ applicable in a variety of contexts and related to vetting, informationgathering, criteria for PMSC licensing and selection, requirements for personnel
hiring in regards to past criminality, intra-PMSC disciplinary measures, weapons
ownership and management, and training in international humanitarian and
human rights standards. Furthermore, although international humanitarian law
applies only during armed conflict, the document’s drafters espoused its value in
constructing responsible state–PMSC relationships in different situations.52
For home states, the document suggests means by which states can increase
their knowledge and oversight of PMSC activities and allow for closer relations
with PMSCs. In particular, the document advocates the merits of different
types of state authorization: ‘an operating license valid for a limited and
renewable period (“corporate operating license”), for specific services (“specific
operating license”), or through other forms of authorization (“export authorization”)’.53 While the document’s main impetus relates to fulfilling international
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legal obligations, such licensing can enhance PMSC effectiveness, through
vetting, supervision, and personnel requirements that improve language abilities,
equipment and training.
Nevertheless, authorization measures would reinforce national prerogatives
regarding violence applied extraterritorially. Factors related to the sort of
PMSC service offered or the state in which operations could take place would
likely come under government purview. Put differently, one cannot assume that
states will give a PMSC offering privatized peacekeepers only a cursory overview
just because the UN is the client. With states becoming increasingly reliant on
PMSC services, they may be loath to allow some of that capacity to serve UN
peacekeeping rather than fulfil other tasks. Preventing PMSC involvement
could therefore challenge the UN’s ability to undertake a mission. Other issues
might concern how these issues resonate in a home state’s domestic politics.
State authorization processes also allow for problems arising from the roles,
effects, and conduct of privatized peacekeepers, to be nipped in the bud, to the
possible detriment of privatized peacekeeping.
Conclusion
In the late 1990s, EO claimed ‘that future peacekeeping/refugee protection
operations will be conducted more and more by companies such as EO’.54 UN
peacekeeping continues to confront qualitative and quantitative difficulties and
pro-PMSC arguments, particularly reflecting upon the EO example, continue to
have currency. Nevertheless, although the contemporary PMSC industry does
employ highly trained and capable individuals, they are not necessarily gathered
and employed in ways that capitalize upon their collective abilities, as argued in
the EO case. Dispersion is largely a response to the requirement of state clients
for PMSCs to perform defensive tasks. The trend of globalized manpower
recruitment, for the sake of reduced costs, also contributes to dilution and the
compartmentalization of responsibilities. Domestic and international regulations
potentially negate the creation of a multinational manpower pool from which
private peacekeepers might be drawn. This regulation may lead to states both
circumscribing the freedom of individuals to seek PMSC employment and
keeping a closer watch on what PMSCs based in their territory do and for
whom. This in turn would affect the ability of a PMSC to respond speedily to
UN requirements, if it could at all.
On the supply side, one cannot entirely discard the possibility of peacekeeping
being privatized, but the arguments presented here point to some of the issues that
the UN would have to consider should it attempt to contract a PMSC for peacekeeping. Contractual arrangements and oversight mechanisms would likely have
to include common language requirements, sufficient equipment allocations, and
the grouping of personnel to take advantage of uniformity developed in past
public service employment. The UN might also demand specific training and
interaction amongst PMSC personnel, regardless of nationality or past public
sector experience, to ensure operational coherence. Politically, of course, the
UN would also have to persuade member states of the legitimacy of using
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PMSCs. Developing world states, especially, have strong reasons to be wary of the
export of violence. These concerns pertain to the potential negative effects of
security sector personnel turning to PMSC work and the security-related challenge of how to manage the societal reintegration of returning PMSC personnel.
The former UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations, JeanMarie Guéhenno, remarked on the paradox that ‘t]he military resources needed
to help keep the peace are being strained by so much peace to keep’.55 In response,
the UN might turn to the marketplace to fill a vacuum left by states. However,
under present circumstances the PMSC industry would likely be severely challenged to respond fully, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and in a way
mimicking the espoused efficacy of the EO example.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author would like to thank Donald Spearin, Noelle Morris and the anonymous reviewers for their
advice and assistance in this article’s preparation. The views expressed in the article are those of the
author; they do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Department of National Defence or
the government of Canada.
NOTES
1. Kofi Annan, ‘Intervention’, Ditchley Foundation Lecture 35, 26 June 1998 (at: www.ditchley.co.
uk/page/173/lecture-xxxv.htm).
2. For comparisons between private and UN forces see, Herbert Howe, ‘Private Security Forces and
African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.34,
No.2, 1998, pp.307– 31; David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998; Victor-Yves Ghebali, ‘The United Nations
and the Dilemma of Outsourcing Peacekeeping Operations’, in Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini
(eds), Private Actors and Security Governance, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, 2006, pp.213– 30. For general overviews of the PMSC industry see
Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2nd edn, 2008; Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
3. The manifold concerns included: the conceptual conflation of PMSCs with mercenaries; the negative impact of mercenaries in some post-colonial peacekeeping situations; the concern in some
troop-contributing states that PMSCs could diminish the substantial hard currency remuneration
they receive from peacekeeping contributions. See Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of a
Norm in International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; Sarah Percy, ‘The
Security Council and the Use of Private Force’, in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer
Welsh and Dominik Zaum (eds), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution
of Thought and Practice since 1945, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.624– 40;
Christopher Spearin, ‘Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to
Securing Humanitarian Spaces?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.1, 2001, pp.20– 43.
4. Cited in ‘UN to Strengthen Peacekeeping Efforts amid Rising Demand, Says Ban’, UN News
Centre, 7 July 2009 (at: www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31383&Cr=Secretarygeneral&Cr1=peacekeeping).
5. For arguments of this kind see Max Boot, ‘A Mercenary Force for Darfur’, Wall Street Journal, 26
Oct. 2006 (at: www.cfr.org/publication/11813/); Steve Forbes, ‘Quick Way to Stop the Killing’,
Forbes (New York), 10 Dec. 2007, p.27; Ian Bruce, ‘UN Should Pay Mercenaries to Keep Peace’,
Herald Scotland (Glasgow), 4 Dec. 2006 (at: www.theherald.co.uk/features/75813.html); Scott
Fitzsimmons, ‘Dogs of Peace: A Potential Role for Private Military Companies in Peace
Implementation’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol.8, No.1, 2005, pp.1– 26.
6. Given the operational focus, it is beyond this article’s scope to consider the cost-effectiveness of
PMSCs vis-à-vis the state supply of military contingents for peacekeeping. Equally, given the
THE PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY INDUSTRY
7.
8.
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9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
207
focus on contemporary applicability, it is beyond the article’s scope to consider the veracity of
1990s-era arguments extrapolated from the EO operations.
Elizabeth Dickinson, ‘Soldiers of Misfortune’, Foreign Policy, No.172, 2009, p.41.
For analysis of these issues, see Ghebali (n.2 above), p.224; Richard C. Longsworth, ‘Phantom
Forces, Diminished Dreams’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.51, No.2, 1995, pp.24–8;
Birger Heldt, ‘Trends from 1948 to 2005: How to View the Relation between the United
Nations and Non-UN Entities’, in Donald C. F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta
(eds), Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects, Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2008, p.21; Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in Peace Operations, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.351–9.
Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, 2nd edn,
2009, p.231 (original italics).
Cited in Longsworth (see n.8 above), p.27.
For analysis of these varying issues see John Heilprin, ‘UN Aims to Limit Costs, Span of UN
Peacekeeping’, CBS News, 13 Feb. 2010 (at: www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/12/ap/
national/main6202905.shtml); Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘The Future of Peacekeeping’, Foreign
Policy in Focus, 28 Dec. 2007 (at: www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4855); Maggie Farley, ‘U.N. Troops’
Chief Said to Be Leaving’, Los Angeles Times, 6 March 2008 (at: www.articles.latimes.com/
2008/mar/06/world/fg-peacekeeper6); Matt Armstrong, ‘Beyond Government Accountability’,
Serviam (Washington), March–April 2008 (at: www.serviammagazine.com/mag/MarApr2008/
0408_Beyond_Govt_Accountability.htm); Gerard J. DeGroot, ‘Supplying the Peace’, Forbes,
5 June 2008 (at: www.forbes.com/technology/2008/06/05/logistics-peacekeeping-un-techlogistics08-cx_gd_0605peace.html); Mark Malan, ‘Africa: Building Institutions on the Run’, in
Daniel et al. (see n.7 above), pp.94– 101; Dickinson (see n.7 above); Peter Williams, ‘Lessons
Learned: Despite Being the Largest U.N. Mission, MONUC Has Little Success to Show for It’,
Journal of International Peace Operations, Vol.4, No.4, 2009, p.12.
‘Peacekeeping in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities’, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Africa of the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives,
108th Congress, Second Session, 8 Oct. 2004 (at: www.commdocs.house.gov/committees/
intlrel/hfa96360.000/hfa96360_0f.htm).
Paul McIvor, ‘Private Peacekeeping – Opportunity or Impossibility?’, Peacekeeping & International Relations, Vol.27, No.6, 1998, p.3.
Howe (see n.2 above), pp.308– 9.
Fitzsimmons (see n.5 above), p.3.
Ibid., p.24.
Anthony C. LoBaido, ‘How Private Warriors Turned Tables in War’, WorldNetDaily (Washington, DC), 18 Oct. 2004 (at: www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=40963).
The continued importance of hiring these personnel can explain, in part, the retention policies the
United States, UK, Canada and Australia created over the past decade to keep their special forces
personnel in uniform.
Note the variety within PMSC teams as described in Robert Young Pelton, Licensed to Kill: Hired
Guns in the War on Terror, New York: Crown, 2006. For information on the relationship
between PMSCs and special forces, see Christopher Spearin, ‘Special Operations Forces a Strategic Resource: Public and Private Divides’, Parameters, Vol.36, No.4, 2006/07, pp.58–70.
To perform the sorts of tasks identified in the text, PMSC personnel must often meet citizenship
requirements and must possess security clearances.
David Batty, ‘New Taps? Or Iraqi Security? East Europeans Answer the Call (Cheaply)’, The
Guardian, 17 Nov. 2008 (at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/17/iraq-afghanistan-jobs/
print); Jody Ray Bennett, ‘Cheap Labor for Private Security’, International Relations and Security
Network, Security Watch, Zurich, 7 April 2009 (at: www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/
Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=98671). From February 2008 to February 2009 pay for
expatriate personnel working for US government clients in Iraq fell by as much as 29 per cent.
See Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘Need to Enhance Oversight
of Theatre-Wide Internal Security Services Contracts’, SIGIR-09-017, 24 April 2009, p.5 (at:
www.sigir.mil/files/audits/09-017.pdf).
Cited in Bernd Debusmann, ‘In Privatized US War, Foreigners Do Most of Dying’, Reuters, 23
May 2007 (at: www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N23195239.htm).
Cited in David Pugliese, ‘The Security Detail’s Dirty Secret: Armies of Low-Wage Workers Form
the Backbone of Private Military Contracting in Iraq’, Ottawa Citizen, 13 Nov. 2005, p.B5.
Tyler Bridges, ‘Hired Guns Shrug Off War Risks in Iraq’, Miami Herald, 31 July 2007 (at: www.
privateforces.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1898).
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INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING
24. See Project on Government Oversight, ‘Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton regarding U.S.
Embassy in Kabul’, 1 Sept. 2009 (at: www.pogo.org/pogo-files/letters/contract-oversight/co-gp20090901.html#23); ‘New Information about the Guard Force Contract at the U.S. Embassy
In Kabul’, US Senate, Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee
on Contracting Oversight, p.5 (at: http://mccaskill.senate.gov/pdf/061009/StaffAnalysis.pdf);
‘The Bureau of Diplomatic Security Baghdad Embassy Security Force – Performance Audit’,
US Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector
General, Middle East Regional Office, Report Number MERO-A-10-05, March 2010, p.23
(at: http://pogoarchives.org/m/co/mero-ig-report-march2010.pdf); Richard Lardner, ‘Panel
Investigating Wartime Contracts Finds Private Guards Lack Essential Equipment, Training’,
Los Angeles Times, 26 April 2009 (at: www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/politics/wire/snsap-us-iraq-base-security,1,5977970.story).
25. Building on this trend has been the rise of firms with either joint international/indigenous
ownership or solely indigenous ownership.
26. Although PMSC reliance upon local employees is not new, the issue became more prominent as
the numbers increased. For a sense of the current scale, see Moshe Schwartz, ‘Department of
Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis’, US Congressional
Research Service, 14 Dec. 2009, pp.10–11 (at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf). See
also Moshe Schwartz, ‘The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress’, Congressional Research
Service, 19 Jan. 2010 (at: www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CRS_19Jan2010_
DeptDefense_PrivateSecurityContractors_Iraq_Afghanistan.pdf).
27. Eric Schmitt, ‘Karzai Admits Helping Free Aide Accused of Graft’, New York Times, 22 Aug.
2010 (at: www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/asia/23karzai.html?_r=2); Dion Nissenbaum
and Hashim Shukoor, ‘Afghan Plan to Shut Private Security Firms May Endanger Convoys’,
Miami Herald, 16 Aug. 2010 (at: www.miamiherald.com/2010/08/16/1778628/afghan-planto-shut-private-security.html#ixzz0ww6JY57S). See also Christopher Spearin, ‘What Manley
Missed: The Human Security Implications of Private Security in Afghanistan’, Human Security
Bulletin, Vol.6, No.3, 2008, pp.8– 11; Swiss Peace, ‘Private Security Companies and Local
Populations: An Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola’, Bern, 2007.
28. The UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the Charter for the first time for the Somalia
‘humanitarian’ operation. The Unified Task Force mandate, determined by Security Council
resolution 794, December 1992, allowed states to ‘use all necessary means to establish as soon
as possible to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’.
29. ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, 21 Aug. 2001 (at: www.un.org/peace/
reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm). See also Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,
Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2nd edn, 2010, p.328.
30. James R. Davis, Fortune’s Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order, Vancouver:
Douglas & McIntyre, 2000, p.129.
31. See Elizabeth Rubin, ‘An Army of One’s Own’, Harper’s Magazine, Feb. 1997, pp. 44–55.
32. David Shearer, ‘Outsourcing War’, Foreign Policy, No.112, 1998, pp.78–9. Consider also
Fitzsimmons (see n.5 above), p.24.
33. Cited in ‘The Story of a Blackwater Recruit from Chile’, Santiago Times, 15 Oct. 2007 (at: www.
tcgnews.com/santiagotimes/index.php?nav=story&story_id=14933&topic_id=15.&story_id=
14933&topic_id=15).
34. Cited in ‘Fiji Men “Hired to Protect Assets”’, Fiji Times (Nadi), 18 May 2007 (at: www.fijitimes.
com/story.aspx?id=62840).
35. Cited in Steve Fainaru, ‘Iraq Contractors Face Mounting Losses’, Washington Post, 16 June 2007
(at: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19256869/print/1/displaymode/1098/).
36. Cited in Patrick Jerome Cullen, ‘Private Security in International Politics: Deconstructing
the State’s Monopoly of Security Governance’, unpublished PhD thesis, London School of
Economics, 2009, p.152.
37. ‘Memorandum Number 17: Registration Requirements for Private Security Companies (PSC)’,
Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/MEM/26, 17 June 2004, pp.7,10–11 (at: www.trade.
gov/static/iraq_memo17.pdf); Walter Pincus, ‘Contractor Hirings in Afghanistan to Emphasize
Locals’, Washington Post, 7 Dec. 2009 (at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/12/06/AR2009120602199.html?hpid=topnews); ‘Contractor Support of U.S. Operations
in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan’, May 2010 (at: www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_
vault/5A_May2010.doc); Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (see
n.20 above), p.6.
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209
38. Cited in Alexander G. Higgins, ‘US Rejects UN Mercenary Report’, USA Today, 17 Oct. 2007
(at: www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246_x.htm).
39. See Andrew Mayeda, ‘MPs Seek Cost of Private Contractors’, Ottawa Citizen, 26 Nov. 2007,
p.A5; Gloria Galloway, ‘$8-Million, No Oversight’, Globe and Mail (Toronto), 18 Nov. 2009,
p.A1.
40. Cited in Brian Brady, ‘Britain Could Hire “Mercenaries” to Guard Bases in Combat Zones’, The
Independent, 6 July 2008 (at: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/britain-could-hiremercenaries-to-guard-bases-in-combat-zones-860882.html).
41. ‘Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights’ (at: www.voluntaryprinciples.org/
principles/private_security).
42. See Cullen (n.36 above); Christopher Spearin, ‘A Private Security Solution to Somali Piracy? The
U.S. Call for Private Security Engagement and the Implications for Canada’, Naval War College
Review, Vol.63, No.4, 2010, pp. 56 –71.
43. For analysis of how firms might change the expectations of states, see Rita Abrahamsen and
Michael C. Williams, ‘Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International
Politics’, International Political Sociology, Vol.3, No.1, 2009, p.14.
44. For analysis of these proposals, see Peter Langille, ‘Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid
Deployment and UN Standing Forces’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.7, No.1, 2000,
pp.219–53; James Fergusson and Barbara Levesque, ‘The Best Laid Plans: Canada’s Proposal
for a United Nations Rapid Reaction Capability’, Vol.52, No.1, 1996–97, pp.118–41.
45. Malan (see n.11 above), p.115; Adam Roberts, ‘Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical
History’, in Lowe, Roberts, Welsh, and Zaum (eds) (see n.3 above), 2008, p.111; John
Mueller, ‘The Banality of Ethnic War’, International Security, Vol.25, No.1, 2000, pp.42–70.
46. Cited in Longsworth (see n.8 above), p.26.
47. Gideon Rachman, ‘Why the World Needs a United Nations Army’, Financial Times, 20 July 2009
(at: www.ft.com/cms/s/0/325b3c42-7558-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1).
48. For these reports, see ‘A Possible Role of Executive Outcomes (a Private Military Company, Now
Disbanded) during the Rwanda Genocide of 1993/94’ and ‘Supporting the MONUC Mandate
with Private Services in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Peace Operations
Association (IPOA) Operational Concept Paper, Jan. 2003, in author’s possession.
49. See Stephanie Hanes, ‘Private Security Contractors Look to Africa for Recruits’, Christian Science
Monitor, 8 Jan. 2008, p.6; ‘Brazil Prevents Hiring of Locals as Mercenaries in Iraq’, 22 Feb. 2005
(at: www.plenglish.com/article.asp?ID=%7B5C55C9C9-AEDB-48DA-B564-AC4363F662E7%
7D&language=EN); Philip C. Jacobs, ‘South Africa’s New Counter-Mercenary Law’, Strategic
Review for Southern Africa, Vol.30, No.1, 2008, pp.71–95. For the most part, firms only
have a limited number of permanent employees. Firms either make open recruiting calls in
order to service a particular contract or they turn to their own personnel databases. For
reasons related to cost and limited state tolerance, private personnel are not permanently
‘barracked’ nor are they ‘standing’.
50. Cited in Bennett (see n.20 above).
51. ‘Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict’, 17
Sept. 2008, p.41 (at: www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-document-170908/
$FILE/ICRC_002_0996.pdf).
52. Ibid., pp.9,16,32,39.
53. Ibid., p.25.
54. Executive Outcomes website (at: web.archive.org/web/19981205152702/www.eo.com/about/
p8.html).
55. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, ‘A Plan to Strengthen UN Peacekeeping’, International Herald Tribune,
19 Apr. 2004, p.2.