Refighting Vietnam in the History Books: The Historiography of the War
Author(s): Phillip E. Catton
Source: OAH Magazine of History, Vol. 18, No. 5, Vietnam (Oct., 2004), pp. 7-11
Published by: Organization of American Historians
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25163715
Accessed: 17/08/2010 10:18
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oah.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Organization of American Historians is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
OAH Magazine of History.
http://www.jstor.org
Phillip E. Carton
America's
amount
most
of academic
attention
to absorb
continues
of many
studied
an enormous
attracted
treasure to defend a relatively small piece of territory, thousands of
miles
from
America's
or a terrible
mistake?
shores?
The
Was
second
Vietnam
the
have
most a fifth of the conference pan
els. Lavish
not
led
Indeed,
erate
to
scholarly
the war continues
vigorous
but
to the
also
the
thirty
nearly
about
gins
The
first
of America's
concerns
after
the war
the ori
in
intervention
Southeast Asia?why did the U.S.
become involved inVietnam? Walt
Rostow,
and
President
Dwight
D.
Eisenhower
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
President
Ngo Dinh Diem at Washington
and
(from left) greet South Vietnam's
National Airport, May 8,1957.
(Image courtesy of the National
Records Administration,
NAIL NWDNS-342-AF-18302USAF.)
an adviser
Johnson
to the Kennedy
once
administrations,
chided
the maker
of a documen
tary for asking what he called this "sophomoric" and "goddamn silly
question"
(i). Historians,
however,
dismiss. Why was Washington
Fi
sought
to di
in
the
cause
the need
for better
strat
egy and leadership next time
around? This kind of exercise has
inevitably become caught up in
contemporary political debates.
From Central America
in the
1980s to the present-day Middle
have revolved around several key
issues.
unwinnable?
especially
onstrate
the fall of Saigon.
Disagreements
an
or was
the outcome,
simply
scholars
have
overseas,
extraordi
years
was
of nation building, ormerely dem
nary passions that the conflict still
arouses
its disposal,
to preserve
vine the larger meaning
of the
conflict and draw lessons from it.
For example, did Vietnam illus
trate the folly of U.S. intervention
wider public. This ongoing debate
testifies not only to the kind of
differences in interpretation that
are part and parcel of the study of
history
altered
nally,
to gen
disagreement
as well
as
historians,
among
in spite of the enor
at
power
U.S.
unable
the war
has
however,
consensus.
attention,
necessary,
the outcome
of the
South Vietnam?
independent
Would different military tactics
in al
featured
commitment
concerns
mous
energies
re
the most
cent meeting of the Society for
Historians of American Foreign
Relations,
the U.S.
issue
conflict. Why,
and
the
At
scholars.
It has
conflict.
the War
of
Historiography
the burgeoning literature devoted to it, the Vietnam War
is surely a contender with the Civil War for the title of
Given
the
Books:
History
The
in
Vietnam
Refighting
have
not
found
it so
easy
to
prepared to expend somuch blood and
interpretation,
the first camp
view Vietnam
Archives
and
East,
the
have
served
of Vietnam
"lessons"
as a
point of reference
for arguments
about
the merits
of
overseas.
U.S.
involvement
While
scholars have adopted
in approach
variations
and
many
we
divide
them
into two main
In
camps.
usefully
might
are those who
are critical
of America's
intervention
and
as a bad war.
they also doubt whether
Given
the
circumstances
of
the
conflict,
the U.S. could ever have achieved its aim of
OAH Magazine of History
October 2004
7
a strong,
South Vietnam.
anti-Communist
intervention
those who
tend to view the U.S.
establishing
camp are
and
enterprise
with
changes
believe
in
tactics
differences
important
that
the war
historiography
have
There
strategy.
as well
as between,
and
within,
been
second
won,
of
are,
these
especially
some
course,
two positions,
the
the war.
As
commentators
several
have
noted,
this
stance
critical
initially
reversed the pattern of historical analysis that had developed
case
of America's
other
major
wars.
the
Whereas
initial
in the
and were
unpopularity
almost
all very
critical;
itwas
not until
the
late 1970s and early 1980s that a revisionist school emerged to
challenge this standard or orthodox interpretation (2).
Journalists and former officials led the way in criticizing the
conflict.
end,
Their
works,
generally
(1967), Arthur Schlesinger
Heritage
administration,
to
traced
conviction
to appear
the war's
began
long before
as a
In The Bitter
Vietnam
mistake.
tragic
argued
Washington's
that America
that
the
roots
Jr., an adviser to the Kennedy
of U.S.
involvement
anticommunism
knee-jerk
the destiny
could determine
could
be
and a foolhardy
U.S.
of the world.
policymakers had mistakenly assumed that every Communist Party
was an instrument of the Soviet Union or China, and failed to
recognize the local sources that fueled revolutions in the Third World.
Consequently, the U.S. had engaged during the postwar period in an
effort
undiscriminating
to
combat
communism
everywhere.
This
doomed
in Southeast
adventure
an elusive
to chase
dispatched
U.S.
communism,
had
policymakers
fact, a struggle by the Vietnamese
colonialism
enemy
guerrilla
trying
and
to sustain
build
a modern
an
anticommunist
blundered
into what
in
was,
people to throw off the legacy of
nation.
Moreover,
by
this
in
contender
creating
and
struggle,
the
U.S. had set itself against the tide of history; itwas the Vietnamese
not
the
and
corrupt
inefficient
of American
parade
backed presidents in Saigon, who proved most adept at mobilizing
popular support (4). In short, FitzGerald and other writers argued that
had
Washington
an
to
nation
the
committed
and
unnecessary
unwinnable war. The lesson to be drawn from this debacle was that the
U.S. ought to pursue amore discriminating foreign policy that took
account
of
These
which
describe
troops
Communists,
interpreta
tions of other conflicts, such as the two world wars, tended to defend
U.S. policy, the first analyses of the struggle in Vietnam reflected the
war's
U.S.
with
through the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam (3).
Frances FitzGerald leveled similar charges in her Pulitzer Prize
winning Fire in the Lake (1972), in which she accused the U.S. of an
"invincible ignorance" about the Vietnamese, friend and foe alike. By
imposing on events their vision of a global contest between freedom
and
The "Bad War"
Critics of the U.S. role in Vietnam dominated the early literature.
in America's
impulse culminated
Asia,
legitimate
serve as a useful way of examining
but this basic division will
of
could
In the
as a
involvement
Diem
the
limits
works
of American
early
in Vietnam.
to Johnson's
power.
a
to explain
U.S.
for Ngo Dinh
support
successive
of the war,
adminis
escalation
military
thesis
"quagmire"
Eisenhower's
posited
From
trations had inadvertently led America deeper and deeper into a bog.
"Each
time
noted
step,"
as the
last
policymakers
expectation
America's
Jr., "was
Schlesinger
that would
be
reasonably
In each
necessary."
the best of intentions
had acted with
the
noted,
and with
the
in Vietnam.
of overcoming
the mounting
was
a
involvement
"tragedy
president ever envisaged the mess
these incremental decisions (5).
at
regarded
case, he
Thus,
no
because
problems
without
villains"
eventually result from
thatmight
In 1971, however,
of the
the publication
so
called Pentagon Papers effectively challenged
this "quagmire" thesis. Leaked by Daniel
the
Ellsberg,
Defense
renegade
Pentagon's
raised
making
decision
aware
Vietnam
of
some
about
ing questions
America's
the
Department
study of U.S.
new and disturb
in-house
the
official,
the formulation
Far from
policy.
consequences
potential
of
un
being
of
their
decisions, the authors of the Pentagon Papers
argued that successive presidents knew full
well that their efforts might fail to bring victory
in Vietnam. Why, then, if the prospects for
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I^^^B^B^bKI^B^B^B^bH
were
success
one
offered
Ellsberg
tion. He
so uncertain,
U.S.
so
been
they
rejected
to that
ques
view,
explanation
was
a deadlock
the
best the U.S. could hope for in Vietnam
the war
cause
successive
in
of
machine"
In this
policy.
answer
the "quagmire" thesis
of a "stalemate
favor
had
to hold the line in Southeast Asia?
determined
could
not
presidents
be won.
be
Moreover,
such
preferred
a stale
to the prospect of admitting defeat.
Ellsberg identified domestic political concerns
mate
as
Two
soldiers
courtesy
VA002335,
crouch
of Douglas
April
across
in a rice paddy while
the paddy, April 1965. (Image
fellow soldiers move
Pike Photograph
The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University,
Collection,
Photograph
1965.)
8 OAH Magazine of History
an
important
fear
the
that
of
Democratic
haunted
accusation
munism
October 2004
source
this
sighted and ignoble behavior,
that
they
were
rather
short
specifically the
presidents
"soft" on
(6). Other commentators
of
com
took a dif
tack. In America's
ferent
George
Herring
and
the
nism,
Longest War,
first published
that mistaken
argued
assumptions
of containing
importance
to persevere
in Vietnam.
about
it,
in 1979,
another
commu
of amore
overseas
encouraged
run
and
vention was driven by the dictates of a flawed policy, containment,
in and out of government accepted without
"which Americans
ammunition
Washington's
serious
for more
question
works
error.
Not
view,
Vietnam
decades"
treated
so the most
radical
was
certainly
American
underlying
imperatives
of U.S.
critique
a bad war.
Yet,
policy,
as a
in Vietnam
involvement
America's
intervention.
it was
given
also
the
tragic
In this
economic
inevi
probably
table. Radical historians argued that
after 1945 the U.S. sought to fashion
a new,
world
capitalist
out
order
policy.
foreign
revisionist
by economic
critique. Wracked
a
Vietnam
state,
postwar
provided
police
of the "noble cause"
thesis
and
for exponents
as
the romantic image of the Vietnamese Communists
the work
(7).
their differences over the origins of U.S. policy, all of the
Whatever
above
two
than
some
of
writers
orthodox
to
an
create
can
economy,
fronted
U.S.
interpretation?that
the U.S.
Thus,
Vietnam's
con
in
revolution.
cause
for America's
their
there
of
(9). However,
as an
the U.S.
tuted
but
victory
U.S.
behavior
that were
emphasizing
factors
structurally
determined,
considerations.
tions
such
by
as
security
in a battle with Viet
explode near a hamlet south of Saigon
1965. (Image courtesy of the National Archive and Records
NAIL NWDNS-342-C-K20652.)
and
or domestic
fears
political
rift goes beyond explana
represents
the main
inter
pretative fault-line in the study of U.S. foreign relations (10).
without
moral
"to save
Communism"
in
1980.
call for a national
Reagan's
revival,
and
for the country
to put
aside post-Vietnam feelings of guilt and self-doubt, went hand in
hand with a full-blooded assault on the standard interpretation of the
conflict.
Vietnam
was
not
a bad war,
Reagan
argued;
it was
a "noble
cause" that would have ended in victory if the U.S. had shown more
resolve.
desire
To
some
extent,
of conservatives
the
of the war reflected
this reinterpretation
to overcome
the country's
fear of ending
up in
Southern
half
of U.S.
and wrongs
rights
was
the U.S.,
the war. Why
Podhoretz
Grant
first
of
former
Sharp,
a number
of
case
the
was
not won
ton,
D.C."
that
by
from
was
not
as America's
nation
powerful
who
officers
defeat
side,"
to
a communist
was
area
not
in his
that the U.S. had gone
in chief
commander
senior
the other
interven
concurred
country
however,
the most
that America's
According
a
to make
the
evils
of
on
so much
of
conduct
on
earth,
country by an army of peasants? U.S.
in a Third World
make
of
involvement
the
defeated
to the U.S.,
threat
to prevent
of the
"attempt
domination
(13).
focus
of the revisionists,
The main
The Revisionist Challenge
While the first analyses of thewar were highly critical, a revisionist
challenge to this orthodoxy began to appear at the end of the 1970s.
Revisionism fed off various changes in the political and intellectual
climate in the U.S., epitomized by Ronald Reagan's electoral triumph
the
that
consti
sought
for American
case
Why We Were in Vietnam (1982), asserting
to war
certain
less
in Vietnam
a
strategic
nevertheless
Norman
justification."
liberation"
(12).Other com
tion. Surveying the "sad fate of the
people of Indochina since 1975,"
Guenter Lewy concluded that the
not
in Vietnam
policy
bombs
Napalm
Cong guerillas,
Administration,
In fact, this philosophical
of American
were
moral
portrayal
power,
imperial
con
imperatives,
by economic
ex
those who
trasted
sharply with
pre
to America's
of national
situation
the
driven
plained
"wars
mentators
in Vietnam?
the Communist
of
that,
differences,
threat
in the Third World
radi
indeed, Kolko stated that he "fully
welcomed"
Com
part
global position. Thus, Washing
ton could not ignore the challenge
presented by Sino-Soviet support
for the Vietnamese Revolution and
showed no sympathy
cal historians
a real
sented
other
of the war,
purely
Vietnamese
The
its internal
for all
(8).
critics
other
a
were
he argued,
munists,
an international
movement
Gabriel Kolko's Anatomy of a War
(1985) is the most thorough and
vigorous articulation of this radical
like
was
revolution
national one that had little, if any
thing, to do with the Marxist
Leninist
of world
pursuit
of the Vietnamese
the progress
an
lution
pre
entirely
represented
to that
threat.
dictable
response
interpretation
movement
controlled by Moscow, Smith also
that
the notion
dismissed
to stop
Revo
effort
and
wrong
communist
monolithic
the Third World that threatened to
close off areas of the globe to free
trade.
was
in Vietnam
involvement
system
of the Ameri
Washington
movements
that had infused
that the conflict was unwinnable. They sought to justify the war's
purpose on several grounds. In the first of amultivolume history of
the conflict, Ralph Smith defended the strategic rationale for U.S.
intervention. While rejecting the
idea that there had ever been a
of
revolutionary
of
plenty
tarnished
attacked both of the central tenets of the standard
Revisionists
international
to the needs
problems
(11).
the chaos and upheaval caused by
the Second World War. In its drive
conducive
to the pursuit
1975 also
after
the
explained
U.S.
inter
strategic
determination
saw as an obstacle
they
in Vietnam
Conditions
which
debacle,
active
Sharp,
he
was
Pacific,
served
not
was
during
inevitable.
"It was
lost
argued,
the nation's
civilian
one
of
the
the war
to
"This war
in Washing
leadership
forced the U.S. military to fight with one hand tied behind its back,
especially with the restrictions it placed on the bombing of North
Vietnam.
His
ire fastened,
in particular,
on
Washington's
OAH Magazine of History
strategy
October 2004
9
of gradual
escalation
and
"The application
of military,
retired
admiral
the
to induce
attempt
to negotiate.
Hanoi
is an ugly
power
war-making
"and it cannot
nicer
be made
concluded,
the
thing,"
this
by pussy
on an
also
touched
postmortem
Sharp's
a
in many
that became
theme
revisionist
recurring
at home
that dissent
and a sensationalist
media
accounts,
namely,
in Vietnam
had undermined
America's
efforts
(14).
with
around
footing
concern
other
the question
two alternative
agree
offered
they
focused
on amore
it could
of how
have
one
that
strategies,
conflicting
conventional
of the war and
prosecution
on
warfare.
emphasis
counterinsurgency
was
statement
the clearest
of
Strategy
(1982)
that placed
On
Summers's
the first approach. Summers argued that the U.S had misjudged
nature
of
the
earlier
In fact,
and
conflict,
Vietnam?with
the
Consequently,
U.S.
symptom?the
forces
fought
counterinsurgency
source
the
confusing
for
the
the war?North
in South
insurgency
the wrong
By opting
campaign.
of
kind
the difficult
consuming business of searching for and trying to destroy guerrilla
forces in the South, the Americans played into the hands of their
a more
conven
the U.S.
should
have waged
Instead,
enemy.
con
tional war
the
real
North
Vietnam.
Summers
threat,
against
to the North
that U.S.
should
the war
tended
forces
have
taken
that
by
sustained
While
eliminating
Communist
Summers
conventional
the
in South
operations
than
conflict,
On
critics
claim
that
Strategy's
argued
exactly
Notwithstanding
a
U.S.
forces had waged
these commenta
campaign,
counterguerrilla
an
tors contended
that the Americans
had actually
essentially
fought
one.
to Andrew
conventional
Will
General
According
Krepinevich,
iam C. Westmoreland's
methods,
relying
This
"big
enemy.
strategy
of attrition
on
and
firepower
battle"
approach,
out insurgents
rooting
on the
tion
inflicted
followed
however,
counterproductive
Vietnamese
South
to overwhelm
In short,
to
had
demands
meant
of Vietnamization
that the U.S. military
had already
process
to win"
to fight the war
it knew
how
"lost the opportunity
(16).
Recent Scholarship
Revisionism
tion
that
continues
has
the war
not
was
or orthodox
the standard
eclipsed
a bad one and could
to dominate
the
be won.
not
interpreta
view
This
the
literature.
policy.
domestic
and
U.S.
Michael
intervention
io
Sorley's
as
A Better War
OAH Magazine of History
defeat
with
(1999)
in a wider
America
does
not
October 2004
against
struggle
the cold war
winning
even
concede
it also
of
has
documentary
the study of
taken
presidential
studies
do not
from
evidence.
the war
administrations
the
represent
the conflicting
in
and
last word
of
interpretations
the declassification
have
allowed
of documents
their
about
defeat,
to offer
authors
the making
of U.S.
judgments
into
studies
fresh
the
provide
insights
that shaped
For
decision
settings
making.
new
these
R. McMaster's
administration
examines
the
(1997)
of Duty
to
civilian
and military
leaders
Dereliction
America's
between
escalated
and
the war.
fought
Fredrik
the Johnson
Logevall's
Choos
(1999) devotes particular attention to the attitudes of other
ingWar
to make
U.S. policy,
in order
the case that, as far as
in foreign
America's
international
capitals was concerned,
was not at stake in Vietnam.
"The
of
the
importance
credibility
viewing
war
this
wider
"becomes
clear
lens,"
opines,
Logevall
starkly
through
towards
the thinking
we
when
One
is
that U.S.
consider
the war
escalate
officials
typically
explained
terms"
(21).
our
widened
certainly
inaccessible
archives
in international
that has
development
of
the
opening
previously
their decision
view
in
of
the
to
the war
People's
Republic of China and the former Soviet Union. Such works as Ilya
Gaiduk's The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (1996) and Qiang
Zhai's China and the Vietnam Wars (2000) shed light on the policies
two great
international
of America's
the broader
evolution.
Zhai,
concerns
U.S.
he
Besides
ese
adversaries
context
that
for
in
the
to fuel
likely
an
(22).
international
attention
substantial
and
1950s
the conflict
served
developing
to pay more
begun
and help us to understand
the war's
and
origins
the mix
of ideological
and
influenced
examines
example,
to extend
that led China
argues,
more
escalation
also
cold war
communists
assistance,
the Necessary
an
entirely
appropriate
to preserve
America's
and the need
aggression
amistake
nor a
the war was
"neither
betrayal
Hence,
credibility.
global
nor a crime";
one military
it was
communism
that ultimately
ended
(18). Lewis
Vietnam:
Lind's
of a
the past, and the emergence
the war is truly history;
reexamined
These
process.
as is apparent
relationship
have
debate
contrast,
on
scholarship
directions.
international
H.
(17). In stark
describes
(1999)
to communist
response
relations"
latest
In addition,
security
Vietnamese
War
literature is increasingly
for whom
and Larry Berman
(20). Nevertheless,
and the release
of taped material
more
informed
and authoritative
Nevertheless,
scholarly
over the
and conduct
of the con
origins
For
feature
of Vietnam
important
historiography.
as its title implies,
American
Kaiser's
David
(2000),
example,
Tragedy
nor winnable;
in fact, itwas
that the war was neither
necessary
argues
in
American
the
of
"the greatest
miscalculation
history
policy
foreign
orthodox/revisionist
an
flict remains
or memoirs,
accounts
journalistic
and mountains
literature
the
important
historians
have
countries
U.S.
to adapt
to the
their standard
failed
operating
procedures
war.
of a guerrilla
when
the
noted,
Krepinevich
Ironically,
in 1972 to a more
of warfare
Communists
switched
that
open pattern
a more
made
them
suitable
for conventional
the
target
firepower,
forces
of
body
Consequently,
some new and
fraught
the
proved
in terms of the destruc
countryside.
studied of events. Unlike
explain how domestic politics affected the way in which
ill-suited
and
of them
perspectives
of scholars,
generation
example,
tried-and-trusted
technology
if such a thing
synthesis,
to refine previous
interpreta
postrevisionist
has helped
the Nixon administration put forward in recent works by JeffreyKimball
(15).
other
support
reflects the fact that historians working in the field can now draw upon
the policymaking
on their
subjects,
Cambodia
Vietnam
counterinsurgency
reverse.
the
and
it new
with
First,
should have fought a
that America
suggested
rather
in Laos
sanctuaries
reduction
only
No doubt, this trend follows from the passage of time, which naturally
weaker
Vietnamese
replace
for
by 1971,
in U.S.
in tone and content.
Even though
the subject
still generates
scholarly
on the war in the last decade
and strong emotions,
works
disagreements
or so are
more
and reflective
than previous
studies.
complex
generally
a vast
time
and
squandered
contributions?many
younger
a
war,
the war
winning
by the
and some of them frankly polemical?the
brings
Vietnam.
of
Westmoreland's
Abrams,
tions and bring fresh insights into this most
revisionists
won.
been
to be
achievement
the emergence
of some grand
recent
is possible,
scholarship
vigorous,
more
the other
Harry
that the war was winnable,
on
W.
Creighton
in effectively
for South Vietnam (19).
Although such conflicting views indicate thatwe have yet towitness
it."
they believed
Although
did not
that General
arguing
had succeeded
ment,
to the
support
This
of
level
1960s.
in Vietnam
and make
of the war,
scholars
history
to the long-neglected
Vietnam
com
once
Kim
Khanh
Huynh
bystanders
story. As historian
or a
"as a battlefield
is all too often
regarded
merely
to be
over"
its
"as
real estate
and
passive
people
fought
in a historical
elsewhere"
process
(23). This
engineered
approach
has
side
piece
of
the
Vietnam
plained,
of
relegated
the Vietnamese
to the status
of bit-part
players
own
in their
it has also
history;
After
all, how can we
of events.
without
to Vietnam's
reference
the Vietnamese
stand
our
hampered
adequately
explain
past, or the conflict's
understanding
the roots of the war
outcome
without
the country's social and political dynamics? To under
appreciating
to draw
severely
students
have been
able
of the struggle,
aspects
such as Jeffrey Race's War Comes
older
studies,
several
upon
to LongAn (1972), as well as thework of Vietnam specialists like David
Marr
the war
by
has
observer
"American
some
(25). Recently,
using
shortcoming,
the
noted,
scholars
and seeking answers
ented questions
Americans"
this
as one
(24). Nonetheless,
is dominated
asking
in documents
historians
have
Vietnamese-language
on
literature
bbSIm^^^^h^f^^^b^b^^^b^bub^EI^b^^b^b^b^b^b^HbbBb^b^b^b^b^b^b^b^b^bI
b^b^^bbk^w^^b^bbI^bHb^HbbbS^b^b^b^b^bIbBb^b^b^b^b^b^b^b^bh
|^^BBBBBJ^B>J^^BBBBHBBBBBBBBBB!^BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBj
American-ori
produced by
sought
sources
to remedy
and
newly
available archival materials to illuminate this neglected dimension of
the war's history. Perhaps it is too early to identify a common theme
among their diverse offerings, but these works do tend to suggest the
enormous
political,
military,
and
cultural
obstacles
the U.S.
that
faced
in achieving its goals in Vietnam (26).
The increased attention to theVietnamese side of the story, together
with the new emphasis on the international aspects of thewar, will help
as "Ameri
to ameliorate
to view the Vietnam
War
the tendency
simply
event
in the twentieth
can" history.
As a major
the conflict
century,
to be considered
context.
in a wider
In any case, only
needs
and deserves
Marine
Heroine
Staff Sergeant
Ermalinda Salazar was nominated
for the 1970 Unsung
Award presented
of
annually by the Ladies Auxilliary to the Veterans
to help the children of the St.
Salazar, determined
Foreign Wars.
Sergeant
in Vietnam
Vincent de Paul Orphanage
in her off-duty hours, holds two of the
in June 1970. (Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records
youngsters
NAIL NWDNS-127-N-A700730.)
Administration,
by appreciating these other dimensions of the struggle will we be in a
better
to answer
position
those
questions
long-standing
about
Vietnam
that continue to divide Americans.
18. Michael
Lind, Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation
of America's
Disastrous Military
(New York: Free Press,
Conflict
1999), 284.
Victories and Final Tragedy of
19. Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined
Last Years in Vietnam
America's
Brace, 1999).
(New York: Harcourt
20. Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War
Press of
(Lawrence, KS: University
Most
i. Bert Schneider
and Peter Davis,
Last One, 1975).
2. George
C. Herring,
American
Historical
"America
Review
Endnotes
Hearts and Minds,
and Vietnam:
92
(April
1987):
VHS
The
(Beverly Hills,
Debate
350; Robert
CA:
Continues,"
A. Divine,
12 (Winter
History
Diplomatic
1988): 79-81.
Vietnam
and American
3. Arthur M. Schlesinger
Jr., The Bitter Heritage:
Democracy
(New York: Fawcett Premier,
1941-1968
1967).
Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese
and the Americans
in
4. Frances FitzGerald,
Vietnam
(Boston: Litde, Brown,
1972).
The Bitter Heritage,
5. Schlesinger,
47-8.
"Vietnam
6. Daniel
7. George
Reconsidered,"
1972).
Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York: Simon and Schuster,
C. Herring,
America's
Longest War: The United States and Vietnam,
1950-1975 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), x.
8. Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy
the United States, and theModern
of a War: Vietnam,
Historical
Books,
Experience
(New York: Pantheon
1985).
9. Ibid., xiv.
10. Robert
A Historiographical
"U.S.-Vietnamese
Relations:
J. McMahon,
Asian Relations on
Survey," in Pacific Passage: The Study of American-East
I. Cohen
the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, edited by Warren
(New York:
Columbia
Press,
University
1996), 322-3.
11. Robert J.McMahon,
"Contested Memory: The Vietnam War and American
26
Society,
1975-2001,"
Diplomatic
History
(Spring 2002):
12. R. B. Smith, An International History
of the Vietnam War, vol.
St. Martin's
Press,
1983).
1998); Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and
Betrayal in Vietnam
(New York: Free Press, 2001).
21. H. R. McMaster,
Dereliction
the
of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam
(New York: Harper
Kansas,
Collins,
1997); Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace
and the Escalation
in Vietnam
CA: University
of
of War
(Berkeley,
California
Press,
1999), xiv.
22. Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War
(Chicago: I. R. Dee,
1950-1975 (Chapel Hill,
1996); Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars,
NC: University
of North Carolina
Press, 2000).
Kim Khanh,
and Unmaking
"The Making
of 'Free Vietnam,"'
23. Huynh
PacificAffairs 60 (Fall 1987): 474.
24.
1972).
"U.S.-Vietnamese
Relations,"
25. McMahon,
314.
26. See, for example, Mark Philip Bradley,
Imagining Vietnam and America:
The Making
Vietnam,
1919-1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: Univer
of Postcolonial
Carolina
K. Brigham,
Guerrilla
Robert
Press,
sity of North
2000);
Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University
Press, 1998); Philip E. Carton, Diem's Final Failure:
Prelude to America's War in Vietnam
Press of
(Lawrence, KS: University
168-9.
I (New York:
Sacred War: Nationalism
and Revolu
Kansas,
J. Duiker,
2002); William
tion in a Divided Vietnam
1995); David W. P.
(Boston: McGraw-Hill,
in the Mekong
Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change
13. Guenter
in Vietnam
Press,
Lewy, America
(New York: Oxford University
in Vietnam
Podhoretz,
441; Norman
Why We Were
(New York:
and Schuster,
1982), 197.
in Retrospect
S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam
(San Rafael,
1978),
Simon
14. U.
to Long An: Revolutionary
Comes
in a
Jeffrey Race, War
Conflict
Vietnamese
Province
CA: University
of California
Press,
(Berkeley,
Delta,
1930-1975
(Armonk,
NY: M.
E. Sharpe,
2003).
CA: Presidio
Press, 1978), 269, 271.
15. Harry G. Summers
Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis
of the Vietnam War
Press,
(Novato, CA: Presidio
1982).
16. Andrew
F. Krepinevich
Jr., The Army and Vietnam
(Baltimore, MD: Johns
Press,
Hopkins
University
1986), 268.
and the Origins of the
17. David Kaiser, American
Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson,
Vietnam War
Press of Harvard
MA: Belknap
University
(Cambridge,
1.
Press, 2000),
Philip E. Catton is an assistant professor of history at Stephen F. Austin
State University. He is the author of Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to
America's War in Vietnam (2002). He would like to thank Bill Brophy,
Bobby Johnson, Heather Slough, and Stephen Taaffefor their comments
and
suggestions.
OAH
Magazine
of History
October
2004
11