International Cartel Regulations and Anti-Corruption from the View Point of a
Japanese Defense Lawyer
By Takeo Kosugi
I.
Cartel Regulations
1.
DOJ’s charges against the cartels conducted by Japanese companies:
On September 4, 2015, the Nikkei Newspaper reported in its morning edition that NGK
Insulators, Ltd. (a first section listed company) was under investigation by the United
States Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division for violating the Sherman Act in
connection with NGK Insulator’s distribution of exhaust emission control systems for
automobiles. 1 NGK Insulators entered into a plea agreement under which the company
agreed to plead guilty and pay a fine of 65 million US dollars. 2 Although the acts of
conspiracy were conducted within Japan, the automobiles that included the exhaust
emission control systems were distributed in the United States market and thus caused
damages to American consumers.
From around 2010, the DOJ has strengthened its efforts to prosecute parties who engage
in price fixing and bid rigging, especially Japanese companies in the auto parts industry. 3
As of September 2015, the DOJ has charged 37 companies and 55 executives in its
investigation, and at least 30 of these targets are Japanese companies or Japanese
citizens. 4 30 individuals have pleaded guilty or agreed to plead guilty and the amount
of criminal fines totals more than $2.6 billion US Dollars (300 billion Japanese Yen). 5
1
日本ガイシに罰金７８億円
米司法省発表、証拠隠滅疑いも、日本経済新聞（９月４日２０１５年）
、
http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFK04H08_U5A900C1000000/.
2
Press Release, DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, NGK Insulators Ltd. to Pay $65.3 Million for Fixing Prices on Auto Parts
(Sept. 3, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ngk-insulators-ltd-pay-653-million-fixing-prices-auto-parts.
3
See, Kevin Krolicki, 4-FBI raids 3 Japanese auto parts maker near Detroit, REUTERS.COM, Feb. 25, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/25/toyota-raid-idUSN2412560320100225; Sharis A. Pozen, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks As Prepared For Delivery By Acting Assistant Attorney General Sharis A.
Pozen At The Briefing On Department’s Enforcement Action In Auto Parts Industry (Jan. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-sharis-pozen-speaks-briefing-department-s-enforcement
.
4
Press Release, DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, KYB Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $62 Million Criminal Fine for Fixing
Price of Shock Absorbers (Sept. 16, 2015), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kyb-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-62-million-criminal-fine-fixing-price-shock-absorbers.
5
Id.
1 / 12
Criminal Enforcement Fine and Jail Charts through Fiscal Year 2014 6
6
DOJ, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT: FINE AND JAIL CHARTS THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2014, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail-charts.
2 / 12
2.
DOJ investigation:
In August 1993, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division revised its Corporate Leniency Program,
making it easier for corporations to cooperate with its investigations, which led to an
increase in amnesty requests and cartel charges. 7 The Program amendments included
1) automatic amnesty if no pre-existing investigation, 2) availability of amnesty even if
the corporation begins to cooperate during an ongoing investigation, and 3) cooperating
officers, directors, and employees are protected from criminal prosecution. 8 The
Leniency Program allows both corporations and individuals to avoid fines, criminal
convictions, and prison sentences by being the first party to confess participation in
cartel activity. 9
After this Leniency Program was adopted, automobile parts manufacturers scrambled to
be the first to report cartel activity, sparking repercussions within the industry; under the
old policy, the average number of applications was only around one per year, but under
the new policy, amnesty applications rose to around one per month. 10
In the investigation process, the DOJ first requests targeted companies conduct an
internal investigation and submit a comprehensive report regarding their cartel
involvement. The DOJ will then typically ask a company whether or not it intends to
plead guilty to the DOJ’s charges.
These negotiations will be conducted between the company’s attorneys and the DOJ.
When the companies choose their representing US lead counsel, they consider the
attorneys’ past experience and may select attorneys who have previously been employed
at the DOJ because of their experience with antitrust cases and familiarity with the DOJ
system. The US attorneys will cooperate with Japanese attorneys, who serve as the
company’s representative in Japan. The companies will respond to the DOJ through the
US attorneys. If the company decides to plead guilty, the plea agreement process will
commence and the DOJ will execute an agreement with the company, which will
become effective pursuant to the court’s approval.
In addition, the DOJ will also determine which employees and officers will be “carved
7
DOJ, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/corporate-leniency-policy.
8
Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen. Scott Hammond, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades,
Presentation at the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime (Aug. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download.
9
10
DOJ, LENIENCY PROGRAM, http://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-program.
See, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades, supra.
3 / 12
in” or “carved out” of the company’s disposition. “Carved in” individuals will be
discharged from responsibility. However, the DOJ will continue to investigate the
“carved out” individuals, whose cases will be referred to a grand jury in due course to
determine whether to indict them.
3.
Factual application of US justice in Japan
I have served as the representative attorney for individual Japanese corporate officers in
three DOJ antitrust cases. Although the DOJ investigations are supposedly conducted
with non-mandatory, voluntary cooperation from Japanese companies, their officers, and
employees, the reality is that most of these investigations are conducted in Japan in
conformance with US laws and regulations using US-style investigation strategies and
methods. In addition, any contact or communication between the Japanese company
and the DOJ are handled by American attorneys, who are based in the United States and
act on behalf of the Japanese companies or individuals.
Generally speaking, Japanese companies and Japanese citizens are very willing to
cooperate with the DOJ’s investigations. This is hardly surprising given Japan has a
reputation for being a homogenous, peaceful society. The DOJ’s authority to utilize
these investigative methods is further supported by their ability to charge the relevant
company or individual with obstruction of justice under US federal law. 11 Japanese
companies tend to proactively cooperate with DOJ investigations to avoid serious
punishment for destruction or concealment of evidence. For clarification purposes, this
does not mean that a Japanese individual has never destroyed evidence or falsified data.
4.
Expensive investigation and attorney expenses
The costs associated with antitrust investigations are extraordinary. Japanese
companies incur significant costs in the actual investigation, and must bear the financial
burden associated with investigation and legal fees for both the company and
individually charged officers/employees.
The company and each individual officer/employee subject to cartel charges typically
retain attorneys both in the US and Japan. The company will be responsible for paying
its own attorney fees as well as the attorney fees for each officer and employee. The
legal fees become quite high especially for the US attorneys because on top of the actual
attorney work costs, the company must pay for the travel, hotel accommodations, and
other costs incurred in the attorney’s trips between the US to Japan.
11
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (United States of America).
4 / 12
In addition to the legal costs, the company will also incur high translation costs
associated with the investigation because many of these documents are in Japanese and
the interviewees do not speak English. The company must bear the burden of preparing
English translations of them for the convenience of the DOJ and the US attorneys and
employing interpreters for officer/employee interviews with the US representative
attorneys.
The recent development of technology has made it necessary for the DOJ to also
investigate electronically stored information (ESI) found in computers and other
electronics, which is called “E-discovery, Forensic Data Analysis.” This analysis must
be conducted by DOJ-accredited investigation companies, which also will incur
substantial costs.
5.
Cultural Differences between the US and Japanese Plea Agreement and Punishment
Systems:
DOJ investigations often drag on for long periods of time. The phenomenal expense of
attorneys’ fees and investigation expenses naturally affect the company’s business.
Considering the time and work necessary to respond to the DOJ investigations and fight
the DOJ charges in court, targeted companies often prefer to terminate investigations at
an early stage. The company may choose to, albeit reluctantly, plead guilty, enter into a
plea agreement, and pay the necessary fines in order to end the investigation as soon as
possible, avoid the high costs of investigations, and risks of potential indictment.
There are many differences in trade practices and culture between Japan and the United
States. Japanese companies and individuals often comply with the US legal system
based on their inability to comprehend certain differences in the criminal legal systems
of both countries, especially with regards to the plea bargaining system. Although the
DOJ often uses the plea bargaining system, which involves charging individuals or
corporations with lesser punishment if the suspect cooperates and provides information
on other potential suspects, this method is not commonly accepted as a proper method of
investigation in Japan. 12
These differences also appear when dealing with language. When the DOJ conducts its
investigation and renders judgments based on the English translations of Japanese
documents and statements made through interpreters, the subtle nuances of language
may get lost in translation.
12
The Japan Times, Say no to plea bargaining,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/07/01/editorials/say-plea-bargaining/.
5 / 12
These differences in culture, legal systems, and legal procedures often appear in
international antitrust cases. We cannot easily overlook these issues when determining
the soundness of our judicial systems.
6.
Criminal punishment and enforcement in the US and Japan:
There are cases in the Japan where the court fined the criminal defendant or handed a jail
sentence with a suspension of execution, but no cases where the court determined the
criminal defendant violated the Anti-Monopoly Act and received a final and conclusive
jail sentence without a suspension of execution. However, this is not the case in the
United States.
There are a number of officers and employees in Japan who voluntarily go to the US to
serve a prison term in the United States; although there is much debate regarding the
reasons these individuals make this voluntary trip, it appears that the possibility of
extradition, along with consideration for future international travel and business
activities, play a role in this decision. 13 This can be attributed to the business culture in
Japan, where many business people enter the company after graduation and advance
their careers through internal promotions with the intent to remain at the same company
until retirement. These individuals maintain a high degree of loyalty to their company
and do not usually engage in violating actions for their own personal benefit. The
employees bear no criminal intent and have no awareness their actions consist of serious
US antitrust violations.
The fines imposed by the US authorities are considerably high compared with the fines
imposed by the Japanese authorities for violation of the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act.
In recent years, the DOJ has focused its attention on companies in the auto parts industry,
especially Japanese companies. The criminal fines themselves are substantial, and
Japanese companies such as NGK Insulators ($65.3 million), 14 NEC Tokin Corporation
($13.8 million), 15 and Yamada Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ($2.5 million) 16 have agreed to
13
Yoshiya Usami, Why did they cross the Pacific?
Extradition: A Real Threat to Cartelists?, AAI Working Paper No.
14-01, at 12-13 (March 20, 2014), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAIWP1401.pdf.
14
Press Release, DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, NGK Insulators Ltd. to Pay $65.3 Million for Fixing Prices on Auto Parts
(Sept. 3, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ngk-insulators-ltd-pay-653-million-fixing-prices-auto-parts.
15
Press Release, DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, NEC Tokin Corporation to Plead Guilty and Pay $13.8 Million for Fixing
Price of Electrolytic Capacitors (Sept. 2, 2015), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nec-tokin-corporation-plead-guilty-and-pay-138-million-fixing-price-electrolytic-capacitors.
16
Press Release, DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, Yamada Manufacturing Co. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing and Bid
Rigging on Automobile Parts Installed in U.S. Cars (Apr. 28, 2015), available at
6 / 12
pay millions of dollars in criminal fines.
Even though we must develop an internally accepted form of justice, it will be
problematic if the punishment standards in the United States are applied to Japanese
people because of their tendency to “follow the rules.”
7.
Simultaneous development of investigations by competent authorities in multiple
jurisdictions:
In many cases, cartel investigations have been simultaneously conducted in several
countries because many Japanese companies conduct business on a global scale, such as
in the United States, Europe, Korea, and Japan. China has also started conducting
investigations into Japanese companies. China’s National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) found twelve Japanese companies guilty of price fixing and
ordered ten of the companies to pay 1.24 billion Chinese Yuan in fines (approximately
208 billion Japanese Yen). 17
Anti-trust agencies in several countries have developed closer cooperative ties. Mr.
Kazuhiko Takeshima, a Japanese citizen, was appointed as the Chairman of the Japan
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) from 2002 to 2012 and utilized his position to advocate
for the internal enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Act within other countries and
international cooperation with the global community, particularly with Asia. 18 Japan
currently maintains Anti-monopoly Cooperation Agreements with Canada, the European
Community, and the United States. 19 In addition, Japan has also executed Inter-agency
Cooperation Memorandums with six countries: Australia, Brazil, Korea, the Philippines,
and Vietnam. 20
In October 2015, the JFTC executed its sixth Inter-agency Cooperation Memorandum
with China’s NDRC, under which the two agencies will hold regular meetings for the
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/yamada-manufacturing-co-agrees-plead-guilty-price-fixing-and-bid-rigging-automobile-parts.
17
Matthew Miller and Yoko Kubota, China fines Japanese auto parts makers record $201 million for price-fixing,
REUTERS.COM (Aug. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/20/us-china-autos-idUSKBN0GK08R20140820.
18
JFTC, MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN TAKESHIMA,
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2012/jan/individual-000467.html.
19
Japan Fair Trade Commission, International Agreements: Japan Fair Trade Commission,
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/int_relations/agreements.html.
20
Id.
7 / 12
purpose of exchanging information on antitrust violations. 21 These Inter-agency
Cooperation Memorandums allow the JFTC to work with the signatory agencies to
prevent anticompetitive activities across borders.
The JFTC has made efforts to develop these international ties because in Japan, the JFTC
has the authority to investigate cartel cases, notify the Public Prosecutor’s Office of its
recommendations, order the respective company to cease and desist their acts, and
impose surcharges. 22 However, the Public Prosecutors Office in Japan has exclusive
power to indict. 23
The fact that anti-trust agencies in several countries have developed closer cooperative
ties leads to concerns that evidence and information collected by an investigative agency
in one country may be used in another country.
8.
Attorney-Client Privilege:
The attorney-client privilege is recognized under law for British and United States
attorneys. These protections are similar to those recognized by law or through EU
Court judgments in several EU countries. However, the attorney-client privilege is not
clearly recognized in Japan.
Under the Japanese law, lawyers have an obligation not to divulge information obtained
from their clients, but there is no other restriction on this obligation. 24 When criminal
investigations are conducted in Japan, investigative authorities can legally request
communication records between lawyers and their clients, who may be either companies
or individuals. Attorney work product, including opinion letters drafted by attorneys,
may be subject to investigation and seizure.
The Japan Federation of Bar Association’s efforts to persuade the Ministry of Justice and
the Japan Fair Trade Commission to recognize the attorney-client privilege has not
reached fruition. Many attorneys are concerned that compared to their foreign
counterparts, Japanese corporations and Japanese citizens have little protection for the
information they share with their attorneys.
21
22
情報交換目的に定期協議公取委と中国独禁当局、日本経済新聞（１０月１４日２０１５年）
。
Act No. 111 of 1998 (Japan).
23
JFTC, MEASURES AGAINST ILLEGAL ACTS, http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/about_jftc/role.files/1009role_3.pdf.
24
MINJISOSHŌHŌ (C. Civ. Pro.), art. 197 (Japan); MINJISOSHŌHŌ, art. 220(iv)(c); KEISOHŌ (C. Crim. Pro.), art. 39(1)
(Japan); KEISOHŌ, art. 149.
8 / 12
9.
Reality of the enforcement of criminal extradition treaties
The Japanese government has entered into criminal extradition treaties with many
countries, including the United States, which also apply to cases involving a violation of
antitrust regulations. The Tokyo High Court will finally determine whether or not to
extradite an individual on a case by case basis. After the Tokyo High Court determines
whether the individual can be extradited under Japanese law, the Minister of Justice has
the authority to make the final decision whether or not to extradite. 25
One of the more famous extradition cases involved Mr. Yasuo Hamanaka, more
infamously known as “Mr. Copper,” who engaged in illegal manipulation of the
international copper market and lost $2.6 billion trading for Sumitomo Corporation in
1996. 26 Even though these actions had effects in the US and UK, Japan did not
extradited Mr. Hamanaka; a Japanese attorney attributed this decision to the fact that Mr.
Hamanaka was a white collar criminal and did not engage in a crime as serious as
murder. 27
The United States Government has never requested the Japanese Government extradite
any antitrust offenders, and no extradition has been approved in the past. However, in
April 2014, the DOJ announced its first ever extradition of a foreign national to the
United States on antitrust charges. 28 German authorities arrested Mr. Romano Pisciotti,
an Italian executive of Parker ITR S.r.l, an Italian marine hose manufacturer, while he
was in Germany on business.
In Japan, the number of Japanese fugitives who are violators of US antitrust law has
been increasing. 29 These recent developments both abroad and in Japan make it
25
Japan Ministry of Justice, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: EXTRADITION, available at
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/ic-01.html.
26
Yoshifumi Takemoto, Hamanaka, Out of Jail, ‘Amazed’ at Copper Prices, BLOOMBERG.COM, December 6, 2005,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aERBG3FANNMw.
27
Norihiko Shirouzu, Sumitomo Trader Is Unlikely To Face Charges in Japan, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 19, 1996,
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB83512797932033000.
28
Press Release, DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, First Ever Extradition on Antitrust Charge: Former Marine Hose Executive
Extradited from Germany to Face Charges of Participating in Worldwide Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (April 4, 2014), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-ever-extradition-antitrust-charge.
29
See Press Release, DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, Current and Former Executives of an Automotive Parts Manufacturer
Indicted for Roles in Conspiracy to Fix Prices – Investigation Has Resulted in Charges Against 90 Individuals and
Corporations (May 21, 2015), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/current-and-former-executives-automotive-parts-manufacturer-indicted-roles-conspiracy-fix-0
9 / 12
difficult to determine whether the general assumption Japan would not extradite
Japanese nationals accused by the US of antitrust violations will change.
II. International Prevention of Corruptive Acts
1.
Unfair Competition Prevention Act
After the OECD adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions in 1997 (41 contracting states), the Japan
Unfair Competition Prevention Act was amended in 1998 (enforced in February 1999). 30
The amendments included a provision in Article 18 criminalizing bribery to foreign
officials. 31 Under Article 18, a person who gives wrongful benefits to a foreign public
official will be punished by imprisonment for up to five years, a fine up to five million
yen, or both. In addition to the individual offenders, the judicial person that benefitted
from the individual’s violation will be punished by a fine up to three hundred million
yen.
In conformance with the above treaty, the United States amended the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“FCPA”) in 1998, 32 and the United Kingdom enacted the Bribery Act of
2010. 33 There are cases where Japanese companies faced sanctions in the United States
under the FCPA.
2.
Cases of the extraterritorial application of the Japan Unfair Competition Prevention Act
The followings are examples of cases where Japanese made wrongful payment to
foreign officials in violation of the Japan Unfair Competition Prevention Act:
(i)
(ii)
A Japanese company’s foreign subsidiary bribed two Filipino government officials
in order to obtain a government contract (2007) 34
Four Japanese individuals bribed a senior Vietnamese government official in
relation to a construction project partly financed by Japanese official development
.
30
Act No. 111 supra.
31
Act No. 51 of 2004 (Japan).
32
DOJ, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/legislative-history.
33
Bribery Act 2010 (United Kingdom).
34
OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN JAPAN, at 10, available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Japanphase3reportEN.pdf.
10 / 12
assistance (ODA) (2009) 35
(iii) A Japanese individual bribed a local government official in China to halt an
investigation into the Japanese company’s Chinese subsidiary (2013) 36
(iv) Three Japanese railway consulting firm executives bribed public officials in
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan in connection with rail projects partially
financed by Japanese ODA (2014) 37
In case (iv), three individual defendants were sentenced to, respectively, a prison
sentence of two years with a three-year suspension of execution of sentence, a prison
sentence of three years with a four-year suspension of execution of sentence, and a
prison sentence of two years and six months with a three-year suspension of execution
of sentence. In addition, the defendant company was required to pay a fine of 900
million Japanese Yen.
Please note that all three individual defendants engaged in these acts of bribery towards
the foreign officials solely to benefit the defendant company. These individuals did not
receive any personal benefits. This type of illegal behavior is common among
Japanese officers and employees working at Japanese companies. The lack of personal
gain plays a significant role in the court’s decision to hand down suspended sentences to
individual defendants.
3.
International judicial assistance
Japanese investigative authorities may request foreign investigative authorities provide
judicial assistance by referring to the “Law Relating to Reciprocal Judicial Aid to be
Given at the Request of Foreign Courts” 38 and the treaty-based “Law for International
Assistance in Investigation and Other Related Matters,” 39 both of which may be used by
the foreign investigative authorities to make the same types of requests for judicial
assistance to the Japanese investigative authorities through the Acts. In addition, Japan
35
Id.
36
Anna Mukai, Former Futaba Industrial Executive Arrested for China Bribery, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 12, 2013,
available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-12/former-futaba-industrial-executive-arrested-for-china-bribery.
37
Consultancy, three officials face bribery charges in Vietnam aid project, THE JAPAN TIMES, Jul. 10, 2014, available at
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/10/national/crime-legal/consultancy-three-officials-face-bribery-charges-vietnam
-aid-project/#.VhS3ieztmko.
38
Act No. 63 of 1905 (Japan).
39
Act No. 69 of 1980 (Japan).
11 / 12
has entered into bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties with some countries. 40
However, Japanese investigative authorities have made efforts to construct various
unofficial channels with foreign investigative authorities because official procedures
may take time and be ineffective.
With regards to Japan’s the relationship with China, investigative assistance is limited to
cases where there exists a particular bilateral treaty between Japan and China.
Although it did not fall under the category of corruption, the Japanese and Chinese
investigative authorities cooperated for the so-called “poisoned jiao-zi” (“poisoned
dumpling”) case in 2008. 41
III. Summary
The Leniency Program is a useful weapon for US investigative authorities. When
coupled with sanctions for obstruction of justice, foreign investigative authorities, such
as the DOJ, who commence investigation can effectively develop strong cases based on
information unavailable to the suspect companies and individuals. This ultimately
leaves the defendant companies, individuals, and defense lawyers with the ability to take
only reactive actions based on incomplete information.
The targeted companies and individuals are unable to predict possible results or obtain
all information necessary to make informed decisions for future action. The fear of
excessive punishments and costs may ultimately lead the company or individual to enter
into a plea agreement with the DOJ in order to preserve the future of the company. We
should fully examine the circumstances that lead targeted companies and individuals to
reach these conclusions, which may provide us with insight into creating a system that is
able to fairly administer justice.
Due to the expansion of international cooperation, investigative officials must engage in
due process by using the rule of law and realization of justice on a global scale. There
are many methods to accomplish this, including duly handling acquired evidence,
protecting information, and restricting extremities. I believe that we can expect that the
global community to provide international assistance across borders and exchange
experience on various levels.
40
Ministry of Justice, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/liai0002.html.
41
See generally, Japan to check China factory over poison dumplings, REUTERS, February 4, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/04/us-japan-china-food-idUST19003620080204; China-Japan poisoned dumplings:
Chinese man jailed, BBC.COM, January 20, 2014, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-25805306.
12 / 12