Filozofski vestnik
Letnik/Volume XXIII • Številka/Number 2 • 2002 • 179-190
TACTICS OF PERSEUS:
TACKLING THE INVISIBLE OTHER
K ik u k o T oyama
As is th o ro u g h ly a rtic u la te d in S a rtre ’s Being and Nothingness: A n Essay on Phe­
nomenological Ontology (1943), th e gaze o f the o th e r se lf/su b je c t has th e qual­
ity o f b e in g u n se e n , fo r “‘B eing-seen-by-the-O ther’ is the tru th o f ‘seeing-theO th e r .’”1 T h e m o m e n t th e O th e r en te rs my universe, I feel d e-cen tered an d
paralyzed, e x p e rie n c in g m yself as an object to be seen. Yet, if such an effect
reveals a ce rta in v u ln erab ility in o u r vision, th e question arises as to how it
ever b eco m es possible to see th e O th e r, or, to see M edusa, a figure standing
fo r th e O th e r ’s p etrify in g look. T his p a p e r will re fe r to som e rep resen ta tio n s
o f this m o n stro u s O th e r a n d suggest th a t as possible devices to bypass the
te rro r, various m e d ia o f spectacle a n d o f re p resen ta tio n m ig h t be designed,
n o tab ly p ain tin g , a t tim es re g a rd e d as an “a rt o f m em ory,” ra th e r th an an art
o f d ire c t p e rc e p tio n .
The invisible Other: “mirror” and the “void”
S artre d istin g u ish es th e eye as th e o b ject o f a look fro m th e look itself,
p u ttin g em p h asis o n th e n o n re c ip ro c ity betw een the object a n d subject o f
th e look: “my a p p re h e n sio n o f a look tu rn e d toward m e appears o n the g round
o f th e d e stru c tio n o f th e eyes w hich ‘lo o k at m e .’ If I a p p re h e n d the look, I
cease to p erceive th e eyes,” so th a t “T h e O th e r’s look hides his eyes; h e seem s
to go in fro n t o f th e m ” (Being and Nothingness, p. 258). In this schem a the
O th e r ’s eyes b e c o m e p rin cip ally invisible, n o lo n g e r given as a sim ple object
to be seen, observed a n d re m a rk e d on, a n d the O th e r ’s look works as “a p u re
re fe re n c e to m yself.” I re co g n ize th a t I am seen, as “a body w hich can be
h u r t,” as an o b ject to b e d e fin e d a n d ju d g e d at th e O th e r’s m ercy. H e re I no
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A n Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans.
Hazel E. Barnes, L ondon, 1986, p. 257. In this p ap e r the book will be abbreviated as Being
and Nothingness with th e page n u m b e r reference added.
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lo n g e r act unselfconsciously, as a p u re , u n re flectiv e consciousness, b u t b e ­
com e an in e rt m a tte r “tran sfix ed ” in its c o m p le te passivity.
T his o f course covers only a p a r t o f th e full ra n g e o f th e e x p e rie n c e o f
b ein g “lo o k ed a t” by the O th er. T h e O th e r ’s gaze d o e s n ’t necessarily petrify
m e /m a k e m e e ith e r an object o r a vulnerable, defenseless being. T h e S artrian
O th er, however, keeps a certain psychological distance, n o t allowing any d ream
o f m utuality, co-existence, o r o f any p erso n a l re la tio n s a t all.2 T h e lo o k o f th e
O th e r h e re seems to o p erate im personally, c o m p arab le to th e effect o f anony­
m ous surveillance cam eras, th e O m n iscien t, a b in d in g sense o f o n e ’s c o n ­
s c ie n c e /in te rn a liz e d law s/taboos.
As p o in te d o u t by M artin Jay, th e o rig in o f this effect m ig h t b e fo u n d in
th e “co n stitu e n t p ow er” th a t adults e x e rt u p o n a n in fa n t in h i s / h e r p erso n al
fo rm a tio n .3T h e following passage o f S a rtre ’s re m in iscen ces clearly shows how
th e gaze o f su rro u n d in g adults o rie n te d his self-u n d erstan d in g as a child,
casting a long shadow over his b eh a v io r a n d c h a ra c te r. “My tru th , my ch a rac­
ter, a n d m y n am e were in the h a n d s o f adults. I h a d le a rn e d to see m yself
th ro u g h th e ir eyes.... W hen they w ere n o t p re se n t, they left th e ir gaze b e h in d ,
a n d it m in g led with the light. I w ould ru n a n d ju m p across th a t gaze, w hich
p reserv ed my n a tu re as a m odel g ra n d so n .”4 In Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr, a
sim ilar story is told to describe the crucial bio g rap h ical m o m e n t o fje a n G enet:
w hen th e ten-year-old boy re ach e s in to a d raw er u n selfc o n scio u sly , “S om e­
o n e has e n te re d a n d is w atching him . B e n e a th this gaze th e ch ild com es to
him self. H e w ho is n o t yet an y o n e su d d en ly b ecom es J e a n G enet.... A voice
declares publicly: ‘Y ou’re a th ie f.’... T h e gaze o f th e adults is a c o n stitu e n t
pow er w hich has tran sfo rm ed h im in to a c o n stitu te d n a tu re .”5 T h e O th e r
2 For a com pact summ ary clarifying w here to p lace S artre’s ex p a n d ed suspicion o f “the
Cartesian perspectivalist gaze” in the history o f th e F ren ch anti-ocularcentric discourses,
see M artin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought
(Berkeley & London, 1993), pp. 264-282. My rea d in g o f Being and Nothingness is greatly
in d eb ted to Jay’s text. Jay also points o u t th a t S artre’s tre a tm e n t o f “th e look” is deeply
affected by his “ocularphobia,” “obsessive hostility to vision,” w hich certainly invites ac­
counts in biographical or psychoanalytical term s (Jay, pp. 276-277).
3According to Jay, François George sees in S artre’s work “le regard absolu,” the transcen­
dent, nonreciprocal look of “an om niscient G od,” which also could be associated with S artre’s
dead father or with his m aternal grandfather (Charles Schweitzer), cf. Jay, pp. 277-279.
4 Sartre, The Words, trans. B ernard F rech tm an (New York, 1964), p .158, q u o te d in Jay,
p. 279.
5 Sartre, Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr, trans. B ernard F rech tm an (New York, 1963), p.
17, q u oted in jay, p. 295. Also in The Reprieve, S artre has th e hom osexual ch a racter D aniel
articulate his agonizing experience o f being p etrified by th e look o f some unspecific
others. “They see m e - no, n o t even that: it sees m e. H e was the o bject o f looking.... I am
seen. T ransparent, transparent, transfixed. But by w hom ?” Cf. Sartre, The Reprieve, trans.
Eric Sutton, New York, 1947, p. 135, q u o te d in Jay, p. 293.
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w ho m akes m e see m yself as a n ob ject is thus related to m e as th e th ird p e r­
son, so to speak, d e sig n a te d particu larly in th e th ird p erso n plural (“they”),
o r e q u a te d even w ith th e im p e rso n a l “it.” C ertainly the O th e r appears each
tim e in th e fo rm o f a specific individual, yet sim ultaneously plays th e role o f
an an o n y m o u s, u n sp ecific b ein g , th e ro le o f th e J u d g e or w hoever represents
th e im ag in ary co m m u n ity called th e “w orld” o r “society.”
As a re su lt o f in te rn a liz in g th e O th e r’s ju d g e m e n t, real o r im agined, I
co m e to believe I ’m su ch a n d such (a h an d so m e boy, an ideal grandson, a
thief, etc.). If so, th e O th e r ’s gaze is, as it were, a m irro r th a t teaches how I
a p p e a r to th em , w h at a ttrib u te s I ’m given by them , while th e m irro r seems
sim u ltan eo u sly to intensify a n d stan d ard ize the effect o f self-reification. B oth
th e m irro r a n d th e O th e r ’s gaze b rin g in to re lie f a discrepancy betw een the
“I” as a pre-reflective, unself-conscious subject o f looking a n d the “I” belong­
in g to th e visible w orld, as an o b ject fo r th e O th e r to perceive. T hey bo th
reveal th e fact th a t I n e e d to b e m e d ia te d by a n d d e p e n d e n t u p o n th e O th e r
in o rd e r to b e w ho I a m /w h a t I am .6
W h e n th is “m ir r o r ” fu n c tio n o f th e O th e r ’s gaze is activated, I am
“p e trifie d ,’’to o o c c u p ie d w ith th e im age o f m yself in im agination to look at
th e O th e r in a ctu al p e rc e p tio n . If I m anage to re tu rn the gaze, th e n the O th e r
d isap p ears, n o lo n g e r re flectin g my im age in th e “m irro r.” T h e in co m m en su ­
rability b etw een p e rc e p tio n a n d im agination, as fo rm u late d elsew here by
S artre, re a p p e a rs h e re , e x c e p t th a t im agination is id en tified this tim e with
“th e paralyzing in te rn a liz a tio n o f th e O th e r ’s gaze.”7
T h e m irro rin g gaze o f th e O th e r also creates a “void,” o p e n in g u p a “h o le”
in m y visual field a n d d estab ilizin g it. It is a process o f the rad ical d ec en terin g
o f th e su b ject, so m e th in g N o rm a n Bryson epitom izes as follows; o n ce the
O th e r e n te rs in to th e w orld, “th e c e n te r o f th e w a tc h er’s lived h o riz o n ” sud­
d en ly loses effect; “th e w a tc h er self is now a tangent, n o t a ce n te r, a vanishing
p o in t, n o t a view ing p o in t, an opacity o n th e o th e r’s d istan t horizon. Every­
th in g reco n v erg es o n this intrusive ce n te r w here th e w atcher self is not: the
in tru d e r b ec o m e s a k in d o f d ra in w hich sucks in all o f the fo rm e r p len itu d e,
a black h o le p u llin g th e scen e away from th e w atcher self in to an engulfing
v o id .”8 T ra n s fo rm in g th e w a tc h e r self in to th e w atch ed , a spectacle fo r
6 As Jay p oints out, th e re seems an undeniable parallel with the Lacanian ego o f the
m irro r stage, for in b oth cases th e ego is considered “as an illusory representation, as a
source an d focus o f alien a tio n ,” alth o u g h Lacan criticized Sartre “for positing an irreduc­
ible co re o f subjective au to n o m y , a ‘self-sufficiency o f co n scio u sn ess’ p rio r to the
intersubjective dialectic o f desire” (Jay, pp. 346-347).
7 See Being and Nothingness, p. 258 an d Jay, p. 288.
8 N orm an Bryson, “T he Gaze in th e E xpanded Field,” in: Vision and Visuality, ed. Hal
Foster (New York, 1988), p. 89.
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a n o th e r’s sight, th e look o f th e O th e r is h e re c o m p arab le to a “d ra in ,” a “black
h o le,” th ro u g h w hich the universe as my visual field, co n cen trically u n fo ld in g
b efo re m e, ru n s away at a gulp.
F o r th e s a m e p ro c e s s , J a c q u e s L a c a n i n t r o d u c e s th e c o n c e p t o f
“sco tom ization:” “As the locus o f th e re la tio n b etw e en m e, th e a n n ih ila tin g
subject, a n d th a t w hich su rro u n d s m e, th e gaze seem s to possess such a privi­
lege th a t it goes so far as to have m e scotom ized, I w ho look, th e eye o f him
who sees m e as object. In so far as I am u n d e r th e gaze, S artre w rites, I n o
lo n g e r see th e eye th at looks at m e a n d , if I see th e eye, th e gaze d isa p p e a rs.”9
A cco rd in g to Jay, th e term “sco to m izatio n ” was first b o rro w ed fro m o p h th a l­
m ology by Jean-M artin C harcot, in o rd e r to d escrib e hysterical vision, a n d
later revived to d esignate a m o d e o f psychotic unaw areness, “a process o f
psychic d ep reciatio n , by m eans o f w hich th e ind iv id u al a ttem p ts to d en y ev­
ery th in g which conflicts with his e g o .”10 In his re-w orking o f th e th e m e o f
vision fro m the well-known m irro r stage th eo ry , L acan re in tro d u c e s th e c o n ­
cep t to suggest th a t “an actual b lin d -sp o t occurs w h e n so m eth in g is too th re a t­
en in g to b e see n .”11
T h e em erg en ce o f th e O th e r th u s g e n e ra te s an excessive th re a t to o u r
vision. A lth o u g h th e stren g th o f this “d ra in ” - w h e th e r th e e n tire w orld o f
visibility fades away o r only a tiny p a rt gets sta in e d - m ig h t flu ctu a te , th e sub­
je c t loses th e fo rm e r integrity o f its visual w orld. T h e O th e r ap p e ars, as it
were, so d istu rb in g , so b lin d in g as to b u rn in to th e re tin a . H is /h e r eyes, th e
face, at least p a rt o f it, o r even th e e n tire body, a t least its fro n t p a rt, tu rn
m o re o r less invisible - a n d oscillate b etw een visibility a n d invisibility.12
As far as th e O th e r is id en tified w ith th e su b ject o f th e look, w hich as “th e
m irro r” m akes m e see m yself a n d as “th e vo id ” deprives m e o f th e p le n itu d e
o f visual p e rc e p tio n , th e O th e r re m a in s, by d e fin itio n , invisible. L o o k in g
straig h t at the O th e r is fo rb id d e n , in a way, as o n e w ould b e p etrifie d , even
b lin d e d like a hysteric. T h e O th e r is th e re fo re a locus w h ere o u r vision proves
im p o te n t - a m alfu n ctio n paradoxically ro o te d in th e age-old alliance be9Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Alan S heridan
(New York & L ondon, 1981), p. 84.
10 René Laforgue, “Scotom ization in S chizophrenia,” in: International Journal o f Psycho­
analysis, 8 (1927), p. 473, q uoted in Jay, p. 354.
11Jay, p. 356.
12 T he effect of the O th e r’s gaze m ight be com parable to th a t o f th e sun as a source of
potentially m addening, excessive stim uli fo r the n aked eyes; w ithout su n lig h t we can n o t
see, an d yet if we look directly into it, we are blinded. See Jo n a th a n Crary, “M odernizing
Vision,” in: Vision and Visuality, ed. H al F oster (New York, 1988), p. 34, fo r his study on
the early 19th century’s “new centrality o f the body in vision,” m anifest especially in some
scientists’ curious passion for “th e ex p erien ce o f staring directly in to th e sun, o f sunlight
searing itself onto the body.”
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tw een see in g a n d know ing. “In sh o rt, th e O th e r can exist fo r us in two forms;
if I e x p e rie n c e h im w ith evidence, I fail to know him ; if I know him , if I act
u p o n him , I only re a c h his being-as-object a n d his p ro b a b le existence in the
m id st o f th e w orld. N o synthesis o f these two form s is possible” (Being and
Nothingness, p. 302).
Slaying Medusa, or how to make the Other harmless
T h e paralyzing effect o f th e O th e r ’s gaze finds its classical re p resen ta tio n
in th e fig u re o f M e d u s a /th e G o rg o n . In F reu d ian sym bolism a n d its applica­
tio n to ico n o g rap h y , M edusa conveys m any-sided, layered m eanings, yet it is
basically associated with “th e castration anxiety th at com es from having looked
a t s o m e th in g .”13 H e re we co u ld possibly discern a n o th e r stratu m o f th e visual
(o r anti-visual?) e x p e rie n c e o f th e O th e r - a stratum in w hich traum atic
signifiers are b u rie d a n d e x p e c te d to resurface.
It is o n th e th e m e o f ca stratio n th a t Yve-Alain Bois plays variations in his
provocative article “O n Matisse: T h e B linding” (1994) .14 C om paring Le bonheur
de vivre (1905-6) w ith P icasso’s Les Demoiselles d ’A vignon (1907), Bois tu rn s to
L eo S te in b e rg ’s p re c e d in g study a n d points out, “T h e essential difference
b etw een th e two canvases lies in th e ir m o d e o f addressing th e sp ectato r.” In
Les Demoiselles d A vignon “all th e figures re la te ‘singly, directly, to th e specta­
to r;’ th ey stare a t u s,” a n d “it was in o rd e r to place the unity o f his p ictu re ‘in
th e startled con scio u sn ess o f a viewer w ho sees him self se e n ’ th a t Picasso used
everything in his p o w er to p re v en t us from viewing it as a scene.” T hese w om en
a re th u s d e p ic te d as a cause o f th e sense o f stupefaction, nam ely, “th e cardi­
n al sym ptom o f ca stratio n anxiety.”15
T h e psychoanalytical in te rp re ta tio n o f the “G azing M o n ster” M edusa is
also a d o p te d in M asayuki T a n a k a ’s latest study o n M an Ray.16 Fully aw are o f
th e possibility o f d e c o d in g sexist traits in th e S urrealist circle, T anaka seem ­
ingly allows such a n in te rp re ta tio n o f M an Ray’s work, in w hich w om en go
th ro u g h objectificatio n a n d frag m en tatio n in o rd e r to serve th e desiring m ale
13 F reud, “T he U ncanny” (1919), in: Standard Edition, vol. 17, an d “M edusa’s H ead”
(1922), in: Standard Edition, vol. 18. S eejay, pp. 275-279.
14Yve-Alain Bois, “O n Matisse: T h e Blinding,” in: October, 68 (Spring, 1994).
15 Leo Steinberg, “T he Philosophical B rothel” (1972), reprin ted in: October, 44 (Spring
1988), pp. 7-74. See Bois, pp. 103-104. Bois amplifies this point, com bining it with an­
o th e r variation o f “th e th em e o f castration anxiety,” that is, the blinding effect o f the sun
(pp. 79, 118-120).
16 Masayuki T anaka, “M an Ray’s R epresentation o f W om an’s Eye an d the U ncanny," in:
Bigaku [Aesthetics], Vol. 50, No. 3 (W inter, 1999), pp. 25-36.
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gaze.17 A n d yet, h e co n ten d s, M an Ray’s re p re s e n ta tio n o f w om an c a n n o t be
re d u c e d to a fem inist schem a o f this k ind. R a th e r, deep ly c o n n e c te d w ith
M edusa a n d h e r fate o f d ec ap itatio n , it sh o u ld b e re a d as a visualization o f
th e castratio n anxiety. U ltim ately, th ro u g h “< th e re tu r n o f th e repressed>
w hich is a th rea t to the ratio n al subject,” th e artist realized th e S urrealist ideal,
an em an c ip atio n o f th e u n co n sc io u s.18
How ever th ese two readings - th e “o b jectificatio n o f th e fem ale su b ject”
a n d th e symbolic re p re se n ta tio n o f ca stratio n anxiety - seem closely re la te d
to each o th er. As T anaka him self articulates, violent m an ip u latio n s o f th e fe­
m ale body - th e eye, the face, o r th e h e a d c u t o ff o r erased a lto g e th e r - could
be co u n ted as variations o f the M edusa th em e. O p p o site in ap p e ara n ce, o n e
causing terro r (a wom an with evil eyes) a n d the o th e r provoking desire (a wom an
w ithout eyes, o r faceless, h ead less), p e rh a p s they only re fer to d iffe re n t sides o f
the essentially sim ilar reaction th at th e m ale subject en tertain s, co n fro n ted with
th e fem ale O ther. It m ight also be possible to see th e original m yth o f M edusa
a n d Perseus as in a way tinged with this sam e am biguity. T h e M o n ster is evoked,
only to b e killed; the object o f fear a n d th e process o f overcom ing coexist th ere,
ju s t as th e F reudian M edusa sim ultaneously re p re se n ts th e cause o f castration
anxiety, th e im age o f castration, a n d its d e n ia l.19
A ccording to C arol D uncan, “very o ften im ages o f w om en in m o d e rn art
speak o f m ale fears,” the story o f m an fighting a n d eventually tran sc en d in g the
m onstrous w o m a n /m o th e r.20 De K o o n in g ’s Woman I (1952) is a p ro m in e n t
exam ple, one o f those “distorted o r dangerous-looking creatures, potentially
overpow ering, devouring, o r castrating.” D u n can po in ts to a “striking resem ­
b lan ce” betw een this im age a n d th e G o rg o n o f an c ie n t G reek art. Indicative o f
h er origin as a fertility o r m o th e r goddess, th e G o rg o n often ap p ears flanked by
anim als an d ad o p tin g a characteristically self-exposing gesture, a n d yet de
K ooning’s figure “appears especially in te n d e d to co n ju re u p infantile feelings
o f powerlessness b efore the m o th e r a n d th e d re a d o f castration: in th e o p e n
jaw can b e read th e vagina d en tate - th e id ea o f a dan g ero u s, dev o u rin g vagina,
too h o rrib le to depict, a n d h en c e tran sp o sed to th e toothy m o u th .”21
17 Ibid., p. 27.
18 Ibid., p. 31.
19 See Bois, p. 104.
20 Carol D uncan, “T he M oM a’s H o t M am as” (1989) in: The Aesthetics o f Power: Essays in
Critical Art History (Cam bridge, 1993), pp. 189-207. Also see pp. 81-120 (“Virility an d Domi­
nation in Early Tw entieth-Century V anguard P ainting” an d “T h e Esthetics o f Power in
M odern Erotic A rt”) for h e r analysis o f th e d evelopm ent o f rep resen tatio n s o f w om en in
m o d ern art, from the fin de siècle “fem m e fatal” to e ith e r a far m o re aggressive “praying
m antis” o r “an obedient anim al/passive, available flesh” in the early 20th century.
21 Ibid., p. 197.
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H ow ever, th e p a in tin g d o e s n ’t sim ple-m indedly visualize “th e d re a d of
ca stra tio n .” B esides th e im age o f th e archaic g o d d e ss/m o n ste r, it also incor­
p o ra te s c o n te m p o ra ry re p re s e n ta tio n s o f w om an in th e mass m edia, by show­
in g o ff h e r vulgarity o r h e r “g irlie” side. T h e w om an h e re is, th ere fo re , “sim ul­
taneo u sly frig h te n in g a n d lu d ic ro u s,” as d e K o oning him self o n ce described
h e r. T h e m o n ste r th a t th e m ale subject has to overcom e, tran sc en d , is already
halfway m ad e harm less. “T h e am biguity o f th e im age thus gives the artist (and
th e viewer) b o th th e e x p e rie n c e o f d a n g e r a n d a feeling o f overcom ing it.”22
Given th a t iconic, fro n ta l im ages o f w om an with staring eyes fre q u e n t the
h istory o f m o d e rn art, th e n e x t q u estio n is w h e th e r they really have the “u n ­
can n y ” effect o f aw ak en ing th e unconscious, o r repressed castration anxiety,
th a t is, w h e th e r M ed u sa’s p etrify in g pow er is k ep t intact even in those m edi­
a te d im ages. “C a stra tio n ” itself is in fact a d u b io u s term a n d its ph allo cen tric
o rig in re m a in s to b e ex cavated,28 b u t th e issue has to b e lim ited h e re to clari­
fying how th e O th e r can b e c a p tu re d w ithin visibility - w ithin rep resen tatio n .
O n th e o n e h a n d , im ages w hich relate directly to the sp ec ta to r som ehow
d o sim u late th e effect o f th e O th e r ’s p resen ce. As sem i-subjects, o r sim ulacra
o f th e O th e r, they re p e a t th e a lte rn a tio n betw een th e O ther-as-subject and
th e O th er-as-o b ject in w hat R ich ard B rilliant calls “the oscillation betw een art
o b je c t a n d h u m a n su b ject.”24 H ow ever, while som e o f those im ages m ay well
visualize m o n stro u s, fo rb id d e n objects a n d to u ch th e layer o f th e unconscious
a lo n g w ith tra u m a b u rie d in it, th a t visualization o f te rro r is o ften accom pa­
n ie d by p ro te c tio n ag ain st itself, as th e m o n ster is shown in a low ered form ,
e ith e r d ep riv e d o f h e r gaze o r m a d e ludicrous. In a way th e p ro tec tio n is
alread y th e re , o r th e a tte m p t to tran slo cate th e m o n ster in to th e w orld o f the
flat p lan e, o f re p re s e n ta tio n , in w hich she as an im age never com pletely n e­
gates visibility.
M edusa a n d P erseu s - this m ythological p air - is in this sense suggestive
22 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
23 For th e issue as to how persistently “the privileged status o f m ale viewers” has been
preserved w ithin the fram e o f m o d e rn art, as in the case o f Demoiselles d ’ Avignon, see
D uncan, pp. 200-201.
24 See Bois, p. 104, an d R ichard Brilliant, Portraiture (Cam bridge, Massachusetts, 1991),
p. 7. Brilliant h ere points to “th e d ouble n atu re o f portraitu re,” which straddles both life
an d art:
“...the oscillation betw een a rt object an d hum an subject, rep resen ted so personally, is
w hat gives p ortraits th e ir extraordinary grasp on o u r im agination.” Images in successful
po rtraits achieve th e effect o f p resence via that o f likeness, since they “p reten d n o t to be
signs o r tokens invented by artists, b u t ra th e r aim to rep resen t the m a n n e r in which their
subjects w ould ap p e ar to th e viewer in life” (p. 20). Particularly a frontal, full-face por­
trait, co m p ared to a profile, directly addresses the viewer in th e first person an d so func­
tions like th e “I-You” relation (pp. 27, 43-45).
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o f how to re p re se n t a n d th ere b y “slay” th e O th e r, th e fu n c tio n o f w hich (as a
m irro r a n d as th e void) w ould otherw ise b e c o m e in to le rab le. A c co rd in g to
T hom as Hess, d e K o oning’s W o m en grasp an elusive, d a n g e ro u s tru th “by
th e th ro a t:” “A nd tru th can b e to u c h e d only by co m p licatio n s, am biguities
an d p aradox, so, like the h e ro w ho lo o k ed fo r M edusa in th e m irro rin g shield,
h e m ust study h e r flat, re flected im age every in c h o f th e way.”25
Immediate vision vs. mediate vision
W hile th e body o f th e O th e r resists b e in g seen, h id in g itself b e h in d th e
b lin d in g gaze, in m any cases th e b o d y is o n display fo r us to d ev o u r a n d th e
h u m an form is said to be “a m a g n e t fo r th e eye.” W e sh o u ld m ove o n now to
ask how a n d o n w hich conditions it b ecom es less p ro b lem atic to see th e O th er.
In S a rtre ’s schem a, w h e th e r o n e re m a in s a su b ject o r d e g e n e ra te s in to
an object d ep e n d s o n th e struggle fo r “th e rig h t to see w ith o u t b e in g s e e n .” I
n eed to see w ithout b ein g seen in o r d e r to c o n c e n tra te o n seein g - if so, som e
devices o r tricks have to be co n triv ed to p ro d u c e a solipsistic illusion o f p u re
subjectivity, to cross o u t th e fact th a t I am th e body, a visible o b ject fo r the
O th er.
W ith devices o f this sort, surely o u r visual w orld changes. It seem s pos­
sible, accordingly, to distinguish two types o f vision, provisionally called i m ­
m ed iate vision> an d c m ed ia te vision>. W h e n a su b ject faces a n o th e r subject,
they are b o th k ep t in each o th e r ’s cim m e d ia te vision>, each stru g g lin g fo r
th e rig h t to rem ain th e subject a n d n ev e r fully achieving it. T h e subject-state
a n d th e object-state alter, “fo r each has its own instability a n d collapses in
o rd e r fo r the o th e r to rise from its ru in s ” (B eingand Nothingness, p. 297). Yet,
it also seem s p a rt o f o u r daily p ra ctice to switch fro m this < im m ed iate vision>
to <m ediate vision> so as to m ake th e O th e r a h arm less object. J u s t as P erseus,
in b e h e a d in g M edusa, looks at th e m o n s te r only in re flectio n in his shiny
shield, so we ca p tu re th e O th e r, n o t in th e flesh /p re s e n c e , b u t in re p re se n ta ­
tion, k eep in g the O th e r distanced ontologically a n d th u s sealing u p th e pow er
o f th e gaze. O n e exem plary case is th e th e a tre , w h e re th e stage form s a w orld
clearly d istin g u ish ed from th e au d ito riu m . A sp o tlig h t is d ire c te d o n th e p e r­
form ers, while th e spectators sink in to th e darkness. T h e sam e stru c tu re is
follow ed by o th e r m ed ia o f spectacle, drastically e x p a n d in g th e la n g u ag e o f
tech n o lo g y for “seeing w ith o u t b e in g se e n .”26 A nd even w ith o u t th o se spe­
25 T hom as B. Hess, Willem de Kooning (New York, 1959), p. 7, q u o te d in D uncan, p. 198.
26 O f course, n o t all the m edia fo r spectacle, fo r th e m ediate vision, have b ee n d e­
signed entirely “to contain the O th e r w ithin his objectivity” (Being and Nothingness, p.
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cific, larg e scale settings, a te m p o ra ry ca p tu rin g o f “th e O th e r as an o b ject”
h a p p e n s everyw here. W h e n you sta n d in fro n t o f som eone w ith a cam era in
y o u r h a n d , its “M ed u sa effect” d e te rm in e s alm ost instantaneously who is look­
in g /w h o is b e in g lo o k e d at. O r w h e n you lie down o n th e o p e ra tin g table,
y o u r b o d y th o ro u g h ly b ec o m e s a n object, as th e gaze of m ed icin e is au th o ­
rized to e x a m in e it.27 A sim ilar asym m etric relatio n o f “seeing w ith o u t bein g
s e e n ” (a n d vice versa) co u ld b e observed in th e stru ctu re o f a p an o p tico n , as
well as in th a t o f a p e e p show - a lth o u g h such relations seem easily destabi­
lized, as in th e case o f D u c h a m p ’s p o sth u m o u s w ork Etant Donnés (1946-66),
w h ere th e view er’s body, su p p o sed ly invisible, becom es a n ob ject to be dis­
play ed .28W h e th e r c lo th e d o r n a k e d may also d e te rm in e to som e e x ten t w hich
o n e takes th e ro le o f th e viewer, if as S artre writes, “To p u t o n clothes is to
h id e o n e ’s object-state: it is to claim th e rig h t o f seeing w ith o u t b ein g seen;
th a t is, to b e p u re su b ject” (Being and Nothingness, p. 289).
In < im m ed iate vision>, I see m yself always exposed to th e O th e r’s look
a n d m y vision easily h u r t by its b lin d in g effect. In <m ediate vision>, as if e n ­
jo y in g seein g th e w orld w ith o u t b elo n g in g to it, th e n o tio n o f “th e disem b o d ­
ie d eye,” “a view o n th e w orld, ra th e r th a n in it” resurfaces. N aturally my eyes,
co n stan tly ch a n g in g d ire c tio n a n d refocusing, never leave m y body, which
itself is e m b e d d e d in th e w orld. H ow ever, th e re are m o m ents I’m ab so rb ed in
a n d a t th e sam e tim e d istan ce d fro m w hat I see in c m ed ia te vision>, so th at
m y object-state as a b o d y sinks in to oblivion. <Im m ediate vision> a n d <m edia te vision> a lte rn a te a n d b o th co n stitu te th e landscape of o u r daily life.29
By th e sam e to k e n , we m ay natu rally im agine th a t a p a in te r (m ale, nor297). In th e m idst o f o u r daily life, w hich is endlessly overloaded with visual “noise,” raw,
chaotic, n o n -o rien ted , an d in flux, those visual m edia provide materials already selected,
e d ited an d restru c tu re d , less b u rd e n in g on o u r vision - a ra th e r com fortable “arm chair”
in w hich o u r eyes can relax a n d slow down the process of perception, en ding u p n o t
seeing unless o rie n te d to see. Such a way of functioning certainly reflects how o u r vision
works, selectively an d actively, shutting o u t and thus defending itself from excessive stimuli.
27 T h e u n canniness o f “my ex p erien ce of my own body” is discussed by M oira Gatens,
Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality (London & New York, 1996), pp. 34-35.
28 For th e ironical situation in Etant Donnés w here “the viewer becom es the uneasy
o b ject o f a gaze from b e h in d - th a t o f those waiting to stare at the p eep show,” see Jay, pp.
169-170. Also for th e role o f a scopophilic viewer which affects th e appearance o f an
object, see Brilliant, pp. 152-153.
29 For this to be discussed fu rth er, M erleau-Ponty’s critique of the C artesian g eo m eter’s
eye, w hich stays outside an d above th e scene it surveys, certainly needs to be reexam ined,
along with Bryson’s opposition betw een Gaze and Glance, or W alter B enjam in’s between
S am m ulung an d Z erstreuung. See N orm an Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic o f the
Gaze (N ew H aven, 1983), pp. 87-131, W alter Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner
technischen R eproduzierbarkeit” (D ritte Fassung), in: Walter Benjamin Gessammelte Schriften
1/2, (Frankfurt an M ain, 1991), p. 504.
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mally) a n d his m o d el (fem ale, o fte n n a k e d ) sh o u ld b e a n o th e r co n sp icu o u s
p air w h e re <m ediate vision> m aterializes itself ag a in st th e field o f cim m ediate vision>. A nd yet, p o rtra it p ain ters o ften p re fe r w orking with p h o to s (o r
rep resen tatio n s o f o th e r k in d s), o r fro m m em ory, ra th e r th a n face to face with
th eir m odels. In som e extrem e cases, a p a in te r even blindfolds him self after
w orking from a m odel. As re p o rte d by Bois, M atisse favored this fashion, since
h e believed, “if I close my eyes, I see objects b e tte r th a n with my eyes o p e n .”30
T his p arad o x rem in d s us o f a lo n g tra d itio n in w hich p a in tin g has b e e n
re g a rd e d n o t as an a rt o f sight b u t as an a rt p rim arily b ased o n m em ory.
P laced in this trad itio n , th e p a in te r som ehow com es closer to th e p o e t/w rite r,
as if p a in tin g a n d draw ing w ere n o th in g b u t subdivisions o f w riting. T h e n , if
‘Y ou only really see w hen you d o n ’t lo o k ,” you give u p y o u r sight in th e p re se n t
ten se - stop catch ing an object in its im m e d ia te sen sa tio n a n d tu rn to its
shadow, its substitute, its im age p reserv ed in m em ory. In this shifting th e origi­
nal is re p la ced by th e copy. A su b stitu te as it is, th e copy surpasses th e original
h ere, com ing th ro u g h a process o f crystallization in m em ory < m ediate vision>,
while th e original, th a t is, an e x p e rie n c e o f th e O th e r < im m ed iate vision>,
always h as som e p a rt b lu rre d (o r even “sc o to m ized ”). T h e copy su p p lem en ts
an d m o d u lates stim uli o f the original, to o in ten se to taste, to o vague to artic u ­
late, to o trau m atic to live fully.
W e may recall Jacq u es D e rrid a ’s re in te rp re ta tio n o f an a n c ie n t a n e c d o te
w hich la te r b ecam e associated w ith th e “o rig in o f p a in tin g /d ra w in g .” T h e
story was initially taken from Pliny th e E ld e r’s N atural History (B ook XXXV)
in w hich Butades, a p o tte r o f Sicyon a t C o rin th , was in tro d u c e d with his d au g h ­
ter, “w ho was in love with a y oung m an ; a n d she, w h en h e was g o in g ab ro ad ,
drew in o u tlin e on the wall the shadow o f his face throw n by a la m p .”31 R efer­
ring to som e exem plary re p re se n ta tio n s in p ain tin g , D e rrid a b rin g s it to o u r
no tice th a t this C o rin th ian girl w asn’t lo o k in g a t h e r lover w h en she drew . “As
if lo o k in g is p ro h ib ite d w hen o n e is draw ing, o r o n e m akes a draw ing only o n
co n d itio n that o n e d o e s n ’t look. As if draw ing is a confession o f love, des­
tin ed to o r o rganized fo r th e invisibility o f th e O th e r .”32 T h u s in th e h e a rt o f
draw ing a n d p ain tin g , fo r w hich “re p la c in g p e rc e p tio n w ith m em o ry ” is es­
sential, th ere lies “th e absence, th e invisibility, o f o n e ’s m o d e l,” “th e invisibil­
ity o f th e O th e r” - if we follow D e rrid a ’s own p h rasin g .
30 Bois, pp. 77-78.
31 A nd “H er fath er pressed clay on this an d m ade a relief, w hich h e h a rd e n e d by expo­
sure to fire with the rest o f his pottery.” Pliny, Natural History (Volume IX, B ook XXXIIIXXXV), trans. H. Rackham (L ondon an d C am bridge, M assachusetts, 1952), pp. 371-373.
32Jacques D errida, Moires d ’aveugle - L ’autoportrait et autres ruins (Paris, 1990), trans, to
Japanese by Satoshi Ukai (Tokyo, 1998), p. 63. (T ranslation in to English is by th e a u th o r
of the paper).
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F o r th e sh iftin g fro m p e rc e p tio n to m em ory, however, o r from the origi­
nal to th e copy, a t least two d istin c t sources sh o u ld b e co n sid ered , fo r p ain t­
in g e ith e r “fro m m e m o ry ” o r “fro m n a tu re ” is n o t an issue solely for p o rtra i­
tu re b u t relates to p a in tin g /d ra w in g in general. At o n e level, th e shift is cer­
tainly n ec essita ted by th e p re se n c e o f th e O th er; th e O th e r d o e s n ’t fully b e­
com e visible in < im m ed iate vision>, w hich proves deficien t u n d e r the b lin d ­
in g gaze. A n d yet, a clear, d e ta ile d , a n d faultless p ictu re - th e p ro d u c t o f a
perfectly n o rm a l vision - co u ld overflow a n d paralyze us so th a t directly p e r­
ceived im ages m u st b e re p la c e d by im ages im p rin te d in m em ory. A lready
ed ite d a n d rew o rk ed th ro u g h a m e n ta l process o f th e subject, they are k ep t in
sto re in a “pow erfully selective,”33 co m pressed form , ready to b e u n p ac k ed at
any tim e.
In m ak in g a p o rtra it o f so m eo n e - in c a p tu rin g th e O th e r via a m edium
o f re p re s e n ta tio n - you are th u s doubly m otivated to m ake a Perseusian d e­
to u r, to switch fro m th e im m e d ia te sensation o f an object to its re p re s e n te d /
rew o rk ed im age.
T his p a p e r in te n d e d to arg u e th a t th e O th e r can be a so u rce o f excessive
stim uli, a b u rd e n m u c h to o heavy o n o u r vision, so th at various m edia o r
devices fo r “seein g th e O th e r ” have b e e n invented. W ith th e m , the O th e r is
re m o v e d to a n o th e r w orld w hich is n o t ours, secu rin g o u r p o sitio n o f “seeing
w ith o u t b e in g se e n .” T h e O th e r ’s body thus g en erates o n e conspicuous lo­
cus, w hich m anifests m o re th a n an y th in g how o u r vision n ee d s to b e p ro ­
te c te d a n d assisted - how it n e e d s to be m ediated.
T h e petrifying, b lin d in g effect is, needless to say, only o n e aspect o f the
O th e r ’s look. A n d yet, w ithin a cu ltu ra l clim ate in which th e h u m a n body is
n o lo n g e r a classical b o d y b u t is re p re s e n te d d o m in an tly as a g rotesque body,
it m ig h t p e rh a p s o b ta in a new m e a n in g to recognize ra th e r d re ad fu l aspects
o f e x p e rie n c in g th e O th e r.34 M oreover, we will hopefully contextualize b e tte r
an altern ativ e p a th tak en by th e d esc en d en ts o f Perseus, w ho choose a copy
33 T hom as Crow, “Saturday Disaster: T race and R eference in Early W arhol,” in: Recon­
structing Modernism: Art in New York, Paris, and Montreal 1945-1964, ed. Serge G uilbaut
(C am bridge, M assachusetts, & L on d o n , UK, 1990), p. 316.
34 A nd we may also u n d e rsta n d b e tte r today’s anti-ocularcentric discourse flourishing
over th e vulnerability o f vision, as this “alternative way” m ight somehow lead to a m iddle
g ro u n d betw een th e “p u re opticality,” th e “disem bodied eye” of the viewer o f m odernist
pain tin g o r o f pop a rt an d the overem phasized physicality of m inim al an d post-minimal
art. See Kikuko Toyam a, “C arnality recovered and painting doom ed: minim alism as a site
o f th e redefinition o f th e aesthetic subject,” in: The Ural InternationalJournal of Philosophy,
N o .l (2), 2000, p p .155-166, an d “T h e Bodies after the ‘E nd of P ainting,”’ in: Bigaku [Aes­
thetics], Vol. 51, No. 2, A utum n 2000, pp. 1-12. Cf. Rosalind Krauss, “T heories o f Art after
M inimalism an d P op,” in: Dia Art Foundation: Discussions in Contemporary Culture, No. 1,
ed. H al F oster (Seattle, 1987), pp. 59-64.
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o n a sh ield < m ediate vision> in o rd e r to kill, le t go, th e o rig in a l < im m ediate
vision> - as if o n e co u ld be re u n ite d w ith th e O th e r only in such an a c tio n o f
m o u rn in g in advance. “O nly th e d e a d can p e rp e tu a lly b e o bjects w ith o u t ever
b ec o m in g subjects” (Being and Nothingness, p. 297).
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