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Political Science
8-1995
'Our Complicated System': James Madison on
Power and Liberty
James H. Read
College of Saint Benedict/Saint John's University, [email protected]
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/polsci_pubs
Part of the American Politics Commons
Recommended Citation
Read, James H. 1995. " 'Our Complicated System': James Madison on Power and Liberty." Political Theory 23(5):452-475.
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"Our Complicated System": James Madison on Power and Liberty
Author(s): James H. Read
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), pp. 452-475
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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"OUR COMPLICATEDSYSTEM"
JamesMadisononPowerandLiberty
JAMESH. READ
CollegeofSt.Benedict
in all Govermnents
to an augmentation
thatthereis a tendency
of
It has beenremarked
as usuallyunderstood
doesnotappearto
Buttheremark
powerattheexpenseofliberty.
thatliberty
shouldbe equallyexposed
reflection
me wellfounded....Itis a melancholy
theGovernment
havetoomuchortoolittlepower,andthattheline
to dangerwhether
whichdividestheextremes
shouldbe so inaccurately
drawnbyexperience.
-Madison, letter
toJefferson,
October17, 1788
Howis itpossibletomakegovernment
morepowerful
without
making
thosesubjectto itsauthority
lessfree?Thatwas one of thechallenges
fortheConstitutional
Convention
Madisonfacedas heprepared
(andfaced
theBillofRights
andinopposing
Hamilton's
againindrafting
policiesin
totheviewsofevery
the1790s)."According
theGeneral
Governmember,
willhavepowers
farbeyond
ment
thoseexercised
bytheBritish
Parliament
whentheStateswerepartoftheBritish
Madison
Empire,"
observed
onJune
Convention.'
Howcouldanygovernment,
29 attheConstitutional
evenone
inform,
beother
than
ifitistobemore
Republican
oppressive
powerful
than
hadbeenwithrespect
theBritish
Parliament
tothecolonies?
Madison
must
thegrain
ofmuch
beabletoargue,
against
ofthetime,2
political
thought
that
moregovernmental
powerdoesnotnecessarily
meanlessliberty-that
they
arenotsimply
tobebalanced.
opposites
inthisessayis toexplore
thecomplicated
Mypurpose
relation
between
andpowerin Madison'swritings,
in thecrucialperiod
especially
liberty
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wouldliketo thankSam Beerand JoeFarryfortheircomments
on an
earlierdraftofthisessay.I also wishto thanktheProgramon Constitutional
Governnent
at
Harvardand theOlin-Bradley
Foundation
thatgavemetimetodo theresearch
forafellowship
and writing.
POLITICAL THEORY,Vol.23 No. 3, August1995 452-475
Inc.
C) 1995Sage Publications,
452
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Read/MADISON ON POWER AND LIBERTY
453
seems
short
1787and1791.Within
spanoftimeMadison
between
arelatively
advocateof centralized
power(1787) to an
to changefroman extreme
form
ofcentralized
critic
(1791).Before
outraged
powerinitsHamiltonian
hecallsfora national
thePhiladelphia
Convention
government
andduring
law
a
state
strike
down
canimmediately
legislature
(which
that
any passedby
Itisnecessary,
hewrites
than
goesevenfurther
present-day
judicialreview).
inMarchof1787,
toJefferson
ina letter
onthelocalLegislatures.
inall cases whatsoever
toarmthefederalheadwitha negative
andreflection
havesatisfied
methat,however
thisdefensive
Without
power,experience
ample the federalboundariesmay be delineatedon paper,theywill be easily and
oftheStates.3
baffled
continually
bytheLegislativesovereignties
about
andworries
mostoftheconvention
He sticks
tothisposition
through
thefinaldocument.4
itsabsencefrom
in1791that
thefederal
charter
government
Yet,whenHamilton
proposes
hadsupported
bank-a powerwhichMadisonhimself
at the
a national
andwhichwouldseemtobe a farlessintrusive
Convention
Philadelphia
ofcentral
is
exercise
negative-Madison
powerthanMadison's
proposed
fearsthatitundermines
thefoundations
andhonestly
ofconstitushocked
of 1798(protesting,
His Virginia
Resolutions
among
tionalgovernment.
theAlienandSedition
other
things,
Acts)calluponthestatestoresistthe
andappear(although
Madison
unjustactionsof thefederal
government
ofnullification-a
hestrove
with
thedoctrine
doctrine
deniedit)tosupport
allhismight
toopposeinthelastyearsofhislife.
here?Oristhismerely
Is there
a pragmatist's
anytheoretical
consistency
to shifting
anddiverse
ofpolicy?
problems
response
political
alignments
hislifeMadisonwasdoggedwiththeaccusation
ofinconsisThroughout
madebymany
historians
andbiographers
as well).He
tency
(anaccusation
onthecontrary,
that
hewasmoreconsistent
thananyone
elseofhis
insisted,
age.5
toHamilton
Madison's
"apostasy"
from
According
andtheFederalists,
hisformer
nationalist
wastheactofa "weakandtimid
soulwho
principles
hadbeenseduced
Jefferson."6
Others,
inhisowntimeandin
bythedevilish
himas atheart
an advocate
ofstates'rights
andvery
ours,haveportrayed
limited
national
conditions
ofthe1780s
powerwhowasledbytheextreme
tofavor
onstatelaws)that
wentcontrary
tohis
powers
(suchas thenegative
andbetter,
Stillothers
hisshift
toa tragic
later,
judgment.7
wouldattribute
conflict
that
aroseinthe1790sbetween
hisnationalism
andhisrepublicanism
inwhich
Madisonfelthecouldpreserve
principle
onlybysacrirepublican
hisnationalism.8
ficing
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454
POLITICAL THEORY /August1995
Thereis nothing
inconsistent
aboutfavoring
an increase
in
necessarily
itatanother.
Onecantrim
central
poweratonepointintimeandopposing
whileholding
toconsistent
Theproblem
inpractice
in
underlying
principles.
hedoesnotmakeentirely
Madison's
caseisthat
cleartheprinciples
that
guide
I attempt
hereto clarify
hispolitical
in a waythat
histrimming.
thought
anunderlying
acrosshis"nationalizing"
demonstrates
workat
consistency
hiscontributions
totheFederalist,
hisadvocacy
theFederal
of
Convention,
inHamiltonian
andhisopposition
tocentralized
a BillofRights,
form
power
inthe1790s.
inbrief,
thepossibility
is this.ForMadison
ofreconciling
Myargument,
governmental
powerandliberty
("public"as wellas "personal"
liberty)
ofclearboundaries
to governmental
dependsaboveall on theexistence
ofthepeopleofthe
powerpublicly
agreed-upon
byan enduring
majority
Insomecases(as withreligious
United
States.
theseboundaries
are
liberty)
inother
ornotthefederal
marked
cases(whether
bynatural
right;
government
a bank)they
areartificial;
butineither
cancharter
havebeen
case,oncethey
isthreatened
ifthey
aretrespassed.
agreed
from
upon,
liberty
Protecting
liberty
inan absolute
governmental
powerdoesnotdependonhowmuchpower,
ina government;
noronwhere
sense,isinvested
thegreatest
islodged
power
in thenationas a wholeorinthestates).
(whether
Thesequestions
were
forMadison's
buthisthinking
ranalong
especially
important
contemporaries,
lines(which
different
inconsistent
tothem).
partly
explains
whyheappeared
ofhowpower
andliberty
Thequestion
and
should
are,
be,interconnected
ofMadison's
In a 1792NationalGazette
goestotheheart
republicanism.
soonafter
hisopenbreakwithHamilton)
essay(published
Madison
writes:
In Europe,charters
ofliberty
havebeengranted
bypower.Americahassettheexample
andFrancehasfollowedit,ofcharters
ofpowergranted
Thisrevolution
byliberty.
inthe
practiceof theworld,may,withan honestpraise,be pronounced
themosttriumphant
andthemostconsolingpresageofitshappiness.9
epochofitshistory,
Laterinthesameessayhedescribes
republican
constitutions
as"instruments,
everywordofwhichdecidesa question
between
The
powerandliberty."
Madison
refers
tohereisnotprivate
liberty
liberty
butpublicliberty:
political
theactivity
participation,
ofthepeopleintheir
sovereign
capacity.
Whatis newabouttheAmerican
(andtheRepublican
French)
constitutotraditional
is notsimply
tions,
thatinsomemechanical
compared
forms,
fashion
strike
a different
they
balance
between
thepowerofgovernment
and
theliberty
ofcitizens;
whodrawsthelinehas also changed.
Onemight
supposethatonce"liberty"
becomesthefountain
of "power"all tension
between
andthusallneedforlimitation
them,
onpower,
disappears-but
that
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hemeansthatliberty
is notMadison's
must
restrain
meaning.
Instead,
itself.
not
that
can
be
restrained
this
In practice requires,
majorities only
by
outsidethemselves
ofMadison's
something
(a common
misinterpretation
learntorespect
thelinesmajorities
butthatmajorities
themselves
thought),
havedrawn.
discussion
oftension
between
twotraditions
There
hasbeenmuch
recently
a "Lockean
liberal"
theAmerican
anda "civicrepubthatshaped
Founding:
theformer
characterized
forindividual
lican"tradition,
byconcern
(natural)
thelatter
andlimited
virtues
rights
government,
byitsfocusonrepublican
I do nothereaddress
thequestion
andpopular
ofhow
self-government.10
theAmerican
interms
accurate
itis tocharacterize
ofa tension
Founding
andliberalism.
Butin anyeventMadisonhimself
between
republicanism
hedraws
cannot
beeasilyplacedintoeither
onbothtraditions
and
category;
indoingso.
wouldnothaveperceived
anycontradiction
DOES PROTECTIONOF LIBERTY
REQUIRE MORE POWER OR LESS?
Madison'ssponsorship
of theBill of Rights,
andhissupport
of civil
innational
liberties
moregenerally
as wellas state
anideal
politics,
provides
forunderlying
inhisthought
starting
pointforoursearch
consistencies
and
actionovertime.At theveryleast-however
consistent
or inconsistent
Madison
toother
ofnational
mayhavebeenwith
regard
questions
power-he
civillibertarian
wasa consistent
so many
ofhiserstwhile
(unlike
Federalist
allies).
His firstsignificant
politicalact (1776) was a successful
effort
to
theclauseconcerning
strengthen
inVirginia's
religious
liberty
Declaration
of Rights(frommere"toleration"
to an absolute
rightof "freeexercise
tothedictates
ofconscience").'
Mostimportant
according
forourpurposes
is thefactthatsupport
forcivilliberties
is themostvisiblelinkbetween
the
periodsin whichMadisongreatly
favored
expanding
national
powerand
thoseinwhichheopposed
it:hisproposed
onstatelegislation
negative
(the
apogeeofhisso-called
nationalist
hadas oneofitsprincipal
period)
objectivespreventing
violations
ofindividual
rights
byfactious
majorities;
his
Resolutions
of 1798,whichcalluponthestates"tointerpose
Virginia
for
theprogress
oftheevil"ofthepoliciesofthenational
arresting
government
(thehighpointofhissupposed
states'
rights
period),
areespecially
directed
toward
theviolation
offreedom
ofspeechandpressundertheAlienand
Sedition
Acts.
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456
POLITICAL THEORY /August1995
both
wouldhaveprevented
draft
ofa BillofRights
hisoriginal
Moreover,
liberty,
andthestatesfromviolating
religious
thenational
government
theversion
andjurytrial(unlike
ofthepress,
finally
passedwhich
freedom
in
Madison
explains a speechin
government).
onlythenational
restricted
hisdraft
ofa BillofRights,
hepresents
onJune8, 1789,inwhich
Congress
ofconscience,
thatnostateshallviolatetheequalright
I havestatedinthe5thresolution,
on all
cases. ... It mustbe admitted,
freedom
ofthepress,ortrialbyjuryin criminal
as the
areas liabletoattacktheseinvaluableprivileges
hands,thatthestategovernments
guardedagainst.12
oughttobe as cautiously
is, andtherefore
generalgovernment
ofall.Itis especially
is themostimportant
Madisonclaimsthisresolution
ofthe
thattheoriginal
assertion
purpose
giventhecommonplace
significant
onthenational
toplacelimits
wasexclusively
government;
BillofRights
oftheform
inwhichitpassedbut
as a characterization
thismaybeaccurate
thepurposes
ofitsprincipal
sponsor."3
misrepresents
itgreatly
arethelinksbetween
Madison's
interests
Whatprimarily
us,however,
the
relation
about
between
his
broader
and
libertarianism
theorizing
civil
I usedas epigraph
tothisessay(inwhich
Thepassagethat
powerandliberty.
andgovernmental
between
liberty
Madisonrejectsanysimpleopposition
toJefferson
isbeginning
a letter
written
justas Madison
power)comesfrom
fora national
BillofRights.
Neither
this
tosupport
from
opposition
toshift
introducing
a BillofRights
letter
norMadison's1789speechinCongress
linkthem
tohiswider
inisolation
butinstead
explicitly
treat
civilliberties
thought.
political
Themosteffective
Anti-Federalist
wemustbackupa fewyears.
Butfirst
theproposed
Constitution
wasthat,
unlike
ofthestate
many
against
argument
itlackeda billofrights.
Butsuchobjections
wouldnothave
constitutions,
diminished
hada declaration
of individual
rights
been
beensignificantly
ifnothing
intheConstitution,
toaugment
included
weredoneatthesametime
ofthestates.
FortheAnti-Federalists
sawthefreedom
andpowers
therights
andthe"freedom"
ofstates
orsovereignty)
ofindividuals
(orindependence,
Thestategovernments,
under
a federal
system,
havea
as closelyconnected.
ofthepeople'sliberties
distant,
alien
against
a more
specialroleasprotectors
whosepowers
bya watchful
national
cannot
beaseasilychecked
government
isnopower,
governments,
"There
orliberty
ofthestate
privilege
community.
ofthis[national]
power,"
orofthepeople,
butwhatmaybeaffected
byvirtue
"Forthemoderate
ofthispower
writes
thePennsylvania
exercise
Minority.
leftin thestategovernments,
is
whoseintervention
thereis no control
14 Whena national
is ableto operate
directly
on
government
destroyed."
of
andtheArticles
theConstitution
individuals
difference
between
(thegreat
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Read/MADISON ON POWER AND LIBERTY
457
individuals
Confederation),
wouldsuffer
becausethestates
willnolonger
be
toprotect
them.
Oneshouldnotice
herethattheliberty
of
abletointerpose
individuals
andthe"liberty"
ofstates
as corporate
entities
arementioned
in
thesamebreath.
with
Hamilton
and
James
(Madison,
along
Wilson,
explicitly
ofanindividual
andthe"liberty"
theliberty
of
between
rejects
thisparallel
a state.'5)
ofliberty
areatstakehere.
Onemight
supposethatdifferent
meanings
insomecasesunderstandings
of"liberty"
cerPerhaps
mayhavediffered;
overapplication
topractice
there
aredifferences
tainly
(e.g.,doesinflated
ofproperty
usedtopaydebtscountas a violation
But
papermoney
rights?).
is thedegreeto whichthecoreofimportant
individual
whatis striking
ofspeechandofthepress,
is agreeduponbybothsides:freedom
liberties
fromarbitrary
confiscation
ofproperty,
freedom
of
jurytrial,protection
Thereis alsobroadagreement
onthekeyelements
ofa
religious
worship.
formof government:
written
republican
constitutions,
frequent
elections,
ofpowers.
Insofar
as theoverworked
distinction
between
separation
"posiand"liberal")
tive"and"negative"
freedom
canbe
(orbetween
"republican"
and"negative"
on bothsides.
appliedhere,onewillfindboth"positive"
inFederalist
10asequally
and"personal"
(Madison
speaksof"public"
liberty
Boththeadvocates
ofprotection.)
ofstrong
worthy
national
government
and
stress
theimportance
ofstatesovereignty
ofidentification
andparticiwith,
a political
ofdifferent
communities
pationwithin,
community-but
scale;
bothspeakofprotection
ofindividuals
actions-but
from
government
they
differ
as towhichlevelofgovernment
orstate)is mostlikelyto
(national
one'sliberties.
Thefactthat
violate
there
weremany
onbothsideswhowould
violate
theseliberties
readily
whenitwasconvenient
todosodoesnotprove
that
haddifferent
they
ofliberty
butonlythat
understandings
someweremore
committed
toitthanothers.
Whatespecially
besidestheseriousness
distinguishes
Madison,
ofhis
commitment
tocivilliberties,
ishisappreciation
oftheextremely
broad
range
from
which
threats
toliberty
canproceed.
TheAnti-Federalists
werecertain
thatthegreatest
threat
fromgovernment,
proceeded
andthatthemore
thegovernment
powerful
(andphysically
distant)
thegreater
thethreat
would
be. Madison,
without
thedanger
denying
posedbypowerful
government,
believed
thatanequalorgreater
threat
proceeded
from
society
itself
inthe
ofa factious
form
control
ofgovernment.
majority
taking
(InAnti-Federalist
onewillnotfind
much
writing
concern
forthedanger
ofmajorities
tyrannizwithin
Insucha casegovernmental
ingoverminorities
states.)
poweris not
thesource,butmerely
theinstrument,
of thethreat
to liberty;
in other
itis theonlyavailable
circumstances
guard
against
that
threat.
Suchconsiderations
makeanysimpleopposition
between
liberty
and governmental
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458
1995
POLITICALTHEORY/August
in his October17, 1788letter
power(of thekindMadisoncriticizes
to
a mistake.
Jefferson)
ofgovernmental
a simple
identification
Buttheopposite
judgment,
power
ofliberty,
wouldbe equallyfalse.During
theheight
ofhis
andprotection
Madisonwrotean essayfortheNationalGazette
battlewithHamilton,
"WhoAretheBestKeepersofthePeople'sLiberties?"
In it he
entitled
a Republican,
whoexpresses
hisownview,and
a dialogue
between
imagines
whoseemsa caricature
ofHamilton:
ananti-republican
"What
a perversion
ofthenatural
order
ofthings!
tomakepowerthe
Republican:
primary
andcentral
objectofthesocialsystem,
andLiberty
butitssatellite."
asitmayseem,themoreyouincrease
"Wonderful
theattractive
Anti-republican:
ofpower,
themoreyouenlarge
thesphere
force
ofliberty;
themoreyoumake
andhostile
towards
thepeople,
thebetter
government
independent
security
you
provide
fortheir
rights
andinterests.",16
heretakesto an absurdextreme
a general
The fictional
anti-republican
onwhich
Hamilton
andMadison
hadonceagreed:
that
atleastsome
premise
ofgovernmental
ofliberty.
increases
Madison
must
poweraretothebenefit
therelation
beabletodescribe
between
ina waythatgets
powerandliberty
of anykind.His thinking
at thetimeof his
beyondsimpleconnections
tosupport
fora billofrights
conversion
maygiveussomeclues.
Madison's
totheAnti-Federalist
callfora billofrights
original
opposition
inhisunwillingness
wasgrounded
tomakeratification
oftheConstitution
onanyamendments,
conditional
anopportunity
tothesecret
thereby
"giving
enemiesof theunionto promote
itsdissolution"17;
thereasonforthis
hadnowpassed.Whatabouttheargument
opposition
(which
originated
with
andwhichHamilton
James
inFederalist
Wilson,
repeats
84) thata Billof
is unnecessary
becausethepowersofthenational
Rights
government
are
limited
tothoseenumerated
inthedocument?
Madisonsaysthatheaccepts
toa certain
thisargument
notintheextent
degree"though
argued
byMr.
Wilson."18
He writes
toJefferson
that
[My]ownopinionhas alwaysbeenin favorofa billofrights;
provided
itbe so framed
as nottoimplypowersnotmeanttobe includedintheenumeration.
AtthesametimeI
haveneverthought
theomissiona material
defect,
norbeenanxioustosupplyitevenby
foranyotherreasonthanthatitis anxiously
subsequent
amendment,
desiredbyothers.
Hepoints
tothedifferent
ofa billofrights
purpose
ina monarchy,
where
the
threat
toliberty
greatest
comesfrom
thegovernment,
andina republic
where
thethreat
comesfrom
hedoubts
society
itself;
thatthe"parchment
barriers"
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Read /MADISON ON POWER AND LIBERTY
459
ofa billofrights
willbe effective
against
What
"overbearing
majorities."
thenistheuseofa billofrights
ina popular
Madison
identifies
government?
two:
1. The politicaltruths
declaredinthatsolemnmanner
acquirebydegreesthecharacter
andas theybecomeincorporated
maximsoffreeGovernment,
withthe
offundamental
the impulsesof interest
and passion.2. Altho'it be
counteract
nationalsentiment,
trueas abovestatedthatthedangerofoppression
liesintheinterested
generally
majorities
thanin usurpedactsoftheGovernment,
ofthepeoplerather
yettheremaybe occasions
on whichtheevilmayspringfromthelatter
willbe
sources;andonsuch,a billofrights
a goodgroundforan appealtothesenseofthecommunity.19
is central
Noticethat"thesenseofthecommunity"
tobothofthesearguinthefirst
ments:
case,a billofrights
mayhelpcreatesucha sense;inthe
theAlienandSedition
secondcase(which
Actscontroversy),
itis
prefigures
a rallying
point.
InhisspeechinCongress
a billofrights
Madisonmakesthe
introducing
pointagain:
It maybe thought
all paperbarriers
aretooweakto
againstthepowerofthecommunity,
be worthy
ofattention...
toimpresssomedegreeofrespect
yet,as theyhavea tendency
forthem,
toestablish
thepublicopinionintheir
androusetheattention
ofthewhole
favor,
itmaybe onemeanto controul
themajority
fromthoseactsto whichthey
community,
inclined.20
mightbe otherwise
He alsomakestheargument
ina negative
way:giventhatthesentiment
in
ofa billofrights-as
favor
inthevarious
expressed
ratifying
conventions-is
so overwhelming,
whatkindofmessagewoulditsendnotto makesuch
amendments?
It will be a desirablethingto extinguish
fromthebosom of everymemberof the
community
anyapprehensions,
thattherearethoseamonghiscountrymen
whowishto
deprivethemoftheliberty
forwhichtheyvaliantly
fought
andhonorably
bled.
he haslittlefaith
Although
intheefficacy
ofwords,
Madisonis enor-
withthepowerofthepublicopinionbehindthewordsthat
mouslyimpressed
wouldconstitute
a billofrights.
It is all themoreimpressive
in thatthe
sentiment
is truly
national
(in drafting
hisbillofrights
Madisonsorted
through
recommendations
originating
intheratifying
conventions
ofseven
states)
andthatitwasexpressed
bythepeopleintheir
ratifying
conventions,
whichMadisonregards
as themostlegitimate
expression
ofthewillofthe
sovereign
people(a pointI takeupbelow).
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1995
POLITICALTHEORY/August
a political
thisis a revelation,
windfall:
a
FromMadison'sperspective
itselfto theprinciple
ofrestrictions
on the
national
majority
committing
Thishas theeffect
of filling
an important
powerof majorities.
gap in
abouttheproblem
ofprotecting
individual
liberties.
Madison's
ownthinking
onstatelegislation
vested
inthe
ideaofa negative
somewhere
Inhisoriginal
was
the
hisreasoning that national
likea
national
government,
government,
andneutral
withregard
wouldbe sufficiently
distant
todisputes
monarch,
Butwhat
force
coulda distant,
toplaytheroleofumpire.21
moral
within
states
A national
merely
neutral,
quasi-monarchical
powerhavein a republic?
andexplicitly
toindividual
excommitted
majority
passionately
liberties,
constitutional
wouldprovide
much-needed
pressedthrough
amendments,
in anyeffort
it shouldmaketo prevent
to thenational
support
judiciary
inthestates
andatthesametimeserveas a checkonanyattempt
violations
toviolate
thosesamerights.
onthepartofthenational
government
Madisonfailedto getan amendment
statesfromviolating
prohibiting
ofreligion,
thepress,
andjurytrialincluded
intheBillofRights,
freedom
togeta national
vetoonstatelegislation.
justas hehadfailedearlier
Yethe
whichwastorespond
atleastpartofhispurpose,
accomplished
to,and
a nationalsenseofthevalueof themostimportant
further
encourage,
liberties.
Anenduring
national
compublicandpersonal
majority
explicitly
mitted
totheseliberties
makesitsafer
tovestsignificant
powerina national
government.
TOOMUCHANDTOOLI7TLEPOWERAS
DIFFERENTFORMSOF THESAMEPROBLEM
Ifcivilliberties
provide
theclearest
example
ofMadison'sconsistency
overtime,thestoryofhisintense
to a national
bank(which
opposition
as Treasury
Hamilton
Secretary
in 1791)wouldseemto be the
proposed
ofdramatic
clearest
Thebankcontroversy
example
inconsistency.
marks
the
Madison
seemstomakea sudden
shift
pointatwhich
awayfrom
support
for
national
tostrong
strong
powers
broadly
tonational
interpreted,
opposition
constructionist
constitutional
anddefense
of states'
power,strict
theory,
AttheConstitutional
Convention
rights.
Madisonhadhimself
proposed
a
"togrant
charters
ofincorporation
where
theinterests
oftheU.S.might
power
& thelegislative
ofindividual
require
provisions
statesmaybe incompethiswouldhaveincluded
tent"-and
banksaswellasinternal
improvements.
Madison's
Hamilton
mostofall.Hehadshown
thebank
opposition
surprised
itpublic,
forhissupport.
plantoMadisonbefore
making
hoping
How,he
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couldthisbe thesameMadisonwhohadoncebeen
mayhavewondered,
national
toexpand
willing
ofgranting
ita negative
powertotheextreme
on
allstatelegislation?22
to Hamilton's
flexible
of national
Madison'sopposition
construction
whenthelatterproposesto charter
powerbecomesevenmoreintense
ofencouraging
forthepurpose
on
monopolies
manufactures;
commenting
onManufactures"
Madisonwrites:
Hamilton's
"Report
Thefederal
hasbeenhitherto
limited
tothespecified
government
powers,
bythegreatest
inexpounding
Ifnotonlythemeans,
ofLatitude
those
buttheobjects
Champions
powers.
hadbetter
bethrown
intothefireatonce.23
areunlimited,
theparchment
To further
confuse
thematter,
andaugment
theimpression
ofMadison's
laterinlifeaspresident
a billtorecharter
inconsistency,
the
(1815)hevetoed
National
thanconstitutional
Bank,butonpolicyrather
he states
grounds:
onthecontrary,
thattheNational
Bankwasnolonger
explicitly,
unconstitutional
becauseithadoperated
nowfortwenty
"theconcurrence
of
yearswith
thegeneralwillof thenation"eventhough
therelevant
constitutional
hadnotchanged
since1791!A yearlaterhesigned
language
intolawa new
BankoftheUnited
States.24
Theeasiestexplanation
fortheseshifts
is thattheyaresimply
political:
Madisonsubordinated
hisconstitutional
to
his
theory
policygoals.Thus,
whenherealized
thatHamilton
wanted
tousea banktoenrich
a privileged
classandencourage
manufacturers
attheexpense
ofagriculture
andwestwardexpansion,
Madisoncontrived
constitutional
arguments
against
banks
andcorporations
eventhough
hehadsupported
both
earlier
forhisownpolicy
YetMadison
reasons.
wascapableofrejecting
asunconstitutional
evensome
Let us consider
policieshe favored.25
whether
theremightbe a better
explanation
forhisapparent
reversals
onnational
power.
Itwouldbehelpful
totakea fresh
lookattheperiod
ofhismostintense
commitment
tonational
oftheArticles
power:hiscriticism
ofConfederation
andadvocacy
ofa new
Constitution
withgreatly
increased
powers.
A careful
examination
ofMadison's
criticism
oftheArticles
ofConfederation
showsthat
theproblem
hediagnoses
wasnotsimply
that
thenational
lackedpowervis-a-vis
government
thestates.
Theproblem
wasthatthere
was a gulfbetween
thepowerstheContinental
Congress
possessedin
principle
reflect
what
(which
theAmerican
peopleexpected
ittoaccomplish),
andthepowersit actually
In principle,
exercised.
forexample,
Congress
couldcalloutmilitary
forcetopunish
a statethatdidnotcomply
withits
thismodeofenforcement
requisitions;
(which
wasnever
attempted)
wasthe
onlyonepossiblewherethenational
government
cannottaxindividuals
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462
POLITICALTHEORY/August
1995
As itturned
directly.
waschronically
out,theContinental
Congress
weak,a
"lifeless
mass"(as Madison
describes
itintheFederalist).
Butthisgreat
gulf
between
thepowers
ofa government
andthoseitactually
expected
possesses
canjust as welllead to usurpation
andevendespotism
as it strives
in
underhanded
denied
toit.InFederalist
waystograbthepowers
38Madison
makesanargument
thatwillappearverystrange
unlessthispointis understood;he catalogues
thealarming
abusesof powerby theContinental
Congress:
Outofthislifelessmasshas alreadygrownan excrescent
power,whichtendstorealize
all thedangersthatcan be apprehended
froma defective
construction
ofthesupreme
oftheUnion... [TheContinental
government
Congress]haveproceededto formnew
states,toerecttemporary
toappointofficers
forthem,andtoprescribe
governments,
the
conditions
on whichsuchstatesshallbe admitted
intotheConfederacy.
Allthishasbeen
theleastcolorofconstitutional
done;anddonewithout
Yetno blamehasbeen
authority.
no alarmhasbeensounded.... Thepublicinterest,
whispered;
thenecessity
ofthecase,
imposeduponthemthetaskofoverleaping
theirconstitutional
limits.Butis notthefact
an alarming
proofof thedangerresulting
froma government
whichdoes notpossess
toitsobjects?
regularpowerscommensurate
Thisis notthelanguage
ofonewhofavors
sweeping,
looselydefined
Thepassageperfectly
powers!
illustrates
Madison's
complicated
perspective
whichcannotatanypointin hiscareer
be reduced
tosimpleadvocacy
of
morepowerorlesspower.
If theproblem
undertheArticles
of Confederation
was a dangerous
between
thepowersCongress
disjunction
possessedin principle
(which
reflected
whattheAmerican
peopleexpected
ittobeabletodo)anditsactual
thesolution
is todesigna national
power,
govemment
inwhichallofthese
Inpractice
coincide.
things
thiswillmeangiving
itmuchgreater
power,
but
thisfollowsfroma national
consensus
aboutitspurposes,
notbecause
national
poweris anendinitself.
Withthisinthebackground,
letusreturn
tothebankcontroversy.
Onthe
surface
theargument
seemstobeoneofconstitutional
interpretation,
Hamiltonfavoring
broadconstruction
whileMadisonfallsbackona naive,and
strict
contrived,
constructionism.
Thelatter
claimsthatthe"necessary
and
proper"clausecoversonlysuchimpliedpowersas arestrictly
necessary,
not
totheexecution
ofanenumerated
merely
useful,
power;Hamilton,
on the
other
thatso cribbed
hand,believes
a ruleofinterpretation
"wouldatonce
arrestthemotionsofthegovernment."26
IfMadison's
constitutional
argument
heredepends
onthepremise
that
the
oftheConstitution
language
isperfectly
clear,
thenitwouldnotonlyreflect
a naivefaith
in thepossibilities
oflanguage
butalsocontradict
Madison's
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463
viewsontheinherent
oflegallanguage
expressed
ownfrequently
ambiguity
ofparchment
barriers.
Butthecoreof
37) andtheinefficacy
(Federalist
ruleoftextual
doesnotdependon thisquestionable
Madison'sargument
analysis.
is thatthepowerHamilton
hadbeen
proposes
His mainpoint,
instead,
notonlyatthePhiladelphia
andrejected,
considered
andclearly
explicitly
hadproposed
Madisonhimself
it)but,moreimportant,
Convention
(where
hislifeMadisoninstateratifying
conventions.
Throughout
bynumerous
lay,not
interpretation
sistedthatthemostlegitimate
guidetoconstitutional
ofthosewho
norinthedeliberations
inisolation,
in thewordsconsidered
butin howitwas understood
theConstitution,
bythepeople when
drafted
of
One clearstatement
conventions.27
theygave ittheirapprovalinratifying
on6 April1796:
gaveinCongress
theviewcomesina speechMadison
forthebodyofmenwhoformed
veneration
mightbe entertained
Butafterall, whatever
as theoracularguidein
thesenseofthatbodycouldneverbe regarded
ourconstitution,
itselfcamefrom
itwasnothing
but
As theinstrument
theconstitution.
them,
expounding
intoit,by thevoice of thepeople,
untillifeand validitywerebreathed
a dead letter,
If we wereto look therefore,
forthe
theseveralstateconventions.
speakingthrough
we mustlookforitnotin
beyondthefaceoftheinstrument,
meaningoftheinstrument,
whichaccepted
whichproposed,butin thestateconventions,
thegeneralconvention,
theconstitution.28
andratified
a bank?In hisspeechin
fortheproposal
tocharter
Whatthenfollows
thebankbillMadison
Congress
against
readsundry
Virginia
andNorth-Carolina
passagesfromthedebatesofthePennsylvania,
hadbeenvindicated
byits
shewingthegroundson whichtheconstitution
conventions,
principaladvocates,againsta dangerouslatitudeof its powers,chargedon it by its
declarations
andamendments
accompanying
theratifiopponents.... The explanatory
cationsof theseveralstatesformeda striking
evidence,wearingthesame complexand
was understood
ion.... Withall thisevidenceofthesenseinwhichtheconstitution
aboutby
adopted,willitnotbe said,ifthebillshouldpass,thatitsadoptionwasbrought
set?29
onesetofarguments,
andthatitis nowadministered
undertheinfluence
ofanother
inthechamber
Madisonaddsthatnoonepresent
to
hashadtheopportunity
on theissue,so Congress
wouldbe proceeding
consult
theirconstituents
without
endorsement.
popular
altogether
believes-anational
banks
powertocharter
If-as Madison
government
andothercorporations
has beenexplicitly
then
andrejected,
considered
Hamilton's
decision
toproceed
inquitea different
light:
notmerely
appears
ofbroadconstitutional
as aninstance
construction
to
buta deliberate
attempt
a clearexpression
of thewillof thepeople.If theArticles
override
of
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464
1995
POLITICALTHEORY/August
between
weredangerous
becauseofa disjunction
legitimate
Confederation
thenHamilton's
andactualpowerinonedirection,
policiesare
expectation
direction:
abovethose
intheopposite
powers
characterized
bya disjunction
toclearly
defined
Ifoneis willing
togocontrary
andagreed-upon.
expected
onefrom
whatwillprevent
inonerespect,
doingitinothers?
boundaries
MadisonevenfearsthatCongressmaybeginincorporating
religious
societies.30
takesveryseriously
whathasbeenagreed
Madison,unlikeHamilton,
atone
isnoinconsistency
inMadison's
reason
there
proposing
upon;forthat
itnow.He had
andopposing
a bankandother
timetocharter
corporations
thantheonetheConvention
a government
more
desired
originally
powerful
butthematter
beensettled
itwould
andthepeopleratified;
having
proposed
ofthe
topressforadditional
Fromtheperspective
be illegitimate
powers.
itis a secondary
how
relation
between
question
proper
powerandliberty
thecentral
isentrusted
terms
what
much
government
with;
powerinabsolute
whatever
broadornarrow
limits
havebeen
is thatitstaywithin
is important
arereconciled
ina
onlyifpower-which
agreedupon.Powerandliberty
notthecreator
is thecreation,
ofliberty-remains
republican
government
within
thoselimits.
infactexisted
in 1791a clearpublicmandate
Whether
there
the
against
a bankis ofcourseanopenquestion;
Madisonmayhave
powertocharter
animportant
ininappropriate
articulated
principle
yetappliedittopractice
of
the
bank's
His
later
constitutionality
mayhavebeena
ways.
acceptance
ofmistaken
admission
Buthisshift
ofposition
can
backhanded
judgment.
ofprinciple:
alsobedefended
ongrounds
thefactthat
thebankwasapproved
under
widely
varying
political
circumstances,
bytensuccessive
Congresses,
anditsoperations
overtime,
proves
thatithas
accepted
bystateauthorities
thesupport
ofanenduring,
nota transient,
majority.
POPULARSOVEREIGNTY
ANDNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
debatetheAnti-Federalists
grasped
immediately
Duringtheratification
that
thepreamble
totheConstitution
andthemodeofitsratification
(approval
of ninestates,notthirteen
was required)
assumedprecisely
whatthey
thatthere
existed
a national
political
community.
The
questioned:
namely,
oftheDeclaration
ofIndependence
wasambiguous
onthequestion
language
ofwhether
thiswastheactofonepeopleorthirteen;
andtheArticles
of
Confederation
hadusedthelanguage
amongsovereign
states.
ofa compact
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Read/MADISONONPOWERANDLIBERTY 465
wordsoftheConstitution-"We
thepeople"-implied
Buttheopening
the
ofa single"consolidated"
rather
existence
than
a conpolitical
community
federation
ofstates,
andsomeAnti-Federalists
criticized
itonthese
grounds.3'
with
totheproblem
ofreconciling
Whyis itofimportance,
regard
power
as a singlepolitical
whether
theUnitedStatesbe regarded
and liberty,
Becauseonecannot
be freewhileobeying
orseveral?
analien
community
inform.
OneoftheAnti-Federalist
evenonerepublican
power,
arguments
becauseitwouldbebothdistant
wasthat
thenational
andalien,
government,
ofthepeople;as a result
itsmeasures
wouldnotpossesstheconfidence
"must
atall;either
ornotexecuted
casewouldleadtothetotal
beexecuted
byforce,
Thestrongest
ofliberty."32
attachments
andloyalties
destruction
ofthepeople
nottoa nonexistent
aretotheir
nation.
state,
oftheproposed
Several
Constitution
supporters
forexam(James
Wilson,
onthecontrary,
ple)argued,
thatthere
is a united
American
people,forged
thecrisisofindependence;
thatthissovereign
through
peoplecreated
both
andcandelegate
toeither
levelofgovernthestateandfederal
governments
ment
whatever
itchooses.33
Thepowerofthenational
powers
is
government
ourownpower,
notsomething
foreign.
Nowonprecisely
thisquestion
Madisonseemstohavepulledhismost
dramatic
reversal.
totheconventional
account
Madisonwasan
According
extreme
nationalist
before
andduring
theConvention,
hadsettled
forsome
kindofmixture
time
andby1798(whenhedrafted
bythe oftheFederalist,
theVirginia
hadcompletely
Resolutions)
accepted
theviewoftheUnionas
a compact
whoretain
their
amongstates
original
Howaccurate
sovereignty.
is thischaracterization?34
Letus beginwiththeFederalist:
Madison's
observations
onthesubject
athandarecomplex
andcertainly
exhibit
somesurface
contradictions.
On
theone hand,he oftenenoughtreatstheAmerican
peopleas a single
Theclearest
sovereign
statement
ofthisposition
entity.
comesinFederalist46:
Thefederal
andStategovernments
areinfactbutdifferent
agents
andtrustees
ofthe
withdifferent
people,constituted
powersanddesigned
fordifferent
purposes.
The
adversaries
oftheConstitution
seemtohavelostsight
ofthepeoplealtogether
onthis
andtohaveviewed
thesedifferent
subject;
establishments
notonlyas mutual
rivals
and
butas uncontrolled
enemies,
byanycommon
in their
superior
efforts
to usurpthe
authorities
ofeachother.
He usesthisargument,
other
among
things,
tojustify
anyirregularities
with
totheexisting
rulesunder
theArticles
regard
ofConfederation
that
mayhave
indrafting
a newConstitution.
occurred
(SeealsoFederalist
40andFederalist
45.)Ifa sovereign
peoplewishes
toalter
their
form
ofgovemment-a
sacred
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466
POLITICAL THEORY /August1995
right
theyalwaysretain-then
theyarenotboundbyanyrulesthatprevent
couldnothavepresented
a
themfromdoingso. JamesWilsonhimself
of theposition
thatthereexistsa single
andclearerstatement
stronger
sovereign
people.(Oneshouldnotethatthepremise
ofa singlesovereign
entaila singleconsolidated
peopledoesnotnecessarily
which
government,
forthissingle
Madisonhimself
of
opposed;
peoplecouldchooseanydegree
ordecentralization
centralization
they
wish.)
toFederalist
assumes
theexistence
ButFederalist
39,incontrast
46,which
thestatesas sovereign
treats
ofa singlesovereign
communities
that
people,
divest
themselves
ofcertain
oftheir
willingly
"Eachstate,
parts
sovereignty.
is considered
as a sovereign
inratifying
theConstitution,
bodyindependent
andonlytobebound
ofallothers,
act."Doesthismean
byitsownvoluntary
intheactofratifying
that
thestates
theConstitution?
giveuptheir
sovereignty
Ordo theyretain
it,inthesensethatthey(likethepeopleina consolidated
canalwaystakeitbackifthey
choose?Inthefirst
republic)
case,Madison's
totwoclassicpremises
formulation
wouldgocontrary
regarding
sovereignty:
andthatitis inalienable-neither
thatitis indivisible
ofwhichareviolated
as theactofa singlesovereign
ifoneregards
theConstitution
people.Ifthe
secondis thecase-statesas stateskeeptheir
Madison
sovereignty-then
whathe saysinFederalist
46 butacceptsa principle
notonlycontradicts
whichwouldcall intoquestion
thelegitimacy
of theconvention's
total
oftheArticles
ofConfederation.
disregard
The difficulty
doesnotendoncetheConstitution
is ratified,
because
Madison
herespeaks(incontrast
toFederalist
46)asthough
theUnited
States
is nota singlepolitical
butseveralcommunities
community
"united
for
particular
purposes."
thebestexplanation
Perhaps
is thatMadisonis making
noeffort
touse
thewords"sovereignty"
and"community"
ina consistent
fashion,
trusting
3 He
instead
thathisreaders
willunderstand
clearly
enough
whathemeans.
does afterall makeit clearthatthenational
willexercise
government
whatever
thepeopleofnineoutofthirteen
powers
states
agreeitshould
have;
andthatina dispute
aboutwhere
theboundary
between
national
andstate
bedrawn
itis thenational
powershould
government
thatmust
judge.
One couldevenarguethattheveryinconsistencies
oneencounters
in
Madison's
contributions
totheFederalist
regarding
thelocusofsovereignty
andthesingleor pluralcharacter
ofAmerican
political
community
are,
theresult
ofa consistent
forthepeople'swill.Forif
paradoxically,
respect
thepeoplefreely
draft
andratify
a document
thatis fundamentally
unclear
on this,thatmixesthelogicofonesovereign
peoplewiththatofseveral
thenitis Madison's
semisovereign
communities,
andargue
dutytorespect
forit.Tomakeitmore
consistent
than
itisonthispoint
iswhat
(which
Wilson
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Read/MADISON ON POWER AND LIBERTY
467
v.Georgia
inhisChisholm
wouldbetodoviolence
does,especially
opinion)
willofthepeople.
totheconcretely
expressed
Madisonhimself
saw inconsistencies
in his modeof
To whatextent
is hardto detennine.
Whatmightappearto post-Civil
expression
War
as anevasion
ofa crucial
cametocrisisin1860)
Americans
question
(which
in a different
mayhaveappeared
lightto Madison.Butevenif he saw
he hadfaithin theability
ofa freepeopleto makethem
inconsistencies
workable.
Ina National
Gazette
essayof1791hewrites:
bothtothosewhoaremorejealouslyattached
Herethenis a properobjectpresented,
to
reserved
theseparateauthority
tothestates,andto thosewhomaybe moreinclinedto
thepeopleofAmericainthelightofonenation.Lettheformer
continue
contemplate
to
whichmightlead to a gradualconsolidation
ofthe
watchagainsteveryencroachment,
Let thelatteremploytheirutmost
statesintoonegovernment.
local
zeal,byeradicating
to consolidatethe affairsof the statesintoone
prejudicesand mistakenrivalships,
and let it be thepatriotic
harmonious
interest;
studyof all, to maintainthe various
each in itsrespective
authorities
established
constitutional
by ourcomplicated
system,
sphere.36
tohimthatsomeseetheUnited
Itseemsnottomatter
Statesas a unionof
andothers
as a singlecommunity.
Bothhavesomething
manycommunities
of"ourcomplicated
useful
toaddtotheworking
Heseemstobelieve
system."
ofaimsispossible
that
practical
political
those
with
convergence
among
quite
different
theoretical
viewsastothesingle
orplural
character
oftheAmerican
theneedtokeepgovernment
people-solongas bothrecognize
within
the
limits
thathavebeenagreed
to.
WhatthenshouldwemakeofMadison's
in
Virginia
Resolutions,
which,
theAlienandSedition
protesting
against
Acts,seemtosidealtogether
with
thestates
thenation?
Acareful
ofthedocument
against
reading
(together
with
his "Reportof 1800"whichexplainshis reasoning
morefully),and a
withJefferson's
comparison
Kentucky
Resolutions
(drafted
at thesame
showsthatMadisonwasnota convert
time),
to"states'
rights."
Jefferson's
Resolutions
Kentucky
(whichMadisonsharply
criticized)37
maintain
thatthestates
constituted
a GeneralGovernment
forspecialpurposes,-delegated
tothatgovernment
certaindefinite
powers,reserving
eachStatetoitself,
theresiduary
massofright
totheir
ownself-government....
Thattothiscompacteachstateaccededas a State,itsco-States
as to itself,
theotherparty....Each partyhasan equalright
forming,
tojudgeforitself,
as wellofinfractions
as ofthemodeandmeasureofredress.38
Thisisthelanguage
ofa treaty
that
canbedissolved
byanyoneoftheparties
toit.Hisdeclaration
thateachindividual
statehastheright
todeclarethe
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468
POLITICALTHEORY/August
1995
actsofthenational
was
government
"unauthoritative,
void,andofnoforce"
ofnullification
to support
thedoctrines
and
laterused,without
distortion,
secession.
Resolutions
call uponthestates"tointerpose
Madison'sVirginia
for
oftheevil,andformaintaining
within
theprogress
their
arresting
respective
theauthorities,
andliberties
limits,
tothem."
Hedoesnot
rights,
appertaining
thefederal
isthecreation
ofthestates;
say,asJefferson
does,that
government
"thepowersofthefederal
he viewsinstead
as resulting
from
government,
thecompacttowhichthestatesareparties"(myemphasis),
whichis a rather
A single,
different
American
thing.
though
complex,
peoplecandrawupa
thestates
towhich
areparties,"
andindoingso decidesauthorita"compact
which
shallbedelegated
towhich
levelofgovernment.
tively
powers
Madisonintends
theVirginia
Resolutions
as Virginia's
contribution
toa
ofprotest,
onthepartofa national
national
the
expression
majority,
against
faction
thathasseizedcontrol
ofthenational
unjust
policiesofa minority
andthreatens
thepresent
to"transform
government
ofthe
republican
system
intoanabsolute,
oratbesta mixedmonarchy."
UnitedStates,
He nowhere
claimstheright
ofa statetoopposea clearmajority
oftheAmerican
people;
hedoesnotmaintain,
as Jefferson
does,thata singlestatecanvoidtheacts
Theprotest
ofthenational
usesthevehicle
ofthestates
government.
because
noother
institutional
mechanism
isavailable.
Thatitmaybenecessary
inthe
lastresort
tousethestatesagainst
thenational
inthiswayis
government
intheFederalist,
admitted
notonlyinMadison's
contributions
butevenin
Hamilton's.
FILLING THE GAPSIN FEDERALISTTEN
Madison's
Federalist
IOisjustly
famous
foritsreversal
oftheassumption
common
atthetimethat
republican
government
couldsurvive
onlyina small
he arguesthatthelarger
territory;
theterritory,
thegreater
thevariety
of
interests
andfactions,
themorestablerepublican
govemment
willbe,provideditisproperly
Andyet,
designed.39
readinisolation,
theessaycanleave
a distorted
ofMadison's
impression
I wishtomakesomevery
thought.
brief
observations
hereabouthowonemight
connect
theargument
ofFederalist
10tothethemes
I havedeveloped
inthisarticle
andtocorrect
atleastsome
ofthemisinterpretations
that
result
from
reading
Federalist
10outofcontext.
InA PrefacetoDemocraticTheory
RobertDahlcharacterizes
Madisonian
as anincoherent
mixofclashing
democracy
principles,
majority
powerand
minority
power.'Dahlregards
as central
toMadison's
fractured
theory
the
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whatsoever
ina republican
premise
thatminority
tyranny
posesnodanger
as definitive
Madison's
oftheproblem
government
(taking
quickdismissal
theonlyimportant
taskistobreakthe
inFederalist
10)andthusthat
political
thatCalhoun
powerofmajorities.
(Dahlcanthusmaintain
"enlarged
upon"
He claimsthatMadisonruledoutanypossibility
ofa
Madison'sthought.)
henceeverything
itself
someethical
majority
restraining
through
principle;
checks.Dahl overlooks
dependson constitutionally
external
prescribed
is central
toMadison's
obstruction
Madison's
equalfearofminority
(which
andtheimportance
heplacedon
ofConfederation)
oftheArticles
criticism
torespect
individual
the"senseofthecommunity"
educating
rights
(as I
ontheBillofRights).
ofMadison
Sucharethe
outinmydiscussion
pointed
of reading
Federalist
10 as though
it werethedefinitive
consequences
ofMadison's
expression
thought.4"
10should
beunderstood
inMadiFederalist
alonga lineofdevelopment
withhisproposed
onstatelegislation
son'sthought
beginning
negative
(for
thesameproblem,
whichFederalist
10 represents
different
and
solution)
atleastthrough
hisdraft
ofa billofrights
whosemostimportant
proceeding
wouldbe enforceable
thestatesas wellas thenational
guarantees
against
forMadisonalwaysmeant
morethanproperty
government.
"Rights"
rights
thatis whatheconcentrates
oninFederalist
alone(although
10).Anditis
outthat
hefavored
whatever
worth
measures
couldmaintain
a broad
pointing
without
His rageagainst
equalityof property
violating
property
rights.
inflated
papermoneycomesfrom
thefactthatin hisviewit amounts
to
confiscation
ofproperty
without
dueprocess
oflaw-in short,
a violation
of
civilliberties,
notanordinary
question
ofeconomic
policy.
Federalist
10dismisses
faction
ina single
minority
sentence.
Everywhere
elseinhiswriting,
hisother
including
Federalist
contributions,
heworries
aboutbothmajority
andminority
faction:
hiscriticism
oftheArticles
of
Confederation
centers
onthetremendous
obstructive
powers
ofa minority;
andin "VicesofthePolitical
oftheUnitedStates"(April1787),
System
which
develops
many
oftheideaspresented
inFederalist
10,heobserves
that
tofactandexperience
"according
a minority
mayinanappealtoforce,
bean
overmatch
forthemajority."42
Madison
didnotexperience
a sudden
conversiontomajoritarianism
in1791anymorethanhe"converted"
atthattimeto
strict
constructionism.
I havestressed
theimportance
forMadison
oftheexistence
ofanenduringas opposed
toa transient
andpassionate-majority.
Itis onthisaccount
that
he was so impressed
bytheoverwhelming
popularsupport
fora Bill of
anditgrounds
hisclaimthat
Rights;
thesenseinwhich
theConstitution
was
understood
bythepeoplewhoratified
itforms
theproper
boundary
ofthe
national
Madison
government's
powers.
wouldseenocontradiction
between
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470
1995
POLITICALTHEORY/August
onmajority
faction:
anenduring
national
thisandhisattack
majority
will,
withtheproper
institutional
bemorethana match
fora localfactious
forms,
majority.
is nothing
inFederalist
10aboutthecharacter
ofgoodas
there
However,
Madisonopposedfaction
to"therights
ofother
opposedtobadmajorities.
ofthecommunity,"
andaggregate
interests
ortothepermanent
but
citizens,
intheessay.Theforceoftheargument
is givennocontent
thelatter
phrase
toprevent
a majority
from
is overwhelmingly
negative-how
formingis toform;
whileremaining
silentabouthowthenecessary
thus
majority
that
theargument
is a shrewd
credence
tothepossibility
divide-andlending
onthepartofa well-connected
elite.
conquer
strategy
Whether
whathe sayslateraboutthe"senseof thepeople"in their
inhismindwhenhewrote
conventions
wasanideaalready
ratifying
present
10oronethat
heonlydeveloped
Federalist
later
tofilla conspicuous
holein
I cannotsay.Andevenwhenhe doesexpresstheidea,it is
his theory,
we havea better
idea of whatcountsas a good
inadequately
justified:
butwhymajorities
should
beabletoriseabovethemselves
majority,
onsuch
Weknowfrom
remains
occasions
Federalist
49 thatMadison
unexplained.
doesnotregard
conventions
as panaceas,
thatwhenresorted
toatthewrong
reasons
willsimply
timeforthewrong
thesamefactions
one
they
reproduce
findsin a legislature.
One fruitful
lineof inquiry
forfuture
studiesof
Madison's
wouldbetotrace
theorigins,
andjustificathought
development,
tionofhisclaimthatthesenseofthepeopleintheir
conventions
is
ratifying
ofmajority
thebestexpression
ruleinitshighest
form.
CONCLUSION
I haveargued
thatMadisonheldtoa consistent,
although
complicated,
viewoftherelation
between
andgovernmental
liberty
I donotmean
power.
thathisviewsneverchanged
to suggest
orthathispolitical
thought
was
unaffected
anddistractions
ofpractical
bythedemands
politics.
Madison
was
mindful
oftheneedtotemper
always
theory
with
considerations
ofwhat
Neal
Riemer
calls"prudent
Buthisapparent
guidance."
reversals
on thecrucial
ofhowmuchpowershouldbe vestedinthenational
question
government
cannot
beexplained
onthebasisofprudent
guidance
alone:onemustgrasp
thetheory
it.Thisis noteasy:Madison's
underlying
reasoning
wasnotwell
understood
eveninhisowntime.
ForMadison
andliberty
governmental
power
arenotsimple
opposites
(as
somuch
oftheonealways
entailed
somuch
lessoftheother):
though
because
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471
toliberty
areso numerous
thethreats
andproceed
from
so manydifferent
willsometimes
sources,
more
preserving
liberty
require
governmental
power,
sometimes
less.Thedegree
towhichgovernmental
powerthreatens
liberty
dependslesson thequantity
thanon the
ofpowervestedin government
existence
ofclearboundaries
towhatever
levelofpowerhasbeenagreed
lessoncrystal-clear
upon.This,inturn,
constitutional
depends
language
(the
ofwhich
Madison
thanonanenduring
possibility
"senseof
alwaysdoubted)
thecommunity"
from
a passionate,
transient
(as distinguished
best
majority)
oftheseveral
exemplified
bytherecords
conventions.
ratifying
The concern
forharmonizing
governmental
and
powerandpersonal
hasnotdiminished
sinceMadison's
publicliberty
theforms
time,
although
that
bothpower
andliberty
havetaken
overtheyears.
Nor
mayhavechanged
hasthetemptation
todrawsimple
conclusions
aboutpowerandliberty
been
overcome.
RonaldReagan's1980campaign
maxim
that"Government
isnot
is theproblem"
thesolution-Government
thekindof simple
expresses
A resurrected
thatMadison
evenifhecould
antagonism
rejected.
Madison,
nottakesidesin ourpartisan
wouldsurelyadviseus against
disputes,
ofpowerandliberty
reducing
problems
toa simple
formula.
Therangeandscopeofgovernmental
intheUnited
Statestoday
activity
is greater
thananything
Madison
couldhaveimagined.
Farmorespheres
of
aresubject
tolawsorregulations
thaninMadison's
activity
time(partly,
of
becausemanyoftheproblems
course,
towhichtheyareaddressed
didnot
existinhistime).
Isthere
about
thisaccumulation
ofgovernmental
something
andactivity
that
chokes
offhuman
power
freedom
if
even itrespects
freedoms
ofspeech,
andthelike?Manypeoplebelievethisandthink
press,religion,
thatgovernmental
as suchmustbereduced.
activity
WhatmightMadisonsay?One mightattempt
to resurrect
his strict
constructionism
andargue
that
mostofthese
historically
accumulated
powers
shouldbecutaway.Sucha lineofargument
wouldfailforreasons
Madison
himself
wouldbe thefirst
tounderstand:
iftheseaddedpowers
are,infact,
andexpected
accepted,
desired,
byanenduring
overa longperiod
majority
oftimethenthey
a presumptive
acquire
legitimacy
(justas theBankeventuallydid).Wecouldnotrestore
Madison's
constitution
evenifwewanted
to.
instead
Madisonwouldaskus whether
Perhaps
ornotthisexpansion
of
governmental
powerhas occurred
withtheconsidered
acceptance
of an
Ifithas,thenitneednotthreaten
enduring
majority.
ourfreedom.
On precisely
thisquestion
Madisonwouldobserve
great
disagreements
tendtofollow
amongus(which
party
lines).If-as is sometimes
chargedthegrowth
of government
results
fromthesuccesswithwhich"special
interests"
havecaptured
government
andcreated
a massofprograms
neither
desired
bynorbeneficial
tothemajority
ofAmericans,
thenfearsforour
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472
1995
POLITICALTHEORY/August
who
fearsofthe"specialinterests"
(justas Madison's
arejustified
freedom
If,onthe
justified).
from
Hamilton's
policieswereprobably
stoodtobenefit
aidtoeducation,
activities
(suchassocialsecurity,
these
expanded
hand,
other
do,infact,
defense)
national
policy,
employment
protection,
environmental
thenthe
ofAmericans,
majority
byan enduring
accepted
servepurposes
toavoid
wewant
that
isthreatened
butsimply
ourfreedom
isnotthat
problem
he
thistoo:thebattle fought
wouldhaveunderstood
thebill.Madison
paying
thatit
tobe taxedon grounds
thosewhorefused
inthe1780swasagainst
their
liberty.
threatened
our
thequestion
ofwhether
toanswer
solving
wouldnotpretend
Madison
moregovernment
or less.He would,however,
requires
problems
urgent
that
weestablish
somekind
inthelongrunourliberty
requires
adviseusthat
thefunctions
we
weclearly
lackatpresent-between
ofequivalence-one
andthepowers
wearewilling
tovestinit.
ofgovernment
demand
NOTES
1. Max Farrand,
ed., TheRecordsoftheFederalConvention
of1787,4 vols.(New Haven,
CT: Yale University
Press,1937),1:464.
HarvardUniversity
2. In TheIdeologicalOriginsoftheAmericanRevolution
(Cambridge:
thedissident
whichtheAmerican
Press,1967),56-59,BernardBailyndescribes
Whigtradition
intotheirpoliticalworldview.
colonistshadincorporated
Most commonlythe discussionof powercenteredon its essentialcharacteristic
of
its endlesslypropulsivetendency
to expanditselfbeyondlegitimate
aggressiveness:
in government
boundaries. . . [Power]inherednaturally
and was thepossessionand
interestof thosewho controlledgovernment,
just as liberty,
always weak, always
in thepeopleand was theirpeculiarpossessionand
defensive. . . inherednaturally
interest.
See also thechapteron "TheWhigScienceofPolitics"in GordonWood'sTheCreationofthe
AmericanRepublic(New York:Norton,1969),3-45.
3. MadisontoJefferson,
March19, 1787.FromThePapersofJamesMadison,vol.9, eds.
andWilliamM. E. Rachel(Chicago:University
WilliamT. Hutchinson
ofChicagoPress,1975),
is discussedinCharlesHobson,"TheNegativeonStateLaws:
318.Madison'sproposed
negative
andtheCrisisofRepublican
JamesMadison,theConstitution,
William
andMary
Government,"
Quarterly
36,no. 2 (1979): 215-35.
4. Farrand,TheRecordsoftheFederalConvention,
1:318-19;2:440,589.
5. "How,manywonder,couldMadison,thepowerfuland prophetic
nationalist
of 1787,
becomebythelate1790'sthenarrow,
pedantic
advocateofstates'rights?"
Neal Riemer,
James
theAmerican
Constitution
DC: Congressional
Madison:Creating
(Washington,
Quarterly,
Inc.,
of variousexplanations
offered
overthe
1986),5. Riemerfollowswitha capsuledescription
yearsforMadison'spoliticalshifts.
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473
6. Riemer,JamesMadison: CreatingtheAmericanConstitution,
7. Two of Madison's
followthisoriginal
Federalistcharacterization.
nineteenth-century
biographers
SidneyHoward
Gay,JamesMadison(Boston:Houghton
Mifflin,
1890),172,writes:
he drifted
Madisonwas a Federalistuntil,unfortunately,
intotheopposition.He was
ofpersonalfriends,
ofJefferson,
sweptawaypartly,
perhaps,
bytheinfluence
particularly
oflocality-that
whichis a harmless
andpartly
bytheinfluence
go withthestatedoctrine,
whenkeptwithin
butdangerous
ina mixedgovernment
kindofpatriotism
properlimits,
likeourswhenunrestrained.
See also GaillardHunt,TheLifeofJamesMadison(NewYork:Russell& Russell,1968[1900]),
211.
7. EdwardMcNallBurnsin JamesMadison:Philosopher
oftheConstitution
(New York:
Madisonas an advocateof strictly
OctagonBooks,1968 [1938]) presents
limitedgovernment
whorespected
theprinciple
ofstatesovereignty
onthat
despitesomeoccasionalinconsistencies
score.
8. "In policyhe remained
an advocateoftheuse offederalpowerforthepublicgood,up
tothelimitofitsdiscernible
existence.
Butthespectacleofchronic
abuseofthatpowerpropelled
himintoa lifelong
hehadhelpedtoplant
argument
againstsomeofthemostimportant
principles
in the Constitution."
IrvingBrant,JamesMadison: Fatherof the Constitution
1787-1800
(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,
1950),332. See also 12-13,102, 132-39.In a recentseriesof
Brant'sreadingofMadison,arguing
essays,LanceBanninghaschallenged
thatMadisonalways
ofpowersandthatthereweregreatdifferences
favoredan enumeration
betweenMadison'sand
Hamilton'snationalism
evenduring
theperiodoftheirclosestcooperation.
See LanceBanning,
"TheHamiltonian
Madison:A Reconsideration,"
Virginia
MagazineofHistoryand Biography
92, no. 1 (1984): 2-28; "JamesMadisonandtheNationalists,
1780-1783,"Williamand Mary
Quarterly
40, no. 2 (1983); "JamesMadisonandtheDynamicsoftheConstitutional
Convention,"ThePoliticalScienceReviewer17 (Fall 1987):5-49.
9. PapersofJamesMadison,vol.13,380-81.
10. For description
of tensionbetweencivic republican
and liberaltraditions
see J.G.A.
Pocock,TheMachiavellianMoment:Florentine
PoliticalThought
and theAtlantic
Republican
Tradition
NJ:Princeton
(Princeton,
University
Press,1975).Ian ShapiroinPoliticalCriticism
claimsthatPocock's oppositionbetweenliberalism
and republicanism
is greatlyoverdrawn
ofCalifornia
(Berkeley:University
Press,1990),166-203.
11.RalphKetcham,
JamesMadison:A Biography
(New York:Macmillan,1971),72-73.It
is significant
thatmuchlater,as president
duringtheWarof 1812,Madison"neverhintedat
measuresabridging
freedom
ofspeechorpress,evenin thefaceoframpant
obstruction
ofhis
government's
policiesand countlesscases of outright
treasonin the 'easternstates'of New
England."DrewMcCoy,TheLast oftheFathers:JamesMadisonand theRepublicanLegacy
(Cambridge:Cambridge
University
Press,1989),12.
12.PapersofJamesMadison,vol. 13,208.
13. The argument
thattheoriginalpurposeoftheBill of Rightswas exclusively
to protect
states'rightsagainstthenationalgovernment
is advancedin Arthur
E. Wilmarth,
Jr.,"The
OriginalPurposeoftheBill ofRights:JamesMadisonandtheFounders'Searchfora Workable
Balance betweenFederaland StatePower,"TheAmericanCriminalLaw Review26, no. 4
(Spring1989): 1261-1321.Wilmarth
doesnotmention
thefactthatMadison'sdraft
wouldhave
restricted
thestatestoo.
14.Herbert
J.Storing,
ed.,TheAnti-Federalist:
Writings
bytheOpponents
oftheConstitution
ofChicagoPress,1985),217.
(Chicago:University
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474
1995
POLITICALTHEORY/August
15.Hamilton
saysatthePhiladelphia
Convention:
their
states
renounce
atthe
Ithasbeensaidthatifthesmaller
equality,
theyrenounce
Thetruth
isitis a contest
forpower,
sametimetheir
notforliberty.
Willthemen
liberty.
thesmallstates
belessfreethanthosecomposing
thelarger?
composing
The
(Farrand,
RecordsoftheFederalConvention,
1:466)
16. PapersofJamesMadison,vol. 14,427.
17. MadisontoGeorgeEve,January
2, 1789.PapersofJamesMadison,vol. 11,404-5;"To
ofSpotsylvania
a Resident
vol. 11,
County,"
January
27, 1789,PapersofJamesMadison,
428-29.
toJefferson,
18.Madison
October
vol.11,297.
17,1788.PapersofJames
Madison,
19.Madison
toJefferson,
October
vol.11,298-99.
17,1788.PapersofJames
Madison,
20.SpeechinCongress,
June
vol.12,204-5.
8, 1789.PapersofJames
Madison,
21.Madison
toWashington,
vol.9,382-87.
April16,1787.PapersofJames
Madison,
22.ForHamilton's
ofthepowers
ofthenational
broadinterpretation
seehis
government,
ofanActtoEstablish
oftheConstitutionality
aBank"(1791).ThePapersofAlexander
"Opinion
vol.8 (NewYork:Columbia
Hamilton,
University
Press,1965),97-134.
23.Madison
toHenry
Lee,January
1,1792.PapersofJames
vol.14,180.
Madison,
24. McCoy,TheLast oftheFathers,80-81.
25.As President
Madison
vetoed
aninternal
billwhich
heconsidered
improvements
tobe
excellent
becausenoconstitutional
amendment
public
policy,
hadbeenpassedtolegitimize
the
power.McCoy,TheLastoftheFathers,92-98.
inCongress,
26.Madison,
speech
February
3,1791.PapersofJames
vol.13,376.
Madison,
ontheConstitutionality
ofa Bank,"
Hamilton,
"Opinion
vol.8,
PapersofAlexander
Hamilton,
107.
27. McCoy,TheLast oftheFathers,75-78.
28. PapersofJamesMadison,vol. 16,295-96.
29.SpeechinCongress,
February
2, 1791.PapersofJames
Madison,
vol.13,380-81.
30. Madison'sfearofa slippery
slopecomesup againin a 1792speechin whichthe
toprovide
forthecod-fishing
innocent-appearing
proposal
bounty
payments
industry,
because
itinvolves
anunconstitutional
couldleadtoa government
power,
thatwould"takeupthecare
ofreligion
intotheir
ownhands."
PapersofJames
vol.14,223.
Madison,
31."Address
andReasons
ofDissent
oftheMinority
oftheConvention
ofPennsylvania"
in
TheAnti-Federalist,
213.
Storing,
IV" inStoring,
32. "EssaysofBrutus,
TheAnti-Federalist,
130.See also "TheFederal
II" inthesamevolume.
Farmer,
33."Mr.Wilson
couldnotadmit
thedoctrine
theColonies
that
when
became
independent
of
G. Britain,
alsoofeachother.
... [They]wereindependent,
theybecameindependent
not
butUnitedly"
TheRecordsoftheFederalConvention,
individually
(Farrand,
1:324;June19).
Thebestintroduction
toWilson's
viewsontheexistence
ofa singlesovereign
peopleis his
as Associate
Justice
oftheU.S. Supreme
in Chisholm
opinion,
v. Georgiain Leon
Court,
FriedmanandFed L. Israel,eds.,TheJustices
oftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt:TheirLives
andMajorOpinions,
vol.1(NewYork:
Chelsea
House,1969).Seealsothediscussion
ofpopular
inhis"Lectures
ofLaw"from
TheWorks
sovereignty
ed.Robert
ofJames
Wilson,
McCloskey
Harvard
(Cambridge:
University
Press),1967,1:268.
In To Make a Nation:The Rediscovery
ofAmericanFederalism(Cambridge:Harvard
infavor
ofWilson's
University
Press,1993)SamuelBeerargues
claimthat
theRevolution
was
theactofa single
consciously
sovereign
thestates
peoplewhich
subsequently
created
(195-214).
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Read/MADISON ON POWER AND LIBERTY
475
ofthecomplicated
nature
ofMadison'sviewsonsovereignty34. SamuelBeer'sdiscussion
46 andFederalist
39-followslinessimilartomyown.
betweenFederalist
especiallythetension
Federalist
39 as a fatalgapinMadison's
See Beer,ToMakea Nation,308-40.Beercharacterizes
moresympathetic
toMadisonon thispoint.
reasoning;myownreadingis somewhat
thecompound
35. "If,Madisonseemstothink,
republicoftheUnitedStatesis incompatible
doctrine
ofsovereignty,
thenso muchtheworseforthedoctrine
ofsovereignty."
withtheabstract
"Federalism
andtheFounding,"
ReviewofPolitics48, no.2 (1986): 186.
MichaelP. Zuckert,
36. PapersofJamesMadison,vol.14, 139.
overthewordingof the
37. For discussionof Madison'sand Jefferson's
disagreements
see McCoy,TheLastoftheFathers,139-49.
protest
resolutions,
is includedin MerrillD. Peterson,
38. The document
ed., ThePortableThomasJefferson
(New York:Penguin,1977),281-89.
onFederalist
39.Thereis anenormous
literature
10.Thebeststarting
pointisDouglassAdair,
"ThatPoliticsMay Be Reducedto a Science:David Hume,JamesMadison,and theTenth
inFame and theFoundingFathers(New York:Norton,
Federalist,"
1974).
40. RobertA. Dahl,A PrefacetoDemocraticTheory
ofChicagoPress,
(Chicago:University
1956),4-33.
41. See also JamesMacGregorBurns,TheDeadlockofDemocracy:FourPartyPoliticsin
Madison'spurposeas deliberateproduction
Americawhichcharacterizes
of deadlockand
ignoresMadison'sfearof minority
obstruction.
(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,
1963),
6-23.
42. PapersofJamesMadison,vol.9, 350.
JamesH. Read is an associateprofessor
at theCollegeofSt. Benedict
ofgovernment
and St.John'sUniversity
ofMinnesotaHe receivedhisPh.D.fromHarvardUniversity
in 1988.He is especiallyinterested
in theconceptofpower,bothfroma contemporary
and as a themeinpoliticaltheoriesofthepast.His recentarticlesinclude
perspective
"ThomasHobbes:PowerintheStateofNature,
PowerinCivilSociety"
(Polity,
Swnmer
1991) and "Nietzsche:Power as Oppression"(PraxisInternational,
Apriland July
a bookontheso-calledzero-sum
1989). He is writing
questionofpower:whether
one's
gain ofpowershouldbe regardedas equal toanother'sloss.
This content downloaded on Sun, 16 Dec 2012 19:44:37 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions