:
The Resurgence
of Conservatism,
1980-1992
While [communists] preach the supremacy of the
state, declare its omnipotence over individual man,
and predict its eventual domination of all peoples
on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the
modern world.
President Ronald Reagan, March 8, 1983
Prologue: Ronald Reagan, the most conservative president in half a century,
emerged victorious in the election of 1980. He set out immediately to implement a
virtual revolution in U.S. politics. He attacked head-on the big-government legacy of
the New Deal and the Great Society. He slashed the federal budget for social programs and induced Congress to pass a sweeping tax cut. He simultaneously called
for massive increases in defense spending, and federal budget deficits soared to
nearly $200 billion a year in the mid-1980s. But "Reaganomics" did slay the ogre of
inflation that had stalked the economy for more than a decade. Reagan took a hard
line with the Soviet Union and announced a major shift in U.S. strategic doctrine in
1983, when he called for the construction of a space-based defense system against
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Jolted, the Soviets made the abandonment of this
so-called Star Wars scheme the precondition for any further discussion of arms control. In Central America Reagan struggled against congressional opposition to send aid
to rebels seeking to overthrow the leftist government in Nicaragua. The Reagan administration's frustrations over congressional opposition to its Central American policies led to the scandalous Iran-contra affair. Meanwhile, new Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev undertook some dramatic initiatives that seemed to spell an end to the
Cold War-or at least a truce. Triumphantly reelected in 1984, Reagan embraced
some emotional social issues, such as prayer in the schools and the anti-abortion crusade. He found support among many fundamentalist religious groups, as well as
among a group of intellectuals known as neoconservatives. These same backers
helped George H. W. Bush win the White House in 1988. Bush presided over the collapse of communism, won a decisive war against a menacing dictator in Iraq, and lost
his bid for reelection. For those who wondered how such a thing could happen, the
Democrats had a simple answer: "It's the economy, stupid. "
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A. The Reagan "Revolution" in Economic Policy _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
I. The Supply-Side Gospel ( 1984)
Since New Deal days, Keynesian economic theory had dominated federal policy.
Named for the brilliant British economist john Maynard Keynes, who had developed
his ideas most conspicuously in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money in 1936, Keynesian theory emphasized the role of government spending, including deficit financing, in stimulating the economy. Now so-called supply-side
economists argued that continual reliance on government spending sapped money
and initiative from the private sector, ballooned deficits, and contained an inherently inflationary bias. Tbe supply-siders came into their own with Ronald Reagan's
election in 1980. Here one of them explains the basics of their approach. What is innovative about it? In the light of the unprecedented deficits chalked up in the Reagan
years, can supply-side theory be said to have worked?
Ronald Reagan campaigned for the presidency on a supply-side platform. It
gave him an employment policy that did not rely on inflation and government programs. It gave him an anti-inflation policy that did not rely on the pain and suffering of rising unemployment. And it gave him a budget policy that eliminated the
deficit through economic growth instead of balancing the budget on the backs of
taxpayers. Reagan was a different kind of candidate because he emphasized thecapabilities of the people and the American economy. He campaigned on a message
of hope that sparked a rebirth of confidence in the people. Reagan's optimism was
so unfamiliar to the Republican establishment that its candidate, George Bush, called
it "voodoo economics."
The political themes of failures and limits, themes that had created and reinforced insecurities in the people leading them to accept more government programs
and controls over their lives, were not a part of Reagan's message. He spoke the language of an American renaissance. His message invigorated the hopes of people
whose lives, pocketbooks, and prospects were cramped by a politics that closed all
frontiers except those serviced by the federal budget. Here was a man breaking all
of the ingrained political rules, and he was winning ....
The President-elect wanted to get on with his business of using incentives to
rebuild the U.S. economy. He ruled out both wage and price controls and the continuation of demand management-the economic cycle of fighting inflation with unemployment and unemployment with inflation. In place of a stop-go monetary
policy ranging from too tight to too loose, there would be steady, moderate, and
predictable growth in the money supply. And instead of pumping up demand to
stimulate the economy, reliance would be placed on improving incentives on the
supply side.
This is the policy package that became known as Reaganomics. Its controversial
feature is its belief that the economy can enjoy a rise in real gross national product
1
Reprinted by permission of the publisher from The Supply-Side Revolution: An Insider's Account of
Policymaking in Washington by Paul C. Roberts, pp. 20-25, 89-94, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press . Copyright© 1984 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College .
A . Tbe Reagan "Revolution " in Economic Policy
551
while inflation declines. Monetary policy would first stabilize and then gradually reduce inflation, while tax cuts would provide liquidity as well as incentives and prevent the slower money growth from causing a recession. By creating the wrong
incentives and damaging the cash flow of individuals and businesses, the tax system
had produced a nation of debt junkies. With the economy strung out on credit, it
had to be carefully rehabilitated so as not to produce a liquidity crisis.
A decade of taxflation (inflation and rising marginal tax rates) had taken most
of the gains in individual incomes, leaving people no recourse but to turn to debt
to finance their gains in consumption. Since the interest on debt is tax-deductible,
being in debt was the only way for people to get some of their income back from
the government and experience a rise in living standards. Businesses were equally
encouraged by the tax system to go into debt. The only way out of this dilemma
is to improve production incentives and the cash flow of individuals and businesses, while gradually reducing the rate of money growth. The tax cuts had two
purposes. One was to lower tax rates and improve incentives. The other was to prevent a reduction in money growth from causing liquidity problems in the private
sector. With incentives restructured, money growth would be used to finance the
growth of real goods and services rather than to bid up the prices of houses and
commodities ....
Keynesian theory explained the economy's performance in terms of the level of
total spending. A budget deficit adds to total spending and helps keep employment
high and the economy running at full capacity. Cutting the deficit, as the Republicans wanted to do, would reduce spending and throw people out of work, thereby
lowering national income and raising the unemployment rate. The lower income
would produce less tax revenue , and the higher unemployment would require
larger budget expenditures for unemployment compensation, food stamps, and
other support programs. The budget deficit would thus reappear from a shrunken
tax base and higher income-support payments. Patient (and impatient) Democrats,
economists, columnists, and editorial writers had explained many times to the obdurate Republicans that cutting the deficit would simply reduce spending on
goods and services, drive the economy down, and raise the unemployment rate.
Keynesians argued that the way to balance the budget was to run a deficit. Deficit
spending would lift the economy, and the government's tax revenues would
rise, bringing the budget into balance. Since cutting the deficit was believed to be
the surest way to throw people out of work, there were not many Republican
economists. When Democrat Alice Rivlin was asked why there were no Republican
economists on her "nonpartisan" Congressional Budget Committee staff, she was
probably telling the truth when she said she could not find any.
The focus on the deficit had left the Republicans without a competitive political
program. They were perceived by the recipients of government benefits as the party
always threatening to cut back on government programs such as social security,
while the taxpaying part of the electorate saw Republicans as the party that was always threatening to raise taxes in order to pay for the benefits that others were receiving. The party that takes away with both hands competes badly with the party
that gives away with both hands, and that simple fact explained the decline of the
Republican Party, which had come to be known as the tax collector for Democratic
spending programs.
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Supply-side economics brought a new perspective to fiscal policy. Instead of
stressing the effects on spending, supply-siders showed that tax rates directly affect
the supply of goods and services. Lower tax rates mean better incentives to work, to
save, to take risks, and to invest. As people respond to the higher after-tax rewards,
or greater profitability, incomes rise and the tax base grows, thus feeding back some
of the lost revenues to the Treasury. The saving rate also grows, providing more financing for government and private borrowing. Since Keynesian analysis left out
such effects, once supply-side economics appeared on the scene the Democrats
could no longer claim that government spending stimulated the economy more
effectively than tax cuts.
2. President Reagan Asks for a Tax Cut ( 1981)
Ronald Reagan scored a stunning electoral victory over jimmy Carter in 1980, and
after his inauguration he set out energetically to cut the federal budget and reduce
federal taxes. A former actor and television personality, Reagan used the electronic
media with more effectiveness than almost any other modern president-earning
for himself the title of Great Communicator. In his nationally televised address of
july 27, 1981, excerpted here, Reagan called on Congress to grant a three-year,
25 percent personal income tax cut across the board to all U.S. taxpayers. Why did he
feel that such a cut was necessary?
It's been nearly 6 months since I first reported to you on the state of the Nation's
economy. I'm afraid my message that night was grim and disturbing. I remember
telling you we were in the worst economic mess since the Great Depression. Prices
were continuing to spiral upward, unemployment was reaching intolerable levels,
and all because government was too big and spent too much of our money.
We're still not out of the woods, but we've made a start. And we've certainly surprised those longtime and somewhat cynical observers of the Washington scene,
who looked, listened, and said, "It can never be done; Washington will never change
its spending habits. " Well, something very exciting has been happening here in
Washington, and you're responsible ....
Because of what you did, Republicans and Democrats in the Congress came together and passed the most sweeping cutbacks in the history of the Federal budget.
Right now, Members of the House and Senate are meeting in a conference committee to reconcile the differences between the two budget cutting bills passed by the
House and Senate. When they finish, all Americans will benefit from savings of approximately $140 billion in reduced government costs over just the next 3 years.
And that doesn't include the additional savings from the hundreds of burdensome
regulations already cancelled or facing cancellation.
For 19 out of the last 20 years, the Federal Government has spent more than it
took in. There will be another large deficit in this present year which ends September 30th, but with our program in place, it won't be quite as big as it might have
2
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 17, no. 31 (August 3, 1981): 814-820.
A. The Reagan "Revolution " in Economic Policy
553
been. And starting next year, the deficits will get smaller until in just a few years
the budget can be balanced. And we hope we can begin whittling at that almost
$1 trillion debt that hangs over the future of our children .
. . . The rate of inflation is no longer in double-digit figures. The dollar has regained strength in the international money markets, and businessmen and investors
are making decisions with regard to industrial development, modernization and
expansion-all of this based on anticipation of our program being adopted and put
into operation.
A recent poll shows that where a year and a half ago only 24 percent of our
people believed things would get better, today 46 percent believe they will. To justify
their faith , we must deliver the other part of our program. Our economic package is
a closely knit, carefully constructed plan to restore America's economic strength and
put our Nation back on the road to prosperity.
Each part of this package is vital. It cannot be considered piecemeal. It was proposed as a package, and it has been supported as such by the American people.
Only if the Congress passes all of its major components does it have any real chance
of success. This is absolutely essential if we are to provide incentives and make capital available for the increased productivity required to provide real, permanent jobs
for our people.
And let us not forget that the rest of the world is watching America carefully to
see how we'll act at this critical moment.
I have recently returned from a summit meeting with world leaders in Ottawa,
Canada, and the message I heard from them was quite clear. Our allies depend on a
strong and economically sound America. And they're watching events in this country, particularly those surrounding our program for economic recovery, with close
attention and great hopes . In short, the best way to have a strong foreign policy
abroad is to have a strong economy at home.
The day after tomorrow, Wednesday, the House of Representatives will begin
debate on two tax bills. And once again, they need to hear from you . I know that
doesn't give you much time, but a great deal is at stake ....
Now,· let me explain what the situation is and what's at issue. With our budget
cuts, we've presented a complete program of reduction in tax rates. Again, our purpose was to provide incentive for the individual, incentives for business to encourage production and hiring of the unemployed, and to free up money for investment.
Our bill calls for a 5-percent reduction in the income tax rates by October 1st, a 10percent reduction beginning July 1st, 1982, and another 10-percent cut a year later,
a 25-percent total reduction over 3 years.
But then to ensure the tax cut is permanent, we call for indexing the tax rates in
1985, which means adjusting them for inflation. As it is now, if you get a cost-ofliving raise that's intended to keep you even with inflation, you find that the increase in the number of dollars you get may very likely move you into a higher tax
bracket, and you wind up poorer than you would. This is called bracket creep.
Bracket creep is an insidious tax. Let me give an example. If you earned $10,000
a year in 1972, by 1980 you had to earn $19,700 just to stay even with inflation. But
that's before taxes. Come April 15th, you'll find your tax rates have increased 30 percent. Now, if you've been wondering why you don't seem as well-off as you were
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a few years back, it's because government makes a profit on inflation. It gets an
automatic tax increase without having to vote on it. We intended to stop that.
Time won't allow me to explain every detail. But our bill includes just about
everything to help the economy. We reduce the marriage penalty, that unfair tax that
has a working husband and wife pay more tax than if they were single. We increase
the exemption on the inheritance or estate tax to $600,000, so that farmers and
family-owned businesses don't have to sell the farm or store in the event of death
just to pay the taxes. Most important, we wipe out the tax entirely for a surviving
spouse. No longer, for example, will a widow have to sell the family source of
income to pay a tax on her husband's death.
There are deductions to encourage investment and savings. Business gets realistic depreciation on equipment and machinery. And there are tax breaks for small
and independent businesses which create 80 percent of all our new jobs.
This bill also provides major credits to the research and development industry.
These credits will help spark the high technology breakthroughs that are so critical
to America's economic leadership in the world. There are also added incentives for
small businesses, including a provision thar will lift much of the burden of costly
paperwork that government has imposed an small business.
In addition, there's short-term but substantial assistance for the hard pressed
thrift industry, as well as reductions in oil taxes that will benefit new or independent
oil producers and move our Nation a step closer to energy self-sufficiency. Our bill
is, in short, the first real tax cut for everyone in almost 20 years ....
If I could paraphrase a well-known statement by Will Rogers that he had never
met a man he didn't like, I'm afraid we have some people around here who never
met a tax they didn't hike ....
In these 6 months, we've done so much and have come so far. It's been the
power of millions of people like you who have determined that we will make
America great again. You have made the difference up to now. You will make the
difference again. Let us not stop now.
Thank you. God bless you, and good night.
3. The New York Times Attacks
Reagan's Policies ( 1981)
Critics of President Reagan's budget-slashing and tax-cutting policies fumed furiously but ineffectively during Reagan 's first year in office. The new president appeared to be a masterful politician whose will was impossible to thwart. Some
observers, however, worried about the real purposes behind Reagan's deft display of
presidential leadership. In the following editorial from the New York Times, what
are alleged to be Reagan 's true intentions? What does the editorial mean when it
states that Reagan "gathers power for the purpose of denigrating its value in shaping
America "? Is this assessment fair?
3Editorial, "The Reagan Paradox," August 2, 1981. Copyright© 1981 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted
with permission.
A. The Reagan "Revolution " in Economic Policy
555
One thing is surely settled: the Presidency is no feeble office. Let a shrewd President single-mindedly pursue a policy broadly grounded in his election mandate ,
and he can put it across.
It does not follow that Mr. Reagan's economic program is therefore wise or efficient, or that a different program, without tax cuts, could have fared so well. But
conservatives did not invent the technique of buying votes with Federal monies;
democracy tilts toward gratifying private wants. It is plainly untrue, however, as
many have complained, that the democracy of Congress is bound to frustrate the
democratic will that elects Presidents.
Nor is it true that Presidential power requires a telegenic face. Rest in peace,
Lyndon Johnson. Power lies in circumstance and in the skill with which it is exploited. The Democrats who opposed Mr. Reagan's budget and tax bills played
weak hands, but they played them badly. By turning for help to special-interest
lobbies, they only challenged the President to outbid them. By forcing a showdown
when they lacked decisive strength, they only magnified the drama of his victory.
But is this President's paradoxical triumph also the nation's? He gathers power
for the purpose of denigrating its value in shaping America. He does not say the nation is overextended financially. He does not say guns are momentarily more important than butter. He does not rerank the nation's needs or argue against assorted
remedies. He denounces all Federal government as oppressive, as the cause of
economic distress and a threat to liberty.
So Mr. Reagan has arranged to shrink annual Federal spending by 1984 by
about $150 billion and cut taxes to let individuals and businesses spend that sum instead. Economically, that is mostly a transfer of purchasing power which cannot
much reduce inflation or unemployment, the Federal deficit or debt. On the contrary, a big increase in military spending will enlarge the deficit unless the President
finds further huge savings in civilian programs. And the pressure to find themwherever-is what he values most about his accomplishment.
But why does the President boast that he has thus improved economic prospects?
Because he holds, as a matter of faith, that a dollar spent privately creates more
wealth than a dollar spent by Government.
That is surely sometimes true: a Government-run railroad that is politically beholden to its unions will tolerate more waste than a private bus company. But it
surely also is sometimes untrue: a Government investment in a student or road or
depressed community can stimulate more productive activity than the same sum
spent by private citizens on diamonds or cameras. Government may be incompetent
to achieve some of its social goals. But uncoordinated private spending is notoriously
inefficient in meeting large public needs.
Take the obvious, urgent need to cool inflation. Mr. Reagan's answer is a tortuous chain of incentives: cut a family's taxes by $500 and the money goes to banks
and merchants who invest in more businesses and machines which will be more efficient and hold down prices. Also: reduce a citizen's tax on the next earned dollar
from 29 to 25 cents and he'll work harder longer and thus reduce costs.
But if it were primarily interested in economic results, Government has surer
ways to achieve those results-as even Mr. Reagan's plan recognizes. For it aims
large tax reductions directly at businesses that buy cost-reducing machines or
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job-producing plants. A still more efficient plan would have aimed more precisely at
the most wanted machines and at workers who hold down wages or communities
that reduce sales taxes.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Mr. Reagan wants to use his power primarily to diminish Government--even where that dilutes economic recovery and prevents
efficient allocation of resources.
That the President's plan will revive the economy remains to be proved. What
is no longer in doubt is that his economic remedies mask an assault on the very
idea that free people can solve their collective problems through representative
Government. One day soon Americans will rediscover that their general welfare depends on national as well as parochial actions. And then they will want not just a
powerful President but one who cherishes the power of Government to act for the
common good.
&R~~n~~re~~~~--------------------
I. Reagan Sees Red in Nicaragua ( 1986)
Central America was shaken by political turmoil in the Reagan years. El Salvador,
thrown into chaos by a coup in 1979, was .finally stabilized only with the help of U.S.
military "advisers. " In the same year, a revolution in Nicaragua against the dictator
Somoza brought to power a leftist government (the Sandinistas) that President Reagan
regarded as a festering thorn in his flesh . He tried repeatedly to win congressional
approval for sending military aid to the Nicaraguan "contras, " or antigovernment
rebels. But American memories of the bloody disaster of Vietnam were still vivid, and
Congress balked at giving the president the authority he wanted. On March 16,
1986, President Reagan made the following case for his policy in an emotional television address. What are his strongest and weakest arguments? How convincing are
his historical analogies?
My fellow Americans, I must speak to you tonight about a mounting danger in
Central America that threatens the security of the United States. This danger will not
go away; it will grow worse, much worse, if we fail to take action now.
I am speaking of Nicaragua, a Soviet ally on the American mainland only two
hours' flying time from our own borders. With over a billion dollars in Soviet-blocaid, the Communist Government of Nicaragua has launched a campaign to subvert
and topple its democratic neighbors.
Using Nicaragua as a base, the Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant
power in the crucial corridor between North and South America. Established there
they will be in a position to threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital Caribbean
sea lanes and, ultimately, move against Mexico. Should that happen, desperate Latin
peoples by the millions would begin fleeing north into the cities of the southern
United States, or to wherever some hope of freedom remained.
1
The New York Times, Ma rch 17, 1986, p . 8.
B. Reagan's Foreign Policies
557
The United States Congress has before it a proposal to help stop this threat. The
legislation is an aid package of $100 million for the more than 20,000 freedom fighters struggling to bring democracy to their country and eliminate this Communist
menace at its source ....
Gathered in Nicaragua already are thousands of Cuban military advisers, contingents of Soviet and East Germans and all the elements of international terror-from
the P.L.O. [Palestine Liberation Organization] to Italy's Red Brigades. Why are they
there? Because, as [Libyan leader] Colonel Qaddafi has publicly exalted: "Nicaragua
means a great thing, it means fighting America near its borders. Fighting America at
its doorstep."
For our own security the United States must deny the Soviet Union a beachhead
in North America. But let me make one thing plain, I am not talking about American
troops. They are not needed; they have not been requested. The democratic resistance fighting in Nicaragua is only asking America for the supplies and support to
save their own country from Communism.
The question the Congress of the United States will now answer is a simple
one: Will we give the Nicaraguans' democratic resistance the means to recapture
their betrayed revolution, or will we turn our backs and ignore the malignancy in
Managua until it spreads and becomes a mortal threat to the entire New World?
Will we permit the Soviet Union to put a second Cuba, a second Libya, right on
the doorsteps of the United States?
How can such a small country pose such a great threat? It is not Nicaragua
alone that threatens us, but those using Nicaragua as a privileged sanctuary for their
struggle against the United States.
Their first target is Nicaragua's neighbors. With an army and militia of 120,000
men, backed by more than 3,000 Cuban military advisers, Nicaragua's armed forces
are the largest Central America has ever seen. The Nicaraguan military machine is
more powerful than all its neighbors combined . ...
If maps, statistics and facts aren't persuasive enough, we have the words of the
Sandinistas and Soviets themselves. One of the highest-level Sandinista leaders was
asked by an American magazine whether their Communist revolution will-and I
quote-"be exported to El Salvador, then Guatemala, then Honduras, then Mexico?" He
responded, "That is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan's that is absolutely true."
The Soviets have been no less candid. A few years ago, then Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko noted that Central America was "boiling like a cauldron" and ripe for
revolution. In a Moscow meeting in 1983, Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, declared: "Over two decades ago there was only Cuba in Latin America. Today there
are Nicaragua, Grenada and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador." ...
So, we are clear on the intentions of the Sandinistas and those who back them.
Let us be equally clear about the nature of their regime. To begin with, the Sandinistas have revoked the civil liberties of the Nicaraguan people, depriving them of
any legal right to speak, to publish, to assemble or to worship freely. Independent
newspapers have been shut down. There is no longer any independent labor movement in Nicaragua nor any right to strike ....
Like Communist governments everywhere, the Sandinistas have launched assaults
against ethnic and religious groups. The capital's only synagogue was desecrated
and firebombed-the entire Jewish community forced to flee Nicaragua. Protestant
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Bible meetings have been broken up by raids, by mob violence, by machine guns.
The Catholic Church has been singled out-priests have been expelled from the
country. Catholics beaten in the streets after attending mass. The Catholic Primate of
Nicaragua, Cardinal Obando y Bravo, has put the matter forthrightly: "We want to
state clearly that this Government is totalitarian. We are dealing with an enemy of
the church."
Evangelical pastor Prudencio Baltodano found out he was on his Sandinista hit
list, when an army patrol asked his name: "You don't know what we do to the evangelical pastors. We don't believe in God, " they told him. Pastor Baltodano was tied to
a tree, struck in the forehead with a rifle butt, stabbed in the neck with a bayonetfinally his ears were cut off, and he was left for dead. "See if your God will save you, "
they mocked. Well, God did have other plans for Pastor Baltodano. He lived to tell
the world his story-to tell it, among other places, right here in the White House.
I could go on about this nightmare-the blacklist, the secret prisons, the
Sandinista-directed mob violence. But, as if all this brutality at home were not enough,
the Sandinistas are transforming their nation into a safe house, a command post for
the international terror.
The Sandinistas not only sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala
and Honduras-terror that led last summer to the murder of four U.S. marines in a
cafe in Salvador-they provide a sanctuary for terror. Italy has charged Nicaragua
with harboring their worst terrorists, the Red Brigades.
The Sandinistas have been involved themselves in the international drug trade.
I know every American parent concerned about the drug problem will be outraged
to learn that top Nicaraguan Government officials are deeply involved in drug trafficking. This picture, secretly taken at a military airfield outside Managua, shows
Federico Vaughn, a top aide to one of the nine commandantes who rule Nicaragua,
loading an aircraft with illegal narcotics, bound for the United States.
No there seems to be no crime to which the Sandinistas will not stoop-this is
an outlaw regime . .. .
Through this crucial part of the Western Hemisphere passes almost half our foreign trade, more than half our imports of crude oil and a significant portion of the
military supplies we would have to send to the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance in the event of a crisis. These are the choke points where the sea
lanes could be closed.
Central America is strategic to our Western alliance, a fact always understood by
foreign enemies. In World War II, only a few German U-boats, operating from bases
4,000 miles away in Germany and occupied Europe, inflicted crippling losses on
U.S. shipping right off our southern coast.
Today, Warsaw Pact engineers are building a deep-water port on Nicaragua's
Caribbean coast, similar to the naval base in Cuba for Soviet-built submarines. They
are also constructing, outside Managua, the largest military airfield in Central Americasimilar to those in Cuba, from which Russian Bear bombers patrol the U.S. East
Coast from Maine to Florida.
How did this menace to the peace and security of our Latin neighbors-and
ultimately ourselves-suddenly emerge? Let me give you a brief history.
In 1979, the people of Nicaragua rose up and overthrew a corrupt dictatorship.
At first the revolutionary leaders promised free elections and respect for human
B . Reagan 's Foreig n Policies
559
rights. But among them was an organization called the Sandinistas. Theirs was a
Communist organization, and their support of the revolutionary goals was sheer
deceit. Quickly and ruthlessly, they took complete control.
Two months after the revolution, the Sandinista leadership met in secret, and, in
what came to be known as the "72-hour document," described themselves as the
"vanguard" of a revolution that would sweep Central America, Latin America and
finally the world. Their true enemy, they declared: the United States.
Rather than make this document public, they followed the advice of Fidel Castro, who told them to put on a facade of democracy. While Castro viewed the democratic elements in Nicaragua with contempt, he urged his Nicaraguan friends to keep
some of them in their coalition-in minor posts-as window dressing to deceive the
West. That way, Castro said, you can have your revolution, and the Americans will
pay for it.
And we did pay for it. More aid flowed to Nicaragua from the United States in
the first 18 months under the Sandinistas than from any other country. Only when
the mask fell , and the face of the totalitarianism became visible to the world, did the
aid stop.
Confronted with this emerging threat, early in our Administration I went to Congress and, with bipartisan support, managed to get help for the nations surrounding
Nicaragua. Some of you may remember the inspiring scene when the people of
El Salvador braved the threats and gunfire of Communist guerrillas-guerrillas directed and supplied from Nicaragua-and went to the polls to vote decisively for
democracy. For the Communists in El Salvador it was a humiliating defeat.
But there was another factor the Communists never counted on, a factor that
now promises to give freedom a second chance-the freedom fighters of Nicaragua.
You see, when the Sandinistas betrayed the revolution, many who had fought
the old Somoza dictatorship literally took to the hills, and like the French Resistance
that fought the Nazis, began fighting the Soviet bloc Communists and the Nicaraguan
collaborators. These few have now been joined by thousands.
With their blood and courage, the freedom fighters of Nicaragua have pinned
down the Sandinista Army and bought the people of Central America precious time.
We Americans owe them a debt of gratitude. In helping to thwart the Sandinistas
and their Soviet mentors, the resistance has contributed directly to the security of
the United States.
Since its inception in 1982, the democratic resistance has grown dramatically in
strength. Today it numbers more than 20,000 volunteers and more come every day.
But now the freedom fighters ' supplies are running short, and they are virtually
defenseless against the helicopter gunships Moscow has sent to Managua.
Now comes the crucial test for the Congress of the United States. Will they
provide the assistance the freedom fighters need to deal with Russian tanks and
gunships-or will they abandon the democratic resistance to its Communist enemy?
In answering this question, I hope Congress will reflect deeply upon what it is
the resistance is fighting against in Nicaragua:
Ask yourselves, what in the world are Soviets, East Germans, Bulgarians, North
Koreans, Cubans and terrorists from the P.L.O. [Palestine Liberation Organization]
and the Red Brigades doing in our hemisphere, camped on our own doorstep? Is
that for peace?
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Why have the Soviets invested $600 million to build Nicaragua into an armed
force almost the size of Mexico's, a country 15 times as large, and 25 times as populous?
Is that for peace?
Why did Nicaragua's dictator, Daniel Ortega, go [to] the Communist Party Congress
in Havana and endorse Castro's cause for the worldwide triumph of Communism? Was
that for peace?
Some members of Congress asked me, Why not negotiate? Good question-let
me answer it directly. We have sought-and still seek-a negotiated peace and a
democratic future in a free Nicaragua. Ten times we have met and tried to reason
with the Sandinistas. Ten times we were rebuffed. Last year, we endorsed churchmediated negotiations between the regime and the resistance. The Soviets and the
Sandinistas responded with a rapid arms buildup of mortars, tanks, artillery and
helicopter gunships ....
If we fail, there will be no evading responsibility, history will hold us accountable.
This is not some narrow partisan issue; it is a national security issue, an issue on
which we must act not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans.
Forty years ago, Republicans and Democrats joined together behind the Truman
Doctrine [seep. 405]. It must be our policy, Harry Truman declared, to support peoples struggling to preserve their freedom. Under that doctrine, Congress sent aid to
Greece just in time to save that country from the closing grip of a Communist
tyranny. We saved freedom in Greece then-and with that same bipartisan spirit we
can save freedom in Nicaragua today.
Over the coming days, I will continue the dialogue with members of Congress,
talking to them, listening to them, hearing out their concerns. Senator Scoop Jackson, who led the fight on Capitol Hill for an awareness of danger in Central America,
said it best: On matters of national security, the best politics is no politics.
You know, recently one of our most distinguished Americans, [former congresswoman and ambassador] Clare Booth Luce, had this to say about the coming vote.
"In considering this crisis, " Mrs. Luce said, "My mind goes back to a similar moment in our history-back to the first years after Cuba had fallen to Fidel. One day
during those years, I had lunch at the White House with a man I had known since
he was a boy-John F. Kennedy. 'Mr. President,' I said, 'no matter how exalted or
great a man may be, history will have time to give him no more than one sentence.
George Washington-he founded our country. Abraham Lincoln-he freed the slaves
and preserved the union. Winston Churchill-he saved Europe.'"
"'And what, Clare,' John Kennedy said, 'do you believe my sentence will be?"'
"'Mr. President, ' she answered, 'your sentence will be that you stopped the
Communists-or that you did not. ' "
Tragically, John Kennedy never had the chance to decide which that would be.
Now, leaders of our own time must do so. My fellow Americans, you know where I
stand. The Soviets and the Sandinistas must not be permitted to crush freedom in
Central America and threaten our own security on our own doorstep.
Now the Congress must decide where it stands. Mrs. Luce ended by saying:
"Only this is certain. Through all time to come, this, the 99th Congress of the United
States, will be remembered as that body of men and women that either stopped the
Communists before it was too late-or did not. " ...
B. Reagan 's Foreign Policies
561
I have only three years left to serve my country, three years to carry out theresponsibilities you have entrusted to me, three years to work for peace. Could there
be any greater tragedy than for us to sit back and permit this cancer to spread, leaving my successor to face far more agonizing decisions in the years ahead? The freedom fighters seek a political solution. They are willing to lay down their arms and
negotiate to restore the original goals of the revolution. A democracy in which the
people of Nicaragua choose their own government, that is our goal also, but it can
only come if the democratic resistance is able to bring pressure to bear on those
who have seized power.
We still have time to do what must be done so history will say of us, We had the
vision, the courage and good sense to come together and act-Republicans and
Democrats-when the price was not high and the risks were not great. We left
America safe, we left America secure, we left America free, still a beacon of hope to
mankind, still a light [u]nto the nations.
Thank you and God bless you.
2. AJournalist Urges Caution in Nicaragua ( 1986)
Tad Szulc, an experienced reporter on Caribbean affairs, saw some disturbing
parallels between Reagan 's proposed steps in Central America and the failed Bay of
Pigs invasion during john F Kennedy's presidency. How convincing is he? What
similarities in the two situations are most disturbing?
April 17 marks the nearly forgotten 25th anniversary of the invasion of the Bay
of Pigs in Cuba-organized, financed and directed by the United States. That sorry
enterprise provides an uncannily real analogy with President Reagan's latest efforts
to arm the Nicaraguan contras in order finally to oust the Sandinistas. Congress may
do well to ponder this analogy as it prepares to vote on President Reagan's request
for $100 million in new aid to the rebels.
There is, to begin with, an eerie similarity in the assumptions underlying United
States involvement in Cuba 25 years ago and in Nicaragua today. There are also parallels in the sequence of policy making decisions that gradually linked United States
geopolitical objectives, first with Cuba, now with Nicaragua.
In the case of Nicaragua, the White House began by asserting that the Sandinistas
were threatening to spread the virus of Communism throughout Central America. A
secret decision was made, apparently in the early days of the Reagan Administration,
in the National Security Council to uproot Managua's Marxist-Leninist leadership. This
was followed by the self-serving declaration that most Nicaraguans were determined
to be rid of the Sandinistas and that all it would take to help them accomplish this
would be clever paramilitary support provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
In the case of Cuba, the National Security Council met on March 10, 1959, to discuss, in secret, ways to "bring another Government to power. " This was barely two
2
From Tad Szulc, "Nicaragua, an Echo of the Bay of Pigs. " Originally published in the New York Times,
March 16, 1986. Reprinted by permission of the New York Times.
562
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
months after Fidel Castro swept into power with overwhelming national support for
his social revolution.
On March 17, 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved "A Program of
Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" because Fidel Castro was moving toward
Communism and a stronger relationship with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, his Administration had begun to develop a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for "future
guerrilla action."
On Feb. 3, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a "Military Evaluation of the
C.I.A. Paramilitary Plan-Cuba," but with the warning that "it is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors, i.e., a sizable popular uprising or
substantial follow-on forces."
However, the C.I.A. misled President John F. Kennedy about the likelihood of
an uprising after the landing of the Cuban exiles' brigade. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk later told a Presidential board of inquiry "that the uprising was utterly essential
to success."
No major uprising occurred in Cuba along with the landing, and not only because Mr. Castro had had the foresight to round up thousands of potential opponents. Even those who had become increasingly disenchanted with Mr. Castro refused
to welcome what they suspected to be a United States-engineered return to the status quo of the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship-indeed, the invading forces included
several Batista officers.
Let us now turn to the Nicaraguan rerun of the Bay of Pigs operations.
Obviously, the conditions are not identical. The Sandinista commandantes have
been in power for nearly seven years, and, notwithstanding their generally appalling
leadership they have managed to consolidate their police and political hold on the
population. Bad as life is in Nicaragua, and repressive as the Government's internal
policies may be, the masses have not rushed to join or support the contras after
nearly four years of C.I.A. entreaties.
In other repressive societies, the people have risen against well-armed dictatorships-as in Poland with Solidarity, and in the Philippines-without C.I.A. manipulations. They have had convincing reasons to rebel, and they have done so with
clean hands. Clearly, this point entirely escapes President Reagan when he compares the contras with the Filipinos or real freedom fighters elsewhere in the world.
Despite its failures, the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979 has brought considerable
social justice and care to Nicaragua's impoverished people. The United States cannot ignore this fact any more than it can ignore the strong nationalistic sentiments of
the Nicaraguan people arising, in part, from earlier armed interventions by United
States Marines.
Nor can it ignore the fact that the leadership of the contras is probably as repugnant to ordinary Nicaraguans as the leadership of the Bay of Pigs force was to
the ordinary Cuban 25 years ago. That the contras are led by key officers of the old
Somoza dictatorship's National Guard, the main oppressors of the population in the
old days, is either sheer C.I.A. folly or a confession that no better leaders could be
produced.
The Administration confronts this argument by pointing out that respected democrats from the first Sandinista regime, including Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo,
are members of the umbrella political organization attached to the contras, and that
B. Reagan 's Foreign Policies
563
this in turn suggests the existence of widespread support inside Nicaragua for the
anti-Sandinista effort.
Here again the Cuban experience is instructive. The C.I.A.-backed Democratic
Revolution Front was headed by Jose Mir6 Cardona, the first Prime Minister after the
Cuban revolution, and included Manuel Ray, who had been Mr. Castro's liberalminded public works minister. But despite their individual popularity, and the fact
that they had been dismissed by an increasingly radical Fidel Castro, they did not have
significant backing inside Cuba, and when the invasion came, the C.I.A.-controlled
Democratic Revolutionary Front turned out to be totally useless.
Just as the C.I.A. misled the Kennedy Administration about the internal support
for the exiles' invasion, the Reagan Administration-equally misleadingly-applies
self-fulfilling prophecies to the Nicaraguan dispute. The President says he is willing
to forget the contras if Managua agrees to negotiate, but what he evidently means by
negotiation is either a Sandinista capitulation or power-sharing with the contrabacked opposition outside the countty.
Since, as President Reagan must realize, this is an unacceptable proposition to
any government, he will be able to proclaim that, having turned down his peacemaking ultimatum, Nicaragua is now fair game for the use of force. And at that juncture he will have trapped himself.
Recent history shows that the United States can impose its will in Latin America
only by applying or threatening the use of its armed forces. The leftist regime in
Guatemala was thrown out in 1954 by a ragtag guerrilla army directed by United
States officers, ushering in a corrupt rightist dictatorship. In 1965, it took two United
States combat divisions to make the civil war in the Dominican Republic come out
our way. In 1983, tiny Grenada was simply knocked out by American forces.
What happens, therefore, in Nicaragua if the contras, even with a fresh $100 million, fail to win their war? Will President Reagan, in desperation, order the use of
American troops there? This is the one thing that John F. Kennedy chose not to do
at the Bay of Pigs.
3. An Editor Analyzes the Iran-Contra Affair ( 1987)
In November 1986 the American people were shocked to learn that representatives of
the Reagan administration had secretly entered into negotiations to sell armaments
to the government of Iran-a government that Ronald Reagan himself had called
''Murder Incorporated. " Tbe public was further stunned by subsequent revelations that
profits from the Iranian arms sales were funneled to the "contra" rebels in Nicaragua,
in blatant defiance of a congressional ban on military aid to the contras. Later congressional hearings and inquiries-especially the report of the Tower commissionand court trials hinted at a shadowy network of secret government operations,
involving National Security Adviser john Poindexter and his aide, Marine Colonel
Oliver North. President Reagan maintained that he knew nothing of all these covert
operations, but questions about his role stubbornly refused to go away. In the following selection, Harper's Magazine editor Lewis H. Lapham speculates on the meaning
3Lewis
H. Lapham, "An Editor Analyzes the Iran-Contra Affair. " Copyright © 1987 by Harper's Magazine.
All rights reserved. Reproduced from the May issue by special permission.
564
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
of the Iran-contra affair for the American governmental system. What picture of
Ronald Reagan as president emerges? How valid is Lapham 's concept of "two governments"? Can a president be held fairly accountable for all the actions of his subordinates? To what does Lapham attribute the political recklessness that led to
Iran-contra?
As expected, the Tower Commission's report depicted the President of the
United States as a matinee idol held captive by his retinue of zealous, vain, and remarkably inept subalterns. Although muffled in the language of bureaucratic euphemism, the text makes it plain enough that President Reagan knew as much
about the Iranian arms deals as he knows about the dark side of the moon. The National Security Council did as it pleased-trading weapons for hostages, ignoring
whatever laws it didn't care to understand, furnishing the President with the lies that
he obligingly and uncomprehendingly read into the television cameras.
If with regard to the habitual somnambulism of the Reagan Administration the
report confirmed what had been obvious for some years, it raised further and more
difficult questions about the paranoid mechanics of any American presidency. Why
is it that so many seemingly enlightened politicians (a.k.a. "the leaders of the free
world") insist on making mockeries of their own dearest beliefs? How does it happen that they repeatedly entangle themselves in the coils of scandal and the nets of
crime? How does it come to pass that President Kennedy approves the doomed invasion at the Bay of Pigs and sets in motion the idiot Realpolitik of the Vietnam War,
or that President Johnson sponsors the escalation of that war with the contrived incident in the Tonkin Gulf, or that President Nixon orders the secret bombing of
Cambodia and entrusts his reputation to the incompetent thugs sent to rifle a desk
at the Watergate?
At least some of the answers follow from two sets of fantastic expectations
assigned to the office of the presidency.
1. The two governments. In response to the popular but utterly implausible belief that it can provide all things to all people, the American political system allows
for the parallel sovereignty of both a permanent and a provisional government. The
permanent government-the Congress, the civil and military services, the media, the
legion of Washington lawyers and expensive lobbyists-occupies the anonymous
hierarchies that remain safely in place no matter what the political truths voted in
and out of the White House on the trend of a season. It is this government-sly and
patient and slow-that writes the briefing papers and the laws, presides over the
administrative routine, remembers who bribed whom in the election of 1968, and
why President Carter thought it prudent to talk privately to God about the B-1
bomber.
Except in the rare moments of jointly opportune interest, the permanent government wages a ceaseless war of bureaucratic attrition against the provisional government that once every four or eight years accompanies a newly elected president
to Washington. The amateur government consists of the cadre of ideologues, cronies,
plutocrats, and academic theorists miraculously transformed into Cabinet officials
and White House privy counselors. Endowed with the virtues of freebooting adventurers, the parvenu statesmen can be compared with reasonable accuracy either to
a troupe of actors or to a swarm of thieves. They possess the talents and energies
B. Reagan 's Foreign Policies
565
necessary to the winning of elections. Although admirable, these are not the talents
and energies useful to the conduct of international diplomacy.
An American presidential campaign resembles a forced march through enemy
country, and the president's companions-in-arms-whether Robert Kennedy, John
Mitchell, Hamilton Jordan, or William Casey-inevitably prove to be the sort of people who know how to set up advance publicity in a shopping mall, how to counterfeit a political image or bully a congressman, how to buy a vote or rig a stock
price. They seldom know anything of history, of languages, of literature, of political
economy, and they lack the imaginative intelligence that might allow them to understand any system of value that can't be learned in a football stadium or a usedcar lot.
The president and his confederates inherit a suite of empty rooms. The media
like to pretend that the White House is an august and stately institution, the point at
which all the lines of power converge, the still center of the still American universe.
The people who occupy the place discover that the White House bears a more
credible resemblance to a bare stage or an abandoned cruise ship. The previous
tenants have removed everything of value-the files , the correspondence, the telephone numbers, the memorabilia on the walls. The new repertory company begins
at the beginning, setting up its own props and lights, arranging its own systems of
communications and theory of command, hoping to sustain, at least long enough for
everybody to profit from the effect, the illusion of coherent power.
All other American institutions of any consequence (the Chase Manhattan Bank,
say, or the Pentagon) rely on the presence of senior officials who remember what
happened twenty years ago when somebody else-equally ambitious, equally newproposed something equally foolish. But the White House is barren of institutional
memory. Maybe an old butler remembers that President Eisenhower liked sugar in
his tea, but nobody remembers the travel arrangements for the last American expedition to Iran.
Because everybody in the White House arrives at the same time (all of them
contemporaries in their newfound authority), nobody, not even Nancy Reagan, can
invent the pomp and majesty of a traditional protocol. The ancient Romans at least
had the wit to provide their triumphant generals with a word of doubt. The general
was allowed to ride through the streets of the capital at the head of a procession of
captured slaves, but the Senate assigned a magistrate to stand behind him in the
chariot, holding the wreath over his head and muttering into his ear the constant
reminder that he was mortal. But who in the White House can teach the lessons of
humility?
Within a week of its arrival in Washington, the provisional government learns
that the world is a far more dangerous place than anybody had thought possible as
recently as two months ago, when the candidate was reciting the familiar claptrap
about the Russians to an airport crowd somewhere south of Atlanta. Alarmed by the
introductory briefings at the Defense Department, the amateur statesmen feel impelled
to take bold stands, to make good on their campaign promises, to act.
Being as impatient as they are vain, they know they have only a short period of
time in which to set up their profitable passage back into the private sector (i.e., to
make their deals with a book publisher, a consulting business, or a brokerage firm) ,
and so they're in a hurry to make their fortunes and their names. Almost immediately
566
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
they find themselves checked by the inertia of the permanent government, by the
congressional committees, by the maze of prior agreements, by the bureaucrats who
bring up the niggling reasons why a thing can't be done.
Sooner or later, usually sooner, the sense of frustration incites the president's
men to "take it inside" or "move it across the street," and so they make of the National Security Council or the White House basement the seat of "a loyal government" blessed with the will to dare and do. The decision inevitably entails the
subversion of the law and excites the passion for secrecy. The technological possibilities presented by the available back channels, map overlays, and surveillance
techniques tempt the would-be Metternichs to succumb to the dreams of omnipotence. Pretty soon they start speaking in code, and before long American infantrymen begin to turn up dead in the jungles of Vietnam or the streets of Beirut.
2. Tbe will to innocence. Every administration has no choice but to confront the
world's violence and disorder, but the doctrines of American grace oblige it to do so
under the banners of righteousness and in the name of one or another of the fanciful pretexts ("democracy," "civilization, " "humanity," "the people, " etc.) that preserve the conscience of the American television audience. The electorate expects its
presidential candidates to feign the clean-limbed idealism of college sophomores, to
present themselves as honest and good-natured fellows who know nothing of murder, ambition, lust, selfishness, cowardice, or greed. The pose of innocence is as
mandatory as the ability to eat banquet food. Nobody can afford to say, with Talleyrand, that he's in it for the money, or, with Montaigne, that a statesman must deny
himself, at least during business hours, the luxuries of conscience and sentiment.
After having been in office no more than a few months, the provisional government no longer knows when it's telling the truth. The need to preserve the illusion
of innocence gets confused with the dream of power, and the resident fantasts come
to believe their own invented reality-the one they made out of smoke and colored
lights when they first arrived in Washington.
During the early years of the Reagan Administration, the President's advisers
were wise enough to remember that they had been hired to work on a theatrical
production. They staged military pageants in the Caribbean, the eastern Mediterranean, and New York harbor, sustained the illusion of economic prosperity with
money borrowed from the Japanese, dressed up the chicanery of their politics in the
sentiment of Broadway musicals. They were as lucky as they were clever, and for a
surprisingly long time their enemies in the permanent government stood willing to
judge the show a success.
The media's applause prompted the President and his companions to mistake
the world behind the footlights for the world outside the theater. Flattered by a
claque of increasingly belligerent and literal-minded ideologues (among them Vice
Admiral John Poindexter, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, and Patrick Buchanan)
and encouraged by the pretensions of his wife, Reagan came to imagine himself a
real, not a make-believe, president. He took to wearing his costume in the street, delivering his lines to passing strangers (among them Mikhail Gorbachev and the Ayatollah Khomeini) with the fond expectation that they would respond with dialogue
appropriate to the scene. The most recent reports from Washington suggest that he
apparently believed he was leading a Republican renaissance in America, that he
had gathered around him not a gang of petty charlatans but a host of selfless ideal-
B . Reagan 's Foreign Policies
567
ists, and that in exchange for a Bible and a key-shaped cake, the Iranian despotism
would abide by the rules of decorum in effect at the Los Angeles Country Club.
Despite having been repeatedly warned of his possible assassination that last
weekend in November 1963, President Kennedy went to Dallas in the firm belief
that he couldn't be killed. President Reagan invited the Tower Commission to examine his nonexistent foreign policy and his sentimental variations on the theme of
America the Beautiful in the belief that his enemies would accept his ignorance as
proof of his virtue.
4. Four Views on the End of the Cold War ( 1994)
At an extraordinary gathering in the summer of 1994, four of the major figures who
played roles in ending the four-and-one-half-decade-long Cold War met in Colorado
to assess the process by which the Cold War at last reached its finale . Margaret
Thatcher was prime minister of Britain for the entire decade of the 1980s; Fran~ois
Mitterrand was president of France; George Bush seroed as Ronald Reagan's vice
president and was elected president himself in 1988; and Mikhail Gorbachev was the
principal architect of the enormous changes that swept through the Soviet Union in
the 1980s. How do they agree, and how do they differ, in their appraisals of what
happened and why in that momentous decade? Which explanation is most credible?
Who should get the lion's share of the credit for ending the Cold War? Which of these
leaders is most prophetic about the future?
Margaret Thatcher. There was one vital factor in the ending of the Cold War: Ronald
Reagan's decision to go ahead with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
The point of SDI was to stop nuclear weapons from reaching their objective. The first nation that got it would have a tremendous advantage because the
whole military balance would change. So, it was of supreme importance.
This was a completely different level of defense. It required enormous computer capability, which he knew at the time the Soviet Union could not match.
And that was the end of the arms race as we had been pursuing it. I told Mr.
Gorbachev when he first visited me that I was all for President Reagan going
ahead with SDI and that some of our scientists would help if needed.
From that particular moment, everything was not so easy in my relationship
with Mr. Gorbachev. At the same time it was clear that (with Gorbachev) we
could negotiate in a different way with a different kind of person who was beginning to allow people in the Soviet Union to have freedom of worship and
freedom of speech.
So the end of the Cold War had a great deal to do with Ronald Reagan and
a great deal to do with Mr. Gorbachev.
Mikhail Gorbachev. I cannot agree that the SDI initiative had this much importance.
SDI-type research was also done in our country. We knew that in the defense sector we could find a response. So, SDI was not decisive in our movement toward
4From M. Gorbachev, M. Thatcher, G. Bush, F. Mitterrand, and B. Mulroney, "What Did We End the Cold
War For?," New Perspectives Quarterly, 13:1 , Winter 1996, pp. 18-28. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Blackwell Publishing.
568
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
a new relationship with the West. If you accept that reforms in the Soviet Union
started under the pressure from the West, particularly as a result of the implementation of SDI, that would distort the real picture and offer the wrong lesson
for the future.
Of decisive importance were the changes within the Soviet Union. They
necessarily preceded any change in our external relations.
We had to go a long way from a critical reassessment of the Communist
model that was forcibly imposed on our country and that was sustained by repressive measures. With technological progress and the improvement of the educational and cultural level, the old system began to be rejected by people who
saw that their initiative was suppressed, who saw they were not able to realize
their potential.
Therefore, the first impulses for reform were in the Soviet Union itself, in our
society which could no longer tolerate the lack of freedom, where no one could
speak out or choose their own party or select their own creed. In the eyes of the
people, especially the educated, the totalitarian system had run its course morally
and politically. People were waiting for reform. Russia was pregnant.
So, the moment was mature to give possibility to the people. And we could
only do it from above because initiative from below would have meant an
explosion of discontent. This was the decisive factor, not SDI.
Franr;ois Mitterrand. From the first moment Ronald Reagan mentioned SDI to me I
made known my firm opposition. I believed this was an excessive project, and
it has since been abandoned ....
In the Soviet Union, the need for change went back long before Gorbachev
arrived on the scene. Nikita Khrushchev and even Leonid Brezhnev were sufficiently intelligent to transform trends into habits. They made reforms; but the purpose of reform was to guarantee their power. For this reason, Soviet public opinion
never trusted or believed in reform. That changed with Mr. Gorbachev. Under him
reforms were carried out for the sake of reforms. That is the difference.
George Bush. I supported SDI, but you have got to remember that Ronald Reagan
was very idealistic on nuclear weapons. Ronald Reagan felt SDI was a way to
reduce nuclear terror. As you remember, he offered to share the technology
with all countries.
At Reykjavik, he and Mikhail almost hammered out a deal to get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. And Margaret had a fit about it, as did a lot of people
in the United States. I suspect Franc;;ois wasn't too pleased either because of the
French deterrent.
I disagree with Margaret, though, about the degree to which it forced reform or accelerated change inside the Soviet Union. We had huge defense budgets at that time and they continued on through my administration. SDI was part
of that, but it was nothing compared to the overall deployment of nukes all
around the world ....
Gorbachev. During the Chernenko* funeral, when I spoke with George Bush (then
Vice President) and Margaret Thatcher, I was also talking with the leaders of the
*Konstantin Chernenko was the head of the Soviet Union from February 1984 until his death in March
1985.
B. Reagan 's Foreign Policies
569
Eastern European countries. I said to all of them: "I want to assure you that
the principles that used to just be proclaimed-equality of states and noninterference in internal affairs-will now be our real policy. Therefore you bear
responsibility for affairs in your own country. We need perestroika [restructuring] and will do it in our own country. You make your own decision. " I said this
was the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine.*
I must say they all took a rather skeptical attitude. They thought, "Well, Gorbachev said something about troop reductions at the UN. He is talking about reform at home. He must be in bad shape. He will improve things a little, and then
the Soviet Union will go back to its old ways. This is playing the game that is
usual with Soviet leaders."
During my years in power we stuck to the p ')licy I announced. We never
interfered, not militarily and not even politically. When Gustav Husak from
Czechoslovakia and others came to us, we told them we would help them to
the extent possible, but "your country is your responsibility."
Bush . We were skeptical (about Gorbachev's proclamations on non-interference).
We were cautious. We were prudent. We didn't want to provoke something inside these Eastern European countries that would compel the Soviet leadership
to take action ....
Mitterrand. What brought everything down was the inability to control the fantastic
migration out of East Germany into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and later to
West Germany. That was the end for the Soviet empire.
If Gorbachev had chosen to use force in those countries under Soviet sway,
none could have resisted. But he made it known that he considered that option
an historical blunder. The very moment that Gorbachev said to the president of
the GDR (East Germany) that he did not intend to use force to solve the crisis,
that this was a new day and a new deal, that was the end. This was when the big
shift occurred. The fault line was not in Warsaw or Prague. It was in East Berlin.
So, the Communist leaders in Germany continued to be Communist leaders,
but they no longer led anything. This was a truly popular, peaceful r~volution
against which they coulq do nothing. After that, it all broke down, leading to the
transformation of Europe and to German unity.
Bush . When the Berlin Wall came down, we didn't know whether there were elements inside the Soviet Union that would say "enough is enough, we are not
going to lose this crown jewel, and we already have troops stationed there. "
In an interview at the time in the Oval Office, I was asked why I didn't
share the emotion of the American people over the fall of the Berlin Wall. Leaders of the opposition in Congress were saying that I ought to go and get up
on top of the Berlin Wall with all those students to show the world how we
Americans felt.
I felt very emotional, but it was my view that this was not the time to stick
our fingers in the eyes of Mikhail Gorbachev or the Soviet military. We were in
favor of German unity early on and felt events were moving properly.
· on the occasion of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announced the "Brezhnev Doctrine," asserting the right of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in any
Eastern European country where Communist rule was threatened.
570
Chapter 40
Tbe Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
So, we didn't want to do something stupid, showing our emotion in a way
that would compel elements in the Soviet Union to rise up against Gorbachev.
Gorbachev. We were not naive about what might happen. We understood that what
was underway was a process of change in the civilization. We knew that when
we pursued the principle of freedom of choice and non-interference in Eastern
Europe that we also deprived the West from interfering, from injecting themselves
into the processes taking place there.
As for what was happening within the Soviet leadership at the time, I
wouldn't have been able to launch the far-reaching process of reforms alone.
There was a group of reformers around me in the very first months of being in
office and we set out to change personnel, including in the Politburo and in the
provinces, and replace them with fresh forces. It was also at this time-in 1986
and 1987-when I thought that we should expand the democratic process. If
we didn't involve the citizens the bureaucrats would eventually suppress all reforms. Without these changes I would have met the fate of Khrushchev. Of
course, it was not a smooth process.
Thatcher. Unlike George Bush, I was opposed to German unification from early on
for the obvious reasons. To unify Germany would make her the dominant nation in the European community. They are powerful and they are efficient. It
would become a German Europe.
But unification was accomplished, really, very much without consulting the
rest of Europe. We were always amazed that it happened. My generation, of
course, remembers that we had two world wars against Germany, and that it
was a very racist society in the second. Those things that took place in Germany
could never happen in Britain.
I also thought it wrong that East Germany, whom, after all, we fought
against, should be the first to come into the European Community, while Poland
and Czechoslovakia, whom we went to war for, had to wait. They should have
been free in 1945 but were kept under the Communist yoke until the collapse
of the Soviet Union and, even now, are not sufficiently integrated into Europe
and suffer from protectionism.
Bush. To be very frank, we had our differences with Lady Thatcher and Fran~ois
Mitterrand. Perhaps it was because I didn't share their concerns based on the
histories of the two world wars. Maybe it is because America is removed and
separated.
But I felt that German unification would be in the fundamental interest of
the West. I felt the time had come to trust the Germans more, given what they
had done since the end of World War II.
I was convinced, also, that Helmut Kohl would not take a united Germany
out of NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. I was convinced he would
opt for the West and not neutrality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as Mr.
Gorbachev wanted. The whole process moved faster than any of us thought,
including Chancellor Kohl. ...
Gorbachev. The German question was the nerve center of our European policy.
You will recall that the Soviet position after World War II was that Germany
should be united-but as a democratic, neutral and demilitarized country. But
that did not happen.
B . Reagan 's Foreig n Policies
571
When West German President Richard von Weiszacker came to see me when
I had first become general secretary and asked about my views on Germany, I
told him that as [a] result of the war and the system created after the war, two Germanys were an historic reality. History had passed its judgment. Perhaps Germany
would reunify in five or ten--or a hundred-years. That was my position then.
At the same time, the Helsinki Process,* begun in 1975, was underway. That
consolidated the postwar realities, among them of a divided Germany, and made
it possible for us to normalize relations with Europe. We then became engaged
in widespread cooperation with West Germany. Together, East and West Germany
were our biggest economic and trade partners. The Federal Republic, to my mind,
had also settled all those frontier issues President Mitterrand raised by signing
treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. All this created the groundwork for
the movement to a new situation.
Of decisive importance, though, was the launching of perestroika in the Soviet Union. It affected public opinion in all the central and eastern European
countries, but especially in East Germany.
When I went to the GDR to participate in the 40th anniversary celebrations
in October 1989 there was a torchlight parade organized by the leaders. The
marchers were carefully selected from 28 districts around the GDR. They were
people who were supposed to be "reliable. " But they began to shout slogans
demanding democracy and perestroika for the GDR.
The Polish premier came to me and said: "This is the end." This had become
the reality. And politicians have to accept realities.
For us the German reunification issue was the most difficult one. For President Bush and the US Administration the key issue was the future of NATO.
And, today, as we see how NATO is being pushed forward instead of a European process of building common institutions, we understand why it was their
concern. That is a problem.
The president of France was concerned about borders and territory. Mrs.
Thatcher had geopolitical concerns about who would dominate Europe. Everyone
had questions.
But I can tell you those questions cannot even be compared with the problems the Soviet leadership was facing given our enormous sacrifices during the
war. So, for us, taking the decision on German unification was not easy. We had
to go a very long way. We thought the process would take a long time and
would be coordinated with the building of new European institutions under the
umbrella not of the Americans, but of a European process.
Like Chancellor Kohl, we thought that initially there would be some kind of
association of German states, a confederation perhaps.
Then history began to speak when the masses created a new reality more
rapidly than any of us were prepared for. Suddenly all these questions were put
in a new frame .
*Representatives of thirty-four nations met in Helsinki, Finland, in July 1975 and officially ended World
War II. The agreements signed at Helsinki recognized the Soviet-dictated boundaries of divided Germany, Poland, and other Eastern European countries. In return, the Soviets agreed to liberalization of educational and other exchanges between East and West. The Helsinki accords also stimulated dissident
movements throughout Eastern Europe to organize and assert claims for political and human rights.
572
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conseroatism, 1980-1992
We had ended the Cold War and said, as George Bush and I did in Malta,
that we would no longer regard each other as enemies. We had come a long
way in opening freedom in our country. We dismantled the totalitarian system,
launched perestroika in the Soviet Union and reforms in Eastern Europe. The
entire world had moved into a new stage of development.
Was all this to be sacrificed by trying to stop what the Germans themselves
wanted by moving in troops? No. Only the political process was available to us.
And the political process is constrained by the realities of what the people
want. We had to recognize the free expression of the Germans.
President Bush was right about Germany. The Germans had accepted democratic values. They had behaved responsibly. They had recognized their guilt.
They had apologized for that past, and that was very important.
So, as difficult as it was, it was inevitable that the Soviet leadership took
decisions consistent with this reality ....
Mitterrand. We too wanted to avoid the military test in the Baltics because this
would jeopardize the position of Mikhail Gorbachev. At the same time, for him
to accept the unconditional independence of revolting nations was to accept
dislocation of the whole ....
I believe that in the next century a new synthesis must be found between
the two requirements stressed by President Gorbachev-the need for integration as well as the need to affirm individual personality, sovereignty and rights
in different areas. And this is by no means a done deal.
The separation of the Czechs and Slovaks is a good example, but there
will be other less harmonious separations in Europe. And let us hope it is not
contagious and spreads to the American continent.
The aspiration for national identity is clearly understandable after what Mrs.
Thatcher called the fallen empires-certainly the main feature of the 20th century. The end of empire releases ethnic and tribal groups. Each goes it alone,
wanting to enjoy all the trappings of sovereignty. But that is not possible. It
clashes with the other basic trend of globalization.
So, a synthesis is necessary. Though Lady Thatcher does not agree, that is
what we are doing within the European community. Shall we succeed in effecting a synthesis between this need for great aggregates and this incipient need of
each small community to affirm itself as such?
Absurd, would it not be, to encourage each splinter of a truth to lead an independent international life? And yet, it is injustice to prevent anyone from doing so.
So, in the next century the world must create the rule of law that protects
minorities, enabling them to live freely with most of the attributes that makes it
possible to meet their national aspirations. At the same time national organizations
must be created so that each country can maintain its cohesiveness.
If we do not do this, we shall see a tremendous scattering and breaking
away. No one will be immune. The need for decentralization in the US or Canada
will prevail over a federal state. And it will be the same in Brazil, in Spain, in
Belgium. There would be no end, no way out.
Will we have political leaders capable of conceiving the organization of this
huge world with a few major coordination centers obeying international laws
C. A Philosophy for Neoconservatism
573
set by the international community, and at the same time making minority rules
that enable each to live according to his or her yearning?
Enough said. A new generation is rising. They will have to answer this
question.
C. A Philosophy for Neoconservatism _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
I. Editor Irving Kristol Defines
Neoconservatism ( 1983)
Liberalism was the dominant political religion for most American intellectuals for at
least a generation after the New Deal and World War II. Liberals pursued a vision of
a just, equitable society, and they looked to government as the means to achieve that
vision. In the 1960s, however, a reaction set in, as some intellectuals-many of them
refugees from liberalism -began to express growing doubts about egalitarian "excesses" and governmental inefficiencies, as well as about the "softness " of liberal foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. One of the leading thinkers in this conservative
renaissance was Irving Kristol, editor of the Public Interest, which became a prominent journal for the expression of neoconservative ideas. Kristol here defines the
essence of the neoconservative outlook. What are its leading features? How does it
compare to and contrast with the liberal outlook?
It should be clear by now that I do think there really is such a thing as
neoconservatism-but it is most misleading to think of it as any kind of "movement." It holds no meetings, has no organizational form, has no specific programmatic goals, and when two neoconservatives meet they are more likely to argue
with one another than to confer or conspire. But it is there, nevertheless-an impulse that ripples through the intellectual world; a "persuasion," to use a nice oldfashioned term; a mode of thought (but not quite a school of thought).
What are its distinctive features? I shall list them as I see them-but to say that
this listing is unofficial would be the understatement of the decade.
1. Neoconservatism is a current of thought emerging out of the academic-intellectual world
and provoked by disillusionment with contemporary liberalism. Its relation to the business community-the traditional source of American conservatism-is loose and uneasy,
though not necessarily unfriendly.
2. Unlike previous such currents of thought-for example, the Southern Agrarians or the
Transcendentalists of the nineteenth century-neoconservatism is antiromantic in substance and temperament. Indeed, it regards political romanticism-and its twin, political
utopianism-of any kind as one of the plagues of our age. This is but another way of
saying it is a philosophical-political impulse rather than a literary-political impulse. Or, to
put it still another way: Its approach to the world is more "rabbinic" than "prophetic. "
1
From Irving Kristol, Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, pp. 75-77 , 263-264.
Copyright © 1983. Reprinted by permission of the author.
574
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
3. The philosophical roots of neoconservatism are to be found mainly in classical-that is,
premodern, preideological-political philosophy. Here the teaching and writing of the
late [University of Chicago philosopher] Leo Strauss ... are of importance, though many
neoconservatives find him somewhat too wary of modernity. Neoconservatives are
admiring of Aristotle, respectful of Locke, distrustful of Rousseau.
4. The attitude of neoconservatives to bourgeois society and the bourgeois ethos is one of
detached attachment. In the spirit of Tocqueville, neoconservatives do not think that
liberal-democratic capitalism is the best of all imaginable worlds-only the best, under
the circumstances, of all possible worlds. This modest enthusiasm distinguishes neoconservatism from the Old Right and the New Right-both of which are exceedingly suspicious
of it.
5. Neoconservatism is inclined to the belief that a predominantly market economy-just
how "predominant" is a matter for some disagreement-is a necessary if not sufficient
precondition for a liberal society. (Daniel Bell, as the theoretician for what may be called
our "social-democratic wing," would presumably take issue with this judgment.) It also
sees a market economy as favorable to economic growth.
6. Neoconservatives believe in the importance of economic growth, not out of any enthusiasm for the material goods of this world, but because they see economic growth as indispensable for social and political stability. It is the prospect of economic growth that
has made it possible to think-against the grain of premodern political thought-of
democracy as a viable and enduring sociopolitical system.
7. Neoconservatives, though respecting the market as an economic mechanism, are not libertarian in the sense, say, that [conservative economists] Milton Friedman and Friedrich
A. von Hayek are. A conservative welfare state-what once was called a "social insurance" state-is perfectly consistent with the neoconservative perspective. So is a state that
takes a degree of responsibility for helping to shape the preferences that the people exercise in a free market-to "elevate" them, if you will. Neoconservatives, moreover, believe
that it is natural for people to want their preferences to be elevated. The current version
of liberalism, which prescribes massive government intervention in the marketplace but
an absolute laissez-faire attitude toward manners and morals, strikes neoconservatives as
representing a bizarre inversion of priorities.
8. Neoconservatives look upon family and religion as indispensable pillars of a decent society. Indeed, they have a special fondness for all of those intermediate institutions of a
liberal society which reconcile the need for community with the desire for liberty.
Karl Marx once wrote that the human race would eventually face the choice between socialism and barbarism. Well, we have seen enough of socialism in our time
to realize that, in actuality as distinct from ideality, it can offer neither stability nor
justice, and that in many of its versions it seems perfectly compatible with barbarism. So most neoconservatives believe that the last, best hope of humanity at this
time is an intellectually and morally reinvigorated liberal capitalism....
It is the fundamental fallacy of American foreign policy to believe, in face of the
evidence, that all peoples, everywhere, are immediately "entitled" to a liberal constitutional government-and a thoroughly democratic one at that. It is because of this
assumption that our discussions of foreign policy, along with our policy itself, are
constantly being tormented by moral dilemmas, as we find ourselves allied to nonliberal and nondemocratic regimes. These dilemmas are guilt-inducing mechanisms
which cripple policy-an attitude that no nation can sustain for long-or else we
C. A Philosophy for Neoconservatism
575
take flight into sweeping crusades for "human rights," which quickly brings us up
short before intractable realities.
Now, there is nothing inevitable about this state of affairs. As a matter of fact, it
is only since World War I-a war fought under the Wilsonian slogans of "selfdetermination for all nations" and "make the world safe for democracy"-that American foreign policy began to disregard the obvious for the sake of the quixotic
pursuit of impossible ideals. Before World War I, intelligent men took it for granted
that not all peoples, everywhere, at all times, could be expected to replicate a Western constitutional democracy. This was a point of view, incidentally, shared more or
less equally by conservatives, liberals, and socialists.
It was only with World War I and its aftermath that thinking about foreign policy
lost its moorings in the real world and became utterly ideologized ....
For Americans, the transition occurred via the utopian enthusiasm of Woodrow
Wilson, preaching "self-determination," "human rights," "one man, one vote," "a world
without war" as if these were in fact unproblematic possibilities. The consequence
has been a foreign policy that is intellectually disarmed before all those cases where
a government is neither totalitarian nor democratic, but authoritarian in one way or
another, to one degree or another. We could, if we were sensible, calmly accept this
basic reality of world politics, while using our influence to edge unenlightened
despotisms toward more enlightened behavior, or enlightened despotisms toward
more liberal and humane behavior. Instead, we end up in either an unstable, guiltridden and seemingly "immoral" alliance with them or displaying a haughty censoriousness that helps "destabilize" them.
2. Journalist Peter Steinfels Criticizes
the Neoconservatives ( 1979)
One of the .first commentators to identify neoconservatism as a distinct body of
thought was Peter Steinfels, editor of the Catholic periodical Commonweal. In his
book of 19 79 about the neoconservative movement, he is sharply critical of many of
its doctrines. What does he .find most objectionable in neoconservative thought? What
does he .find most valuable?
The great virtue of neoconservatism is the serious attention it pays to the moral
culture that is a fundament of our political and economic life. There is barely a serious
school of liberal or even Marxist thought that holds humans to be economically determined and values, culture, and beliefs the mere reflection of socioeconomic forces.
And yet in practice liberals, radicals, and socialists concentrate on questions of economic deprivation or physical pain rather than of meaning or moral capacity. They do
not deny the importance of culture and values; but when they would act upon them,
they almost inevitably propose to enter the chain of causes at the point of providing
material support or physical well-being. Otherwise, the Left, broadly speaking, has
been primarily concerned with culture by way of removing constraints--commercial
2
Reprinted with the permission of Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group from Tbe Neoconservatives
by Peter Steinfels. Copyright© 1979 by Peter Steinfels.
576
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conseroatism, 1980-1992
pressures, government censorship, insufficient funding, traditional taboos, established
conventions. The New Left did criticize liberalism in the sixties for its rendering of politics as procedure and its presentation of social science as value-free. Irving Kristol
and the New Left were thus agreed on the necessity of "republican virtue" (though the
New Left, unlike Kristol, would not rally to the "bourgeois ethic"). But the New Left's
concern dissolved into assorted dogmatisms on the one hand, and into the cultural
laissez-faire of "do your own thing" on the other. It was left to neoconservatism,
sworn enemy of the New Left, to be the serious force reminding us that the capacity of self-government and self-direction is not a given which simply emerges once
restraints are removed. It is an active power that must be fostered, nourished, and
sustained; that requires supporting communities, disciplined thinking and speech,
self-restraint, and accepted conventions. In a number of ways neoconservatism is
not itself faithful to this insight, even contradicts it; but it has put the moral culture
of society on the public agenda and no doubt will keep it there.
The second virtue of neoconservatism is its rejection of sentimentality. By sentimentality I mean the immediate emotional response that renders a reality all of a
piece and "obvious ." When sentimentality governs our responses to the world's ills,
it clings to the visible or physical evils at hand and tends to ignore the less apparent, more diffuse, and distant dangers. It leaps to solutions and short-circuits reflection. Neoconservatism has countered this sentimentality by forcing back the
discussion of many political issues to first principles and by its delight in exposing
unintended consequences of well-meant measures. There is a good bit of sentimentality in neoconservatism; there is even a sentimentality of anti-sentimentality- areflexive granting of credibility to whatever, through irony, paradox, or complexity,
appears to resist the pull of sympathy, and an equally automatic suspicion of whatever appears untutored or unguarded in its registration of experience. And there is
also the tendency toward that hard-headed constriction of feeling that Dickens, in
Hard Times, fixed in the very name as well as character of Gradgrind. Nonetheless,
the neoconservative presence in public controversy has certainly reduced the likelihood that the "obvious" will escape questioning. Is money what the poor need? Or
better schools the solution to illiteracy? Does poverty breed crime? Should more
people vote? Or campaign spending be limited? Is equality desirable? To some people, the very posing of such questions is an annoyance and a diversion. To those,
however, who believe that the unexamined proposal is not worth pursuing, the
neoconservative attitude appears salutary.
The third virtue of neoconservatism is related to the second: the thoroughgoing
criticisms that it has made of liberal or radical programs and premises. This is less an
attitude, like its anti-sentimentality, than a self-assigned agenda. Neoconservatism
has taken pride in frontally challenging the excesses of the New Left and the counterculture; more important-because those excesses were probably self-liquidating
and already on the wane when neoconservatism set to work-have been the detailed and often technically superior critiques of mainstream liberal notions. Despite
the polemical overkill that too frequently mars such critiques, they provide a much
more factually informed and sophisticated debating partner for liberal or left-wing
thought than has traditional American conservatism, in any of its rugged individualist,
agrarian aristocrat, or super-nationalist manifestations.
D. Assessing the Reagan Presidency
577
To every virtue a vice. The outstanding weaknesses of neoconservatism have already been amply suggested: its formulation of an outlook largely in negative terms;
its lack of internal criticism; its unwillingness to direct attention to socioeconomic
structures and to the existing economic powers; its exaggeration of the adversarial
forces in society; its lack of serious respect for its adversaries. If neoconservatism is
to construct a convincing defense of an outlook emphasizing a stoic rationality,
public restraint, and the maintenance of an ethic of achievement and excellence, it
will have to confront the extent to which such an ideal challenges contemporary
capitalism. If it is to defend freedom in a bureaucratic age, it will have to understand
freedom in a richer sense than anti-Communism and a derived anti-statism. If it is to
defend high culture and intellectual rigor, it will need to celebrate the enlarging and
life-giving force of superior work and not merely issue self-satisfying strictures on
the inferior or fashionable.
Neoconservatism began as an antibody on the left. Many of its leading figures
originally conceived of it that way and perhaps still do: it was a reaction to what
they considered the destabilizing and excessive developments of the sixties, and
when these had been quelled, it would once again be indistinguishable from mainstream liberalism. Its own excesses, or at least its somewhat narrow focus of attention on one set of adversaries, would be balanced by the native strengths of the
liberalism of which it was part. That, of course, has not turned out to be the case.
Neoconservatism is now an independent force. To return to the biological analogy,
antibodies which overreact can destroy the organism. The great danger posed by
and to neoconservatism is that it will become nothing more than the legitimating
and lubricating ideology of an oligarchic America where essential decisions are
made by corporate elites, where great inequalities are rationalized by straitened circumstances and a system of meritocratic hierarchy, and where democracy becomes
an occasional, ritualistic gesture. Whether neoconservatism will end by playing this
sinister and unhappy role, or whether it will end as a permanent, creative, and constructive element in American politics, is only partially in the hands of neoconservatives themselves. It will also be determined by the vigor, intelligence, and
dedication of their critics and opponents.
D. Assessing the Reagan Presidency _________________
I. A Skeptical View
of Reagan's Legacy (2004)
Tbe Reagan presidency is remembered as much for Reagan 's personality as for his
policies. In these panels the political cartoonist Kirk Anderson explores the contrast
between the undeniable appeal of Reagan 's charm and the troubling specifics of
some of his administration's actions. How might the two have been reconciled in the
public mind?
1Copyright
©
Kirk Anderson/ www.kirktoons.com.
578
Chapter40
Tbe Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
I
He tripled the national
debt, but he had such
CHARISMA!
He supported apartheid,
but he was ALWAYS
personable!
He crushed worker rights,
but he was someone you
could sit down and have
a beer with.
Star Wars turned out to
be an expensive fantasy,
but he had that
INFECTIOUS OPTIMISM!
He backed death squads
throughout Central
America, but he always
looked for the best in
He looked the other way
when Salvadoran allies
raped American nUns,
but he had that SELFDEPRECATING HUMOR!
He confused old movies
with foreign policy, but
he was always QUICK
WITH A JOKE!
He traded arms for hostages and 9iverted money
to drug-running death
squads, but he never lost
his SUNNY DISPOSITION!
He backed Saddam, but
he made us feel GOOD
about ourselves!
REMEM9ERINE:a REA<.:sAN
. www.kirktoons.com
- 11'4~
D. Assessing the Reagan Presidency
579
2. Charles Krauthammer Praises Reagan (2004)
The conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer saw in the fortieth president
much more than just an infectious smile. In this essay, Krauthammer insists that
Reagan met the true "definition of presidential greatness. " How accurate is Krauthammer's assertion that ''Reagan won the cold war"?
What made Ronald Reagan the greatest president of the second half of the 20th
century? Well, he certainly had the one quality Napoleon always sought in a general:
luck. Luck in his looks, luck in his voice, luck in his smile, luck in his choice of mate
(although for Reagan the second time was the charm).
And the greatest luck that any President can have: trouble, serious trouble ....
[B]ecause the best chance any President has for greatness is to be in power during
war or disaster....
Reagan's luck was to find a nation in trouble-in post-Vietnam retreat and disorientation. His political genius was to restore its spirit. And his legacy was winning
the longest war in American history, the long twilight struggle of the cold war.
He achieved all that with two qualities: courage and conviction. Conviction led
him to initiate economic shock therapy to pull the U.S. out of the stagflation of the
1970s. Courage allowed him not to flinch when his radical economic policies (and
those of a merciless Federal Reserve) initially caused the worst recession since the
Great Depression-and during a congressional election year (1982) to boot.
Reagan didn't waver, and by 1984 it was morning in America. The new prosperity gave a lilt to the rest of his presidency. But you don't get called great for lilt.
You get called great for victory. And Reagan won the cold war.
Conviction told him that the proper way to deal with this endless, enervating,
anxiety-ridden ordeal was not settling for stability but going for victory. Courage allowed him to weather the incessant, at times almost universal, attacks on him for the
radical means he chose to win it: the military buildup; nuclear deployments in Europe; the Reagan doctrine of overt support for anticommunist resistance movements
everywhere, including Nicaragua; and the piece de resistance, strategic missile defenses, derisively dubbed Star Wars by scandalized opponents. Within eight years,
an overmatched, overwhelmed, overstretched Soviet Union was ready for surrender,
the historically breathtaking, total and peaceful surrender of everything-its empire
and its state.
Reagan won that war not just with radical policies but also with a radically
unashamed ideological challenge, the great 1982 Westminster speech predicting that
communism would end up in the "ash heap of history" and the subsequent designation of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire. " That won him the derision of Western sophisticates, intellectuals and defeatists of all kinds. It also won him the undying
admiration of liberation heroes from Vaclav Havel to Natan Sharansky. Rarely does
history render such decisive verdicts: Reagan was right, his critics were wrong. Less
than a year after he left office, the Berlin Wall came down ....
With the years, the shallow explanations for Reagan's success-charm, acting,
2
Charles Krauthammer, "He Could See for Miles," Time, June 14, 2004. © 2004 Time, Inc. Reprinted by
permission.
580
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
oratory-have fallen away. What remains is Reagan's largeness and deeply enduring
significance. Let [Senator] Edward Kennedy, the dean of Democratic liberalism, render the verdict: "It would be foolish to deny that his success was fundamentally
rooted in a command of public ideas .... Whether we agreed with him or not,
Ronald Reagan was a successful candidate and an effective President above all else
because he stood for a set of ideas. He stated them in 1980-and it turned out that
he meant them-and he wrote most of them not only into public law but into the
national consciousness."
There is no better definition of presidential greatness.
3.James T. Patterson Weighs the Reagan Record (2003)
Historian james T Patterson analyzes the three major issues of the Reagan presidencyhis impact on "Big Government, " his contribution to a resurgence of conservative
politics, and his effect on national morale. Patterson finds a decidedly mixed record.
judged against Reagan's own goals, should his presidency be considered a success or
a disappointment?
... Those who are impressed with the size of Reagan's shadow often emphasize .three general points. First, that he succeeded in resisting what had appeared to
be an irreversible tide of Big Government. Second, that he shoved politics and political thinking toward the right. And third, that he heightened popular faith in the
nation.
The first claim is inaccurate insofar as means-tested programs for the poor are
concerned. Though stemmed in 1981, they increased again after 1984, and welfare
spending was higher in 1989 than it had been in 1981. In other ways, too, this claim
is overstated. His own rhetoric to the contrary, Reagan was far too adept a politician
to undertake any serious dismantling of large and popular social programs such as
Social Security or Medicare .... The number of federal employees increased more
rapidly during his presidency than it had under Jimmy Carter. Federal government
spending as a percentage of gross domestic product was slightly higher under Reagan than it was to become under Bill Clinton.
Reagan also failed to overturn, or even seriously to challenge, a number of
highly controversial practices, such as abortion or affirmative action, that he said he
would fight hard against. ... In coping with these matters, as with popular programs
of the New Deal, a politically careful Reagan took the path of least resistance ....
. . . [H]e was careful to name conservatives to the federal courts .... [But] the
courts moved more slowly to the right in later years than ardent conservatives had
hoped. Most of the landmark liberal decisions of the 1960s and early 1970sconcerning school prayers, criminal rights, and reproductive rights-had not been
overturned as of early 2003.
The second claim, that Reagan helped move politics and political thinking to the
right, seemed to be valid in the early and mid-1980s .... In 1980, for instance, polls
3James T. Patterson, "Aftetword: The Legacies of the Reagan Years," Tbe Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic
Conservatism and Its Legacies, 2003, pp. 368-371. Reprinted by permission of the publisher, the University Press of Kansas.
D. Assessing the Reagan Presidency
581
showed that there was a considerable Democratic edge-of more than 20 percentin the expressed partisan preference of voters. After Reagan's reelection, however,
Republicans were approaching parity with Democrats. The victory of George Bush
in 1988 seemed to indicate that Reaganism was promoting a political realignment in
the nation.
There is also little doubt that the resurgence of conservative thinking in the Reagan years placed liberal ideas on the defensive. In 1988 Bush effectively demonized
the "1" word, liberalism. And Democrats, too, saw conservative handwriting on the
wall. Under Bill Clinton, they moved to the right, especially in the areas of welfare
and fiscal policy. The recentering of the Democratic Party under Clinton, who understood the force of Reagan's impact on political thinking, was probably a key to
the revival of its fortunes in the 1990s ....
It was obvious by 2003, however, that Reagan failed to accomplish what FDR
had done: create a major realignment of partisan preferences. Democrats maintained
firm control of the House of Representatives until 1995, recaptured the Senate between 1987 and 1995, and regained the White House in 1993 .... Nor is it accurate
to credit Reagan alone for the resurgence of the Republican Party .... As [Reagan
adviser] Martin Anderson has stressed, this conservative "Revolution, " as he calls it,
was well on its way before 1980. Reagan gave a substantial boost to many conservative ideas, to be sure, but he was a beneficiary as well as a mover of the rise of the
right.
What, then, of the final claim-that Reagan's greatest legacy was to make Americans feel good again about themselves and the future of the nation? If by this claim
it is meant that Reagan-the avowed enemy of Big Government-ironically restored
popular faith in the competence of Washington, that is true-to some extent. ...
But Reagan's tenure did not mean that the majority of Americans came to love
their government. (Nor, of course, would he have wanted them to love it.) They admired the star, not the play. For one thing, Iran-Contra strengthened a host of already anguished popular doubts about the evils of federal officialdom ....
The larger claim, that Reagan made Americans feel good about themselves and
about their country, is in any solidly quantifiable sense unverifiable. But the claim is
plausible. Like FDR, he was indeed an optimist and a booster who was fortunate politically in that he entered the White House at a somber time in United States history.
Rejecting the notion that America had reached an Age of Limits, the Great Communicator told people again and again that they could still accomplish wonderful
things and that the future would be better than the past. In so preaching he made
effective use of the bully pulpit of the White House. Though this was often "feel
good" leadership, it helped him forge a bond with many Americans. Without this
leadership, the malaise of the late 1970s might have persisted.
With the limited hindsight that we now enjoy, however, it is hard to claim too
much for the legacy of Reagan's presidency. Though strong as a booster, he was a
frequently negligent and incurious manager. Concerning many policy areas-race
relations, urban affairs, immigration and population issues, health care, action
against AIDS, education, environmental concerns-he was essentially uninterested.
Excepting his efforts to lower income tax rates, and-more important-his contributions to the ending of the cold war, he did little in the way of developing new or
effective approaches to key problems, some of which were allowed to fester.
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Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
To speak, therefore, of a "Reagan Revolution," or of an "Age of Reagan," seems
excessive. Grand phrases such as these are best reserved for twentieth-century presidents like Theodore Roosevelt, who did much to promote the activist presidency of
our own times; like Franklin Roosevelt, whose New Deal inaugurated the welfare
state; or like Harry Truman, whose foreign policies established America's response
to the Soviet Union for forty years or more. By contrast to these formidable figures,
Ronald Reagan does not seem quite so tall. Still, his legacies in the realms that he
cared most about-tax rates and Soviet-American relations-have been durable as
well as significant. His large shadow remains.
E. George H. W Bush and the First Gulf War _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
I. Stephen J. Solarz Makes the Case for War Against
lraq(/991)
A Democratic congressman from New York, Stephen]. Solarz, was among the primary sponsors of the resolution authorizing the use of U.S. military force to remove
Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991. In the following article, Solarz makes the case for
intervention. He resolves the apparent discrepancy between his previous opposition
to the Vietnam War and his support for the current action against Iraq by insisting
that the national interests and values imperiled in the Persian Gulf were much
greater than those that had been at stake in Southeast Asia. From what you know
about the two conflicts, do you agree with his argument?
Ironies can sometimes be painful. I began my political career in 1966 as the
campaign manager for one of the first anti-war congressional candidates in the
country. Now, a quarter century later, I find myself supporting a policy in the Persian
Gulf that might well lead to a war that many believe could become another Vietnam. Such a position is more and more anomalous, I know, in the Democratic party.
And yet I cannot accept, or be dissuaded by, the analogy with Vietnam.
In Vietnam no vital American interests were at stake. The crisis in the Gulf poses
a challenge not only to fundamental American interests, but to essential American
values. In Indochina the cost in blood and treasure was out of all proportion to the
expected gains from a successful defense of South Vietnam. In the Gulf the potential
costs of the American commitment are far outweighed by the benefits of a successful effort to implement the U.N. resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Iraq from
Kuwait. The war in Vietnam dragged on for years and ended in an American defeat.
A war in the Gulf, if it cannot be avoided, is likely to end with a decisive American
victory in months, if not in weeks. Sometimes you are condemned to repeat the past
if you do remember it-that is, if you draw the wrong lessons from it, and let the
memory of the past distort your view of the present.
1
Stephen]. Solarz, "The Case for Intervention. " Reprinted by permission of Tbe New Republic, copyright
© 1991, Tbe New Republic, LLC.
E. George H. W Bush and the First GulfWar
583
The United States clearly has a vital interest in preventing Saddam Hussein from
getting away with his invasion and annexation of Kuwait. An aggressive Iraq bent
on the absorption of its neighbors represents a serious economic threat to American
interests. A hostile Iraq armed with chemical, biological, and eventually nuclear
weapons represents a "clear and present danger" to American security. And a lawless Iraq represents a direct challenge to our hopes for a new and more peaceful
world order. Any one of these reasons would be sufficient to justify a firm American
response to this brutal and unprovoked act of aggression. Together they make a
compelling case for doing whatever needs to be done, in concert with our coalition
partners, to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to establish a
more stable balance of power in one of the most volatile and strategically important
parts of the world.
There is, for a start, the question of oil. If Saddam succeeds in incorporating
Kuwait into Iraq, he will be in a position to control, by intimidation or invasion, the
oil resources of the entire Gulf. This would enable him, and him alone, to determine
not only the price, but also the production levels, of up to half the proven oil reserves in the world. This is not simply a question of the price of gas at the pump. It
is a matter of the availability of the essential energy that we and our friends around
the world need to heat our homes, fuel our factories , and keep our economies
vigorous.
The United States needs a comprehensive energy policy that will reduce our dependence on Gulf oil. This was obvious at the time of the 1973 oil embargo, and it
is obvious today. But regret at our failure to have diminished our dependence on
Gulf oil, and our resolve to diminish that dependence in the future, will not solve
our problem now. Even if we no longer needed to import oil most other countries
would still persist in their dependence; and to the extent that our economic wellbeing is linked to theirs, we cannot expect to insulate ourselves from the consequences of a cutoff in this esential source of supply .
. . . It would be unthinkable for the United States to permit a rampaging dictator
like Saddam to have his hands on the economic jugular of the world ....
If we succeed in blocking Saddam's ambitions and restoring Kuwait's independence, we will have preserved our continued access to a stable supply of oil. The
stability of the Arab governments that have joined with us to oppose Saddam will
be significantly strengthened. We will have a good chance of eliminating Saddam's
weapons of mass destruction and setting back for a substantial period of time, perhaps forever, Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. The prospects for progress in
the peace process between Israel and the Arabs will be greatly enhanced. We will
have reversed a monumental injustice, we will have thwarted one of the most ruthless expansionists in the world, and we will have created the basis for a new international order.
If this isn't worth fighting for, I don't know, as an American and as a Democrat,
what is.
584
Chapter 40
The Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
2. The Gulf War as Happy Ending or Ominous
Beginning ( 1991)
As the .first major American military effort of the post-Cold War era, Operation Desert
Storm proved both encouraging and frightening: encouraging because a diverse
coalition of nations, led by the United States, succesifully thwarted the aggression of
a dangerous dictator; frightening because it represented a new kind of global crisis,
in which hot spots-particularly in the Middle East-might upset the fragile interdependence of the global community. In the following cartoon, jim Morin cautions
those who failed to see the darker realities lurking behind the conflict with Iraq. In
light of subsequent history, how appropriate was his warning?
~
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forcesdr'O\ethe
badSaddam
out oF Kuwait,
ancltheNew
\\brld ONfer
lived happily
after,,
TheEtld '"
eve~'
v~
Ci:bt ii'thuni
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2
Copyright © Jim Marin/ Cartoon & Writers Syndicate.
585
E. George H. W Bush and the First GulfWar
3. The Foreign Policy President Falls
Short at Home ( 1991)
In the wake of a dramatically successful war, many commentators believed that a
politically unassailable George H. W Bush would easily win the next presidential
election. They were wrong. To growing numbers ofAmericans, the Bush White House
seemed more interested in solving international crises than in tending to pressing
matters at home. That perception became all the more damaging as the American
economy dipped into a prolonged recession. Mike Luckovich here captures the sentiment of those who felt that the president neglected his domestic responsibilities. What
does the cartoonist's perspective suggest about the relative importance of domestic
and foreign policies in the post-Cold War era?
i ee ahd you
~
st ~tit notice
n
utona
ffie!...
~kcllrM
3By
permission of Mike Luckovich and Creators Syndicate, Inc.
586
Chapter 40
Tbe Resurgence of Conservatism, 1980-1992
Thought Provokers
1. Did Reagan's electoral victory in 1980 ring the death knell for the philosophy of the New
2.
3.
4.
5.
Deal and the Great Society? Did the Reagan administration constitute a true revolution in
U.S. politics?
Did Reagan's massive military buildup make the world a safer place? Did the prospect of
a Star Wars defense stabilize or destabilize the international scene? To what degree was
U.S. foreign policy responsible for the changes in Russia and Eastern Europe in the late
1980s and early 1990s? Were there any positive features of the Cold War?
What developments gave rise to the neoconservative philosophy? What has been the impact of neoconservatism? Are ideas important in politics?
How will the future judge Ronald Reagan, the man, as president? How will it judge his
presidency?
What made Operation Desert Storm so successful in the field and so popular at home?
Did the war against Iraq resolve or exacerbate the United States' problems in the Persian
Gulf? Why did it fail to ensure George H. W. Bush's reelection?