ELFUTURODELAALIMENTACIÓNYRETOSDELA
AGRICULTURAPARAELSIGLOXXI:
Debatessobrequién,cómoyconquéimplicacionessociales,económicasy
ecológicasalimentaráelmundo.
THEFUTUREOFFOODANDCHALLENGESFOR
AGRICULTUREINTHE21stCENTURY:
Debatesaboutwho,howandwithwhatsocial,economicandecological
implicationswewillfeedtheworld.
ELIKADURARENETORKIZUNAETANEKAZARITZAREN
ERRONKAKXXI.MENDERAKO:
Munduanork,nolaetazer-nolakoinplikaziosozial,ekonomikoetaekologikorekin
elikatukoduenizangodaeztabaidagaia
Juststandards:internationalregulatory
instrumentsandsocialjusticeincomplex
resourceconflicts
JenniferFranco,ClaraPark,ClaraPark
Paper#83
Apirila–Abril–April
24,25,26
2017
www.elikadura21.eus
Juststandards:internationalregulatory
instrumentsandsocialjusticeincomplexresource
conflicts
JenniferFranco,ClaraPark,ClaraPark
NOTE:THISISAFORTHCOMINGARTICLEINCANADIANJOURNALOF
DEVELOPMENTSTUDIES2017
Climatechangemitigationandlandgrabbingaredistinctbutnotisolated
phenomena.Thereisevidencethattheirintersectionandinteractioncontribute
torapidagrariantransformationswithdiresocialandecologicalspillover,
includingtheonsetandaggravationofconflicts.Severalexistinghumanrights
instrumentsareapplicabletosuchspilloversituationsandarepreferabletoother
kindsofregulation,astheytendtobeseenasmorelegitimatebythoseadversely
affected.WithinsightsfromCambodiaandMyanmar,thispaperarguesfora
recalibrationofanalysisandactiononclimatechangemitigationandlandgrabs
thatmovesbeyondregulationineachisolatedcaseandtowardintegrated
solutions.
KEYWORDS:Climatechange;agrariantransformation;landgrabbing;conflict
transformation;regulation
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
Abstract
1
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
2
Theenvironmental,socialandgenderimpactsofclimatechangemitigation
strategies(biofuels,REDD+(ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationand
Degradation)andhydropowerprojectsportrayedasrenewableenergy)andof
landgrabbingcontinuetocapturetheattentionofscholars,practitioners,
governmentandcivilsocietyactors.Relevantresearchofteninvestigatesthese
processesseparatelyandconfinedwithindiscretetemporalandspatial
boundaries(suchasaparticularlandholding)wheredispossessionorcompeting
landclaimsoccur.Yet,evidencefromthegroundincreasinglypointstotheneed
forawideranalyticlens,suchaslandscapeorregion.Itistheintersectionand
interactionofthesephenomenathatcanproducesocialandecologicalspill-over
effects,chainreactionsandigniteneworaggravateoldsetsofcompetingclaims
andconflictsoverresourceswithinawiderarea.
Whenclimatemitigationinitiativesandlanddealsoverlap,competeorrunin
parallel,theydosonotjustspatiallyortemporally,butalsoinstitutionally,in
termsofpolicies,landclaims,communitysocialdynamicsandmechanismsfor
settlingdisputes.Futureconflictandcooperationoutcomes,particularlygendered
ones,willdependonintersectingstrugglesofpowerandmeaninginthe
constructionofnarrativesandcontestationsaroundthegrabbingofoneresource
oranother(land,forest,water,fisheriesoraquaticresources,orsome
combinationofthese).Understandingspecificconflictsinaparticularmomentin
timerequiresanalysingthewiderspatial,social-ecologicalandhistoricalinstitutionalconditionsandcircumstancesinwhichtheyarise.Onlythencanwe
contemplateappropriateinterventionsforinfluencingtheirtrajectoriesinthe
directionofgreatersocialjustice.
Forthoseinterestedinpromotingsocialjustice-basedsolutionsinthese
situations,somekindofregulatorymechanismmayberelevantandusefulunder
certainconditions.Anarrayofnationalandinternationalmechanisms,processes
andbodiesareavailabletorespondtoissuesarisingfromtherelatedongoing
agrariantransformations.Broadlyreferredtohereasinternationalregulatory
instruments,isuchmechanismsareincreasinglyconsideredaspotentialsolutions
tomanyoftoday’snaturalresourcerelatedproblems.However,fromasocial
justiceandpoliticallegitimacyperspective,acleardistinctionmustbemade
betweeninternationalinstrumentsadoptedbystates,suchasthehumanrights
treaties,andthoseinstrumentsthatareestablishedbycorporationsforthe
ostensiblepurposeofcorporatesocialresponsibility.Theformeraregroundedin
internationalhumanrightslawandwithinthestatesystem,whilethelatterare
essentiallyattunedtocorporateinterests(seeCoumans2017).
After2008,followingthe(re)new(ed)globalattentiontolandgrabbing,anumber
ofinitiativesemerged–rangingfromintergovernmentalguidelines(Principlesfor
ResponsibleAgriculturalInvestmentsjointlydevelopedbyUNCTAD,IFAD,FAO
andWorldBank)tocorporate-ledself-regulation(forexample,Bonsucro,whichis
amulti-stakeholdermembershipbasedorganizationwhichpromotes‘responsible’
sugarproductionincludingthroughcertificationofstandards,andwhose
membersincludebigcorporationsalongsidefarmers,endusersandcivilsociety)–
ostensiblytoinfluencehowinvestmentsarecarriedoutinrelationtosocialand
environmentalconcerns.iiWhilepotentiallyuseful,thereisatendencytoapply
regulatoryinstrumentsaccordingtotheprojectparametersofaninvestmentor
initiativeinisolationandwithinasinglelandholding,asifthisishowsuch
processesactuallyunfoldinreality.Whileinsomeinstances,a1:1
correspondenceratiomayberelevant,thisisnotthecaseinothers.Often,these
phenomenaintersectandinteracttoproducecomplicatedsituationswithsocial
andecologicaleffectsthatspillovertheinitialprojectparameters.Evenifan
interveningactor–beitacompanyorthestate–iswillingtoapplyorusehuman
rightsinregulatinganintervention,inpracticetheirsenseofobligationmightstill
stopatthephysicalortimeboundariesoftheirproject,whichwouldeffectively
indicateadifferentlogicatworkthanhumanrights.
WithinsightsfromCambodiaandMyanmar,thispaperproblematisesthecomplex
realitycurrentlyunfoldinginSoutheastAsia,andcallsforrecalibrationofanalysis
ofinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsandaction,includingmovingbeyonda1:1
applicationofregulationtoasinglecaseinisolation.Assumingthatinternational
regulatoryinstrumentscanhelpavoidconflictordirectconflictdynamicstowards
moresociallyjustoutcomes,itisarguedthattheireffectivenessdependsnotonly
ontheunderlyinglegitimacyoftheinstrumentdeployedbutonotherfactorssuch
asinterpretation,contextandstrategy.
Background
CambodiaandMyanmarpresentsimilaryetdifferentcontexts,opportunitiesand
challengesforthedeploymentofinternationalregulatoryinstrumentswithregard
totheintersectionofclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbing(and
theconflictsthesemightignite).Bothcountrieshaveallowed,andsometimes
proactivelypromoted,theexploitationandextractionofvaluefromlandand
forestresourcesbyelite,militaryandprivatecompanies.Agribusiness
developmenthastakentheformoflargescaleflexcropandtreemonocultures
andhasoftenentaileddisplacementorevictionoflocalcommunities.Climate
changemitigationactivitiesarealsoongoinginbothcountries,albeitmore
evidentlylabeledassuchinCambodiawherethediscourseandrhetoricisbeing
usedtojustifylargescaleforestryplantations,forinstance(ScheidelandWork
2015).CambodiaisalsoaREDD+readycountry,meaningthatconcreteprojects
existontheground,thoughthecollectionofcarboncreditsisyettostart.In
MyanmarREDD+plansexistbuttherearenoprojectsattimeofwriting,although
hydropowerprojectsareincreasingly(re)framedasclimatechangemitigation
(Borrasetal.2015).
Bothcountrieshaveembracedambitioussocio-economicandpoliticalreform
agendas,althoughmuchearlierinCambodia(1992)thaninMyanmar(2011).This
timelapsemeansthat,forinstance,Myanmarhasnotaccessedandratifiedmost
humanrightsinstruments(seetable1below),whereasCambodiaratifiedmostof
themfrom1983onwards,includingtheInternationalCovenantonCiviland
PoliticalRights,InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights
andtheConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofDiscriminationagainst
Women.Theinstitutionalsetupandframework,aswellasinstitutionalcapacity,
ismuchmoreestablishedinCambodiathanitisinMyanmar.Forinstance,in
Cambodia,the2001LandLawsetstheframeworkfortenurerightsinthecountry,
includingintermsofindigenouspeople’saccesstocommunallandtitles.Thereis
currentlynoequivalentcomprehensivepieceoflegislationinMyanmar,but
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
3
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
4
existinglegislationdoesnotrecognisecustomarylandrightsorcommunallands
andinsteadseestheseareasas“vacant,fallowandvirgin”landandearmarks
themforlarge-scale(foreign)investment.iii
INSERTTABLE1HERE:Statusofratificationofhumanrightsinstrumentsin
CambodiaandMyanmar
Realityonthegroundinbothcountriesismarkedbymultiple,discreteland-based
interventionsandinitiatives–eitherinmoreorlessthesameplace(butdifferent
historicalperiods),atmoreorlessthesametime(butindifferentspaces),orboth
inthesameplaceandatthesametime.Asinmanysocietieswherelandand
watergrabbingisoccurring,thetwocountriesexhibitanoverallfailuretoaddress
land-basedconflict(Deininger2011;CollierandHoeffler2005).
Meanwhile,theregulatorylandscapesinwhichtheseinterventionsoverlapand
interactarecharacterisedhereas“plurallegal”,withnumerousregulatoryfields
competingforstandingonthegroundandthestatelawbeingjustoneofthese.
Toillustrate,inCambodia’sPreyLangForest,aonce-massivecontiguousforest
area,conservationandexploitationisoccurringinacontestedfieldofpower
occupiedbyprivatecompanies,conservationorganisations,government
ministriesandthecommunitieswhohaveinhabitedandusedtheterritoryfor
generations.Eachactorinthelandscapeisattemptingtoassertitsown
understandingofwhohaswhichrights,towhichland,forhowlongandforwhat
purpose;eachattemptstoperformthisallocationofnaturalresourcesinsociety.
Likewise,inMyanmar’sNorthernShanStatesub-region,inadditiontothestate
militaryandnumerousethnicarmedgroups,otheractorsarerecastingthe
landscapeandexistingpatternsofsocialrelationsthrough:miningconcessions,
illegallogging,treeplantationsbilledas“conservation”,agribusinesslinkingflex
cropproductiontoprocessingplantsneartheborder,hydropowerdamprojects
andChina’sopiumsubstitutionprogrambeingusedbyentrepreneursasa
steppingstonetoamasslargelandholdings.Inbothoftheserapidlychanging
landscapes,statelawisjustoneactor,amongmany,andveryoftenisnotthe
mostauthoritativeactorontheground,whilelocalisedcustomarylawsystems
continuetooperatesimultaneously.Plural-legalsettingscanvaryfromoneplace
andtimetoanother,andthusplayavariableroleinstructuringlimitsand
opportunitiesforcompetingrightsclaimsandinshapingresourcerelatedconflicts
(Franco,2011).
However,institutionsandprocessesthatcouldcontributetopreventingor
transformingcomplexresourceconflictsmaybeweakorabsentintheveryplaces
andatthescalewheretheyareprobablymostneeded.Inthecaseofcomplex
resourceconflicts(involvingintersectionandinterplayofmultipleinitiativesand
grabs),forexample,theissueofscaleisimportant.Villagelevelcustomary
practicesareoftenveryrelevantandappropriateforhandlingsocialconflict
withinavillageandbetweenpartiesofrelativelyequalstatus.Butthesame
institutionsmaynotbegearedtowardaddressingconflictsthatspillovervillage
boundariestoinvolvemultiplevillagesatatime.Theymaynotbecapableof
handlingconflictswhereonepartyisrelativelymorepowerfulthananother.
Institutionalstrengthispartlyaboutcapacityandpartlyaboutautonomyvis-a-vis
powerfulactors/interestsinsociety(Fox1994).“Institutionalcapture”andthe
vetopoweroflandlordshelptoexplainwhy,historically,inpredominantly
agrariansocietiesmarkedbyinequality,democratisingthedistributionofland
(throughtitlingprograms,throughredistributivereformorthroughland
restitution)isextremelydifficult.Similarly,thenotionthat“waterflowstopower”
resonatesbecauseitdrawsalinkbetweendecisionmakingcontrolandpolitical
powerandwaterallocationoutcomes(Roth,Boelens,andZwarteveen2005,2).
InbothCambodiaandMyanmar,oneclusterofincreasinglyprominentland-based
interventionsandinitiativesinvolvesgenericlandgrabbingontheonehand,and
climatechangemitigationontheotherhand.Whenithitstheground,eithersort
ofactivitymayengageexistingstructuralandinstitutionalfault-lines,potentially
reignitingoldconflictsortensionsortriggeringnewones.Butthemore
complicatedandpotentiallyexplosivesituationiswhenlandgrabbingandlandbasedclimatechangemitigationstarttooverlap,interactwithandreshapeone
another(Hunsbergeretal.2017).InthePreyLangForest,villagersarebeing
squeezedbetweenexpandinggovernment-awardedeconomiclandconcessions
ontheonehand,andinitiativeslabeledasclimatechangemitigationactivities,
suchasforestconservation,ontheotherhand(seeScheidelandWork2015).
MembersofthegrassrootsPreyLangCommunityNetwork(PLCN)seekingto
protecttheforestanddefendtheirplaceinitagainstillegalloggingand
deforestationbycompanieshavesufferedviolentattacksbyarmedassailants.ivIn
theTanintharyiRegioninMyanmar,governmentforestpreservationforcarbon
sequestrationinitiativesandinternationalenvironmentalNGO-drivenmarine,
forestandwildlifeconservationprojectsareaccommodatinglarge-scalelandtakingsthatareconsumingforestandforestcommunities:anexpansiveNavy
confiscationareaeatingupvillagers’long-standingcasheworchardsand
communityforests,numerousminingconcessionscontaminatingtraditionallocal
watersources,asprawlingSpecialEconomicZone(SEZ)andamajorhighway
slashingthroughkilometersofold-growthforesttoconnectThailandtothe
AndamanSea,andexpandingoilpalmandrubberconcessions(andthelucrative
large-scaleloggingthatprecedesthem).Villagersareespeciallyvulnerablewhen
concessionsandconservationneedthelandbutnotthepeopleonit,asLi(2011)
putsit.
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
Recalibrationofanalysisandaction
Inadditiontorecastingthewaylandisused,inbothCambodiaandMyanmar,this
convergenceofeconomiclandconcessionsandforestconservation-as-climate
changemitigationbuildonportrayalsofvillagers’customarywaysoflifeand
productionasdestructiveand/orinefficient(Borrasetal.2017),therefore
(re)producingnarrativesthatcanmakethenewarrangementsseemmore
acceptableaspartoftheprocessoftakingcontrolofthelandawayfromthe
villagers(ScheidelandWork2015).InMyanmar,portrayalsofshiftingcultivators
asforestdestroyersoriginateinnineteenthcenturycolonialrulewhen,“as
Colonialforestdepartmentsenteredintocompetitionwithswiddenersforcontrol
ofland,theybegantocharacterizeswiddencultivatorsasprimitive,unproductive,
even‘pre-agricultural’incontrasttoforester’sso-called‘modern’,‘scientific’
management’”.vFast-forwardingtotoday,accordingtoonecloseobserver,
“[m]anyofthe[resulting]policies,andthehostileassumptionsandattitudeson
5
whichtheyarebased,persisttothisday.Eventhoughtheyarerarelybasedon
morethansubjectivepreference,theyhavebeenselectivelyemployedtounfairly
de-legitimatecultivators’rightsinwaysthatwouldbeinacceptableforlowland
cultivators.”viAsonestudynotes,whilethedebateonthepersistenceordemise
ofswiddencultivationhasneverceasedamongstgovernmentsandacademics:
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
6
FromtheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangein1992
totheKyotoProtocolin1997,thepoliciesofinter-governmental
organizationhaveimmenselypromotedresearchontherelationships
amongswiddenagricultureandforestdegradationandglobalwarming[…]
Negativeperceptionsfromgovernmentstowardsswiddeningingeneralin
SEAhaveacceleratedthedemiseofthistraditionalswiddensystem.(Liet
al.2014,1656,1658)
Insuchsettings,nationalandinternationaldevelopmentworkers,activists,or
companyofficialsinchargeofcorporatesocialresponsibilitymayseektopromote
oneoranotherinternationalregulatoryinstrumentasapotentialsolution,often
inthenameofconflictmitigationorconflictresolution.Buttoooftendeployment
ofsuchmeasures,whenitoccurs,failstotakeintoaccounttheinteractionof
multipleresourcegrabs,hencetheneedforrecalibrationofanalysisandaction.
Similarly,evaluatingrule-of-lawandjusticereforminitiativesintheearly2000s,
Carothers(2003)foundthemsufferingfromaprofoundknowledgedeficitwith
muchtobelearnedandunlearned,atatimewhensuchinitiativeswerestillhigh
onofficialdevelopmentaidagendas.Heobservedthatthenatureand
consequencesofproposedrule-of-lawchangesofteneludedlegalreformers,and
thatthefieldofrule-of-lawpromotionwasslowtoscaleupempiricalknowledge
gainedinpracticeintolessonslearned.Hedrewattentiontothe“embedded
obstaclestotheaccumulationofknowledge[that]existbelowthesurface”such
as:(1)thecomplexityanddiversityofsocietiesandofhowlawfunctionsand
operatesand(2)theweakimpulsesofaidorganisationsandlawyerstoundertake
systematic“ruleoflawinsociety”knowledge-accumulation(Carothers2003,14–
15).Theresultingknowledgedeficitendedupreinforcingexistingtendencies
towardtop-down,technicalreforms(Decker,Sage,andStefanova2005).
Fromaregulatoryperspective,andwithinsightfromCarothers,perhapsitwarrants
askingthefollowing:Iswhatisperceivedasoneproblem,infactaclusterof
problems?Arethetoolsofanalysisandactionbeingbroughttobear–including
relevantinternationalregulatoryinstruments–moresuitedtodealingwitha
single(typeof)initiative/interventionatatime,andtowhatextentcantheydeal
withaclusterofproblems?Climatechangemitigationinitiativesandland
grabbingincidentseachhavethepotentialtoreviveoldconflictsandsparknew
conflicts.Whentheyariseatthesametimeorspilloverintothesamelandscape,
theirintersectionandinterplaymayturnseeminglydiscreteconflictsintoa
“conflictcocktail".Howtoaddressthesecomplexsituationswithdifferent
possibleaggravatedconflictscenariosisnotobvious.
Regulatoryinitiativesdonotnecessarilyorautomaticallydetecttheseinteractions,
nordotheynecessarilyorautomaticallyadjusttotheinterplayevenifdetected.
Would-beregulatorsofconflict,whethertheyarefromthegovernment,the
privatesectororthecivilsocietysphere,maysimplyfinditeasiertofocusonjust
oneproblem,ratherthanaclusterofproblems.Agivenregulatoryintervention
maybeprogrammedtofocusonjustonetypeofsituation,andtheimplementers
ofthatprogramsimplyunabletoadjustevenifaclusterofproblemsisdetected.
Towhatextentdoesfocusingonjustoneproblem,forwhateverreason,havethe
potentialtoaggravateratherthanregulateconflict?Meanwhile,notallregulatory
interventionsarethesameeither.Therealmofregulatoryinterventionsandof
(inter)nationalgovernanceinstrumentsisalsohighlydifferentiated.Forexample,
today,thereareverysharpdifferencesinhowtheUSGovernmentandmany
indigenouspeoplesmovementsintheworldunderstandandusetheprincipleof
Fee,Prior,andInformedConsent(FPIC),andwhenthesedifferentunderstandings
aredeployedintheformofaparticularregulatoryinitiative,itismoreasan
assertionofwhichparticularunderstandingshouldprevailoverandagainst
another,thanasanexpressionofauniversallyagreedunderstanding.Giventhata
lackofconsensussurroundingthemeaningandpurposeofdifferentinternational
regulatoryinstrumentsisindeedpartoftheregulatorylandscapetoday,which
understandingofwhich“standard”oughttoapplyinagivensituation?And
equallyimportant,whataretheimplicationsandconsequencesofusingone
understandingandstandardoveranother?
Withthesequestionsinmind,thisarticleaimstolaysomeanalyticalfoundationsfor
exploringtheideathatrecalibrationofanalysisandactiondescribedearliermust
alsoproblematisetheuseofinternationalregulatoryinstruments.Thepointisnot
tocriticiseusingthemingeneral,oranyoneinstrumentinparticular,butrather
toputforwardsomepreliminarytheoreticalreflectionsonthefollowingquestion:
wherediscreteprocessesoflandconcessionsandland-basedclimatechange
mitigation/adaptationandconservationoverlap,interactwith,andreshapeone
another,underwhatconditionscanwhichinternationalregulatoryinstruments
contributetotransformingconflictinthedirectionofgreatersocialjustice?
Regulatingandtransformingconflict
Aplural-legalapproach(vonBenda-Beckmann2001)combinedwithBourdieu’s
(1987)conceptof“fieldsofaction”allowsrurallandscapestobeviewedas
regulatedbutdynamicspaces,markedbytheco-existenceofseveralfieldsof
socialregulation,wherestatelawisjustoneamongseveralcompetingfor
standing.viiThisanthropologicalviewoflawemphasisesthesocial,political,
economicandintellectualcontextofenforceablenorms,andtheroleofstateand
non-stateactorsinmakingthemauthoritativeinsociety.Suchanapproachallows
“Inquiries[…]intothewaynormsaregenerated,howmandatorinessiscreated,
andhowregularitiesaremaintained”(Moore2005,1).Forinstance,untilrecently
inWesternsocieties,avarietyofsocialregulation,includingreligiouslaw,local
customarylawandpersonallaw,historicallycoexistedandcompetedwithstate
law.Theinterplayofvariousregulatorysystemsdeterminedwhichregulatoryfield
heldgreaterswayrelativetotheothers,andtheoutcomescouldvaryovertime
andfromonelocaletoanother.Bytheendofthelastcentury,neither“increasing
centralisationofauthority”nor“increasingimportanceofinternationaland
transnationallegalobligationsandinstitutions”haserasednon-statelawfieldsor
underminedthe“complexarrayofjurisdictions”theyentail(Cotterrell1992,28).
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
7
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
8
LegalpluralismcharacterisesmanycountriesinSoutheastAsiatoday,anditisnot
unusualtofindShari’asystemsexistingalongside(diverse)customarysystems,
andbothoftheseexistingalongsidenationalConstitutionsandstatutorysystems
–whatBourdieu(1987)callsthe“juridicalfield”comprisingtheensembleof
nationalofficialinstitutions,agents,legalinstrumentsandnormsparticulartoa
givennationalterritory.Thisjuridicalfieldisconstitutiveofthestate,butnot
coterminouswithit,sinceitisreproducedbytheactionsnotonlyofstate
agenciesandjudges,butalsolawyers,lawfirms,professionalassociations,nongovernmentallawreformorganisationsandcivilsocietyrights-advocacygroups
(HoutzagerandFranco2003).Thejuridicalfieldmaybecentraltostatelaw
making,butitisnotnecessarilyorautomaticallycentralto“makinglawmatter”in
society(Crook2001).Instead,itisjustoneofseveralfieldsofactionwherepeople
mayactuallyendupgoingtoregulateconflictandgetredressandprotection.
Anotheriscustomarylaw,whereface-to-facedisputeprocessingbyordinary
peopleatthevillagelevelmayinvolvedirectnegotiation,informalmediation,
retaliationandothercustomarypracticestoaddresstheirgrievances.viii
Customarylawpracticeshaveraisedconcernsoverhowso-called“traditional
authority”andcustomarylawallowsinjusticetocreepin,tothedetrimentof
womenandthelandlessruralpoor(Agarwal1994).Itisrelevanttonotethat
villagersmaysometimesresolveaconflictsimplyby“lumpingit”inorderto
restoresocialharmony(Galanter1981).InsightsfromAfricasuggestthatbecause
bothstate-juridicalsystemsandcustomarysystemscanproduceunjustoutcomes,
thequestionforresearchishowdifferentpeopleorgroupsofpeoplenegotiate
suchplurallegalcontextsintheireffortstoclaimrightsandgetjustice(Ikdahlet
al.2005).
Usingalegalpluralismlensdoesnotassumethattheco-existenceofdifferent
regulatorysystemsisnecessarilysmoothorunproblematicorevenalwaysvisible
toeveryactororobserver.Theremaybecompetitionand/orcomplementation
betweenwhatColchesterandChao(2011)call“diversepathstojustice”,and
morelocalisedregulatorypathsmayormaynotmeshwellwithregulatory
pressuresandinstrumentsoriginatingfrom“outside”.Suchanapproach,
however,makespossiblebetterdetectionofdiverseandpossiblycompeting
understandingsofjusticethatdifferentpartiestoaconflictmaybringtobear.
“Makinglawmatterinsociety”canthenbeseenasaprocessthatextendstoand
ispartlycontingentupontheperceptionsandchoices,andactionsand
interactions,ofindividualsorgroupswhomaybeseekingjusticeorlookingto
resolveadisputeortoaddressagrievance.Intheory,aggrievedindividualsand
groupsonthegroundcontributetodeterminingwhereandwhenconflicts
emergeoutintheopen,whichregulatoryorder(s)areactivatedinresponse,and
whetherandhowtheseconflictsgetresolvedortransformed.Butexactlyhow
andhowmuchtheycontributeisanempiricalquestionthatinvitesfurther
investigation.
Resolvingortransformingconflictincreasinglyinvokesapplication/useof
internationalregulatoryinstrumentsbydifferentactors,butisnotnecessarilyor
automaticallydeterminedbythesealone.Increasedinterestinusinginternational
regulatoryinstrumentstoaddressconflictinplaceswhereclimatechange
mitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbingisoccurringhasbeendriveninpartbya
perceived“weakness”ofstate/juridicalinstitutionsinhandlingtheresulting
conflicts.Thisispartofthedeclaredlogic,forinstance,behindincreased
corporateinterestinusinginternationalgovernancemechanismstoregulate
naturalresourceallocationanduseinrelationtotheso-called“globallandrush”
inrecentyears.Buttheunderstandingsoftheassociatedconflictsandthe
instrumentschosentoregulatethemcanvaryconsiderably,ascanthelegal
reformmeasuresprescribedtoaddressperceivedunderlyinginstitutional
weaknesses.Forinstance,“…the[World]Bank’slegalreformfocusisontheability
oflegalsystemstofacilitatemarkettransactionsbydefiningpropertyrights,
guaranteeingtheenforcementofcontractsandmaintaininglawandorder”.ixBy
contrast,somecriticsoftheWorldBankhavearguedthatwomen’sindividualland
rightshavebeenusedasatrojanhorseforneoliberalagriculturalandland
maskingcommodificationandprivatisationoflandrightsunderhumanrights
languagewhileobscuringtheneedtostrengthenwomen’sdistinctrighttolandin
differenttenuresystems(O’Laughin2009;Monsalve2006).Forsome,
“[i]ndependentjudiciariesandfunctioningcourtsystemsareclearlyimportant
toolsforhumanrightsprotection”(Harris2007,1),whileforothers,itismore
aboutprotectingpropertyrights.
statejusticeinstitutionsmaybe(1)vulnerabletoelitecaptureand(2)inaccessible
either“becausetheyareincompatiblewithlocalnormsandcustomsandtheyare
physicallyoreconomicallyinaccessible,orbecausepeoplelacktheknowledgeor
capacitytonavigatethesystem”.x“[I]nstitutionalsafeguards,transparency,and
theexistenceofacivilconstituency”maythusbeseenasrelevantmeasures
neededtoboostjudicialindependenceandaccountability.xiAllthismayseem
logicalandappropriateatfirst.Yetthewayforwardstillremainsobscured.For
example,howexactlydoesincreasedtransparencyboostpublicaccountability?As
Fox(2007,350–351)hasnoted,transparencydoesnotnecessarilyor
automaticallyproduceaccountability;andonlycertaintypesoftransparency
mightdoso,andthenonlyundercertainconditions.Toooften,global
prescriptionsrelyonanalyticalframeworksthatignorethewiderregulatoryfield,
institutionalisedinequalitiesandtheagencyofdifferentactorsthatinhabitthe
groundwheretheyareintroduced,whilealsoignoringcomplexprocess-tooutcomepathways,whichcanthenimpedeaccesstojusticeandleavewhatsome
aggrievedpartiesperceiveastherealconflictstofesterunresolved.
Analytically,bringinginternationalregulatoryinstrumentstobearinsituations
markedbynaturalresourceconflictorclusterofconflictsisperhapsbest
understoodasacontingent,dynamic–andpotentiallycontentious–political
processthatunfoldsinthe“shadowofthelaw”(Cooter,MarksandMnookin
1982),where“law”inageneralsensecomprisestheentiretyofwhatGalanter
(1981,6)referstoasthe“backgroundofnormsandproceduresagainstwhich
negotiationsandregulationsinbothprivateandgovernmentsettingstakeplace”.
Howthisprocessunfoldscanvaryacrosstimeandplace,sincenolawor
regulatoryinstrumentisself-interpretingorself-implementing.Instead,lawsand
regulatorymeasuresareinterpretedandimplementedinspecifichistoricalinstitutionalcontextsbyreal“flesh-and-blood”peoplewhoseperceptions,
interests,politicalcalculationsandpowerresourcesarevariablyshapedby
personalexperiencesandby“structuresinheritedfromthepast”(Houtzagerand
Franco2003;Franco2011,2014).Theperceptions,interests,meaningsand
purposesthatgetactivatedbyorenduptappingintotheseprocessescanalso
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
9
influencewhetherandhowanygiveninternationalregulatoryinstrumentistaken
upandwhereitmightlead.
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
Problematisingtheuseofinternationalregulatoryinstruments
10
Anarrayofnationalandinternationalmechanisms,processesandbodieshave
emergedandarebeingusedinresponsetoissuesarisinginaneraof“globalland
grabbing”andrelatedfalloutintermsofagrariantransformation.Numerous
internationalinitiatives,fromintergovernmentalguidelinestocorporate-ledselfregulation,aspiretoinfluencehowinvestmentsarecarriedoutinrelationto
socialandenvironmentalconcerns.Suchmechanismsareincreasinglytakenfor
grantedaspotentialsolutionsorpartofasolutiontomanyoftoday’snatural
resourcerelatedproblems.Internationalgovernanceisoftenapproachedasa
matterofapplyingcertainfit-for-purposeproceduralinstrumentsortechnical
toolsinordertoobtainmoreorlessanticipatedresults,orimplicitlymakesonesize-fits-allassumptionsaboutwheretheyarerelevantorappropriate.Itis
increasinglytakenforgrantedthatdifferentinternationalregulatoryinstruments
areonequalfootingintermsoftheiroriginsandlegitimacy.Theseassumptions
areproblematic.Anysituationthatisdeemedillegitimatebythosewhoare
affectedislikelytobeworsenediftheregulatoryresponseislikewisedeemed
illegitimate.Inthefollowingsections,wereflectontheseissuesandputforward
fourpropositionsforamorecalibratedapproachtointernationalgovernancethat
promotessocialjusticeoutcomes
Proposition1–interpretation
“Makinglaw”isacoreprocessinsocietythatincludes,butalsogoesbeyondwhat
happensinnationallegislaturesandcourts,toinvolvestrugglesbetweendifferent
actors(stateandnon-state)tomaketheirpreferredinterpretationsofregulatory
normsandrulesauthoritativeinsociety(HoutzagerandFranco2003).Competing
interpretationsofwhatcountsasgoodgovernance,deployedorperformedby
differentactorsinthefield,arealsofactorsinshapinghownaturalresourcesare
beingallocated,usedandmanaged.Relatedly,differentformsanddegreesof
legitimacymayshapetheinterpretationandenforceabilityofdifferent
instruments,forinstancehumanrightstreatiesvs.corporate-ledinstruments.Itis
thusimportanttoproblematisetheveryconceptof“goodgovernance”inthe
contextoftheinternationalpoliticaleconomyinwhichthedifferentinitiatives
arise(Margulis,McKeonandBorras2014).
InterpretationanduseoftheinternationalhumanrightsprincipleofFreePrior
InformedConsent(FPIC)xiiisillustrative(Franco,2014).UseofFPICorits
functionalequivalents(“communityengagement”)isontheriseinlandand
naturalresourcegovernanceinitiativesgloballyxiiifollowingcallsforgreater
transparencyandfulldisclosureinbiglanddeals.Yetverydifferentactorswith
verydifferentpurposesinmindandindifferentsettingstranslatetheprinciple
intopracticeverydifferently.Forsome,FPICisabasicdemocraticprinciplethat
includestherighttoveto.Forothers,FPICenablesoutcomeswhereboth
communitiesandcompaniesbenefit,evenifsuchsharingofresourcesand
benefitsofuseisnotautomaticallyornecessarilypromotingsocialjustice(IIED
2012).Forstillothers,FPICisatoolforavertingsocialconflict,whileproviding
Theexampleraisesseveralissues.First,whoisinitiatingwhichinstrumentforwhat
purpose?Second,howcanoneknowwhenagivenstandard(whetherFPICor
someother)hasbeentrulymet?Achievingconsent,forexample,isnot
necessarilythesameaspeoplehavinghadarealchoicetobeginwith,andin
manylandgrabbinghotspotsinMyanmar,forinstance,toooftenthechoice
offeredtovillagerswhentheirconsentissoughtisbetweenquittingtheirland
withcompensationorwithout.Third,towhatextentcanconsentbetreatedasa
one-time,isolatedandfixedoutcomewheninactualitycommunitiesare
differentiated,projectsarefluidandimpactsareexperiencedwithinalarger,
livinglandscape?Somevillagersmayresistatthestartandlaterswitchto
acceptance,whileothersmayendupwithdrawinginitialacceptance.Or,some
villagesthatwerenotaffectedinitially,maygetdrawninduetospilloverorchainreactioneffects,suchaswhenvillagersdisplacedbyahydropowerdamproject
move,oraremoved,ontolandinadjacentvillages.Fourth,whoismakinglawon
naturalresources,andfromwhichgenderperspectivespecifically,whetherin
termsofformulatingregulatoryresponsesincorporateofficesorstatecorridors,
orintermsofinterpretingtheminthefield?xivWhatarethevariedwaysinwhich
genderisconsideredandmanifestedinregulatorymechanismsaroundnatural
resources?Whataretherisksofexclusionofwomenfromtheassociated
processes,andconversely,whichkindsofprocessesmightfavorwomen’s
inclusion?Relatedly,inwhatwaysistheperceivedlegitimacyofagivenregulatory
instrumentgendered,therebyshapingitsuseorreceptioninthefield?
Finally,ifthereareopportunities,therearealsolimitstointerpretation,andso
analysismustconsiderthatbydesignsomeinstrumentsmaybelessopento
interpretation(includingsocialjusticeinterpretations)thanothers.
Proposition2–(pro-socialjustice)design
Here,differentspecificinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscanbesituatedalong
acontinuum–forexample,ashoveringsomewherebetweenamore“probusiness”poleandamore“pro-socialjustice”pole,usingcriteriatolocatethem
initiallyandtotrackchangesintheircharacterovertime(visionandprocessof
development,whoparticipates,arethehumanrightsbased,dotheypromote
socialjustice,genderequality)asillustratedinFigure1below.
INSERTFIGURE1HERE:Thecontinuumofinternationalregulatoryinstruments
Whilesomeinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsmaybemorepro-socialjustice
bydesign,designalonemaynotimpedeorpromotesocialjusticeinpractice.Also
relevantistheinclusivenessoftheprocessbywhichagiveninstrumentis
developed,aswellasitsrelationtohumanrights.Evenwhenaregulatory
responseostensiblyis,byprovenanceanddesign,pro-socialjustice,thisdoesnot
necessarilyorautomaticallymakeitsoinpractice.TheCFSTenureGuidelines
(TGs),forinstance,weredraftedthroughwhatiswidelyconsideredahighly
participatoryprocess–consultationswithmorethan1000peoplefrom
governments,CSOs,privatesector,academiaandinternationalorganisations,
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
sociallicensefordealstoproceed(minusthesocialconflictanditsdisruptionsand
coststodevelopers).
11
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
12
fromnearly150countries.TheTGsareexplicitlyhumanrightsbasedandinclude
amongtheprinciplesforimplementationnon-discrimination,equityandjustice,
genderequalityandaccountability,amongothers.Althoughtheyareasoftlaw
instrument(incontrasttotheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Socialand
CulturalRights(ICESCR),forinstance,whichislegallybindingonceaccessedbythe
states),xvsincetheiradoptionin2012,onecanfindtheTGsbeingdeployedbya
widerangeofactors,inavarietyofways,includingforpurposesthatcouldbesaid
tounderminesomeactors’visionsofsocialjustice.
Accessibilityisanotherbasisonwhichtoassesstheextenttowhichagiven
regulatoryinstrumentispro-socialjustice.Forinstance,theRoundtableon
SustainableBiomaterialscertificationschemedoeshaveazero-tolerancepolicy
forinvoluntaryresettlementandgrievancemechanismstoaddressconflict.Yet
theprocessforpresentingagrievanceiscomplexandnoteasilyaccessible,
particularlyforindividuals,andpresentslimitationsintermsoftime(past12
months),numberofappeals(onlyoneallowed)andtypeofgrievances(those
fallingoutsidethepredeterminedtypologyareconsideredinadmissible).In
anotherexample,theIFCPerformanceStandardsonEnvironmentalandSocial
Sustainabilitystatethatlandacquisitionandinvoluntaryresettlement(both
physicalandeconomicdisplacement)aretobeavoidedorminimised,with
compensationbeingprovidedifdisplacementcannotbeavoided.Butthe
definitionofFPICiswatereddowntoa‘goodfaithnegotiationbetweentheclient
andtheAffectedCommunitiesofIndigenousPeoples’,whichdoesnotnecessarily
requireunanimityandmaybeachievedevenwhenindividualsorgroupswithin
thecommunityexplicitlydisagree.
Tosupportpro-socialjusticeanalysisandaction,itmakessensetoprivilege
internationalregulatoryinstrumentsthatcomeoutofmoreinclusiveprocesses,
aswellasthosethatareexplicitintheirhumanrightsfoundations,whilebeing
attentivetotheirpluralinterpretations,discoursesanduses.Butwheremultiple
landgrabbingandland-basedclimatechangemitigationinitiativesoverlap,
interactwithandreshapeoneanother,asinMyanmarandCambodia,attention
mustbegiventocompetinginterpretationsacrossmultiple,intersectinginitiatives
andhowthesemayundermineorreinforceeachother.
Proposition3–context
Internationalregulatoryinstrumentsmaytakeonvariedmeaningsand
operationalcharacteristicsdependingonthehistorical-institutionalcontext,
includingthelocally-specificassemblageofrulesandprocedures(informaland
formal)thathavebeensociallyconstructedandreconstructedovertime.
Forinstance,inCambodia,theHunSengovernmenthasdismissedtheTGs
completelyonthegroundsthatthecountryalreadyhasawell-establishedlegal
andpolicyframeworkaroundlandandnaturalresourcemanagementand
administration–andarguingthatitisonlytheimplementationwhichposes
problems.Thegovernment’sstance,inturn,hasmeantthatCambodiancivil
societyorganisationshavealsolargelychosentonotrefertotheTGsintheir
advocacyandpoliticalworkoncasesoflandgrabs–atleastfornow.Bycontrast,
somecivilsocietyorganisationsinMyanmarhavebegunexperimentingwithusing
theTGsintheirorganisingandadvocacywork.ThecaseofTGuptakeinMyanmar
showshowchangesinagivencontext,howeversmallandseeminglyinsignificant,
canpresentnewopportunitiestoinfluencelawmaking.There,untilrecently,few
observerscouldhaveimaginedanofficialpublicconsultationonanewnational
landusepolicy,orthatitcouldbeanythingmorethanademonstration
consultation–heldunderhighlycontrolledconditionsandaimedatmerely
signalingratherthanactingingoodfaithtointernationaldonors,governments,
andinvestors.xviYetinOctober2014theTheinSeingovernmentinitiatedsucha
procedureandprogrammedittostartandfinishintwomonths.Whateverthe
intentionsbehindit,theofficialprocessunexpectedlylastedfarlongerandwent
fardeeperthanoriginallyplanned,aspreviouslyexcludedsocialactorsespecially
from“below”mobilisedtopoliticallyengageandregistertheirconcernsand
proposals,andasmoderatepoliticalcurrentsonthe“inside”workedto
accommodatethesenewvoices.Exploitingthegovernment’sopeningupto
internationalstandards(afterdecadesofisolation),somecivilsociety
organisationsandgrassrootsgroupsusedtheTGstoframetheircriticismsand
recommendations,whichperhapscontributedtoreshapingthepolicyin
significantwaysandpushingitinarelativelymoreacceptabledirection.
Takentogether,theexamplesfromCambodiaandMyanmarshowhowthe
existinghistorical-institutionalcontext–includingchangesinthiscontext–can
influencethepoliticalperceptionsandcalculationsofkeyactors–including
governmentauthoritiesandcivilsocietygroups–onwhetherandhowtotakeup
whichregulatoryideas,framingsandtoolsthatmayoriginatefromthe
internationalarena.
Proposition4–politicalstrategy
Insituationswherepowerfulactorsareconvergingtoreallocatelandandrelated
naturalresourcesawayfromruralworkingpeople,internationalregulatory
instrumentsarelikelytobeperceivedaslegitimatebythose(potentially)
adverselyaffectedifthesearegroundedexplicitlyinhumanrightsprinciplesand
provisionsbecauseofthelatter’scoreconcernforremedyingsocialinjustice.Such
instrumentsarelikelytobemostrelevantifusedinawaythatopensuppolitical
spaceforaffectedpeopleandpeoplestoorganiseandmobilisetoputpressureon
especiallystateauthoritiestoactintheirfavor.Withthisinmind,international
humanrightsinstrumentscanbeenvisionedashavingatleastfourtacticaland
strategicuses.
First,theycanbeusedtoinformandframesocialmovements’andotheractors’
understandingsofthenaturalresourcerelatedproblemsthataffecttheirlivesand
livelihoods,aswellasthepossiblesolutionstotheseproblems.xviiThewayin
whichsomeCSOsandgrassrootssocialactorsusedtheTGstohighlightthe
problemoflandgrabbingwhilevalidatingtheirownresponsestoitduringthe
publicconsultationonadraftnationallandusepolicyinMyanmarisagood
example.Second,theycanbeusedtomake(more)visiblegenderdimensionsof
theseconflicts,andtoputforwardmoregenderequitablesocialjusticeplatforms.
Again,recentexperienceinMyanmarprovidesanexample:there,softlawand
hardlawhumanrightsinstruments(CEDAW,theRighttoFood,andtheTGs)were
deployedbyCSOstoexposeseriousweaknessesinthegovernment’shandlingof
women’slandrightsinthedraftnationallandusepolicy,andtoputforward
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
13
alternativepolicyproposals,manyofwhichwereeventuallyaccepted.Third,
multipleinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscanbeusedtoidentifyarangeof
(potential)institutionalleveragepointstobetargetedbyadvocacyandcollective
actioncampaignsatdifferentscales.Fourth,specificinstrumentscanbeusedto
develop“verticallyintegrated”strategies(Fox2001),wherestateauthorityis
targetedatdifferentlevelssimultaneouslyinordertominimiseaversionof
responsibilitythroughdisplacement(or“passingthebuck”).
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
Conclusion
14
InCambodiaandMyanmar,bothclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandland
grabbinginterventionsarerecastingthewaylandisused,whileenflamingoldor
sparkingnewconflicts.Nationalandinternationaldevelopmentworkers,activists,
orcompanyofficialsinchargeofcorporatesocialresponsibilitymaybetempted
tolaunchtheirowninterventionsinthesesimmeringcomplexsituations,by
promotingoneoranotherregulatoryresponseasasolution.Towhatextentsuch
interventionsareaddressing–andcapableofaddressing–notoneproblem,but
theclusterofproblems(theoverlap,intersectionandinterplayofactivitiesthat
areeachintheirownwayrecastinglandrightsandlanduse)remainsanopen
question.
Inlightoftheabovepropositions,andinthecontextofcomplexlandscapeswhere
climatechangemitigationinitiativesandlanddealsoverlapandintersectsuchas
CambodiaandMyanmar,itmakessensetoprivilegetheCFSTenureGuidelines,
forbothanalysisandaction.Thisdoesnotmeandiscardingotherinternational
regulatoryinstrumentsasinappropriateorirrelevant,butthatthereare
compellingreasonstoemphasisethisparticularinternationalstandardinin
analysisandactiononthisspecificproject.Thereasonsareasfollows:
First,theTGsalonewereformulatedtoaddressandanswertheunderlying“land
question”whichisattheheartofcomplexresourceconflicts,namely:Whoshould
havewhatrightstowhichnaturalresources(land,fisheriesandforests),forhow
longandforwhatpurposes,andwhogetstodecide?
Second,theTGsareuniqueamongthearrayofregulatoryinstrumentsmost
commonlybeingappliedintoday’sresourceconflictsgloballyinexplicitly
anchoringthemselvesininternationalhumanrightslaw.Notonlydotheymake
referencetovariousotherspecificinternationalhumanrightsinstruments,but
basichumanrightsprincipleshavebeendirectlyintegratedinspecificprovisions
aswellasgloballythroughoutthedocument.
Third,theTGsareunprecedentedinthedegreetowhichtheyareimbuedwith
politicallegitimacy.Theseguidelines,incontrasttootherinstrumentscurrentlyin
use,aretheofficialproductofalengthyandinclusiveintergovernmental
negotiationandagreement,whichuniquelyinvolvedthedirectparticipationinthe
debates(butnotinthefinaldecision)ofcivilsocietyactors,specificallyNGOs,
humanrightsorganisationsandsocialmovementrepresentatives,andwasbuilt
uponarelativelyextensiveandintensiveandinclusiveformalconsultation
process.
Acknowledgements
Thispaperisinformedbyinsightsfromtheproject“MOSAICClimatechange
mitigationpolicies,landgrabbingandconflictinfragilestates:understanding
intersections,exploringtransformationsinMyanmarandCambodia”,2014-2018,
fundedbyNWOandDFID.Forinformationvisittheprojectwebsiteat
https://www.iss.nl/research/research_programmes/political_economy_of_resour
ces_environment_and_population_per/networks/mosaic/
Notesoncontributors
JenniferFrancoisaresearcheractivistwiththeTransnationalInstitute.After
receivingaPhDinpoliticsin1997intheUS,shebeganworkingwiththePhilippine
solidaritygroupintheNetherlands,andwithlocalpeasantorganizations,rural
communityorganizingandhumanrightsgroups.Since2012shehasbeenleading
researchonruralpoliticsandlandgovernanceinMyanmar.Jennyisalsoadjunct
facultywiththeCollegeofHumanitiesandDevelopment(COHD)attheChina
AgriculturalUniversityinBeijing.
ClaraMiYoungParkisaPhDcandidateattheInternationalInstituteofSocialStudies
inTheHague,Netherlands.Herresearchfocusesonthegenderedand
‘generationed’politicaleconomyofclimatechangeandresourcegrabbingin
Myanmar.ClaraisRegionalGenderRuralandSocialDevelopmentOfficerwiththe
AsiaPacificRegionalOfficeoftheFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnited
NationsinBangkok.
RomanHerreholdsaM.A.ingeography(minoringinethnology)fromWestfälische
Wilhelms-UniversitätMünster.Heisseniorpolicyadviserlandandagriculture
2007-presentwiththehumanrightsorganizationFIANGermany.Hismain
activitiesincludecaseworkonselectedcasesoflandconflicts,humanrights
expertiseonlandissuesandpolicydevelopment.Heisalsopartofnationaland
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
Fourth,theTGshaveimmediatesocialrelevanceincomplexresourceconflict
settings:theirparticularcharacter(describedabove)meansnotonlythatstates
haveanobligationtoimplementtheseguidelines,butalsothatcivilsociety
organisationsandgrassrootssocialactorsneednotwaitforthistohappenand
caninsteadimmediatelymakeuseoftheprinciplesandprovisionscontainedin
theseguidelinesto(re)frametheiranalysesandactions,includingassessingtheir
ownsituations,monitoringandevaluatinggovernmentandcompanyinitiatives,
anddevelopingawarenessraising,organisingandmobilisingstrategies.
Finally,asaresultoftheirparticularorientationandcharacter,theTGshaveawiderangingapplicabilitythatisintrinsictotheirpurpose.Ratherthanbeingbuilttobe
usedinrelationtoaspecificprojectorinitiative,theycanbeusedformultiple
typesofinterventionsandinitiativesthatcutacrosspolicyarenasandissueareas.
TheTGs’built-in,wide-rangingapplicabilityisespeciallyrelevantforsituations
suchasthefocusofourpaper–whereclimatechangemitigationinitiativesand
landgrabbingimpulsesoverlap,intersectandinteract.
15
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
internationalnetworking,researchinrurallandrelatedconflicts,consultationof
governmentsandNGOs,educationalwork,lectures.
16
References:
Agarwal,B.1994.AFieldofOne’sOwn:GenderandLandRightsinSouthAsia.
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Borras,J.etal.2015.“LandConcentrationandLandGrabbinginEurope:A
PreliminaryAnalysis.”CanadianJournalofDevelopmentStudies38
(FORTHCOMING):PagesTBA
Bourdieu,P.1987.“TheForceofLaw:TowardaSociologyoftheJuridicalField,
TranslatedbyRichardTerdiman.”HastingsLawJournal38:814–53.
Carothers,T.2003.“PromotingtheRuleofLawAbroad:TheProblemof
Knowledge.”WorkingPaperNumber34,RuleofLawSeries,DemocracyandRule
ofLawProject,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace.
Collier,P.andA.Hoeffler.2005.“ResourceRents,Governance,andConflict.”
JournalofConflictResolution49(4):625–633.
Cooter,R.,S.Marks,andR.Mnookin.1982.“BargainingintheShadowoftheLaw:
ATestableModelofStrategicBehavior.”11J.LegalStud.225(1982). Availableat:
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/85
Crook,R.2001.“EditorialIntroduction”.InMakingLawMatter:Rules,Rightsand
SecurityintheLivesofthePoor,editedbyR.C.CrookandP.PHoutzager.IDS
Bulletin32(1),1–7.
Decker,K.,C.Sage,andM.Stefanova.2005.“LaworJustice:BuildingEquitable
LegalInstitutions”.Washington,DC:WorldBank.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9152.
Deininger,K.2011.“ForumonGlobalLandGrabbing:ChallengesPosedbythe
NewWaveofFarmlandInvestment.”JournalofPeasantStudies38(2).
Doss,C.,G.Summerfield,andD.Tsikata.2014.“Land,Gender,andFoodSecurity.”
FeministEconomics20(1):1–3.
Fox,J.1994.“TheDifficultTransitionfromClientelismtoCitizenship:Lessonsfrom
Mexico.”WorldPolitics46(2):151–84.
Fox,J.2001.“VerticallyIntegratedPolicyMonitoring:AToolforCivilSocietyPolicy
Advocacy.”NonprofitandVoluntarySectorQuarterly30(3):616–627.
Fox,J.2007.AccountabilityPolitics:PowerandVoiceinRuralMexico.Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress.
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
17
Franco,J.2011.BoundbyLaw:FilipinoRuralPoorandtheSearchforJusticeina
Plural-LegalLandscape.Honolulu:UniversityofHawaiiPress,Manila:Ateneode
ManilaUniversity.
Franco,J.2014.“ReclaimingFreePriorandInformedConsent(FPIC)inthecontext
ofgloballandgrabs.”Amsterdam:TransnationalInstituteforTheHandsOffthe
LandAlliance.
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
Galanter,M.1981.“JusticeinManyRooms:Courts,PrivateOrdering,and
IndigenousLaw.”JournalofPluralismandUnofficialLawVol.13(19):1-47.
18
Harris,V.2007.“ConsolidatingIdeologyinLaw?LegalandJudicialReform
ProgrammesattheWorldBank.BriefingpaperfortheBrettonWoodsProject.
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/print.shtml?cmd[884]=x-884-554671.
Herman,E.,andF.Brodhead.1984.DemonstrationElections:U.S.-StagedElections
intheDominicanRepublic,Vietnam,andElSalvador.Boston:SouthEnd.
Houtzager,P.,andJ.Franco.2003.“WhenthePoorMakeLaw:Comparisons
AcrossBrazilandthePhilippines.”ResearchNote,Law,Democracy,and
DevelopmentProgramme.Brighton:InstituteofDevelopmentStudies.
Hunsberger,C.etal.2017.“ClimateChangeMitigation,LandGrabbingand
Conflict:TowardsaLandscape-basedandCollaborativeActionResearchAgenda.”
CanadianJournalofDevelopmentStudies38(FORTHCOMING):PagesTBA
Ikdahl,I.,A.Hellum,R.Karrhus,T.A.Benjaminsen,andP.Kameri-Mbote.2005.
“HumanRights,FormalisationandWomen’sLandRightsinSouthernandEastern
Africa.”StudiesinWomen’sLawNo.57,InstituteofWomen’sLaw,Universityof
Oslo.
IIED(InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment)2012.
“BiodiversityandCulture:ExploringCommunityProtocols,RightsandConsent.”
ParticipatoryandActionLearning65.London:IIED.
LandLawofCambodia,NS/RKM/0801/14,August,2001.
Li,T.2011.“ForumonGlobalLandGrabbing:CenteringLabourintheLandGrab
Debate.”JournalofPeasantStudies38(2).
Li,P.,Feng,Z.,Jiang,A.,Liao,C.,andZhang,J.2014.“AReviewofSwidden
AgricultureinSoutheastAsia.”RemoteSensing2014,6,1654-1683.
Margulis,M,N.McKeon,andM.S.BorrasJr.2014.“LandGrabbingandGlobal
Governance:CriticalPerspectives.”InLandGrabbingandGlobalGovernance,
editedbyM.Margulis,N.McKeon,andM.S.BorrasJr.London:Routledge.
McAdam,D.,J.McArthy,andM.Zald,eds.1996.ComparativePerspectiveson
SocialMovements:PoliticalOpportunities,MobilizingStructures,andCultural
Framings.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Monsalve,S.2006.“AccesstoLandandProductiveResources:Towardsa
SystematicInterpretationoftheFAOVoluntaryGuidelinesontheRighttoFood.”
Heidelberg:FIAN.
Moore,S.F,ed.2005.LawandAnthropology:AReader.Oxford:Blackwell
Publishing.
Nader,L.2001.“TheUndersideofConflictManagement—InAfricaand
Elsewhere.”InMakingLawMatter:Rules,RightsandSecurityintheLivesofthe
Poor,editedbyR.C.CrookandP.P.Houtzager.IDSBulletin32(1):19–27.
Nader,L.1990.HarmonyIdeology:JusticeandControlinaZapotecMountain
Village.StanfordUniversityPress.
O’Laughlin,B.2009.“GenderJustice,LandandtheAgrarianQuestioninSouthern
Africa.”InPeasantsandGlobalizations.PoliticalEconomy,RuralTransformation
andtheAgrarianQuestion,editedbyA.H.Akram-Lodhi.andC.Kay.London:
Routledge.
Roces,M.2010.“AsianFeminisms:Women’sMovementsfromtheAsian
Perspective.”InWomen’sMovementsinAsia,editedbyM.RocesandL.Edwards.
London:Routledge.
Roth,D.,R.Boelens,andM.Zwarteveen.2005.LiquidRelations.ContestedWater
RightsandLegalComplexity.NewBrunswick:RutgersUniversityPress.
Scheidel,A.,&Work,C.2016.“Large-scaleforestplantationsforclimatechange
mitigation?NewfrontiersofdeforestationandlandgrabbinginCambodia.”In
ICASColloquiumonGlobalgovernance/politics,climatejustice&agrarian/social
justice:linkagesandchallenges.ColloquiumPaperNo.11.TheHague.Retrieved
fromhttps://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/11icas_cp_scheidel_and_work.pdf.
Springate-Baginski,O.2013.“RethinkingSwiddenCultivationinMyanmar:Policies
forSustainableUplandLivelihoodsandFoodSecurity”.UniversityofEastAnglia/
PyoePin.http://www.slideshare.net/khinayehan/rethinking-swidden-cultivationin-myanmar-pyoe-pyin-2014.
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
19
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
TNI(TransnationalInstitute).2016.“TheChallengeofDemocraticandInclusive
LandPolicymakinginMyanmar:AResponsetotheDraftNationalLandUse
Policy”.Amsterdam:TNI.
OHCHR(OfficeofHighCommissionerforHumanRights).StatusofRatification
InteractiveDashboard(accessedDecember2015).http://indicators.ohchr.org.
VonBenda-Beckmann,F.2001.“LegalPluralismandSocialJusticeinEconomicand
PoliticalDevelopment.”InMakingLawMatter:Rules,RightsandSecurityinthe
LivesofthePoor,editedbyR.C.CrookandP.P.Houtzager.IDSBulletin32(1):46–
56.
20
i
Here, we refer to international regulatory instruments, processes and monitoring
mechanisms, tools and entities collectively as international regulatory instruments.
However, these instruments vary considerably in terms of legitimacy, ownership,
accountability and enforceability. For instance, “corporate-led” instruments are developed
by private sector actors, sometimes together with civil society actors, as self-regulatory
tools and can be sector-wide or company-specific.
ii
Margulis, McKeon, and Borras (2013, 5) highlight “the rapid elevation of land grabbing
onto the global governance agenda and a flurry of global rule-making projects at various
scales involving a multiplicity of actors to regulate land-grabbing.”
iii
See TNI 2016. “The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive Land Policymaking n
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
Myanmar: A response to the draft National Land Use Policy”. 13 (Accessed 5 April 2016).
https://www.tni.org/files/download/the_challenge_of_democratic_and_inclusive_land_poli
cymaking_in_myanmar.pdf.
iv
See http://iphrdefenders.net/cambodia-prey-lang-community-network-plcn-press-release-
attempted-murdered-plcn-activist/
v
Springate-Baginski, Oliver 2013.
vi
Scheidel and Work 2015.
vii
Bourdieu (1987) differentiates between diverse fields of social regulation to illuminate
different individual actors and groups of actors embedded in field-specific institutions and
forms of stratification. Their unique combination of bases of power, institutions and forms
of stratification give fields a particular logic and coherence of their own, and therefore, a
degree of autonomy from each other.
viii
Such practices are a basic feature of many societies, whether they originate in pre-
colonial cultures, or with European Christian missionaries seeking to spread a “harmony
legal model” (Nader 1990; 2001, 21). As von Benda-Beckmann (2001, 52) argues, “Even
if one’s main orientation is to accept the inevitable primacy of the state and state law as the
means for change, one nevertheless has to take into account the overall constellation of
normative and institutional orders in which the state apparatus, its institutions and
regulations, are only one part.” In recognition of customary law, many official legal and
judicial reform initiatives include “non-state justice” components as a way to expand
access to justice without further burdening regular courts.
ix
22
x
Harris 2007, 1.
Decker, Sage, and Stefanova 2005, 7, 156.
xi
Decker, Sage, and Stefanova 2005, 7, 157.
xii
FPIC refers to the right to self-determination and to freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development. It is clearly articulated in the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from
their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed
consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair
compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.” (Article 10)
xiii
FPIC is appearing in initiatives “…ranging from the safeguard policies of the
multilateral financial institutions; practices of extractive industries; water and energy
development; natural resources management; access to genetic resources and associated
traditional knowledge and benefit sharing arrangements; scientific and medical research;
and indigenous cultural heritage” (as noted by Antoanella-Julia Motoc and the Tebtebba
Foundation in a legal commentary submitted to the Commission on Human Rights SubCommission on the Promotion and Prosecution of Human Rights, Working Group on
xiv
While it is safe to assume that most international regulatory instruments will address
gender, it is important to remember that gender equality is a contested notion, including in
Asia (Roces 2010), which can lead to different constructions of meanings and politics. The
evidence indicates that overall, women are disproportionately affected vis-a-vis men by
land dispossession (Doss, Summerfield and Tsikata 2014, 3) due to existing hierarchical
structures and patriarchal norms. Conflicts, shocks and competition over scarce resources
can exacerbate existing gender and social disparities and further marginalise those who are
most vulnerable.
xv
There are ten core international human rights instruments. For each there is a committee
of experts to monitor implementation of the treaty provisions by its states parties.
xvi
The term “demonstration” is used here conceptually, as in Herman and Brodhead
(1984).
xvii
On the “framing” function of social movements, see McAdam, McArthy, and Zald
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
Indigenous Populations, at the twenty third Session, 18–22 July 2005).
(1996).
23
NazioartekoHizketaldia
ELIKADURARENETORKIZUNAETANEKAZARITZARENERRONKAKXXI.MENDERAKO:
Munduanork,nolaetazer-nolakoinplikaziosozial,ekonomikoetaekologikorekin
elikatukoduenizangodaeztabaidagaia
2017koapirilaren24/26.EuropaBiltzarJauregia.Vitoria-Gasteiz.Araba.Euskal
Herria.Europa.
InternationalColloquium
THEFUTUREOFFOODANDCHALLENGESFORAGRICULTUREINTHE21stCENTURY:
Debatesaboutwho,howandwithwhatsocial,economicandecologicalimplications
wewillfeedtheworld.
ElfuturodelaalimentaciónylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.
April24th-26th.EuropaCongressPalace.VitoriaGasteiz.Álava.BasqueCountry/Europe
ColoquioInternacional
ELFUTURODELAALIMENTACIÓNYRETOSDELAAGRICULTURAPARAELSIGLOXXI:
Debatessobrequién,cómoyconquéimplicacionessociales,económicasyecológicas
alimentaráelmundo.
\]/\^deAbril,\_`a.PalaciodeCongresosEuropa.Vitoria-Gasteiz.Álava.PaísVasco.
Europa.
GUNTZAILEAK/COLABORAN/COLLABORATINGORGANIZATIONS
LAGUNTZAEKONOMIKOA/APOYAN/WITHSUPPORTFROM
21