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European Integration,
seen from Historiography and Political Science
Hartmut MARHOLD*
Introduction: a risky methodological trial
European integration is still a young branch of historical research1）, young because it is an
ongoing process which started only some half a century ago – nearly too young, for some
historians, since archives are not yet open for research except for those from the first years
of this era. Nevertheless, numerous publications presenting a partial or even a comprehensive
look at European integration are available nowadays, most of them giving a fascinating
account of the phenomenon, but only very few of them based on methodological reflection
about the approach (unconsciously) chosen to capture this innovation somewhere between the
history of (nation-) states and international relations.2）
On the other hand, political science is very much concerned with European integration from
a very different methodological stance, with its specific methods (the inevitable “independent
variable” explaining one ore more “depending variables”), turned more to the future than to
the past, even if some political scientists try to get in touch with a historical approach by
＊ Director
General of Centre International de Formation Européenne.
is conducted at many places, but there is only one specialised journal, the “Journal of
European Integration History”, published since 1995 by the European Union Liaison Committee of
Historians (itself founded in 1982). Another centre of historical research is the “European History
Project at the European University Institute at Florence in Italy, where namely many important archives
are at the disposal for historians. See on the whole subject and these introductory remarks Johnny
Laursen: Towards a Supranational History? In: Journal of European Integration History (JEIH), Vol 8, 1
(2002), p. 5 – 11. See as well the important “state of the art”-report of Michael Gehler: Zeitgeschichte
zwischen Europäisierung und Globalisierung. In: Internet-publication of the German journal "Das
Parlament - Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte", Deutscher Bundestag und Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, 01.08.2003.
2） As example for historical tale without methodological reflection: Gerhard Brunn: Die Europäische
Einigung von 1945 bis heute. Stuttgart 2002; on the contrary, similar to the idea put forward here,
of a combination of a historical and a political science approach: Fabrice Larat: Histoire politique de
l’intégration européenne. Paris (La documentation francaise) 2003. A third example, for “A Liberal
History of European Integration” (Christopher Chivvis in his review of) John Gillingham : European
Integration 1950 – 2003 : Superstate or New Market Economy. Cambridge 2004
1） Research
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introducing “long term trends”.3） But political scientists are rarely interested by a genuine
historic approach (and are even often sceptic about the historical tendency to contend itself
with an account, a sort of tale, without theoretical preconditions); they try to explain up-todate and ongoing evolutions, and the scope of their historic résumé is often limited to the
4）
last decade.
One could consider the wide range of integration theories5） as an effort to bridge the gap
between political science and history. As far as European integration is concerned, at least
some of these theories discuss processes having a historical dimension. This is certainly the
case of the (neo-) functionalist theory, one of the earliest (from Haas6） to Lindbergh and
Scheingold7）), which provides an explanation of the historical evolution of the European
integration – an internal logic of “spill-over” effects would then explain the integration
process, as if one step to integration would lead somewhat logically to the next one. It is not
surprising that this theory had its apogee in the sixties, when the steps from the European
Community for Coal and Steel led to the European Economic Community and to further
implementation of a customs union, which seemed to imply a common market for the next
generation. Unfortunately, the crisis of the mid-sixties (de Gaulle’s politics of maintaining
national sovereignty) stopped this evolution, and neo-functionalists were embarrassed…
The fusion thesis is another relatively young theory, which attempts to explain European
integration. This theory does so be the merger of (at least two) decision-making levels (the
state level and the European level). The advantage of this theory is its ability to take into
account changes (namely on the administrative level) of the nation states – but with limited
explanatory potential for sudden breakthroughs (like the Single European Act in 1985) or
brutal breaks (like the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954).
What I try to propose here is something rather unconventional and risks, by the way, to be
considered by both historians and political scientists as too strange to them to be recognised
See e.g. Wessels’ “long term trends”, in: Institutionen der Europäischen Union: Langzeittrends
und Leitideen, in: Gerhard Göhler (Hrsg.), Die Eigenart der Institutionen. Zum Profil politischer
Institutionentheorie, Baden-Baden 1994, p. 301-330.
4） See Johnny Laursen, op. cit.: “ […] the history of European integration is not only pursued by
historians, but also by other disciplines such as political science, law etc. [...] Not only historians (of
which there are many kinds already), but also political scientists, sociologists, lawyers and many others
apply themselves to this rich field. It is an example for an enriching, interdisciplinary exchange between
archive-based, empirical history and more theory-oriented approaches. “ (p. 7) (Examples for Political
Science books with historical introductions … see as well Wessels Forschungsbericht im Jahrbuch.)
5） English Beiträge der Geschichtswissenschaft zur Deutung der Europäischen Integration, in: Wilfried
Loth/Wolfgang Wessels (Hrsg.), Theorien europäischer Integration, Opladen 2001, S. 87-106; Claus
Giering (and his bibliography) englische Titel!
6） Ernst B. Haas: The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economical Forces 1950-1957. London
1958
7）
Leon N. Lindbergh and Stuart A. Scheingold: Europe’s Would-Be Polity. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970.
3） R. L. R.
European Integration, seen from Historiography and Political Science
205
as a serious contribution to their research: It is a sort of marriage of the two of them by
8）
means of a structured model of the main factors (maybe one could speak of “variables”, at
least in a systems analysis sense) influencing European integration since its birth. On the one
hand, this model should be able to give an account of the structural conditions of integration
by explaining its scope and limits in so far it is a political science model. On the other hand,
it should be able to explain the evolution of Europe’s integration, dividing the fifty year
old process in different periods, distinguishing eras of different nature in so far it would be
a specifically historical model (if historians accept models at all, as useful methodological
instruments).9） But let us see whether there might be some evidence for this risky approach,
by examining the empirical background.
Three visions for post-war Europe
As is often the case after wars, the post-war period was an unknown void.10） Nothing was
obvious, everything had to be rebuilt – not only the economic structures and industrial
infrastructure, but also the political patterns and frameworks. Even the nation states had no
longer a natural stand, in some European areas (like in Germany) there was no state status,
other nation states existed before the war and continued to exist after it (like Poland), others
just reassembled the destroyed parts the war had left (like France). Neither international,
nor supranational structures in Europe really existed– the political landscape was empty, and
invited the existing or potential actors of the time to develop plans and visions for a new
Europe, shaped in a way, which corresponded to their interests.
This was certainly the case for those powers that emerged from the war as the real historical
11）
winners, the newly so-called “superpowers”. The era of bipolarity began, and this meant
that the two superpowers thought strategically in a global dimension. Europe was one
piece, maybe even a masterpiece in this puzzle, as Europe became a key element of both
8） For
a an old (historical) but always useful definition of „model“ see : Phillip C. Wall: How scientific
are Political Science Models?” In: Political Methodology 1/3 (summer 1974). New models are often to
be found in game or real actor theories, but should not be confounded with the theories themselves.
9） Another terminological possibility to seize the difference of the two approaches would be to speak of
a synchronic and a diachronic dimension.
10） Historical books on the post-war situation see under the website of the University of Leiden,
Netherlands,
http://www.eu-history.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?m=3&c=10&garb=0.40005079549039213&session ;
in German, one of the first historical books based on archive research and covering the whole range
of integration matters for a certain period was Wilfried Loth: Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der
europäischen Integration 1939-1957. Göttingen 1990.
11） Historical books on the era of bipolarity, the discussion on the beginning of this era, and the term see
e.g. Richard T. Griffiths « Cold War International History Project » and research within this project ;
http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409: in German see e.g. Loth: Die
Teilung der Welt 1941-1955. Munich 1987.
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superpowers’ global interests. On the other hand, European nation states were not likely
to cede to the newly created superpowers without having a say. One could imagine a new
Europe within the framework of the old structures, dominated by the nation states and their
12）
claim to sovereignty. Alternatively, between the global ambition of the superpowers and the
regional weight of the nation states, an intermediate, continental, genuine European level of
political power and decision-making seemed to have some historical right to emerge and coexist alongside the superpowers. Some examples may illustrate these three dimensions and
levels of shaping a new Europe after the war.
The superpower vision
One thing is so obvious that it does not need any analysis and argumentation: The Soviet
Union was determined to dominate without any ambiguity the whole part of the continent
conceded to it already during the famous conferences in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. It was
only a question of time as to when the USSR would install, if necessary by means of putsch,
regimes in the east central European states where its hegemony was most important for its
imperialistic interests.
It is much more interesting to have a look on the western part of Europe and its relations to
the other superpower, the United States, and to ask the question whether and how American
interests prevailed in Europe, and whether in this respect European and American interests
coincided? We can also ask a different question: whether there was, in a far smoother way,
nevertheless an US-hegemony under way. The Marshall Plan can serve as a test13）: It was
without any doubt motivated by the will to help Europeans to reconstruct their economies
and to escape poverty and hunger, social uprising and political chaos – the humanitarian
motivation of the American help is obvious and should not be questioned. At the same time,
the Marshal plan also served the self-interests of the United States.
Firstly, the western part of Europe should be fortified and become a barrage against soviet
expansion. This can be interpreted as the Americans investing in their own safety. Secondly,
the American economy needed a commercial partner that was sufficiently well equipped
and rich to buy American goods, and to serve the common interest of exchanging goods, in
order to become richer. Europe was a prime candidate. Thirdly, and arguably most important
of all, the Marshal plan was not neutral with respect to the economic and social system,
but clearly inspired by a liberal logic. This logic is very clearly expressed in the three steps
12） See
Johnny Laursen, oc.cit.; Hagen Schulze: States, Nations and Nationalism. From the Middle Ages
to the Present. Oxford: Blackwell 1996.
13）
For literature and discussion of the Marshall Plan see the special page of the Homepage of Richard T.
Griffith (footnote 11) http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/mp.html, (updated 1999). More recently
Bernard Pujo: Le Général George C. Marshall (1880-1959). Par deux fois il a sauvé l’Europe. Paris
2003.
R. L. R.
European Integration, seen from Historiography and Political Science
207
indicated by Truman in his memoirs (more clearly than in the speech Marshall held himself
14）
5 June 1947 at the Harvard University) , when he says that (1) a working economy had to
be rebuilt by means of installing free markets, (2) as a condition of the evolution of social
structures, which would not fail to resist to revolutionary attempts and temptations coming
from the east, since they were based on healthy economic conditions, and (3) to lead to “free
institutions”, a parliamentary democracy well known in the United States but under pressure
(and a minority system in inter-war Europe). The US believed that by initiating a process
of economic reconstruction based on a market economy and leaving it to evolve freely, one
could almost guarantee that the result would be a political system corresponding more or less
to the Western (or American) model.
These considerations should not be misunderstood by saying that the USA tried to dominate
Europe, and that the Marshal plan was a means of imposing their hegemony. The approach
was, on the contrary, exactly the opposite in comparison with the Soviet one: The Soviets
believed in power and violence, the Americans in freedom; the process they initiated was,
in their eyes, a free and natural one – the outcome, nevertheless, served the American
interests even in so far as the western part of Europe would become similar to the USA and,
consequently, a natural ally. It is undeniable that the United States regarded Europe as one
part of a world wide political struggle, and attached to the free part of Europe a role in this
bipolar world. Roosevelt, Truman, Marshal and other American leaders perceived Europe not
from a genuine European point of view, but from an American one (which does not mean
that European and American interests could not be complimentary). Their vision for the
future of Europe was that Europeans had a specific role to play in the worldwide struggle
between the Superpowers.
The nation-state vision
One week after the armistice, 15 may 1945, General de Gaulle held a speech at the French
Constitutive National Assembly,15） a speech that reveals his vision for the future of France
and implies, as one can try to find out by extrapolation, a future of Europe on the whole.
First, he considers the Second World War as another in a long series of similar wars, all of
them motivated by the ambition of one or another European power to dominate all the others.
“Once more …” is the formula de Gaulle uses to underline his position. This is certainly an
16）
interpretation confirmed by historians later on . However, one could have equally expected
14） Harry
S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope. 1946-1952 (= Memoirs vol. II) New York 1965, p.135.
For one of the multiple publications of the Marshall Plan see the NATO website: http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/1947/s470605a_e.htm
15） De Gaulle: Discours et messages. Pendant la guerre. 1940-1946. Paris 1970, Discours du 15 mai
1945, p. 582.
16） For the notion of „Balance of Powers“ see Ernst B. Haas: The Balance of Power: Prescription,
Concept or Propaganda? In: World Politics 5 (July 1953), p. 442-77; Herbert Butterfield: The ↗
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that de Gaulle had the impression that this war was unique. His interpretation to the contrary
is a first hint of his vision of continuity in European state and international affairs. He
astutely describes the mechanism of the European system of competing nation states, which
has been created over several centuries. Historians and political scientists have also come to
the same conclusion and did indeed later, identifying a system of “balance of powers” or of
“hegemony and equilibrium”. The Second World War in De Gaulle’s eyes is one further war
in this long and bloody history. Providing that the old mechanisms still work, (e.g. a system
of coalitions forged together by the challenge of a common enemy) they will be strong
enough in the end to overcome, thereby the ambition of hegemony.
The second lesson to be drawn from de Gaulle’s speech is that he considers centralisation
on the national level as the right means to cope with the danger, menace and challenge of
those ambitions for hegemony from any foreign power. His experience during the war, as it
had been for many French people, was that the division of France was an awful aberration,
that it had decisively weakened the French capacity of maintaining its national integrity –
and division of the French nation (and state) is a catastrophe for all (politically thinking)
Frenchmen. His reaction to this challenge was to re-unite all national forces, the different
17）
and divergent resistance forces first, but later on the French nation on the whole. This
huge effort of re-unification led (rightly so in de Gaulle’s eyes) to more unity and more
centralisation than ever. The French nation state should be able to dispose of all the resources
of the nation so that it would be strong enough to resist to every attack from outside. Once
more, a small word reveals the spirit of this vision of the French nation state’s reconstitution:
France should be enabled “to stay” (“rester”) what it always was. This vision is a historically
based one and can be seen to draw its orientation for the future from the past.
One can easily imagine a Europe according to De Gaulle’s vision: a Europe composed of
nation states able to discourage any potential enemy to attack, by a sort of multilateral
deterrence on the national and continental level. Certainly, this design does not exclude
specific forms of cooperation, if the national sovereignty and the individual security interests
of the nation states are not questioned.18） Following this rationale, however, Europe would
become a continent of strong, defensive and ultimately nationally minded sovereign states.
↘ Balance of Power. In: Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.): Diplomatic Investigations. Essays
in the Theory of International Politics. London 1966, p. 132-148. Ludwig Dehio : Hegemonie oder
Gleichgewicht. Zürich 1948; an English version under the title: Precarious Balance. The Politics of
Power in Europe 1494-1945, New York 1962.
17） De Gaulle’s political ideas see in Daniel J. Mahoney: De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur, and
Modern Democracy, New Brunswick, N.J. 2000.
18） De Gaulle’s plans for a post-war European cooperation, his false federation with neighbouring
regions under French domination are analyzed in Conze, Eckart. Hegemonie durch Integration ?
Die amerikanische Europapolitik und ihre Herausforderung durch de Gaulle. In: Vierteljahrshefte für
Zeitgeschichte , 43 Jg (1995), vol. 1. p. 297-340.
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European Integration, seen from Historiography and Political Science
209
Even if this model for the future of Europe is in de Gaulle’s own speeches and political
action, as well as in the policy of other European statesmen, merely implicit, it was an
important one. Perhaps the de Gaulle version can be seen as an extreme vision of rebuilt
nation states being the only components of the Europe of tomorrow. Yet de Gaulle was
of course not the only statesman in Europe who thought in these conservative terms and
categories.
It is nevertheless obvious that this national or nation state based vision was incompatible with
those of the superpowers. This incompatibility is exemplified by De Gaulle’s complete lack
of recognition to the existence of extra-European powers in Europe after the war – There is
no mention of the Soviet Union or the United States in his speech. He bases his vision solely
on French experiences of the Second World War. De Gaulle insisted on the possibility – one
might say illusion – of the European nation states left alone and being once more entitled
and able to shape the future of the continent themselves, without foreign assistance.
A genuine European vision
A third proposition for the new Europe focussed on the continental level, and regarded
Europe as such as the appropriate actor able to adapt to the new historical situation. This
third vision stemmed from the logic that European nation states were incapable of resolving
their conflicts peacefully so that rebuilding them would lead to the same wars as in the past,
the only difference being that industrial modern weapons had the potential to kill whole
peoples. It also stemmed from the recognition that the appearance of the new superpowers
– with the consequence that nation states were no longer able to assure independence to the
European peoples on their own. A continental political unity would not only regulate conflicts
within Europe in a peaceful way, but also assure independence for the old continent.
This view of the future of Europe emerged essentially from the resistance movements in
different European countries, even in Germany,19） but was of course not new in the history
of European ideas; it drew inspiration from centuries of plans for European unification, a
vision as old as that of splitting the continent into separate nation states.20） The First World
War already encouraged plans for a unified and peaceful Europe, as for instance Count
Koudenhove-Kalergi’s proposal, which was supported by his “Paneuropa”-Movement.21）
19） Frank
Niess: Die europäische Idee – aus dem Geist des Widerstands. Frankfurt a.M. 2001; Arnold J.
Zurcher: The Struggle to Unite Europe 1940-1958. New York 1958.
20） For the history of the European idea see Derek Heater: The Idea of European Unity, Leicester 1992,
Pagden, Anthony (ed.): The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the European Union, Cambridge UP
2002.
21） Derek Heater, op.cit.; sources in Walter Lipgens: Documents on the History of European Integration,
Berlin/New York, several volumes, 1985 …, together with Wilfried Loth from vol. 3 on.
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After the Second World War, however, these plans were specifically adapted to the new
challenges, as shown for example by the “Charter of Hertenstein”, the result of one of the
first and most important international meetings of European federalists after the war. This
meeting brought together representatives from sixteen different European countries, including
22）
for the first time Germans, and lead to the foundation of the most important pro-European
movement of the post-war period, the Union of European Federalists (UEF).23） The Charter
was agreed upon in September 1946 and outlines a European federation which had namely
two tasks, one internal and another external. The former was to assure peace between the
Europeans themselves and to guarantee to all European nations and cultures an autonomous
existence and evolution. The latter was to assure the whole continent its independence from
all extra-European powers. In the minds of the authors both aspects were linked. Only a
continental community would be able to guarantee this diversity of national cultures in the
future, with individual nation states being seen as too weak to assume this task vis-à-vis the
menacing and predominant superpowers. The solution must be a European federation, with
sufficient unity to assume its tasks efficiently, yet with a maximum of diversity to assure the
autonomy of its components.
This is a third model for the post-war future of Europe: It is neither conceived in the interest
of any European nation state, nor in the interest of one of the two superpowers and their
world politics. It is specifically European; in so far as it’s starting point is the interest of the
continental community of nations. One could say that the nation state model is of a limited,
regional24） scope, whereas the superpower vision is of global scope – the European model, on
the contrary, is of continental scope.
Construction of a model representing the structural factors of post-war Europe
The construction of this model aims to simplify a given historical situation. With this
particular model, we try to identify in this way the structural factors, which shaped the postwar Europe. A model might contribute to a long term explanation ofEuropean integration
in so far as it should be allowed to reduce complexity for a certain phase of the scientific
process – once the model is constructed, once lessons are drawn, once the explanatory
22） The
charter of Hertenstein itself is to be found on the homepage of the British Federal Union: http://
www.federalunion.org.uk/archives/hertenstein.shtml, as well in Lipgens and Loth, oc.cit.
23） UEF-history see the homepage of the UEF itself, with a short history: http://www.uef-europe.org/
id161.htm; see as well http://www.geocities.com/europafederalisterna/history.htm; and Sergio Pistone
(ed.): I movimenti per l' unita europea, 1945-1954. Milano 1992.
24） The term “regional” might seem to be not appropriate in this context, since it is usually employed
either for intra-state territorial entities, or for international “regions”, just in the continental sense (since
Joseph S. Nye (ed.): International Regionalism, Boston MA 1968, Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A.
Scheingold (eds.): Regional Integration. Cambridge 1971). Here it should express the limited dimension
of the Nation state, in comparison with and opposition to the wider scope of the continental integration.
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European Integration, seen from Historiography and Political Science
211
capacity is extracted, the model may be replaced by the real richness of historical reality.
It seems that none of the three models for Europe after the Second World War briefly
outlined above completely determined the future of the continent; none of them succeeded
totally in exclusively dominating all the others. Europe did not completely surrender to the
bloc logic, nor did it turn back to the system of “hegemony and equilibrium” – nor did a
European federation appear. It is evident that the post-war Europe was a combination of all
the three of these models: Nation
States were rebuilt, but they did not regain the whole range of their sovereignty; the Iron
Curtain came down and divided Europe in two parts, but at least the western part of Europe
kept a important margin of autonomous evolution; and a continental integration came into
existence, without being powerful enough to replace the nation state structures or to avoid the
division of Europe into the two zones of influence of the superpowers. Instead of one model,
all three of them were implemented. In reality they had to co-exist instead of being separate,
unrelated activities, we find a composed model. This we can use in our effort to explain the
coexistence and the historical dynamics between its components.
This model, with its three components, could be visualised as shown on the next page.
Some further explanations may be useful to understand the structures of the model, and then
some lessons should be drawn from it. It suggests that Europe, in the post-war period, was
divided into two spheres of influence or two blocs, limiting the extension of integration from
both sides, but in the same time developing them on their own. The iron curtain was the
most evident borderline in Europe soon after the war and reflects how far the Superpowers
imposed their model – even if one should also bear in mind how their domination worked out
differently in the two parts of Europe. The division of Europe is reflected in the horizontal
dimension of the model.
The structured model takes into account as well the existence of three decision-making levels
issued from the partial implementation of the three post-war models for Europe. These levels
are inspired by a global, a continental and a regional (national) approach – the three visions
for the new Europe after the war find their structural translation in the three coexisting levels.
The coexistence of the three visions finds its visual expression in the vertical dimension of
the model.
Finally, the third dimension of the model reflects the fact that that the division of power
between the three post-war models for the future of Europe led to a sort of distribution
of certain policies to certain actors: The Superpowers and their bloc organisations were in
charge of defence and security, the Nation states regained the power and competence of
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redistribution policies, education and culture etc., while some sectors of economic policy (coal
and steel, later on agriculture and the project of a common market) were conferred to the
new emerging continental community.
Lessons from the model
The model can be explained or understood by the lessons we can draw from it. There are
two types of lessons to be drawn, following the idea of a combination of historical and
political science methods: the first one is diachronic or historical in the proper sense, the
second one is synchronic, structural, similar to a systemic approach, and linked to political
science methodology.
Historical lessons: Chapters of a “History of European Integration”
The model suggests indeed, at least implicitly, the chapters of a history of European
Integration, in a very simple way: The first era would be the construction of the reality
reflected by the model, the second the period of existence of the visualised structures, and
the third their breakdown25）. Even if this might seem banal, it reflects nevertheless the reality
25） This
translation of the model into time seems to be similar to a well-known vision of history, the
vision of the “Rise and Fall” of a historic actor – one of the most famous applications of this organic
model was the correspondent interpretation of the Roman Empire, and its analogy with contemporary
history by Edward Gibbons. An application to European integration see Mancur Olson, footnote 29.
Moreover, it would be interesting to compare the division in different chapters proposed and applied
in different books on the history of European integration. Many of them divide in a similar ↗
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European Integration, seen from Historiography and Political Science
213
of the historical process:
Chapter One: Construction of the post-war framework (from the end of the war to the end
of the fifties)
The first chapter of a history of European Integration deals with the emergence of the postwar structures, and one can say that this period finished by the end of the fifties. In 1945
none of the international structures existed, and some Nation states (not only Germany) were
not quite sure of their existence. State structures were built up only in 1949, with the creation
of the two German states. On the international level, in 1945 neither NATO nor the Warsaw
Pact, neither the European Community nor the Comecon (neither the Counsel of Europe nor
the WEU …) existed – and some twelve years later, the whole landscape of international
affairs in Europe was (again) completely covered by these structures.26）
Such a first chapter would then describe and analyse, in order to explain and to understand
how these structures of international relations in Europe emerged and were forged; how the
Iron Curtain came down; how the first steps to continental integration were made; which of
them failed and which succeeded.
Two phenomena are obvious from this methodological approach: Firstly, for all of the
three main actors, promoters of the models or visions shortly presented above, “speed was
27）
essential”, as Truman put it in his memoirs himself. They were conscious of the pressure
of time – if it was not their vision that immediately prevailed, the others would pass with
their plans, implement them and marginalize the others. Nation states, promoters of European
integration and the Superpowers hastily attempted to implement their own model, in order to
attract the largest part of political power in this period of reconstruction. And this conscience
of the pressure of time was particularly obvious in the camp of the “Europeans” who felt that
once the Nation states and the bloc structures were established, there would be little space
for an autonomous European political structure.
By the end of the fifties, the structures corresponding to the model existed, and the post↘ way the distinguishable historical periods (like Larat, op.cit. who integrates in his historical account
methodological reflection), others differ from the plan proposed here (like Brunn, op.cit., who does not).
26） This does not mean that the evolution of international and other structures in Europe came to a
complete standstill; see for the ongoing differentiation of international organisations see Hermann
Lübbe: Föderalismus im 21. Jahrhundert. Zivilisationsrevolutionäre Voraussetzungen. In: Europäisches
Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung (ed.): Europäischer Föderalismus im 21. Jahrhundert, Tübingen
2003, p. 8-23.
27） Truman, op.cit.; see as well Hendrik Brugmans: L’Europe vécu. Bruxelles 1979: « Nous le savions
bien: il fallait aller très vite. Pour l’instant, les Etats nationaux – à ‘exception de la Grande-Bretagne –
n’avait pas encore trouvé leur prestige d’antan. […] Cinq ans ? Oui, tout au plus. Puis on ferait autre
chose. » (p. 26)
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war period came to an end. One can characterise this period as a sort of competition, a race
or course of three competitors who started by the end of the war and reached the goal a
decade or some twelve years later. All three of them indeed reached the goal, even if they
were not equally successful: The division of Europe, the Iron Curtain and soon afterwards
the Berlin wall showed clearly which level had become the most powerful. The Nation states
were back as well, even Germany had developed state structures, and it is precisely the
case of Germany, which depicts most eloquently just how much the Superpower structures
were superior to the other levels. And, last and, maybe, for the time being, even least: A
European decision-making structure had finally come into existence as well … The European
Integration process had begun.
Furthermore, the model even gives some hints to a subdivision of this first chapter. One may
consider the ambitious plans to create a complete European federation – and the failure of
these plans –immediately after the war as a first sub division. The Congress of the Hague
(may 1948) and the relative disappointment about the creation of the Council of Europe (may
1949) mark the end of this period and the turnover to an alternative strategy, initiated by
Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, starting integration from an modest level, leading it step
by step towards a political federation.
Chapter Two: The long life of the post-war structures (end of the fifties to middle or end of
the eighties)
The second chapter of the history of European Integration deals with the long period of
the unchallenged existence of the structural pattern represented by the model – a whole
generation of unchanged, hard and resistant structures, 28 years of the Berlin Wall (1961-1989),
35 years between the Treaties of Rome, the promise of a common market (1957/8), and its
realisation (1992/3). The division of Europe did not change in this period; neither did the
division of political power between the three acting levels profoundly change on the whole.
Certainly, there were some advancements towards a European political system: a Customs
union in the sixties - but cut short by the refusal of General de Gaulle, in 1965, to accept
any conferral of more competences to the EEC, which led some integration theorists of the
time to abandon their explanations. Ernst B. Haas for example did just that and this proves
once more the utility of the model proposed here: Haas despaired because he had tried to
explain the integration process almost exclusively by its internal – “functional” – logic, and
this was too poor a framework to take into account the external factors shaping Europe on
the whole.28） The model visualised in the “cube”, on the contrary, takes into account external
factors as well, external to the integration process itself, but having an impact on it. In the
28） See
Haas’ despair in his book : The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley 1975.
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215
case of de Gaulle’s politics in 1965, this illustrates without any doubt the political will to
safeguard the Nation state model. The conflict was a struggle between two of the three
decision-making levels represented in the model, the Nation state and the continental level,
and it proved once more impossible to advance with integration if there was no coalition of
interests between the continental and another level.
After de Gaulle, other steps forward became possible, such as the creation of the European
Council in 1975 and the elections of the European Parliament in 1979. But the plans for
an economic and monetary union (“Werner-Plan”) did not succeed in the same decade.
Enlargements were also no longer blocked by de Gaulle. The UK, Denmark, Ireland
(1973), and later on Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) became member states. This
certainly signifies the success and attractiveness of the European Communities. The European
Communities promised the completion of the Common Market by 1970 at the latest but
this remained unattained in the beginning of the 80s. Consequently there was widespread
disappointment about the impossibility of a real take-off of the European integration. Hence
29）
the birth of the term “Euro sclerosis” …
Once again, subdivisions of this second chapter is possible, e.g. between the dynamic youth
of the EEC (1958-1965), and the long period of stagnation (1966-1983/84). This second
phase could even be subdivided again: into the years of stagnation when de Gaulle was still
around (1966-1969), the years of hope (1969-1972/3), the years of crisis (“stagflation”),
steps towards deepening and enlargement (1973-1982), and finally the preparation for a new
departure (1983-1985).
Chapter Three: New dynamics, globalisation and European integration (from the end of the
eighties to today)
Things began to move once more by the middle of the eighties: a third, and once more a
fascinating era started, the era of the destruction of the model (not of all its components
however!). It is somewhat curious to see that the start-off to new horizons falls in the same
year in both the European Communities and in the Soviet Union: In 1985, Gorbatchov
took power in the USSR, and the Europeans decided, within the framework of the Single
European Act, to definitively establish a framework for completing the internal market.30） East
29） The
notion of „eurosclerosis“ in Mancur Olson, The Varieties of Eurosclerosis: the Rise and Decline
of Nations since 1982 (Florence: European University Institute, 1995); Mancur Olson, The Rise and
Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven 1982.
3 0 ） H a r t m u t M a r h o l d : D r e i We n d e n . Z u s a m m e n b r u c h i m O s t e n , Z u s a m m e n s c h l u ß i m
Westen, Globalisierung. Nice 1999. One of the first who predicted the evolution towards
a communication based economy was Zbigniew Brzeezinski: Gesellschaft und Staatenwelt
im technotronischen Zeitalter. In: Europa-Archiv 23 (1970), p. 845-456; Gillingham,
op.cit., speeks of “seeking the New Horizon” and of “a new realm of possibility”.
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and West answered the same challenge, that of the United States and Japan who had made
the first steps to a new stage of economic evolution, marked by the new “high technology”,
the “Chip revolution”. This breakthrough seemed to be the solution for the crisis of the
seventies, the “stagflation”, a combination of inflation and unemployment. Europe was on the
brink of permanently losing competition in the famous “triangle” of the three main industrial
regions (North America, East Asia, and Europe itself). It risked being unable to cope with
this new challenge unless European nation states renounced some part of their (illusionary)
sovereignty, in favour of a common market thus providing similar advantages to the European
companies as those enjoyed in the USA. This challenge proved even more dramatic for the
Soviet Union. Without profound changes of its political, economic and social system, it
would not be possible to maintain the status of a Superpower in the era of high-tech weapons
– as Ronald Reagan decided to create with his SDI or “star wars”-initiative.
Here is not the place to analyse in detail either the origins or the evolutionary (or rather
revolutionary) reform process in the USSR or in Europe. It is, however, a matter of fact that
these two historical reforms led to the breakdown of the post-war structures in Europe. What
had begun in 1985, culminated in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, itself a symbol for
the fall of all the communist regimes in Central Europe. For the first time in a generation,
31）
the structures of political power in Europe were profoundly changed. Since then the whole
model has come down, at least in so far as the Eastern part no longer exists, neither the
USSR, nor the bloc organisations, nor even some of the “Nation” states, like the German
Democratic Republic or Czechoslovakia.
If one looks at the model nothing seems more natural than the extension of the western
international and supranational structures to the East, with some differences nevertheless:
Even if NATO enlargement occurred earlier than EU-enlargement, the question is indeed
whether NATO has not already fulfilled its mission since the collapse of the Iron Curtain and
whether its functions should not be overtaken by the continental integration. The borderline
between the Superpower influence zones was the justification for the organisation of the
third bloc level. With the end of bipolarity, the “raison d’être” of these bloc structures is less
evident. These considerations explain at least the quest of NATO for new tasks, the search
for a new reason to exist.32）
This chapter can also be subdivided from its beginning in 1985 to the decisive year 1989,
31） See
all the literature of a New World Order, from Francis Fukuyama: The End of History and the
Last Man, New York 1992 (after his article entitled “The End of History?”, in: The National Interest,
16, Summer 1989) and Huntingdon: The Clash of Civilisations. New York 1996, to the new debate on a
“multilateral” or “American” world order.
32） NATO’s quest for a new raison d’être: see e.g. the debate in the NATO review, http://www.nato.int/
docu/review/1998/9804-toc.htm
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European Integration, seen from Historiography and Political Science
217
from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Maastricht
treaty (1990-1992) and from the early nineties to the introduction of the €uro (19931999/2000), etc.
The breakdown of the model concerns the last fifteen or twenty years, and is a distinguished
new era of European history and of European integration history particularly. On the whole,
as simple as these three periods implied by the model may seem, they indeed reflect a large
part of the historical reality of Europe and its efforts to unify itself over the second half of
the twentieth century. Thus, the model could and should lead historians to divide the history
of European integration into these three parts, evidently with a lot of subdivisions.
Structural lessons: The explanatory potential of the model
The approach to the history of European integration proposed here is characterised by a
combination of a specifically historical methodology with a political science approach, as
indicated in the introduction. Up to this point, some historical implications of the model have
been drawn. However, it is now time to draw specific implications for political science, since
the model incorporates these two aspects.
In fact, the first politically scientific implication has already been discussed as a historical
one: the idea that progress in European integration was and remains possible only (necessary
condition) or always (sufficient condition) when the promoters of “Europe” were able to form
a coalition of interests with either the bloc level – e.g. USA, in the case of Western Europe
– or the Nation states (or both of them); some examples have already been given above
(Marshall-Plan, Rome Treaty/Common market).
A second implication of the model concerns already referred to integration theories more
explicitly: The model suggests indeed that the European integration process cannot be
understood only by reference to its internal logic. Functionalism as well as Neo-functionalism
are theories referring nearly exclusively to this internal logic, well known under the term of
spillover. The idea of a three level model, on the contrary, takes into account the interaction
between the continental level and the two other ones, and provides in this way explanatory
tools for several characteristics of European integration:
Firstly, the choice of Coal and Steel as economic sectors to be the first ones to be integrated
cannot solely be explained by any genuine European interest. On the contrary integrating
these two sectors of economic policy was as much integration as the Nation states was
willing to accept at that time.33） The limiting factor was one of the two other competitors
33） Jean-Maire
Pelt: Robert Schuman. Paris 2001 ; in his famous speech of 9 mai 1950, Schuman said :
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete ↗
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of the post-war period. Finally, European integration was obliged to develop by means of
economic integration firstly before reaching any political objective. This was imposed by
nation states so that the whole character of the integration process as an economic one can
be explained by the competition between Nation states and “Europe”.
Secondly, there was certainly an internal logic of further integration initiated by the projects
of Monnet and Schuman. Had the internal process been free from external pressure this
would have led to the integration of transport, energy, social and defence policies, all of
which would have been integrated policies stemming from the Coal and steel community
and following the internal logic of spill-over. However, it is not this logic, which explains
why defence policy entered the agenda so soon – it was the Korean War, an external factor,
derived from the bipolarity of the two Superpowers.34） The internal logic cannot explain why
the project of a European Defence Community failed in 1954. It was the fear of the Nation
states (especially France in this case) to loose too important part of its sovereignty. This goes
similarly for the EEC: The choice of the policy fields to be integrated – agriculture and a
market for industrial products – doesn’t find its explanation in a genuine European interest,
but in a coalition of European and Franco German national interests: France was interested
in guarantees for its agriculture, West-Germany in external markets for its industries – and
“Europe” in advancements in any shape or form.35）
After the Rome treaties, the EEC had a dynamic youth and indeed reached the stage of an
area of free trade and a customs union earlier than provided in the treaty. But yet again
internal logic should have led to the achievement of the common market by the end of the
sixties. So why did it fail to do so? The explanation is again the opposition of an external
factor; the Nation state interest forwarded de Gaulle who halted integration in 1965. Internal
logic may explain the steps to the common market (and even to the single European
currency), but it does not explain why it failed in ’65 (and thus Haas was right to despair)
or why it saw its revival only twenty years later, in 1985, with the Single European Act. It
was at this point that Nation states themselves finally saw their self-interest in the common
market, in a moment when they were dramatically loosing their influence in the world wide
economic competition. Other examples might be quoted as well …
In all these cases, the model here proposed provides explanations of acceleration or slow↘ achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. […]By pooling basic production and by instituting
a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries,
this proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European federation
indispensable to the preservation of peace.” (http://www.robert-schuman.org/robert-schuman/declaration2.
htm#anglais, homepage of the Robert-Schuman-Foundation, Paris).
34） Wilfried Loth: Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939-1957, p. 91.
35） Pierre Gerbet: La construction de l’Europe, op.cit, p. 183-189.
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European Integration, seen from Historiography and Political Science
219
down of the integration process, by placing it in the framework of the three level system.
The limits of enlargement are drawn by the Iron Curtain (up to 1989 at least), which was far
from being evident by the end of the Second World War. Plans for a “Third Way” seemed do
offer a possibility to escape from this bloc logic36）, and even by the end of 1947, the UEF
sent its president to Prague in order to prepare the important congress of the following year,
37）
becoming then the “Congress of the Hague”…. European integration must be seen and
explained within the pattern of the European post-war structures on the whole, by a system
of actors, each of whom occupy a certain and specific political power. None of these actors
could freely expand to other policy fields, since they were occupied by his competitors. The
small cube representing the European integration, within the big cube representing Europe on
the whole, visualises this situation of living and developing “in-between”, somewhat squeezed
by the others: The limits of integration were drawn by the existence of the Superpower-level,
the level of the Nation states, and of the Iron Curtain. The European Union became what
it is today because of this structural situation. For most of its existence, its history is the
history of its relations with its structural environment represented by the model.
Limits of the model
Every model has its limits, and it is obvious that the model developed here is not able to
explain everything. Firstly, it is of course far too simple to take into account the whole
complexity of the historical and political reality. There is for example no place for the
neutral states in the “cube” representing Europe. Secondly, the model is limited to only three
decision making levels, but there are more in the world, even in the European world – one
would have to enlarge the “cube” to the regional and local level below, and to the UN- or
global level above. Thirdly, the world politics of the Superpowers are only taken into account
in so far as they had an impact on Europe – one could artificially enlarge the “cube” not
only in a vertical dimension (regional, local, global), but also in a horizontal dimension, in
order to reflect the extension of the two blocs over a larger part of the world than Europe.
But the choice of the medium complexity of the model has been made consciously: all
these adaptations to reality would probably not enhance the explanatory capacities of the
model, but reduce its transparency and operational power, without being able to reflect the
complex reality. Finally, the model is not objective in itself: It is only an aid in helping us to
understand, to explain and to describe a complex reality. This is also the job of historians or
political scientists.
36） See
e.g. Allan Bullock: Ernest Bevin. London 2002.
Brugmans: L’Europe vécu, op. cit., and L’Europe des congrès. For documents and literature
on the Congress of the Hague see: http://www.coe.int/t/E/Communication_and_Research/Library_and_
Archives/Services/Archives/hist_hague1.asp#P15_172.
37） See