Foreign Policy White Paper 2017 –
submission by Marshall Hall
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How should we define Australia’s national interests in a changing world?
Our main external interests are overseas trade, stability of governments in SE Asia, and intolerance
of areas controlled by organisations that conduct terrorist operations in nations other than their
own.
There have not been any problems with freedom to navigate by cargo ships (other than by pirates
off NE Africa), but Australia should make it clear that any threat to such freedom would be
challenged. Australia need not object to cargo ships having to detour by an amount that adds little
to the journey cost. Neither should Australia challenge sovereignty claimed by others in what we
may regard as international waters, providing they allow cargo ships to pass without hindrance.
There is further comment on national interest in my response to question 03 below.
How should our values underpin Australia’s foreign policy?
First, what are our values? PM Malcolm Turnbull recently expressed them well (in my opinion) as
follows: “… as do the cultures of all our migrants from every corner of the world. Each new
Australian adds another thread to our national tapestry, magnificent in its diversity and the most
successful multicultural society in the world…. Deep in our DNA we know that everyone is entitled to
a fair go in the great race of life. And if you fall behind, we will lend you a helping hand to get ahead.
This strong sense of justice springs from the solidarity, the mutual respect and mateship that
transcends and binds us together in our diversity.”
We should adopt policies consistent with being an outward-looking nation that engages with the
world. Since our economy is not large enough to competitively produce most of the goods required
to sustain our standard of living, we should welcome free trade and globalisation.
What should we do differently? How can we do better?
Although we should welcome globalisation (and automation), a number of Australians have and will
suffer from this policy (motor car manufacturing, for example). Workers laid off because of
automation or free trade should be given generous redundancy benefits, including retraining.
We need to recognise that some US presidents, particularly those from the Republican Party, have
had unrealistic international goals (although George H. Bush snr. was an exception). The USA and
allies did win WW2 (at great cost) but that was over 70 years ago. At around that time, the US
Government understandably regarded the Pacific Ocean as an American lake, and some presidents
in recent decades have behaved as if that were still the case. In the western Pacific Ocean, China’s
importance is growing and it is reasonable to expect that it will eventually be comparable with the
USA’s.
Australia’s policy of always supporting the USA (gratitude for saving us from Japan, and also in case
we might need their help again) should be moderated; we should define the conditions under which
we would support a future US-led campaign. Unless endorsed by the UN Security Council (such as for
Korea, c. 1950), Australia should not support campaigns aimed at bringing about regime change
(Vietnam c. 1960-75, Afghanistan 2001 - .., Iraq 2003 - ..). Regarding Afghanistan, it was appropriate
to destroy the (feral) Al Qaeda manpower and facilities there, but toppling the indigenous Taliban
government has proved to be an unsustainable (and pointless) goal.
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02
Which countries will matter most to Australia over the next 10 years?
China, USA, Japan, Indonesia
Why and in what ways?
How should we deepen and diversify key relationships?
Which global trends, such as developments in technology, environmental degradation and the role
of non-state actors, are likely to affect Australia’s security and prosperity?
How should Australia respond?
03
Which regional and global organisations matter most to us? How should we support and shape
them?
The UN in principle, although there are difficulties. For example, Australia sued Japan in the UN
International Court of Justice on whaling and won the case, but there has been no effect.
Another difficult issue is China’s claim to almost the whole South China Sea (SCS). Claims by 6
nations are shown in the Figure 1, copied from [1]
China’s claim extends inordinately close to the Philippines, eastern Malaysia, and Vietnam. China has
a large submarine base on Hainan Island [2]. It is reasonable to speculate, as newspapers have, that
anti-aircraft and radar bases are being placed on particular islands to create a defence system for
that submarine base.
Figure 1. Territorial claims in the South China Sea. Copied from [1]
A UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been in force since 1994 and 60 nations have
ratified it [3]. This UNCLOS defines Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZ) of any nation that possesses a
coastline as extending out to 200 nautical miles from such coast, unless any such area is within 200
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nautical miles from another nation’s coast, whereupon a line of mid-points would demarcate the
two EEZs. A map showing the boundaries of EEZs in the South China Sea is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. China's Claimed Territorial Waters and the boundaries of the South China Sea Exclusive
Economic Zones based on the U.N. Convention on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS). Copied from [4]
Any contents of the ocean or seabed throughout an EEZ belong to the corresponding nation.
Australia and China are parties to UNCLOS, but the USA is not. Neither Australia nor the USA has an
EEZ in the South China Sea. In the absence of other relevant international laws, US government
officers presumably allude to UNCLOS when they state that SCS disputes should be resolved under
“the rule of law”, even though their government has not ratified it (the USA refused to ratify
UNCLOS because it objected to a Part that set up a regime on seabed minerals outside any EEZ,
although it expressed agreement with the remaining provisions [3]).
According to [1], “In July 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims in Philippines v.
China, although it is not enforceable. The PRC does not acknowledge the tribunal, nor abide by its
ruling, insisting that any resolution should be through bilateral negotiations with other claimants”
By building manned facilities on disputed (previously uninhabited) islands/reefs/atolls and claiming
sovereignty over them, China is converting those areas into inhabited islands. It would be
inappropriate for Australia do anything of a military nature in the SCS. The US casts the issue as
“freedom of navigation”, presumably wishing to sail and fly military craft within what China would
describe as territorial waters (closer than 12 nautical miles) around the disputed islands without
needing to first obtain China’s concurrence. Australia should take a pragmatic approach; whether
Australian warships can pass unhindered within 12 nautical miles from those islands is not our
“national interest”. We should be concerned about cargo ships rather than warships. We should
support the application of UNCLOS to any marine dispute, but also accept that what were previously
disputed islands/reefs/atolls are now inhabited islands under China’s sovereignty. It would be an
artifice for China to claim the corresponding EEZs, and any such claim should be challenged.
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How can we maximise our influence?
04
What steps should be taken to maximise our trade and investment and expand commercial
opportunities for Australian business?
Multilateral qualified (as distinct from “free”) trade agreements have proved to be unfruitful.
Australia should be a free-trade nation open to all nations that have the same policy. Although the
EU is useful to its members largely because it creates a single economy (that also can compete with
the American economy), there is no group of nations at present which Australia could join for a
similar purpose.
How can we ensure Australia is positioned to take advantage of opportunities in the global
economy?
What are the key risks to Australia’s future prosperity and how should we respond?
05
How can Australia best deal with instability beyond our borders?
The Solomon Islands has provided a strong example of nearby instability in recent decades. The
Australian response was to provide financial aid, and to lend civil service, police and ADF personnel,
nominally to the failed government, referred to as the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon
Islands (RAMSI). Doing so smoothed over the symptoms of failure but it is not a long-term solution.
A small businessman based in Honiara told me (while RAMSI was in action) that when he went to a
government office to seek approval for a local commercial development, it was his opinion that,
although the indigenous clerk had to obtain concurrence from his Australian supervisor before he
finalised a decision, once the RAMSI staff departed the indigenous staff would revert to their
previous ways, which he described as requiring undocumented payments. My suggestion for a
better approach is to maintain monitoring of the (failed) government’s performance for at least two
decades, under threat of losing AUSAID funding.
How can our foreign policy, including our overseas development assistance program, support a more
prosperous, peaceful and stable region?
(1) Australia should acknowledge that some of the demarcations of Indonesia established in the
1960s are unsustainable and work to rationalise them. A map of the boundaries of Indonesia’s
provinces, copied from [5], is shown in Figure 2. The provinces Papua and West Papua (P&WP)
comprise the western half of the island of New Guinea; the nation “Papua New Guinea” comprises
the eastern half (shown in part only).
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Figure 2. Boundaries of Indonesian provinces. Copied from [5] (although the province names can be
read in the figure on the webpage, they are not evident in this copy).
Prior to being colonised by (three) European nations, the island of New Guinea was populated by
Melanesian people, still is mainly, and future stability would be enhanced if it were to become a
single Melanesian nation. Disturbances by the Melanesian “Free Papua Movement” will continue if
the provinces P&WP are left with Indonesia, exacerbated by Indonesia encouraging migration there
of Javanese people from densely populated Java. To compensate Indonesia for losing P&WP to PNG,
Sabah and Sarawak (“Eastern Malaysia”) should be transferred to Indonesia. The people of
Sabah/Sarawak have more in common with those of Indonesian Borneo than they do with Malayans.
A paragraph in the-then UN secretary-General’s report [6] on the issue is as follows:
Having reflected fully on these considerations, and taking into account the framework within which
the Mission’s task was performed, I have come to the conclusion that the majority of the peoples of
Sabah (North Borneo) and of Sarawak, have given serious and thoughtful consideration to their
future, and to the implications for them of participation in a Federation of Malaysia. I believe that the
majority of them have concluded that they wish to bring their dependent status to an end and to
realize their independence through freely chosen association with other peoples in their region with
whom they feel ties of ethnic association with other peoples in their region with whom they feel ties
of ethnic association, heritage, language, religion, culture, economic relationship, and ideals and
objectives. Not all of these considerations are present in equal weight in all minds, but it is my
conclusion that the majority of the peoples of the two territories, having taken them into account,
wish to engage, with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged
Federation of Malaysia through which they can strive together to realize the fulfilment of their
destiny.
The second sentence (highlighted) is open to the conclusion that the people of Sabah/Sarawak
would have been equally willing to join Indonesia, if that option had been presented to them.
If Sabah/Sarawak are transferred to Indonesia in the future, “Western Malaysia” would revert to
“Malaya”, which Australia should offer one-off monetary compensation. Indonesia should be
sounded out on offering Malaya a generous free-trade agreement to offset loss of revenue from
Sabah/Sarawak.
The events in East Timor during the 1990s indicate that the transfer of a province from one
developing nation to another must be accompanied by strong international support and supervision.
Australia was directly involved in East Timor’s transition (at a late stage), and should provide suitable
support (from an early stage) to any transfer of Sabah/Sarawak from Malaysia to Indonesia.
(2) Australia should withdraw from world-wide commitments to accept refugees. Horrible events
will continue to occur all over the world, but in general displaced people should be discouraged from
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travelling great distances, since eventually there should be an opportunity for them to return home.
Through UNHCR, Australia should provide comprehensive and generous assistance to large refugee
camps throughout the world.
How should our international engagement work to protect Australia against transnational security
threats, such as terrorism?
(1) We should make it clear that if a terrorist group with international aims were to occupy an area
of land in a SE Asian nation, then the facilities and manpower of that group would be destroyed by
Australian military action. Once that had been achieved the military action would cease.
(2) Australia should be careful about accepting other nations’ assertions that particular groups are
“terrorists” or that particular nations sponsor terrorism. Israeli governments depict Palestinians as
terrorists whenever an outbreak of resistance to occupation occurs, and US Governments (usually of
Republican party persuasion) depict Iran as “sponsoring terrorism” because Iran funds Palestinian or
Lebanese organisations. Palestinian terrorism was quite violent during the 1970s, but has been quiet
since. The Israeli government does not give Palestinians any credit for that, and continues to deny
them rights to land in the (Jordanian) territory occupied by Israel.
(3) The Israeli government is trying to goad the US into attacking Iran militarily unless Iran
unilaterally disarms. Australia should make it clear that we would condemn such an event.
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What assets will we need to advance our foreign policy interests in future years?
In any year, Australia’s manpower, material and financial contributions to UNHCR should in total be
comparable with that of the EU, on a per capita basis.
How can we best use our people and our assets to advance Australia’s economic, security and other
interests and respond to external events?
How can Government work more effectively with non-government sectors, including business,
universities and NGOs, to advance Australia’s interests?
Bibliography
[1] Wikipedia, "Territorial disputes in the South China Sea. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,"
Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., 2 February 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_in_the_South_China_Sea#cite_note-4.
[Accessed 5 February 2017].
[2] Wikimedia, "Yulin Naval Base," Wikimedia, 6 November 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yulin_Naval_Base. [Accessed 28 February 2017].
[3] Wikipedia, "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. From Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc, 27 January 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea. [Accessed
5 February 2017].
[4] BBC News, "Spratly Islands - China's Claimed Territorial Waters and U.N. Convention on the Law
of The Sea 200 Mile Economic Zones," 21 March 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/media/images/78360000/gif/_78360663_sprat.gif. [Accessed
28 February 2017].
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[5] Wikipedia, "Indonesia. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia," Wikimedia Foundation, Inc, 5
February 2017. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia. [Accessed 6
February 2017].
[6] United Nations Secretary-General, "United Nations Malaysia Mission Report, “Final Conclusions
of the Secretary-General,” 14 September 1963," Philippine Government, 14 September 1963.
[Online]. Available: http://www.gov.ph/1963/09/14/united-nations-malaysia-mission-reportfinal-conclusions-of-the-secretary-general-14-september-1963/. [Accessed 28 February 2017].
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