Letter from the Director
Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the Arab side of the Joint Crisis Committee: The Six-Day War at &MUN V.
My name is Henry Crossman, and I am excited to have the chance to be your director for this
committee.
I currently live in the quiet city of Lexington, embedded in the mountains of western
Virginia. Prior to moving to Lexington, I lived in North Carolina for several years. In addition to
directing for &MUN V, I’ve directed for our middle school conference and have served on the
Secretariat for our high school conference. I am studying international relations, and am
interested in researching the intersection of international conflict and development. Apart from
the W&M International Relations Club, I am a research assistant at the Institute for the Theory
and Practice of International Relations. I’m rarely without a cup of coffee in hand, and enjoy
taking long strolls through Colonial Williamsburg. I urge you to take a walk there yourself, if
you have the chance.
The JCC: The Six-Day War combines two interesting approaches to model UN in a
creative, and I hope, engaging way. As a crisis committee, the JCC will be fast-paced and
responsive to developments from within committee; as a historical committee, the JCC will
challenge you to stay within the 1967 timeframe. Your crisis director has a great vision for
this committee. This committee belongs to you; your actions will determine crises and the
response from the other side of the JCC. As I facilitate this debate, I hope you will provide me
with feedback continually, as I will welcome all criticism and suggestions.
If you have any questions concerning this committee, please feel free to reach out. I look
forward to meeting each one of you.
Sincerely,
Henry Crossman
Director, JCC: The Six-Day War – Arab Side
Letter from the Crisis Director
Welcome Delegates!
It is a true pleasure of mine to welcome you to the Joint Crisis Committee: The Six-Day
War at &MUN V at the College of William & Mary. My name is Leigh Seitz, and I am the crisis
director for this joint committee. I am a senior at the College, majoring in International Relations
and eagerly searching for jobs at the moment. I am from Richmond, Virginia, and didn’t intend
on going to college in state until I fell in love with this beautiful campus. Prior to &MUN V, I
have directed at our high school and middle school conferences, and served on the &MUN IV
Secretariat last year. I currently serve as Service Chair in the International Relations Club, so
please buy our stickers so we can fundraise money for our charity!
In addition to my extensive devotion to the IRC, I am involved in a student led dance
company, a social sorority, and created a club for humanitarian mapping (honestly, talk to me
about maps!). You will be sure to see some stellar maps throughout the weekend, as we delve
into the nitty gritty details of the Six-Day War. The Six-Day War was a fast-paced crisis, and
you can expect nothing but fastballs thrown at you this weekend. I have a loose plan set for the
committee, but with your input and detailed crisis notes, it will ultimately be you leading the
changes within the committee.
I’m looking forward to working with you, and can’t wait to party with you at our great
events on Friday and Saturday night! If you have any questions about the crisis aspect, please
direct them to your director. Can’t wait for &MUN V!!
Sincerely,
Leigh Seitz
Crisis Director, JCC: Six-Day War,
Committee Procedure
The Joint Crisis Committee: The Six-Day War, 1967 shares aspects of both a joint crisis
committee and a historical committee. As such, it is important to remember and consider certain
aspects of this committee in order to ensure the smooth flow of committee. I ask that you keep
the following in mind as we progress through the conference.
As a crisis committee, this JCC will be primarily driven by the events that unfold in the
committee rooms for both sides. It is imperative that you act responsively to the crises presented,
as this is the way to move committee forward. Personal and committee directives are the primary
means through which you should seek to direct the actions of the committee. Additionally, it is
important to remember that you have the freedom and ability to use your personal portfolio
powers that come with the position you are assigned in the committee. You can find a brief hint
of these portfolio powers in the dossier included in this background guide. I encourage you to
seek further clarification on these personal powers through your contacts with the crisis staff.
As a historical committee, it is important to keep in mind the timeframe of the committee.
The committee will begin June 5, 1967, immediately after the attack by Israeli Defense Forces
on Egyptian military aircraft. Changes in the timeframe will be made clear by the dais and crisis
staff as changes occur. All historical events prior to June 5, 1967 are fair game for discussion and
may be found to be relevant for the committee; the use of knowledge formed from events after
the June 5th attack is prohibited. This allows for the chance to change historical outcomes and
creates the dynamic and engaging committee we aim to simulate. It is important to remember
that no outcome is certain to occur, as all events will driven by the actions of the two sides of the
Joint Crisis Committee.
Overview: A Brief History of Israel-Arab Tensions
Introduction
A coalition of Arab states, principally led by Egyptian and Jordanian military and
political officials, but consisting of advisers and officials from Syria, Kuwait, and several
additional Arab states in the region, has been formed in response to the surprise attack on
Egyptian military targets occurring on June 5, 1967. The Israeli attack eliminated 90 percent of
the country’s air force capabilities and severely weakened the ability of Syrian military forces to
respond.1 It is the role of this committee to bring members of the Arab community together to
effectively respond to this immediate crisis, managing a rapidly evolving situation and balancing
competing interests in the region. In order to effectively respond to this crisis, it is important to
consider the historical, political, geographic, and economic contexts in which the crisis takes
place.
1
"Six-Day War."
Figure 1: Territorial Claims, Pre-19672
Historical Context
In order to effectively respond to this crisis, it is critical to understand the origins of the
Arab-Israeli conflict which, always tense, has periodically escalated into armed interstate conflict
between Israel and Arab actors. Following the conclusion of the Second World War, and in
response to the growing influence of Zionist interest groups in Western Europe, member-states
of the newly-formed United Nations voted to partition Palestine on November 29, 1947.
Palestine, a British mandate at the time, would be separated into an Arab and a Jewish state.3
However, inclusion of the borders of this newly-formed Israel as determined by the United
2
3
http://zeetalkradio.com/?p=2052
Harris, Jay.
Nations resolution was rejected by the committee charged with writing the Israeli Declaration of
Independence.4 The state of Israel officially declared its statehood on May 14, 1948, and was
immediately recognized by several countries in the international community, including the
United States.5 Notably, several Arab countries refused to recognize the legitimacy of the State
of Israel, and as a result of the unwelcome perceived seizure of Palestinian land by Israel and
existing tensions resulting from an unpopular view of British governance over the mandate of
Palestine prior to Israel’s declaration of independence and statehood, a coalition of Arab states
occupied territory in the regions now claimed by Israeli actors in Palestine, sparking a conflict.6
This conflict, the first of two Arab-Israel conflicts before the 1967 attack on Egyptian
forces by the Israeli Defense Forces, The First Arab-Israeli War, also known as the 1948 ArabIsraeli war, began on May 15, 1948, as Egypt, Jordan, and Syria moved military forces into
Palestine, conducting military operations against Israeli forces and settlements.7 The 10-month
conflict, ending in March 1949, had lasting material and ideological impacts on the region that
contribute to the tensions leading up to the 1967 Israeli attack. At the conclusion of the 1948
Arab-Israeli war, Israel not only held control of the territory provided for in the aforementioned
United Nations resolution, but also increased its territorial holdings by gaining control of over
half of the land that had been dedicated to establishing an Arab state by the same resolution.
Additionally, over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were displaced and became refugees, and a number
of Jewish individuals similar in magnitude to the Palestinian refugees residing in these Arab
states immigrated to Israel at the conclusion of the 1948 conflict.8 The suspension of armed
4
Harris, Jay.
"Memorandum on the De Jure Recognition of Israel."
6
"Arab-Israeli Wars."
7
Margolick, David.
8
Moris, Beni.
5
conflict, ending with an armistice resulting in significant territorial gains for the State of Israel,
did little in the long-run to reduce tensions in the region.
Tensions escalated into armed conflict again in 1956, as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser, whose rise to power can be partially attributed to the Pan-Arab movement, nationalized
the Suez Canal. Known in the West as the Suez Crisis but commonly referred to as the Tripartite
Aggression by Arab nations, Nasser’s actions spurred an international crisis, as British and
French commercial interests were deeply uncomfortable with Egyptian control of the critical
waterway.9 France and Britain allied with Israel to invade the Sinai Peninsula in October 1956
and return authority over the Suez Canal to Western powers.10 Both the United States and the
USSR, in addition to a large number of member-states of the United Nations, placed substantial
diplomatic pressure on France, Britain, and Israel to withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. As a
result of this pressure, diplomatic and otherwise, through unilateral and multilateral avenues,
largely due to diplomatic intervention by the United States, a permanent cease-fire was reached.
The resulting embarrassment for Britain and France, in particular, had lasting repercussions both
in terms of Britain’s standing in the international community and in the perception of Arab states
of Western European intentions in the region. Though holding onto the Sinai Peninsula territory
until March 1957, the active conflict lasted just over one week.
9
"Arab-Israeli Wars."
"Arab-Israeli Wars."
10
Figure 2: The Suez Crisis11
Several years prior to the Suez Crisis, in 1952, Nasser, backed by military officials,
ousted the existing government of Egypt under King Farouk I. Though he wielded substantial
influence prior to his elevation to prime minister in 1954, in this capacity he became a
transnational leader in the Arab world.12 Nasser had emerged in Egypt as the chief advocate of
Pan-Arabism, an ideology centered around the pursuit of “cultural and political unity among
Arab countries.”13 The popularity of the pan-Arab ideology caused principle tenets of the
ideology to become incorporated in the domestic political systems of Arab states. Though closely
11
http://www.slidego.com/go/11664
"Pan-Arabism."
13
"Pan-Arabism."
12
managed by Nasser in Egypt, the Pan-Arab sentiment informed the creation of the Ba’ath Party
in Syria and Iraq. By 1963, the Ba’athist Party in Syria had control of the government and, in
Iraq, enjoyed substantial political influence.14 Thus, the spread of a unifying Arab ideology in
combination with the inclusion of Pan-Arab principles in domestic politics in countries
throughout the Arab world is important to consider in understanding the rising tensions between
Arab countries and the West, including Israel.
In addition to spearheading the Pan-Arab movement, Nasser was also implementing a
nonalignment foreign policy, attempting to balance the United States against the Soviet Union in
a way that was advantageous to Egypt. Responding to the news the United States and other
Western countries withdrew aid meant for economic development in 1956, Nasser’s government
moved quickly to seize the Suez Canal, sparking the crisis mentioned above.15 This thus
provided space for alternate offers and the potential for increased dialogue by the Soviet Union,
complicating the external dynamics of Nasser’s policies.
It is within this historical context that tensions between Israel and Arab states, in
particular Egypt, escalate to the point of Israel conducting a preemptive attack on Egyptian
military forces in June 1967. Leading up to the June 1967 attack, a series of isolated military
skirmishes and provocation of Israel occurred. These fueled perceptions by the Israeli
government of aggressive intentions of Arab states, in particular Syria and Egypt, leading the
Israeli government to pursue a defense agreement with the government of Jordan.
Misperceptions and missteps leading to the June 5th attack were further exacerbated by
intentional misleading of external foreign actors, most importantly the Soviet Union. As a result,
14
15
"Ba'th Party."
"Gamal Abdel Nasser."
the government of Israel was led to the conclusion that a preemptive attack on Egypt’s offensive
capabilities was warranted and necessary.
Political Context: Rising Tensions
It is important to understand the major actors and the international and domestic political
context that cause existing tensions to escalate into an active military operation being conducted
against Egyptian military targets. Prior to the June 5th event, Palestinian organizations supported
by Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan conducted guerilla-style operations against Israel, prompting
military reactions from the government of Israel, which led to rising tensions. In November
1966, Israel military forces conducted a strike on a village in the Jordanian West Bank. Five
months later, in April 1967, Syrian fighter jets were shot down by the Israeli Air Force.16 These
military operations fueled inflammatory rhetoric in the domestic politics of both Israel and
neighboring Arab states, raising the political stakes and heightening the probability of escalating
conflict.
In Israel, the actions of armed Palestinian guerilla organizations tangentially and
materially backed by neighboring Arab states, deemed terrorist activities by the government of
Israel, fueled speculation of a larger attack on the country, meant to undermine the legitimacy of
the State of Israel and its right to exist in the region.17 Domestic interest groups within Israel
were unsatisfied with what many saw as a passive approach to dealing with the perceived threat
from Arab states, especially Egypt, by the Prime Minister in 1967, Levi Eshkol. This perception
of a weak stance vis-à-vis the surrounding Arab states resulted in the replacement of the defense
16
17
"Six-Day War."
Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America.
minister on June 1, 1967.18 Four days later, the Israel Defense Forces carried out what Israel
viewed as a preemptive attack on Egypt, depleting its air force capabilities.
In Egypt, President Nasser had been criticized for not aiding the Jordanian and Syrian
governments after military operations had been conducted in their territory and in an attempt to
deplete their military capability by the Israel Defense Forces. Nasser had, up to this point, been
comfortable with relying more heavily on United Nations peacekeeping forces to maintain the
status quo between Egypt and Israel, in particular in regards to Egypt’s territorial control over the
Sinai Peninsula. However, intervention by external actors would cause Nasser to reconsider his
defensive strategy vis-à-vis Israel.
External actors and international organizations also played a role in the events leading up
to the June 5th attack. Though nominally a member of the non-aligned movement, which
emerged as a hopeful solution explored by several middle powers to the problem of having to
align politically with either the United States of the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War, it
became increasingly clear that Egypt had a strong relationship with the Soviet Union. In the
spring of 1967, intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union informed Nasser and the Egyptian
government that the Soviet Union had reason to believe Israel was planning an attack on Syria.19
This information motivated Nasser take a series of actions meant to protect against the potential
attack on Arab allies, information illuminated by Soviet intelligence. First, on May 14, 1967,
Nasser moved military forces into the Sinai Peninsula, to protect Egyptian interests from a
potential Israeli invasion. Four days later, on May 18th, Nasser’s government formally asked the
United Nations to remove the peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula. Within a few days,
on May 22nd, Egyptian military mobilizations was limiting Israeli maritime activities in what has
18
19
Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America.
"Six-Day War."
been viewed as a blockade of critical ports in southern Israel.20 As news of this Soviet
intelligence and a perception of growing aggressive animosity in Israel of its Arab neighbors
spread in the region, Arab states began to form defensive agreements in the event of an attack.
By May 30th, the government of Jordan signed an agreement with Egypt in which Jordanian
military forces would be under the command of the Egyptian military.21 This led to other security
agreements by Arab states, starting the process of coalition-building, should an attack on an Arab
state by Israel occur. These agreements pursued by Arab states, in combination with Egyptian
military mobilization close to the Egyptian border produced security-dilemma mechanisms
leading to increasing tension arising from uncertainty.
The United States and international organizations such as the United Nations, sensing
that rapidly increasing tensions and actions taken by Israel and Egypt that increasingly were
viewed by the opposition as inflammatory could spiral into armed conflict, sought diplomatic
solutions. Prior to June 1967, the United States refused requests by the government of Israel of
military aid. The American government also reaffirmed its support for the United Nations
peacekeeping force on the Sinai Peninsula, in place with the purpose of securing free maritime
navigation in the area and reducing the incentive to escalate to armed conflict, a solution the
United States had vigorously sought as a solution to the Suez Crisis a decade earlier.22
Geographic Context: Israel & Its Arab Neighbors
Another important factor in understanding the cause for tensions between Israel and its
Arab neighbors is knowledge of the geography of the region. The Sinai Peninsula, under
20
"Six-Day War."
"Six-Day War."
22
Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America.
21
Egyptian control borders Israel and the Gaza Strip, also controlled by Egypt. Jordan, which
borders Israel to the West also controls the West Bank, a region northeast of the Egyptiancontrolled Gaza Strip. Syria, located to the northeast of Israel, controls Golan Heights, which is
located at the north-eastern border of Israel. Lebanon is located directly north of Israel. Egypt,
Israel, and Lebanon each border the Mediterranean Sea. Geography will be an important
consideration when considering strategies to respond to growing tensions. A map identifying this
region in more detail can be found below.
Figure 3: Physical Map of Arab States & Israel23
Economic Context: Maritime Activity in the Region
23
http://slideplayer.com/slide/3870867/
Up to this point, this background guide has largely been focused on historical events and
political motivations and missteps that have led to growing tensions between Israel and
neighboring Arab states. In order to fully grasp the mechanisms driving these tensions, however,
proper analysis of the situation requires exploration of economic concerns of both the Israelis
and the Arab states, particularly Egypt. Economic causes of tension chiefly revolve around
maritime activity.
Located at a critical juncture for maritime trade, the Suez Canal and other shipping lanes
in the Sinai Peninsula are viewed as vital passageways for maritime commercial activity. The
decision by Egypt’s Nasser to mobilize military forces in the Sinai region to defend Egypt
against an Israeli attack on its northern border, and expel United Nations forces from the area,
was deeply concerning for Israel and several other international actors. The move, however
justified based on intelligence provided by the Soviet Union regarding preparations for an Israeli
attack on the Egyptian controlled area, was reminiscent of the Suez Crisis a decade earlier.
Fearful of another closure or limitation of critical passageways to maritime trade, as had
happened during the Suez Crisis until Israel returned the area to Egyptian control, both Israel and
Egypt desired to keep these passageways open for their own economic interests.
With Egypt concerned about the potential loss of the territory after an Israeli invasion and
Israel concerned with Egyptian forces preventing Israeli maritime economic activity from use of
these passageways, tensions between the two countries escalated. Israel, concerned with the
implementation of international law protecting maritime trade in international waters especially
after the expulsion of United Nations forces from the area, has an interest in maintaining its
access to the area. Egypt, concerned with Israeli aggression and reminded of its brief control of
the Sinai Peninsula after previous Arab-Israeli conflicts, sought to protect its territorial holding.
The Arab Coalition
Membership & Formation of the Coalition
Following the crippling surprise attack on Egyptian air force capabilities, a coalition of
Arab states has been formed in order to design and execute an effective response to the threat
posed by Israel. Formed from the invocation of defense and security agreements made by a
collection of Arab states and from support offered in response to the Israeli attack from other
Arab states, officials representing military and political organs from a number of governments
and actors in the region must quickly and efficiently develop a strategy with short-term and longterm considerations and goals in mind. Major actors in the Arab coalition are the governments of
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, who each had security arrangements in the event of an
Israeli attack. The coalition is supported by Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan,
Tunisia, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The major actors and leaders represented at
this meeting of the coalition of Arab states can be found in the position dossier attached to the
end of this background guide.
Resources of the Arab Coalition
Careful consideration and strategic deployment of scarce military resources will be one of
the principal ways in which the Arab coalition may choose to respond to the Israeli attack on
Egypt’s air force. A brief overview of military capabilities of coalition forces appears below.
When considering what military resources to utilize it is important to consider quantity, scope,
location, and capabilities of the units each country in the coalition provides.
Egypt had, by June 5th, moved 100,000 troops into the Sinai Peninsula, and had
approximately moved approximately “950 tanks, 1,100 APCs and over 1,000 artillery pieces to
Sinai” for deployment.24 Syria had available nearly 50,000 troops, with 500 tanks and 300
artillery pieces.25 Jordan had available 45,000 troops and approximately 270 tanks, in addition to
additional artillery units and air force capabilities.26 Additionally, Iraq can provide tanks and an
infantry division. Additional Arab states including those supporting states listed above could be
willing to provide additional military resources if requested by the coalition.
Combining the individual military capabilities of coalition members, there are
approximately 550,000 troops, just under 1,000 military aircraft, and 2,000 tanks that can be
used by the coalition.27
Goals of the Coalition
The role of the Arab Coalition will extend beyond making short-term military decisions
intended to repel an attack by Israeli forces. While a critical component of the coalition will be to
propose, develop, and implement military strategy to respond to the Israeli attack on Egyptian
military forces, the coalition must also consider political and long-term components of the
conflict. It is known that Israeli political organs have been working to create alliances and deals
with external actors in the international community to acquire military aid and promote empathy
for what the government of Israel claims was a preemptive strike, necessarily made due to
Egyptian aggression. This coalition must engage effectively with other states, including the
Permanent Five members of the United Nations Security Council and other member-states to
respond to diplomatic maneuvers by Israel. Additionally, this coalition must set and create a
24
Pollack, Kenneth M. “Air Power in the Six-Day War.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 28:3
(2005): 475.
25
Pollack, 476.
26
Pollack, 476.
27
Pollack, 475-6.
long-term vision to avoid future crises and to protect and ensure its position vis-à-vis Israel.
Coming to a consensus on level of engagement, which actors to engage, and the direction of the
Arab community in the face of an aggressive Israel, while dealing with an active and everchanging military threat from Israel is no simple task.
Positions
Information on positions can be found below. It is important to consider both the
motivations of the individual you represent in addition to the role the official position of that
official plays in dealing with the threat from Israel. I encourage you to use personal directives
and crisis notes to make the most of the positions revealed below.
Egyptian Delegation
•
Gamel Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt
•
Zakaria Mohieddin, Vice President of Egypt; formerly, Minister of Interior & Head of the
Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate
•
Mohammed Sedki Sulayman, Prime Minister of Egypt
•
Abdel Hakim, Amer, Minister of Defense
•
Abdul Munim Riad, Lieutenant General, Egyptian Army
Jordanian Delegation
•
King Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan
•
Zaid Ibn Shaker, high-ranking Jordanian military official
•
Asad Ghanma, Commander, 48th Infantry Battalion, Jordanian Army
Syrian Delegation
•
Salah Jadid, Assistant Regional Secretary of the Syrian Regional Branch; formerly served
as Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army
•
Nurreddin al-Atassi, President of Syria; Secretary General of the National Command of
the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party
•
Hafez al-Assad, Minister of Defense
Iraqi Delegation
•
Abdul Rahman Arif, President of Iraq
•
Adnan Pachachi, Minister of the Foreign Affairs of Iraq; formerly served as Iraq’s
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Kuwaiti Delegation
•
Mubarak Abdullah Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Major General
•
Saleh Mohammed Al-Sabah, Minister of Interior & Minister of Defense
•
Fahad Al-Ahmed, Commander, 2nd Battalion, Kuwait Armed Forces
Palestinian Delegation
•
Ahmad al-Shuqayri, Chairman, Palestinian Liberation Organization
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Cambridge U, 2009. 602. Print.
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Feb. 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pan-Arabism>.
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