NB: This revision booklet represents the bare minimum for HI4. It only covers the basic themes and at A2 level you are
expected to have a deep knowledge which can only be required through reading around the topic.
Introduction – “The 30 year war debate”
This whole module is dominated by the “30 year war debate.” We need to look at each key event and assess whether it
substantially contributed to hostility or peace, conflict or reconciliation. The debate is whether the inter war period was
merely an armistice which slowly and inevitably led to a Second World War or whether genuine attempts at reconciliation
were smashed by economic crisis and evil dictators. In other words, was there continuous war between 1914 and 1945?
KEY EVENTS 1918-45
1919 – 1923 – A Hostile peace
• 1919 – The Treaty of Versailles
• 1923 – Hyperinflation in Germany
• 1923 – The French and Belgian invasion of the
Ruhr
1924 – 1929 – A search for collective security
•
•
•
•
•
1924 – The Dawes Plan
1925 – The Locarno Agreement
1926 – Germany joins the League of Nations
1928 – The Kellogg – Briand Pact
1929 – The Young Plan
1929 – 1931 – World Recession
• 1929 – The Wall Street Crash
1931 – 1938 – The Rise of Extremism
• 1931 – The Japanese invasion of Manchuria
• 1933 – Japan leaves the League of Nations
• 1934 – Hitler becomes Fuhrer of Germany
• 1935 – Italy invades Abyssinia
• 1936 – The Spanish Civil War and the
Rhineland is re-militarized by Hitler
• 1937 – Japan attack China
• 1938 – German Anschluss (union) with Austria
1938 – 1939 – Failed Appeasement
• 1938 – German invasion of the Sudetenland
(Czechoslovakia) and the Munich conference
• 1939 – The Polish Guarantee
1939 The outbreak of War
• 1939 Germany invade Poland
• 1941- Germany invade USSR
• 1941- Pearl Harbour and the outbreak of war
in the Pacific
• 1945 Yalta and Potsdam
2
France
The French were economically, socially and
geographically devastated by the war. They
faced 7 billion dollars worth of debt and a fear
that a naturally stronger Germany would rise
up and attack again in the future. For most of
the population therefore, Versailles did not go
far enough. Clemenceau had compromised
hoping for an Anglo-American military
guarantee that never came. French foreign
policy in the early 1920s consequently looked
to further enforce the treaty and cripple
Germany whilst looking for Anglo-American
support. The failure of the Ruhr crisis (1923),
its expense and Anglo-American-German
unity against French aggression greatly
diminished France’s ability to exert serious
political influence.
Germany
USA
Despite Wilson being the
architect behind many of the
ideas at Versailles, the US
senate failed to ratify the Treaty
or the League. US isolationism
left international policing to an
unstable and unable AngloFrench relationship. It also
nullified the credibility of the
settlement and left the league
without the most powerful country
in the world to back it up.
The Consequences of the
Versailles Peace settlement
for International relations.
Britain
The British were also devastated by the war which seriously threatened their position
as an imperial power. They saw the French line as far too harsh and contradictory as a
weak Germany would not be able to pay reparations or help build the European
economy. British aims were simple. They wanted stability in Europe so they could stay
out of any WW1 like alliances and concentrate on their Empire. The stark differences
between British and French policy was the foundation upon which the climate for
European diplomacy was built.
Italy
Despite being on the winning side the Italians gained very little from the peace
settlement. They fully expected to gain some German African territory and so Versailles
undoubtedly led to the rise of Mussolini and his imperialist policies.
Japan
The Japanese were able to make considerable gains at Versailles where they
increased their influence in China and the Pacific. Anglo-American
determination to stop the Eastern expansion of communism would lead to them
vastly underestimating Japanese potential.
Versailles left the Germans resentful and
unproductive. The reparation totals were
unreasonable especially considering most of
Germans industrial regions had been placed
under foreign control. There was never any real
German acceptance of the Treaty and the whole
interwar period saw German foreign policy being
focused on the reversal of the treaty of
Versailles, instead of the rebuilding of
international friendships.
Russia (Soviet Union)
Russia was not invited to Versailles nor offered
membership of the league. Western distrust of
the Bolsheviks and their open policy of COM
intern led to cold relations between Russia and
the West and without a strong ally in the East it
was going to be very difficult for the allies to
impose the terms of Versailles
Eastern Europe
Versailles created incredible instability in
Eastern Europe. The alternative to making an
alliance with Russia was to create new, large
countries responsible for curbing Russian,
Germanic and even Ottoman expansion. The
problem was that these countries (Poland and
Czechoslovakia) were far too new and therefore
socially, militarily and economically weak to act
as effective buffers (ironically by the time they
were ready the allies sold them out). They
simply became the focus of German and
Russian resentment and future territorial
interest. Moreover other peace treaties created
more resentment in countries like Austria,
Hungary and Turkey. This led to a rebellion in
Turkey which showed the effectiveness of
violence against Versailles.
The Locarno Era 1924 – 29: Genuine Reconciliation?
FOR
AGAINST
• The Dawes plan brought Europe out of the crisis created by
the Ruhr invasion and initiated the start of German recovery
and the needed return of America to international affairs
• The Locarno agreements brought a final settlement to Western
Europe borders and settled Franco-German tension. Britain
also became less isolated and seemed to be teaming up with
Italy as a police force in Western Europe.
• Britain, France and Germany all had excellent foreign ministers
in the late 1920s. Chamberlain (Austen), Briand and
Stresemann became close friends and shared similar visions
for the future of Europe.
• 1926 – Germany joined the League
• 1927 – Allied disarmament Commission and 10,000 troops
removed from Germany
• 1929 – Young Plan reduced reparations and talks about
greater political and economic unity in Europe were winning
support
• Throughout the 1920s the French made a number of pacts with
the new vulnerable Eastern European countries to protect them
against either German or Russian expansion.
• The League’s constitution did seem proactive in its aim to
protect any victim of aggression
• The League’s social and economic work bolstered its
reputation, particularly in the mandates.
• The League built its respect and became a successful mediator
over a number of issues
• The naval conferences limited ship building and the KellogBriand pact seemed to be a pact for World peace.
• The Dawes plan was centered on Anglo-American aims and
both France and Germany were unhappy with it. The French
wanted a military guarantee and the Germans wanted a
reduction in the overall reparations total but the terms were
forced upon them.
• There were many different perceptions of Locarno. The British
saw a return to a balance of power without committing
themselves, the French saw Britain committing itself to
defending France and the Germans saw the beginnings of the
revision of Versailles.
• The skill of the foreign ministers meant they were all able to
support selfish interests but cleverly appear to be
compromising.
• The French and the Germans were continuously skeptical and
suspicious of the developments between 1926 and 1929 and
had opposing aims. Britain and America were only interested in
securing the balance of power in Europe (against Communism)
whilst making as much money as possible by exploiting the
German economy. As soon as the balance was achieved the
British and the Americans could return to isolation.
• French hostility to German entry to the league led to the peace
pact between Germany and Russia which fuelled Western
suspicions of the spread of Communism.
• In the 1920s neither Germany nor Russia had the resources to
attack Eastern Europe and so there was a temporary peace.
However neither were willing to accept the borders laid down at
Versailles as both had expansionist aims for the future.
• The League was only given authority if the powers were
disinterested in the issue
• The League’s constitution made it indecisive with too many
loopholes
4
GERMANY
American loans dried up and
repayments were demanded.
European investors also lost
confidence and cashed in their
assets. The German economy was
devastated and unemployment rose
to 6 million. When you look at a
graph of Nazi electoral support it
is difficult not to argue that the
depression wasn’t the most
important factor in the rise of
Hitler
FRANCE
French political and military
instability was heightened
by the depression. It
resulted in them being
unwilling to act without
British support and being
overly reliant on a
defensive military strategy.
BRITAIN
Britain focused even more on its
economic problems and further
delayed the process of disarmament.
Britain sought to protect its empire
which led to appeasement towards
Japan, Italy and Germany. British
focus on selfish issues isolated
potential allies like France and Russia
and did nothing to convince the US to
come out of their own isolation.
JAPAN
USA
America reacted with complete
isolation. Roosevelt’s New Deal
focused on internal problems and so
the increasing American involvement
of the late 1920s was over. The end
of US money and trade and
devastating effects all over the
world
ITALY
Worldwide depression gave
Mussolini a chance to exploit
British and French
preoccupation with internal
problems and so he began his
plans for the conquest of
Abyssinia. Moreover it can be
argued that his imperial policy
was an attempt to distract
Italians from their own
internal problems.
Economic crisis and the lack of
American imports led to a serious
shortage of raw materials in
Japan. This in turn led to the idea
of gaining control of the rich
Chinese territory of Manchuria.
The consequent Manchurian crisis
in 1931 showed potential
aggressors that the League was
too weak and its allies too self
concerned to stand up to
aggression. The Manchurian crisis
can be seen as the symbol of this
period of depression and the
start of the age of extremism.
5
Italian Foreign Policy 1922-45
DATE
1922 – 33
Diplomatic
1933 – 35
ProVersailles
EVENT/FOREIGN
POLICY
Mussolini worked within
the International system
set up at Versailles. He
pushed Italian interests
but without upsetting
France or Britain.
From 1933 to 1935
Mussolini pioneered a
front against German
rearmament and
expansionism culminating
in the Stresa Front
agreement in 1935.
In 1935 Mussolini invaded
Abyssinia and had
completed the conquest
by April 1936. The
invasion is seen as one of
the most important turning
points in European
relations
1935 – 36
Abyssinia
REASONS
CONSEQUENCES
During the 1920s Mussolini had far too many domestic
problems to follow an adventurous foreign policy. Italy
was too unstable and weak and Mussolini assumed
Britain and France would unite against any bold Italian
action. Besides which, there was no other country in
Europe that Italy could work with against the British
and French in the 1920s.
Mussolini knew that the Anchluss (union between
Germany and Austria) would create a huge powerful
country on Italy’s border and he worked hard to avoid
it. Mussolini felt that his allegiance to the Democracies
meant they would support his African ambitions and as
he heard no direct opposition to this at the Stresa
Front Agreements he assumed he could begin his
plans.
Mussolini hoped that an Empire in Africa would lead to
Italy becoming one of the great powers. He had a
number of objectives:
• Military prestige would enhance his position as
Duce.
• Italy would be respected and feared by other
nations.
• Italians unable to prosper in Italy could become
colonists.
• African people would swell the size of the Italian
army.
• The economy benefiting from new markets and
resources
• Abyssinia was one of only two African states that
had not been conquered by Europeans.
Furthermore, it lay next to the Italian colonies of
Eritrea and Somaliland.
• Abyssinia had embarrassed the Italians during their
last conquest attempt in 1896. It was time for
revenge.
Mussolini’s apparent moderation
won him support from Britain and
France, flattered him with an
image as an international
statesman and offered the
possibility of concessions from the
allies.
Mussolini now felt secure that he
was fully backed by Britain and
France to gain his empire and to
stop German expansionism.
The
Italian
conquest
was
achieved through brutal methods
which turned public opinion in the
democracies against it. The British
and French leaders did not want
to lose Italy as an ally and so
sought a secret appeasement.
However the publics found out
and pressure led to them placing
weak sanctions on Mussolini
using the league. The sanctions
did nothing except infuriate
Mussolini who thought he had
loyalty from the West. By the end
of the Abyssinian crisis Mussolini
had become alienated from the
British and French, whilst at the
same time deciding that they
lacked the real strength of
character to stand up to him. He
therefore saw friendship with
6
Germany as the best way to force
concessions from Britain and
France.
1936 – 39
Spanish
Civil War
1936 – 39
The Axis
1940 – 43
War
Mussolini sent 50,000
troops to assist General
Franco’s defeat of the
elected Republican
(communist) government
• 1936: Rome Berlin Axis
• 1937: Anti-Comintern
Pact
• 1938: Mussolini
supports Hitler at
Munich
• 1939: Italy invades
Albania and makes
plans on French territory
in Nice Corsica and
Tunis.
• 1939: Pact of Steel
• 1939: At the start of war
Mussolini backs out of
the Pact of Steel and
remains neutral
In June 1940 Mussolini
decided to enter the war
and launched an invasion
of France.
For Mussolini, a Spanish Nationalist victory offered a
number of possibilities:
• It would extend Italian influence to Spain.
• Gain credit for helping to defeat communism in
Spain.
• He hoped to weaken British naval power in the Med
• France would be flanked by hostile states.
• Italy could test the efficiency of its armed forces in
Spain
Mussolini signed the Rome Berlin Axis on the promise
that Hitler would support his ambitions in the
Mediterranean and the Anti-Comintern Pact allied with
his personal hatred of Communism. The Pact of Steel
was caused by the allies guarantee to Greece after the
invasion of Albania and Mussolini’s further realisation
that only Hitler would support his territorial ambitions.
After the Pact of Steel Mussolini lived in constant
regret which explains his betrayal at the outset of war
The Italian – German friendship
was growing as was Mussolini’s
confidence in himself and in the
weakness of the Western allies
Mussolini was amazed by the success of Hitler’s early
campaigns and so decided to join the winning side.
Italy was totally unprepared and
the whole war was a complete
disaster until they capitulated in
1943
From 1936 onwards Mussolini
isolated himself from the allies
and left himself no option but to
follow Hitler towards war. He
increasingly had to accept a back
seat to Hitler who didn’t bother to
tell Mussolini about the Anschluss
or the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Mussolini and Italy were not ready
for war and misjudged Hitler’s
intentions
7
German Foreign Policy 1933 – 38
Hitler’s major aims in foreign policy
1) Reversal of Versailles
1934 - Rearmament
1933 – Germany leaves league and
disarmament conference
2) Incorporating all ethnic Germans inside
1935 – Anglo-German
Naval agreement
1936 – Rhineland remilitarised
3) To obtain lebensraum in the East
1936 – Rome-Berlin
Axis
1935 – Hitler does not condemn 1936 – Hitler sends troops to the
the Abyssinian invasion
Spanish Civil War
1938 – Anchluss with
Austria
1936 – Anti-Comintern Pact
REACTION/CONSEQUENCES
BRITAIN
FRANCE
As early as 1934 Chamberlain described Germany as the greatest threat to European peace. Britain had been hit
hard by the depression and by 1935 it faced German aggression in Europe, Japanese aggression in the Far East
and Italian aggression in the Mediterranean. It simply did not have the resources to cope with these problems. The
aim was therefore to blunt Hitler’s aggression and get Germany back into the League of Nations where it could be
tied down. The British were reluctant to join any Anti-German pact as it would reflect the dangerous pre-WW1
alliances so instead they looked to negotiate a pact with Germany which would give territorial guarantees in the
East and South and allow Germany to re-enter the League. As an island race they felt secure after the AngloGerman Naval pact but it was a selfish act that isolated the French and gave British consent for the illegitimacy of
Versailles. Hitler’s moves into the Rhineland and Austria cause concern but the British public and government were
desperate to avoid a war and so supported Germany’s legitimate grievances against Versailles. In conclusion,
Britain’s indifference and often support for Hitler gave him confidence and meant opportunities to create an antiNazi front were lost.
The French had ceased to have any real control in Europe since the failure of the Ruhr invasion. They no longer
had the resources or influence (Eastern Europe) to threaten Germany and so they continued to seek military
security and tried to negotiate with Hitler. The Nazi coup in Austria was fortunate for the French as it convinced the
Italians to sign the Rome Agreements in 1935. An Italian alliance seemed like the best buffer against German
expansionism in the West but the French also wanted security in the East and so looked for a pact with Russia
which was signed in May 1935. The French now looked for a deal with Germany but their pro-Versailles approach
was always going to fall on deaf ears. The Depression hit France heavily between 1932 and 1935 and this led to
11 coalition governments in this period. With threats from the extreme right and left, these administrations could not
come up with any decisive foreign policy and so the French fell back on an inactive, defensive mentality. The
remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 went against everything the French had been campaigning for since
Versailles and the small German force used would have easily been repelled. However the French government
was too weak and unwilling to act without Britain’s help. The Rhineland invasion was the last chance the French
8
ITALY
SOVIET
UNION
USA
JAPAN
would have to outmuscle the Germans. It also meant that it would be impossible for the British and French to get
their troops to Eastern Europe. A fact that played heavily in Hitler’s favour. French reaction to the events of 1936
onwards was therefore to strengthen the Maginot line. The French were acting on the premise of World War One
that defense would always win over attack, they did not give enough consideration to the offensive potential of new
weapons like aircraft and tanks. In conclusion France’s disunity, weakness and inability to gain a military alliance
with teeth showed Hitler that the French could do nothing but sit and wait for him.
At first Mussolini was a Versailles revisionist and supported a pact between the Western powers (Four Power Pact
suggested in June 1933). However the Nazi threat in Austria turned Mussolini and he now sought to uphold the
treaty against Germany. The Rome protocols (1934) with Austria and Hungary and the Rome Agreement (1935)
with France had this very goal in mind. Mussolini then invited Britain and France to the Stresa conference in April
1935 to discuss opposition to German rearmament and so by 1935 Mussolini’s stand point seemed clear. However
the Abyssinian crisis can be seen as a huge turning point in European relations. Public opinion forced the British
and the French to oppose the invasion and Mussolini was outraged. By the end of the Abyssinian crisis Mussolini
had become alienated from the British and French, whilst at the same time deciding that they lacked the real
strength of character to stand up to him. He therefore saw friendship with Germany as the best way to force
concessions from Britain and France. In 1936 Italian and German troops fought for the nationalists in Spain and
this further unity led to the Rome-Berlin Axis. Mussolini was never really certain of his union with Hitler which
shows with his desertion at the start of the war. Nevertheless, the Abyssinian crisis was a huge turning point as it
united the two dictators and ended any chances of a Western alliance against Germany. Once again, Hitler’s
confidence grew.
Stalin hoped that Hitler would be a dramatic failure paving the way for Communism. If not, he probably distrusted
the West more than the Nazis and Collectivisation meant he was far too busy with internal issues. He therefore
hoped that the traditions of Rapollo and the common hatred of Poland would ensure the continuation of NaziSoviet cooperation. Stalin made security pacts with France and joined the League in 1934 but still looked to keep
diplomatic channels with Germany open. Secret talks concerning a Soviet-Nazi pact continued right up until 1936
when the French Parliament finally ratified the Franco-Russian pact but Stalin’s willingness to do a deal with Hitler
over Eastern Europe is evident in the Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939) despite Hitler’s public hatred of communism. Stalin
signed the pact as he expected a Japanese invasion from the East and would be happy to see Western Europe
torn apart so that Communism could come in and pick up the pieces. Moreover, like so many other countries, the
Soviet Union was too unprepared, with too many internal problems to contemplate standing up to Hitler in the
1930s.
The USA were determined to stay isolated despite growing concerns from the Jewish community. The Neutrality
Act of 1935 gave the President the power to ban arms sales to any country and this only strengthened the culture
of non-involvement. Even after Pearl Harbour the Americans looked to stay out of the war in Europe but this option
was taken away when Hitler decided to declare war first.
The Japanese and the Nazis saw a way in which they could be mutually beneficial to one another. Both would act
as a distraction away from their own territorial ambitions. Their common need led to the Anti-Comintern pact in
1936.
9
Appeasement and the Road to War 1936 - 39
The Countdown to War
•
•
•
July 1937 – Japan declares war on China
March 1938 – German occupation of Austria
29th September 1938 – At the Munich Conference
Hitler agrees to no more territorial demands if Germany
is given the Sudetenland
•
•
•
•
15th March 1939 – Germany invades Czech areas of
Bohemia and Moravia.
23rd August 1939 – The Nazi-Soviet Pact
1st September – Germany invades Poland
3rd Sept – Britain and France declare war on Germany.
Why did Chamberlain appease Hitler?
1) British Military Weakness
After World War One Lloyd George committed Britain to a disarmament programme. The government initiated the 10 year
plan that predicted a war would not be waged on Britain for at least 10 years. Expenditure was severely cut in the army, navy
and air force. In 1938 Britain was relatively defenceless. It had a small trained army, very few fighter planes and even less
anti-aircraft technology like radar. Britain’s navy was still strong but it was thought to be redundant with the new threat from
the air. Chamberlain was very weary of the bomber in modern war, in speeches he often talked about the new threat to
civilians from enemy bombers. Chamberlain did not want to be remembered as the Prime Minister who led Britain into a war
that caused millions of civilian deaths. Most of the P.M’s military chiefs were warning him of the threat of the Luftwaffe and it
was this threat that led him to appease Hitler. Nothing could be gained from sentencing the population of major cities to
death.
2) Chamberlain’s personality and the British character
Chamberlain had a personal conviction for appeasement. His father was a politician and had strived for a union with
Germany, Chamberlain hoped to fulfill his father’s goals. Chamberlain came from a background in business. He believed the
only outcome of war was the disintegration of trade relations between countries. War was barbaric and any international
situation could be resolved if two statesmen sat down face to face and reached a compromise. It was this part of
Chamberlain’s personality that led him to support appeasement so vehemently. Chamberlain was stereotypically British. The
public widely supported appeasement after the horrors of World War One but they also supported Chamberlain’s British
outlook. His need to be the bigger man and find a peaceful resolution was respected throughout the country. Appeasement
between the wars can therefore be seen as a typically British policy. Many Britons were guilty long after World War one.
Guilty that their imperial aims had led to such a bloody war, guilty that they had punished a nation with so many cultural
similarities who had gone to war for the same aims and guilty that they had sat back and forced the German people to turn to
a dictator for help. If the British could stop these dictators from getting their publics into difficulties and help these countries
back into the international community then they would be acting as Britons should. Britain had become industrialized and
civilized before anyone else, it was her job to act as the world’s mother, encouraging developing countries into more civilized
and peaceful times. It was this culture which possibly led to the British public not questioning the policy of appeasement,
which in turn, strengthened Chamberlain’s resolve.
10
3) British economic situation
The British economic situation was a heavy influence on appeasement. World War One was a turning point in British history,
the aftermath saw a period of damage limitation by the Cabinet regarding Britain’s world status. Britain could no longer afford
to be a strong military imperial power and one by one the colonies turned into dominions and then independents. After the
Wall street crash in 1929 Britain hit a very dark economic period. The U.S.A started to call back their war loans in larger
instalments and Hitler stopped reparations so Britain went into negative equity. This economic situation pushed towards
appeasement because Britain could not afford to re-arm. Furthermore, the cost of another war would mean the end of the
Empire and Britain’s position in the world. Moreover, appeasement might lead to the re-opening of Anglo-German trade links.
The British economist Keynes had always urged that German trade was essential for British economic recovery. An economic
union between Britain and Germany would mean Europe could begin to challenge isolationist America.
4) British worldwide commitments
British commitments in the 1930s were stretched across the world from Sydney to London. The economic situation meant that
the government had to review and prioritise these commitments in order that they might remain in control of some of them.
Chamberlain was a proud imperialist and felt that the empire gave Britain its livelihood and character. The new imperial Japan
was a huge threat to British interests in the far East and so was a huge reason for appeasement. Britain had to reduce the
number of potential enemies around the world and it made sense to deal with the closest European threats first. Once Europe
was at peace then Britain could turn its attention to the protection of the Empire. Chamberlain’s second biggest headache on
the worldwide stage was the spread of communism and this again was an important reason for appeasement in 1938. In
1938 Hitler had only expressed intentions to take back land with German peoples living in it, Russia on the other hand had
declared their intentions to support a worldwide communist revolution, Russia was therefore seen as a bigger threat to Britain
than Germany. Chamberlain’s conservative, elitist principles stood him firmly against Bolshevism and he believed Hitler could
be utilised as a buffer against the spread of Communism across Europe. If Britain and Germany destroyed each other in war
it would leave the gate of Europe open to Russia. A strong Germany was a welcome relief for the right wing in London.
5) British relations with other countries
Another key factor leading to appeasement was Britain’s relations with other countries. In 1938 Britain had a relatively small
amount of international friends and so Chamberlain could possibly be excused for trying to make a new one in Germany.
Chamberlain had no faith in the French .The 1930s had seen a string of short, weak French governments who never really
gave any clear policy direction. Revolutionary Communist Russia was a huge threat to Europe as a whole and Italy had
proven to be an unpredictable pain down in the Mediterranean. Isolationist U.S.A were unreliable and although Roosevelt
expressed sympathy for Chamberlain’s problems, his actions were controlled by a strong congress and an anti-European
American public. Japan was also proving to be a real threat to British interests in the Far East. Chamberlain’s personal
attitude to particular countries certainly bolstered his resolve to appease Hitler. He viewed Czechoslovakia as a false,
unstable country which would inevitably collapse. It would be far better if that collapse was controlled by Britain and used as a
bartering weapon against Hitler. Moreover Chamberlain viewed many non-European, non-white countries as mere real estate
to be used in diplomatic dealings. It was Chamberlain’s attitudes to these countries that allowed Hitler and Mussolini to run
over them without opposition. Overall Britain’s diplomatic situation in 1938 naturally lent itself to appeasement. Chamberlain
had no real allies he could trust to help him build a front against Hitler. He did not trust the French, the Russians or the
Italians; the U.S.A were not interested and the Japanese were only interested in themselves. What is more, many British
(including Chamberlain) felt a cultural affinity with the Germans. Chamberlain felt that Hitler had a legitimate grievance in the
Sudetenland and a successful political alliance with Germany would form a union against American arrogance and Russian
dominance.
11
The causes of World War Two
The causes of World War Two have sparked a great deal of debate amongst Historians and simplistically this debate can be split into
two schools of thought. One group supports the “30 year war” argument which proposes that the Second World War was an
inevitable continuation of the First World War and the inter war period was simply an armistice. The other school of thought is that it
was ‘Hitler’s war’ where circumstance brought a megalomaniac to power who’s dream to dominate Europe made war inevitable after
1933.
Possible headings for the causes of World War Two
The following headings are not a definitive list. There are other ways to approach this topic; however, they offer a broad approach
which allows for counter arguments and a good final conclusion. However, if you wish to use different headings and reach different
conclusions it is fine, but you must justify your arguments.
Other possible headings could include the following:
US isolationism
The fear of communism
Mussolini’s imperialism
Anglo-French disunity
1) The Legacy of World War One and Versailles
The First World War ended abruptly without a clear winner and so for most of the inter war period many parties saw it as
‘unfinished business’. Versailles sowed the seeds for future conflict because it angered countries like Germany, Italy and
Russia. Moreover compromise meant that Germany was left intact and able to regain strength and seek revenge in the future.
The treaty became the most important focus of French and German foreign ministries and so it dominated and tarnished
international relations which made diplomacy very difficult. The legacy of Versailles was important because it stunted
European growth and didn’t allow countries to leave the war in the past and rebuild Europe together. There was no moment
when the revision of Versailles didn’t dominate International relations, but most importantly, hatred of Versailles was the
foundation of Hitler’s foreign policy and an important reason for his rise to power.
However, there is always resentment after war and it was accepted practice that the winners should be compensated.
Germany was not really any worse off than any other participant and history proves that resentment does not make war
inevitable. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that by the early 1920s everyone except the French accepted that Versailles
needed to be revised. The work of the Locarno era went a long way towards not only revising the treaty but also rebuilding
international relations. In this sense 1929 was a far more important year than 1919.
12
2) The Great Depression
The depression caused dictatorships, extremism and expansionism. Britain, France and the US (Roosevelt’s New Deal)
retreated to isolation with the first two relying on their empires. They became suspicious of one another which led to poor
cooperation during the crisis of the 1930s and the depression meant they could not justify rearmament. This directly led to the
British policy of appeasement and the French retreat behind the Maginot line. Italy and Japan followed the British and French
example and began looking for their own empires to find new resources and boost public morale; this expansionism caused
conflict and the muddling of alliances in Europe. Most importantly the desperation caused by the depression gave power to
Hitler and the Japanese military. In short, if we believe that it was Hitler’s war, then 1929 significantly began Hitler’s rise to
power and explains the democracies’ inability to oppose him in his early years.
However, Hitler’s rise to power was not caused by the wall street crash but rather by the reaction to the Wall Street Crash. In
other words, if there had been better collective security and cooperation after 1929 then perhaps Germany’s problems could
have been alleviated and extremism would not have become popular. Therefore, perhaps the failure of collective security was
more significant than the depression. After World War One the world powers should have prepared themselves for a
depression and a better response to it in 1929 may have diverted disaster.
3) The failure of collective security
The 1920s give us a stark example of the importance of collective security. In the early 20s Britain and the US sat back and
watched Franco-German relations disintegrate and then explode at the Ruhr. However, after 1924, the benefits of
collaboration were evident. The Locarno era saw the world move away from the economic and psychological scars of WW1
and a future peace seemed possible. It was vital therefore that this collaboration continued when the world met the crisis in
1929. Perhaps if the democracies had reacted to the depression with free trade and cooperation then confidence would have
returned far more quickly to the market. Evidence of this can be seen in the economic cooperation of the 1950s which had
such positive effects on war torn countries. The crucial consequence, of course, would have been that the Germans, Italians
and Japanese may not have turned to extremist ideas. Moreover, the failure of collective security continued as extremism
grew and by the time Hitler was Chancellor in 1933 it was too late.
However, the failure of collective security does not explain war. Again, if you support the Hitler’s war theory, then the amount
of collective action against him was only ever going to affect the timing. Appeasement delayed the war by a year and maybe
US or Soviet opposition may have delayed it further. However, once Hitler was in power, his policies meant that a conflict was
inevitable at some stage. Perhaps, the significance of the first three causes is that they all helped to bring Hitler to power.
However, on their own they do not make war inevitable. The Locarno era proved that resentment, economic depression and a
lack of cooperation could be overcome if everyone wanted peace. However after 1933 this was not the case.
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4) Hitler
Most historians now agree that the chief responsibility for unleashing war on Europe in 1939 rests with Hitler and the Nazis.
Some argue that Hitler was merely reacting to the international situation and the weakness and disunity of other leaders;
however this argument is thin when you consider that Hitler had published his aim for European domination in Mein Kampf in
1924, well before the Wall Street Crash and the troubled 30s. The Locarno era had shown that diplomacy and international
cooperation could ease tension and economic crisis and so there was no reason to believe that a compromise could not be
found in the 1930s. Blaming the western democracies for not destroying Hitler in the early years is poor hindsight history and
is similar to blaming the British for not helping the French to finish off Germany in 1923. US isolationism, the depression and
the fear of communism could quite easily have been motivations for Western Europe to put aside their past and work more
closely as similar circumstance did from 1945 onwards. Blaming appeasement for Hitler’s actions is like blaming indifferent
parenting for an adult’s criminal behaviour. If Hitler was just another German leader of the inter-war period then he would
have been happy with his achievements in reversing the territorial constraints imposed at Versailles. Hitler did not want to
pursue German aims through the established international system (like his predecessors) he wanted to destroy the
international order and replace it with a continent dominated by an Aryan super race.
Conclusion
The causes of World War Two is a specific topic and it is not the same as a question on the causes of conflict from 1919 – 39. At A2
level you must be careful to answer a question specifically. For example, for a question on the Causes of World War Two you must
illustrate why your chosen causes led directly to war in 1939 and not why they caused general hostility/conflict.
It is easy, under exam pressure, to misinterpret a question. What is the difference between the two questions below?
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To what extent was German foreign policy mainly responsible for the failure of collective security between 1919 and 1939?
(2006)
“The failure of collective security between 1919 and 1939 was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1939.” Discuss. (2003)
To what extent was Germany the main threat to Europe in the period 1918-1945? Jan 2011
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Conflict or Reconciliation?
Reconciliation
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1924 – The Dawes Plan
1925 – The Locarno agreement
1926 – Germany enters the league of Nations
1928 – The Kellog-Briand Pact
1929 – The Young Plan
1934 – The Stresa Front
Conflict
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1923 – The Ruhr invasion
1931 – The Manchurian crisis
1933 – Japan leaves the League of Nations
1934 – Hitler becomes Fuhrer of Germany
1935 – Italy invades Abyssinia
1936 – The Spanish Civil War and the Rhineland is re-militarized by Hitler
1937 – Japan attack China
1938 – German Anchluss (union) with Austria
1938 – German invasion of the Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia) and the Munich conference
1939 – The Polish Guarantee and the outbreak of War
Above is a simple list of events that might help you in answering a question focused on either conflict or reconciliation or
both. If you look closely at your past paper questions you will notice that each one has a unique focus and so there is no
point giving you pre-prepared paragraphs like in HI1. You must have a good knowledge of the whole period and then you
must assess the thrust of the question and then focus your knowledge specifically. You will not have time to write about
every event so you must select the knowledge you use carefully ensuring it is the most relevant and gives coverage to the
whole period in the question. Below are some examiner’s tips on HI4 technique and a student friendly markscheme.
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Examiner’s comments on HY4
N.B At AS level the examiner is desperate to give you marks. At A2 they are far more demanding. There is a big
step from AS to A2 in terms of the examiner’s expectations
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HI4 questions will either be “To what extent…”or an interpretation followed by “Discuss.” Therefore your answers
must be balanced, focused on the question and come to a judgment.
Examiners are far more critical of your historical knowledge at A2 level. Your factual knowledge must be detailed
and relevant. For example, it is not good enough to talk about the Locarno era generally; you must know names of
foreign ministers and names of treaties and their terms and consequences. In short, if you want an A, your
knowledge must stand out.
Two common mistakes at HY4
1. Students do not make the jump to A2 level. In HY1 (question b) you can get away with writing a pre-prepared
list of reasons. This will not be good enough for HY4 and you will not be able to get out of level 2. Each
factor/argument and every fact used must be directly relevant to the question. You must be constantly answering
the question if you hope to achieve the top levels. One examiner said “students must be like a dog with a bone,
never letting go of the question!”
2. Timing. In the HY4 exam you have to write two essays in 1hr 40 mins. Every year the second essay is consistently
worse. It is far better to write two good essays than one excellent and one poor. Below are some tips on timing:
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Write an essay plan and stick to it
Finish the first essay after 45 minutes and shut your mind off for 3 minutes before you begin to plan the
second essay.
Start with your weaker topic.
Remember two sides of reasoned argument will always outscore 4 sides of partially relevant knowledge. It’s
not a competition to see who can write the most but a competition to see who can answer the question most
succinctly.
Points to remember:
• You must identify exactly what the question is asking. Identify key words and the overall thrust. Summarise it in
your own words at the start of your plan.
• Make sure you are making judgments on the question throughout the essay but particularly at the start and end.
• Relevant argument
• Impressive historical knowledge
• Don’t pre-prepare factors and then force them to fit the question. You must read and understand the question and
then search your mind for arguments and knowledge that are relevant.
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HY4 Mark scheme
Assessment Objectives
AO1 a – Historical knowledge –12 of 40 (24 out of 80 for both Intnl Relations and Britain)
AO1b – Historical Explanation – 28 out 40 (56 out of 80 for both Intnl Relations and Britain)
You can see from the allocation of marks that it will not be good enough to make a list of facts and pretend it’s an essay. You must use your
knowledge to form clear and sophisticated arguments.
Types of Questions
1. To what extent……
This question requires a series of mini judgements to evaluate the key question. Eg; To what extent is Germany mainly responsible
for causing WW2? Germany is mainly responsible because…. Versailles is also responsible for causing WW2, but less/more so
than Germany because….In conclusion the factor mainly responsible for causing WW2 is…..
2
Discuss
This question requires a series of mini evaluations and a judgement eg; The seeds of the 2nd world war were planted in 1938 at
Munich, not in 1919 at Versailles. Discuss. Versailles oversaw the beginnings of war because… Munich oversaw the beginnings of
war because … .In conclusion ……. was more important in making war inevitable because ….
Intro-NOT -‘in this essay I am going to write about’ or ‘yes,I agree with the question’ NO WAFFLE, NO ANSWERS
BUT either
define terms
set scene
linking anecdote
3 / 4 lines only
Try and include 5 factors/main issues (including your topic given in the question, which should be your first paragraph) and
ensure you cover the whole question –arguing in a sustained way throughout to ANSWER THE QUESTION. Debate throughout.
Conclusion –short, an answer in a nutshell and make sure it is a definitive answer (explicit judgement). Do NOT say some
historians say-only use historians to support your argument.
Mark Scheme
Level 1 (AO1: 1-3
AO1b: 2-14)
The answer will be descriptive or limited in scope and accuracy. Spelling and grammar may be weak. The answer will not often be focussed on the set
question and will show limited understanding..
Level 2 (AO1: 4-6
AO1b: 8-14)
The answer will display general historical knowledge of the topic but will still be limited in range or depth. There will be some lapses in spelling and grammar and
coherence will not be sustained. The answer will be generally focussed on the topic area. The answer will attempt a judgement with some support.
Level 3 (AO1: 7-10 AO1b: 15-21)
The answer will deploy mostly accurate and specific historical knowledge. It will be largely coherent. Answers will be expressed clearly although spelling may be
variable and grammatical rules inconsistently applied. The answer will focus on the set question mostly. The answer will reach a judgement which has a
reasonable degree of substantiation.
Level 4 (AO1: 11-12 AO1b 22-28)
The answer will display a high level of historical accuracy and coherence. Selection of supporting information will be effective and relevant. Spelling will be
accurate and grammatical rules consistently applied. The answer will be fully focussed on the set question. The judgements reached will be fully substantiated.
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