Professionalism in Public Service
Management: The Making of Highly Qualified,
Efficient and Effective Public Managers
by Staffan Synnerström
"My experience of bottles tells me that the bottleneck is always at the very top of the bottle."
Swedish middle manager accused of forming a bottleneck in his organisation.
Introduction
In this paper I will try to outline why public managers are important for the success of public
administration reform, and how the performance of public managers in central and eastern
European countries (CEECs) could be improved. The paper is not based on empirical
research. It provides my personal views on a very important subject based on five years’
practical experience within the SIGMA Programme at OECD, where my work has been
related to the establishment of civil services in the CEECs.
The reform needs in most CEECs make the performance of public managers extremely
important; and the situation in these countries makes it difficult to find well-performing
managers. While the needs for good managers are vast, the supply is limited. Governments
cannot meet the competition from the private sector. In addition, the legal frameworks,
institutional capacities and systems necessary to recruit, develop and retain good managers are
still weak, if in place at all.
In this paper I will concentrate mainly on the legal frameworks and institutional and
management structures necessary for making good managers. In doing so I will concentrate
on the highest officials in government, with the presumption that much of what is needed to
improve the performance of top managers is also needed to improve the performance of
managers at other levels.
I will therefore not look at the training necessary for making good managers. Although
training is crucial in this respect, it is at the same time a broadly and well-recognised
precondition for making good managers. Nor will I look at other means to inculcate shared
values necessary for a common public management.
The Importance of Public Managers
The quotation above from the frustrated middle manager in the Swedish tax administration
clearly illustrates the importance of having good public managers at higher levels. Without
appropriate top managers, an organisation cannot achieve its optimum. With sub-standard
managers at the top, the performance of an organisation becomes poor, and operations tend to
get blocked -- the bottleneck. The bottleneck is also present in organisations lacking
systematic mechanisms for delegation and for accountability. Although the performance of
top managers is crucial, it is of course equally important to have corresponding quality in the
performance at all management levels.
Western European countries have, for a long time now, recognised the fact that management
standards and the performance of managers are critical for the success of public
administration reform as well as for general public administration performance. Programmes
to improve the selection and development of top managers have been a normal part of public
administration reform for the last 10-15 years. Among all the reasons for the existence of such
programmes, two are striking:
When public administration reform means, as it does in several western European countries,
delegation and devolved responsibilities, when it means giving up power-sharing in decisionmaking and ex ante controls in favour of power allocation to managers and ex post controls,
the quality of the managers vested with these powers becomes a more than essential
consideration.
And when national policy-making, becomes more and more complex and more and more
exposed to international coordination, as in all countries, the need becomes evident for top
managers with holistic perspectives and an ability to coordinate their work with both national
and international institutions.
France, with its career system and its corps, has by tradition defined groups of senior officials.
Individuals at the top of their career are in each corps centrally managed and are assisted in
career development through training and mobility. The state always has a pool of competent
individuals to select from when a top position needs to be staffed. Other countries are now
establishing similar defined groups of top managers who are centrally selected, appointed and
managed. The Netherlands, with its devolved administration, is developing a Senior Public
Service with a strong emphasis on the professional development of managers and on
improving coordination capacities.
More information on developments in this respect in OECD Member countries can be found
in The Senior Civil Service - A Comparison of Personnel Development for Top Managers in
Thirteen OECD Member Countries (PUMA/HRM(97)2), and in the SIGMA newsletter,
Public Management Forum, Vol. III, No. 2, 1997. In Top Management Service in Central
Government: Introducing a System for the Higher Civil Service in Central and Eastern
European Countries (SIGMA Paper no. 1), Professor Jacques Ziller analyses solutions in
some OECD Member countries with a view to providing options for central and eastern
European countries.
That kind of senior civil services does not yet exist in any CEEC but some of the countries are
gradually introducing special policies and management mechanisms for the highest officials
in government. Hungary, Poland and Latvia are examples of countries that are currently
implementing reforms related to top managers, although with very different approaches. Other
CEECs are in the planning phase.
Rationale for Public Administration Reform
In 1989/1990 CEEC governments had two major reasons to reform their administrations: to
make the administrations ensure democracy, and to make them ensure a market economy.
Later, a third reason was added in ten of the countries: to integrate with Europe and to
facilitate accession to the European Union.
A democratic administration should represent the stability and continuity of the state. It
should, under the constitution, be ruled by law and not use the public powers and means that it
has been entrusted with in an arbitrary way. The execution of these powers should be
protected from partisan interests, and it should be controlled through transparent mechanisms
and by impartial institutions. It should interact with the public in a transparent and serviceoriented way.
An administration in a market economy should not be, in the first place or mainly, occupied
with the production of goods and services. Its task is to create fair and equal preconditions for
economic activities through regulation, and by monitoring the activities through impartial
institutions, in order to establish a competitive private sector. This has nothing to do with the
fact that states are producing goods; it only means that production is not a task for the core
administration of the state.
An administration in a country aiming for European integration should be able to implement
effectively EU regulations within the national context. Although the European Union does not
have any direct powers in relation to how countries should organise their governance system
and public administrations, the membership and accession to the Union presuppose certain
capacities and qualities in countries’ administrations. An administration in a country aiming
for European integration must be able to cope with all the preparations and negotiations
required in the process, and to adopt and implement the "acquis communautaire".
The objectives for ensuring democracy and a market economy have already been achieved, to
a large extent, in the majority of the CEECs in terms of necessary legislation and institutions.
There are of course still shortcomings in the enforcement of the legislation and in the
functioning of the institutions in all countries due to a scarcity of financial and, particularly,
human resources. At the same time, some CEECs are still in the process of reforming the
administration to ensure the basic objectives of democracy and a market economy, i.e.
redesigning the role of the state.
The Administrative Heritage
Public administration reform is a continuous process in all western European countries. For
reasons dictated by changes in substantive policies or financial constraints, and for purposes
of achieving greater efficiency, internationalisation, service-orientation, etc., western
European governments are continuously adapting their public administration to changing
requirements and demands. All the CEECs need to reform their public administrations for the
very same reasons and purposes, and most evidently for the reason of financial constraints and
the purpose of internationalisation.
To understand the needs for public administration reform and the possible ways of achieving
results in a given country, one must have an understanding of the national administrative
context. Although each CEEC has its special context and traditions, there are some
administrative characteristics that could be, and to a certain extent can still be, found in most
of the countries. These charecteristics are the heritage from the communist administration,
and they should be the target for reform in all CEECs. These characteristics and the impact
they still have in CEEC administration give public administration reform different
preconditions than in most older democracies.
To make it brief and simple, one could say that an administration in a democracy, functioning
in a market economy, should sustain at least the following basic qualities:
i) guarantee of fundamental rights
ii) legal certainty and predictability
iii) balance of powers
iv) instruments of accountability and control; transparency
v) coherence within government
Communist administrative structures and procedures did not emphasize any of these qualities,
but instead contradicted them. This is still a general starting point for public administration
reform in CEECs. The heritage is still part of the explanation for sometimes slow progress in
the development of, e.g., horizontal government functions, such as the policy-making process,
the law-drafting process, the budget process, financial control, audit, and the staffing and
management of personnel in the administrations. The heritage includes the following
characteristics:
The Lack of Coherence and Coordination
In the communist administrations sectoral ministries managed their activities down to the
lowest level. Political and strategic decisions, including those related to funding, were
coordinated and taken within the party structure, not within the administrative structure. In the
old system, there was therefore no real need for coordination between government
institutions. The centre of government, including the Prime Minister and the Ministry of
Finance, was weak and did not have the policy-making, coordinating or financial authority
that it has by tradition in western democracies.
Although much of this has improved in CEECs, through the establishment of new
constitutions, territorial reforms, restructuring of government, new institutions, improved
budget laws and budget procedures, etc., the lack of cohesiveness and the low coordination
capacities still prevail in CEEC government administrations.
In many cases no clear systems exist for delegation of powers and officials have no clearly
defined accountability. In western governments, civil servants on various levels have the
authority to take decisions or to make agreements on behalf of their institution in the
coordination process. They have a clear definition of their authority in relation to others, i.e. a
mandate, through regulations and job descriptions, and their accountability is defined in law.
Coordination negotiations are usually put up to the next level only if an agreement cannot be
reached on a lower level, and few final decisions have to be made on the political or
ministerial level.
In most CEEC governments the situation is different by tradition. First of all, there used to be,
during the first years of transition, a clear mistrust of incoming elected officials for officials
who had been appointed and had worked in the old system. This mistrust can still be seen in
some of the countries when new governments come into office and is one of the reasons for
the fact that non-political officials in a ministry are not given clear mandates.
But there are also structural or systemic weaknesses. Coordination procedures are inadequate
and systems for the delegation of responsibilities are lacking. Coordination issues are
therefore often pushed upwards, appearing unsolved on the agenda of the Council of
Ministers. Negotiations between ministers then have to take place in regular government
meetings, with long and demanding sittings as a consequence.
Without mandates and defined accountabilities for officials, negotiations cannot be
concluded, and problems cannot be solved at levels below the highest political ones, and often
not below the Council of Ministers. In the absence of a permanent role and professional
integrity for the higher non-political officials, this mistrust will remain. Also administrative
issues will continue to be dealt with at political levels and from a political point of view rather
than from an administrative one.
So what appears to be a problem of a lack of horizontal coordination is, to a great extent, a
problem of a lack of vertical delegation, i.e. a lack of defined roles and mandates for officials
within a ministry. It is partly also a matter of mistrust, which is a vertical problem as well.
The low capacity for horizontal coordination, reinforced many times by coalition
governments without common political programmes, could be addressed through the selection
and management of the highest non-political officials, i.e. through top management reform.
The Lack of Coordinated Staffing and Personnel Management
Another characteristic of the old administrative structure was that each ministry and state
institution was an independent employer, defined by and subject to the regulations of the
Labour Code. No common standards for selection, recruitment, promotion or personnel
management existed. Each institution had its own regulations, and each minister or head of
institution could freely choose or change his or her staff, even at the highest levels. In the field
of labour law, each institution was regarded as an independent legal entity. There was no
notion of the state as a common legal entity with institutions acting on delegation and on
behalf of the state in issues related to employment and personnel management.
This part of the heritage still prevails in CEEC administrations of today, and to a large extent
even in countries that already have civil service legislation in force. There are a number of
reasons behind the fact that countries have failed to break this uncoordinated and even
fragmentized structure for staffing of the administration and for personnel management.
One of the reasons is the fact that in most countries no clear division exists between what
should be political posts and what should not. In an administration staffed and managed under
a labour code, it is at the discretion of the minister or the head of institution to define when
political merits are necessary and when they are not. Although formally a labour coderegulated administration is not defined as a spoils system, it will always become a spoils
system in practice.
The power to select staff is one important and attractive power for ministers. By using this
power they can surround themselves with individuals whom they know and can rely on
instead of taking on staff they don’t know and may mistrust By using this power ministers
can also reward individuals for their political work, e.g. during election campaigns.
Line ministers do not easily accept a system where their staffing capabilities would be much
more limited and subject to special standards and procedures, perhaps even meaning that
decisions related to the highest officials would be taken at the centre of government rather
than by themselves. From their point of view, such a reform would not necessesarily represent
an improvement. It would mean, in a short-term perspective, that they would have to give up
an important power without getting much in return. As important stakeholders in any top
management or civil service reform, line ministers will not automatically become convinced
of the benefits of such reforms.
Few CEEC governments have so far had the interest or the power to convince or actually
force sectoral ministers to accept a new and unified structure for decision-making related to
the staffing of higher management positions in the government administration and for the
career management of the position-holders.
This leads to the continuation of political staffing of crucial positions in the administrations, a
spoils system which is de facto although not de jure. This does not mean that individuals
selected on political grounds are not fit for their jobs; in many cases they are of course well
qualified. But in the long term such a spoils system means a lack of continuity and a lack of
professionally independent input into the decision-making process. It also maintains the lack
of delegation of responsibility to positions in government at lower levels than the clearly
political level, as the decision-making and coordination will continue to take place within the
political structures of the administration.
The Lack of Administrative and Management Professions
In the old system there was no understanding of a common state administration profession,
such as being a civil servant. Each job in the state administration was regarded as a specialist
job in the employing institution with limited career bridges to jobs in other institutions and
without clear professional criteria also valid for a job elsewhere in the state administration.
Mobility between different institutions was not encouraged and was rare.
Due to the tradition that everyone was a specialist within a special technical field, and the fact
that the coordination of policies and between institutions was done within the political
structure, there was no need for generalists or managers with a broader perspective than that
of their own technical field.
The kind of permanent management positions that can be found at higher levels within
Western civil services was, and still is in most CEECs, the prerogative of the political class.
Non-politically selected managers were, and in many cases still are, competent specialists
within their field of expertise, providing technical contributions but rarely ensuring
management and coordination.
Public administration reform in CEECs should therefore aim to establish a management
profession in the administration. But how can relevant powers and responsibilities be
transferred from political structures to administrative ones and how can professional managers
be made capable of managing these responsibilities?
Or, to use the terminology of this conference: how do you establish the scope for professional
managers, and how do you professionalise them?
Professionalisation of the Administrations in the CEECs
Professionalisation is of course a question of training of managers and staff, but this is not all.
It is of course also a question of introducing regulations defining duties, accountabilities and
corresponding rights of staff, as in a civil service law; but that is not enough. It is also a
question of improved personnel management and management standards, but it involves
much more besides.
It is to a large extent a question of establishing an administrative context in which officials
can carry out their duties in a professional, impartial, transparent and controllable way.
Professionalisation is therefore not only about the professional quality of staff and about their
status. It is very much about:
i) the quality of substantive law, providing the substantive framework for decision-making,
i.e. the "tool" for the officials and the source of information and prediction for the public.
ii) the quality of procedural legislation, providing procedures for administrative decisionmaking, for coordination and for balancing of powers, for officials’ relations and
communication with the public, and providing opportunities for concerned physical or legal
persons to have a say or to appeal.
iii) the quality of financial and administrative accountability and control mechanisms,
providing for transparency, checks of financial and administrative decision-making and
including means for correction, prosecution and redress.
Professionalisation is a much wider task than implementing civil service laws and introducing
personnel management improvements. If the administrative context within which officials are
working is not also improved, they might still have to make arbitrary decisions, with
insufficient communication with the public and insufficient coordination with other
institutions, even in a situation where they have been selected on merit and are subject to
systematic training.
Objectives for Top Management Reform
I think it is reasonable to say that top management reform should aim at the following:
i) improved quality of the outputs of public institutions
This objective can only be met by a combination of measures related to the position of the
manager and to the corporate functioning of the organisation. The administrative context must
be addressed, as stated above. The managers should have a clearly defined responsibility for
the output-quality, and there should be incentives for improvement.
ii) improved efficiency and cost-effectiveness in public institutions
To meet this objective it is necessary to address the role of the manager in the organisation in
a broader way, e.g. rather than just in terms of appointment conditions. The responsibilities of
managers, especially in relation to the political levels, the accountability, the decision-making
and reporting structures, must be clearly defined, and financial management and mechanisms
for financial control need to be addressed as well. If not, there is a risk that top management
reform will end up as a "one man show", with limited impact on the performance of the
organisation.
iii) better coordination between public institutions
This is an objective which can be reached through top management reform. Establishing a
professional group of permanent managers selected on common qualitative criteria and
subject to common training and networking activities supporting a common corporate spirit,
will improve both the understanding for coordination and the capacity to do it. But the
administrative context must also be addressed. The permanent managers must have a defined
responsibility, an obligation to coordinate and a mandate to take decisions and to come to
agreements on behalf of the institution. In addition the government procedures for
coordination should establish preconditions for efficient coordination.
iv) improved professional continuity and development within public institutions
Since top management reform should build on the establishment of a civil service where
managers and other civil servants have permanent status and are selected on professional
merit, and whose dismissal or transfer is subject to special legislation, it goes without saying
that the professional continuity will be improved. The improved job security provided by the
legislation will support behaviour characterised by professional integrity. For the professional
development of managers and others, there should be training related to improved
management skills and to management in an improved administrative context.
v) reduced scope for nepotism and corruption
This should be one objective for each top management reform, as it should be for general civil
service reform. To meet the objective of preventing nepotism, it is necessary to select
managers on merit, using transparent criteria, communicated across and even outside the
administration. The decision-making must be shared in such a way that the immediate
superior should not be the only one to take the final decision on selection. There should either
be collective decision-making, e.g. through commissions of some kind, or the "grandfather
principle" should be introduced. This principle for balancing powers means that decisions on
selection or recruitment is formally taken at the level above the immediate superior.
Subsequently the highest civil servants or managers should formally be appointed by a
decision of the Council of Ministers or the Prime Minister.
To reduce the scope for corruption is of course a more complicated objective to reach.
Corrupt behaviour might vary from one country to another and from one culture to another.
What is regarded as a bribe in one part of Europe might be considered normal social
behaviour in another part. But at the same time certain behaviour should be regarded as
corrupt in any democratic state.
In addition to the selection mechanisms above, a clear professional role must be established
for managers and other civil servants which is based on shared values i e a public service
ethics. Incentives for refusing corruption should be built into salary schemes. Corruption
should be openly discussed, and how to fight and resist corruption should be on the agenda of
any training programme for managers. In addressing public service ethics the PUMA Ethics
Infrastructure is a useful tool. It is published in Ethics in the Public Service: Current Issues
and Practice (PUMA Occasional Paper no.14).
In order to fight corruption at the top levels of the administration, the administrative context
must be the right one. There should be a balance of powers in decision-making, justification
of decisions, transparency and freedom of information. Functioning mechanisms must be in
place for the control of the appropriateness of decisions, as well as functioning mechanisms
for correction, prosecution and redress.
Finally, if the permanent staff in an administration is subject to all these measures to prevent
corruption, it is necessary that permanent managers and civil servants also have the mandate
to act with integrity towards their political masters, to react against improper action and to
refuse participation in inappropriate decisions without risking their career or social situation.
vi) increase the public trust for the administration
Public managers at all levels have a crucial role in improving the relations between the
administration and the public and the way in which the public perceives the actions of
officials. Managers should have the responsibility, within the administrative context, to
improve the quality of the output, to improve external communications, to develop services
and to explain to the public what the public institutions are doing and why. This is necessary
also when special government communication and information programmes exist.
This important long-term, and yet everyday, task can only be pursued by managers who are
selected in a way that the public can both understand and accept. There must also be a clear
perception outside the administration that officials are selected on merit, and that they are
carrying out their professional tasks under the rule of law. It should be clear that they are the
ones found to be best suited for the job through a transparent and competitive process.
vii) attract and retain qualified individuals for management positions
This objective can be reached through introducing pay reform and permanent status, in
combination with an improved definition of the role of managers in the operations of their
institutions and in relation to their political masters. Although it is easy to define in theory the
means to reach this objective, it is still very difficult to implement them. To raise salaries
significantly for officials is difficult in times of financial constraints and budget deficits. Any
country can of course afford to raise the salaries for a very limited number of officials. The
question is then whether such a limited scope for a pay reform will have any impact on the
general performance of the institutions if the pay reform does not gradually continue down to
other levels of the administration as well.
The objective to attract and retain qualified individuals is often used as the first argument for
civil service reform or for top management reform. To attract and retain good staff is
extremely important. But rather than an objective per se, I would say it is a means to reach the
operational objectives set out under i)-vi) above.
However important the attraction and retention objective is, top management reform cannot
be carried out merely through raising salaries with everything else remaining unchanged.
Governments which aim to reform the management of public administration mainly by
increasing the salaries of a limited number of officials without changing the administrative
context, including the system for their selection and their professional role, risk ending up
with an even lower confidence of the public, and without any guarantees for improvement in
the administrative context or in the deliveries from the institutions.
It is also difficult to get acceptance from the public for a pay reform as long as it does not
perceive that officials are selected on professional grounds through a transparant and
competitive procedure.
How to carry out Top Management Reform
Permanent higher officials and managers selected on merit is an essential condition for a
successful public administration reform and for improved administrative performance in the
CEECs. It is a prerequisite for professional continuity and for depoliticization of
administrative decision-making. At the same time, the establishment of permanent top
officials implies a dramatic change of administrative and staffing procedures in more than one
CEEC, and will be seen by some as an interference in the traditional - and appreciated prerogative of politicians.
Three aspects must therefore be considered in top management reform, in addition to all
technical issues: The first is the need for a strong political commitment behind such a reform.
Without strong and active backing from the Prime Minister and from the centre of
government, a reform aiming to change the selection and management of higher officials, as
well as their roles in the government machinery, will fail.
The second is that the reform must be accepted by affected line ministers. Line ministers will
have to give up one of their most appreciated powers, at least to some extent. This must be
justified by the fact that they will benefit from this sacrifice in terms of improved quality of
the professional support they can expect within their domains. But it must equally be
understood and accepted that it will take some time before the investment in professional
managers will give full return to the politicians giving up their powers. It will take some time
before sufficient numbers of qualified managers will be in place.
The third absolutely crucial point to consider is the need for creating a system of selection and
management of managers which is transparent, and which guarantees that the individuals are
selected on their professional merit and none other. If a system is implemented without such
guarantees, the selected managers will never be accepted by political parties in opposition. On
the day when goverment will change, the new leadership might change the system and
everything will once again start from square one. There must be a political consensus and
common understanding among all important political parties that such a system represents an
improvement. These considerations are mainly of a political nature, but they have to be taken
into account.
In order to establish permanent managers on higher levels, there are a number of more
technical issues that have to be addressed, in addition to the political considerations. There are
specific needs related to the positions and to the management of the managers For managers
at lower levels, the same structures and management systems should be applied as developed
for the top managers, with possible differences in the pace of implementation, remuneration
and career management. The following needs can be identified.
Borderline political/professional positions
The first thing that needs to be done is to separate the political positions from the permanent
ones. This can be done in two ways. The first is to transform existing political postions into
permanent ones, e.g. to change the positions of, say, a state secretary or vice minister into a
kind of permanent secretary position. The second way is to keep the political positions
political, and instead introduce new permanent positions into ministries, such as secretarygenerals or director-generals.
The first option was chosen in Hungary but in my opinion is not feasible in most of the
CEECs. And the question is if it is even desirable in these countries. In all CEECs there is a
tradition of strong politicization which cannot be broken overnight. Trying to do so would
result rather in a manipulation of the system than in actually professionally selected vice
ministers or state secretaries. The fact that most countries are governed by coalition
governments adds to the need for political leadership in ministries and of political projects.
The second way is probably more feasible. It is easier to establish new functions than to try to
change traditionally political ones. The fact that ministries in many CEECs have very flat
organisational structures with heads of departments reporting directly to the political level
facilitates the introduction of one level, in between, of permanent managers. Introducing this
top permanent level would not be aimed at bringing in more red tape into the administration
but would rather be a means of ensuring "good bureaucracy" and of actually facilitating the
translation between political and permanent levels of an institution.
Establishing a new kind of permanent top position will raise a crucial problem of scope in
relation to existing political positions. What should the new officials’ responsibilities be?
How will they be able to establish themselves as a power center within structures that are used
to functioning without them? They will need support by means of clear definitions of their
functions and powers within the institutions. They will also need external support from a
central management capacity and from their colleagues in other institutions.
I think it is realistic to give the new permanent top officials responsibility for the functional
services of the organisation. They should be responsible for financial, organisational,
personnel and legal affairs within their institutions. With time they will be able to strengthen
their position within their institutions, due to their continuity. They should eventually become
a general link between the political and professional levels of the institutions, providing
professional, impartial input to decision-making, and acting externally on behalf of the
institutions.
With this kind of new high-level professional, permanent managers in place, the scope for
political staff might eventually become reduced as the role of the permanent staff or of
professional managers at lower levels will be upgraded. So instead of totally abandoning
political positions overnight, their numbers might be gradually reduced as the permanent parts
of the institutions develop their capacities and as the cooperation between the political and
professional levels improves.
Civil Service Legislation
In my opinion it is absolutely necessary to define, in public legislation, ie a civil service law,
the duties, accountabilities and rights of officials entrusted with public powers and managing
public funds. Duties and accountabilities cannot be agreed between a state institution and an
individual in a private law employment contract under the labour code. Regulations in a
general labour code are not sufficient for officials to whom the authority of the state is
delegated.
A civil service law should strike the balance between the duties and the accountabilities
implied in a public office and the rights securing the professional integrity in carrying out the
office. A civil service law should thus contain provisions protecting the civil servants from
unjustified interference. But it is equally important that a law should contain provisions
aiming to raise or safeguard the professional quality of the staff subject to the law. This is
crucial for the development of better public managers at all levels.
The primary goal of a civil service law is not to define better and safer employment
conditions for public employees. The primary goal is for the state to safeguard a certain
quality, professionality and impartiality in the performance of the administration, while
certain improved appointment conditions will become necessary means to reach the primary
goal.
Civil service laws are not yet common in the region, although the passing of such laws has
been on the reform agenda in most countries for a long time. In fact, civil service laws are in
force only in Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. Civil service laws have in addition been
passed, but not yet implemented, in Lithuania and Albania. Instead of enforcing the existing
law, Lithuania is currently drafting a new law.
No other CEEC has succeeded in passing a civil service law, although drafts exist or have
existed in most of them. There are many reasons for this, the main reasons probably to be
found in the financial situation and in the mistrust between political factions as well as the
mistrust of politicians for existing employees. The fact that many draft laws have been drafted
as labour codes for civil servants, aimed at improving their employment conditions but
neglecting the need to raise the quality of the administrative performance, has added to the
difficulties of having the laws passed.
It is necessary to pass a special legislation defining the duties, accountabilities and rights for
civil servants, if a layer of new top managers is to be established and is to function properly. It
is necessary to give them sufficient protection to be able to act with professional integrity in
traditionally highly politicised contexts. This is also necessary in order to improve the
performance of managers in the administrations in general.
Central Management Capacity
One problem with the inherited administrative structures is the lack of coordination of staffing
of the administration, and the lack of common standards for personnel management. The
fragmentation should be broken and personnel management should be harmonised within
government administrations. This calls for some kind of central capacity for the management
of the civil service. The competence and the institutional character of such a capacity should
also be defined in a civil service law. It can be a unit preparing decisions for the Prime
Minister or for the Council of Ministers. It can be a special ministry or it can be a separate
institution reporting to the Prime Minister, etc.
The civil service should be regarded as a common management function within government,
with the selection and management of the civil servants based on professional criteria and on
common standards. To issue such standards and to monitor the management within the state
institutions are important tasks for a central management capacity. It should of course not be
directly involved in the staffing of and personnel management in the government institutions.
But it should draft government regulations related to the civil service, issue guidelines,
provide advice and monitor career management throughout the civil service.
And if a new layer of top officials is introduced into an administration, there will be a need for
a central capacity both for the selection of them as well as for their career development. New
secretary-generals or director-generals should not be appointed directly by the line ministers
(cf. the "grandfather principle" above). The power to appoint should be shared with the Prime
Minister or with the Council of Ministers in a balanced way. Decisions related to these
officials’ careers should formally be taken at the centre and prepared by this central capacity,
independently from the more narrow sectoral interest.
Selection Mechanisms
The system for selection is one of the most crucial areas in top management reform, as
mentioned earlier. While a system for the selection on professional merit of civil servants in
general, and of middle managers, can be introduced without major conflicts, the system for
selection of top managers cannot. It is therefore extremely important that a system for
selection provides for transparency, and that guarantees exist that the most suitable person is
selected. If that is not the case, or even if it is perceived not to be the case, there will be
mistrust towards those individuals appointed, from both the public and from the political
opposition.
On the other hand, it must be possible to recruit individuals with a background of political
affiliation to permanent top positions, at least for the first generations of top officials. Many
top officials in most CEECs have that background. The important thing is that once selected,
political affiliation should cease and the selected manager should act in his or her work
according to civil service standards, and his or her performance should be impartially
monitored..
Decision-making Structures
As said earlier, there must be balanced power-sharing in the decision-making related to
staffing of the administration.This is necessary to really guarantee a selection on merit and to
prevent nepotism. Two principles for balancing powers could be used. One is to establish
collective bodies for the decision-making, e.g. a kind of civil service commission. The other is
the "grandfather principle", where selection and appointment decisions are formally taken one
level up. Decisions related to selection, appointment and careers of the very top officials
should be taken by the centre of government i e by the Prime Minister or by the Council of
Ministers. The two principles for balancing powers could also be combined.
In a civil service system with permanent managers and officials, it is important that decisions
related to their selection and career management do not lie solely with one person, especially
since that person will be in the position on a political mandate and for a limited period of
time.
Ten Conclusions
1. Improving the quality of public managers through selection, training and career
management, and by improving the administrative context in which they have to work
(professionalisation).
2. Defining professional top management positions and protecting the professional selection
to these positions as well as the professional integrity of the position-holders.
3. Defining the status of civil servants, and particularly the top permanent officials, in a
special law, a civil service law. The law should strike the balance between duties and
accountabilities implied in a public office and the rights provided to safeguard the
professional integrity of managers and other civil servants. The law should further strike the
balance between the professional qualitative demands on the officials and the benefits offered
to ensure that sufficiently qualified individuals will be attracted and retained. The law should
not cover officials employed in political positions.
4. Establishing a central capacity within government to ensure a common or harmonised
management of top officials and of the civil service.
5. Establishing a separate system of unified selection, appointment, training and career
development for the very top officials. This could be an additional task for the central civil
service capacity.
6. Recognising that the making of high quality managers is a broader task than just providing
them with training and improving their appointment conditions. It is equally important to
recognise that it will take some time before investments to improve the quality of managers
will give full returns.
7. Recognising that implementation of civil service reform based on a new law is a long-term
process. It should be done gradually for reasons of limited civil service management
capacities and for reasons of financial constraints. Top management reform should be
included in any early implementation phase, but reform should not stop at the top levels.
8. Recognising the need for a broad political consensus on civil service reform and especially
on a new system for selecting, appointing and developing top managers, in order to avoid
manipulation of the system and undesired changes when government changes. It is equally
important to have civil service reform, and especially top management reform, recognised and
accepted by the public as well as by other kinds of employees in the state administration.
9. Recognising that top managment reform should aim to improve both the coordination
capacity within government and the cooperation between permanent professional levels of
government and political levels. The raised quality of permanent managers should lead to an
upgraded role for the permanent levels in the government decision-making and in the
administrative process. Such improved translation between political and permanent levels
should be to the benefit of government.
10. Being pragmatic in the implementation of reform and especially recognising the need for
special transitional provisions and mechanisms in the early stages of any civil service or top
management reform.