Global Political Studies
Peace and Conflict Studies
Bachelor Thesis
Fall semester 2011
Tahrir Sq.
Location
and Goal
On Changes in the Liberal Political
Discourse in Post-Revolution Egypt
Isaac Heinrich
Supervised by: Dr. Ane M. Kirkegaard
Words: 16,422
Keywords: Tahrir Square, the Arab Spring,
Liberalism, Egypt, Egyptian revolution, MENA,
discourse analysis, opinion articles, op-eds
ABSTRACT
Liberal Arab thought has long been fighting for elbow room in the political discourse in Egypt. The
ruling nationalist–statist ideology from Nasser to Mubarak is renown for its repression of political
dissidents, and the Islamist opposition often side with the ruling elite in its resistance against liberal
reformers and democratization. Political liberalism is associated with a host of professional and
personal risks and many are silenced. The Arab Spring revolutions across the MENA from
December 2010 throughout the spring of 2011, however, seem to have revived the interest for
liberal ideas in the Arab world.
This thesis investigates the impact of the Arab Spring on the liberal Arab discourse in Egypt.
It asks whether the revolution has lead to increased opportunities for liberal Arabs to voice their
opinions, and how the tone of the public debate has been affected. A discourse analytical research
method is used to scrutinize thirty opinion pieces from two major Egyptian newspapers in the
timeframe November 2010–September 2011, on eight sample days. The work also considers 115
articles published after the revolution on the sample days to monitor the impact of the events on the
public debate quantitatively.
The study finds that the most salient feature after February 2011 in the op-ed material
examined is the forming of the “Tahrir Square discourse,” a symbolically charged ideational entity
that associates itself with liberal political rhetoric and values. It is a major influence during the
stated period affecting 77% of the 115 post-revolution articles. The Tahrir Square discourse is an
expression of a more permissive climate for voicing liberal and reform-friendly opinions, the thesis
concludes. The empirical material exhibits more profuse mentioning of and advocacy for these
values after the revolution. The tenor and rhetorical mode vary greatly in the studied articles;
despite this, a broad support for the revolution itself is present. The study, however, is reluctant as to
the permanence of these changes.
List of Abbreviations
FJP
Freedom and Justice Party (MB)
MB
Muslim Brotherhood
MENA
Middle East and North Africa
NP
National Party
SCAF
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)
Table of Contents
Introduction
1
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
1.6.
1
2
3
3
3
4
Context
Problem Formulation
Objective and Purpose Statement
Research Questions
Why Egypt?
Outline of Thesis
Background
5
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
5
7
8
Statism and Islamism in the Case of Egypt
Who the Liberal Arabs Are and What They Want
The Liberal Arab Predicament
A Discourse Analytical Approach
10
3.1.
10
12
13
13
14
3.2.
General Orientation
3.1.1.!Discourse, Knowledge and Power!
Theoretical Tools
3.2.1.!Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity!
3.2.2.!Styles: Tenor and Rhetorical Mode!
Method and Data Selection
15
4.1.
15
15
16
17
18
18
18
19
19
20
4.2.
Methodological Considerations
4.1.1.!Chickens and Eggs: a Self-Evaluation!
4.1.2.!Technical Difficulties and Solutions!
4.1.3. !Literature Critique!
Procedural Features of the Study
4.2.1.!Data Collection!
4.2.2.!Sampling the Timeframe!
4.2.3.!Data Indexing!
4.2.4.!Further Delimitations!
4.2.5.!Delimited Sample versus Complete Sample Inquiries!
Analysis
21
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
21
24
26
27
27
29
31
31
34
36
5.5.
Before Tahrir Square
The Liberal Infusion and the Birth of the Tahrir Square Discourse
Qualitative Aspects: Analytical Categories
The Yes-Men
5.4.1.!The Revering!
5.4.2.!The Liberal Reformers!
The Critics
5.5.1.!On the Political Immaturity of Egyptians!
5.5.2.!Fearing Religious Extremism!
5.5.3.!Security Concerns, the Economy and Losing Sight of Revolution Goals!
Discussion
38
Conclusion
41
Chapter 1:
Introduction
1.1.
Context
A year has passed since those defining moments around the turn of 2010 when the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region was set in motion by a series of popular uprisings that spread like
wildfire across the region. It was an unchartered and erratic trip for greater political participation
and improved civil rights, fueled by the grievances of populations in more than a dozen countries
rising almost at once against their governments. The “Arab Spring,” as it is commonly known, was
provoked by the somewhat arbitrary event of a Tunisian street vendor and graduate student,
Mohamed Bouazizi, who in protest against the dire sociopolitical conditions in his country set
himself on fire on December 17, 2010 (Reuters Dec 19, 2010). The act caused a heavy stir in
Tunisia, a country not famous for its many political protests (The Guardian Dec 29, 2010), and
produced a number of copycat suicide protests in more than eight other countries in the MENA
region (BBC Jan 23, 2011; The Guardian Jan 16 & Jan 17, 2011; Haaretz Feb 13, 2011; WikiLeaks
Jan 19 & 24 2011). The protests spread rampantly across the region1.
Despite this rather morbid beginning, Arab Spring protests were otherwise largely
nonviolent. The main grievances behind the uprisings varied locally, but included public discontent
with governance issues, high level of corruption and human rights abuse, along with reactions to the
dire socioeconomic situation in the region, such as lacking housing and basic services, rising
inflation and food prices, scarce work opportunities and poor working conditions (The Guardian
Dec 29, 2010; Jan 7 & 16, 2011; The Washington Post Feb 12 & 25, 2011). In many ways, the
protests can be regarded as the return of liberal ideas to the MENA. In Egypt, the demonstrations
rallied protesters in the millions. Tahrir Square alone, the central square in Cairo, accommodated
more than a million people for several consecutive days at the end of January (Al Jazeera English
Feb 1, 2011 a&b), briefly erupting in hostilities on February 2 between protesters and pro-Mubarak
1
Starting with insurgencies in Tunis in mid-December 2010 it was shortly followed, in chronological order, by: Algeria
(Jan 6-7), Jordan (Jan 14/28), Yemen (Jan 23/27), Saudi Arabia (Jan 23/end of Feb), Egypt (Jan 25), Lebanon (Jan 25),
Oman (Jan 27), Palestine (Jan 28), Iraq (Feb 12), Bahrain (Feb 14), Iran (Feb 14), Libya (Feb 15), and Morocco (20
Feb), Syria (Mar 15) (for an interactive overview, see The Guardian Nov 18, 2011; supporting articles Al Jazeera
English Jan 14, Feb 22 & Nov 20, 2011; BBC Jan 23, 2011; The Washington Post Feb 12, 2011). For difficulties
attending rapid and widespread social upheaval, precise starting points (indicated in parentheses above) are hard to
determine; dates are tentative and based on when revolts first made headlines in the mentioned sources.
1
supporters and security forces (ibid. Feb 2), but peaceful protests resumed shortly thereafter. Sit-ins
and peaceful marches were regularly conducted across Egyptian provinces and main cities for
several weeks through January and February 2011. The chief demands of Egyptian demonstrators
were the step down of President Mubarak and the abolishment of Emergency Law, which had
granted the administration extensive powers to strike down on political dissidents and restrict civil
rights since 1981.
The results of the Arab Spring resounds to date as we have not yet seen the end of the
revolutions across the MENA. The toll on local governments, however, can already be somewhat
tentatively established: political concessions in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Oman (Al Jazeera
English Feb 22, 23 & Apr 16, 2011), strike-down against protesters and curfews imposed in Iraq
(The Washington Post Feb 25, 2011), regime shift and civil war between government troops and
insurgents backed by NATO in Libya ending with the killing of Muammar Gaddafi in October (Al
Jazeera English Oct 21 & 25, 2011). By-elections were held in Bahrain, Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt.
Bahrain announced a second round of by-elections on October 1 due to low voter turnout, Tunisia’s
final election results were announced on November 14 (Al Jazeera English Nov 14, 2011), and
Yemen’s President Saleh announced his resignation on November 24 (ibid. Nov 24, 2011); Mubarak
resigned on February 11 and extra parliamentary elections were held in Egypt from November 28,
2011, to January 11, 2012. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has governed in the
interim period. Syria is most likely the next scene for violent Arab Spring offshoots, currently
faltering, as it were, between insurgency and civil war.
As a life-altering and cross-polity social event in the making, the Arab Spring remains to be
fully mapped out, investigated and scrutinized in academia. The absence of published scholarly
works may be noted even in the reliance on news media sources for this short introduction. This
study, although small in scope, will employ a discourse analytical approach to assess the impact of
the Arab Spring on mainstream news media in Egypt in a modest attempt to remedy this blind spot,
and contribute to what will doubtlessly consume political and social researchers for years to come.
1.2.
Problem Formulation
Arab liberal influence in MENA politics has long been a “virtual footnote in the ongoing Middle
East discourse” (Rubin 2006:11). This is partly due to the hegemonic rule of Arab nationalist and
competing Islamist schools of thought. This ideological struggle has left its mark on regional
politics and perhaps more so than elsewhere in Egypt. Nationalists and Islamists have a broader
supporter base, stronger social ties and acceptance on the ground (Islamists are particularly
2
populist), and control large media networks and political and ideological fora, notably in the case of
nationalists, the national education system (ibid. 41). Arab liberals have limited access to these
platforms and therefore face significant challenges voicing their opinions, not to mention the risks
to personal safety and livelihood for such political engagement. Egypt has a bleak record of human
rights abuse and is known for its repression of political activism (Amnesty International 2011). This
is not to say that the work of Arab liberals is insignificant: both politically and academically, liberal
Arab ideas have been much circulated in international press and scholarly works, although mainly
in English-language publications.
The efforts of Arab liberals in the MENA remains to be investigated, and particularly in the
context of the Arab Spring. This study will focus on the injection of liberal ideas in the political
debate as a result of the revolutions. It asks whether the popular revolt finds its counterpart in a
more permissive and open debate in the media. Has the ban on liberal political ideas been lifted?
1.3.
Objective and Purpose Statement
By studying the political debate in two leading Egyptian newspapers (one governmental and one
independent), I attempt to discern how the political discourse in staff written or unsolicited opinion
articles, or op-eds, have been affected by the Tahrir Square revolution.
The broader purpose of the study is to assess whether the Arab Spring poses a real paradigm
shift in the political life (and how political discourse is being carried out) in Egypt beyond the
symbolical and, perhaps, cosmetic. Does Tahrir Square mark the dawn of liberal Arab thought in
Egypt, or does it, reversely, signal the fallback of the state to the benefit of military-statist or
Islamist rulers?
1.4.
Research Questions
1. Has the Arab Spring led to increased opportunities for Egyptian liberals to voice their opinions
and for liberal political ideas to be debated in Egyptian media?
2. What change, if any, can be noted in the content and tone of the political messages that are
being voiced?
1.5.
Why Egypt?
Egypt has a prominent position with respect to Arab liberal thought. Among the twelve notable
Arab liberals that Barry Rubin mentions in the opening chapter of The Long War for Freedom, nine
3
are Egyptians (2006). Historically, it was the first Arab country 2 to introduce in the 1820s-30s the
government printing press publishing the first Arabic-language newspapers, and forming language
and military officers’ training schools fashioned on European-style academies (Cleveland & Bunton
2009:67-8). The purpose of these faculties was to train a new generation of Egyptian Arabs from all
levels in society in the European sciences and technologies that had proven so successful, especially
in warfare. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the press had become the primary medium for
political opinion and a host of newspapers of different political coloring had been established (ibid.
107, 109).
In modern times, Egyptian media has become one of the MENA region’s most influential:
its newspapers are the most widely circulated, Egypt is a major player in the film and entertainment
industry, and it was likewise the first Arab nation to have its own TV satellite, Nilesat (BBC May 6,
2011). Journalistic freedom is also among the most liberal by regional standards (ibid.). This is seen
in the surge in recent years (2000s) of independent press, starting with al-Masry al-Youm and
followed by newspapers like Al-Shorouk and al-Tahrir, and widespread use of the internet (Oxford
Business Group 2010:183; Freedom House 2007). Considering the relative freedom of Egyptian
media compared those of countries of similar political background in the MENA, that is, Syria and
Iraq, and the ease of political transition during the Arab Spring, again as opposed to its counterparts,
Egypt rises in relevance as a suitable focus for this particular inquiry.
1.6.
Outline of Thesis
In this chapter, the general background and research problem has been presented. In Chapter 2 next,
the Egyptian political setting is dealt with, and I define Arab liberalism, its ambitions and
challenges. In Chapter 3, the discourse analytical approach will be presented along with the
theoretical tools relevant to this study. Chapter 4 deals with the exigencies of data collection and
delimitation, and considers some important methodological difficulties. We will then turn to the
analysis in Chapter 5, the results of which are discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7
summarizes and concludes the study.
2
I here, right or wrong, disregard similar contemporary developments in the Ottoman Empire that, although belonging
to the same religious-cultural and geographical continuity, followed a distinctly Turkish–ethical trajectory beginning
with the Young Turks and Kemal Atatürk in the early 1900s.
4
Chapter 2:
Background
To grasp the state of contemporary Arab liberalism we need to inspect it from different angles. This
chapter has been divided into three main sections; the first provides the sociopolitical setting in
which Arab liberals have lived and acted in recent time, the second defines the term and stated
ambitions of “Arab liberalism” as intended in this work, and the last with existing difficulties and
risks connected to liberal political commitment in the Arab world.
2.1.
Statism and Islamism in the Case of Egypt
Liberal thought in the Arab countries has long been struggling against a hard countercurrent, stuck,
as it were, between statist and Islamist ideologies. In most Arab countries throughout the 1950-60s,
Arab socialism in the form of Nasserism and Baathism, commonly associated with a statist and
stout Arab-nationalistic stance, came to dominate the political life in many MENA countries,
notably Egypt, Syria, and Iraq3. Following the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, Nasser developed the
Arab Socialist Union which quickly became a dominant single-party system with a hefty
bureaucracy employing some five million workers by the late 1960s (Cleveland & Bunton
2009:318). In Syria and Iraq, Baathist one-party rule was institutionalized by Hafiz al-Asad in 1963
and Hasan al-Bakr in 1968/1977 respectively (Saddam Hussein was still second in command at the
time; ibid. 399, 409-410). The short-lived union between Syria and Egypt – the 1958-61 United
Arab Republic – was an early but rather unsuccessful attempt at pan-Arabism in practice. It failed
because of Syrian disenchantment with Nasserist Egypt dominating the politics of the union, and
rather than treating Syria as a partner quickly imposed the same single-party military regime on the
country as it had vis-à-vis its fellow Egyptians (ibid. 314, 326; Cantori & Baynard 2002:351).
Despite this, statism, socialism and Arab nationalism has become deeply embedded in the way that
these states logically function and reason, from their education systems, intellectual culture, to
government rhetoric (cf. Choueiri 2000, Groiss & CMIP 2001, Rubin 2006, Stacher 2001).
3 Arab
nationalism had begun as an ideological movement over a century earlier with Arab literary clubs and scientific
societies emerging from within the Ottoman empire in Lebanon and Syria (Cleveland & Bunton 2009:130).
Interestingly, nationalism went hand in hand with a liberal–scientific orientation at this point. The forming of the Young
Arab Society, al-Fat!a (1880-1984), is an epitome of this influence. Again in the 1940s-50s, Syria became the arena for
Arab-nationalistic enterprise with the founding in 1946 of the Arab Baath Party by Michel Aflaq and Salah ad-Din alBitar. The influence of Baathism on the more recent Nasserism is well-established (ibid. 325-326).
5
Throughout the 1960s–80s, Rutherford writes, the prevailing state ideology in Egypt was a
“sweeping conception of statism that created a vast and pervasive state apparatus” (2008:131). This
created a highly centralized statist regime that controlled the economy, polity and society, and in
which political rivals were outlawed (ibid. 132).
During the 1970s, Anwar Sadat partly abandoned the government-instituted Arab socialism
and set out on an economic and political reform program. It involved opening up to Western aid and
investment, decentralization of government, and a move away from the centrally planned economy
(Cantori & Baynard 2002:355). After the lost October War of 1973 it likewise meant reconciliation
with Israel, culminating in the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty (ibid.). For ordinary citizens,
however, this move towards economic liberalization seems to have had little effect toward
improved living standards. This caused in a renewed popular interest in Islamic principles of justice
and social order (Cleveland & Bunton 2009:382). The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) grew
considerably through recruitment from the student body of universities around the country and
some more radical organizations developed simultaneously (ibid.). By 1980, confessional conflict
between Christian Copts and militant Islamists had erupted throughout the country, and the years
1980–81 were marked by increasing political violence (Cantori & Baynard 2002:355). In an attempt
to curb the uprisings, Sadat’s government struck down hard on the assailants and ordained severe
countermeasures against persons from a broad range of different political backgrounds. Newspapers
were closed, some political parties and religious groups were banned, and between 1,000-1,500
individuals (numbers diverge, cf. ibid 356; Cleveland & Bunton 2009:382) were arrested in one
month, September 1981, alone.
Following Sadat’s assassination on October 6 the same year, Emergency Law – one of two
primary grievances voiced at Tahrir Square – was imposed. It has not been lifted entirely, even with
the resignation in February 2011 of Hosni Mubarak, Sadat’s vice president and presidential
successor. From 1984, repression of the political opposition augmented and elections became ridden
with intimidations and fraud – the “hallmark of elections under the Mubarak regime” (The
Guardian Nov 30, 2011). “These were not new practices in post-1952 Egypt, but their use by a
regime that had no purpose other than to stay in power and by a president who inspired little
popular confidence served only to alienate the public,” Cleveland & Bunton write (2009:393).
Throughout the regime of Mubarak, Emergency Law has existed as an instrument for the
government to strike down on political dissidents. At the turn of 2010, the record was persistently
bleak despite a May 2010 presidential decree to limit its application. Political prisoners in the
thousands were still in administrative detention, torture in police stations, prisons and detention
6
centers described as “systematic” and generally committed with impunity, and suppression of
freedom of expression and state censorship was widespread (Amnesty International 2011:131-4).
For this reason, Islamism has only gained in public appeal in Egypt since the decline of Arab
nationalism at the end of the 1970s. The officially banned, but overtly operating and broadly
supported MB is a telltale example of this. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that religion has been
described as “the only uncensored public expression in most Arab countries” (Ghabra 2004 in
Rubin 2006:32). Islamists, furthermore, are often accused by liberals of playing into the hands of
ruling regimes by opposing liberal democracy and thereby keeping the system’s goals intact (ibid.
57). The recently concluded (January 2012) Egyptian by-elections – a direct outcome of the popular
Arab Spring revolution – turned out a massive victory for Islamist parties, the MB’s Freedom and
Justice Party (FJP) winning 47.2% and the ultraconservative runner-up al-Nour, an even more
fiercely Islamist party, secured 24.3% (BBC Jan 21, 2012). Islamists have likewise been successful
in post-revolution elections in Morocco and Tunisia this fall (The Guardian Nov 30, 2011). This
outcome strengthens the argument that Islamism is a force to be reckoned with in the Arab world.
Despite the recurring periods of turmoil over the past thirty years and the sometimes
strenuous dynamics between statism and militant political Islam, Cantori & Baynard note that,
“Egyptian political culture […] has remained relatively constant” (2002:357). We will next turn to
define the role and ambitions of Arab liberalism in the MENA.
2.2.
Who the Liberal Arabs Are and What They Want
In this work, the word “liberal” and “Arab liberalism” is related to classical social liberalism. As
Bruce K. Rutherford explains, “Egypt’s liberal tradition incorporates the core principles of classical
liberalism: a clear and unbiased legal code, the division of state powers into separate branches,
checks and balances among these branches, and respect for basic civil and political
rights” (2008:32). The political implications of this position are many, as Barry Rubin, in his book
The Long War for Freedom, exemplifies:
This book defines [liberal Arabs] as people who support one or more of the following concepts:
multiparty elections, parliamentary democracy, human rights, women’s rights, a more tolerant
interpretation of Islam, rapprochement with the West, and peace with Israel […] [It] may also include
additional ideas such as the diversification of the economy, a higher emphasis on toleration of other
cultures, and opposition to terrorism in principle. (2006:3-4)
Given that this definition is broad-brushed and perhaps lacks a bit of analytical clarity as a result, it
is nevertheless this encompassing but distinct “entity,” or discourse, I am interested in. The reader
7
should therefore note that what is designated has less to do with party politics or the particular voice
of any one school of thought, but with a cluster of ideas expressed by different actors. One
condition is of course that we disregard the “dishonest liberalism” of regimes who only pay lip
service to democracy and human rights to veil de facto authoritarianism, so common for the MENA
(ibid. 4; Schnabel 2003:36).
So what do liberal Arabs want? As just mentioned, I have associated liberal Arabs with the
pursuit for improved civil rights and freedoms. Increased political participation by members of
society together with transparency and accountability in electoral affaires and political processes
logically follow this position. This, however, is no piecemeal undertaking in countries were the
implementation of democracy and human rights, despite their enshrinement in constitutions and
legal codes, are “often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately disregarded” (UNDP 2002:2 qt. in
Schnabel 2003:34). In many Arab countries, democratization is systematically de-prioritized for
security reasons (Rubin 2006:62; Abu Jaber 2003:132); Arab states many times exhibit amazing
regime stability. This is true for Ben Ali’s Tunisia, Gaddafi’s Libya, Mubarak’s Egypt, al-Asad’s
Syria, the Hashemite Jordan and, prior to his deposal, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. As Albrecht &
Schlumberger somewhat punningly remark: “What we should investigate is therefore not the
‘failure’ of democracy, but the ‘success’ of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North
Africa” (2004:373). We may therefore easily appreciate that what Arab liberals actually impose on
their governments and societies is nothing short of revolutionary:
After all, the main changes the reformers advocate involve abandoning the ruling doctrine and ending
the regime’s educational-cultural monopoly (which validates the existing intellectual elite); reducing
high military spending (which keeps the armed forces happy); breaking up the statist economy (which
enriches the regime and its followers); putting corrupt civil servants and human rights violators in jail
while firing the incompetent (thus threatening the government bureaucracy); and holding fair elections
(which will throw the current rulers and political elite out of power). (Rubin 2006:45)
2.3.
The Liberal Arab Predicament
Political activism in Egypt comes with a hefty price tag and particularly so when the values one
maintains run counter to state ideology. Liberals who openly champion their ideas are admittedly
few, in part due to the dramatic consequences of such political engagement: “Arab liberals are
indeed under siege, and that’s putting it mildly. [They are] fighting to retain the last foothold that
liberal values still have in the Arab world” (Abdulhamid in The Daily Star Aug 31, 2004 qt. in
Rubin 2006:8). The Egyptian Government is known for its intimidations and reprimands against
8
journalists and bloggers (Oxford Business Group 2010:184; Amnesty International 2011), and even
after the political transition in 2011, several individuals have been litigated, fined and/or imprisoned
on defamation charges and/or for disturbing peace and security (Reporters Without Borders, Sep 10
& Nov 16, 2011).
Those that do not succumb to the fear of summary arrests, and mistreatment and physical
abuse while in penal custody additionally have to face the dilemma of just getting one’s point
through. Arguably, nationalists and Islamists have far more followers and have been vastly more
successful in dominating the political discourse through the various information channels they
control (Rubin 2006:11). Moreover, threats to one’s safety, career and livelihood, and the safety,
careers and livelihoods of friends, associates, and family is not a negligible influence. Smear
campaigns are often launched against liberal reformers, and people have been barred from working
and expelled from professional organizations (Rubin 2006:55, 61). The “central pillar of the
system,” according to Rubin (ibid. 45), is the use of conspiracy theories: “Xenophobia has always
been one of the Arab regimes’ most valuable tools, with the anti-America and anti-Israel cards as
the aces in their hands. In the Arab world, patriotism is the first refuge of scoundrels, who defend
their privileges by denouncing reformers as traitors” (ibid. 62; cf. Groiss 2001, Heinrich
2011:32-34).
Consequently, Arab liberals are often silenced (threatened, defamed or simply not published)
due to lack of political mandate and exclusion from different communication channels. It remains a
fact that most of Egypt’s five-hundred or so newspapers and magazines are controlled by the
government (Oxford Business Group 2010:183). While the surge of new and critical independent
newspapers after the 2003 launch of Al-Masry Al-Youm itself is a sign of improved conditions for
Egyptian publishers, editorial and journalistic self-censorship remains a great obstacle to free
political expression (Grant 2008). Similarly, Egyptian media (television, internet) and the academic
world remain largely unaffected by liberals. One way to evade domestic repression and censorship
is publish one’s work abroad, generally in English-language journalistic and academic literature.
This however aggravates the scarcity of liberal historical and ideological works available to a
predominantly Arabic-speaking-only public (ibid. 39).
Others, still, have paid the highest price for their ideals. Incidents of disappearances, deaths
in custody and death penalties against political dissidents have been commonplace throughout
Mubarak’s regime (Amnesty International 2011:131-4).
9
Chapter 3:
A Discourse Analytical Approach
Discourse analysis is a methodological and theoretical approach to social analysis that has been
developed intensely over the past forty years. In its modern form, it is commonly attributed to
Michel Foucault (e.g. Fairclough 2006:37; Phillips & Jørgensen 2006:12; and Garrity 2010). This
chapter builds on the work of recent protagonists like Norman Fairclough, James Paul Gee and
Phillips & Jørgensen. For reasons associated with the closeness of theory and method in discourse
analysis, they will here be described conjointly, whereas the methodological concerns particular for
this study will be dealt in the next chapter (“Method and Data Collection”). First, I will provide a
general orientation to discourse analysis and then review the analytical tools of the approach
relevant to this study.
3.1.
General Orientation
Discourse analysis, simply put, is the study of “language-in-use” (Gee 2011:8). Rather than
representing a particular theory or methodological approach, it is a theoretical stance based on a set
of ontological and epistemological claims related to social constructivism. “Discourse analysis is
just one among several social constructionist approaches but it is one of the most widely used
approaches within social constructionism” (Phillips & Jørgensen 2006:4; cf. Weiss & Wodak
2003:12). Discourse analysis recognizes that language use is a social practice with substantial
implications for how the world is and can be perceived. To understand why, we need to look at how
discourse analysis conceives the term “discourse.” The notion is used quite differently in different
academic cultures. Between Habermas definition of discourse which focusses on communication
and intersubjectivity and Foucault’s archeological description of the term which ponders how it is
possible to meaningfully talk about anything at all, there is a gulf to traverse, as Garrety (2010:194)
points out.
Fairclough, whose work is guiding in this study, applies the term in three different ways. In
the most abstract sense, he defines discourse as “language use as a social practice” (Phillips &
Jørgensen 2002:66). Discourse analysts view language as mutually constituted of information,
action and identity (Gee 2011:2). When we express ourselves on a topic, the act of speaking has an
10
intended audience and a message that aims to achieve some kind of result or action. Moreover, the
things we say and do by saying them to a varying degree involve the enactment of identity. These
identities are embedded in the language used to transmit them. The focus on performance and other
physical, emotional or cognitive implications of language, and how social realities in turn affect the
choice of possible topics and the language used to reflect on or modify these realities, makes the
social practice definition meaningful. Secondly, discourse is the “kind of language used within a
specific field” (Phillips & Jørgensen 2002:66), like politics, the media or everyday conversations.
Each field carries within a certain “lingo” and a way of representing and enacting a certain role or
identity. The terminology and tone of a physician or a layperson discussing public health is quite
different, as is speech addressed to a child from that addressed to adults, official correspondence as
opposed to private conversations, PR buzz talk, chat language, and so on. The potential for
specialized forms of language, so-called social languages (Gee 2011:28) or genres (Fairclough
2006:126-7), are almost infinite.
The third and most concrete definition of discourse is “a way of speaking which gives
meaning to experiences from a particular perspective” (Phillips & Jørgensen 2002:67). Consider
Gee’s definition:
I use the term “Discourse”… for ways of combining and integrating language, actions, interactions,
ways of thinking, believing, valuing, and using various symbols, tools, and objects to enact a particular
sort of socially recognizable identity. (2011:29)
Being a lawyer, for example, presumes not only a way of speaking, but to a way of dressing,
composing oneself and a palette of attributes and attitudes. Showing up for work in baggy pants and
a baseball cap would certainly raise a few eyebrows, indicating how easily social roles can be
transgressed. Fairclough proposes that discourses have three key elements: the identity, relational
and ideational function (Phillips & Jørgensen 2002:67). In addition to indicating the role and
identity of the elicitor, language defines social relations. The same person may be addressed “Mr.
Cane,” “Robert,” “Bobby,” “dad” and “honey” depending on the relation one maintains with the
designee. Moreover, wording, tone and attitude to that which is expressed may point to sets of
values and beliefs shared or contested by the speaker and his or her intended audience, again
defining the relationship between the producer and consumer of the information. More
fundamentally, all language usage is linked to systems of human knowledge and meaning, the
ideational element. To meaningfully state any claim – and here I wish anew to draw the reader’s
attention to Foucault’s archaeology – the things we say or write need to be consistent with socially
agreed upon perceptions of reality, that is, they need to be built on shared experiences, whether
11
facts, phenomena or values, that resound with the expectations of the recipient to make sense. In
this way, all statements contain elements of historically antecedent statements and knowledge that is
itself enmeshed in and “stored” as contemporary discourses. This is referred to as intertextuality
(Fairclough 1996:102), where “text” from a discourse analytical perspective is taken to mean any
form of written or spoken language, or mix thereof. Both in the case of text production and
consumption, that is, interpretation, the sociocognitive processes that are in play are largely
unconscious and automatic (ibid. 80). Discourse analysis acknowledges and stresses that discourses
are evolving and transient (even the most persistent [mis]perceptions, e.g. that the earth is flat, do
change over time). As such, discourse is an important form of social practice that both reproduces
and changes knowledge, identities and social relations over time (ibid.).
3.1.1. Discourse, Knowledge and Power
Having outlined some fundamental ontological claims of discourse analysis, we will now look at
the epistemological implications in the case of social research on power. Discourse analysis and
social constructivism enshrine the trinity of language (discourse), knowledge and power; they are
interested in the ways discursive practices reproduce existing relations of knowledge and power
(Weiss & Wodak 2003:12-15). The postmodernist venture, of which constructivism and
poststructuralism are part, is adamant in its critique against the empirical positivism of
Enlightenment scientific inquiry (Mouffe 2005:13). The ethical knowledge, or knowledge
emanating from the ethos (self), it professes is counterintuitive to the scientific–epistemic
knowledge created by positivism (ibid. 14). It assumes a “fundamental unity of thought, language
and the world” (ibid. 17). This critique of rationality suggests that knowledge is historically and
socially situated and opens up for research into the hermeneutical, ideational, and discursive.
Knowledge, by this token, is subjective rather that objective, because, “knowledge and
representations of the world are not reflections of the reality ‘out there,’ but rather are products of
our ways of categorizing the world” (Phillips & Jørgensen 2002:5). Discourse analysis thus takes a
particular interest in the relationship between language and knowledge, and how this knowledge is
embedded in, and used to reinforce, manipulate or challenge existing distributions of power.
Power is about relations of difference, and particularly about the effects of differences in social
structures. The constant unity of language and other social matters ensures that language is entwined
in social power in a number of ways: language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where
there is a contention over and a challenge to power. Power does not derive from language, but
language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and
long term. (Weiss & Wodak 2003:15)
12
As this research aims to discover the way(s) in which political discourse pre- and post-Tahrir
Square has evolved to reflect on the changing power structures in Egypt, it seems befitting to
employ a method that enshrines this dialogical language–power paradigm at its core.
3.2.
Theoretical Tools
Many theoretical concepts used in this study have provisionally been defined earlier in this chapter.
The following two sections will briefly elaborate on the most relevant.
3.2.1. Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity
Two ideas in the critical discourse analyst’s palette will be much used in this work, what Fairclough
terms manifest- and constitutive intertextuality, the latter of which is also known as interdiscursivity
(Fairclough 1996:102). We have established that all “texts,” spoken or written, draw on other texts
and discourses to make sense to the interpreter, that is, they are informed to a varying degree by
other systems of knowledge and meaning. Texts are therefore “inherently intertextual” (ibid.). There
are several ways in which a text reflects on, alludes to, incorporates or embeds other discourses and
knowledge. Manifest intertextuality, henceforth simply intertextuality, indicates that the borrowing
is explicit. In his work, Fairclough deals with five instances of this type: discourse representation,
presupposition, negation, metadiscourse and irony (ibid. 118-23). Each in their own way directly
refer to utterances made by other people. Discourse representation can be, but is not limited to
direct quotes; it has to do with reporting what someone else has said. Presupposition are taken for
granted propositions by the text producer; the compound phrase “the Islamist threat,” for example,
assumes that such a threat exists. Negating something naturally implies that someone else has
previously stated the contrary. Metadiscourses arise when the author distances him/herself from
parts of the own text to comment on or differentiate various levels of the narration, treating it as if it
were an external text. Paraphrasing, metaphors and hedging belong to this subfield. Irony, finally, is
traditionally taken to mean “saying one thing and meaning the opposite.” It may express a negative
attitude towards, criticizing or ridiculing, something someone else has stated in the person’s own
words. This form has interesting implications on the intersubjectivity of producer and interpreter
since it a) assumes shared attitudes to that which is expressed, and b) depends on the interpreter
being able to recognize the irony, taking the meaning to be antithetical to that which is expressed.
If intertextuality highlights relations between texts, interdiscursivity can be seen to more
broadly address, “relations between discursive formations or more loosely between different types
13
of discourse” (ibid. 47). However, it may equally apply to cases on textual level where the reference
to other texts is indeterminate and implicit (ibid. 124).
3.2.2. Styles: Tenor and Rhetorical Mode
I have already dealt with social languages or genres above. Genres are commonly associated with a
particular style, although alternatives exist (ibid. 127). An op-ed genre, in this case, is most
commonly related to a formally written texts with the purpose of relating to and politicizing some
contemporary event. There are, of course, several ways this can be done. The terms tenor, mode and
rhetorical mode address variations in style of written or spoken language of any specific genre.
Tenor, first, addresses the relationship between interlocutors, which can be “intimate,”
“casual” and so on (ibid.). In this work, it is likewise taken to mean the tone and attitude of the
message communicated. Mode, in turn, applies to the particular form of the text, if it is written,
spoken or a combination (i.e. written-as-if-spoken etc.). In my case, all articles are simply written
and the analysis will not deal with this particular aspect of style. More significantly, rhetorical mode
is used to classify texts according to the exposition of language, such as “argumentative,”
“descriptive,” “explanatory” and so on (ibid.).
14
Chapter 4:
Method and Data Selection
Having outlined the methodological and theoretical stance of this research, we turn to the
practicalities of the study. The first section in this chapter treats some methodological and technical
challenges resulting from the choice of method and research topic, and how these were met. I then
turn to the procedural details of the method, such as selecting scope and timeframe, indexing and
delimiting the material.
4.1.
Methodological Considerations
4.1.1. Chickens and Eggs: a Self-Evaluation
Working with a meta-theory such as discourse theory, it is easy to lose oneself in its theoretical
complexities. The researcher may unwittingly, and perhaps as a result of simple causation, “create”
the discourse that s/he is investigating through the research focus and personal categorizations
(Kirkegaard 2004:48). As a researcher, it is easy to topple into the pitfalls of this chicken-and-egg
causality, arriving at research outcomes that are nothing but consequences of the research strategy,
the active choice of sources and data, selection of analytical tools and definition of concepts.
Perhaps I myself am guilty of such “ingenuity.” Having chosen Rubin Barry as my main theorist on
Arab liberalism, and my reliance on his definition of the term, naturally frames this study. Putting
liberalism at odds with Islamism as I seemingly have in the Chapter 2 is another example, and one
that I do not consistently subscribe to at that 4. For the terminology I have chosen to identify or name
discourses in the op-eds investigated in this study, it should follow that these are by necessity representations of ongoing political discussions in Egypt through the conceptual lens of the author,
that is, me. Their validity must be weighed against the strategy employed to define them. For this
reason, the following chapter aims to clarify the process of data collection and delimitations thereof,
and to describe the research strategy.
4
There is no immediate logic to the claim that political Islam cannot function liberally like many Christian–Democratic
parties in the West have (cf. Stacher 2001:84).
15
4.1.2. Technical Difficulties and Solutions
An initial and lingering challenge presented itself in the data gathering for this study. Libraries
commonly keep catalogues and archive back issues of news media on microfilm or hardcopies and,
increasingly, as scanned PDF:s. In addition, they have access to various public databases, such as
Library Press Display. Perhaps naively, I believed that leading Egyptian newspapers would be
easily availed; Egypt has a long intellectual and literary history and I pictured the interest for
Egyptian news media would be warm outside the country. Given the research aims (Chapter 1), it
was imperative to access articles as they were presented to the Egyptian public in the original
Arabic language. Newspapers traditionally have farther reach than internet-based news sources, so
it was important to get hold of original paper issues of the journals (web versions of some major
Egyptian newspapers had proven to be slightly different from the printed versions on an early
inspection). The process, as it turned out, took more than a month to complete during which I
contacted various local and international database administrators, library staff, newsrooms and even
a few Egyptian freelance journalists. The literature list (section “Databases and Library
Catalogues”) will reveal the extent of this information search. In the end, I settled for scanned
PDF:s of printed originals available through the web archives of the two studied newspapers but
with adjusted timeframe (see 4.2.1. below).
As a consequence, I had to modify my initial idea to study one state-run (Al-Ahram), one
independent (al-Masry al-Youm), and one more “radical” independent newspaper (al-Tahrir or alDustour), simply because it proved too difficult to acquire originals of the latter (al-Masry alYoum’s online data archive coincidentally crashed during the information collection process).
Instead, as a deserving runner-up the selection fell on Al-Shorouk, an independent newspaper that
was remarkably favored during the revolution: its circulation had doubled to 150,000 a day by
March 2011 (the Guardian Mar 10, 2011). Al-Ahram, the biggest state-run newspaper in Egypt, has
a circulation ranging from 300,000 to 900,000 copies on weekdays and over a million on Fridays
according to the Oxford Business Group (2010:183). Real circulation figures for state-run press in
Egypt seem hard to establish, however: one media analyst claims Al-Ahram weekday circulation to
be closer to 140,000 (the Guardian Mar 10, 2011).
With the choice of newspapers settled, I sampled the timeframe for the study (explained in
4.2.2.). This however resulted in 133 op-eds to cover, creating another methodological dilemma. In
qualitative studies large selections of empirical data will necessarily affect the analysis negatively.
Qualitative studies have a tendency to inflate, generating more data than one initially starts out with.
It becomes difficult for a single person to retain so much information while at the same time
16
preserving a coherent overview of the material, and chances are important points are lost. This
difficulty compelled me to employ quantitative methods to organize and delimit the material. These
are described below (4.2.4.)
On a final note, I wish to discuss the consequences of poor adaptation of right-to-left (RTL)
languages in many word processors. For my computer of choice, there are limited resources to
manage Arabic script. The Arabic language consists of 28 consonants, which can be written in two
to four conditional forms. The letter t!’ (“t”), for example, is drawn in four distinct ways depending
on its position in the word (initial, medial, final or isolated = in reverse: ! "#$% "%&$% "%'). This creates a
cursive style of writing whereby each letter of a text is merged typographically into compound
words. Most word processors, however, cannot reproduce this morphology: Office 2011 for Mac
cannot link Arabic letters at all (!), whereas iWorks do in only certain fonts:
The words “the Arabic language,” “()*+,-. (/0-.,” turn into “!"#$%&' !(&&'” as a result.
In the first (correct) instance, I had to change the Times New Roman font to Times or Helvetica. In
addition, the use of Arabic letters in the preceding paragraph disconnected the default tab stop in
this section and I had to insert a first line indent manually. Furthermore, the text cursor (|)
disappears in Arabic script, making editing of already typed Arabic text a painstaking task. For
these and other formatting disadvantages, I have chosen not to include original Arabic quotations in
the analysis and instead translate directly to English. While this affects the means to control the
accuracy of my translations, I have likewise offered a careful and systematic index of the material
(“Appendix I: Opinion Article Index”) that may guide the studious reader to the cited text in the
source material. For the non-Arabic-speaking audience this choice should be inconsequential.
4.1.3. Literature Critique
Whereas much of the literature used in this study is uncontroversial, that is, established academic
works or scientific databases and reference literature, there is likewise a high dependency on news
media sources to be noted (see “Sources”). The explanation for this is that the Arab Spring, due to
its overwhelming scope and recentness in history, is still being examined by scholars of various
backgrounds. Academia, it seems, is still to “catch up” with the new realities in the MENA.
Because of the current lack of scholarly works to base this research on, I have turned to online news
media to trace the Arab Spring, and to inform myself Egyptian conditions and events throughout
2011–12. The use of several major news agencies to get a combined impression should to some
extent counter the negative effect of these sources on the overall reliability of this study.
17
4.2.
Procedural Features of the Study
4.2.1. Data Collection
Data collection has been dealt with in some detail in subsection 4.1.2. above. Having decided on AlAhram and Al-Shorouk as my primary empirical data, I set out to determine the days which were to
be covered. To avoid selecting days of news drought some key dates were chosen. Originally, these
were June 6, 2010 (the day of the murder of blogger Khaled Saeed whose death became a symbol
during the Tahrir Square demonstrations), February 11, 2011 (Hosni Mubarak’s resignation), and as
close to parliamentary by-elections of 2011 as possible (in my case September 2011 when the data
was gathered). Since no archive material was available for June 2010 (another technical dilemma),
the first annual commemoration in 2011 was selected, and the starting point became the November
2010 elections.
Secondly, a newspaper’s political profile is generally defined by its editorials and opinion
pages. Since the political discourse was targeted these became my primary focus. However, the two
newspapers studied had no clear editorial page, or only did so on selected days, why I determined to
look exclusively on the op-eds.
4.2.2. Sampling the Timeframe
The material in this study has been chosen through a semi-randomized sampling technique
employing both stratified random sampling and purposive or non-probability sampling (cf.
Chambliss & Schutt 2006:97, 101). The fixed dates in this purposive sampling were February 11
and June 6, 2011; the rest were generated through random sampling in the four strata (months)
through Random.org website. The site offers random number sampling based on atmospheric noise
rather than number algorithms conventionally used for random sampling (Random.org). One day in
February and June 2011 and two days in November 2010 and September 2011 were randomly
sampled creating the following timeframe:
Stratum
Day 1
Day 2
1: November 2010
14
5
2: February 2011
11*
19
3: June 2011
6*
15
4: September 2011
4
27
Table 1. Time Sample (*preselected)
18
4.2.3. Data Indexing
As the third step in the inquiry, it was necessary to index the data collected by creating a
spreadsheet database of op-ed material (available as “Appendix I: Opinion Article Index” at the
end). Index letters were uniquely given to each of the eight issues (sampled days) of Al-Ahram (A to
H) and Al-Shorouk (O to V). It was then an uncomplicated task to identify individual op-eds by
page and article number (starting top to bottom of page, right to left in agreement with Arabic
writing customs). Through this process, an overview of the material was gained while
simultaneously creating a practical referencing system for the analysis. Instead of a bulky “AlAhram Feb 19, 2011, page 7:1” the reference is replaced with the index “D7:1,” where the letter D
indicates newspaper source and date. Please view coding key in Appendix I and Table 2 (Chapter
5) for further information.
4.2.4. Further Delimitations
The compiled op-ed material from the eight dates altogether comprises 133 articles. Inevitably, I
had to limit the material further and intended to do so by setting a word range limit. Having an
interest in longer texts where the author has the opportunity to develop his or her arguments, I set
this range to 750-1000 words, the lower figure corresponding to a common word limit for op-eds
(cf. The New York Times n.d.; Sourcing Journal Online n.d.). Word limits vary between newspapers
but many editorials accept contributions exceeding these limits for consideration, some up to 1,200
words (The Op-Ed Project n.d.; Communications Consortium Media Center n.d.). The Washington
Post specifically asks for 750-1000 words (Columbia University 2010:6) providing the limits also
for this study.
While theoretically a straightforward task, Al-Ahram’s collected PDF material turned out to
be saved as a non-searchable image rather than text/image file, making any attempt to search or
extract words from the documents impossible. Even in the case of Al-Shorouk, copy-pasting text
passages into word software proved overwhelmingly complicated since spaces and some special
Arabic characters turned out as indecipherable icons (and needed to be deleted one by one). Even a
fairly sophisticated OCR software like Readiris Pro with Arabic language support could not perform
the translation to word file for any of the newspapers.
Again in this somewhat troublesome data collection and delimitation process, I had to resort
to a creative though unorthodox solution. Both newspapers use a similar font that turned out in both
cases to be two millimeters in my printed copies. I thus measured the height and width of eight
articles, four from each newspaper, and counted the number of words manually. This allowed for an
19
approximation of word per square centimeter (cm2) text (please view “Appendix II: Average Word
Calculation” for details); I then measured the remaining articles and estimated number of words
based on that average. Through a final strike of luck, not only did thirty op-eds turn out in the
defined range – a manageable amount – but fifteen from each newspaper.
4.2.5. Delimited Sample versus Complete Sample Inquiries
This study primarily considers the “Delimited Sample” – the thirty articles within the 750-1,000
word range that will be scrutinized using discourse analysis. Nevertheless, I have benefited from the
(133 article) “Complete Sample” when determining the impact of the Arab Spring on opinion pieces
from February–September 2011 (section 5.2. in “Analysis”). The complete sample was manually
scanned for references to the revolution (keywords like “Tahrir Square,” “the January 25
Revolution” or “the Demonstration of the Millions”) to assess how much of the Complete Sample
was affected by the event. Each article mentioning the revolution was marked once and percentages
could be established.
20
Chapter 5:
Analysis
This chapter begins with an assessment of the empirical material from November 2010. The
following sections deal with developments in the political debate after the overthrow of the
Mubarak regime and ceding of power to the transitional military government, during which time the
future political trajectory of Egypt was thoroughly debated; first through the lens of the revolution
supporters and reformers, then the more reluctant or critical. This organization of the chapter also
lends the presentation a certain chronology, as will be explained.
As a guide, please view Table 2 over indexes used for referencing throughout this chapter.
Date
Al-Ahram Index
Letters
Al-Shorouk Index
Letters
nov 5, 2010
A
O
nov 14, 2010
B
P
feb 11, 2011
C
Q
feb 19, 2011
D
R
jun 6, 2011
E
S
jun 15, 2011
F
T
sep 4, 2011
G
U
sep 27, 2011
H
V
Table 2. Referencing Guide!
5.1.
Before Tahrir Square
On November 28, 2010, regular Egyptian parliamentary elections were held. Front page stories in
both newspapers on the fifth and fourteenth are concerned with the electoral run. Main concerns are
the National Party’s (NP) candidature (e.g. A1:3>A7:2; B1:1), the refusal to enlist Islamist
candidates, and the imprisonment of several MB candidates (e.g. A1:3>A7:1; O1:5>O4:1; P1:2).
Al-Shorouk discusses the UN statement that Egypt is a “democracy without rotation” (O1:2). Both
Al-Ahram and Al-Shorouk include articles on threats against Egyptian Copts by al-Qaeda (A1:1;
O1:3) in connection with the organization’s attack on a Catholic church in Baghdad on October 31
(al-Masry al-Youm Nov 1, 2010).
21
Op-eds during this time refer intertextually to these events. “The Criminal Mind...Threatens
Egypt” by Editor Usama Soraya, making first page headlines, is a vindictive debate article, its
language resembling that of the Arabic rhetorical form ta"r#$ (“agitation” or “incitement”). Its
opening statement illustrates this tone:
Stay safe O Egypt from each treacherous and cowardly villain. Stay safe O Egypt with all your
Christian and Muslim [people] from each conspirator that does not know your destiny and unaware of
your [value]. (A1:1)
The dramatic language in this passage is underscored twice by the address “O Egypt,” evocative of
ecclesiastical texts and poetry. The convention to incite and fend oneself through conspiracy
imagery noted previously (2.3.) is seen in the “treacherous villain” and the “conspirator,” this time
directed at al-Qaeda. He continues: “the criminal mind hits the safety of Muslims [with] lies and
calls for extremism” but, he asserts, “these terrorists do not know the true Egyptian human
alloy” (A1:1), referring to the assumed resilience and brotherhood between Egyptian Muslims and
Copts.
The article is more than a call for unity among the ranks against al-Qaeda, as later passages
reveal:
Today we recognize the reality of policies and decisions taken in Egypt to protect its unity and security
[…] Some days ago there was a decision to close several satellite channels that frequently had
transgressed and for which we have been very patient. Many of us went on to explain this in light of
the upcoming elections, not realizing at the time that many of these channels had sunk into the depths
of the fitna […] Today we recognize how much these satellite channels with their poisons and devious
intentions represent a real threat to all Egyptians, and today we recognize also just how false some
media practices were for exploiting the freedom in our country.
This segment is replete with intertextual and intersubjective implications. First, the elections are
mentioned by name; we see how they play a direct role in contextualizing some contemporary
interpretations of the closure of (mainly religious) satellite stations. However, in refuting this
standpoint, defending instead the official position that the act was motivated by a genuine concern
for national safety and integrity, the author interdiscursively sides with another unmentioned party:
the government. For it is the government who authored the “policies and decisions” mentioned in
the first sentence, and who banned the broadcasters. Second, intersubjectively, there are two
coexisting self-identifications, two distinct “we:s,” in this text (compare “today we recognize” and
“many of us”). On closer inspection, these actually designate an “us” and “them.” The “many of us”
directs an implicit accusation against the critics, the others, who were too quick in the mind of the
author to blame the government for interfering in elections.
22
So who is this “we” that has been patient with the satellite stations and that has come to
recognize the appropriateness of government decision-making? The readers of Al-Ahram? Us, the
Egyptians? Partisans of the NP or the government itself? The rhetoric of this piece is normative
both in the way that the author fashions himself as the spokesperson for a political grouping, and in
the priority he gives to his “truth,” dismissing opponents as unaware (“not realizing”). And who are
the others? The subject matter itself implicates not only al-Qaeda, but the Islamist bloc in general,
and the MB are most certainly included; they were likewise complicit in spreading their “poisons”
through the closed stations. Adding to this association is the use of the term fitna, meaning “trial” or
“temptation,” a religious reference to the division of Islam into Shiism and Sunnism with
connotations of secession and upheaval. To be sure, the article is more than a warning against
extremism; it is likewise a call for unity and siding for the “home team” in the upcoming elections.
Characteristic for op-eds from this time is the ambiguous narration and roundabout way of
stating a case, especially in the selected articles from Al-Ahram. Both the dispute over historic
interpretations in “The Man Who Pronounced Egypt’s Defeat in the October [War]” and the Coptic
Pope Shenouda’s piece “Effects on the Mind and Thought” (B10:2) and are examples of
indeterminate texts with several possible interpretations. In the latter, Pope Shenouda initially talks
about how the human intellect and feelings are interconnected, how the mind influences the heart
which then may grow into will and action. At first, it seems like a philosophical or spiritual piece;
he mentions how feelings affect both the conscious and unconscious, highlights the importance of
reading and talks appreciatively about the education of women. He urges readers to tend to the
integrity of their intellect.
Verily, God has created you with two ears. In a symbolic way, in order to listen to one point of view
and […] the point of view of the other, and not depend on one idea only […] Rather, focus your mind
on what you hear, welcome what is beneficial, and reject what harms, and don’t make your mind
dependent on your ears, that is, don’t be [overly] receiving and don’t believe everything that you hear,
but examine everything. (ibid.)
The first two clauses seem to call for more tolerance and openness to other’s opinions. In the third
clause, however, he dissuades readers against being too naive. The intertextuality is subtle, though:
there is no passage in the article as such that indicates what this warning refers to. The upcoming
elections and the closing of satellite channels, as well as al-Qaeda intimidations against Copts could
foreground this piece. To underline this vagueness, the article then discusses the effect of music on
the mind.
23
As a contrast, one op-ed, “Distortions of Egyptian Political Life as Shown in the Parties’
Electoral Programs” published in Al-Shorouk on November 14, 2010, is particularly outspoken. The
article, written by the Research Director at the Carnegie Center in Beirut, champions many liberal
ideals, among them the need to revise the electoral system, both legal and procedural, to improve
political pluralism and secure fair elections, and increase political participation on a societal level
(P14:1).
During these past few days, the ruling NP has presented its intended and excluded candidates and
absurdly [listing] more than one candidate per electoral seat, conclusive evidence of the continuing
systematic distortion and failure of modernization efforts led by its General Secretariat and the
Secretariat of Policies to convert it into a “normal” political party. (ibid.)
In “normal” situations, the author claims, candidates for government compete with members of
other parties for electoral seats, not with candidates from their own ranks. He also criticizes the NP
for its “absolute silence” on the topic of a possible repeal of the Emergency Law.
As for Egypt, and in its distorted political life, the possibility for rotation of power is lacking, and
everyone knows in advance that the results in elections will not alter the NP’s dominance in the
People’s Assembly. (ibid.)
The author does limit his critique to the ruling party, but likewise comments on the MB program,
stating that while it addresses current economic, social and political conditions, it offers little
alternatives; it is “satisfied with rhetorical generalities and unsupported analyses” (ibid.).
Having limited space to develop what is in reality a complex and initiated political analysis,
suffice it to say that the break from the obscurity of other contemporary op-eds and open advocacy
for political liberalism presents an exception in the sample. Next, we will begin to study the impact
of Tahrir Square on these conditions.
5.2.
The Liberal Infusion and the Birth of the Tahrir Square Discourse
There is a similarity to be noted between the Tahrir Square demonstration slogans and some core
liberal ideals (view 1.1. & 2.2.). The Arab Spring may just represent the infusion of political
liberalism into the popular discourse in the MENA. “There is a new appreciation for liberalism in
the Arab world after the revolution” (Liberal International n.d.). While the political significance of
the revolutions is still to reach its denouement, there is little doubt that the discursive impact of
Tahrir Square in Egypt is exceptional. Of the 24 op-eds in the Delimited Sample published after
February 2011, all but two (S11:3; V11:3; both concerned with the Palestinian application for UN
membership – neither expresses liberal values why they have been omitted in the analysis) relate in
24
some way to the events at Tahrir Square. To better appreciate just how pervasive the synonymous
phrases “Tahrir Square,” “the January 25 Revolution” or “the Demonstration of the Millions,” along
with other references to the revolution have been since February 2011, I turned to the Complete
Sample of the empirical material (listed in Appendix I). Table 3 summarizes the result of this
examination.
Date
Mentions
Total Articles
Percentage
feb 11, 2011
16
16
100%
feb 19, 2011
16
18
89%
jun 6, 2011
18
21
86%
jun 15, 2011
15
22
68%
sep 4, 2011
15
22
68%
sep 27, 2011
9
16
56%
Total
89
115
77%
Table 3. Mentions of Tahrir Square Demonstrations in Sample
Out of 115 articles in the sample published from February 11 to September 27, 2011, 89 contain at
least one such reference, whether explicitly discussing the revolution and the effects thereof, or
mentioning the events as a way to contextualize an adjacent debate. While not claiming any
statistical accuracy for which a substantially larger sample size and measure frequency would be
necessary, the percentages indicate that Tahrir Square, in its various appellations, has received much
attention in the political debate in post-revolution Egypt in the two newspapers studied. As late as
September 27, 2011, Tahrir Square is still discussed in a majority of op-eds in the sample, although
this influence is diminishing with time elapsed since the revolution, decidedly so after mid-June.
The results are graphically presented in Pictures 1 and 2.
25
100%
20
75%
15
50%
10
25%
5
0
11-Feb 19-Feb 6-Jun 15-Jun 4-Sep 27-Sep
Mentions
Total Debate Articles
Picture 1. Mentions per Total Op-Eds! !
0%
11-Feb 19-Feb 6-Jun 15-Jun 4-Sep 27-Sep
Percentage
Picture 2. Percentage Mentions over Time
25
We may hence conclude that various authors have interpreted, analyzed, commented on, and
debated the spring events in different attempts to understand the forces and processes in play, and
the direction of the popular movement. For reasons related to the psychological, symbolic and
iconographic meaning that Tahrir Square has in the minds and hearts of many Egyptians – in the
words of one columnist: “If the revolution has become associated with the famous square ‘the
Liberation,’5 this is a significant match pointing to the connection between the location and
goal” (F10:5) – I will term this major influence the birth of the Tahrir Square discourse.
5.3.
Qualitative Aspects: Analytical Categories
Turning again to the Delimited Sample, we will begin to assess how political commentators in
different ways address the revolution, and how this has affected the liberal discourse in Egypt. To
deal efficiently with the material, I have categorized the material according to existing differences
in genre, rhetorical mode and tenor as my choice of method bids, and, for the 22 articles dealing
with Tahrir Square, attitudes toward the revolution. The following categories and modalities were
identified:
Genre
Op-ed
Obituary
Style
Attitude to Revolution
I. Tenor:
Laudatory
II. Rhetorical mode:
Advocating
Supportive
Conditional support
Critical
Argumentative
Unclear/ambiguous
Apprehensive
Critical
Historic-ideational
Expository
Table 4. Analytical Categories: Genres, Styles and Attitudes and Their Modalities
It should be clear that there are several ways in which the different categories and modalities in
Table 4 can be combined. That being said, there is a strong connection between supportive voices
for the revolution and a laudatory tenor, for example.
It is noteworthy with regard to genre that among the op-eds were two obituaries, one dating
to November 14, 2010, (B10:3) and the other June 15, 2011, (F10:2) both in Al-Ahram.
Furthermore, no one article in the sample expresses opposition to the revolution or tries to defend
the Mubarak regime. However, at least one article (D10:4) is too ambiguous to be neatly rendered
as pro or con. Articles expressing conditional support is a major grouping and one that deserves
5
M#d!n at-Ta"r#r is commonly translated in the media as “Liberation Square”; the word al-ta"r#r (“the liberation”),
however, is the verbal noun of the Arabic verb "arrara: “to free” or “liberate” – it refers both to the result and the
action, i.e. “liberation/liberating.” With this in mind, we may better appreciate the wordplay and symbolism engrained
in the name.
26
extra attention. I will discuss variations within this camp in section 5.5. But first a word on the
supporters.
5.4.
The Yes-Men
In this section I attempt to depict the supporters of the revolution. A much recurring idea in the
material is the equation between Tahrir Square and liberal vindications, such as the need to improve
civil rights and liberties, for democratic transition and reform. Insofar as different writers are
positive to the revolution, they would hence be supportive of these values. There is an element of
time to be noted: the enthusiasm is at its highest early on (although exceptions exist; e.g. F10:5).
Indeed, all quotations in the next subsection were taken from February 2011.
5.4.1. The Revering
I was honored in the past week to walk behind the promising youth of Egypt in their demonstrations
demanding the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and his regime, which culminated on Tuesday in the
Demonstration of the Millions. (Q12:2)
The article entitled “Quantitative and Qualitative Aspects of the Cairo Demonstrations of the
Millions and its Implications” from February 11 tries to gauge the number of demonstrators at
Tahrir Square from January 25 onwards, and to depict the diversity of backgrounds among the
congregated. Intertextually, it both reports and negates national television estimations saying the
crowd “did not exceed 15,000” (ibid.), the author’s own calculations suggests 2.3 million “at a
minimum”; ten million including Alexandria and the provinces. The author, a sociology professor,
who initially presents himself as a “nonpartisan adversary of Mubarak and his regime” (ibid.)
expresses his revere (“I was honored”) for the young protesters.
Of the seven respondents in his miniature study only two claim to belong to any political
party, the left-wing nationalist Nasser Party – four describe themselves as liberals and one as leftist.
Whether the intentional wish of the author or not, depicting this particular background of the
protesters suggests whom he believes the revolution “belonged to”: the youth, the liberals, the
leftists. Weighing in the support and respect the author expresses for these youths, likewise hints at
the political persuasion of the author. The perception that the revolution had a liberal impetus is
commonly shared among writers in the study, as we shall see more of.
Note how the revolution is described as “their demonstrations.” This dissociation from the
young crowd at Tahrir Square is interesting. The metadiscursive element in the distancing thirdperson pronoun their is seemingly at odds with the fact that the author himself clearly took part in
27
and supported the demonstrations. Obviously, people of varying age groups were present among the
millions as, if nothing else, the same story about the professor and his engineer friend testifies to.
Perhaps the author’s twin-ambitions to participate, a result of his political convictions, and to study
the event, a vocational pursuit, leads to a confusion of his roles as “protester” and “sociologist.”
Certainly the latter would call for a more abstract language usage. The rhetorical mode is
argumentative.
The sociologist is not alone in equating the revolution with the youth. Another columnist
writes on February 19:
At a time when we bow with respect for the Youth of the January 25 Revolution, we, who exceed them
in age, owe them an apology […] We thought that they didn’t have the desire nor the capacity for
studies and achievement, as if we imagined them [to be from] Al-Madrasat al-Mushaghibin [School of
Scoundrels] […] These young people have truly surpassed us both in their ability to communicate, and
their potential to organize and unite. Who gave them such courage and the initiative and willingness to
sacrifice, even when hundreds of them had fallen as martyrs and thousands [were] wounded and
injured, who weren’t intimidated by the Central Security Forces or the cowboy attacks in the [Tahrir]
Square, or the F16s passing over their heads in a desperate attempt to show strength and spread panic?
[…] How were they overcome by this spirit of brotherhood, friendship, and solidarity [that] faded
enmities, melted differences, and swept aside doctrines? (R13:2)
The tenor in this excerpt is deeply venerating: “we bow with respect,” he describes the youth as
“courageous” and “willing to sacrifice,” and compares them to his own generation (they “have truly
surpassed us”). The author also blames himself and his generation for having underestimated the
young Egyptians (“we owe them an apology”), with an amusing reference to the famous Egyptian
comedy film and theatre play School of Scoundrels from the seventies. The students of the play,
starred by some of Egypt’s most beloved actors, are spoiled, unruly and disrespectful towards their
teachers and headmaster, more concerned, as it were, with attracting the opposite sex than academic
achievements. It is burlesque and funny, and suggests that the author of the op-ed wishes to humor
his audience. The article is less formal in tone, but contains several points of self-critique directed at
the older generation.
The entry of the Government and its designated role in the last clause of this passage
illustrates a second way for the author to side with the protesters: he lashes out against its use of the
military to disperse the crowd. The undertone is belittling, he calls the attempt “desperate,” meaning
perhaps futile and ineffective; at best, we may interpret the statement as an overdue effort. The
Government strategy backfired, however: the protesters “weren’t intimidated.”
28
Another highly laudatory piece comes from Kevin Rudd, Australian Minister of Foreign
Affaires:
These past days, Australians have shared the ecstasy of the democratic transition which has happened
in Egypt. We salute the sacrificing courage, dedication and determination that millions of Egyptians
have demonstrated to achieve change. Without regard for personal interests, they wanted to find a
better future for Egypt, where the energies, creativity and talent of the Egyptian people would flourish,
especially its youth […] When I visited Egypt last December I was impressed like other visitors by the
greatness of the ancient civilization which continues to live in its people today. (D10:1)
Again, the tone is flattering (Egyptian protesters are described as “courageous,” “dedicated” and
“sacrificing”; Egyptians are “creative” and “talented”). The intention to rapprochement between
Australia and the new, developing leadership in Egypt is unquestionable (“Australians have shared
the ecstasy”; the Australians “salute” the protesters). It is a diplomatic piece with little apparent
incentive other than presenting an affirmative stance towards (advocating) the democratic transition
and liberal efforts to reform Egyptian society. It evokes on a number of occasions Egypt’s long
history to account for its preeminence in modern times, as the last sentence shows. The article ends
with the following passage:
The whole Arab world knows that Egypt is the Mother of the World. The unique pride of the Egyptian
people for their homeland and the commitment to its supremacy is based on a civilization that has
lasted five thousand years. During the last weeks, Egyptians have shown that Egypt, by its culture and
people, will remain immortal after the Pharaohs and famines and even presidents. (D10:1)
There is a sense of “cultural destiny” in his wording: Egyptians are poised at the summit of a
historical continuum stretching thousands of years back in time. The liberal revolution, we might
presume, is the natural and destined progression of this trajectory.
5.4.2. The Liberal Reformers
We now turn to examples which more explicitly deal with the subject matter of this thesis. Writers
of different backgrounds in both newspapers studied often restate the link between Tahrir Square
and liberal values such as democratic reform, social justice, and improved civil rights. The tendency
to equate Tahrir Square with these values is persistent throughout the material, as hinted at
previously. The next quote, taken from the opening of an advocating op-ed recommending steps to
foreign policy reform, is hopeful and appraising in tone:
The great White Revolution that was led by the Youth of January 25 and in which all social groups
participated is a defining historical moment and it will always remain a guiding light illuminating the
road for all peoples of the world … We are at the beginning a new stage that everyone hopes will bless
29
Egypt with good governance, true democracy, respect for human rights, and equality for all without
any form of differentiation or discrimination. (R12:2)
Liberal ideas are firmly established in the passage. Note also the encompassing pronoun
“everyone,” implying that the author in some way reports, mirrors or assumes the role as
spokesperson for what he believes to be the will (“hope”) of the masses. Written on February 19,
almost a month had transpired since the first major demonstration (January 25), Mubarak had
resigned and his government been dissolved; political trends must certainly have been seen to be
playing into the hands of the reformers. Again, we note a sense of “destiny-in-the-making” in the
words of the author (“a defining historical moment … illuminating the road for all peoples of the
world”).
Several debaters in the sample similarly contextualize advocacy in various sectors by
foregrounding Tahrir Square and the urgent need for thoroughgoing amendments and reform. The
recommendations aim at improving political coherence, transparency and accountability, fighting
corruption and “respecting the will of the people” (Q13:5); reforming the constitution and electoral
system (S10:2; U11:3; R12:2) and foreign policy (ibid.) and framework for municipal governance,
their function, elections, and control mechanisms to ensure just appointment of officials and
governors, and to reduce corruption (U10:2); amending the legal economic framework, in particular
the law of shareholding between the government and private sector which has led to “recurring
plundering practices and monopoly harming the nation’s and citizens’ interests” (E10:2), and
opening up for a competitive economy; educational development and strengthened student and staff
democracy, freedom of scientific educational organizations, staff counseling and training (F10:5);
and, finally, addressing the funding crisis of NGOs, especially those concerned with civil and
human rights, and to create a unified and clear vision for the future (U11:1). It should be clear from
this summary that the reforms suggested in the various articles encompass local, national and
international politics and governance issues, jurisprudence and the rule of law, the economic and
educational system, and the social sector. The reform-willingness is certainly as comprehensive as
Barry Rubin (2006:45) projected it would be. In all these prescriptions for the future of Egypt, we
are faced with liberalizing forces at play.
Insofar as the revolution has become associated with these liberal ideas and values, the
profuseness of the Tahrir Square discourse following February 2011 (as discussed in section 5.2.),
and the broad support thereof, indicates that something momentous has happened in the frequency
and manner that liberal political ideas are debated in Egyptian news media. To better appreciate
how the Tahrir Square discourse has affected various strata within Egyptian society, we shall turn
30
the page to discuss some both critical and concerned voices, and how debating Tahrir Square can
lead to different interpretations and implications for the future.
5.5.
The Critics
A second major grouping in terms of attitude to the revolution is the conditionally supportive. The
reason for this classification has less to do with sanctioning the revolution per se – its protagonists
are generally positive to the popular movement and endorse its maxims of freedom, civil rights and
democratic transition – rather, they share a concern for the outcomes and possible setbacks. These
spokespersons vary between the critical and apprehensive in tenor. Divided thematically, these
articles express:
• Critique against the political immaturity of Egypt as a polity with negative implications for the
political reform process (5 articles)
• Critique against sectarianism, particularly Islamism, and warnings against confessional
divisions, Islamist takeover in elections, and the negative effect this would have on revolution
goal achievement (3 articles)
• Warnings against the deteriorating economic situation, breakdown of security and implications
for revolution goal achievement (2 articles)
5.5.1. On the Political Immaturity of Egyptians
Coincidentally, three articles discussing the possibility of backlashes due to insufficient political
training and experience appear in Al-Shorouk already on February 11, the day of Mubarak’s official
resignation. This critique is directed not only to the youth of the revolution, but to Egyptian society
at large. Entitled “Symptoms of the Failed Political System,” “What Do the Egyptians Want?” and
“Who Owns the Future of Egypt?,” these articles discuss the problem of long-standing democratic
deficit in the country and its effects on citizens’ capacity to deal with the extraordinary events
happening in their country.
Of the three articles, the last is the most positive and appraising, but it also presents some
independent variables that need to be met for the successful realization of the revolution:
Despite my wishes that the future of Egypt exclusively belongs to the remarkable young people that
filled our sky with hope and our souls with new lust for life, reality forces us to say that Egypt’s future
depends on, first of all, the consolidation of political powers in all its forms, partisan, popular, and
people of all communities, and to overcome narrow interests and the desire for small victories while
forgetting the bigger picture […] It also depends on the ability [of the new political power] to be
31
subject to review after the stabilization of the situation, and to purge itself from all corruption and
elitism and isolation from the real street, and its honest belief in democracy as a practice and not a
slogan, and freedom and justice for all. (Q13:5)
The author, a political scientist, seems to ask for forbearing and tolerance of its readers (“to see the
bigger picture”), to overcome political discord and fighting for “narrow” sectarian interests. Among
the political powers in Egypt he surprisingly elicits three popular powers, indicating that this
address, and the political consolidation the author envisions, starts with the citizenry. In the last
sentence, indirect critique against the former regime (“purging itself of corruption and elitism”
presumes that these are characteristic of past rulers) appears in conjunction with liberal advocacy.
The insincere liberalism of Mubarak’s regime is highlighted (democracy should be “practiced” not
be a “slogan”). Isolation from the “real street” is another creative elaboration on the catchphrase the
Arab Street (the public opinion in the Arab world), which again draws attention to the grassroots
nature of the popular uprising and the perceived alienation of political leaders from their supporter
base.
Others, however, are less optimistic about the ability of ordinary Egyptians to refashion their
country along democratic lines, and unite socially and politically. An independent researcher writes:
Civil society and the political culture are among the most important features of a healthy political
system, and civil society and the political system are responsible for teaching the people how to
express their political differences and to accept the plurality of opinions and antagonisms […] Very
unfortunately, the current crisis in Egypt has amply proven how the system has worked to destroy all
foundations of political knowledge among the people, even the educated. (Q12:4)
She motivates her statement as such:
The biggest problem is that most of the members of these two teams are new to politics and many of
them [have never read] political analyses and have no objective foundations, rules or documentation
for their claims […] Most of them cannot explain what they mean by “the political system.” (ibid.)
The political immaturity of most Egyptians (“newness to politics”), in this argumentation, is both
sociopolitical – a result of an “irresponsible” educational system and civil society – and personal;
even at the most basic level (defining “the political system”), individuals lack schooling and
experience to make informed analyses, making the prospect of sound decision-making to reform the
system an enterprise with little chance of success. Whereas Mubarak’s thirty-year reign receives
most of the blame for this, the political opposition is equally complicit for not having articulated a
viable alternative:
32
The lesson learned is the erosion of the level of education, information, culture and political
expression of Egyptians, and we may not forget that the political opposition has contributed to this
decay when its expression of dissent […] was reduced to exposing ministers on holiday. (ibid.)
She also warns against political parties “free riding” (ibid.) on popular sentiment in attempts to
exploit the success of the revolution to further their own partisan or sectarian goals. “Mubarak’s
system has lost its credibility and so has the opposition parties,” the article concludes.
The highly critical tenor noted here is repeated in the third article from the same day. “What
Do the Egyptians Want?” builds on the author’s background as a professor of Middle Eastern
history, who approaches the problem in seven points of critique covering most sectors of Egyptian
society, the first two with its citizens:
First, the events show an unwillingness of sectors of the Egyptian people to carry the burden of
change. It seems that the Egyptian people had believed that the revolutions would last a few days and
then they would reap the fruits of success, but history tells us that revolutions usually is a long series
of hits-and-runs in which many victims fall and causing heavy losses. (Q13:1)
The author recollects the French Revolution, which “lasted nearly ten years, and which killed
hundreds of thousands of French” (ibid.). He hints at a naivety or presumptuousness on part of the
Egyptians for believing victory would come cheap.
History since 1952 reveals that Egyptians have not yet decided on the legitimacy of singular autocratic
rule. So when some demonstrators raise pictures of the former dictator to bring down the present
dictator, which has occurred, it is a comical and sad paradox, clearly indicating a serious weakness in
their political culture which makes them unable to refuse autocratic rule. (ibid.)
The inability of Egyptian demonstrators to come to terms with their dictatorial past is mirrored in a
“comical and sad paradox” that shows their lack of awareness; the farcical depiction lacks neither
humor or biting indictment. Sympathy for Mubarak, the author further says, shows that some
sectors in society are unable to see the president as a civil servant rather than “the father of the
people” (ibid.). The argument that the relationship between past regimes and despotism needs to be
recognized and studied is echoed in an article on June 6 (S11:4).
The historian does not limit his critique to the people and the former regime, however, but
also castigates the religious establishment: “Most of the Islamic religious leaders who didn’t behave
like tongue-tied devils favored the system directly or indirectly” (Q13:1). The Coptic church’s call
for its followers not to support the revolution, he says, is a “dangerous sanctification of
sectarianism” (ibid.). In his final paragraph, he scolds Egyptian intellectuals for warning against
“rushes for power” in the absence of a government, echoing a much-used justification of Mubarak’s
government to attack regime critics, “a clear indication of the capitulation of that elite to the
33
exclusionary discourse of the Mubarak regime” (ibid.). The article ends with two rhetorical
questions:
Finally the Egyptian people are entering a new era of political pluralism […] So is the Egyptian people
capable of carrying the burden of freedom and democratic practices? […] Secondly, is the Egyptian
elite of different orientations capable of accepting the results of resorting to the people, whatever these
may be, or will they change into an elite that imposes guardianship on the people and replaces the
police state with another totalitarian ideology so we will be like someone who seeks protection from
the frying-pan in the fire? (ibid.)
It should be clear from selected material from these articles that the authors are not opposing
the revolution nor its aims. On the contrary, the transition is welcomed and the tone is appreciative
of liberal values (e.g. “Finally the Egyptian people are entering a new era of political pluralism”).
This pioneering critique against Egyptian political phenomena could be regarded as instructive
attempts to deal critically, even satirically, with the past. In the last quotation, nevertheless, the tone
is apprehensive; the author warns against new forms of guardianship and totalitarianism.
5.5.2. Fearing Religious Extremism
Somewhere in June articles start to appear to comment on the upcoming elections, while at the same
time building on Tahrir Square events. “The Constitution First” (S10:2) is an argumentative piece in
favor of immediate constitutional and electoral reform before the by-elections, directly referring to
both discourses in a case of manifest intertextuality. While ostensibly defending a liberal position,
the article likewise includes several points of criticism directed at the MB and Christian factions: “I
don’t understand why the MB perceives this demand [of constitutional reform] as directed
specifically against them, though the nature of logic requires fixing the constitution before the
parliamentary election, which cannot be executed unless on the basis of the former?” (ibid.). The
MB is spreading rumors, the author claims, that the purpose of the Constitution First movement is
to change Article II of the constitution, which states that, “Islam is the religion of the state, and the
Arabic language is its official language. The principles of Islamic law are the chief source of
legislation” (Egyptian Government Portal 2011), before they are elected to parliamentary majority
(although the author himself doubts they will win).
[The MB] plays on the strings of religious intolerance in a blazing reality for narrow political gains.
Because Article II determines a fact that cannot be changed, which is that the majority of Egyptians
are Muslims and differences in political orientations and pluralism does not lead to change in beliefs in
accordance with the charges by Sobhi Saleh who announced that the Brotherhood does not recognize a
liberal or secular Muslim. The Christians […] are holding on even more to this article […] because it
34
ensures that they can turn to their own laws in the Personal Status Codes rather than referring [their
cases] to civil courts. (S10:2)
On September 4, Al-Ahram publishes a highly critical expository article that treats “the
ridiculous power display” (G10:7) of Salafis in Tahrir Square and al-Arish, Sinai, on July 29, 2011.
The Salafi demonstrations lasted over nine hours and involved setting cars aflame and escalating
gunfire, in which several police officers and civilians were injured and killed. In al-Arish the local
police station was attacked (ibid.). BBC implicates MB participation in the Islamist rally (Jul 29,
2011). Raising banners proclaiming the Islamic Emirate of Qurayshi and waving Saudi flags “did
not go unnoticed” the columnist says (G10:7).
It is well-known that some neighbors hate the word democracy and can’t stand hearing it, and do not
want the citizens of their states to live under its tenet [lit. “umbrella”] […] With all that they can
muster […] these have been active to prevent the construction of a democratic system in Egypt.
(ibid.)
He accuses these states of “sabotaging democratic efforts” in Egypt (ibid.), and asks to what
methods these forces will resort if they are denounced power in the elections. There is certainly a
heavy incrimination to be noted (e.g. “democracy haters” fighting “with all they can muster,” even
“sabotage”). His argument builds on a regional power balance analysis:
...the forces of radical fundamentalism of the Salafis and others like them contribute, knowingly or
not, to defending the ruling regimes in some neighboring states that saw the democratic spring, the
dignity, freedom and human rights in the Arab world – especially in Egypt – as a threat to them. (ibid.)
The description continues with some eyewitness details about the event as such; the author is
affronted by the meager attempts to stop the violence:
It is not known with certainty why the attackers continued firing intensively for nine consecutive hours
[…] During these long hours, no force actively intervened against these attackers, no force even
intervened to bloc the attackers’ ammunition supply which allowed them to continue firing until three
in the morning. So now: what is the message? (ibid.)
Of course, the question is all but rhetoric. It implies the complicity of Egyptian security forces and
police and pointing to an objectionable lenience of the SCAF, which was the main political
authority responsible for securing peace and public order at the time. As a singular analyst in the
sample to spell this out, he concludes that, “The January 25 Revolution opened the door to all these
dangers, because if there hadn’t been a revolution, these radical Islamist political forces wouldn’t
have emerged this way” (ibid.). The article ends with an ominous question whose gravity would not
be lost to the Egyptian secular reader: “Is that which we are witnessing a part of a larger scheme
35
that we haven’t yet realized?” This author, unlike the last example in the previous section (5.5.1.), is
certainly more distressed about a possible Islamist takeover in the November parliamentary
elections but also, it would seem, about the consequences if they failed to secure enough seats.
5.5.3. Security Concerns, the Economy and Losing Sight of Revolution Goals
Also in June, there is an increased concern for the economy and the breakdown of security around
the country, and this is mirrored in two articles in Al-Ahram.
It seems that attention has not yet [been given] to the [stifling] economic conditions that [may] lead to
economic paralysis or face a cycle of violent crises if all attention continues to be directed at the
political aspects in aftermath of the overthrow of the system. (E10:2)
After this quite dramatic introduction, the author’s tenor is then moderated slightly although he
retains his foreboding tone. “We should not exaggerate the danger of the economic situation, which
has led some to say that Egypt is on the verge of bankruptcy, but at the same time we should not
underestimate the dangers of what is happening in the economic arena,” he continues (ibid.). The
article presents some of the underlying factors for the recession, among them the breakdown of
security.
Similarly, an argumentative article on June 15 states that:
If we accept that the economic system and economic conditions in any state represents a solid base
that affects the formulation of the concept and elements of social justice, and that provides a climate of
freedom, it is possible for us to understand the implications of the state of lawlessness and chaos that
surges over the Egyptian Street today, its inevitable impact on the economic situation, and, in turn, on
the [possibility] to achieve the noble [revolutionary] goals that Egyptians are looking forward to.
(F10:6)
At the very beginning of his article, the author connects notions such as “social justice” and
“freedom” with a stable economy. However, the disruption of peace and security in Egypt has
enforced a state of emergency in economic affaires, ultimately to the detriment of the people’s
revolution. More detailed in its argumentation, and at the same time more encompassing in its
warnings, this author identifies four overarching threats to internal stability: persisting factional
demonstrations and sectarian clashes, the pervasiveness of thuggery and the breakdown of security,
which alone is “the most important entryway to stability” (ibid.). He supports his argument by
pointing to some distressing figures: production speed has declined by more than 50%, export rates
have dropped 40%, and a lack of revenue from tourism has risen to 80% by this time (ibid.). The
economic significance aside, he takes an interest in the social implications: poverty has jumped
from 45% before the revolution to circa 70% including those under the poverty line and the
36
destitute, and unemployment increased to four million, of which 45% have higher education (ibid.).
All figures are the author’s; he does not state his sources.
Here the question itself arises how it is possible, with a situation like that, to realize the goals of the
revolution of social equality, freedom, and democracy in that structural order of the interrelated
priorities? Because the holistic and integrative relationship between these three fundamental goals, the
golden rule lies in the provision of social equality for all without discrimination through which we free
the will that represents the true entrance to a democratic culture and [making] the right choices. An
imbalance in this equation will eventually produce the reverse goals of the revolution, and the freedom
and democracy becomes a luxury that a capable minority practices, forbidden for the majority of
disadvantaged. Hence, the freedom and democracy of the poor is to avail for them the minimum
required for a decent life. (ibid.)
The author envisages the future of liberal democratic transition in Egypt to be depending primarily
on the provision of social equality, to ensure the other two priorities, freedom and democracy. The
“democracy-as-commodity” argument in the end inadvertently paraphrases the warning against new
forms of guardianship of a previous author in this analysis (5.5.1.). Evident in the article’s focus is
the author’s social commitment leading him to return repeatedly to the conditions of society’s
disadvantaged. Although he meta-discursively positions himself outside “their” revolution, he
persistently expresses warm feelings for its “noble goals.” Little wonder then that he fears the
subversion of these objectives.
37
Chapter 6:
Discussion
Tahrir Square, in its multiple material, symbolic, ideational and discursive forms, represents for
many observers a sociopolitical surge of liberal ideas in Middle Eastern politics, in Egypt and
elsewhere. Core contentions at the square, as noted, are similar to those of classical social
liberalism; slogans such as freedom, democracy, social justice, civil rights, coupled with demands
for constitutional and legislative reform to safeguard these interests, are but a few examples. The
widespread support for the Tahrir Square demonstrations on a popular level has reverberated amply
in the media. In fact, the most clearly distinguishable Egyptian discursive event of last year is the
formation of what I have called the “Tahrir Square discourse.” A clear majority of post-revolution
op-eds studied in this work deals with the revolution; close to 92% (22 of 24) of the Delimited
Sample, and 77% of all op-eds in the Complete Sample depart intertextually from the revolution.
For reasons most likely associated with declining newsworthiness, the discursive influence of the
revolution seems to have diminished over the year, but the impact is, nevertheless, substantial. This
dominance has several dimensions that need to be considered:
First, that whether applauding, criticizing or warning for negative implications of the
revolution, almost every author cited in this study, directly or not, equates the revolution’s goals
with contentions known from social liberalism. I therefore argue that the Tahrir Square and liberal
Arab discourse in Egypt, at least for most parts of last year, have become synonymous and integral.
Second, many openly express support for these values and the revolution. This is clearly the
position by those who favor liberal reform, but it is true for most critics as well, some of who are
fervent liberal spokespersons. Their argument is based on a legitimate – considering developments
throughout the year – and profound concern with the outcomes of a movement that is spearheaded
by a group of young, inexperienced, and perhaps too idealistic individuals against notable
reactionary forces, both religious and social conservative, who are better equipped and better
organized to take advantage of the situation, and under conditions, as latter examples in the analysis
draw attention to, that are all but conducive to stability and orderly democratic processes.
Third, the comparably smaller allotment of articles discussing liberalism and liberal values
during the November 2010 electoral and other contemporary debates indicates a shifting political
interest after Tahrir Square, with attending alterations in political analyses and inclinations. Again,
38
no statistical veracity is intended, but my argument is based on changes above all in tenor and the
stated concerns of these articles compared to the post-revolution debate. And while it may seem a
necessary truth (with great political transformation comes great reactions, both material and
discursive) it carries within several questions that are in part evoked by the empirical material and,
in part, by events that have transpired in the transition period since revolution, which brings me to
my fourth and last point:
Previously in the analysis, I have highlighted how several actors have benefitted from the
relaxed environment after the revolution to present comprehensive liberal reform initiatives,
coinciding of course with an increased openness to precisely this type of political ideas. We have
likewise seen how an event like this, as in the case of the Australian foreign minister, can be
exploited to strengthen or build new diplomatic ties. For many reasons people may be tempted to
bandwagon in the face of such impressive popular mobilization. We may indulge ourselves for a
moment in envisioning what would happen to a political commentator who in February 2011
publishes an article defending Mubarak’s regime; in all likelihood, it would amount to nothing less
than professional suicide. It is precisely this one author fears when she warns against “free riders.”
An illustrative example in this context is MB’s formation of the Freedom and Justice Party in midFebruary, less than a month after the first major demonstration at Tahrir Square; the title overtly
signals a link between the revolution and the party. No doubt this is a strategic choice. A leading
MB figure, Essam al-Arian, self-consciously tells al-Masry al-Youm reporters: “When we look at
the revolution’s slogans, such as ‘freedom,’ ‘social justice’ and ‘equality’ – all of these can be found
in Islamic Law. This revolution is calling for what Islamic Law calls for” (Feb 23, 2011). In the
same article, an anonymous source tells al-Masry that if internal MB disagreements were not
resolved a second party would be formed – the Reform Party – twice underlining the unintended
irony.
Inevitably, we must accept that this interpretation of contemporary events, the revolution, its
paroles, is not only possible but even from a moderate Islamic point of view, uncontroversial. Islam,
to be sure, embodies all these values, albeit with its own understanding of the content and meaning
of the words. The key issue here is that in all the op-eds studied in this work, no-one promotes the
idea of an exclusively “Islamic” revolution. This is underscored by the often repeated assurance by
commentators in the sample that the revolution is, in its very nature, nonpartisan (be it liberal or
leftist) and incorporating the wishes and political activism of all sectors of society and “sweeping
aside” political and religious differences (e.g. Q12:2; R12:2; R13:2, section 5.4.). Indeed, in several
articles published through the year there are vindications, perhaps subtle warnings, against the
39
“highjacking” of the revolution (note e.g. D11:1 “The People’s Revolution Cannot Be Stolen!!”;
V11:1 “On the Abduction of the Arab Spring”). Given the delicate and volatile sociopolitical
dynamics of Egypt, as explained in the background chapter of this thesis, the revolution truly
“opened the door” to this kind of sectarian exploitation, as the one author puts it (G10:7, subsection
5.5.2.).
The questions arise: could the cited political commentators have been mistaken? Were the
supposedly liberal slogans of the revolution actually the voices of thousands of MB supporters in
the country? Or did these simply masquerade as saviors ex post facto? The humble results of liberal
parties6 in the 2011-12 Egyptian parliamentary elections as opposed to the FJP landslide victory,
outnumbered even by the ultraconservative Salafist al-Nour Party 7, challenges many conceptions –
and confirms many fears – expressed in the aftermath of Tahrir Square.
6 Altogether
16.2% or 81 parliamentary seats, shared by New Wafd Party: 7.6%, the Egyptian Bloc: 6.8%, Reform and
Development Party: 1.8% (BBC Jan 21, 2012).
7
FRJ secured 47.2% or 235 parliamentary seats alone; al-Nour 24.3% (BBC Jan 21, 2012).
40
Chapter 7:
Conclusion
Trying to gauge the impact of the Arab Spring on the political discourse in Egypt, this thesis has
reviewed a selection of 133 Egyptian op-eds from November 2010 to September 2011, thirty of
which have been studied in detail using a discourse analytical research method. The main interest
has been to discern if and to what extent Egyptian liberals have been favored by the political
transition in the form of increased opportunities to voice their opinion publicly, something that
traditionally has been associated with high personal and professional risks.
The study concludes that the most salient feature after February 2011 in the Egyptian
material examined is the forming of the “Tahrir Square discourse,” a symbolically charged
ideational entity with several prominent characteristics:
• The discourse is formative in the sense that it frames and contextualizes separate discussions
and reform initiatives on politics, from the local to the international; jurisprudence and the rule
of law; governance issues such as electoral procedures, political transparency and
accountability; the economic and public education system; the social sector and grassroots
activism
• It is unified in its critique against the former Mubarak regime; however, commentators diverge
in attitudes to Islamism and the gradual advances by MB throughout the year; another
substantial strand within the discourse is self-critical and reserved regarding the revolution’s
chances for success
• It is significant in the sense that it dominates or influences most articles written in the sample;
77% of the Complete Sample and 92% of the Delimited Sample
• Most importantly for the aims of this study, it associates itself with liberal political rhetoric
and values
Returning to the research questions, it would seem that the discourse itself is an expression of a
more permissive climate for voicing liberal and reform-friendly opinions, and the empirical material
exhibits more profuse and recurring mentioning of these values after the revolution. The tone in
these messages are, for the most part, advocating, argumentative or critical, although a widespread
support for the revolution itself is present. However, recent parliamentary election results showing
massive support for Islamist parties, as the last chapter discussed, generates some unanswered
41
questions as to the actual nature and permanence of this development. A modest answer is perhaps,
yes, a liberal opening is noted but this renewed interest in liberal values and the tolerant atmosphere
may be temporary. To answer the question more fully, one would have to perform a follow-up study
to discern, for example, the effect of the new government on the Egyptian political discourse, and to
monitor trends at greater distance in time from the events.
In many ways, this study is pioneering; the newness and magnitude of the events has meant
that scholars are still trying to catch up. This has led to a high dependence on news media sources
for background information on the chronology of the Arab Spring revolutions and its corollary, with
attending implications on source reliability. Notwithstanding this difficulty, I hope that my effort,
for whatever value it holds, may contribute to the general knowledge base that is underway on one
of the most momentous popular movements in recent history.
42
Sources
Empirical material
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http://www.ahram.org.eg/pdf/Zoom_1500/index.aspx on October 28, 2011.
Al-Shorouk (transcribed: a+-+ur,q). Issues studied: November 5 & 14, 2010; February 11 & 19, 2011; June 6
& 15, 2011; September 4 & 27, 2011; and November 28 & 29, 2011. Downloaded from http://
www.shorouknews.com/pdf/ on October 28, 2011.
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–– September 10, 2011: “Is the Supreme Council a New Predator of Press Freedom?” http://en.rsf.org/egyptis-the-supreme-council-a-new-10-09-2011,40962.html Retrieved September 21, 2011
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January 18, 2011: “Oman Protestors Call for Fight Against Corruption” by Claire Ferris-Lay. http://
www.arabianbusiness.com/oman-protestors-call-for-fight-against-corruption--374524.html Retrieved
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BBC:
January 23, 2011: “Man Dies after Setting Himself on Fire in Saudi Arabia” by unknown. http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12260465 Retrieved November 21, 2011.
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The Daily Star:
August 31, 2004: “Arab Liberals: the Last Hope for Reform” by Ammar Abdulhamid. http://
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The Guardian:
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Borger. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/29/tunisian-president-vows-punish-rioters Retrieved
November 21, 2011.
45
January 7, 2011: “Algerian Riots Resume over Food Prices” by Reuters. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2011/jan/07/algeria-riots-food-prices Retrieved November 21, 2011.
January 16, 2011: “Tunisia’s Protests Spark Suicide in Algeria and Fears through Arab World” by Ian Black.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/16/tunisia-protests-suicide-algeria-arab Retrieved November 21,
2011.
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2011.
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2011/mar/10/egypt-media-newspapers-mubarak-propaganda Retrieved: November 21, 2011.
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2011.
Haaretz:
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middleeast/2011/01/20111141219337111.html Retrieved November 21, 2011.
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46
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47
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Abstract page: http://farm3.staticflickr.com/2287/5729647883_a0eaf97097_z.jpg
48
Appendix I - Opinion Article Index
Coding Key
Code
Significance
Index
Index letters are uniquely given to each issue used in the study. Al-Ahram is
indexed A through H and Al-Shorouk O through V from the first to the last of the
eight days studied
B10:4
Example index. The letter B indicates source and date; in this case, Al-Ahram on
11/14/2010. First number 10=page number, second number 4=article number.
(grey fill)
(no fill)
///
unknown
Delimited Sample article, i.e. 750-1,000 words
Complete Sample article
Non-existent alt. not applicable
Author(s) not mentioned in the article
Index
Source
Date
Words
Author
A1:1;
A5:1
Al-Ahram
11/5/2010
794
!"#$% &'!%(
A41:1
Al-Ahram
11/5/2010
1849
4+"56 789!:
///
Al-Shorouk 11/5/2010
///
///
Title
English Title
$)' *+," ..-$./# 0123# The Criminal Mind..
Threatens Egypt
;6$" <3 <'=3# :4$> ?'#5@ Free margins: time will not
A#95B3 turn back the clock
/// ///
B10:1
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010 1232
B10:2
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
902
4*5JU !V!E3#
W3!X3#
$ON3#8 0123# YBZ [#$\]' Effects on the mind and
intellect
B10:3
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
970
7!S+3# C+.'
7D^(8 M3G!_3# `!ab $"F53# Minister Kamal El-Shazly
[!V!cRHT# and the ethics of elections
B10:4
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
343
d!a"e .*
f$EKV
B10:5
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
961
$U!E' j+EZ
M: $)' &a"=,V `!S Ck3# 06$3# The man who pronounced
$V5Rb( the defeat of Egypt in
[the] October [War]
B11:1
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
244
unknown
YBZ A#$R:T#8 &:!i)3# &"$> Freedom of the press and
$)' slandering Egypt
B11:2
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
215
+E23# l"$U
4*!L3# :&K%!K% d5mU Political Affairs: the
d8+2ERL/# excluded gentlemen
B11:3
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
247
+ai' n'(
n'(
h!E_3# d!/$V :&KV$Z &%!K% Arabic politics: the youth
parliament
B11:4
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
199
B11:5
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
734
!JE3# o69
B11:6
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
717
+EZ -F!>
d!a>$3#
B11:7
Al-Ahram 11/14/2010
249
$)RJ' qDr
C8DEE3# -F!>
G!1HI &"+1J3# &%!KL3# MNOP 0@ Is the monetary policy
QM/!23# *!)RST# enough to save the global
economy?
M: 4#8!L/#8 MJg53# h=i3# The National Party and
[!"$i3# the equality of freedoms
C$OU `!,H o2)3# 9#$13# :&K%!K% [!V!cRH# Political elections: the
difficult decision
&Z!p3#8 ;aL3# &Z!a6 :d#5^I# The Brotherhood: a group
of blind obedience (lit.
“wish and command”)
”MJg53#“ d!@9 Bet on "National"
`Dgs# &"!O> :C(9 *$.' Just an opinion: the story
of the ruins
1 of 12
Appendix I - Opinion Article Index
Index
Source
Date
Words
P5:1 Al-Shorouk 11/14/2010 1574
Author
4+"56 789!:
Title
English Title
:tKVs# uKE3# M: n'!Z +2V After two years in the
t'!v3# 0E1RL/#8 !'!V8( White House: Obama and
the uncertain future
P14:1 Al-Shorouk 11/14/2010
965
P14:2 Al-Shorouk 11/14/2010
953
y!aL3# +ai'
P14:3 Al-Shorouk 11/14/2010
744
fT5OKH
|5RL"$b
C9:1
Al-Ahram
2/11/2011
388
$1r lg!Z
C9:2
Al-Ahram
2/11/2011
753
&U5E> +ai'
C9:3
Al-Ahram
2/11/2011
425
+K% .*
+a>( 95U!Z
C9:4
Al-Ahram
2/11/2011
296
C9:5
Al-Ahram
2/11/2011
386
+EZ YNp)'
Å9#53#
495X3#8 95R%+3# The Constitution and the
Revolution
C19:1 Al-Ahram
2/11/2011
1387
4+"56 789!:
0K.3# #k@ -D>( #5{,.P T Do not abort the dreams
of this generation
Q12:1 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
1175
ME@k3# f9!:
Q12:2 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
907
YKi' +ai'
<"+3#
Q12:3 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
595
=Z qDr
Q12:4 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
948
na%!"
789!:
M%!KL3# -!xJ3# É#$Z( <' Symptoms of the failed
0U!N3# political system
Q13:1 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
981
d!aXZ 8$aZ
Qd5"$)/# +"$" #G!' What do the Egyptians
want?
Q13:2 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
678
&BKb &'D%
Q13:3 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
438
M%$' <P!:
Q13:4 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
441
$1r +a>(
95U!Z
Q13:5 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
958
4*!a> 0'(
8$aZ &"$)/# &K%!KL3# 4!Ki3# [!@5_P Distortions of Egyptian
C8#=a>
h#=>s# w'#$V !@$,xP !ab political life, as shown in
&KV!cRHT# the parties’ electoral
programs
!'+JZ :d*T <V-z5V &3*!2'! The Bush–Bin Laden
*$.' Y3e &m"$E3# !"!i{3# `5iRP equation: When innocent
[#A!)>e victims turn into mere
statistics
8 4+iR/# [!"T53# nV &E_3# }68 The similarities between
F5/# [!"95,a6 the U.S. and banana
republics
$P5R3# lKNiR3 q#$RS# A proposal to ease the
tension
$"F8 !"“ <g8 &aBb &"e MJ2" What does the world
Q”-DZI# homeland mean, "O
Minister of Information"?
ua)3# nH( The moan of silence
~!.> !KJ/# :!i' YBZ y5V ÄKN3# 495\ Facebook revolution on
the governor of Minya
MJKLi3#
49#5H ..495r ..495\ Revolution .. Picture ..
Blossom
4$@!13# $@!x' M: lKO3# 8 ÇO3# Quantitative and
}PTT*8 &KH5KB/# qualitative aspects of the
Cairo demonstration of
the Millions, and its
implications
Q*9!/# f(9 <"( Where is the giant's
head?
+2V &Kg#$1a"+3#8 &K3#$EKB3# <Z On liberalism and
$)'8 ÄH5P democracy after Tunisia
and Egypt
495r 495r 495r Image, image, image
Ñ513# &b9!_' ÇKxJP8 ;K%5P Expansion and organizing
<@#$3# lS5/# ÇLi3 &KJg53# participation of the
national forces to resolve
the current situation
Q$)' 0E1RL' ÖBa" <' Who owns the future of
Egypt?
2 of 12
Appendix I - Opinion Article Index
Index
Source
Date
Words
Author
Q16:1 Al-Shorouk 2/11/2011
1040
n'( `D6
D7:1
Title
English Title
d5iRL" T8 d5:!c" They fear and are not
ashamed
Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
2484
Ç2J/# +EZ .*
+K2%
D10:1 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
881
*89 nNb
D10:2 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
536
u2:9 .*
+K2L3#
lKL3# 8 }1N3#8 ÇB13# The pen, Islamic
jurisprudence, and the
sword
D10:3 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
1122
C+a>
d#$pE3#
4+"+6 &g$U 5iH Towards a new police
D10:4 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
852
CF5: +KN'
+â -!23# oÜ!J3# Y3e äDV #5NZ Pardon, complaint to the
!$p/#8 Äa_3# Attorney General against
the sun and rain!
D10:5 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
1066
8$aZ .*
;KV9 ÇU!@
&K2"$_R3#8 &"95R%+3# [D"+2R3# The urgent and necessary
&"98${3#8 &iB/# constitutional and
legislative amendments
D11:1 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
183
unknown
!!&S$LB3 &BV!S $Kã o2_3# 495\ The people's revolution
can not be stolen!!
D11:2 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
212
q!RN3# +EZ
ÇK@#$Ve
!Q495X3# +2V #G!' --- &K:!N_V With transparency --What comes after the
Revolution?!
D11:3 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
212
n'( +ai'
C$)/#
D11:4 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
221
*5ai'
C8!J/#
!d535iR/# --- 06!Z d!KV Urgent statement --Transformers! (=shifting
alliances)
D11:5 Al-Ahram
2/19/2011
1454
+ai' -$O'
+a>(
&K3!1RHT# &B>$/# [#98$â The necessities of the
!!@$"G!i'8 transition phase and its
pitfalls!
R12:1 Al-Shorouk 2/19/2011
1120
}BB3!V =R2'
q!RN3# +EZ
$Kã 495X3# 7Få' <' ~8$c3# Out of the predicament of
&BaRO/# the unfinished revolution
R12:2 Al-Shorouk 2/19/2011
906
MV$23# 0KEH
R12:3 Al-Shorouk 2/19/2011
537
MNK3 `!KH#*
R13:1 Al-Shorouk 2/19/2011
1023
&aLV
MH!a{S
R13:2 Al-Shorouk 2/19/2011
799
&E@8 h!2"e
R13:3 Al-Shorouk 2/19/2011
1151
C$L" n'( 5@ !/ Ä6#5@8 ..Å+> !aV q#$:( Joys of what happened ..
..[ç And concerns of what is
to come ..
R16:1 Al-Shorouk 2/19/2011
489
C+"5@ Ma,:
!LKÜ9 MJg8 á:#5P àU$' The national consensus
&"95,a.B3 presidential candidate of
the Republic
A!S+r( ..4+_3# M: A!S+r( Friends in need are
d5K1K1> friends indeed
?K.3# ..A!:53# <'F --- [!aBb Words --- Time of loyalty..
4+2%8 ;:!H8 The army and Nafi‘ and
Sa‘ada
!JR%!K% &26#$/ uS53# d!> It is time to review our
&K69!c3# foreign policy
$)' ;' -DL3# 4+@!2' 0E1RL' The future of the peace
treaty with Egypt
ÇOP5S M: #51\ ..d5"$)/# !,"( O Egyptians .. Have faith
&"5J2/# in your moral strength
+1H Y3e &6!i3# :495X3# M>8 <' Inspired by the revolution:
[#k3# the need for self-criticism
-!xJ3# é!1%e +"$" o2_3# The people want to
overthrow the regime
3 of 12
Appendix I - Opinion Article Index
Index
Source
Date
Words
Author
Title
English Title
E10:1
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
708
9*!H .*
MH!6$:
E10:2
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
852
u2:9 -!)Z
E10:3
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
324
áK:5P ÇK@#$Ve
E10:4
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
635
0a.3# +K2%
E10:5
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
392
+ai' .*
nH!Li3#
E10:6
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
613
*#$' *5ai' QÖ3kb !1> 5@ 0@ ..7!:53# 9#5i3# Dialogue of
reconciliation .. Is it really
so?
E10:7
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
283
+ai' -$O'
+a>(
E11:1
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
236
unknown
!Q$@*=" ”MV$23# ;KV$3#“ The “Arab Spring” is
blooming?!
E11:2
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
248
9!1)3# }K68
ÇKx23# $)' 95% --- $xH &,68 Point of view --- the Great
Wall of Egypt
E11:3
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
188
&K'!%
$)J3#5V(
E11:4
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
200
E11:5
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
1208
Ç2J/# +EZ .*
+K2%
E11:6
Al-Ahram
6/6/2011
243
$)RJ' qDr
S10:1 Al-Shorouk
6/6/2011
1428
d#5U9 A!Kâ
S10:2 Al-Shorouk
6/6/2011
859
+@!.' +a>(
S10:3 Al-Shorouk
6/6/2011
680
+2% Ç"9
S11:1 Al-Shorouk
6/6/2011
1101
ÄS$' $Ka%
S11:2 Al-Shorouk
6/6/2011
287
-!%8
j8+J%!V
S11:3 Al-Shorouk
6/6/2011
910
unknown
S11:4 Al-Shorouk
6/6/2011
989
ÄK:5Bb
*5)1'
&Ka@s# 8 &KEBãs# *#+ER%# $p^ Risk of tyranny of the
4+S!J3# &KBSè3 &6$i3# majority and the crucial
importance of a critical
minority
!?K23# &a13 G!1He &KH5KB' The Millions to rescue
livelihood!
$)J3# àKP!N' ..49#*I#8 4*#9I# The will and the
administration.. keys to
victory
&'Fs# <' ~8$c3# The way out of the crisis
$KKvR3#8 êëí3# &Z5a.' The Group of 15 and
change
QM:#k13# 2R" 0@ --- 95H &p1H Point of illumination --Does Gaddafi learn a
lesson?
Q*!.'s# MJEJ% YR' --- &"ì9 Vision --- When will we
build the glory?
+a>( ÇK@#$Ve &KV$23# [!â!NRHT# --- M"(9 #k@ This is my opinion --9!.J3#
d*T î3 oÜ!v3# 98+3#8 Arab uprisings and the
absent role of bin Laden
!Q4$K^( 4$' !JB_: #G!/ Why did we fail the last
time?!
+>#8 MV!cRH# <g5' :C(9 *$.' Just an opinion: One
election district
d5H!S ï8$_' `5> [!x>D' Notes on the Draft Law of
MV!cRHT# -!xJ3# the electoral system
T8( 95R%+3# The Constitution first
+K2% +3!^ Ñ$bG M: In memory of Khalid
Saeed
Ä%s# ..4+"+.3# &"95,a.3# The new republic ..
AÑ*!E/#8 Foundations and
principles
YBZ &"!,J3# --- <aK3# &3!%9 Message of Yemen --- the
&"+KB1R3# &KJaK3# &1"$p3# traditional Yemeni way of
ending
0KÜ#$%e ;:#8* (5%( F=2" !'!V8( Obama promotes the
worst motives of Israel
&K26$' d8* <' &"5K> Dynamics without
references
4 of 12
Appendix I - Opinion Article Index
Index
Source
Date
Words
Author
Title
English Title
S11:5 Al-Shorouk
6/6/2011
416
f5'!Z
0KÜ$@
F10:1
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
264
Ç2J/# +EZ .*
+K2%
M3#$EKB3# 7Få' :4$@!13# <' From Cairo: Egyptian
!C$)/# liberal dilemma!
F10:2
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
983
oBg <L> .*
+3#5c3# nV ..+3!^ Khaled... among the
Immortals [wordplay:
immortal among
immortals]
F10:3
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
659
F10:4
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
274
+ai' -$O'
+a>(
F10:5
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
825
+K2% .*
MBZ 0KZ!a%e
F10:6
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
825
F11:1
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
200
unknown
*!%5aB3 &265' &V$â A painful blow to Mossad
F11:2
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
215
$U!E' j+EZ
d!J>8 ..&EpEg --- &KV$Z `#5>( The Arabic conditions --Caresses .. And
tenderness
F11:3
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
215
+B1' $@!'
..n.L3# oKEp3# --- $xH &,68 Point of view --- the
$KNL3# 4*!2%8 imprisoned doctor .. And
His Excellency the
Ambassador
F11:4
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
224
~!.>
MJKLi3#
F11:5
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
693
MV!E'e MiR:
+123#8 $_Z <'!X3# -5K3# The eighteenth day and
MZ!aR6T# the social contract
F11:6
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
482
$)H .*
|9!Z +ai'
&'Fs# 98k68 &KNÜ!p3# &JRN3# Sectarian strife and the
roots of the crisis
F11:7
Al-Ahram
6/15/2011
236
T3:1 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
236
+a>( &'D%
&'D%
T10:1 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
622
$p' 0Ka6
T10:2 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
1198
d!aKB% `Dg
[!"95,a.3# $KKvP d8+"$" y5B/# The Kings want to change
the republics
T10:3 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
1108
-$b $Ka%
ÇOi3# M: *5,Z &2V9( 4$r!2' Living through four eras in
power
T11:1 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
1203
C$J@
d!a.K%
-!xH :&KBKÜ#$%e &KJ'( [#$"+1P Predictions of Israeli
$,U( `D^ 9!,JK% +%s# 9!_V security: the regime of
Bashar al-Assad will
collapse within months
lg!Z !,.{H 0ES 4$aX3# |DR^# &"$xH Theory of difference of
fruits before their maturity
C$av3#
!&EcJ3# M: &BO_/# :95H &p1H Point of illumination: the
problem of the elite!
ÇKB2R3# $"$iP Y3e á"$g &p"$^ A road map to liberate
C$)/# Egyptian education
+EZ .* $p^ M: |#+@s# ..&"$)/# 495X3# Egyptian Revolution ..
Goals at risk
:!i3#
C*$O3#
!7!NJ3# [!JK6 Genes of hypocrisy!
$)RJ' qDr #95: &"85J3# #8+a6 --- C(9 *$.' Just an opinion --- Freeze
the nuclear immediately
..j+>8 C85H ÄK3 Not only nuclear...
$"$iR3# !K6535JOP :[!Z!EpH# Impressions: Liberation
Technology
Q5@!KJRH8 !'!V8( }B2N" Ck3# !' What are Obama and
Netanyahu doing?
5 of 12
Appendix I - Opinion Article Index
Index
Source
Date
Words
Author
Title
English Title
T11:2 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
324
-!%8
j8+J%!V
&K38+3# Ñ513# 98* :<aK3# &3!%9 Message of Yemen: the
MJaK3# +,_/# *5a6 M: role of international forces
in the deadlock of the
Yemeni scene
T11:3 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
621
C95^ M'#9
495X3# YBZ A!JE3# Building on the revolution
T11:4 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
1076
*5ai' +ai'
-!'I#
T16:1 Al-Shorouk 6/15/2011
512
C+"5@ Ma,:
G10:1 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
283
Ç2J/# +EZ .*
+K2%
u1E% !'+JZ :4$@!13# <' From Cairo: When “the
!”uLaH5O"I#“ Economist” was
preceded!
G10:2 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
661
MaB> .*
*5Z!13# +ai'
Q|!S8s# <' f!J3# +"$" #G!' Why do people want from
Waqf?
G10:3 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
692
4*5JU !V!E3#
W3!X3#
G10:4 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
286
+ai' -$O'
+a>(
G10:5 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
202
&2a6 d!a2H
G10:6 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
416
9!_RL/#
MNJ> +ai'
*5ai'
G10:7 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
846
$U!E' j+EZ
G10:8 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
409
+EZ +K38
h!Lb +6!/#
495X3# +2V !' W"+>8 !KEK3 Libya and post-revolution
talk
G11:1 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
182
unknown
0i3# 5@ 78+J)3# The ballot box is the
solution
G11:2 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
239
+E23# l"$U
$"F8 åp^( 0@ :&K%!K% d5mU Political Affairs: Was the
Q-DZI# Minister of Information
wrong?
G11:3 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
224
C$OU `!,H
&.pBE3# -!Z :&K%!K% [!@!.P# Political trends: year of
bullying
G11:4 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
212
C8#5J3# -*ç
G11:5 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
587
G11:6 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
587
+EZ -F!>
<a>$3#
G11:7 Al-Ahram
9/4/2011
264
$)RJ' qDr
U10:1 Al-Shorouk
9/4/2011
642
+3!^
MLKac3#
U10:2 Al-Shorouk
9/4/2011
969
&3#+23# ..[!"538s# oKP$P M: In arranging priorities ..
T8( &KV!cRHT# Electoral justice first
$iV M: &p1H A drop in the ocean
}Z#5H(8 }Br( :q$N3# Joy: its origin and types
!nKJKpLBN3# &^8* :95H &p1H Point of Illumination:
Palestinians’ vertigo!
;Ka.3# 75: $)' Egypt above all
`D1R%# <Z &38+3# &K35mL' State responsibility for the
&KÜ!{13# &pBL3# independence of the
judiciary authority
A!JK% -5.@8 ..$"$iR3# d#+K' Tahrir Square .. And the
attack of Sinai
Ç's# ÇOiP #kO@ :$xH &,68 Point of view: thus
nations rule
d!"$23# +ai' &aKxZ 495\ `!aOR%T &KaR> -!,' The inevitable tasks to
complete a great
revolution
;aR./# <' A!J.L3# -!1RH# Revenge of prisoners
from the society
!&:5J^ á> :C(9 *$.' Just an opinion: the right
of Khanoufah!
&Bm%( Questions
!"$bF +3!^ !"!{S ;' MÜ=.3# 0'!2R3# 495p^ The dangers of partially
n'(
$)' M: [!KBi/# dealing with municipalities
in Egypt
6 of 12
Appendix I - Opinion Article Index
Index
Source
Date
Words
Author
Title
English Title
U10:3 Al-Shorouk
9/4/2011
561
+KN"*
f5KU!J6e
4+Z!1B3 +"+6 ÇKZF é51% The fall of the new leader
of the Al Qaida
U11:1 Al-Shorouk
9/4/2011
894
j+EZ h!,"e
0"5aP &'F( <' ~$cH lKb How do we get out of the
Q&KB@s# [!K2a.3# funding crisis of NGOs?
U11:2 Al-Shorouk
9/4/2011
436
&aLV 7$p3# 7$RN'8 !KEK3 :!"95% &3!%9 Message of Syria: Libya
MH!a{S
!"95% M: and the crossroads in
Syria
U11:3 Al-Shorouk
9/4/2011
975
0'!b 4=Z
U11:4 Al-Shorouk
9/4/2011
1019
unknown
H10:1 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
281
Ç2J/# +EZ .*
+K2%
H10:2 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
615
+EZ +K>8 .*
+K./#
H10:3 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
661
+EZ 8$aZ .*
;KaL3#
$r!J3# +EZ +3!^ Khaled Abdul Naser
H10:4 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
280
+ai' -$O'
+a>(
l2{3# &p1H :95H &p1H Point of illumination: the
!QMJKpLBN3# Palestinian point of
weakness?!
H10:5 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
256
+EZ &_Ü!Z
9!Nv3#
Y38s# j#$bG M: $@!' +a>( Ahmad Maher in his first
anniversary
H10:6 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
764
M353# q8+a'
&V!1H `D1R%#8 ..M'5Oi3# ÇZ+3# Government support ..
nKNi)3# And independence of the
Press Association/
Journalists’ Union
H10:7 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
844
5V( +ai'
0{N3#
j!.PT# ÄOZ $KLP h#=>s# Parties are going against
counter-direction
H11:1 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
207
unknown
!"!{13#8 ..&K3!1RHT# &B>$/# The transition .. And the
&B6!23# urgent issues
H11:2 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
204
-!L> [!>$:
<"+3#
!*#*=" *!LN3# :&KV$Z `#5>( The Arabic conditions:
Corruption is increasing!
H11:3 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
194
YNp)'
M'!%
”5RKN3#8“ !'!V8( :&K%!K% d5mU Political Affairs: Obama
h$23#8 npLB:8 "and the veto" and
Palestine and the Arabs
H11:4 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
248
H11:5 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
896
+ai' .*
+K2L3#
Ä"9*e
H11:6 Al-Ahram
9/27/2011
613
+a>( .*
MS5U
V11:1 Al-Shorouk 9/27/2011
1777
C+"5@ Ma,:
$Kvr ÇB> Y'$' YBZ On the verge of a small
dream
[!"T53# $Ü!L^ :Ç3!23# $ON" The world thinks: U.S.
d!RLH!v:( M: 4+iR/# casualties in Afghanistan
;K:9 ñK^ :4$@!13# <' From Cairo: a thin line
|$R3# #k@ 0b $)' 0aiRP 0@ Can Egypt bear all these
QMV!cRHI# electoral luxuries?
MNKNZ 0Ka6 d!J>8 &'5Oi3# :&K.KP#$R%e 4$xH Strategic vision: the
-s# government and motherly
tenderness
ó!KaKBSe8 ó!KV$Z h!Kv3# <a\ The price of absenteeism
on Arabic and regional
levels
!!495X3# &"!ai3 ”&"!Nb“ h5Bp' "Kifaya" is required to
protect the revolution!!
MV$23# ;KV$3# |!pR^# <Z On the abduction of the
Arab Spring
7 of 12
Appendix I - Opinion Article Index
Index
Source
Date
Words
Author
V11:2 Al-Shorouk 9/27/2011
455
+a>( &,"=H
Mb$R3#
V11:3 Al-Shorouk 9/27/2011
970
ÇKaP
M\5ã$E3#
Title
English Title
&KJg53# &iB)aB3 y$R_/# -5,N/# The common
understanding of national
interest
&KJKpLBN3# &38+3# <Z On the Palestinian State
8 of 12
Appendix II - Average Word Calculation
Average word/cm2 calculation
Index
No. words
B10:3
B10:4
E10:1
E10:3
Q13:2
Q13:3
U11:2
U11:3
944
358
714
360
634
496
435
930
Height (h)
(cm)
Width (w)
(cm)
16,6
16,2
12,5
4,6
15,1
10,4
8,6
15,5
10,5
3,9
9,8
12,1
7,7
7,3
8,8
10,9
Min
Max
Average
Words/cm2
5,416
5,666
5,829
6,468
5,453
6,533
5,748
5,505
5,416
6,533
5,827
Application on complete sample (average=5.827)
Index
A1:1+A5:1
Height (h)
(cm)
Width (w)
(cm)
a=13.2, b=2.6 a=5.5, b=24.5
No. words
(=h*w*avr)
794
A41:1
12,9
24,6
1849
B10:1
a=17.6, b=9.5
a=7.8, b=7.8
1232
B10:2
17,4
8,9
902
B10:3
16
10,4
970
B10:4
15,1
3,9
343
B10:5
16,5
10
961
B11:1
7,6
5,5
244
B11:2
6,7
5,5
215
B11:3
7,7
5,5
247
B11:4
6,2
5,5
199
B11:5
16,8
7,5
734
B11:6
16,4
7,5
717
B11:7
15,8
2,7
249
P5:1
19,3
14
1574
P14:1
9
20,7
1086
P14:2
14,1
11,6
953
P14:3
14,5
8,8
744
C9:1
4,3
15,5
388
C9:2
8,5
15,2
753
C9:3
4,8
15,2
425
C9:4
3,3
15,4
296
C9:5
4,3
15,4
386
C19:1
20
11,9
1387
Q12:1
8
25,2
1175
Q12:2
19,7
7,9
907
Q12:3
6,9
14,8
595
9 of 12
Appendix II - Average Word Calculation
Application on complete sample (average=5.827)
Index
Height (h)
(cm)
Width (w)
(cm)
No. words
(=h*w*avr)
Q12:4
10,5
15,5
948
Q13:1
6,9
24,4
981
Q13:2
7,7
15,1
678
Q13:3
10,3
7,3
438
Q13:4
9,7
7,8
441
Q13:5
19,8
8,3
958
Q16:1
10,5
17
1040
D7:1
17,4
24,5
2484
D10:1
9
16,8
881
D10:2
11,5
8
536
D10:3
25
7,7
1122
D10:4
17,4
8,4
852
D10:5
22,3
8,2
1066
D11:1
5,7
5,5
183
D11:2
6,6
5,5
212
D11:3
6,6
5,5
212
D11:4
6,9
5,5
221
D11:5
13,2
18,9
1454
R12:1
21,6
8,9
1120
R12:2
10,3
15,1
906
R12:3
6,1
15,1
537
R13:1
7,5
23,4
1023
R13:2
8,9
15,4
799
R13:3
22,7
8,7
1151
R16:1
15
5,6
489
E10:1
12,4
9,8
708
E10:2
12,6
11,6
852
E10:3
4,6
12,1
324
E10:4
12,1
9
635
E10:5
11,8
5,7
392
E10:6
12,1
8,7
613
E10:7
19,4
2,5
283
E11:1
7,8
5,2
236
E11:2
8,2
5,2
248
E11:3
6,2
5,2
188
E11:4
6,6
5,2
200
E11:5
14,5
14,3
1208
E11:6
14,9
2,8
243
S10:1
9,8
25
1428
S10:2
10,6
13,9
859
S10:3
10,9
10,7
680
S11:1
10,1
18,7
1101
10 of 12
Appendix II - Average Word Calculation
Application on complete sample (average=5.827)
Index
Height (h)
(cm)
Width (w)
(cm)
No. words
(=h*w*avr)
S11:2
9,3
5,3
287
S11:3
12,7
12,3
910
S11:4
13,8
12,3
989
S11:5
5,8
12,3
416
F10:1
18,9
2,4
264
F10:2
19,4
8,7
983
F10:3
13
8,7
659
F10:4
18,8
2,5
274
F10:5
11,9
11,9
825
F10:6
11,9
11,9
825
F11:1
6,6
5,2
200
F11:2
7,1
5,2
215
F11:3
7,1
5,2
215
F11:4
7,4
5,2
224
F11:5
14,5
8,2
693
F11:6
14,5
5,7
482
F11:7
15
2,7
236
T3:1
8,1
5
236
T10:1
21,8
4,9
622
T10:2
10,6
19,4
1198
T10:3
9,8
19,4
1108
T11:1
11,1
18,6
1203
T11:2
10,5
5,3
324
T11:3
7,4
14,4
621
T11:4
18,1
10,2
1076
T16:1
15,7
5,6
512
G10:1
19,4
2,5
283
G10:2
12,9
8,8
661
G10:3
13,2
9
692
G10:4
19,6
2,5
286
G10:5
3,9
8,9
202
G10:6
12,3
5,8
416
G10:7
12
12,1
846
G10:8
12,3
5,7
409
G11:1
6
5,2
182
G11:2
7,9
5,2
239
G11:3
7,4
5,2
224
G11:4
7
5,2
212
G11:5
14,6
6,9
587
G11:6
14,6
6,9
587
G11:7
15,1
3
264
U10:1
16,7
6,6
642
11 of 12
Appendix II - Average Word Calculation
Application on complete sample (average=5.827)
Index
Height (h)
(cm)
Width (w)
(cm)
No. words
(=h*w*avr)
U10:2
9,5
17,5
969
U10:3
5,5
17,5
561
U11:1
10,3
14,9
894
U11:2
8,6
8,7
436
U11:3
10,8
15,5
975
U11:4
19
9,2
1019
H10:1
19,3
2,5
281
H10:2
12
8,8
615
H10:3
12,6
9
661
H10:4
19,2
2,5
280
H10:5
5
8,8
256
H10:6
11,4
11,5
764
H10:7
11,5
12,6
844
H11:1
7,1
5
207
H11:2
6,6
5,3
204
H11:3
6,4
5,2
194
H11:4
8,2
5,2
248
H11:5
14,5
10,6
896
H11:6
14,6
7,2
613
V11:1
12,2
25
1777
V11:2
5,5
14,2
455
V11:3
18,1
9,2
970
12 of 12