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Colonial Past, Regime Choice and Regime Stability – a
Global Comparison
Preliminary research plan, please do not quote!
Carsten Anckar
Department of Political Science
Åbo Akademi University
e-mail: [email protected]
Phone: +358 2 2154830
Prepared for the ECPR General Conference in Glasgow, September 3-6, 2014. Panel:
New Methodological Frontiers.
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Introduction
During the last decades research on the requisites of democracy and democratization has
erupted. To a certain extent this is a consequence of the fact that data nowadays is easily
accessed and that the proficiency of using statistical methods has increased substantially
among political scientists. In light of the multitude of studies conducted in the field it is
indeed remarkable that the results arrived at in these studies point at very different directions.
Lipset’s (1959) seminal finding, that socioeconomic development fosters democracy has been
confirmed, modified, and challenged in a number of studies. More than a decade ago, Ross
(2001) made the argument that oil resources constitute an impediment to democracy famous,
but there is still disagreement as to whether oil (and/or natural resources in general) hinders
democratization or not. Democracy has also been explained by cultural factors, particularly
religion, and here too authors differ in their view whether or not Islam prevents the emergence
of a democratic form of government or not. More and more, geographic and demographic
variables (size, insularity) tend to be included among the ‘usual suspects’ in multivariate
regression models, and here too, the results are highly disparate.
The present project focuses on a frequently applied but rarely problematized plausible
determinant of democracy, namely the colonial heritage. Although the colonial past is
frequently included among the explanatory variables in studies on democracy or
democratization, authors have, with very few exceptions (notably Bernhard et al. 2004;
Olsson 2009) refrained from giving the link between colonialism and democracy the primary
attention. In its simplest form ‘colonial heritage’ is treated as a dichotomous variable, where
former British colonies receive the value 1 and the rest of the states the value 0. A somewhat
more sophisticated strategy is to operate with a multi-nominal variable, where the authors
control for the impact of, for instance, British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese legacy.
However, treating a complex phenomenon like colonial heritage as an ‘either-or-phenomenon’
leaves a lot of information out of account. Clearly, the British legacy is stronger in New
Zealand and in the English-speaking states in the Caribbean than it is in Britain’s former
protectorates Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. There are also countries that have been under the
rule of many colonial powers at the same time, which consequently raises the question if and
to what extent countries like Somalia, Libya and Vanuatu should be considered as having a
British legacy or not. It is therefore my firm opinion that a multifaceted phenomenon like
colonialism needs to be treated in a more elaborated manner and Bernhard’s et al. (2004: 226)
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assertion that ‘colonial legacies have not received substantial attention in the latest
discussions of democratization’, is therefore still valid.
Colonial heritage, regime choice and regime stability
The present study is concerned with the relationship between colonialism on the one hand,
and the emergence and survival of political regimes on the other. However, it should be
admitted that much of the theoretical foundation that the study rests on is concerned with the
link between colonialism and democracy. There are a number of theoretical arguments which
support the view that a British colonial legacy strengthens the prospects for democracy. The
standard argument postulates that in the British colonies, native participation in the governing
process was strongly encouraged whereby local elites consequently became familiarized with
popular government (Bell, 1967; Bollen and Jackman, 1985: 445; Weiner, 1987; 19–20). In
this respect, the contrast to the French colonies in particular is said to be striking; although
local organizations existed here too, their powers were much more limited (Betts, 1991).
Some authors also point at the fact that whereas the process of independence went smoothly
in the British colonies, the opposite tended to be the case in the French ones (Hadenius, 1992:
130). Finally, in contrast to other colonizing powers, the British actively promoted
democracy-enhancing features within the economic sphere, namely free trade and market
economy (Lange et al. 2006).
There are, however, also a number of features which speak against a positive link between a
British colonial heritage and democracy. Accordingly it has been argued that the indirect rule,
practiced by the British in many of their colonies, hindered the development of democratic
institutions and instead consolidated power into the hands of local chiefs (Fieldhouse 1983:
31-35; Lange 2004). Another school of thought considers a colonial past to be detrimental for
democracy, regardless of which of the European countries that possessed the colony. Based
on dependency theory it has been claimed that former colonies are condemned to an inferior
position on the world market and, thus, to underdevelopment. Since development constitutes
an important requisite for democracy, the former colonies will have a difficult task in
introducing and maintaining a democratic form of government (Bernhard et al. 2004: 229).
Finally, a colonial past can be assumed to have an indirect negative effect on democratization
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since colonialism is associated with ethnic fragmentation, which, in turn lowers the prospects
for democratic stability (Bernhard et al. 2004: 229).
Given the problem of delimitation of the concept colonial past, it is not surprising that the
empirical results regarding the association between colonial heritage and democracy point in
different directions. The positive influence of a British colonial legacy on democracy has been
confirmed by Weiner 1987: 19-20; Muller 1995: 975-979; and Olsson (2009), but
disconfirmed by Bernhard et al. (2004); Hadenius (1992, 131-133) and Teorell 2010: 43-45).
A yet another category consists of authors who have provided evidence in support of a
relationship between a (Western) European influence and democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2001:
1384-1385; Hariri 2012).
Within the framework of the present study, the ambition is to study the effects of colonialism
on political regimes from as many angles as possible. The general aim is to quantify the level
of penetration by the mother country on the colony and then study to what extent this measure
is related to the level of regime stability. A first aim is to assess the level of association
between the colonial heritage and the degree of democratic stability. However, it also takes a
wider perspective in that it additionally aims to study to what extent the colonial heritage can
explain constitutional variations within democratic and autocratic systems. The basic
assumption is that many former colonies have adopted political institutions resembling those
of their former mother countries. In some colonies these features have survived for extensive
periods of time whereas in others they have been abandoned right from the start or after a
while. The ambition is to study to what extent the choice and survival of the institutional
features in states can be related to their past as colonies.
Time period of study
The time period will be 1800-2014. The first point in time is chosen both for theoretical and
practical reasons. According to Fieldhouse (1982: 100) the history of European colonialism
can be divided into two periods, which partly overlap each other. The first one begins with the
discovery of the Americas and ends when the American countries gain their independence in
the beginning of the 19th century. The second one starts in the late 18th century, when the
European colonial powers shift focus from west to south and east, thereby intensifying the
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colonization of Africa and Asia. The breaking point also marks a dividing line between, on
the one hand, Spanish and Portuguese dominance and, on the other, British colonial
supremacy.
Since it is possible that the point in time when the political entity gained its independence can
affect the prospects for regime stability the study should cover an extensive period of time.
Furthermore, since the ambition is to study effects of a wide variety of colonial arrangements
the study should include colonies that received their independence from as many colonizing
powers as possible and in different time periods. At the same time, we cannot go very far back
in time; measuring the level of democracy in the 17th century, for instance, is a meaningless
exercise since there were no democratic states at that time. Therefore I have chosen to use the
year 1800 as a starting point. This means that the effects of Spanish and Portuguese colonial
heritage can be traced during the first years of independence for the former colonies of these
countries in the Americas. There is also a practical reason for choosing the year 1800 as the
starting point as this happens to be the first year which is covered by the Polity-dataset.
The dependent variable
The colonial legacy can affect a number of constitutional devices. It can, for instance, explain
why countries adopt federal or unitary structures, bicameral or unicameral legislatures,
judicial systems based on civil law or common law, proportional or majoritarian electoral
systems or presidential or parliamentary forms of government. In the present work, the main
ambition is to study to what extent the colonial past is linked to regime stability, which will be
assessed in terms of a number of constitutional features. A natural point of departure is the
dividing line that separates autocracies from democracies but both of these categories can be
split up further.
Particularly the category consisting of autocracies is a very heterogeneous one, incorporating
diverse systems like Saudi Arabia, China, Turkmenistan and Libya. The categorization of
non-democratic systems is anything but an easy enterprise and it is therefore not surprising
that authors differ markedly in terms of how systems are classified (Linz & Stepan 1996;
Geddes 1999; 2003; Geddes et al. 2012; Diamond 2002; Hadenius & Teorell 2007; Cheibub
et al. 2010; Hadenius et al. 2013).
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The three most widely used data sets on autocratic political regimes are the ones proposed by
Cheibub et al. (2010), Geddes et al. (2012) and Hadenius and Teorell (2007), subsequently
modified by Hadenius et al. (2013). Cheibub et al. recognizes three types of non democratic
regimes, namely military, monarchy and civilian. Geddes et al., again, operate with four main
categories: military, monarchy, party and personalist. Finally, Hadenius et al. (2013) make
use of the following six categories of autocratic systems: military, monarchy, multi-party,
one-party, no-party, and other.
Classifying the political regimes of the countries of the world for a time period exceeding two
hundred years raises a number of problems. On the one availability of data is scarce the
farther back in time we go, which means that classifications are difficult to make; in essence,
the more categories we operate with, the higher the risk of misclassifications. We must
therefore find a balance between parsimony and comprehensiveness. The categorization by
Cheibub et al. is the simplest one as it operates with three categories only. At the same time
their category ‘civilian’ is highly heterogeneous as it incorporates, under the same umbrella,
communist systems like the Soviet Union, fascist dictatorships like Nazi-Germany and most
of the post-colonial regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Inevitably, it makes sense to split the
category ‘civilian’ into systems where a party is in rule from systems where a person (other
than a monarch or military officer or junta) rules. This is the strategy applied by Geddes et al.,
and I shall, as a point of departure, make use of their categorization and consequently classify
the regimes of the autocratic countries into the following four categories: monarchy, military,
party and personalist.
Admittedly, the categorization could be split up further. Hadenius et al., for instance,
distinguishes
between
one-party
and
multi-party
authoritarian
systems,
thereby
acknowledging the fact that the degree of autocracy varies in non-democratic systems.
However, the relevance of introducing the category of multi-party authoritarian systems can
be questioned. In a strict sense, the concept is of course an oxymoron; a true multi-party
system cannot operate within a non-democratic setting. Instead, the term denotes systems in
which one party rules but parties other than the dominating one are allowed to take part in
elections and gain representation in parliament. Such arrangements are common in many
states ruled by one party in order to give the impression that the countries in question are
more democratic than what they actually are. The important thing, however, is that in both
one-party and multi-party authoritarian systems power resides in the hands of a single party.
The categorization, thus, reflects the fact that some one party systems are more autocratic than
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others but in essence this is a difference in degree, not in kind. Hadenius et al. further
disregards the category personalist regimes on the ground that ‘[it] implies a conflation of
regime and leader characteristics’ (Hadenius et al. 2013: 30). Here, a different strategy is
applied. Although it is clear that in most authoritarian countries other than monarchies or
military a ruling party can be identified I find, in line with Geddes et al, it relevant to
distinguish between situations where the leader is dependent on a political party (a is the case
in most communist systems) and situations where the political party is merely a tool for the
leader in his exercise of power (as in Russia or Belarus).
Turning, then, to the category of democracies, the first constitutional device of interest
concerns the position of Head of State. Here the crucial dividing line goes between
constitutional monarchies and republics, i.e. systems where the position as head of state is
inherited and systems where the head of state is elected or selected for a limited period of time.
(In autocracies, no categorization based on the position of head of state is done, since the
position of head of state coincides more or less perfectly with the regime type). The second
constitutional device of interest in democratic systems concerns the relation between the
legislature and the executive and here I make a distinction between parliamentary,
semipresidential and presidential systems. The structure of the dependent variable is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Regime
Democracy
Autocracy
Monarchy
Republic
- Monarchy
-Parliamentary
-Presidential
-Military
-Hybrid
-Semipresidential
-Party
-Parliamentary
-Personalist
-Hybrid
Figure 1. Structure of the dependent variable.
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The independent variable
As we have seen, the standard way of capturing colonial legacy in comparative research has
been to pay regard to the identity of the colonizing power. This strategy disregards the fact
that the way the various areas were ruled varied extensively not only between the different
colonial powers but also within the empire of the same colonial power. The present research
project takes the view that a multifaceted phenomenon such as colonialism needs to be treated
in a more elaborated manner and introduces a way to capture the essence of colonial
penetration by disaggregating the phenomenon in question into at least the following six
subcomponents, all but one of which will then be measured by a number of indicators:
country of origin, political influence, ethnocultural connection to mother country, time,
economic ties, and transition to post-colonialism.
Country of origin
Although the ambition is to disaggregate the level of colonial heritage this exercise cannot
ignore the identity of the colonizing power. The number of countries that can be regarded as
former colonial powers varies according to the definition we apply. If we make use of a broad
definition of colonialism we find that at least the following existing countries have been in
possession of territories which have received their independence after 1920: Great Britain,
France, Serbia, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, USA, Belgium, Ethiopia, and Japan. The list
grows if we include also countries which have received their independence from a former
colony (as Namibia) or countries which have received their independence from political
entities which no longer exist (e.g. Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia).
Although the list of colonial powers is long it is also true that most of the existing countries
trace their origin to a few European colonizing powers, namely Britain, France, Portugal, and
Spain. However, within the framework of the present study all states which are currently
independent will be included, which means that all states which received their independence
after 1799 are regarded as former colonies. This, of course, means that a rather large number
of colonial powers will be identified.
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Political influence
This component of colonial heritage consists of variables which account for how the colonies
were ruled by the colonial powers. Here, at least the following features are relevant when
assessing the colonial legacy.
1) The formal status of the entity
There are various ways of categorizing colonies. On the one hand, it is possible to base the
classification on the purpose the colony served for the mother country. Accordingly,
Osterhammel (2005: 10-12) distinguishes between three types of colonies: maritime enclaves,
exploitation colonies, and settlement colonies. The deepest form of colonization was when
citizens of the mother countries moved to the colonies in large numbers and took over the
land from the native population. The settlers brought with them laws, customs and traditions
from the mother country and transferred them overseas (e.g. Robinson & Gallagher 1961;
Cain & Hopkins 1993). The most extreme variants of settlement colonies were found in North
America, Australia and New Zealand where European settlers arrived en masse, at the same
time as the native population was nearly extinguished.
Exploitation colonies were the most typical form of colonies. They were established in order
to increase the wealth of the mother country and existed in all parts of the world. This form of
colonialism began with the conquistadors in the Americas and the exploitation of natural
resources along the West African coast and continued in Asia and the African hinterland. The
third category consist of areas where the colonial power only occupied strategically important
areas along the coastline but otherwise largely refrained from interfering in the rule of the
areas.
We would assume that settler colonialism in particular would give rise to constitutional
resemblance and also pave the way for a democratic form of government as most settler
colonies were of British origin. Denoon (1983) has argued that values like freedom,
representative institutions and private ownership, were deeply rooted among the settlers. In
Pinkney’s words ’Transferring the letter and spirit of the ”Westminster model” to Australia,
where the level of economic development was relatively high, education was almost universal
and most people shared a common language and culture, was a very different matter from
transferring such a model to Nigeria, with its economic underdevelopment, mass illiteracy and
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cultural heterogeneity’ (Pinkney 2003:43). However, the positive relation between settler
colonialism and democracy does not stand completely unchallenged as Pinkney (2003: 49-50)
also opens up for the possibility that settler colonialism is bad for democracy since the
presence of a minority which is more educated, richer, and of European descent makes the
transition to majority rule difficult (e.g. South Africa).
In exploitation colonies the prospects for democracy were initially much worse. In order to
maximize their economic profits, the European colonial powers were eager to keep the
population of the colonies under strict control and consequently imposed authoritarian rule in
the colonies (Acemoglu et al.2001: 1375). Although we would expect that the prospects for
democracy in these colonies become brighter as we move along the time-axis, this is not
necessarily the case. As suggested by Young (1994: 283), many features of the authoritarian
systems of the colonial era were inherited by the newly formed state after the colonial period
ended and Acemoglu et al.(2001: 1376) note that slavery persisted or was reintroduced in
many former colonies, including Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala and Zaire. According to the same
authors, there are a number of economic incentives which explain why a newly independent
state would uphold an authoritarian system, namely the cost of introducing democratic
institutions, the size of the ruling elite, and the amount of investments made to the
authoritarian institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001: 1376-1377; 1383-1385).
Regarding maritime enclaves, finally, it is evident that a colony where foreign influence was
largely restricted to naval bases on the coastline has been quite immune to influences by the
colonizing power.
Since we operate with a wide definition of colonialism we should also add the category of
states which have been subjugated as a consequence of empire-building and received their
independence when the Empires weakened or fell apart. This is the case with countries that
had been under Ottomon rule or the former Soviet republics. In these countries, it is more
difficult to predict how their past should affect the choice and survival of political institutions.
Another possible way of classifying former colonies is based on their status in international
law. Here, a distinction is a distinction is made between colonies, protected areas, mandates
and trust territories.
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Indirect rule vs. direct rule
In the colonies which were ruled indirectly, indigenous laws as well as social and political
structures were preserved at the same time as local leaders were responsible to the
representatives of the colonial power. Local leaders also had to ensure that taxes were paid to
the colonial power.
In colonies where direct rule was applied, power was centralized to the administration of the
colonial power. Traditional social structures were torn down and indigenous political leaders
had to give up their powers. According to Fieldhouse (1982: 95-96), direct rule presupposed
that the colony was ‘sufficiently rich to support a large number of professional administrators;
sufficiently civilized to produce educated non-European subordinates; and sufficiently
individualized … for the people to accept government other than through traditional chiefs
and local customs’. Direct rule was the norm in the French colonies. After the French
revolution it was natural to consider it morally wrong to treat colonies as subordinate
possessions and colonies were accordingly considered to be integral parts of the French
republic and the indigenous population became French citizens. In practice, however, the
indigenous population did not possess equal rights with the population residing in the mother
country. In many ways, the inhabitants of the French colonies had less political freedoms than
the inhabitants of the British colonies and French colonial rule remained bureaucratic,
centralized and assimilationist (Fieldhouse 1983: 36-39).
It is important to emphasize that there is no unequivocal link between the identity of the
colonizing power and how the colony was ruled. Indirect rule was not practiced from the
beginning, and far from everywhere in the British Empire. Direct rule was also practiced in
many parts, notably in India but also in the plantation colonies in the Caribbean.
For the purpose of the present study it is reasonable to expect that direct rule is likely to
engender political institutions that resemble those of the mother country whereas indirect rule
makes it possible to preserve features of indigenous forms of rule. With regard to democracy,
the presumed relation is more problematic. One of the main arguments for the assumption that
a British colonial heritage is conducive for democracy is based on the fact that British
colonialism is associated with indirect rule whereas French colonialism in particular is
associated with direct rule. Indirect rule meant self-government in the sense that the local
population was involved in the decision making process (e.g. Bell 1967; Bollen & Jackman
1985: 445; Weiner 1987: 19-20). However, indirect rule could also hinder democratization
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since it spelled conservatism; a contract was set up between the colonial power and the local
elites, which hindered the development of democratic institutions and instead consolidated
power into the hands of local chiefs (Fieldhouse 1983: 31-35). Similarly, direct rule could be
conducive to democracy since nationalism counteracts internal cleavages and conflicts among
the native population and helps to bring about a feeling of consensus (Pinkney 2003: 50-51).
For what it is worth, the latest empirical evidence appears to contradict the assumption of a
positive link between indirect rule and democracy (Lange 2004; Hariri 2012: 475, 485-486).
Number/share of military personnel from mother country
There is a high degree of variation with regard to the military presence of the mother
countries in the colonies. It is reasonable to expect that the number of military personnel
constitutes an indicator of how firmly held the colony was by the colonial power. It goes
without saying that in areas which were of strategic importance the military presence of the
mother country was strong, whereas the opposite was the case in areas of no or little strategic
importance. However, the some extent the number of soldiers from the mother country is a
problematic measure of colonial penetration because the colonizing power often recruited
indigenous soldiers. Also, it can be assumed that the level of military presence is an indicator
of how high the resistance against the colonial power was. If this is the case, we would expect
that high levels of military personnel were found in areas which were least likely to be
receptive to influences from the colonial power.
Ethnocultural connection to the motherland
Another area of importance is concerned with the extent to which the population of the colony
was familiar with and felt closeness to the culture and traditions of the mother country. If
large segments of the populations of the former colony and its mother country look alike,
speak the same language and worship the same God, it is an indication that the colonial power
has left a deep, ineradicable impression on the former colony whereas the opposite is the case
if the populations differ in terms of race, language and religion.
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The share of the population which originates from the mother country
The first indicator concerns the ethnicity of the population of the colony. Some colonies
attracted high number of immigrants from the mother country whereas other colonies
remained populated by persons of aboriginal descent. The most extreme cases were no doubt
the settler colonies in North America and Australia, where Europeans arrived in large
numbers at the same time as the native populations were driven away. In other areas, such as
South Africa, large number of Europeans arrived and took over wide areas of land, but
remained a minority in the colony. Other colonies, again, were never populated by immigrants
from Europe to any considerable extent.
The share of the population which speaks the language of the mother country
Language is a very strong indicator of how closely the former colony was tied to its mother
country. If large parts of the population were given the opportunity to go to schools and the
language of education was the same as in the mother country, the language in question soon
became familiar to large segments of the population. Here, it is possible to make a distinction
between countries where the language of the colonizing power erased all local languages and
became the mother tongue of the majority of the population and countries in which local
languages prevailed alongside the European language, which, in turn, was the language of
education and/or at least one of the official languages of the country. Accordingly, it makes
sense to account for both the share of the population which speaks the language of the
colonizing power as its mother tongue and the share of the population which is able to speak
the language in question.
The share of the population which adheres to the religion of the mother country
It is important to also account for religious adherence rates and ask to what extent religious
beliefs coincide in the former colony and the mother country. Christianity is strongly
associated with the European continent and was the religion of all the European colonizing
powers. It has subsequently spread from its European base throughout the world through
missionary work (which was strongly related to colonialism). The share of Christians is
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therefore a good indicator of the extent to which the former European colonies where
influenced by their mother countries.
Time
The length of the colonial period
The time period during which countries have been ruled by foreign powers varies
considerably among the former colonies of the world. It goes without saying that countries
which have been under colonial rule for a long period of time are more likely to have been
influenced by their mother country than states that have been under colonial rule for a short
period only. It has been suggested that differences in the duration of the British rule might
explain why former British colonies in Africa have remained autocratic whereas the ones in
the Caribbean enjoy high levels of democracy (Huntington 1984: 206; Diamond 1988: 6;
Bernhard et al. 2004: 33). Axel Hadenius (1992: 131-3) on his part noted that the length of the
colonial period was critical for the success of democracy but it mattered little if the colonial
power was Britain or any other democratic country. His findings are supported by Hariri
(2012: 484-486) but contradicted by Bernhard et al. (2004: 243-245), who detected a positive
relation between the length of the colonial period and democratic survival but also noted that
this association was valid for former British colonies only. A somewhat similar conclusion
was reached by Olsson (2009: 545), who found a positive relation between length of colonial
rule and democracy but reached the conclusion that this relation was ‘mainly driven by British
former colonies and by countries colonized after 1850’.
Length of independence
It is reasonable to expect that the length of independence is related to regime choice and
stability. As time passes by, former colonies should gradually distance themselves from their
mother country. In other words, he longer the period that has elapsed since a country was
under colonial rule, the lower the likelihood that the political regime of the country in
question resembles that of the former mother country. Although colonies, as they embark on
their road to independence, are likely to copy many of the structures of the former colonial
power, they are all different from each other and from their European mother country. As they
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each confront specific circumstances and problems they are likely to gradually form their
constitutions and institutions in different ways.1
Point in time when colonial rule ended
Pinkney (2003: 45-48) has suggested that the prospects for democracy are better in entities
that were colonized and liberalized in the democratic era than in regions which were under
rule by a foreign power during the pre-democratic era. If an entity was a colony in a period
where democratic values were absent in the mother country, the prospects for democracy are
worse than if the entity was a colony after the enlightenment. In simple terms, if democracy
was absent in the mother country there were no incentives for building democratic political
institutions in the colonies.
The situation was different if the mother country was ruled democratically. In such cases,
there was an established democratic model of how a country should be run. It is, however,
important to point out that the political systems established in the colonies were by no means
democratic; in other words, the inhabitants of the colonies were not given the same rights as
the subjects residing in the mother country. In any case, the fact that the colonizing power was
ruled democratically meant that the indigenous elites were exposed to the democratic system
and had the possibility to compare it with the political system the colonizing power had
established in the colony (Pinkney 2003: 47).
As a rule, we can expect that countries that have received their independence late in history
are more likely to be stable democracies than countries which received their independence
earlier. If a country received its independence at a point in history when democracies were
rare or non-existent, the prospects for democracy were poor. In contrast, the likelihood that a
newly formed country adopts a democratic constitution increases as we move along the time
axis. Today, a new state faces strong external pressures for democracy and a democratic form
of government is often a prerequisite for the granting of independence. This trend has been
particularly manifest since the end of the Cold War, when democratic promotion was
introduced on a large scale.
1
Note however that Olsson (2009) detects a positive correlation between length of independence and
democracy.
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Pre-colonial experience of statehood
We should also pay regard to the conditions which prevailed in the colonies prior to
colonization. The areas that were confronted with the Europeans were quite different from
each other; in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa no political entities above the level of tribe
existed; in the Americas the Aztec and Inca Empires covered large areas but were weak and
internally fragmented. On the other hand, in the Middle East and North Africa developed state
structures were in place and this was even more true in China and Japan (Hariri 2012: 473).
Areas where developed state structures existed were difficult to conquer because they could
put up coordinated resistance against the Europeans. In these areas, the European strategy was
to use various forms of indirect rule and leave the existing authority structures intact (Gerring
et al. 2011; Hariri 2012: 473). It is therefore reasonable to expect that areas which had
developed state like formations were less likely to copy the political systems of the European
colonizing powers than colonies in which no state like institutions existed at the time of their
colonization. We can also expect that there is a negative link between pre-colonial statehood
and democracy. As shown by Hariri (2012) outside of Europe, autocracy is more likely to
occur in areas which had high levels of statehood at the time they were colonized than in areas
where no structures resembling a state existed at the time when the Europeans arrived.2
Economic ties
It is necessary also to pay regard to the extent to which the colony was economically tied to
the mother country. At this stage, at least the following measures are being considered:
Share of factories owned by citizens of the former mother country
Share of farms owned by citizens of the former mother country
Share of investments made by citizens of the former mother country
Share of trade with former mother country
2
According to Hariri, the association operates through an intervening variable, namely European colonization
(measured, primarily by the fraction of the population which speaks a Western European language as their
mother tongue and the extent to which the colonies were ruled indirectly or directly).
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The transition to post-colonialism
The process of decolonization is of importance when linking colonial heritage to regime
stability. Robert Dahl (1971: 40-47) has argued that the prospects for democratic stability are
affected by the process of independence, claiming that democracy faces an upward struggle
particularly in former colonies where the struggle of independence was violent and the
defeated part become citizens of the newly formed state. On the other hand, if democracy is
introduced by ‘evolutionary processes’, i.e. by mutual agreement between the previous regime
and the indigenous elite, the legitimacy of the new regime will be strong.
In essence, the arguments put forward here boil down to the question if the mother country
and the colony departed as friends or enemies. In the former case, we would expect the new
state to be more willing to adopt features of the political system of the mother country than in
the latter case. It is possible to split the process of decolonization into many subareas.
Pinkney (2003: 51-64), for instance, has put forward a number of hypotheses of how the
transfer of power affects the prospects for democracy in the newly established state. Here I
shall focus on the ones which connect to Dahl’s assumptions and explicitly concern the
relations between the colonial power and local leaders.
Preparation of independence
The first one is concerned with the question how well the mother country prepared the colony
for independence. Generally, Spain and Portugal made no preparations for independence; in
fact they tended to resist the independence of the colonies. Regarding France and Britain there
are no clear patterns and there are differing views especially about the extent to which the
British prepared their colonies for independence. In any case it is reasonable to expect that the
way a unit received its independence is likely to affect its willingness to adopt the political
system of the mother country. If the process of independence was well-prepared we would
expect that the new country was quite willing to adopt and retain features of the political
system of the colonial power. In contrast, if the European power was unwilling to secede the
territory and the new state emerged as a consequence of a civil war, the new country might
want to distance itself from its former mother country and therefore choose a political system
with few resemblances to that of the colonial power.
18
Relations between the colonial leaders and local leaders
The second assumption concerns how well local leaders were involved in the process of
independence. If the new state emerged as a result of a consensus between the colonizing
power and representatives of the majority of the local population we can expect higher levels
of regime stability than in cases where power was transferred to a minority in the newly
formed state (as in South Africa).
Relating the independent variable to the dependent
In the preceding part colonial heritage has been disaggregated into a number of components
and subcomponents. It is thus possible to conduct analyses where different aspects of
colonialism are related to the dependent variable. The ambition would then be to establish
which dimensions of colonialism that are of relevance for regime choice and stability and
which are not. Another strategy is also possible. For each of the subcomponents countries
receive scores and these scores can then, in principle, be aggregated to an index, which, in
turn, can be linked to the dependent variable. Before this can be done we should, however, be
aware of some problems. Our basic point of departure is that the closer the colony was tied to
its mother country the higher the likelihood that its political system resembles that of the
mother country. This is fine, but not all of the aspects of colonialism render themselves
quantifiable along a scale measuring the level of colonial penetration. Therefore, it is
necessary to aggregate the components of colonialism into two categories, one which is
explicitly concerned with the level of colonial penetration and one which is concerned with
other dimensions of colonialism which are likely to affect regime choice and regime stability.
In the first mentioned category we find all subcomponents listed under the headlines ‘political
influence’, ‘ethnocultural connection’, and ‘economic ties’ as well as the subcomponents
length of the colonial period and length of independence. The second category includes the
subcomponents listed under the heading ‘transition to postcolonialism’ as well as the
subcomponents point in time when colonial rule ended and pre-colonial experience of
statehood.
Recall that the first dimension of the dependent variable separated autocracies from
democracies. Here we would, much in line with Hariri (2012), expect that democracy is
enhanced by a strong level of colonial penetration combined with a late date of independence,
19
no pre-colonial experience of statehood and a well-prepared and smooth transition to
independence.3 However, it is important to emphasize that this expectation is only valid for
colonies under rule by a colonial power with a strong democratic legacy (which, according to
Hariri (2012) is the case with all the colonial powers in Western Europe). For countries that
have received their independence from states with an autocratic legacy the expected links
would be different. Autocracies would occur, most likely, in countries without a Western
European colonial heritage, which received their independence early and have a pre-colonial
experience of statehood.
In a like manner, we expect the constitutional design to be affected by the colonial
experiences. We already know that countries which received their independence from Britain
to a large extent are monarchies and have parliamentary systems but the question remains to
what extent the long-term success of this form of government can be attributed to the colonial
past. Correspondingly, we ask ourselves if certain forms of authoritarian systems emerge and
prevail in settings with a particular colonial past. Do, for instance, one-party regimes emerge
and prevail in former Western European colonies where the level of colonial penetration was
weak and absolute rule in systems with no experience of European rule? The ambition is to
discover such kinds of patterns with the help of an extensive data-set, which is currently under
construction.
3
Admittedly, this presupposes that we accept the controversial assumption that direct rule is more likely to
pave the ground for democracy than indirect rule.
20
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