RAILROAD ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
Report No. 4019
THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY
LEWISBURG, OHIO
JULY
13, 1964
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
• Washington
SUMMARY-
DATE:
J u l y 13, 1964
RAILROAD:
New York Central
LOCATION:
Lewisburg, Ohio
KIND OF
Head-end collision
TRAINS
TRAIN
ACCIDENT:
INVOLVED:
NUMBERS:
LOCOMOTIVE
NUMBERS:
Freight
Freight
Extra 5796 North
Extra 5798 South
Diesel-electric
Diesel-electric
units
5796, 5672
unit
5798
CONSISTS:
31 c a r s , caboose
16 c a r s , c a b o o s e
SPEEDS:
19 m. p. h .
16 m. p. h .
OPERATION:
Timetable, train orders
TRACK:
Single; 3°00' curve; level
WEATHER:
Clear
TIME:
3:50 p.m.
CASUALTIES:
10 i n j u r e d
CAUSE:
F a i l u r e of the c r e w of t h e s o u t h b o u n d t r a i n t o o b e y a m e e t o r d e r
V i e w northward.
T w o l o c o m o t i v e u n i t s of E x t r a 5 7 9 6 N o r t h s h o w n a t r i g h t j u s t b e y o n d m e n s t a n d i n g o n s i d i n g .
L o c o m o t i v e of E x t r a 5 7 9 8 S o u t h is p a r t i a l l y h i d d e n b e h i n d d e r a i l e d c a r a t l e f t .
1
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
SAFETY AND SERVICE BOARD NO. 1
RAILROAD
ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
REPORT NO. 4019
THE NEW YORK C E N T R A L RAILROAD COMPANY
JULY 13, 1964
SYNOPSIS
At 3:50
freight
trains
p.m.,
July
at Lewisburg,
The accident
was
13,
1964,
Ohio.
caused
a head^end
All crew
by failure
collision
members
of the crew
declined
of both
trains
between
were
of the southbound
two
New
York
Central
a meet
order.
injured.
train
to obey
LOCATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION
The a c c i d e n t occurred on that part of the Ohio Central Division
between Carlisle J e t .
and Van Wert Yard, 0 . , 101.7 miles, a single-track line over which trains operate by timetable and
train orders. No block-signal system is in u s e .
At Lewisburg, 24.1 miles north of Carlisle Jet., a siding 4,508 feet long parallels the main
track on the e a s t . The north siding-switch is 4,635 feet north of the station.
The collision occurred on the main track at Lewisburg 1,052 feet north of the station and
3,583 feet south of the north siding-switch.
Details of the track, trains involved, damages, operating rules, and other factors involved
in the accident are provided in the appendix.
DESCRIPTION AND DISCUSSION
under
Until approximately three weeks before the accident, trains operated in the territory involved
a manual block-signal system. On June 17th, the transportation superintendent of the Ohio
2
Central Division issued Bulletin Order No. 24, reading in part a s follows:
* * *
Effective
12:01 a.m., June 22, 1964
The use of Manual Block Signal System Rules * * *
is discontinued * * * between Carlisle Jet. and Jackson.
* * *
Jackson is 102.2 miles north of Van Wert Yard. All the crew members of the trains involved read
Bulletin Order No. 24 before the day of the accident. '
Extra 5796 North, a northbound freight train, consisting of 2 diesel-electric units, 31 c a r s
and a caboose, left Middletown Yard, Ohio, at 2:30 p.m. on the day of the accident and proceeded
5.5 miles to Carlisle Jet., where it entered the single-track line involved. Before leaving Middletown Yard, the crew received copies of train order No. 218, which read in part a s follows:
*
* *
EXTRA 5798 SOUTH MEET
5796 NORTH AT
EXTRA
LEWISBURG
All the crew members read- the train order and understood its requirements. This order e s t a b l i s h e d
Lewisburg a s the meeting point for Extra 5796 North and Extra 5798 South. Under its provisions,
Extra 5798 South, the train in the inferior direction, was required to enter the Lewisburg siding at
the north switch and clear the main track for Extra 5796 North. The order restricted Extra 5796 North
from proceeding beyond the clearance point of the main track and north siding-switch until Extra 5798
South entered the siding and cleared the main track.
Extra 5796 North p a s s e d Carlisle Jet. at 2:53 p.m. Approximately 56 minutes later, it a p proached Lewisburg at 30 miles per hour, a s indicated by the speed-recording tape. The engineer
sounded the whistle signal prescribed for a train approaching a meeting point and reduced the speed
to 27 miles per hour. The locomotive then passed the Lewisburg station and the south siding-switch.
At this time, the engineer's view of the track ahead was materially restricted because of the track
curvature to the left and the long hood in front of the locomotive control compartment. The fireman's
view ahead was restricted intermittently by structures, bushes, and trees on the west side of the
track structure. After the locomotive had moved about 300 feet north of the Lewisburg station, the
fireman saw the headlight of Extra 5798 South come into his view about 1,000 feet ahead, but could
not immediately determine whether the opposing train was on the main track or the siding. Soon
afterward, he noticed the opposing train was obstructing his view of^ a few cars stored on the siding
and realized it was moving on the main track. He immediately called a warning, and the engineer
applied the brakes in emergency. A few moments later, when its speed had been reduced to 19 miles
per hour by the emergency brake application, Extra 5796 North collided with the locomotive of Extra
5798 South 3,583 feet south of the north siding-switch.
3
As Extra 5796 North approached the accident point, the front brakeman was in the control
compartment of the second diesel-electric unit and the conductor and flagman were in the c a b o o s e .
These crew members were unaware of anything wrong before the train brakes were applied in emergency.
The engineer, fireman, front brakeman, conductor and flagman of each train were injured.
Extra 5798 South, a southbound local freight train, left Ansonia, 28.5 miles north of L e w i s burg, at 11:12 a.m., performed switching operations en route southward, and arrived at West Manchester, 5.9 miles north of Lewisburg, at 2:50 p.m. This train, consisting of a diesel-electric unit,
16 cars and a caboose, left West Manchester at 3:40 p.m., after the operator there provided the crew
with copies of train order No. 218. All the crew members read this order and understood it required
Extra 5798 South to enter the Lewisburg siding and clear the main track for Extra 5796 North. However, they did not realize the order a l s o required their train to pull into the Lewisburg siding at the
north switch or provide protection against opposing trains on the main track if it was n e c e s s a r y to
back into the siding at the south switch. According to their statements, it had been common practice
under the manual block-signal system discontinued June 22nd, for the southbound local freight train
to back into the Lewisburg siding at the south switch to clear the main track for northbound trains.
On these o c c a s i o n s , they stated, it was assumed the manual block operator would provide protection
for the southbound train by not permitting northbound trains to enter the block at Carlisle J e t . until
the southbound train backed into the siding and reported clear of the main track.
About 10 minutes after leaving West Manchester, Extra 5798 South approached Lewisburg
at 30 miles per hour, a s indicated by the speed-recording tape. The fireman, a qualified engineer,
was at the locomotive controls, and he and the other crew members were under the erroneous impression that Extra 5796 North would be restricted from passing Carlisle Jet. until their train entered the
Lewisburg siding and reported clear of the main track. The fireman sounded the whistle signal prescribed for a train approaching a meeting point and at this time, in accordance with the common
practice followed when the manual block-signal system was in effect, it was the intention of all the
crew members that their train would back into the Lewisburg siding at the south switch to clear the
main track for Extra 5796 North. About 3:50 p.m., Extra 5798 South passed the north siding-switch,
where it was required by train order No. 218 to enter the siding, and continued southward on the main
track without protection as prescribed by rule. Soon afterward, a s the train approached the curve
involved, the fireman saw the headlight of Extra 5796 North come within his range of vision at a
relatively short d i s t a n c e . He immediately called a warning and applied the brakes in emergency.
Both engine men then alighted from the locomotive and the collision occurred a few moments later,
when the speed of Extra 5798 South had been reduced to 16 miles per hour.
The front brakeman, conductor, and flagman of Extra 5798 South were in the caboose, and
were unaware of anything wrong before the fireman applied the brakes in emergency.
All the crew members of Extra 5796 North and Extra 5798 South attended Book of Rules
instruction c l a s s e s held by the carrier in 1963. According to the division rules examiner, Book of
Rules instruction c l a s s e s were also held in Middletown and Van Wert during February 1964 and the
timetable and train order method of operation was extensively d i s c u s s e d in these c l a s s e s before
use of the manual block-signal system was discontinued. However, the same requirements a s to the
inferior
train entering and pulling into the siding at the meeting point, which are applicable in the
instant c a s e , a l s o were applicable under similar circumstances before discontinuance of the manual
block-signal system.
FINDINGS
Under the provisions of train order No. 218, Extra 5798 South, the inferior train, was required
to enter the Lewisburg siding at the north switch and clear the main track for Extra 5796 North. The
investigation revealed all the crew members of Extra 5798 South were unfamiliar with the requirements
of train order No. 218, apparently because of the elimination of the manual block-signal system, and
mistakenly thought Extra 5796 North would be restricted from approaching the meeting point until
their train entered the Lewisburg siding and reported clear of the main track. Consequently, none
of the crew members of Extra 5798 South took any exception when their train p a s s e d the north sidingswitch at Lewisburg and continued southward on the main track without authority or protection a s
required. The collision occurred soon afterward, a s Extra 5796 North moved northward on the main
track as authorized by train order No. 218.
CAUSE
This accident was caused by failure of the crew of the southbound train to obey a meet order.
Dated at Washington, D. C , this fifteenth
day of March, 1965.
By the Commission, Safety and Service Board No. 1.
(SEAL)
BERTHA F . ARMES,
Acting Secretary.
5
APPENDIX
Track
From the south on the main track there are, in s u c c e s s i o n , a long tangent, and a 3°00' curve
to the left 1,250 feet to the accident point and 586 feet northward. From the north, there are, s u c c e s sively, a long tangent and the curve on which the accident occurred. In this vicinity, the grade is
practically level.
Trains
Involved
Extra 5796 North consisted of road-switcher type diesel-electric units 5796 and 5672, coupled
in multiple-unit control, 31 cars and a caboose. The control compartment where the enginemen were
stationed was at the south end of the first diesel-electric unit. The train brakes had been tested
before departure from Middletown Yard and had functioned properly when used en route to the accident
point.
Extra 5798 South consisted of road-switcher type diesel-electric unit 5798 with the control
compartment at the north end, 16 c a r s and a caboose. The train brakes had been tested before departure from Ansonia, a s well a s points where switching was performed, and had functioned properly.
Damages
Both diesel-electric units and the 1st and 18th cars of Extra 5796 North derailed. The first
diesel-electric unit stopped with the .front end 25 feet north of the accident point. It stopped upright
diagonally a c r o s s the main track. The second unit overturned onto its side and stopped a c r o s s the
main track structure immediately to the rear of the first unit. The first car stopped upright on the
west side of the main track structure, and the eighteenth car stopped on and in line with this structure
The 1st diesel-electric unit was destroyed and the 2nd unit was heavily damaged. The two derailed
cars were somewhat damaged.
Extra 5798 South stopped with the front end at the collision point. The locomotive stopped
on its right s i d e with the front end 25 feet west of the main track and the rear end on the main track
structure. The locomotive and the first 2 cars were derailed. The two derailed cars stopped upright
in leaning positions on the main track structure immediately to the rear of the locomotive. The derailed cars were destroyed and the locomotive was heavily damaged.
Operating
Rules
S-88.
*
*
*
At m e e t i n g p o i n t s b e t w e e n e x t r a t r a i n s , t h e t r a i n in t h e i n f e r i o r t i m e - t a b l e d i r e c t i o n m u s t t a k e t h e s i d i n g
unless otherwise provided.
T r a i n s m u s t p u l l i n t o t h e s i d i n g w h e n p r a c t i c a b l e ; if n e c e s s a r y t o b a c k in, t h e t r a i n m u s t f i r s t be p r o t e c t e d a s p r e s c r i b e d by R u l e 9 9 , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d .
6
9 9 . When a train s t o p s under c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h it may b e o v e r t a k e n by a n o t h e r train, t h e f l a g m a n
must g o b a c k i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h f l a g m a n ' s s i g n a l s a s u f f i c i e n t d i s t a n c e to i n s u r e full p r o t e c t i o n , p l a c i n g t w o
torpedoes,
and when n e c e s s a r y , in addition, displaying lighted f u s e e s .
*
* *
T h e front of t h e train m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d in the s a m e w a y w h e n n e c e s s a r y by the h e a d brakeman, * * *
or fireman.
FORMS
OF TRAIN
ORDERS.
S-A
(1)
*
*
*
* * * Extra 6 5 2 north m e e t E x t r a 2 3 1 s o u t h a t B .
T r a i n s r e c e i v i n g t h e s e o r d e r s w i l l run with r e s p e c t t o e a c h other t o the d e s i g n a t e d p o i n t s a n d t h e r e
m e e t in t h e manner p r e s c r i b e d by t h e r u l e s .
Other Factors
Timetable s p e c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s of the carrier read in part a s follows:
On single
of the same
track
class,
Northward
unless
trains
otherwise
are superior
to Southward
trains
specified.
The maximum a u t h o r i z e d s p e e d for freight t r a i n s in t h e territory involved i s 30 m i l e s per hour.
7
o Van Wert Yard, Ohio
49.1 mi.
Ansonia
22.6 mi.
West Manchester
5.7 mi.
Point of accident
0.2 mi.
Lewisburg
24.1 mi.
Carlisle Jet., Ohio
*,635 f t .
The New York Central Railroad
Lewisburg, Ohio
July 13, 1964