"Harry Bridges, Labor Radicalism, and the State"
Robert W. Chernv*
For two generationsof Americans, Harry Bridges was the leading voice of the left
within organizedlabor and an ilnportant voice of dissentwithin American society more
generally. His careerprovides many opportunities for studying "the Tradition of Dissent
Among Waterfront Workers," today'sconferencetopic. In my paper, I shall first explore
some of the meaningsBridges attachedto "left-wing unionism" and then look at some
aspectsof the responseof the stateto those views. Given time constraintsand the state of
my own research,I shall concentrateon the first dozen years of Bridges's career.
I.
What did it meanto Harry Bridgesto be leaderof a left- wing union? Testifying
committee,Bridgesonceofferedhis definitionof a "left-wing
beforea Congressional
union":
It's a union that's willing to arbitrate . . . [This provoked chuckles in the
hearing room.l lt's also a union that believes in a lot of rank and file
democracy and control . . . It's a union that believes that its officers should be
easy to remove and . . . lthat] their wages and expenses[should be] no more
than the . . . highest paid worker that's a member of the union. It's also a union
that recognizesthat, from time to time, it's got to stand up and fight for . . .
civil liberties,racial equality,and things like that. (1)
*Robert W. Cherny teacheshistory at San FranciscoStateUniversity, where he
specializesin U.S. history from the Civil War to World War II, especially politics and
labor. He is the author of several books and articles, including A Righteous Cause: The
Life of William JenningsBryan (1985; reprint, 1994)and, with William Issel,Sas
Francisco.1865-1032: Politics. Power.and Urban Development (1986). He is currently
at work on a biography of Harry Bridges. This paper was originally presentedat a
conferenceon "Harry Bridges and the Tradition of Dissent Among Waterfront Workers"
at the University of Washington,January28, L994.
In his def,rnition,Bridges emphasized"a lot of rank-and- file democracyand
control." As president,he claimed that all he ever did "was act as spokesman"(2) for the
rank and file. For Bridges, the rank and file also representedhis most important source of
strength. He once describedhis relationship to the rank and file as follows:
I had a bunch of guys down bslow that I represented,and if I made a
mistake--andI made plenty--and led with my chin--they'd throw me back in the
ring, and say: 'Get back in there,you stupid fool, and duck next time.' I had
somethinggoing for me that way . . . I knew I could always fall back into their
arms.(3)
Thus, Bridges not only drew his strengthfrom the rank and file, but he also gained
confidence from the knowledge that they supportedhim.
The membersof the ILWU did supportBridges. Nearly all unions practice a form
of plebiscitary democracy,in which officers repeatedlywin reelection againstlittle or no
opposition. That was, in fact, the casein the ILWU: Bridges was reelectedtime after
time, rarely againstopposition. As comparedwith most other unions at that time,
however, there was a major difference: Bridges was always re-electedby the full
membershipof the ILWU. He had advocatedsuch a policy for the ILA in 1935,before
ttre creation of the ILWU, and direct election was written into the ILWU constitution
from the beginning.(4) When he ran for district presidentin 1936,he won withT1%oof
the vote, his worst showing. In 1949,facing deportationand expulsion from the CIO,
Bridges madehis secondworst showing,when he won SIVoof the vote. (5)
Part of Bridges's definition of a left-wing union specified that "officers should be
easyto remove." In 1935,when still part of the ILA, he had unsuccessfullyproposedan
amendmentto permit recall of international officers by 20.percentof the membership.(6)
As president of the ILWU, he constantly reminded members--especiallyhis critics-that
the ILWU constitution specified that a petition by only 15 percentof the membership
could suspendan international officer and force a recall election. (7) This provision was
highly unusualif not unique amonginternationalunions.
Plebiscitary democracymay be typicat of most unions, but the ILWU developed
other, more unusual meansfor membersto participate in crucial decisions. The most
significant was and is the Longshore Caucus,a meeting of electeddelegatesfrom all
LWU waterfront locals who meet for severaldays to discussissuesfacing them,
especiallycontractissues. At the conclusionof the caucus,its recommendationsgo to
eachrelevantlocal for discussionand endorsement.At the conclusionof negotiations,
the contract is reviewed by the caucusbefore a vote by the full membership. Caucuses
serve as important channelsof communication over vital contract issues--inthe caucuses,
the officers and coast committee hear the concernsof the membership,and membersfrom
every local hear the committee explain contract decisions.(8)
Bridgesunderstood
the powerof symbolsfor minimizingthedistancebetween
leadersandmembers.Onesuchsymbolwashis salary. He arguedthat a unionpresident
shouldnot earnmorethanthehighestpaid working unionmember,andhe stuckto that
commitmentthroughouthis career.In fact,he acceptedno morethanthe bestpaid
clerksand
wofkin1memfurof his local-eventhoughmembersof somelocals--especially
walkingbosses--could
earnmorethanhe did. In 1964,for example,Bridgesreceivedjust
under$17,000--about
$14,000assalaryandunder$3,000for expenses.Thatsameyear,
JoeCurrantook in nearly$106,000from theNationalMaritimeUnion,Jimmy Hoffa got
morethan$91,000from theTeamsters,
GeorgeMeanyreceivedalmost$49,000from the
AFL-CIO, andMike Quill of the TransportWorkerspickedupjust over $29,000.Of 36
unionpresidentslistedin a newsmagazinesalarysuryey,nonereceivedlessthanBridges.
(e)
Bridges's lifestyle reflected the sameconcerns. When he and Nikki bought a
home, it was a modest row housein a middle class neighborhood. When he traveled, he
often stayedin cheaphotels. When other ILWU international officers were buying
Cadillacs through a specialprice arrangement,Harry kept driving a Ford--although he
apparently was sorely tempted--becausea Cadillac would deliver the wrong message
about being the presidentof the ILWU. (10) Nothing earnedHarry's contempt faster than
making a personalprofit from the trust of the union members,and he set a high personal
standard.
All of thesewere symbols of an underlying commitment on Harry's part, one that
he statedforcefully as early as 1935 when he told a local meeting in San Francisco that
"union officials who like their jobs becauseof the salary attachedto it [sic] are not worth
anything to the workers." (11)
Another criterion that Bridges specified in his definition of a left-wing union was
a willingness to fight for such issuesas civil liberties and racial equality. As a union
leader, Bridges led many such fights. In the time I have today, I can look briefly only at
someof his efforts regardingracial discrimination.(12) In October 1933,Bridges and his
group within the San Francisco local addressedracial issuesin an anicle in the
Waterfront Worker, their mimeographednewsletter;in that article, they arguedthat
building a strong, unified organization required not only recruiting black longshoremen
into the union but also integratinglongshorework gangs.(13) Pressedby Bridges and his
group, the local executive committee appointeda specialorganizer to work with black
longshoremen. According to Thomas Fleming, who was a studentand reporter for a
black newspaperin 1934,Bridges spent his Sundaysat black churchesthroughout the bay
area during the strike, "implored Blacks to join him on the picket line," and promised
that, "when the strike was settled,Blacks would work as union memberson every dock in
the Bay Area and the West Coast." Bridges'sown memory,recordedin 1942,is virtually
identical: "In 1934,I recall, I went directly to them. I said: 'Our union meansa new deal
for Negroes. Stick with us and we'll standfor your inclusionin [the] industry."' (14)
Soon after the strike, when the Bridges group won control in the San Franciscolocal, they
integratedblack membersinto white gangs,and barredthe old Jim Crow gangs.(15)
Soon affer. theLAalso broke throughlong-standingbarners agunst recruiting union
membersof Asian ancestry.
Throughout his careerin the ILWU, Bridges advocatedfull integration of the
workforce and the union, and the union repeatedlypronounceditself in favor of "equal
treatment for all regardlessof race, creed,color or sex." (16) The Dispatcher,the ILWU
newspaper,frequently carried articles advocatingequality for all workers, and regularly
featured stories,often with photographs,about the union activities and workplace
contributionsof African Americans,Latinos,Asian Americans,and women. (17) In
1945,the paper also presenteda long feature article exploring the nature of prejudice as a
"roadblockto progress."(18) The ILWU alsopointedwith pride to blacks and women on
its executiveboard and organizingstaff. (19) The DispatchercarriedBridges'scolumn,
"On the Beam," in nearly every issue for 35 years,and Bridges often used his column to
advocateracial equality; in 1942,for example, he characterizeddiscrimination against
blacks as "unconscionable,cruel and anti- American,"and as "anti-labor."(20)
During World War II, a large increasein the number of black longshoremenin
Pacific Coast ports producedracial problems in some locals, but Bridges and the other
International ofJicers spoke clearly and consistentlyin favor of full integration. However,
their commitment to local autonomy--andperhapstheir understandingof political
realities--meantthat they did not intervene in large and politically powerful locals where
there was clear evidence of racial discrimination, notably San Pedro and Portland. (21) In
March 1945, the Stockton warehouseunit precipitateda crisis when it refused to admit
JamesYamamoto, who had been recently releasedfrom a relocation camp. Union
officers tried to reasonwith the Stockton membersbut found them adamant. Committed
to racial equality and spurred as well by a political concern for the potential impact of
their actions on organizing underway in Hawaii, Bridges joined other officers in going to
Stockton, where he personally ripped their charter from the wall and suspendedthe unit
until each member signed a non- discrimination pledge; those who refused were expelled.
(22) The Portland longshore local, Local 8, resistedpressuresfor racial integration until
the early 1960s,when the International officers finally forced the local to acceptits first
black members.(23)
In 1935,Bridges presentedan importantelementfor his conceptof left-wing
unionism: "all unions should supportunionson strike." (24) He especiallyliked to quote
Marx's injunction, "Workers of the world, unite." (25) Throughout his years as leader of
the ILWU, he sought repeatedlyto develop a unified approachto collective bargaining for
all maritime unions--or even all transportationunions. In 1935,he helped to createthe
Maritime Federation of the Pacific, combining all the Pacific Coast maritime unions, (26)
only seeit founder on the shoalsof conflict betweenthe Sailors and the Longshoremen,
and between the AFL and CIO. Bridges took the lead in 1946in forging the Committee
4
for Maritime Unity, aimed at developing common bargaining among all six CIO maritime
unions. ln the late 1950s,when JamesHoffa called for a Conferenceon Transportation
unify. Bndgesresp0ndedfavorably:at the sanrctime,theILWU andtheTeamsters
workedtogetherto resolvejurisdictionaldisputesin warehousing
andin Hawaii, andthey
heghnSlme ilinthargaining. Bridges alsotried to bring a conimonexpirationdatefor
wasto
eastcoastandwestcoastlongshorecontracts.Oneof his lastpublic statements
endorseaffiliation with the AFL-CIO whenILWU membersvotedon that measurein
1988.(27)
In additionto Bridges'scommitmentto rank-and-filedemocracyandcontrol,to
racialequality,andto laborunity, a centrallyimportantelementin his identity asa labor
radicalcamefrom his outspokensupportfor anddefenseof the CommunistParty(CP)
andthe SovietUnion. Bridgeshimselfacknowledged
that "all the evidenceintroduced
againstme in thatfight with thegovernmentwas95Vo
true."(28)
A few exampleswill indicatethe natureof his supportfor the CP andSoviet
Union. In 1938,whenthe DiesCommitteechargedBridgeswith beinga party member,
he dismissedthe chargesas "lies,"but, at the sametime, addedfuel to Dies'sfire by
describingthe CommunistPartyas "friendsof the workingclassandthe smallbusiness
menandfarmers."(29) Whenaccusedof meetingwith knownCommunists,he always
freely acknowledged
that he discussed
issueswith a wide rangeof people,including
Communists.
In his columnin the Dispatcher,andin thepapermoregenerally,Bridgesmade
clearhis supportfor the SovietUnion. In May 1943,for example,he devotedhis column
to refutingchargesthat the Sovietshadmurdered10,000Polisharmyofficersnear
Smolensk.In February1944,whenthe Sovietconstitutionwaschangedto establish
sixteenseparaterepublics,Bridgesdefendedthechangeagainstcriticismfrom thosehe
phonypoliticiansandfifth columnists."And in AugustL945,the
described
as "chiselers,
Dispatchercarrieda full two-pagespreadon "How SovietTradeUnionsWork," by
Mikhail P. Tarasov,secretaryof the All Union CentralCouncilof TradeUnionsof the
ussR.(30)
For Bridges, the enemiesof the CP and the Soviet Union were his enemiestoo.
He attackedred-baitersas "agentsof the enemy" and suggestedthat "it is not the reds, but
the red- baiterswho ought to be kicked out of our unions."(31) During the World War
II, he condemned "Trotskyites" as "the undercovertools of fascism" (32) and lumped
them with "Axis Fifth Columnists,. . . anti-laboremployers,Norman Thomassocialists,
[and] the appeaserpress" as the greatestdangersto full mobilization and maximum
production.(33) This, in turn, clearly points up someof the limits on his commitmentto
the unity of labor.
a
Bridges'sviewson theCP andtheSovietUnionwerenot unusualamongILWU
internationalofficersandstaff. Indeed,thepro-Communistviewsof Bridgesandother
LWU officers attacted calable anddedicatedstaff memberswho were eithercP
membersor supportiveof it. (34) CP officialsseem,on occasion,
to havetriedto
intan,ano in ILWU office matters-One woman told me that, while she was a ?al.:ty
member and on the ILWU rEsearchstaff, a CP official directed her to end her relationship
with a man who the party thought was politically unreliable; shortly after she refused, her
immediate superior on the ILWU staff told her she could not longer work for the union if
she did not end the relationship. When Bridges heard about it, however, he immediately
made clear that her job was not dependentupon following CP orders about her personal
life. (35)
The public record makesclear that Bridges often followed the party's lead when
he commentedon foreign and domestic policy issues.(36) Both the government and the
CIO charged that Bridges acceptedorders from CP officials and that Bridges and the
ILWU had unfailingly followed the Communist Party line. (37) There is no reliable
evidence for such charges,however, and the evidencethat exists suggestsa much more
complicated relationship: CP officials had easyaccessto Bridges and they sought to
influence him and the ILWU, but Bridges made his own decisions.(38) He put it this
way in 1945: "our policies will be made to fit our union and determinedby it, and it only.
If . . . [our opponents]revive the old cry about us taking orders from Moscow, we have no
time for even contempt any more--only for a horselaugh." (39) The left perspectiveof
Bridges and other ILWU leaders,for example, led them to seekcontract provisions
specifying racial nondiscrimination, a position that coincided with the views of the CP.
Similarly, Bridges's support for the no-strike pledge and for increasedproductivity during
World War [I coincided with the views of the Communist Party. (a0) On the other hand,
for a contrary example, when the CIO was preparing to expel the ILWU for being
Communist dominated and the party sent Al Lannon to San Franciscoto urge Bridges not
to wait for expulsion but to walk out, Bridges flatly refused,arguing that the ILWU
belongedin the CIO and would not leaveof its own accord. Again, in 1954and 1955,the
Communist party took the position that the expelled unions should go back into the
mainstreamlabor movement on whatever terms they could gain, but Bridges and the
ILWU remainedindependent.(41)
A central thread that runs through theseelementsis Bridges'sMarxism. He felt
his class analysis always kept him groundedin negotiations;no matter how well he got
along personally with the men on the other side of the table, he knew that, in bargaining,
they representedwhat he called the "classenemy." He approachedrace relations from a
class analysis, arguing for racial integration of the workforce and the union, and he tried
to build class solidarity acrossthe lines of race, ethnicity, gender,and craft. Similarly, he
worked from his ideological perspectiveto define the role of union president and to foster
rank-and-file democracy. His ideological perspectiveled him beyond "pork chops" to
domesticpolicy issuesinvolving civil rights and civil liberties,and to foreign policy
issuesas well.
At the sametime, however, Bridges's ideological commitments drew such attacks
nn him and hic union ac to drain enoffnousamountsof time. energy,and resourcesjust
for defenoc. Further, Bridges's ideological commitments--andthose of many other ILWU
activists--ultimately led the CIO to expel them. The ILWU lost its easternlocals. They
tried to protect the Marine Cooks and StewardsUnion--also expelled from the CIO--by
taking it under their wing, but lost that jurisdiction too. They did incorporate into the
ILWU the West Coast locals of the Fishermen'sUnion, anotherexpelled union, and
added at least one local from the expelled Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. For 38
years--Z7of them under Bridges's leadership--theILWU stood outside the mainstreamof
organized labor, and for many years it spent an inordinate amount of its resourceson
defense.
tr.
At this point, I want to turn from considering Bridges's definition of labor
radicalism and to look insteadat the responsethose views elicited from the state. In a
recentessay,Ellen W. Schreckerconcludedthat:
The onslaughtagainstthe unions whose membersand leaderswere in
or close to the CP came from all sides. Corporations,other unions, even the
Catholic Church--all joined forces to drive Communists out of the labor
movement. But it was the federal governmentthat guaranteedthe successof
the endeavor. It legitimated the efforts of the other groups,bringing public
support and the blessingsof patriotism to hitherto private efforts. It also
brought the power of the modern stateto the task. (42)
The experienceof Harry Bridges in the 1930sprovides a rich and many-layeredcase
study in the developmentof efforts by the stateto eliminate Communists and Communist
sympathizersfrom unions. (43)
The Bridges casebegan six days after Pacific Coast longshoremenwent on strike
in 1934, when the San Franciscooffice of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(IIr{S)receiveda tip that Bridges "shouldbe investigated."A week later, the Washington
head of the INS directed the San FranciscoDistrict Director to report on Bridges. A
hastily preparedreport went to Washington the next day, and was delivered to the
President'soffice the day after. (44)
The investigationsthat beganin May l934lasted until 1955,eventuallyproducing
a mountain of documentarymaterial, including contributions from the INS, Department
of Labor, FBI, the White House,and Congress,as well as Bridges'sunion and his defense
attorneys.(45) The archival material on the Bridges casetells many stories--about
Bridge-c-his union. the CIO- the Left. and anti-cormmunistactivitieson the Pacific coast
in the 1930s. It also provides a window through which to view the functioning of the
otataia tha 1010o
Until 1940,the INS was under the Labor Departrnent,and it is that part of the
Bridges deportationcasethat I shall examine. Doing so will demonstratethat "the state"
during the New Deal containedofficials who differed significantly over policy, and
agenciesthat often acted at cross-purposes.Within the federal executive branch, officials
and agenciesinvolved in the Bridges casebefore 1940included the President,the
Cabinet, the Secretaryof Labor, the Solicitor of the Departmentof Labor, and much of
the INS, from Commissioner down to scoresof inspectorsand clerks, some of whom
acted with a high degreeof autonomy. Congressbecamedeeply involved in the Bridges
casethrough House and the Senatecommitteesthat challengedthe executive branch. The
Bridges casealso involved stateand local officials throughout the entire Pacific Coast. In
addition, various local, state,and federal governmentalagenciescooperatedwith, and
sometimesrelied upon, a network of non- governmentalorganizationsdedicatedto
fighting communism.
A good place to begin is with Secretaryof Labor FrancesPerkins. Upon taking
office, she was surprisedand distressedto learn that immigration and naturalization
matters took up more than two-thirds of the budget and staff of the Labor Department.
She was also well aware that, under her predecessors,"the Immigration Service had been
used improperly to get rid of certain militant and effective labor people." She resolved
that nothing like that would happenin her administration,and she choseDaniel
MacCormack to head the INS becauseof his competenceand honesty. Together they
worked to changefederal deportationpolicy. (46)
The initial treatmentof Harry Bridges by the INS reflected thesenew policy
priorities. Through 1934 and 1935,local INS officials dutifully followed up leadsthey
were given about Bridges, mounted limited investigationsof their own, approachedthe
San Franciscopolice for evidencethey might have--andthen, periodically, announced
that they had uncoveredno reliable evidence. None of them seemedeagerto deport
Bridges; none seemedparticularly interestedin protecting him. Bridges himself, in
August 1934,told the assistantdirector of the San FranciscoINS office that he had lied
on his 1928declarationof intent when he statedhe had beenmarried in 1923. This,
however, was not used againsthim. Instead,San FranciscoINS officials specified that
there was "only one issue"--"whetherBridges is a member of the Communist Party or
affiliated" with it. The WashingtonINS office reported,in August 1935,that, "an
exhaustiveinvestigation" had yielded "no evidence . . . to wzurantthe chargesof
communism."(47)
As Bridges gained prominence after the 1934strike, however, the clamor for his
deportation increased,including the governorsof California and Oregon. (48) Perkins's
nOWADP1\ACV
WaSnow challengedfrom two directions--from local INS offtcials, who
came under increasingpressurefrom anti-communistorganizations,and from membersof
Con0recc who were also being pre-csured
by anti-communistgroups.
As Perkins'sapproachto deportationbecameapparent,groups outside the Labor
Department began an aggressive,and sometimesunprincipled, searchfor evidence to
justify the deportation of Bridges. One key figure was Harper Knowles, head of antiradical activities for the California American Legion. Knowles claimed that his
organization held a central place among anti-Communist efforts within California, with
close working relations with Military and Naval Intelligence, the California Division of
Criminal Identification and Investigation, various Pacific Coast police departments,and
leadingemployers'associations.(a9)
In late 1935, Knowles beganpressuringthe INS to undertakelegal action against
radicals in general and Bridges in particular. When INS officials insisted that reliable
evidence was lacking, Knowles presentedan affidavit claiming that Bridges had made
statementsthat, Knowles argued, "in themselves. . . justify deportation proceedings."
When the Acting Solicitor of the Labor Departmentfound the affidavit inconclusive,
Knowles refusedto acceptthat analysis.(50)
Meanwhile, Stanley Doyle, an Oregon lawyer and prominent Lrgionnaire,
received a special agent'scommission from the governor of Oregon. Through
:urangementsmade by the governor'soffice, Doyle beganto work closely with Captain
John Keegan,chief of detectivesfor the Portland Police Department,and with the
department's"red squad."(51) In Spring 1936,while in SanFrancisco,Doyle recruited
the assistanceof Arthur Kent, a Communist party functionary who apparentlyprovided
Doyle with blank party membershipcards. Kent or Doyle, or perhapsa third party, seems
to have forged a party membershipcard in the name of Harry Dorgan, allegedly the party
name of Harry Bridges. In June 1937,when Bridges was in Portland for a meeting of
maritime unions, Doyle delivered the forged card to Portland police, claiming that Kent
had taken it from Bridges's hotel room. Doyle also worked with Portland police officials
in planting a recordingdevice in Bridges'shotel room during that convention.(52)
On June 14, a Portland police officer contactedRoy Norene, the Portland INS
director, displayed the forged membershipcard, and promised testimony againstBridges
by two witnesses. Norene later explained that he would have been "derelict in my duty if
I did not receivethis testimony."(53) By suchprotests,Norenemay have intendedto
demonstrateto his superiorsthat he was initially a reluctant participant, but his
subsequentbehaviorsuggestsotherwise. One witness,Kent, showedup as promisedand
testifiedon June l5; the other, Henry Schrimpf,was subpoenaed
but refusedto testify.
9
He denouncedthe INS to the maritime unions'meeting, which promptly demandedthat
Perkins investigate what it termed INS "collusion with forces hostile to labor." (54)
To investigate,Perkins dispatchedRaphaelP. Bonham, of the SeattleINS office,
who absolvedthePonlandINS of wrong-doing.and promptly joined in the efforts by
Doyle and the Portland police to securemore evidence.(55) Financial and other support
for the activities by Doyle and the Portland red squadcame from businessinterestsin San
Francisco and Oregon, the American Legion, and conservativeAFL unions in California
and the Northwest.(56)
On September23,1937, Bonhamrequesteda warrantfor the deportationof
Bridges, basedon five statementsby potential witnessesand the forged membership
book. At the sametime, Doyle threatenedto publish everything if immediate action were
not forthcoming from the INS. (57) Perkins sent Gerard Reilly, Solicitor for the Labor
Department, to Portland to evaluatethe evidence,because,as Reilly stated,"the
Department . . . suspectedthat someof the evidencewas manufactured."(58) Reilly
reported to Perkins that the witnesseswere of "dubious character,"that "their stories did
not corroborate," and that there was a "complete absenceof documentaryevidence." He
therefore advised her not to issue a wiurant without further investigation. (59)
Those who wanted chargesbrought againstBridges did not shareReilly's critical
assessmentof the evidence. The governor of Oregon, CharlesMartin, claimed that the
evidence showed Bridges was a communist and called upon Rooseveltto arrest and
deport him. (60) Spurredin part by Doyle's threatsto publish, and despiteReilly's
analysis of the evidence,the new head of INS, JamesHoughteling, began to preparea
deportation hearing. When news of theseplans reachedthe press,Bridges insisted to
Perkins that no hearing was necessary.(61) Perkins'sresponse,actually drafted by Reilly,
included a disclaimer that holding a hearing did not mean that the Department of Labor
consideredthat "the evidence. . . is necessarilytrustworthy." (62) At this juncture,
Perkins apparently saw a hearing only as a way to clear the air; later she recalled that she
"did not believe that Bridges was a Communist."(63)
Powerful membersof Congressnow joined the chorus urging that Bridges be
deported. On January 25, the SenateCommittee on Commerceand the Committee on
Education and Labor, in joint session,requestedthat Perkins provide them with the
completefile on Bridges. The requestcited a pendingbill, S. 3078,asjustification.
Perkins, in response,summarizedrecent developmentsin the caseand arguedthat the
likelihood of a formal hearing in the near future made it inappropriateto surrenderthe
file, given the need for confidentiality and protection of potential witnesses. The
committee chairman, Royal Copeland,promised Perkins confidentiality but insisted on
having the file. Copeland then announcedthat the file proved Bridges was a communist
and should be deported.(64) Soon after, Reilly appearedbefore the committee in closed
sessionand presentedhis critical analysisof the evidence,but Copelanddid not back
r0
down. (65) When Bridges demandedto appearbefore the committee to respond to the
charges,the Committeevoted unanimouslynot to hearhim. (66)
Copeland also introduced a resolution, soon passed,creating a Special Committee
to Invegtigate Condition.sin the Amencan Merchant Marine. He signaled the new
cornrnittee'sagendawhen he hired Margaret Kerr as clerk, for Kerr had previously
worked for the Better America Federationof Los Angeles, a leading West Coast antiCommunist organization that claimed to have evidencethat Bridges was a Communist.
Copeland continued to seekinformation regarding Bridges, but when Bridges asked to
testify before the committee, Copelandrefused.(67)
Repeatedlyrebuffed when he sought to respondto the chargesagainsthim,
Bridges now wired Perkins to requestan immediate INS hearing. (68) By then, INS
preparationswere well underway,but a decision in anothercasecausedthe Labor
Department to delay the Bridges hearing until an appealcould clarify appropriategrounds
for deportation. (69)
The delay in hearing the Bridges casebrought a storm of criticism upon Perkins,
the Labor Department,and the INS. (70) In August, the House Special Committee on
Un-American Activities--the Dies committee--heardtestimony from a prominent AFL
official, who claimed that Bridges was a Communist and presentedthe committee with a
photostatic copy of the forged membershipbook. (71) Soon after, a committee
investigator chargedthat Bridges was being advised,instructed,and protectedby "an
outstandingofficial" in the Labor Department.(72) From late August through early
December,Dies kept the pot boiling by producing additional witnesses,including
Keegan.(73)
Bridges denouncedthe Dies Comminee chargesas "lies" and as part of a
"conspiracy of reactionaryemployers and A. F. of L. leadersto smashthe new labor
movement and the New Deal on the Pacific Coast." He arguedthat the attack on him was
motivated by "my respectfor, and loyalty to, PresidentRooseveltand the principles of the
New Deal" and was part of efforts to defeat New Deal supportersin the 1938
congressionalelections. At the sametime, Bridges addedfuel to Dies's fire by refusing to
denouncethe Communist Party or to reject its support,describing party membersinstead
as "friends of the working class and the small businessmen and farmers." (74)
The Cabinetdiscussedthe Bridgescaseon January7, 1939. According to Harold
Ickes's diary, Perkins told them that the evidencewas unreliable, but JamesFarley argued
that "deportableor not, Bridges ought to be sent out of the country for the sakeof the
Democratic party." Rooseveltovemrled Farley, and "made it clear that Bridges ought not
to be deportedunlesstherewas legaljustification." (75)
l1
Soonafter,in the Houseof Representatives,
ParnellThomas,a conservative
Republicanfrom New Jersey,apparentlyactingon behalfof Dies,movedto impeach
PefkinS.ReillV. andHoughtelinefor holdins up action asainstBridges. Headlinesblared
the charges,andtheHouseJudiciaryCommitteeheldbrief hearings.The committee
q,tickly fo.tr"d insufficient evidenceto proceed,and the House tabled the Thomas
resolutionin March. (76)
At about this time, Bridges met privately with Perkins when she was in San
Francisco and told her not to hold back on his account and, instead,to saveherself
politically. He also told Ickes that "he was ready for the hearing and he welcomed it."
(77) Bridges'sconfidenceseemedwell placed. On March I0,1939, Reilly reviewedthe
situation for Perkins and noted that the only evidencethat Bridges had so much as
mentioned force and violence againstthe governmentcame from only one deposition,
which "even if believed (and it is sure to be contradicted)merely shows prophecy and not
advocacy."(78)
A hearing finally beganon July 10. By then, Bridges'sattorneysknew a good deal
about the efforts to secureevidenceagainsthim. Someonehad provided them with a
sunrmary of Reilly's memorandumof October 13, 1937,with its highly critical analysis of
the Portland evidence,and an anonymousinformant had pointed to some of the funding
sourcesfor Keegan'sactivities. In the hearing, Bridges'sattorneysraised serious
questionsabout the credibility of each witness and revealedmuch of the Doyle-Knowles
efforts. The hearing officer, JamesLandis, dean of the Harvard Law School, found for
Bridges. (79)
Bridges, Perkins, and Landis were all unpreparedfor the storm that the Landis
decision generated.(80) Events quickly dashedany hopesthat the hearing would end talk
of deporting Bridges. On June 13, 1940,the House of Representativesvoted 330-42 to
direct the Attoniey General to arrest and deport Bridges, "notwithstanding any other
provision of law." (81) Presidentialstaff membersfretted about the political damage
likely to occur from such a measurein an election year, regardlessof whether Roosevelt
signed or vetoed it. Attorney General Robert Jacksonintervenedin the Senateto kill the
measure.(82) Soon after, the INS was transferredfrom Labor to Justice,the grounds for
deportation were modified, Jacksonorderedthe FBI to investigatethe Bridges caseand
then ordered a new hearing. (83) This hearing found againstBridges and had to be
appealedto the SupremeCourt before Bridges could becomea citizen in 1945. His
citizenship was later challengedin two more court cases,requiring another appeal to the
SupremeCourt. The last Bridges casewas finally dismissedin 1955.(84)
This survey of the Bridges casefrom 1934to 1940,as a casestudy in the role of
the statein suppressinglabor radicalism, has establishedthat "the state" during the New
Deal contained officials who differed significantly over appropriatepolicy and agencies
that actedat cross-purposes.SecretaryofLabor Perkinssoughtto establisha different
t2
policy towarddeportingradicalsthanthatof herpredecessors,
andtheinitial stagesof the
Bridgescaseproceeded
underherguidelines.Suchefforts,however,wereundercutby
Amd}yef gl0ups, AFL unions,theAmericanLegion,localpolicered squads
, andlocal
INS officials. The evidencetheysecured,andcontinuingpolitical agitationby someof
the eameorgenizedgroups,alsogenerated
pressures
for actionin importantSenateand
Ilouse committees.Perkins'seffortsto implementherown policy priorities,andto
preventa deportationhearingbasedon taintedevidence,eventuallytailed in the faceof
thesepoliticalpressures.
ENDNOTES
My recearch on [Ianr7 Eridges. including that for parts of this paper, has benefited from a
f"lloln ship from the National Endowment for the Humanities in 1992-1993, a summer
stipendfrom NEH in 1990,a summerstipendfrom SanFranciscoStateUniversityin
1989,andresearchgrantsfrom theAmericanCouncilof LearnedSocieties,the American
PhilosophicalSociety,the AmericanHistoricalAssociation,the HenryJ. KaiserFamily
Foundation,andSanFranciscoStateUniversity.
The secondsectionof this paperwasgivenin a differentform at the 1994annualmeeting
of the AmericanHistoricalAssociation.
1. Transcribedfrom Bridgestestimonydescribedasbeforethe SenateLaborRelations
Committee[sic], no date,Harry Bridges:A Man andHis Union [videodocumentary,
s, 19921.
Minott WeihnachtProduction
June2, 1944,p. 3.
2. [SanFrancisco]Dispatcher,
transcriptof
3. "HarryBridges,"Bill MoyersJournal,January29,1974(mimeographed
program;New York: WNET, 1974).
News,July 1I,1935.
4. For 1935,seeSanFrancisco
July27, 1936,p.7 .
5. For 1936,see[Tacoma]PacificCoastLongshoreman,
News,July 11,1935.
6. SanFrancisco
7. For an exampleof his useof it againsthis critics,seehis responseto criticism over his
in 1940;SanFranciscoChronicle,Nov. 5, 1940.
oppositionto a third termfor Roosevelt
pridein thisprovision,e.9.,to Bill Moyersin 1974;Bill Moyers'Journal,
He expressed
op cit.
haveexistedfor otherdivisionsof the union,too, includingNorthern
8. Similarcaucuses
Californiawarehouseworkers,andHawaiiansugarandpineappleworkers. Such
alsoexistin a numberof otherunions.
caucuses
salariesarein U.S.NewsandWorld Report-May 17,
9. The otherunionpresidents'
May 14, L965,p. 5. Bridgesdid not maketheU.S.
1965,asreportedin the Dispatcher,
April
Newslist, andhis incomeis basedon his tax returnfor 1964.SeealsoDispatcher,
1 8 ,1 9 6 9p, . 3 .
I4
10. Interview with SidneyRoger,March 4,1986.
p.7.
11.WaterfrontWorker,
April15,1935,
12 Eeforc l0?2- only the Tacoma ILA local had admitted blacks as members;see Ron
Magd"n, Serving Tacoma's Waterfront: One Flundred Years (Tacoma?: Print Northwest
pp.3, 6, 35.
for ILWU Local23,1986),
13. WaterfrontWorker,October3,1933.
14. ThomasC. Fleming,"Harr5/Bridges: An HonestLaborLeader"(editorial),San
FranciscoSun-Reporter,
April 4,1990: interviewof ThomasC. Flemingby Terry
SandersandRobertCherny,May 25,1991;for Bridges'srecollection,seeDispats&eg
Dec.18,1942,p.7.
15. [Tacoma]PacificCoastLongshoreman,
Feb.3, 1936,p. 6.
16. Policy statementapprovedby theLongshoreCaucusin I9M, Dispatcher,April 7,
1944,p.9.
17. For examples,
seethecolumnsby J. R. Robertson,
Dispatcher,
Feb.26,1943,p. 12,
p.
Aug.
photo
and
27,1943, 8, andthe
featurerelatingto strikesupport,Nov. 15, 1946,p.
9; for a differentapproach,seethe storyentitled"He SavedLives," Dispatcher,March 26,
1943,p.8. The Dispatcher
beganpublicationin 1942;thesegeneralizations
arevalid for
theyears1942-46,the periodcoveredby this paper.
18. Dispatcher,
Sept.2I,1945, pp. 8-9;thesectionwasreprintedfrom the Army's
orientationcourseon prejudice,asreprintedby the InternationalLaborDefense.
19. Dispatcher,
Aug. 27, 1943,p. 8.
20. Dispatcher,
Dec.18,1942,p.7.
21. Seetherevealingaccountof theSanPedrolocalby NancyQuam-Wickam,
"Who
Controlsthe Hiring Hall? The Strugglefor JobControlin theILWU," andtheequally
interestingaccountof the ILWU's inability to makeorganizinghead-wayin the Gulf by
BruceNelson,"ClassandRacein the CrescentCity: The ILWU, from SanFranciscoto
New Orleans,"bothin SteveRosswurm,
ed.,TheCIO'sLeft-LedUnions(New
Brunswick:RutgersUniversityPress,1992),pp. 47-68and19-46respectively.
22. HarveySchwartz,"A Union CombatsRacism:The ILWU's Japanese-American
'StocktonIncident'of 1945,"SouthernCalifornia
Quarterly62 (Summer1980):16l-176.
15
23. William W. Pilcher, "The Portland Longshoremen: A DispersedUrban
Community," in Urban Anthropologyin the United States: Four CaseStudies,ed.
pp. 338Spindler(NewYotk: Holr,RinehartandWinston,1978),
GeOfgendLOUiSe
340.
24. SeattleSise!, April 15, 1935.
25. For examples,seeDispatcher,June 18, 1943,p. 3.
26. For an overview of the Maritime Federation,seeBruce Nelson, Workers on the
Waterfront: Seamen.Longshoremen.and Unionism in the 1o30s(Urbanaand Chicago:
University of Illinois Press,1988),chs. 7, 8.
27. Dispatcher,May 17, 1946,p. 1; CharlesP. Larrowe, Harry Bridges: The Rise and
Fall of Radical Labor in the United States(New York: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1972), p.
3 59, 361; Goldblatt,oral history, pp. 2:757-780, 2:893-9 | 4.
28. Mimeographedtranscript,"Harq/ Bridges,"Bill Moyers'Journal,op cit.
29. New York Times,Sept.l, 1938;SanFranciscoChronicle,Sept.1, 1938.
30. Dispatcher,May 7, 1943,p. 5; Feb. lI, 1944,p. 5; Aug. 10, 1945,p. 8-9.
April 7,1944,p.5.
31. Dispatcher,
Feb.8,1946, p. 2. Seealso,e.g.,Dispatcher,Aug. Il,1944, p. 2; Aug.
32. Dispatcheq,
2 5 , 1 9 4 4 ,p . 2 ; M a r c h9 , 1 9 4 5 , p . 5 .
33. Disnatcher.Feb. 12. 1943.o. 5.
34. Interviews with Martha Bielawsky, Berkeley, Jan. 28, 1993; and Lincoln Fairley,
San Francisco,Sept.8, 1986.
35. Bielawsky interview.
36. This includes a defenseeven of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact; for a later defenseof
this action, seeDispatcher,Sept.22,1944, p. 2, which notesthe chargebut respondsby
an analogy that largely fails to addressthe question.
37. This was, of course,the basic argument madeboth by the CIO in its hearing on the
expulsion of the ILWU for being "Communist-dominated"and by the government in the
various hearingsand trials aimed at deporting Bridges.
t6
38. cf. thefollowingevaluation
by oneof Bridges'smostdoggedopponents,
Paul
Jacobs:"TherelationshipbetweenHarry Bridgesandthe Communistpartywasnot one
in whjch the partygave oile$ andBridgesmecbanicallyobeyed. Rather,the party
generallyfoundit necessary
to'handle'Bridges,
sometimes
wheedling,sometimes
aaialing,elwayefeedinghieego- The anangement
betweenBridgesandthe partywas
sornethingundrearnedof in the government'sphilosophy, a qgid-ptg-Slggworking
alliance. Bridges had party membersto help him organize,build, and control the ILWU;
the party, with Bridges as CIO regional director, was in an excellent position to control
stateand local CIO councils. Bridges gave the front organizationsa kind of statusthey
would not otherwisehave had. It hasbeena handy setupon both sides." SeeJacobs,
"The Due Processingof Harry Bridges,"Reporter(March 8, 1956),p. 36, and a virtually
identicalpassagein his The Stateof the Unions (New York, 1963),p. 95. Jacobs'sviews
are echoedby Bert Cochran,Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped
American Unions (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,1977),p. 89n, and JosephR.
Starobin,American Communismin Crisis- lo43-1o57 (Berkeleyand Los Angeles:
Universityof CaliforniaPress,1972),p.258, n51.
39. Disoatcher.June29. 1945.o.2.
40. For race,see,e.g.,Louis Goldblatt,Working ClassLeaderin the ILWU. 1q35-1977,
an interview conductedby Estolv Ethan Ward in 1978-79(Berkeley: Regional Oral
History Office, Bancroft Library, Unversityof California, 1980),2 vols., pp. 1:384-85;
for wartime commitments, seeMichael Torigian, "National Unity on the Waterfront:
Communist Politics and the ILWU During the SecondWorld War," Labor History 30
(1989):4O9-432.
41. Interview with David Jenkins,May 8, 1987. For anotherexampleof Bridges taking a
position contrary to the CP's views, seeMaurice Isserman,Which Side Were You On?
The American Communist Party During the SecondWorld War (Middletown, CT:
WesleyanUniversity Press,1982),p. 113,regardingBridges'srefusalto advocate
commitment of American troops to the war in Europe when Germany invaded the Soviet
Union. On the samesubject,seePaul Crouch, "UnbrokenChains" (unpublished
memoir), Paul Crouch Collection,Hoover Institution,StanfordUniversity, box 17, pp.
XXVII-9. For 1954-55,seeHarvey Klehr and JohnEarl Haynes,The American
CommunistMovement: StormingHeavenItself (New York: Twayne Publishers,1992),
p.l4L For other examples,seemy interviewswith David Jenkins,May 8, 1987,June
16, 1987,and December3, 1992,regardingBridges'sreactionto the Duclos letter and the
"white chauvinism"campaign.
42. Schrecker, "McCarthyism and the Labor Movement: The Role of the State," Thg
CIO's Left-Led Unions, pp. 139-158,esp. 139. Schrecker'scommentsrefer especiallyto
the 1940sand 1950s.
L7
43. Publishedaccountsof theseeventsinclude Estolv E. Ward, Harry Bridges on Trial
(New York: Modern Age Books, 1940):CharlesLarrowe, Harry Bridges: The Rise and
Fnll nf PndinnlI ahnr in the Ilnited States(New York: LawrenceHill and Co., 19721;
Martin, Madam Secretary,especiallychapter31; Lillian Holman Mohr, FrancesPerkins:
"That \Vornan in HDR'o Cabinetl" (n.p.: North River Press,1979); Donald Ritchie, James
M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators(Cambndge: HarvardUniversity Press,1980),pp.
95-99:Thomas K. McCraw, Prophetsof Regulation: CharlesFrancisAdams. Louis D.
Brandeis.JamesM. Landis. Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge: Belknap Pressof Harvard
University Press,1984),p.2M: and, the besttreatmentto date,StanleyI. Kutler, The
AmericanInquisition: Justiceand Tnjusticein the Cold War (New York: Hill and W*9,
1982), chapter 5.
44. Telegram, MacCormack to District Director,Immigration and Naturalization Service,
May 22,1934;fileNo.12020125037, Bridges,Harry Renton,City Office file [2], Bridges
INS files; W.E. Walsh for Edwin L. Haff to INS Washington,May 23,1934, file No.
12020125037,Bridges, Harry Renton, City Office File 12/21,box 14, Bridges INS files; a
copy is in General Recordsof the Departmentof Labor, Office of the Secretary,RG 174,
SecretaryFrancesPerkins,GeneralFiles 1933-41,box 42,folder Conciliation--StrikesLongshoremen,National Archives (hereinafterPerkins Papers,National Archives);
confidentialletter,Turner W. Battle to Marvin H. Mclntyre, May 24,1934, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Papers,Official File 407b, box 11, folder 1934: Pacific Coast Longshoremen's
Strike, Franklin D. RooseveltLibrary (hereinafterFDR Papers).Battle's letter derived
directly from Haffs report.
45. Since the appearanceof the last major scholarly treatmentof this case,by Stanley
Kutler, in 1982, severalimportant collections of papershave become available to
researchers,especially the papersof Richard Gladstein and Norman Leonard, members of
the law firm that defendedBridge; the Gladstein papersare at the SouthernCalifornia
Library for Social Studiesand Research,Los Angeles, and the Leonard papersare at the
Labor Archives and ResearchCenter, San FranciscoStateUniversity. Important
materials from the files of anti- communist groups are in the Surveillance Papers,
Meiklejohn Institute for Civil Liberties, Berkeley, which apparentlycame from the files
of Harper Knowles, head of the California American Legion's Radical Research
Committee. Other important sourcesnot cited by previous researchersare in the Frances
Perkins Papersat Columbia University and the files of severalSenateand House
committees in the National Archives.
46. Martin, Madam Secretary,p.25; PerkinsOral History, op cit., book 6, p. 449;
Martin, Madam Secretary,p. 247,294.
47. See,e.g., memorandumto the Secretaryof Labor from CharlesWyzanski,July 17,
1934,PerkinsPapers,Columbia University, box 41, folder: Wyzanski, Charles,June 15July 26,1934; ThomasV. Donoghueto District Director,February2,1935, and telegram
t8
from "Brown,"February2,1935,andletter,ThomasV. Donoghueto DistrictDirector,
samedate,all in BridgesINS files,b. 18,f. 19030/1-1,
Bridges,Harry--S.F.Arrival file
Paul
Armstrong,AssistantDistrict
1eI14:memorlndumfor theFileof HarryBndges.by
Director,INS, 8/20134and 8122134,
BridgesINS files,b. 17,f. Bridges,Harry Renton,
f,fot-.^l,lo^{,1^-fll-- trlla tal2L U/71,,In re: FlarnTRenton Bridges, File No- 558741896,
Documents."
PerkinsPapers,Columbia,box 79, folder "BridgesCase/lvlisc.
48. FrankE. Merriam,Governorof California,to FrancesPerkins,July 18, 1934,Frances
PerkinsCollection,Microfilm PS0472,reel 10,ColumbiaUniversity(hereinafterPerkins
July 18, 1934,FDR Papers,OF 407b,
Collection,Columbia);Merriamto thePresident,
box 11,folder 1934-PacificCoastLongshoremen's
Strike;SanFranciscoChronicle,
October
9,1937.
49. SeeKnowlesto Thurston,May 12,I936,Doc.454,LeonardPapers.Seealso
April5, 1938,Document208;William Hynesto Frank
Knowlesto CecileS. Hambleton,
G. Martin,May 1, 1936,Document2031;Knowlesto C. S. Morrill, Augustl,1936,
Document18;Monill to Knowles,August6,1936,Documentl8a; H. M. Nilesto
Knowles,July 15, 1937,Document38a;William D. Browneto Knowles,July 25,1938,
Document58; Statement
of IvanFrancisCox,August31, 1938,Document2023;allin
Harry BridgesCaseFiles,NormanLeonardPapers,LaborArchivesandResearchCenter,
SanFranciscoStateUniversity,hereinafterLeonardPapers.SeealsoKnowles's
Beforethe ImmigrationandNaturalization
testimonyin Official Reportof Proceedings
of Labor,DocketNo. 55973/217,lntheMatterof Harry
Serviceof the Department
Hearing,vol. 19,pp.3133-3311,
esp.3138,3159-3165,
and3168Bridges--Deportation
3173. SeealsoH. L. Chaillauxto Knowles,April 20, 1936,Document11,Leonard
Papers.
50. Telegramto SanFranciscoINS District Directorfrom WashingtonINS office,
1 Bridges,Harry
January7, 1936,in BridgesINS files, b. 14,f. No. 12020/25037,
Renton,City Officefile [1/2]; Knowlesto Armstrong,May 4,1936,BridgesINS files,b.
Div. File 1al3I [Il2]; Knowlesto
17,f. Bridges,HarryRenton--Naturalization
June20,1936,ibid.;memorandum
for theCommission
of Immigration
MacCormack,
W.W.
Brown,
Thomas
Finucane,
and
Joseph
by
S.
Savoretti,
andNaturalization
SurveillancePapers,MeiklejohnLibrary, series1,box 3, folder 6. Copiescanalsobe
foundin a numberof othercollections,includingthe PerkinsPapersandtheBridgesINS
files.
51. For Doyle, seeSurveillancePapers,MeiklejohnInstitutefor Civil Liberties,
Berkeley,series1, box 3; for indicationthatDoyle workedwithoutpay, seeDoyle to
WallaceWharton,executivesecretary
to thegovernor,January24,1938,in ibid.,folder
5; seealsoDoyle to WallaceWharton,executivesecretaryto thegovernorof Oregon,
OctoberL, 1937,Surveillance
Papers,
s.1,b. 3, f. 5. For thePortlandpolice,seeNational
l9
LawyersGuild, OregonChapter,Reportof theCivil LibertiesCommittee(May 24,
1938),esp.pp. 6-7.
52. This brief summaryof the origin of the "Harr5/Dorgan"cardis constructedfrom the
f-[lo*l^g
c6urdae., trEl.ief Histor5l of Arthur James Kent," Doc- 2L23; rePorts of meetingS,
and
E e l l e v uE H o te1l1, :0 0 -1 1 :5 0 a .m .,Apr
13,il1936,and3:15- 4:30p.m .,Doc.2237
Doc.2239;stenographic
reportof meeting,New Dalt Hotel,5:33-5:48April 1l, 1936,
Doc.7319;Harry BridgesCaseFiles,NormanLeonardPapers,LaborArchivesand
Reportof Meeting,New
ResearchCenter,SanFranciscoStateUniversity;Stenographic
Dalt Hotel,5:33-5:48April 11,1936;affidavitof ArthurKent,Los Angeles,December
28,1937:Reportof Conversation
betweenArthurMargolisandS. M. Doyle, 12:50p.m.
to l:40 p.m.,April 20,1936;REPORTOF: [unidentified
contact,]May 8th, 1936;
REPORTOF: [unidentified
contact,]May 15, 1936,ibid.;Affidavit of Anhur Kent,Los
Angeles,December28,1937;all seriesI, box 3, folder2; andLarry lDoyle]to Moke
Papers,
Micklejohn
[Knowles],MondayMidnite,series1,box 3, folder5; Surveillance
Library; EstolvE. Ward,The GentleDynamiter:A Biographyof Tom Mooney(Palo
Alto: RampartsPress,1983),pp.235-237;GerardReilly to Perkins,October13, 1937,
FrancesPerkinsPapers,ColumbiaUniversity,box 38, folder "Reilly, GerardD., Oct. 1Oct. 13, 1937";StanleyM. Doyleto JohnP. Boyd,October2I,1949, attached
to Stanley
M. Doyleto WestbrookPegler,October2I,1949, WestbrookPeglerPapers,Herbert
HooverPresidentialLibrary, box 91, folderUnions,Longshoremen;
CharlesP. Pray,
Chiefof Police,Portland,to JohnP. Boyd,October23, 1949,BridgesINS file, b. 9, f.
to -- [4/51.
1200-25566[Portland]9120149
53. R.J.Noreneto I.F.Wixon,July7, 1937,BridgesINS file,b. 9.f.505-327.
of
Harry R. Bridges--Transcripts
54. Bridges'sINS files, b. 17,f. 12020/25037,
takenin SeattleDistrict; subpoena,
June15, 1937,BridgesINS files,b. 9, f.
Statements
PortlandOregonian,
June17,1937,p. l; SanFranciscoChronicle,June17,
5051-327:
1937.
55. Bonhamto ActingCommissioner
June25, 1937,Bridges'sINS file,
[Houghteling],
PortlandOregonian,
June24 and25,1937;PerkinsOral History,book
b. 9, f. 5051-327;
6, pp. 387-88;Bonhamto WalterE. Carr,July 17,1937,Bridges
INS file, b. 9, f. 160049908,PartI [Los Angelesoffice, 1937-1939).
December20,1938,PerkinsPapers,
56. Reilly to The Secretary,
Columbia,box 38,
folder"Reilly,GerardD., Dec.6-20,1938."Doylewasrumoredto haveworkedfor an
seeReilly to Houghteling,
October6, 1937,PerkinsPapers,
employers'association;
Columbia,box 38,folder"Reilly,GerardD., Oct. l-Oct. 13,1937."SeealsoReilly to the
Secretary,
October13,1937,PerkinsPapers,
Columbia,box 38, folder"Reilly,GerardD.,
wasremovedfrom the
Oct. l-Oct. 13,1937."The file regardingDoyle'sappointment
(file D-G, SpecialAgents'Commissions,
carton39,
files of SpecialAgents'Commissions
20
GovernorRecordGroup, RGG4, Accession57-98/I, OregonStateArchives), to be sent
to Henry Fowler, of the La Follette Committee, and was apparentlynever returned.
UnfoftunetelV- the National Archives files on the LaFollette Committee'sCalifornia
investigationsconsistonly of scrapbooksof newspaperclippings.
Regardingfunding, seeDoyle'sreportsof September26, 1937,October 1, 1937,
October 17, 1937,November24, 1937,February20, 1938,and February28, 1938,
SurveillancePapers,series1, box 3, folder 5; JamesStewart,affidavit, June6, 1950,
Bancroft Library; Statementof Ivan Francis Cox, op cit.; Reilly to The Secretary,October
1.3,1937,PerkinsPapers,Columbia,box 38, folder "Reilly, GerardD., Oct. I-I3, 1937."
57. GerardReilly to Houghteling,October6,1937, PerkinsPapers,Columbia University,
b. 38, f. Reilly, GerardD., Oct. 1- Oct. 13, 1937. Doyle to Bonham,September2O, 1937,
SurveillancePapers,s. 1, b. 3, f. 5; Doyle's threatwas taken seriously;seeReilly to
Houghteling,October6,1937, PerkinsPapers,Columbia University, b. 38, f. Reilly,
GerardD., Oct. l-Oct. 13, 1937.
58. Reilly to The Secretary,October4,1937, PerkinsPapers,Columbia,box 38, folder
"Reilly, GerardD., Oct. I-I3,1937."
59. Reilly to The Secretary,October 13, 1937,Perkinq Papers,Columbia, box 38, folder
"Reilly, GerardD., Oct. l-I3, 1937." Seealso "History of BridgesCase- January4,
1939," Perkins Papers,Columbia, box 79, folder "Bridges Case/lVlisc.Documents."
60. Clipping attachedto Reilly to Houghteling,October6,1937, op cit.; seealso
"Governorof OregonAsks," San FranciscoChronicle,Oct. 9, 1937, and,"Bridges Defies
Martin on CommunistCharge,"San FranciscoChronicle,Oct. 10, 1937.
61. Houghtelingto The Secretary,January11, 1938,PerkinsPapers,b. 34, f .
Houghteling,JamesL.; Bridges to Perkins,Feb. 3, 1938,PerkinsPapers,Columbia, reel
l.
62. Quotedin 75th Cong., 2d Sess.,Houseof Representatives,
Subcommitteeof the
SpecialCommitteeto InvestigateUn-AmericanActivities, Nov. 4, 1938,p. 2082. A copy
of it, indicating that it was dictated by "GDR"--Gerard D. Reilly--is in the Dies
Committee files, box 626-70. Neither the Perkins Papers,Columbia, nor the Perkins
Papers,National Archives, nor the Bridges correspondencefiles in the ILWU Library,
San Francisco, include a copy of this letter.
63. Perkinsoral history, book 6, p.M5.
64. Roger Williamson to Perkins,January25,1938, PerkinsPapers,Columbia
University, microfilm reel#14; copy in CopelandCommittee files, b. 1, f. Harry Bridges
21
(confidential);Perkinsto vandenberg,January22, rg3l,Perkins Papers,columbia
university,microfilmreel#13;Copelandto Perkins,February2, rg38,copeland
SecreraryPerkins,
Committeefiles.
b. l,f.Bnd,ees.Harry(Confidential):statementof
February3, 1938,CopelandCommitteefiles,b. 2, f. Bridges,Harry--correspondence
with
LaLar Dapartmaat by Comrnittee; New York Times, Feb. 8, 1938, p. 13.
65. For Reilly'saccountof his testimony,seeReilly to MissJay,Feb.10, 1938,Perkins
Papers,Columbia,box 38,folderReilly,GerardD., Feb.l0-July 29,1938;for the
newspaperversions,see"SenatorsReceiveReporton Bridges,"New York Times,Feb.9,
1938,or "Deportingof BridgesForecastby Copeland,"SanFranciscoehlenielg, Feb.8,
1938.
66. "BridgesDemandsa Hearing,"New York Times,Feb.10, 1938.
67. History of the SpecialSenateCommitteeto InvestigateLaborConditionsin the
AmericanMerchantMarine,CopelandCommitteefiles,b. 2, f. Committee(Special),
Historyof.
68. Telegramto Lee Pressman,
Feb.11, 1938,GladsteinPapers,
box 19,folder 1.
69. SanFrancisco
ehfggiglg,April 20, 1938,p. 1; Kutler,AmericanInquisition
,p. 12627.
70. See,e.g.,JosephK. Carson,Jr.,to Secretary
of Labor,April25, 1938,Perkins
Papers,Columbia,reel 1; SanFrancisco
Chronicle,May 7,1938;New York Times,May
23, 1938.
71. 75thCong.,2dSess.,Houseof Representatives,
SpecialCommitteeon Un-American
Activities,PublicHearings,August13, 1938,pp. 104,106,107;"Communists
Rulethe
C.I.O.,Freyof A.F.L.Testifies,"New York Times,August14, 1938.
72. "FederalOfficial ProtectsBridges,DiesAide Charges,"New York Times,August
15,1938;seealso"DiesGroupSeeksBridges'Adviser',"New York Times,August17,
1938.
73. SanFrancisco
Perkinsof
Chr@iclg,Aug. 31, 1938.In November,Diesaccused
misrepresenting
bothfactsandlaw; see75thCong.,2d Sess.,Houseof Representatives,
SpecialCommitteeon Un-AmericanActivities,PublicHearings,Nov. 4, 1938,pp.20752083,esp.2081. Dieskeptup thepressure
by callingKeeganasa witnessin early
presented
December,andKeegan
someof the affidavitsaswell asoneof the witnesses,
JamesFerguson,
in person;ibid.,Dec.7, 1938,pp.29O9-2919.
74. New York Times,Sept.1, 1938;SanFrancisco
Chronicle,
Sept.1, 1938.
22
75. IckesDiaries,Libraryof congress,microfilmreel3, page3149-3150.
" by Drew
75. Mnfin- Mad ameSecretary.D.4 11.4 15: "Washington Merry-Go-Round,
Pearson
andRobertS. Allen,Washington
Post,January31,lg3g, andNew York Times,
f,;fnrah75, tOlo,olippingein PerkinsPapers,Columbia,box 94, folder "Impeachment
Proceedings";
76thCong.,lst Sess.,Houseof Representatives,
ReportNo. 3 1I , Gladstein
Papers,box l, folder 5. SeealsoImpeachment
Hearings,Committeeon theJudiciary,re
FrancesPerkins,JamesL. Houghteling,andGerardD. Reilly, RG 233,NationalArchives
# 15309and15310].
[2 trays,unprocessed,
77. lntewiewwith HarryBridges,January20, 1988;IckesDiaries,reel3, p. 3444.
78. Reilly to The Secretary,
March 10, 1939,PerkinsPapers,
Columbia,box 38, folder
"Reilly,GerardD., Feb.-Apr.1939."
79. Ward,Bridgeson Trial, providesthe mostdramaticaccountof the proceedings.San
Francisconewspapers
carrieddaily coverage.Larrowe,Ihidg€s,summarizes
the hearing
on pp. L5l-216.
80. Landis,especially,wasdelugedby hatemail; seeJamesM. LandisPapers,Harvard
Law Library,box 5, folders2-6.
81. H.R. 9766(Allen,Louisiana),77th
Cong.,lst Sess.;for thefloor debateandvote,see
Congressional
Record--House,
June13, 1940,pp. 12380-12407.
82. Memorandum
for thePresident
from JamesH. Rowe,Jr.,August13, 1940,with
notationby Roosevelt
dated8/1511940,
FDR Papers,
OF1750.
83. Kutler,AmericanInquisition,p. 135.
84. Kutler,AmericanInquisition,pp.135-149.
23